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Tanmay K ji,Tanmay K wrote:Rajesh ji,
Both of us have different assumptions w.r.t US power and its endurance.I think that India's rise will be slow as compared to the decline in American power and influence.I fear that India is still susceptible to plots by foreign powers that support balkanisation.One may call it paranoia or irrational fear.
Shillong, Nov 19 (PTI) As Bangladesh continues to deny India access to landlocked Northeast through Chittagong port, a little-known Burmese port on the Bay of Bengal has promised to solve the long-standing problem.
Sittwe port on the Myanmar coast was not long ago a small village of fishing communities and farmers. Now, it could serve as a commercial sea route to the north-eastern states through Burmese territory.
A Union Commerce Ministry team, which recently came here in connection with a seminar, said that the port has attained immense strategic importance with India developing the port, expanding facilities to accommodate goods traffic under an agreement signed by the two governments in April, this year.
From Sittwe the Kaladan River will be made navigable for 225 km, up to Kaletwa (Myanmar). From there, a 62-km highway will take the traffic to the India-Myanmar border in the Indian state of Mizoram.
A road from the border will link the project to India's National Highway 54. The sea distance between Kolkata and Sittwe is about 540 km. India is financing the entire $ 103 million project.
DONER minister Mani Shankar Aiyar recently said, "The Union cabinet would soon sanction a project of the Union Ministry of Shipping, Road Transport and Highways for developing highway connectivity in Mizoram and along the 250 km route to the port."
To improve road connectivity within Mizoram, one of the remotest states of the country, the Union ministry for shipping, road transport and highways has sanctioned Rs. 120 crore to state for development of national highways during 2008-09 as part of steps to develop the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transport project to link Sittwe Port with India.
The Multi-Modal project, which is to make the river Kaladan navigable up to Sittwe Port, would be connected to national highway 54 at Nalkawn in Mizoram.
New Delhi's move to develop the Sittwe port in western Myanmar assumes significance in view of Bangladesh's reported reluctance to give India access to Chittagong, Ashuganj and other ports for transportation of goods to the Northeast region and the rest of India.
"Myanmar had become a country of critical importance to India in terms of trade and commerce as Dhaka has denied transit to New Delhi through Bangladesh. We can also bring goods from Sittwe to any Indian port by using sea routes," Union Minister of State for Commerce Jairam Ramesh Ramesh had recently said.
There is a river route through Bangladesh but that has not been a practical answer for steady commerce as the Bangladesh government was not very enthusiastic. Further, the shallow river bed of the Brahmaputra also did not allow movement of large vessels.
At present, all traffic is routed through the narrow and congested "chicken neck" corridor via the Indian states of Assam and West Bengal.
Ramesh said after the completion of the project in 2012, Mizoram would become a hub of international trade. The project is expected to give a huge boost to the economic activities in the landlocked Northeastern states.
The questions is why is there a need for US interest to neutralize the Chinese.RajeshA wrote:
Myanmar is the right border from where USA can neutralize the Chinese.
The owner is a Puki, the cooks are BDese, the waiters are Thai & Burmese mix.—Rang Mahal Restaurant: Atop the Rembrandt Hotel, Sukhumvit Road Soi 18. The Sunday brunch is a rooftop feast fit for a maharajah. Cost $21 (720 Baht) for the buffet.
It is 180 Bath/Thali not 100 Bath, and the owner runs a school 37 km afar, the shop opens and closes on his whim, when hungry most likely you will have to find yourself another eatery.—Sri Mahamariamman Temple: Silom and Pan roads. Bangkok teems with temples, but this religious crossroads is truly unique. Nearby: Chennai Kitchen — try the dosais, or Indian crepes, for lunch for under $3 (100 baht). For dessert, try one of the nearby pastry shops.
Bangkok - The Myanmar Army has occupied Laogai, the capital of the Kokang region in its eastern Shan State, sending thousands of refugees into neighbouring China while splitting the Kokang army into two opposing forces, media and resistance sources said Thursday. Laogai has been under Myanmar Army control since Monday, said Khuensai Jaipen, editor of the Shan Herald News Agency, a resistance media that monitors news in the remote Shan State.
The seizure of the capital followed a split in the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), as the Kokang army has been called since it signed a ceasefire with the Myanmar government 20 years ago.
According to border sources, MNDAA deputy chairman Bai Souqian, who is backed by the Myanmar military, now leads 200 Kokang troops, while MNDAA chairman Peng Jiasheng heads the remaining 800.
Thousands of Myanmar soldiers and Bai's Kokang troops now occupy Laogai while Peng's followers have fled to the Chinese border, sending thousands of refugees into the Nansan district of Yunnan province, Khuensai said.
The Kokang are an ethnic Han Chinese minority group who have lived for centuries in north-eastern Myanmar, once known as Burma. They formed one of the core groups in the Burmese Communist Party, now defunct, and are known to still have close ties with mainland China.
Tempting opportunities - but what about our recent headache about ethics?Border watchers have opined that the Myanmar Army's move against the Kokang, one of the smallest ethnic minority forces in Shan State, would be followed by similar attacks on the United Wa State Army and Shan State Army, which have also rejected the government's calls to become border militias.
It remained to be seen whether the Wa and Shan would join forces with the Kokang to oppose what appears to be a government push to pressure them into bowing to its demands that they lay down their arms and become border militia before next year's polls.
"A military alliance between the Kokang, Wa and Shan could raise an army of 40,000 to 50,000 soldiers that the Burmese army would have a hard time getting rid of," said David Mathieson, a Myanmar watcher for Human Rights Watch.
Some of the armed Myanmar rebels, who had sneaked into China, have surrendered to Chinese authorities. The local government did not clarify whether they will be handed over to the military authorities in Myanmar, whom they had been fighting.
The surrender might cause problems for Chinese government, which may be under pressures from Myanmar to hand over the rebels.
China rushed senior officials to examine the sensitive situation in the border region and talk to the surrendered rebels, many of whom are ethnic Chinese. It may be politically difficult for Chinese authorities to hand over the rebels to the Myanmar military
The situation in Myanmar's Kokang region or Shan State Special Region-1 in the northeastern part of the country remained tense with some small clashes between the Kokang ethnic army and the government forces going on Friday, reports reaching here from the border area said.
The splinter group of the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), led by Bai Xuoqian, who is former deputy to the MNDAA chief Phone Kyar Shin, has in fact taken control of the situation with Bai becoming the top leader of the army, supported by the government forces, thus replacing the former chief Phone, the sources said.
The tense situation originated from a move-in of the government troops in Laukkai, the capital of the Kokang region, on August 8 when Phone Kyar Shin's residence as well as an arms factory were raided on suspicion of producing drugs and the standoff between the two forces have triggered large outflux of border inhabitants into the neighboring Yunnan province's Nansan area, according to local sources.
China hoped Myanmar could properly solve its domestic issue to safeguard the regional stability of its bordering area with China, said Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Jiang Yu Friday.
She said China was paying close attention to the development of this issue and had expressed its concern to Myanmar through the diplomatic channel. "We also urge Myanmar to protect the safety and legal rights of Chinese citizens in Myanmar," Jiang said.
Kokang was the only Burmese-Chinese feudal state in Myanmar. It was founded by the Yang dynasty, a Chinese military house that fled with the Ming dynasty to Yunnan Province in the mid 1600's and later migrated to the Shan States in eastern Burma.
For the services of Kokang during World War II, it was recognised as separate from Shan State in August 1947 by the British, and the ruler took the title Saopha
Malaysia Muslims protest proposed Hindu temple
By VIJAY JOSHI (AP) – 2 days ago
KUALA LUMPUR, Malaysia — Dozens of Malaysian Muslims paraded Friday with the head of a cow, a sacred animal in Hinduism, in a dramatic protest against the proposed construction of a Hindu temple in their neighborhood.
The unusual protest by some 50 people in Shah Alam, the capital of Selangor state, raises new fears of racial tensions in this multiethnic Muslim-majority country where Hindus comprise about 7 percent of the 27 million population.
The demonstrators who marched from a nearby mosque after Friday prayers dumped the cow head outside the gates of the state government headquarters. Selangor adjoins Kuala Lumpur……………….....
AP via Google
A group of Malay-Muslim protesters claiming to be residents of Section 23 have threatened bloodshed unless the state government stopped the construction of a Hindu Temple.
Amid chants of "Allahuakbar," the group also left the severed head of a cow at the entrance of the State Secretariat here as a warning to Selangor Mentri Besar Tan Sri Khalid Ibrahim.
The sixth meeting of the 11th National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference's (CPPCC) Standing Committee, the highest-level advisory body of the People's Republic of China, met ahead of the general plenary that is taking place in Beijing from June 22 to 27. During one of the committee's working group meetings on June 18, the former deputy chief of the General Staff of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and standing committee member of the CPPCC, General Zhang Li, recommended that China build an airport and seaport on Mischief Reef located in the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. The additional facilities, Zhang said, would enable China to conduct aircraft patrol of the area, support Chinese fishing vessels and demonstrate the country's sovereignty over the disputed islands (Ming Pao [Hong Kong], June 22). The call for building military installments on the disputed islets by General Zhang, a senior high-ranking military officer, may be signs of China's increased willingness to use force in resolving territorial disputes as tension between China and ASEAN-member states (i.e. Philippines, Vietnam) boil over the contested islets in the region.
Hanoi is stepping up pressure on its critics, detaining one Vietnamese journalist and two Vietnamese bloggers this past week after they wrote provocative reports that questioned China's territorial aims. Though there have been no official announcements about the charges, all were allegedly arrested for violating "national security."
The latest arrest took place early morning on Sept. 3 when police detained blogger Nguyen Ngoc Nhu Quynh, 30, at her home in the coastal city of Nha Trang. Quynh's mother said that plainclothes police had been watching the house for several months, ever since her daughter had started criticizing Vietnam for giving China the green light to mine its vast stores of bauxite, a mineral needed to process aluminum, on her blog. "The warrant said my daughter was arrested under Article 258 of the Criminal Code for abusing democratic freedoms to infringe upon the state's interests," said an emotional Nguyen Thi Tuyet Lan, Quynh's mother. "They searched her house until 3:30 that morning and then put her in a van that disappeared into the quiet of the night." The family has not heard from her since. (Read "In Vietnam, Fears of a New Chinese Invasion.")
On Sept. 3, the New York-based Committee to Protect Journalists criticized Vietnam's recent crackdown on journalists and political bloggers, whose "independent reporting challenges the tightly censored state-run media's traditional monopoly on local news and opinion." But it's not exactly a surprise. The Vietnamese government has long been extremely sensitive about its relationship with neighboring China. The two nations have battled for centuries, last going to war in 1979 over a border dispute, which Vietnam won. Today, China is a huge trading partner and investor in Vietnam — providing cash that the country desperately needs. (See pictures of the China-Vietnam border war.)
The blogger's arrest follows the detention of two other writeres. On Aug. 27, a blogger named "Wind Trader", whose real name is Bui Thanh Hieu, accused the Communist Party of rolling over when it came to China on his blog, and was also critical of the government's handling of the controversial mining project and its territorial disputes with Beijing. A day later, authorities arrested Pham Doan Trang, a 31-year-old journalist working for VietnamNet, a reform-leaning, online website, which, like all domestic media in Vietnam, including blogs, is under the control of the government. Trang covered the long-running boundary dispute between China and Vietnam in the South China Sea. Access to several of her articles on VietnamNet are now blocked.
It's not clear what work Trang was arrested for. Like many young Vietnamese, Trang also had a blog. Her last posting was in May, where she discussed the controversial bauxite mining plan that was being debated by the National Assembly. Her single entry that month contained fairly innocuous remarks, mentioning only that the government had hastily prepared their report on the bauxite project. Nguyen Anh Tuan, the editor of VietnamNet has said that all he knew was that his reporter was arrested for violating national security, insisting that these alleged crimes were not related to her VietnamNet stories. Tuan has heard nothing from Trang since her arrest, nor does he know where she is being held. "We have to wait now."
VIETNAM-INDIA: TIME TO MAKE PARTNERSHIP TRULY STRATEGIC
By Dr. Subhash Kapila
Introductory Background
Vietnam has always been viewed and analyzed by this author in terms of perspectives as a nation most deserving with which India could and should foster the forging of a substantive strategic partnership.
With this in view, more than five years back, this author, brought this relationship in focus in his paper on this website entitled: “India-Vietnam Strategic Partnership: The Convergence of Interests” (http://saag.org/papers2/paper177.html) dated 1.10.2001. After a detailed analysis, it was concluded that:
* “Such a strategic partnership is in India’s national security interests and India should not fight shy of proclaiming it as such.”
* “Vietnam has already declared (through its President Tran Duch Luang) that ‘Vietnam treats India with strategic importance’.”
The BJP Government through the visits of Defense Minister Fernandes (five day visit) and later of Prime Minister Vajpayee did put India on the road towards a strategic partnership with Vietnam.
However, with a change of Government in India, it was becoming discernible that the Congress Government’s approaches to this partnership were more routine and economic and less strategic. This author was therefore prompted to place on this website another paper on the subject “India-Vietnam Strategic Partnership Needs Political Impetus From India” (http://saag.org/papers14/paper1397.html) dated 01.06.2005.
This paper re-analyzed the continuing strategic importance of Vietnam to India and the way ahead. Relevant for purposes of discussion in the present paper, one would like to reproduce the introductory and concluding paragraphs of that paper:
* “India’s upward rise on the trajectory of a rising key global power carries with it an important responsibility. The Indian foreign policy establishment and the Indian Government of the day should acutely remember that in the process of rising stardom, India does not forget its traditional friends of long standing.”
* “Vietnam is one such country that deserves special consideration by virtue of the geo-strategic importance, potential to be a regional power and convergence if strategic interests with India.”
* “Sustaining the India-Vietnam strategic partnership needs re-affirmation of its value by the new Indian Government and by adding political impetus to it in visible terms.”
The recently concluded 13th Vietnam-India Meeting (February 27, 2007) between Vietnam’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Pham Gia Khiem and Indian Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee, was focused on trade, economic and science and technology aspects. Such a meeting of Foreign Ministers of the two countries ideally should have emphasized the strategic aspects too.
One would now avidly watch the visit of the Vietnamese Prime Minister to India in April 2007 to see whether India emphasizes the strategic partnership or fights shy of reiterating it.
It needs to be recalled that following Prime Minister Vajpayee’s visit to Vietnam in 2001, the BJP Government signed in 2003 the “Joint Declaration on Framework of Comprehensive Cooperation Between Republic of India and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam As They Enter The 21st Century”. It was emphasized that in addition to other things, India and Vietnam would take steps to expand cooperation in security and defense.
The Foreign Ministers’ (27 Feb 2007) meeting statement spoke of “Two sides agreed to raise traditional relationship to new heights”. New heights have not been touched even in the economic, trade and commerce, and science and technology fields, leave alone defense and security.
Words alone cannot forge relationships; they have to be forged through substantive gestures. One may also like to note that no Indian President has visited Vietnam since 1991 and Prime Minister Vajpayee’s visit has yet to be followed by present Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh who has been in office from May 2004 onwards.
Strategic partnerships entail a comprehensive engagement and cooperation in all fields – strategic convergences, defense and security cooperation, political convergences, economic and trade cooperation on a preferential basis and cooperation in science and technology. Details of these in relation to what is required to be done were discussed in the author’s two papers referred above.
It is not the intention to once again repeat those aspects. This paper would prefer to focus on the strategic imperatives that should determine India’s approaches to a “Vietnam-India Strategic Partnership” and cooperation in the defense and security fields, in a generic sense.
This is being examined in this paper under the following heads:
* Strategic Partnerships: India Needs to Change its Mindsets
* Vietnam-India Strategic Partnership: The Contextual Determinants Present an Opportune Moment to Declare Intent
* India Should Assist Vietnam’s Emergence as a Regional Power
* Vietnam’s Security and Defense Requirements: India’s Role
Strategic Partnerships: India Needs to Change its Mindsets
India, of late, seems to be bestowing the appellation “strategic partnership” in its diplomacy to every set of relationships on the occasion of foreign dignitaries visiting India or Indian dignitaries visiting abroad. India’s foreign policy establishment must not confuse “strategic” with “long range”. While it may be the intent to develop a long range and substantial relationship with a particular country, it can only qualify for a “strategic partnership” only when there is included an overwhelming strategic, defense and security and military component, and it is time tested and enduring.
India’s “strategic partnership” in its effective sense exists only with Russia. The US-India partnership is presently not a true strategic partnership, as it is still evolving and its enduring aspect has to be tested by time. Besides, dissonance exists in terms of strategic perceptions within South Asia itself between the two nations.
India as it rises economically and militarily and entertains hopes of being a key global player if not a global power, should realize that it would need meaningful strategic support from countries in different regions in which it wishes to exercise influence.
India, to achieve the above end- objective, would need to strategically and militarily invest in the future of its chosen friends in each region. One could even term it that India should invest strategically and militarily in the emergence of its traditional friends in such regions to gain regional pre-eminence.
Global power and influence do not come cheap, and India should recognize this. As I have been constantly reiterating in my papers, India can become an economic superpower, but it cannot become a key global power, unless it develops the political will to exercise its attributes of power and secure its national security interests, unapologetically.
“Vietnam-India Strategic Partnership” qualifies to emerge as a true strategic partnership which can be developed to its fullest strategic potential for achieving mutual national security interests. India must accordingly change and energize its mindsets and policy approaches to forge such a partnership with Vietnam.
India also needs to get out of the mindset that in its quest for substantive strategic partnerships it should not ruffle the strategic sensitivities of other powers in the region. In the case of Vietnam, the present Indian Government seems to be sensitive to China’s strategic sensitivities.
India can borrow here a leaf from China’s strategic policies. China was never sensitive and continues to be insensitive to India’s strategic sensitivities on the building of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and nuclear capable missile arsenal. Then why should India be sensitive to what China thinks when it comes to Vietnam.
In terms of “Vietnam-India Strategic Partnership”, Vietnam too would have to change its strategic mindset of being concerned all the time of the China factor in its policy approaches to India or others.
Vietnam-India Strategic Partnership: The Contextual Determinants Present an Opportune Moment to Declare Intent
As a strategic analyst, one could dare to say that the contextual determinants presently provide an opportune moment for India and Vietnam to declare their intent to move towards forging a strategic partnership. Diplomats can work out the soft words to paraphrase this declaration of intent, and this should be declared without any apologetic overtones.
The contextual determinants that India needs to factor-in her approaches to this strategic partnership are as follows:
* Vietnam today lies at the strategic crossroads where her rich geopolitical and geo-strategic assets have become the strategic focus of United States, China and Japan
* Vietnam figures prominently in the strategic calculus of USA and China in their approaches to East Asian security. This author’s following papers refer: “Vietnam in China’s Strategic Calculus: An Analysis” (
* http://www.saag.org/papers17/paper1609.html) of 11.11.2205 and “Vietnam’s Renewed Significance in United States Strategic Calculus” (http://www.saag.org/papers18/paper1796.html) of 5.11.2006. USA, China, Japan, European Union, Australia and Singapore are intensifying their exchanges with Vietnam including trade investments
* Vietnam has recently been admitted to WTO and is fully integrated with ASEAN, APEC and EAS
* In recent times, the Chinese President and US President have paid visits to Vietnam
* Vietnam’s sustained economic growth rates are the second highest in Asia
* Vietnam’s strategic significance stands enhanced today by virtue of its pivotal location astride the sea-lanes of East Asia with particular reference to South China Sea.
All of the above and many more factors suggest that Vietnam is destined to play a major role in South East Asia and the South China Sea region.
Keeping in mind that the United States, Japan, Singapore and Australia have a strategic stake in Vietnam and that with all these nations, India has a strategic congruence in South East Asia and East Asia, the declaration of intent by India to work towards a strategic partnership should not create any misgivings. They would all welcome such a possibility contributing towards the national strengths of Vietnam.
China expectedly will frown on a “Vietnam-India Strategic Partnership”. But then China would have to be reminded of its assertions that it views China-India and China-Pakistan relations as two different sets of relationships. India would have to tell China that it views India- China and India-Vietnam relations also as two different sets of relationships and that it is not strategically aimed at China the way it has aimed Pakistan at India.
India Should Assist Vietnam’s Emergence as a Regional Power
Before too many hackles are raised, it must be clarified that emergence of a regional power does not necessarily imply the emergence of a “regional hegemon”. Further regional powers can be benign and constructive regional powers like India, with no record of aggressive intents. And then, a regional power or a pre-eminent power in a region inhibits unrestrained intrusive presence or interference by external powers.
It is with this perspective, the proposition is being offered that Vietnam should be assisted by India to emerge as the regional power in South East Asia. It is already so in the Indo-China region. Vietnam as a regional power would not be hostile to India or Indian national security interests in the region.
India’s “Look East” policy originated by PM Narasimha Rao was a visionary policy and the credit goes exclusively to him. India consequently today stands economically and politically integrated with ASEAN/South East Asia and with EAS.
The ASEAN region today is no longer plagued by Cold War divisions and concerns of inspired propaganda of Vietnam aggressiveness. ASEAN today is more concerned over China’s rise in East Asia. India’s economic and political integration in regional groupings of ASEAN was prompted to offset China’s unipolar dominance in the region.
Following economic and political integration in the region, India should not fight shy in contributing to the security of the region through the mechanism of a “Vietnam-India Strategic Partnership”. Vietnam lies at the Eastern fringe of South East Asia, with a strategic significances more towards the South China Sea. ASEAN nations therefore should have no concerns with such a proposition.
India is politically well placed to assist Vietnam’s emergence as a regional power than the United States or Japan. The major reason being that such assistance is not aimed at creating a military alliance. Further, that unlike USA and Japan, India is not tied down by other military alliances in the region.
Before moving to the next related aspect the author would like to highlight the stress laid by India’s Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherji and Defense Minister Antony at the 9th Asian Security Conference in New Delhi recently. In relation to South East Asia, they stressed (1) Convergences in security perspectives. (2) Commitment to peace and stability in the region. (3) Security of sea-lanes. (4) India’s assistance in capacity building of the regional Armed Forces to deal with maritime threats. (5) Stable regional environment conducive for economic and social growth.
Keeping the above assertions of the Indian Foreign Minister and the Defense Minister, India would be well advised to begin her capacity building commitment with the Vietnamese Armed Forces, as Vietnam’s pivotal location makes her eminently qualified for the security roles envisaged by India above.
Vietnam’s Security & Defense Requirements: India’s Role
Vietnam’s “strategic culture” has been viewed by one author, as being determined by the necessity of maintaining good relations with China while at the same time creating military deterrence so as to raise the cost of any aggression against it. India can play a vital role in the capacity building of Vietnam’s military deterrence capabilities.
Vietnam’s Armed Forces till the mid-1990s were hampered in their military up-gradation and modernization by low budgetary allocations and restricted sources of supply. Thereafter, Vietnam embarked on a process of selective motorization of its Armed Forces, but still a lot has to be done.
Vietnam’s future threat perceptions have to focus on maritime and aerial warfare threats. Its ground forces are large enough to deter aggression, though they need modernization and advanced equipment.
Details of India’s commitments to Vietnam in the defense and security field stood enumerated in the 15 point Defense Assistance Agreement committed by Defense Minister George Fernandes in 2000. Details stand covered in this author’s earlier papers. Impetus needs to be added to its materialization.
Countries that can assist in substantial up-gradation and modernization of Vietnam’s Armed Forces are the United States, Japan and India. The problem with US military assistance is long lead times and delays caused by US Congressional approvals and interference, Japan is prohibited by its Constitution to export military hardware. That leaves India as the only nation which can fulfill this role and it synchronizes with its national security interests.
India is singularly well placed to cater for Vietnam’s defense and security needs by virtue of a certain commonality of Russian origin weapon systems and India’s indigenous defense industry including production of such equipment.
Since India has stressed heavily through its two senior ministers on South East Asia maritime security, sea lanes security and capacity building, India would be well advised to offer substantive assistance to the Vietnamese Navy to build up its capacity (1) To counter maritime threats in the South China Sea, Gulf of Tonkin and the Gulf of Thailand (2) Maritime surveillance by the Navy over such extended areas both by sea and air (3) Surveillance of its EEZ and (4) Protection of its off shore oil platforms. These tasks are akin to the Indian Navy operational roles and India can therefore offer valuable help to the Vietnamese Navy in terms of force modernization, communication and surveillance systems integration, training and operational expertise.
India’s help to the Vietnamese Air Force perforce get restricted to refurbishment of Russian origin combat aircraft, weapon systems and honing aerial combat skills. However, India can provide at “friendship prices” its Advanced Light Helicopters and other aviation equipment for all three Services of the Vietnamese Armed Forces.
Details can be worked out by respective Armed Forces Headquarters of both the countries through a process of fast track consultations.
The major defense and security requirement of Vietnam would be to build up its conventional military deterrence. India can contribute vitally by providing Prithvi Ballistic Missiles and Brahmos Cruise Missiles. These are produced indigenously in India and therefore do not need approval from any other nation. Nothing more would highlight India’s commitment to contribute to the security of Vietnam than these conventional missiles.
It is high time that India recognizes the tremendous value of “Military Diplomacy” which includes military aid and weapons supplies as an added instrument of India’s foreign policy. In cases where India has to build up strategic partnerships, such provision of military assistance should not be on a commercial sales basis, but at ‘friendship prices’ like the Chinese do.
Concluding Observations
On the threshold of the 21st Century the global strategic, political and economic center of gravity stands shifted from the Euro-Atlantic region to East Asia.
India today stands fully integrated politically and economically with East Asia. However it has yet to demonstrate its political will to integrate itself with the security requirements and concerns of East Asia and everybody knows what they are.
India’s integration with East Asian security architecture would require forging of strategic partnerships within the region. The existing pattern of strategic partnerships in East Asia is bi-lateral in nature.
In this sort of pattern, Vietnam offers the best strategic bet in terms of a strategic partnership with India. It would be a bilateral relationship and not a military alliance.
Former Prime Minister Vajpayee had this in mind when during his visit to Vietnam in 2001 he asserted.
“History has willed that we become strategic partners in the New Century to promise peace, stability, security and sustainable cooperation among countries in Asia.”
(The author is an International Relations and Strategic Affairs analyst. He is the Consultant, Strategic Affairs with South Asia Analysis Group. Email:[email protected])
India and Vietnam
Since the Russians left the base has remained mostly empty and its future open to much speculation. Every so often since then the Vietnamese have hinted to different national delegations that they are amenable to granting access, although to date the port remains vacant. The airfield has been opened up to some commercial traffic (in what may be a sign of things to come).
There are only three powers with naval forces in the region sizeable enough to make access to such a facility worthwhile – China, India, and the United States. (Russia is presumably not interested, having just left, and Japan’s history and defense-oriented policy rule out overseas basing for the present.)
A fourth scenario – the most likely in the opinion of many - is that Vietnam opens the bay as a commercial port, perhaps granting visitation rights to all three of the above. If Solyaris were to offer odds, it would place them as follows: China – 100:1; US 50:1; India 10:1; open to commerce: 1:1.
China is not likely to be considered an acceptable candidate for a Cam Ranh Bay deal due to historical tensions and current disputes. A long standing land-border dispute was only settled last year, and both countries lay claim to the same resource-rich portions of the South China Sea.
The United States likewise has much historical baggage that would make it difficult to secure any sort of basing deal with Vietnam. Further, it doesn’t recognize Vietnam’s claims to the Spratly Islands or other places disputed with China and so its presence back in Vietnam is unlikely to shift the balance of power in a manner that country would find significantly advantageous. Vietnam does occasionally allude to US access to the Bay in private talks, suggesting it is within the realm of possibility – albeit a very distant one – that the US returns.
India has a much better history with Vietnam than either China or the United States, a growing Navy, and like Vietnam is wary of China’s naval ambitions. Further, it would welcome a base in the South China Sea as a counter to China’s Indian Ocean presence, straddling India with a base in Gwadar (Pakistan) and “friendly” ports in Myanmar. In the words of the Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, “India needs Vietnam in strategic terms as a spear in the Chinese underbelly to counter the threatening Beijing-Islamabad-Rangoon entente now taking shape against New Delhi” (quoted in “Cam Ranh Bay…” article mentioned above). Vietnam and India both maintain Russian equipment and this has been a convenient common ground in several recent defense partnerships between the two countries. There is also a history of nuclear cooperation and officer exchange programs.
Despite this, the fourth option (opening Cam Ranh Bay to private commerce) seems like it would be the best from Vietnam’s point of view for the following reasons:
* Money. Both for its own benefit and in response to public pressure from within – regional authorities are pressuring Vietnamese leadership to open the port to commerce for the money it will bring.
* Flexibility. Doing so will allow Vietnam to continue to balance China and the United States (and any other regional powers) by granting visitation rights on an individual, non-committal basis.
* Diplomacy. Doing so will have the extra benefit of not appearing to “take sides.” Vietnam is pursuing closer relations, despite its differences, with both China and the United States.
* Security. Connecting this port to the broader South China Sea lines of communication gives everyone using it an interest in maintaining the status quo. Further, America seeks “places, not bases” in South East Asia: agreements with countries to use their ports rather than sovereign, U.S.-run facilities (like Subic Bay). This option would still be on the table for the U.S. if Vietnam opened to port to commercial traffic.
* Politics. By retaining sovereignty over the Bay the Vietnamese leadership wouldn’t have to worry about popular backlash granting rights to a foreign power would likely produce.
Good sense prevails over Islamic bigotry in Malaysia.arun wrote:Islamic bigotry in Malaysia.
To stop the construction of a Hindu temple, head of a freshly slaughtered cow paraded by Muslims:
6 Muslims charged with sedition for anti-Hindu protest in Malaysia
PTI 9 September 2009, 11:47am IST
KUALA LUMPUR: Six Malaysian Muslims were on Wednesday charged with sedition and illegal assembly for indulging in an act that hurt the sentiments of the Hindu community during a controversial demonstration against the relocation of a century-old temple in a Muslim majority neighbourhood.
Besides six others were charged with illegal assembly under the Police Act.
PTI
If you're talking about the Su-30 then Malaysia has the MKM variety. Its based on teh MKI but is a lot different, similar to the chinese MKK.V_Raman wrote:whenever this mki to malaysia question is raised, there is either silence or admin warnings in this forum. strange.