Bharat Rakshak

Late Edward Taylor never found a problem which could not be solved with his device, the one stop solution for myriads of problems. 1 or 2 group or 72 groups, going by the historical precedence, they will all degrade and fall to the ideological animalisic instincts and try to do the JDAM . Sooner they are nuked to better places, better it will be for the humanity but i dont perceive Indian power brokers/elites coming to the same conclusion for another 10-15 years . The second best thing is to keep them in slow or, half boiled egg equation and hope they keep neutralizing each other in ROPE ways so there wont be many left to waste the big radiation device and possible to be cleansed with other quick ways. The sad part is we will end up doing this dirty work for the sake of civilzed world.

Taking pakistan or the nuclear threat out will mean soldiers dying on the ground. At present the west does not have the stomach for an all out offensive and bodybags arriving back home.

Their solution would be to let things deteriorate so that India has to step in to clean the mess.
The danger is that India will take some hits and that will be bad for economic reasons the world over, not that the Indian soldier losing his life is of any consequence to anyone's calculations anywhere.

So the only solution at present seems to be to destabilize pakistan by keeping it on slow fire, with frequent IED mubaraks, meanwhile pakistan's cons-pee-racy theorists will do the rest to an uneducated populace. The result will be pakistanis seeing a hidden hand behind everything, shadows everywhere, and given their proclivity towards savagery and violence, soon they will be at each others throats.

Something that mumbai police does when the gang wars erupt there, let the killers kill each other off, because they know where the other gang lives, then go after the injured and those left over. This strategy has seen many a gang eliminated in mumbai's urban jungles. Who's to say that the same can't be applied to the jungle that the land of the pure is.

So India is going to have to go in at some point when the situations is ready enough. If in the next few months we see karachi go off, we will be closer to the goal.

shiv wrote:Gagan, Johann, Lalmohan - thanks for your inputs.

The crux of the issue as I see it (as expressed by some of you above) is loyalty to Islam versus loyalty to Pakistan the nation state.

..So Pakistan today is split into four overlapping groups:

Group 1) The old British style secular army of discipline and loyalty to the nation state first.
Group 2) A section of the Army allied with retired army officers and men allied with militant Islamic groups who serve roles that vary between protecting Pakistan the nation state and protecting islam. The loyalty of this group is ambiguous. Islam could be their "first love" and they could renege on loyalty to the nation state if they could ally with non Pakistanis who are Islamic allies. Their concept of nation corresponds more closely to Islam an the ummah. They could choose either Pakistan or the nation of Islam depending on which they thought might win.
Group 3) The rich elite who belong to neither group 1 nor group 2 but serve as spokespersons for the Pakistani state because their eggs are in that basket
Group 4 The vast majority of Pakistanis who do not fear Islam per se, admire the Pakistani army but continue to led their lives guided by what they are fed as information from the 3 groups above them

Group 4 are important for Pakistan and the long term future of the subcontinent, but they do not matter one bit when it comes to the question of nuclear weapons and their possible control and use.

Group 1 used to be the most powerful, but Group 2 is now emerging as a real alternative. Group 2 has within its ranks an unknown number of members of Group 1.

The "Peak power" status that was achieved by Pakistan was a seamless alliance between Group 1 and Group 2. I believe that this era has now passed. The glory days of defeating the Soviets followed by the days of unchecked infiltration into India and jihad related victories in Lebanon, Africa, the Philippines and Russia reached their zenith with 9-11.

After 9-11 and Parakram, both the US and India have colluded to bring about a split in Pakistan between groups 1 and 2 using a good cop - bad cop routine where India the bad cop promises to spoil everyone's party, while the good cop US promises group 1 sops for getting rid of group 2.

With regard to nuclear weapons, the exact reach and influence of Group 2 is completely unknown. But in a power struggle between group 1 and 2 - both would naturally like control over some, if not all nuclear weapons. But the logic here is fairly simple.

a) Groups 1 and 2 used to be allies and their alliance resulted in a very powerful Pakistan with control over Afghanistan
b) The split between Group 1 and group 2 has mainly been engendered by the US which is paying "traitorous elements" of group 1 to oppose group 2
c) In the ideal situation groups 1 and 2 should re unite and fight together. Such a situation could occur of the cowardly Indians only agreed to fight a war.
d) If group 1 (supported by the US) controls the nuclear weapons and it prevails, the nukes could well come under risk because the US cannot be trusted.
e) group 2 alone can never control all the nuclear weapons (at least the probability is low)

The best chance for Islamist forces to control at least a few nuclear weapons if not all is to either take control and defeat group 1 or to spirit away a few weapons.

Shiv,

That is perhaps too charitable a reading of the distribution of loyalties and inclinations within the PA.

I would say there's not two, but three major kinds of orientations in the PA

- The officer committed to jihad without compromise. The children of Zia who see jihad as Pakistan's greatest weapon, and the relationship with the West as a disgraceful betrayal, and a hobble upon the power of Islam, jihad and Pakistan. Hamid Gul and company. Much like what you described as 'group 2'. Not many in the current general officer corps, but much more common further down. Facing a definite glass ceiling in their careers because of Western pressure, which is only one element of their hatred.

- The 'old fashioned' officer you talked about in 'group 1', who looks at the jihadi power as a dead end for Pakistan, something thats gone too far. Very willing to fight the jihadis. A decided minority, who have good mutual relations with NATO forces, which has helped with promotions, but which also imposes something of a trust deficit with many other PA officers and limits their ability to rise to the very top of the PA hierarchy. These men are being eliminated by the Pakiban and what you called 'group 2'. The West at this time can only do a little to physically protect many of them.

- Musharraf and his children. Opportunists who believe that the worst thing Pakistan can do is actually commit wholeheartedly to one side or the other - either NATO or Pakiban. They do favours both sides - because they see *both* the West and the jihadis as indispensible. These guys dominate the PA's general officer corps. They have no real desire to stamp out either one of the other groups - they need both of them. However, they do care very much about maintaining overall control of the situation.

I don't believe the opportunists are going to be actually dislodged - but Zia's children are very have the means and the will to inflict real pain on the PA. When they go far enough in attacking the PA's cohesion and prestige, the opportunists at the top will publicly over to their point of view, even while secretly attempting to keep some doors to the West open.

The Ziaists have *every* incentive to undermine the opportunists control, and discourage or eliminate the anti-jihadis. If they could get a hold of a core and turn it in to a dirty bomb, or even better a core and a trigger, they would have no hesitation in detonating it outside Bagram Airbase, along with loud public threats to continue such attacks on every US base until the Americans left.

Would it be dangerous? Not for the Ziaists, or 'group 2' because they have everything to gain. Its unlikely that any US administration would directly blame Kiyani, or carry out nuclear retaliation. That is why I said on the first page of this thread that India's deterrent posture against the nuclear terrorist threat from Pakistan is far stronger than that of the West.

However, any US administration would feel *compelled* to directly secure the Pakistani arsenal, which would set the stage for a direct US-Pakistan confrontation that would give the Ziaists the chance to either dislodge the opportunists, or force them to make the break with the US.

So, how tight is the opportunists control over all of the elements nuclear arsenal? Seymour Hersh, who knows what he is talking about documented how the Opportunists have hedged their bets by dispersing the weapons in such a way that no one can seize them all - not the Americans, and not any other sub-grouping within the PA. All the Ziaists need is one of course, but overcoming dispersal at the sub-system level would still require organisation, and a failure (or conspiracy) across all of the relevant counter-intelligence elements of the PA - ISI, MI and SPD.

This is something worth gaming out - if you were a Ziaist and got a hold of a core, but not a trigger, how much extra time and risk would you go through to get a hold of a trigger? If not from PA or PAEC stores, then through the numerous elements of Pakistan's proliferation network still functioning. If you were one of the opportunists, how long would you try to keep it quiet and recover the core before you gently broke the news to the Americans just to be sure they don't retaliate in the worst possible way when surprised? A couple of NEST teams might have a chance working with the opportunists.

Of course if you were a Ziaist, you probably would move it out of the country to be sure you could secure it until you had everything you needed - Afghanistan, Yemen, eastern Iran, Somalia as you said, any place you could get along the traditional smuggling routes - but this would be a temporary measure.

A Coalition base Afghanistan is one of the first places that's likely to see a terrorist nuke go off - but bases in the Arabian peninsula are possible as well.

Nice analysis Shiv ji. If analysis can be extended on Group 2, there are different notions. We like to think that as monolithic entity. This is true before 9/11. But after the Mush U turn and lal masjid incident and probably after action against Meshud talibans and swat there are several visible fissures and fractions in that. N weapon is the ultimate currency of power. These factions are tribal in character and follow the diktat of jungle. There are some lingering questions. What happens if a faction, say Mehsud Taliban gains N weapon while others not(like LET). Will there be infighting or others accept there suzerainty? Or, what happens if certain groups like Uzbek smuggled them out of country. What happens if more than one faction gains access to N weapon. Will they fight for their supermacy. In all these chaos, what happens to N weapon ?

Johann has brought up some interesting nuances - particularly the existence of a "neither here nor there" purely corrupt faction who are neither wholly Pakistan loyalist nor wholly Islam loyalist, but are loyal to themselves.

But that in fact has been Pakistan's problem for decades - i.e the existence of a greedy self-serving faction who have used both Pakistan and Islam to serve themselves. Their presence has, in fact made the Islamists (the "Ziaists" - if you like) more powerful because in Pakistan whenever there is a debate about what should get primacy - Pakistan or Islam, the latter automatically wins out. So no self serving Musharaffite can be seen to be opposing the Ziaist faction. At best they serve as a "moderate face" to hoodwink the Americans.

In an interesting example of fractal recursivity I believe that his same structure of groups with an ambiguous loyalty to Pakistan and/or Islam is repeated all across Pakistan - in individual military commands, and in strategic establishments - including, I suspect places like Kahuta, Kamra and Sargodha.

There is also enough fear of India and now the US (among all groups) to believe that Pakistan's nuclear weapons are at risk. I am certain that all the factions in Pakistan are united in wanting to make sure that Pakistan's weapons are dispersed sufficiently to survive horror stories of foreign spl forces teams coming to de-nuke Pakistan. But beyond this, who controls them, or who will control them is difficult to tell. Stories of Zardari or Gilani having a "nuke button" are a joke that should only be posted in the benis thread.

Do Pakistanis store weapons in which cores are mated with triggers? Everyone says "No" in public. Is this really credible? We have a paranoid failing nation where the majority of people, leave alone the armed forces believe that the world is out to destroy them. Their best bet to punish and thwart such enemies is nuclear weapons. Using this as a starting point, what state of readiness of nuclear weapons would be the best bet for Pakistan? Reports (and photos posted by Gagan earlier) indicate systems of tunnels that probably run into scores of kilometers in length in which nuclear weapons or componnts can be stored.

I have no information on how nuclear weapons are stored. I only know that the US has "ready to use" nuclear weapons that are "safed" by some mechanism. It is claimed that India and Pakistan store "cores" separate from triggers. Most reports say that Pakistan has traditionally had Uranium based weapons and they are now increasing their Plutonium stockpile. Hudoodbhoy has speculated that Pakistan has Uranium-Plutonium hybrid weapons.

What evidence is there that Pakistan has cores separate from triggers? None other than some public statements made by various people.

One question that needs to be asked is "Why on earth would anyone want to "safe" a nuclear weapon?" There are two answers
1) To prevent accidental detonation
2) To prevent unauthorized access.

The words "Unauthorized access" make me laugh. The US coined such terms and they occur in most references to safing of weapons. The US stored ready-to use weapons deployed on delivery systems and "unauthorized access" was important to them. But to Pakistan?

But yes, even Pakistanis would not want an accidental detonation, so they surely have some safing mechanisms in place. Apparently robust safing mechanisms have been devised since the 1940s and high tech is not 100% essential for safing. In a "gun" type Uranium based fission weapon a metal rod inserted across the barrel of the gun would physically prevent a critical mass from developing even if the explosives were fired. In addition, the triggers for the conventional explosives may just have disconnected wires. Open the box (4 screws), twist the wires together, close box and remove the metal rod and your weapon is ready. I would not be fooled by public rhetoric about American PALs on Paki nukes.

I mean just look at Pakistan honestly. A failed state led by a paranoid military-mullah coterie who think that he world is about to get them. Does anyone seriously believe that Pakistan will store nuclear weapon cores tens or hundreds of km away from the weapon triggers and delivery systems? Especially when the whole goddam world is talking about denuking and "unsafe" Pakistan. Pakis would be irrational if they wanted to be denuked. They are not irrational - they want their nukes to be usable.

You can be sure that Pakistani nuclear weapons are stored in a nearly ready state. Pakistanis are intelligent enough to realise that Xerox Khan cannot come and ready all his weapons if the time comes to use them. neither can Kiyani do it. The weapons will have to be readied by technicians who have a Paki level of education. That means simple safety devices. Connect a wire, replace a dummy switch with a real one - or some things that can make weapons ready in a matter of hours.

Check public source information on where Pakistanis store their nukes. If you were a Paki would you not read that public source information yourself and realise that those "public" sites will be targets for India and the US? What would you do? You would not twiddle your thumbs. You would move a decent number of weapons to more than one completely hidden and unknown site. Does anyone think that a nation that has hidden Osama and Mullah Omar will not be able to hide a few ready to use nuclear weapons? If you do I would like to offer you a white marble building for sale in Agra.

shiv wrote:Johann has brought up some interesting nuances - particularly the existence of a "neither here nor there" purely corrupt faction who are neither wholly Pakistan loyalist nor wholly Islam loyalist, but are loyal to themselves.

But that in fact has been Pakistan's problem for decades - i.e the existence of a greedy self-serving faction who have used both Pakistan and Islam to serve themselves. Their presence has, in fact made the Islamists (the "Ziaists" - if you like) more powerful because in Pakistan whenever there is a debate about what should get primacy - Pakistan or Islam, the latter automatically wins out. So no self serving Musharaffite can be seen to be opposing the Ziaist faction. At best they serve as a "moderate face" to hoodwink the Americans.

Shiv,

The Musharrafistas you might say are out to hoodwink everyone - Americans and jihadis alike. They point to their clean chins to the Americans, and they point to their prayer mats to the jihadis.

How else can you describe the post Parakram arrangement where they dropped covering fire as part of the LoC ceasefire, but continued to push jihadis across the line towards certain, futile death? It was meant to keep the jihadis calm by demonstrating 'commitment' to the cause, even while selling them out.

The LeT is very close to the PA, and has never acted against it, despite the PA leadership's opportunism. However ever larger sections of the Deobandi jihadis, and those within the PA who identify with them are not OK with being ritually sacrificed for the Americans. The Uzbeks and Arabs have never been OK with it.

The results are explosive for the PA and the Pakistani state.

Check public source information on where Pakistanis store their nukes. If you were a Paki would you not read that public source information yourself and realise that those "public" sites will be targets for India and the US? What would you do? You would not twiddle your thumbs. You would move a decent number of weapons to more than one completely hidden and unknown site. Does anyone think that a nation that has hidden Osama and Mullah Omar will not be able to hide a few ready to use nuclear weapons?

Not even the Americans really believe they know where all of the Pakistanis nukes are. Otherwise they'd have much less to be anxious about.

I mean just look at Pakistan honestly. A failed state led by a paranoid military-mullah coterie who think that he world is about to get them. Does anyone seriously believe that Pakistan will store nuclear weapon cores tens or hundreds of km away from the weapon triggers and delivery systems? Especially when the whole goddam world is talking about denuking and "unsafe" Pakistan. Pakis would be irrational if they wanted to be denuked. They are not irrational - they want their nukes to be usable.

You can be sure that Pakistani nuclear weapons are stored in a nearly ready state. Pakistanis are intelligent enough to realise that Xerox Khan cannot come and ready all his weapons if the time comes to use them. neither can Kiyani do it. The weapons will have to be readied by technicians who have a Paki level of education. That means simple safety devices. Connect a wire, replace a dummy switch with a real one - or some things that can make weapons ready in a matter of hours.

As for the likelihood of state in which Pakistani nuclear weapons are stored, you must take in to account not just the PA's paranoia of the outside world in to account, but the paranoia *within* the PA thanks to the tensions between various loyalty groups as well.

Musharraf, and now Kiani had every reason to worry about not only American or Indian attacks on the arsenal, but that someone, or a group of people in the PA or PAEC or KRL might get carried away and do something that would get him, Musharraf, nuked.

As you pointed out, its certainly not in the interest of the opportunists running the PA to set off a nuke tied to Uncle's tail in Bagram.

Even if the retaliation is not nuclear, it will probably be the end of whomever is COAS. For the Ziaist or committed jihadi, anything that breaks the PA's leadership without breaking Pakistan itself can only be good news. Given how A.Q. Khan or others like him were committed to Pan-Islamic goals shafted by Musharraf, do you think they'd hesitate to cooperate with those willing to do something?

That risk for the PA leadership is far higher than any crisis with India. It would only take a few days at most to mate the cores, the krytons and the delivery system together for a couple of weapons they can point at Mumbai and Delhi. No crisis with India is going to require them to move faster than that. Once the TELs and F-16s are dispersed, the strategic uncertainty will be sufficient to bring deterrence in to play. They dont need to have all 60 or 120 or 240 weapons ready to launch at once - that is a cold war, nuclear warfighting perspective.

The Pakistanis neither possess the local expertise to build a PAL-type system, nor would they trust technology provided by the Americans. The only way for the PA leadership to maintain full command and control would be dispersal at the sub-system level - although if I were to hedge my bets I'd keep a small number of disassembled weapons much closer to one of my assembly sites. There's a lot of different military and military-industrial facilities scattered around Islamabad and Taxila.

lets say there are 100 bums. lets say 20 are stored in complete knocked down form with friendly states who can do nothing with teh components (KSA most likely) but feel good about being part of the scam. lets say 70 are then stored in semi knocked down form around pakistan to ensure their overall safety by dispersal and the hope that no one entity can steal cores and triggers - if all were 'well' and i were fighting a normal nuclear war, i might mate them when required. if i were a mush, i'd have kept 5 mated, paired with mijjiles and 5 mated, paired with eff-solahs for personal insurance against india and any other comers, ready to go at any time.

the first 20 are write offs
the next 70 could end up contributing to a maila-bum
the remaining 10... are perhaps the most vulnerable to a group 2 coup de jehad

There was fictional account "Snow Lepoard" where under Western assurances India and TSP denuke. But the TSP keeps a few (5?) and decides to launch a strike on India-the targets are Delhi, Bombay, Kolkota, Bangalore and Hyderabad. They have all 'dedicated' fundoo pilots flying a PRC developed stealth plane! Offcourse the USN pilots come to rescue and shoot them all down with near misses.

Why did I post this?

- Well its premise is TSP cant be trusted. They will retain something for their Gottdamerung scenario.
- They will have PRC help
- US will be meddling.
- And Hyderabad is their prize despite all the dreams of Dilli and Red fort for it hurts a lot.

And all this was written in mid 80s by a US writer. And the West knows everything but support those miscreants.

In the TS PA upper levels, are there really anyone who are either comitted Islamists or comitted secularists? Aren't all of them basically opportunistic?

What I mean is that it seems all of them are basically opportunistic, they will go with Jihad if it works, and would go with the West if that works, and as a matter of fact will go with PRC if that works too. Who amongst them has ever shown a tendency to take a position based on principles & go down wth the consequences of it.

They are islamist only in the sense that if it is not too much of a sacrifice, they would like Islam to triumph. They are secular only in the sense that they are secular because that seems to be the best route to more opportunities.

Where are the comitted ideologues (apart from rhetoric)?

Originally posted by Pranav

Mastermind of attacks on brigadiers held
http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news- ... diers-held

Published: December 03, 2009

ISLAMABAD - Law enforcement agencies have apprehended the alleged mastermind of attacks on serving Army brigadiers in the Federal Capital, sources informed on Wednesday.
The sources further disclosed that the accused was netted by law enforcement agencies when he was driving an International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) vehicle. They informed that the arrested accused subedar (Retd) Zafar Iqbal had close links with Capt (Retd) Zaidi, owner of the Inter-Risk Security Company. They further disclosed that the accused was the main motivator for recruiting the retired servicemen in the Inter-Risk.

The sources further informed that the accused was the main facilitator of the three terrorist attacks on serving brigadiers, which took place in a period of less than 15 days a couple of month ago.

They said that the detained facilitator had confessed that he played a vital role while attacking army officers as he carried out monitoring activities of serving brigadiers and informed the attackers besides provided them with bikes and weapons. They informed that after all three attacks, Zafar Iqbal facilitated the attackers in fleeing the scene after completing operation by loading their bike on a private vehicle. The sources informed that it was yet to be ascertained whether someone inside the Red Cross was involved or the accused used fake number plate of Red Cross vehicles.

Terrorist attacks on military officers: main 'facilitator' arrested
http://www.brecorder.com/index.php?id=9 ... =&supDate=
RECORDER REPORT

ISLAMABAD (December 01 2009): Law enforcement agencies (LEAs) have claimed to have arrested the main facilitator of the three terrorist attacks on military officers in Islamabad with links to foreign agencies. The detained facilitator, Subedar Zaffar Iqbal, a retired junior commissioned officer (JCO of SSG was arrested from G-6 sector of Islamabad, when he was driving an International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) vehicle with the number plate ICRC 72-31, intelligence sources told Business Recorder on Monday.

They said that Zaffar has admitted that he was the main facilitator of the terrorist attacks on the three Brigadiers of Pakistan Army in Islamabad. He undertook surveillance of the three targets prior to planning the place and timing of the attacks. He subsequently got the terrorists in place, provided them with bike and ammunition, and, after successful completion of the attacks, ensured their getaway by loading the bike on a Hilux pickup, sources said.

Zaffar Iqbal was questioned about the ICRC vehicle, and he failed to give any satisfactory reply as to how he got access to the ICRC vehicle, sources said, adding that the relevant authorities are investigating whether the number plate of the vehicle is genuine or fake.

Concerned citizens in Islamabad are reporting almost daily to Islamabad police about some foreign nationals of western origin who are accused of moving in the capital with fake number plates. However, Islamabad Police and civil administration are helpless to stop them, said an official of Islamabad Police.


He said that some foreigners and their local employees have been accused of using diplomatic vehicles with fake number plates for 'nefarious activities' but the police are being ordered to stop as and when it takes notice of such movement/activities. Dutch diplomats and American diplomat were arrested, along with sophisticated weapons and hi-tech cameras, but were allowed to go after intervention from their diplomatic missions, he added.

Intelligence sources said that Zaffar Iqbal was under surveillance for a long time, and added that during the course of the investigation it was learnt that he was the main motivator for recruiting retired servicemen for 'Xe Services' (previous named Blackwater World-wide), which is operating under cover with Inter-Risk Security company. Sources said that during the investigation it was learnt that Zaffar Iqbal owns three plots in Bahria Town , one of the posh areas of the capital, and three more in Beharia Town in Lahore with several luxury vehicles. He is said to have close links with a top builder and developer of, and is a regular visitor to, Dubai.

Sources said that detained Zaffar Iqbal has close links with Captain (Retd) Zaidi, owner of Inter-Risk Security Agency which was raided on September 19 and a huge cache of unlicensed sophisticated weapons was impounded. Captain Zaidi, a retired officer of SSG was arrested from Islamabad office of his security company.

Inter-Risk security agency is a partner of the Dyncorp, an American contractor company providing logistic support to US forces in Afghanistan Sources said that Zaffar Iqbal retired from SSG in 1989. Sources informed this scribe that the Interior Ministry has taken serious note of the hiring of retired commandos and directed the Inspector General of Islamabad Police to investigate the matter and submit a report in two weeks.

Lalmohan wrote:if i were a mush, i'd have kept 5 mated, paired with mijjiles and 5 mated, paired with eff-solahs for personal insurance against india and any other comers, ready to go at any time.

Well this is fast becoming the new 'Think Like a Pak' thread, or should I say "Think Like a M*shy" - N, where are you?

If I was Musharraf, I'd know when major terrorist ops are about to take place, and I can start the process of readying part of the nuclear forces in advance whenever I need to. After all every war or near-war crisis since 1986 has been an Indian reaction to some Pakistani action by terrorists, or as in Kargil regulars pretending to be irregulars.

So, I dont *really* need to be prepared for a bolt from the blue.

However, because I command a lot of restless, tall, tight-arsed martial types all jockeying for position, I need to look like toughest, meanest, most dangerous type of all - someone the world respects and fears a little bit.

So I'd (secretly of course) put out the word that I had a small section of the nuclear forces on permanent standby alert, so that the wicked Indians, and even those stupid Americans cant imagine they can take us by surprise. I'd even let the pilots and many of men in the missile units feel that they are privy to a great secret, and a special responsibility.

And I'd pull the wool over their eyes by making sure that they're loaded with duds, because I don't really trust *anyone* with that much power. Too many crazy people, too many ambitious people who want to see me gone. And its one more ambiguous card I can play both ways with the Americans for enormous leverage. Am I lying? Or am I telling the truth? Or am I lying about some things, and not others? Which things? Almost no one can be sure. Good thing I can trust old Khalid Kidwai. That reminds me, I need to send his wife something nice for her birthday - I think she'll enjoy her trip to Dubai.

surinder wrote:In the TS PA upper levels, are there really anyone who are either comitted Islamists or comitted secularists? Aren't all of them basically opportunistic?

...Where are the comitted ideologues (apart from rhetoric)?

Absolutely!

By 2004 Musharraf cleaned out most of the committed Islamic ideologues, including his good friend and ally Gen. Aziz Khan from the PA's general officer corps.

Their most senior representatives of this group are retired - people like Hamid Gul, Aziz Khan, Mirza Aslam Beg, Javed Nasir, etc, but they continue to be influential within the Pakistani establishment. They are people that Islamist field grade officers, the jihadi minded majors and colonels -of which there are many- look to for guidance.

This is why many in the US believe 'engagement' with the PA is crucial - i.e. lots of visits, exchanges, training, and military aid that can be used to influence just what kind of officer moves up. The thought used to be they could ensure that secular-minded, pro-American officers rose to the top of the PA and dominated it. This was how both the US and the Soviet Union competed in the 'third world'.

What the Americans have discovered in the last few years however is that its not the secular, so much as the opportunists that have risen - but aggravating as the opportunists are, they prefer them to the committed Islamists.

Johan, buy most of that. however, could mush or kiyani ever really really be sure that there would not be a first strike from india? afterall, they assume all kinds of chankiyan reds under the beds at the drop of a khaki pant for gubo?

Johann what you write sounds credible but I would be more suspicious. Zia ul Haq was an opportunist who turned out to be an Islamist. The Americans are fools (I don't say this lightly, but I must define fool here)

Let me delve for a minute into world views. The American world view tends to revolve around the here and now with no great emphasis on what happens far into the future so long as America reigns supreme. Since America currently reigns supreme, there is no climbing involved - only maintenance and consolidation. The odd downhill skiing like Vietnam, Iran, Somalia or Cuba do not affect the overall strength of the US in the short to medium term although each one of these acts will be remembered in those nations who are looking at thumbing their noses at America at some future date. One can add Pakistan to this list.

Pakistani "opportunists" fit in well with what America wants. At the same time, a Pakistani Islamist needs to behave like an opportunist to survive. If you read about the changes that Islamism has wrought within Pakistan since 1971 - the one thing that strikes me is the old British style secular openness in which Army establishments had with a bar and no mosque has been turned around 180 degrees. Defence establishments have mosques and no bars. It is no longer possible to be secular and liberal in the Pakistani armed forces except while pretending for the benefit of the West

The US, which found allies and friends in the old secular Pakistani armed forces, is still managing to find "allies" in the Islamic conservative armed forces. Exactly who is a opportunistic Islamist? Cooperation with the US is recognized as a sign of opportunism, but hidden support for Islamists is equally a sign of his long term commitment to Islamism. So I think the US is being fooled into thinking that opportunists are allies when they should be able to keep their eyes wide open and see that the character of the Pakistani armed forces has changed. For a committed Ziaist, survival is dependent on appearing like a moderate so the assumption that Musharraf managed to weed out the Islamists is a dangerous and untenable one. The idea that Pakistanis are traitorous opportunists is a great way to induce somnolence among Americans.

The Pakistani opportunist will know that milking the Americans is necessary, but in case the Americans go, staying on the right side of the Islamists is the difference between life and death. Under these circumstances - if there is a core group of Islamist who spirit away a few weapons for "safekeeping" the pro American opportunist will feign ignorance.

I believe the chances of some nukes being under "ambiguous control" or under firm control of an Islamist faction are high. It is another matter that such nukes are not so easily adapted to terrorism. Whether Paki opportunists control some nukes or whether Islamists control them a Pakistani nuke on India will cause too much retaliatory damage to Pakistan to serve the long term needs of either Islamists or opportunists. The same is true for a nuke on a US asset.

So If I was a terrorist leader in Pakistan with access to nukes - I would be very rational and careful about how to wield the nukes lest all my support and assets get destroyed by my numerous enemies. Claiming that India or the US will be "defeated" by terrorist nukes is premature. But there certainly are situations in which India or the US can be checkmated.

For example a Pakistani nuke set off in Lebanon or in Somalia could divert the attention of the US enough for it to make a hasty retreat from Afghanistan after suddenly skiiing downhill to start "trusting" the opportunist Pakistanis to "take care of Afghnistan". Again - Pakistani nuke set off somewhere in Pakistan itself can serve as a warning sign to interfering parties too keep out of the region, allowing the long term consolidation of the Islamist forces.

We just can't tell which way this cookie can crumble and the only way out is to coopt the US and China into crushing the nuclear capability of Pakistan. One of the best ways of doing that would ironically be to actually let the Islamists get a nuke into Xinjiang.

Johan, buy most of that. however, could mush or kiyani ever really really be sure that there would not be a first strike from india? afterall, they assume all kinds of chankiyan reds under the beds at the drop of a khaki pant for gubo?

Well if I'm a PA officer the odds are I also assume that most Indians however sneaky and underhanded are also cowards who can easily be intimidated.

Hence the utility of a quiet bluff about weapons on standby alert. It would make the PA establishment feel powerful, and the Indians cautious. But I'd have to make sure they were duds, just to be sure someone under me didn't get funny ideas about bypassing my control and upsetting the applecart.


Shiv,

Zia ul Haq was an opportunist who turned out to be an Islamist.

I dont know if we can call Zia an opportunist.

Musharraf loved his whiskey and his dogs, and supported jihad to the extent that was useful to his career and to the PA. He was willing to sell out anyone at anytime for the right price, but he never cut his ties to either side.

Zia was consistent his commitment to Islamisation. His Islamically orthodox lifestyle was something that was well known before he became COAS - it was also his family background. He never compromised on jihad, and he never compromised on the nuclear programme. Musharraf for example hung AQ Khan out to dry, twice under American pressure. Zia on the other hand ignored the imposition of US sanctions on account of the uranium enrichment project in 1978, and instead waited for them to come to him. Zia turned down Carter's first proposed aid package publicly as peanuts - Musharraf has taken whatever the US is willing to give.

The pattern we see in Zia is one of confidence not just in his *personal* ability to survive and thrive - I doubt anyone can beat the Commando on that score. It's confidence in his ideology, and in the national strength that steadfastness to that ideology would provide.

Some people may think that his participation in the Jordanian army's suppression of the attempted PLO coup against King Hussain (Black September) makes him an insincere Islamist. What such people don't know is that the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood (whom Zia was likely in contact with while in the country) backed the King 100%. The Muslim Brotherhood and the PLO had become quite sharp rivals by this time, and of course in the ME in particular your enemy's enemy is your friend.

So I think the US is being fooled into thinking that opportunists are allies when they should be able to keep their eyes wide open and see that the character of the Pakistani armed forces has changed. For a committed Ziaist, survival is dependent on appearing like a moderate so the assumption that Musharraf managed to weed out the Islamists is a dangerous and untenable one. The idea that Pakistanis are traitorous opportunists is a great way to induce somnolence among Americans.

From everything I've read and heard, the Americans are clearly worried about junior and mid ranked PA officers.

Musharraf did not *voluntarily* clean out the committed Ziaists from among the generals. The first wave of firings after 9/11 was under American pressure. The Americans had a very good idea of which generals bitterly opposed Pakistan's cooperation with the American overthrow of the Taliban. However this was not exactly a clean sweep.

From 2003 onwards, the American war in Afghanistan moved inside Pakistan, again with Musharraf's assent. This led to the second major wave of purges. It came from Musharraf himself. Making ever larger compromises with the Americans meant he needed to silence dissent and ensure his own security. Particularly after two assassination attempts conducted with lots of assistance on the inside.

The fear of a sleeper Ziaist is not something that can be dismissed of course - but any COAS working with the Americans *must* for his own security ensure that the corps commanders, the ISI DG, and the General Staff at least behave and talk like opportunists.

Defence establishments have mosques and no bars. It is no longer possible to be secular and liberal in the Pakistani armed forces except while pretending for the benefit of the West

One of the things that happened in Zia's time is that the established 'culture' of PA officer life simply moved from the mess to officers homes. The majority of officers continued to drink together, and didn't even really try to keep it a secret. Its typical of many Islamic eras when the emphasis is on the regulation of public life, while simultaneously reassuring people that you could do whatever you wanted in private. It is a situation that breeds hypocrisy and opportunism.

Zia attempted to stack the odds a bit more in favour of the committed Islamists by giving advantages in promotion to those who didn't just obey the rules about public behaviour, but went a step further - they wore a beard, they said their prayers throughout the day, peppered their speech with Quranic and hadith references, etc. Most of all they weren't willing to look towards the Kafir or compromise with him on core principles.

Its hard, very hard in fact for the Ziaists to get to the top. Aslam Beg managed it, and that was in the early 1990s. Hamid Gul came close, and Aziz Khan came even closer.

But on the whole, its become harder for them to break through the glass ceiling. This dichotomy between field grade and general officers is part of the PA's growing problems with cohesion, and which is why the brass so desperately need a war, or at least a war crisis with India.

Cooperation with the US is recognized as a sign of opportunism, but hidden support for Islamists is equally a sign of his long term commitment to Islamism...The Pakistani opportunist will know that milking the Americans is necessary, but in case the Americans go, staying on the right side of the Islamists is the difference between life and death.

The opportunists see terrorism and insurgency as tools that Pakistan can never afford to entirely give up, given Pakistan's weaknesses.

However, those tools are only a means to an end, the end being their personal success, and the PA's institutional power and prestige, which they benefit from. They'll make compromises on the jihad front under pressure if their interests demand it.

So yes, its the overall balance of power that will drive their behaviour.

Of course the more compromises they make, the more violent the reaction of the committed Islamists to these betrayals.

Will the Americans departure make them vulnerable? Not unless the Americans escalate the war to a much higher level, and then completely disengage, giving the opportunists no time to adapt.

Remember, it is the American's involvement and pressure that sets the opportunists and the Ziaists on a collision course. A gradual disengagement would allow the Opportunists to go back to the way things were.

In the 1990s, the opportunists remained in charge, but worked closely with the Ziaists on and off, particularly when Bhutto wasn't in power. The Ziaists made too many enemies when they ran things, not just in the West, but in the Arab world as well, and the results were bad for the PA overall.

I am one of the last people to argue that the current situation is a stable one - in fact I'm saying the opposite. American presence is driving a rift within the PA that is unprecedented. Particularly since the committed Islamists are willing to go so much further than the opportunists, who have power but refuse to use it.

American pressure, and American demands continue to increase. The opportunists are confronted at every step of the way with two choices;
- make a break with America, and risk losing national financing and access to very modern weaponry
- go along with America, and risk more breakdowns in PA loyalty and public anger disgust with the PA

The longer the opportunists chose cooperation with America, the more violent the Islamists reactions will get because the American demands and pressure represent an existential threat.

The longer this goes on, the more likely it is that they will be able to gain access to a weapon, and that they will use it against the American presence in the region, or an adjoining region.

Nuclear deterrence against the opportunists when they're in an 'alliance mode' and halfheartedly fighting the wholehearted is a much, much more dangerous situation for the West.

Much better if the opportunists chose to make a break to save their own hides, or if the Ziaists ride public anger to achieve a takeover. That's the only way to bring stable deterrence to the situation.

Johann - Zia was perhaps the archetypal opportunist Islamist. He realized that for Islamist ideology to be empowered an "interface" class of people who appeared moderate and cooperative with the Americans was essential while Islmaism could be injected into a Pakistan that was reeling from the 1971 defeat and virtual mutiny among the Pakistani armed forces (Attock conspiracy and the witchunt thereafter). Islam was the balm to unite Pakistan and wreak revenge on India.

Zia pushed all the correct buttons with Nixon and later Reagan. Only Zia had the chutzpah to dismiss a US promise of 200 million dollars as "peanuts" and to state that it is OK to lie in the name of Islam. And that is what he did. It just so happened that in the Zia era Pakistan the nation and a nascent Islam had a lot in common with the cold war requirements of the US. What the US needed against the Soviets in Afghanistan was exactly what Pakistan needed against India. Zia's Islamization was certainly resented by many except by a few who saw Islamization as an opportunity. And this is relevant to a statement you have made:

Remember, it is the American's involvement and pressure that sets the opportunists and the Ziaists on a collision course. A gradual disengagement would allow the Opportunists to go back to the way things were.

If you step back 2-3 decades you find that it is America's involvement that gave the first opportunities to Islamists headed by Zia to control Pakistan (and Afghanistan) in an era when communism was the only threat and Islamic extremism was no threat to the US itself.

One has to go to a period earlier than 9-11 (2001) to see why the Islamists of Pakistan who got everything they could dream of (money, power, praise) from from America, went against the US. After all, even after the US left it was the Taliban who gained complete control of Afghanistan, and Pakistan was as powerful as it could get - having expanded its influence over Afghanistan apart from possessing nukes. Was it just greed and resentment that the US "lost interest" in Pakistan that made Islamists attack the US on 9-11?

Let me tell you my version of this. The Pakistan Army-Taliban combine saw themselves as having helped the US defeat the Soviet Union. They assumed that the US would continue to help as they defeated India through insurgency and terrorism. The US did not do that (or was unable to do that). This is what set up great anger against the US. "We the Pakistan army and the Islamists helped you the US and you are not helping us" . There was an initial spillover of jihadis into various parts of the world culminating with 9-11.

It was 9-11 that reversed the traditional Pakistani-Islamist cooperation with the US and it was 9-11 that ensured that the US started looking for a rift between Islamists and "others" - with "others" being moderates or opportunists. Musharraf was one such moderate appearing opportunist who understood that attacking the US is a bad idea. He helped the US in sidelining Isamists at some risk to himself.

But the game (if you exclude the India factor) is now Islamists versus the US. The US is now willing to fund anyone who opposes the Islamists in the same way that it funded anyone (including the Islamists) to oppose the Soviet Union. In an earlier era it was the Islamist opportunists who gained from the US and now it is the "moderate/pretender opportunists" who gain from the US.

So no matter which way one dices it the following well known truths remains true:

• 1) The Islamists (Ziaists) oppose the US
  2) The Opportunists/moderates would rather accommodate both the US and the Islamists
  3) Both the Islamists and the moderates/opportunists would rather fight India
  4) The opportunists would rather not take onthe Islamists
  5) The real islamists are willing to take anyone on. They think they took on and defeated the Soviets. They believe they have the US on the mat. They have no hesitation in taking on the Pakistan army factions that behave as pro-US moderates.

The following 3 statements by you are significant and interrelated

• One of the things that happened in Zia's time is that the established 'culture' of PA officer life simply moved from the mess to officers homes. The majority of officers continued to drink together, and didn't even really try to keep it a secret. Its typical of many Islamic eras when the emphasis is on the regulation of public life, while simultaneously reassuring people that you could do whatever you wanted in private. It is a situation that breeds hypocrisy and opportunism.
• From everything I've read and heard, the Americans are clearly worried about junior and mid ranked PA officers.
• But on the whole, its become harder for them to break through the glass ceiling. This dichotomy between field grade and general officers is part of the PA's growing problems with cohesion, and which is why the brass so desperately need a war, or at least a war crisis with India.

British style messes and bars in the armed forces were not designed for debauchery and kufr. They actually encouraged cameraderie and allowed junior officers to mix informally and socially with seniors. A vertical relationship was fostered and maintained.

When the parties and drinking went private, the socialization became more horizontal than vertical. And that is why there is a whole cadre of junior officers who are totally changed. The "glass ceiling" only indicates the presence of the wall between junior and senor. I just wonder how long it can last before time decimates the seniors.

But there is a rift in the Paki armed forces to the extent that the Paki officers will not be able to order their men to fight the jihadis, while the jihadis are motivated enough to fight the army. It is difficult to say what this mans for nukes - but I believe Musharraf was slimy enough to make the US eat out of his hands while appearing to be a slave. He is likely to have appeased the Islamists somewhere. After all the Kunduz airlift was under his watch and Al Q numbers 3.14...000 to 3.14...500 were all caught as he lapped up US$ 8 billion.

Shiv, Johann, others:

We hear a lot of rhetoric on the Indian side about supporting "democratic" forces in Pakistan, presumably forces equivalent to the opportunistic element of Pakistani military. What if India did the opposite--actively undermined this opportunistic / pseudo-democratic element through rhetoric, refusal to talk, etc., while not actively supporting the Ziaists? How do you see the nuclear scenario playing out in that case? A question here is, does India's choice in this regard have any impact at all?

cross post for completion - it is relevant to this topic

arun wrote:X Posted. Excerpt dealing with the security of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan’s nuclear weapon arsenal from the transcript of the interview of our Minister of State for External Affairs, Shashi Tharoor by Karan Thapar:

Karan Thapar: ………………… Let me move to something that concerns everyone and clearly it concerns President Obama: the state of Pakistan's nuclear weapons. In his speech he seems to have suggested it that they could fall into terrorists' hand. So let me as Minister of State of Foreign affairs ask you bluntly: how safe do you believe are Pakistan's nuclear weapons?

Shashi Tharoor: We don't have first hand information on that. But certainly those who do and those who are very close to Pakistan are seem to be convinced, at least in terms of various private soundings, that there is nothing to worry about in that area.
Obviously, we will never be complacent about these things but Pakistan, for all its limitations, does have a strong military establishment. As of now, in any case, they appeared to be in control of their own weapons.

Karan Thapar: Pakistan says their weapons are secured and that they are in complete control. Do you take at that face value?

Shashi Tharoor: At this stage, yes, we have no reason to doubt that yet.

Karan Thapar: Was this subject discussed between the Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and American President Obama when he (Manmohan Singh) visited Washington recently?

Shashi Tharoor: I have no reason to believe so. It certainly was not part of debriefing that I received, so I don't know.

Karan Thapar: Does India have its own contingency plan of action, in case Pakistan's nuclear weapon seem to be in danger of falling into the wrong hands?

Shashi Tharoor: Look, we are not there yet. I am little anxious- not to get into unnecessary alarmism at this point. Pakistan has lot of difficulties but they are not about to fall apart yet as a state and they are not about to have their army surrendering control of its most prized military assets to irregulars.

So at this stage this is not a concern. But obviously this is a further argument for why, as the Prime Minister has repeatedly said, a stable, peaceful Pakistan is in our interest too.

Karan Thapar: Are you sounding sanguine or are you in danger of sounding little complacent?

Shashi Tharoor: No, we are not complacent at all. What good it would do to worry the Indian public about a threat which at this point is purely theoretical.

Read it all:

Devil's Advocate: Tharoor speaks on Pak's N-arms

1) The Islamists (Ziaists) oppose the US
2) The Opportunists/moderates would rather accommodate both the US and the Islamists
3) Both the Islamists and the moderates/opportunists would rather fight India
4) The opportunists would rather not take onthe Islamists
5) The real islamists are willing to take anyone on. They think they took on and defeated the Soviets. They believe they have the US on the mat. They have no hesitation in taking on the Pakistan army factions that behave as pro-US moderates.

No disagreements there whatsoever.

Zia was perhaps the archetypal opportunist Islamist. He realized that for Islamist ideology to be empowered an "interface" class of people who appeared moderate and cooperative with the Americans was essential

...If you step back 2-3 decades you find that it is America's involvement that gave the first opportunities to Islamists headed by Zia to control Pakistan (and Afghanistan) in an era when communism was the only threat and Islamic extremism was no threat to the US itself.

Again, I'm not sure about this.

Zia did not publicly articulate an ideology of hostility against the US in particular.In this he looked moderate compared to Khomeini. But the initial American view in the 1970s was that he was a religious fundamentalist who didn't really like the West and didn't want much to do with it outside normal economic relations.

It was under Zia that Jamaat-e-Islami mobs burned down the US embassy in Islamabad, and attacks were staged on American cultural and educational institutions throughout the country.

Zia, like Bhutto continued to articulate the idea of Pakistan in a 'third way camp'. Bhutto's version was secular, radical 'third worldism'. Zia's version of the third way was explicitly Islamic. He was satisfied with the same Bhutto-devised combination of OIC-paid French and donated Chinese weapons would serve Pakistan - there was no need for America, or specifically, the compromises that America would want.

Until the combined events of the Iranian revolution (during which the Marxists and Khomeinists struggled for control) and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Zia was seen as a fundamentalist who was not a particularly good prospect for alliance. The seriously considered prospect that Iran and Baluchistan as well as Afghanistan might go to the Soviets convinced the Americans they should try to work at least tactically with Zia.

It was a cautious engagement. Even when Reagan first came to power, US-Pakistani alliance was limited and cautious- US arms sales in 1981 to Pakistan were paid for not by the Americans, but by the Saudis. In return, the Pakistanis provided the Saudis with an anti-coup force.

But there were a number of influential Americans wanted the chance to really pay the Soviets back for Vietnam bad enough that they were willing to give Zia anything he wanted. "Charlie Wilson's War" tells that story well, and names who those people were, and how hard they had to work to change Zia's very poor image both within the US political establishment and general public. Zia was seen as someone who hanged political opponents, revived barbaric punishments (stoning, amputation), and enabled hostile fanaticism. Of course people who met him were surprised because the expect fanatics to be foaming at the mouth and screaming when contradicted in conversation -like Hitler - not polite, self-controlled and rational.

The Pakistan Army-Taliban combine saw themselves as having helped the US defeat the Soviet Union. They assumed that the US would continue to help as they defeated India through insurgency and terrorism. The US did not do that (or was unable to do that). This is what set up great anger against the US. "We the Pakistan army and the Islamists helped you the US and you are not helping us" . There was an initial spillover of jihadis into various parts of the world culminating with 9-11.

The Hamid Guls and Aslam Begs (who were around in the frosty 1972-1979 period) recognised the conflict between Zia's ideology and the Americans even before the war ended, when US aid was at its peak. They *expected* 'abandonment', and the resumption of the nuclear sanctions that were in place before the Soviet invasion to once the Soviets were gone. They repeatedly, and bitterly semi-publicly warned of it. And they were right.

The sanctions came back in 1990, and the US had no interest in the Ziaists larger agenda. Aslam Beg as COAS went as far as publicly proposing an Iranian-Pakistani alliance against the US - this was when Pakistan was selling them centrifuge technology, and cooperating with them and the North Koreans for ballistic missile technolgy. Zia throughout his regime kept good relations with Iran, staying neutral in the Iran-Iraq war, even as Shia activism was suppressed.

The PA's institutional response to this was not to embrace the Ziaists, but to make sure the top slot went to opportunists in order to maximise US support, however limited.

He is likely to have appeased the Islamists somewhere

Of course he did - besides Kunduz or OBL's survival there were other, even more significant choices. His rigging of elections in the Islamists favour in NWFP and Baluchistan in 2003 (the start of the Pakiban's meteoric growth), his support to the Taliban's leadership which peacefully settled in Quetta, his abandonment of Madrassa regulation and reform, etc.

Musharraf appeased as well as betrayed both the Americans and the jihadis. The difference between the Americans and the jihadis is that there were significant numbers of jihadis, especially Deobandis who despised Musharraf and sought to kill him no matter what favours he did.

The Islamists were necessary to Musharraf not just for external geopolitical purposes. Like all of the other opportunists, he used the Islamists and the political parties to check each other, switching support back and forth. When the Islamists demand became too threatening, he'd turn to the PPP and vice versa. The whole point of the exercise is to be indispensible to all the major players, however antagonistic they are to each other.

http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/ ... t_team.php

"Residents should leave the cities of Islamabad, Rawalpindi, Lahore, and Multan," Hakeemullah said, warning that government institutions will be targeted, after he took credit for a series of attacks on police and intelligence services in Lahore in May.

I wonder why all the residents are being urged to leave?

KV Rao wrote: We hear a lot of rhetoric on the Indian side about supporting "democratic" forces in Pakistan, presumably forces equivalent to the opportunistic element of Pakistani military. What if India did the opposite--actively undermined this opportunistic / pseudo-democratic element through rhetoric, refusal to talk, etc., while not actively supporting the Ziaists? How do you see the nuclear scenario playing out in that case? A question here is, does India's choice in this regard have any impact at all?

Rao garu I have never really understood what the hell Indian spokespersons are talking about when they talk of support to democracy in Pakistan. Anyone who looks at Pakistan with any seriousness will realise that democracy in Pakistan is empty rhetoric. There is no democracy worth mentioning. It's a bit like saying, "I respect and support this whore's virginity".

Perhaps India's statements were a diplomatic way of saying that they cannot support any current group in Pakistan?

A lot of this thread is about the PA's ability to enforce its orders through its chain of command, so I thought I'd cross post this from the TSP thread;
==============================================================

The Pakistan Army from around 1964-65 onwards reworked Pakistan's ideology in a way that was quite durable until about 2003.

The fundamental tenet was that the PA was army of Islam. More specifically, *whatever* the PA did, under the command of the COAS and senior officers was for the greater good of Islam and of Pakistan.

In other words, Islam==Pakistan==Pakistan Army==PA brass

The acceptance of this ideology by Pakjab and significant sections of the NWFP's population gave the PA's leadership enormous manoeuvring room in terms of overall strategy and tactics, because at the end of the day the public accepted the general officers decisions as the right choices for Pakistan and Islam.

Certainly, it was not significantly questioned within the PA itself, and that significantly contributed to the stability of the chain of command within the PA.

Zia however introduced a new, more restrictive set of yardsticks of how the interests of Islam and Pakistan were to be measured, and he heavily promoted those within both the PA and the wider society. Although the people who succeeded Aslam Beg in commanding the PA were closer in mold to the pre-Zia leadership, these kinds of officers and men remained a powerful minority, and with them the dangerous (to the opportunists) that there was a higher moral authority on earth than the COAS and collective senior PA leadership.

Musharraf purged the generals of anyone who might think of acting independently, but the lower ranks have not received the same kind of attention.

The PA as an institution can not survive this current conflict when it has officers who not only think that the PA is on the wrong side, but are prepared to act against the PA and its leadership as well.

In Egypt, Algeria, Syria, the old Irag, monitoring and purging of *all ranks* has been a priority since the revolutionary regimes came to power in the 1950s and 1960s - after all these countries were wracked by ideological conflicts that swept every institution, including the army, and produced coups, counter-coups and counter-counter coups. Those who emerged on top like Hafez al-Asad, or Saddam, or Nasser, etc paid *very* close attention to military loyalty, acting swiftly and ruthlessly against all threats. Their successors continue to do so. It has allowed them to survive *every* internal threat from both secret organisations, as well as general unpopularity with the public.

Pakistan and the PA in many ways saw far fewer ideological conflicts at the grassroots level until the arrival of the 'War on Terror', and so the mechanisms of lower level surveillance, deterrence and punishment within the government and army were not nearly as well developed. The PA is moving in that direction now. They can not tolerate strong independent opinions or convictions in the PA's ranks any longer. They have no choice but to assert the pre-Zia ideological formulation, and back it up with a disciplined, unquestioningly loyal police state.

What will this do to the PA as a fighting force? It remains to be seen.

shiv wrote:

KV Rao wrote: We hear a lot of rhetoric on the Indian side about supporting "democratic" forces in Pakistan, presumably forces equivalent to the opportunistic element of Pakistani military. What if India did the opposite--actively undermined this opportunistic / pseudo-democratic element through rhetoric, refusal to talk, etc., while not actively supporting the Ziaists? How do you see the nuclear scenario playing out in that case? A question here is, does India's choice in this regard have any impact at all?

Rao garu I have never really understood what the hell Indian spokespersons are talking about when they talk of support to democracy in Pakistan. Anyone who looks at Pakistan with any seriousness will realise that democracy in Pakistan is empty rhetoric. There is no democracy worth mentioning. It's a bit like saying, "I respect and support this whore's virginity".

Perhaps India's statements were a diplomatic way of saying that they cannot support any current group in Pakistan?

I am trying to bend over backwards to get away from the premise that Indian spokesmen are so willfully blind that they will not see that if there is a popular democracy established in Pakistan, w/o US bribes to military, then we would have a government that would be openly seething with hatred against India, and, by corollary, to the extent to which the current system there is democratic and populist, the system is in fact more, and not less, hostile to India. From thinking, they (GOI) can't possibly as stupid as they seem, I am progressing to try and understand if there is something Chankian in their repeated assertions about Paki democrcy etc., or possibly I am missing some important nuances due to my jingoistic glasses.

On the other hand, experience teaches that if you want to divine the intention of anyone, GOI, GOP, Uncle whoever, the best place to start is by taking their consistent and repeated assertions at face value, and accept that blindness and stupidity do exist, even though at times it may be inconceivable.

Johann wrote:A lot of this thread is about the PA's ability to enforce its orders through its chain of command, so I thought I'd cross post this from the TSP thread;
==============================================================

The Pakistan Army from around 1964-65 onwards reworked Pakistan's ideology in a way that was quite durable until about 2003.

The fundamental tenet was that the PA was army of Islam. More specifically, *whatever* the PA did, under the command of the COAS and senior officers was for the greater good of Islam and of Pakistan.

In other words, Islam==Pakistan==Pakistan Army==PA brass

The acceptance of this ideology by Pakjab and significant sections of the NWFP's population gave the PA's leadership enormous manoeuvring room in terms of overall strategy and tactics, because at the end of the day the public accepted the general officers decisions as the right choices for Pakistan and Islam.

Certainly, it was not significantly questioned within the PA itself, and that significantly contributed to the stability of the chain of command within the PA.

Zia however introduced a new, more restrictive set of yardsticks of how the interests of Islam and Pakistan were to be measured, and he heavily promoted those within both the PA and the wider society. Although the people who succeeded Aslam Beg in commanding the PA were closer in mold to the pre-Zia leadership, these kinds of officers and men remained a powerful minority, and with them the dangerous (to the opportunists) that there was a higher moral authority on earth than the COAS and collective senior PA leadership.

Musharraf purged the generals of anyone who might think of acting independently, but the lower ranks have not received the same kind of attention.

The PA as an institution can not survive this current conflict when it has officers who not only think that the PA is on the wrong side, but are prepared to act against the PA and its leadership as well.

In Egypt, Algeria, Syria, the old Irag, monitoring and purging of *all ranks* has been a priority since the revolutionary regimes came to power in the 1950s and 1960s - after all these countries were wracked by ideological conflicts that swept every institution, including the army, and produced coups, counter-coups and counter-counter coups. Those who emerged on top like Hafez al-Asad, or Saddam, or Nasser, etc paid *very* close attention to military loyalty, acting swiftly and ruthlessly against all threats. Their successors continue to do so. It has allowed them to survive *every* internal threat from both secret organisations, as well as general unpopularity with the public.

Pakistan and the PA in many ways saw far fewer ideological conflicts at the grassroots level until the arrival of the 'War on Terror', and so the mechanisms of lower level surveillance, deterrence and punishment within the government and army were not nearly as well developed. The PA is moving in that direction now. They can not tolerate strong independent opinions or convictions in the PA's ranks any longer. They have no choice but to assert the pre-Zia ideological formulation, and back it up with a disciplined, unquestioningly loyal police state.

What will this do to the PA as a fighting force? It remains to be seen.

This is only my speculation but I don't think they can unsqueeze that particular tube of toothpaste. They could spin it as Pakistan being all about Islam (as Kiyani saw fit to assert recently), as opposed to the Pakistani army being in charge of the definition of what Islam's army means. A subtle distinction, but one that moves to a more civilian control of the army, which is to say the army will lose whatever rationality, modernity of outlook, and professionalism it had, and become more and more a sword-arm of irrational fanaticism. The generals will be channeling more Hamid Gul than Ayub khan.

I am upping this thread to remind people that a some discussion on this issue has already been done and there is some gyan here.

Yes, I was looking for an appropriate thread to ask this question: with all the oversupply of water in pakistan and, ahem, attentions diverted, what are the prospects of some aspects of the country's nuclear facilities changing hands? Clearly only the Army and the Islamist conglomerate are of any use here, so the prospect of control in certain areas slipping from one to the other is not inconceivable.

JE Menon wrote:Yes, I was looking for an appropriate thread to ask this question: with all the oversupply of water in pakistan ahem, attentions diverted, what are the prospects of some aspects of the country's nuclear facilities changing hands? Clearly only the Army and the Islamist conglomerate are of any use here, so if the prospect of control in certain areas slipping from one to the other is not inconceivable.

JEM - I think Johann had some interesting inputs here but the information is such that most Indian on this forum are unwilling to believe it on the grounds that such ideas are blasphemous and would be an example of India's closing their eyes and hoping for the best by clutching straws that reassured them.

Let me explain that.

It is not clear that only one entity rules over Pakistan completely. Pakistan, to all intents and purposes is a mixture of cooperating and competing power centers. For example - a power center with arms and bombs - such as the islamists might stand opposed to the army on some issues. Nevertheless the Pakistan army retains the maximum coercive power, and that includes nuclear weapons.

So what might persuade the Pakistani army that it needs to hand over control of some of those weapons to someone else? The only situation I can think of where the weapons might be spirited away to some other location would be to safeguard them from Indian or US attack and retain a Pakistani nuke capability. But why would this be entrusted to a non army group. If the weapons do go to an "islamist" group the most likely scenario is that the Islamist group is only a deniable cover for the Pakistani army and the Army retain control. Handing it over to an autonomous group over which the army does not retain control is dangerous for the Pakistan army in several ways. First it could be used against them, or their interests. Secondly the use of nukes by an autonomous group could invite retaliation on the Pakistan army itself. The third point is that I believe that satellites of all nations will be watching Pakistan carefully now. Every armed force and government in the world with the capability will be watching what is happening to Pakistani military installations. besides, with roads and bridges damaged - this might be the worst time to move anything.

So I believe that if any movement has to be done - it will already have been done, or will be attempted when the Pakistan watchers can be deceived.

The only question I have is how much flooding has occurred in silos and underground bunkers. I am certain that these would have been contsructed to be earthquake and flood resistant, but we don't know. Isloo is up in the hills and above the water.

Where are Pak nukes known to be present? Margala? Chashma?

shiv wrote: Where are Pak nukes known to be present? Margala? Chashma?

Shiv Ji I have tried to keep up with this Nuke business for a year as a lurker and member here now.When you say Pak nukes, what exactly do you mean-
According to me nukes are categorized into :
1). Dirty bum, radiation spewing with TNT mixed with other lethal ingredients.
2). JDAM- Low yield tactical nuclear warhead.
3). 10-40 KT nukes
4) T Nukes.
5) something I am missing.

I have been wanting to ask this question for a long time but somehow gathered the courage only now.Kindly explain so that confusion for me and I am sure lurkers around here would finish and would be able to debate from that point onwards without fear of getting ridiculed.
Most would not dare ask question like this to a highly respected senior member like you.

Manishw wrote: According to me nukes are categorized into :
1). Dirty bum, radiation spewing with TNT mixed with other lethal ingredients.
2). JDAM- Low yield tactical nuclear warhead.
3). 10-40 KT nukes
4) T Nukes.

1) Dirty bum, radiation spewing with TNT mixed with other lethal ingredients.
In theory a terrorist group could get this - not just from Pakistan, but, as is often alleged, from unguarded stocks in the former Soviet Union. I think there is a philosophical question that crops up with regard to "dirty radiation spewing" bums.

They are terror weapons that have been conjured up by literature and gamers but have never been used. They have some potential for use, but they are unlikely to cause deaths even in the hundreds, leave alone hundreds of thousands like a standard atomic explosive. The nuclear material for this is hard to obtain, hard to handle and store. If used they can cause local disruption and possibly some localised environmental contamination.

But in no way can this be called a "strategic weapon of war or subjugation". It is a panic causing weapon. I have read recently in the news that the Times Square bomber could have cause "thousands of deaths" in New York. I believe that is total hype and the media tend to hype that sort of thing - just like the initial estimates of the number of dead after 9-11 was 15,000 or more.

2) JDAM- Low yield tactical nuclear warhead.
By JDAM I presume you mean "Jihadi Delivered Atomic Munition".
Low yield tactical nuclear devices are extremely sophisticated and are not easy to make. It is easier to plonk together two lumps of U 235 to make a critical mass and get a 10 kiloton bomb than a low yield tactical nuke of 0.5 kiloton. None of these are in the "suitcase" category. None is likely to weigh much less than 150Kg at best and I believe only the US and Russia currently have experience in making such devices. Jihadis getting such devices is unlikely.

3). 10-40 KT nukes
This is within Pakistan's capability. This is what we need to think about when we talk of JDAM. Unlikely to be of suitcase size. Likely to be deliverable unconventionally be truck or shipping container.

4) T Nukes:
By "T nukes" I presume you mean Thermonuclear bum. Given the level of skepticism expressed over India's ability to produce TN bomb, the likelihood of anyone having small (less than 200 kg), workin and reliable thermonukes outsode of the US, Russsia, China, UK and France is low. But even if Pakistan had one or more of these - the issue falss into the same category as 3 above.


3 is what I refer to when I speak of bombs in terrorist hands.

^^^Confusion is cleared sir, Thanks for the good deed on ID for helping me and people like me.Now it would be much easier to follow and participate in future discussions.Once again Thank you Saar.

shiv wrote:So what might persuade the Pakistani army that it needs to hand over control of some of those weapons to someone else? The only situation I can think of where the weapons might be spirited away to some other location would be to safeguard them from Indian or US attack and retain a Pakistani nuke capability. But why would this be entrusted to a non army group. If the weapons do go to an "islamist" group the most likely scenario is that the Islamist group is only a deniable cover for the Pakistani army and the Army retain control.

Shiv, if you are referring to the fission-type HEU bombs, they are supposed to be in 'recessed deterrence' which means technical expertise is needed to assemble them into a useful warhead. Besides, they need to be mated to the delivery vehicle. My expectation, therefore, is that rather than 'spiriting away' these devices, which gives the jihadis absolutely no way of detonating them, they would simply occupy the launch silos and weapon sites and with either insider connivance or threats, fire them. The collapse will be from within. The PA may simply feign 'gross breach of security' and India may may be pressurized not to retaliate because non-state actors were involved.

As I said in the other thread, Javid nasir, Hamid Gul, Mahmoud Ahmed, Nadeem Taj were DGs of ISID but Islamist jihadis to the core. What do we know about Shuja Pasha or Khalid Kidwai (he was a PoW in Indian hands in 1971) ?

The suitcase-type dirty bombs are another matter altogether.

SSridhar wrote: Shiv, if you are referring to the fission-type HEU bombs, they are supposed to be in 'recessed deterrence' which means technical expertise is needed to assemble them into a useful warhead. Besides, they need to be mated to the delivery vehicle. My expectation, therefore, is that rather than 'spiriting away' these devices, which gives the jihadis absolutely no way of detonating them, they would simply occupy the launch silos and weapon sites and with either insider connivance or threats, fire them. The collapse will be from within. The PA may simply feign 'gross breach of security' and India may may be pressurized not to retaliate because non-state actors were involved.

Absolutely correct Sridhar - but I just did not want to add that extra level of complexity to the post.

But the PA "feigning gross breach of security" is too flimsy an excuse for allowing one sided nuclear war to occur; there are too many consequences of that - but I was going to put down some thoughts on the managing Pakistan thread because I think the issue f nuclear usage cannot be separated from the goals of various actors in Pakistan.

Shiv
>>If the weapons do go to an "islamist" group the most likely scenario is that the Islamist group is only a deniable cover for the Pakistani army and the Army retain control.

SSridhar
>>My expectation, therefore, is that rather than 'spiriting away' these devices, which gives the jihadis absolutely no way of detonating them, they would simply occupy the launch silos and weapon sites and with either insider connivance or threats, fire them. The collapse will be from within. The PA may simply feign 'gross breach of security' ...

Above two views reinforce my own perception. Not that I’m trying to inject the idea that the PA and the Islamist conglomerate are separate entities in anything other than description and name. One may be a serving brigader, while the other a retired brigadier, colonel, major or whatever. The “retirement” notion is meaningless in the PA case and in the west there is a tendency to overplay this issue (probably for political expediency rather than anything else). I’m trying rather to understand the mechanics of how such a transfer would occur.

Would it be wholesale transfer? Probably not, but rather in a staggered fashion – so that the efficacy of the system could be tested.

Would it be mainly to the cadre of the LeT? Most likely, with other selected individuals – on basis of Islamist commitment/anti-India sentiment/soldierly qualities (respect for hierarchy, etc).

When would such a transfer be initiated? Based on Kidwai’s initial statement to the Italian journalists, and subsequent modifications, could one assume that the conditions are already past for such an exigency? In which case, might the transfer process already have begun?

My feeling, given the relative public silence of the PA over the past two weeks of difficult circumstances, to say the least, is that there is some serious discussion going on about what to do. Maybe the transfer has already begun, at least in terms of “guarding” facilities, etc.

This need not lead to war, of course. But it may certainly fulfil a "training" role for a future one.

It is clear that there is more than enough info exchange between the retired and the serving officer class to render this transfer fairly efficiently in my opinion.

I hope the people watching, are watching closely.

Three years after the last post and having had time to reflect we need to differentiate between nuclear terrorism and nuclear terror and their causes and origins.

Nuclear Terrorism

Nuclear terrorism is terrorism using nuclear weapons. These can be caused by :
1) states or
2) entities supported by states or
3) rogue factions of the state or
4) rogue entities who have acquired the weapons by benign or hostile actions.

Let us deal with them step by step here.

From states:

Here we are talking about TSP and PRC individually or jointly. The whole purpose of the 1989 weaponization and the 1998 tests, the promulgation of the MND, formation of Strategic Forces command is to counter the threats from formal states. Shyam Saran has restated and clarified where necessary the Nuclear Doctrine recently. Short answer: If anyone uses a nuke on India or Indian forces in a foreign soil then India will massively retaliate. If they have allies they will get it too.

From entities supported by states :

Here we are talking about terrorist groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba and other sundry sarkari terrorists located in TSP. Now one has to look at things from TSP perspective and think whether they can trust such groups of using them Bhasmasur fashion on the TSP itself, or if such groups are already penetrated by foreign intelligence agencies of US, Russia, China and even India. The fact that LeT is allowed to survive shows there is an interest in keeping it alive as holding pen for all undesirable elements in TSP. Given that it has been accused of aiding the nuke proliferation network from TSP, it should have been wound up soon after 9/11. Also the ease with which Daoud Gilani aka David Hadley hobnobbed with the upper echelons shows how easy it is for US agents to penetrate it. And who else is an academic question. So a TSP handing over nukes to a sarkari terrorist group is probable but not plausible. A more probable scenario would be a TSP military strike force doffing their uniforms/temporarily irregular forces and carrying out a nuke attack. But then this reverts to the state actors scenario already discussed above and the MND addresses it.


Rogue factions of the state

Here we are only addressing a rogue or rebel takeover of the TSP. We don't expect such a case for PRC for that would be a much bigger world problem with US and Russia in the mix.
A rogue or rebel takeover of TSP can occur when the military splits due to inherent contradictions or factions coming to power. TSP military is a hierarchical organization with a clear chain of command. It is devoid of a colonels coup. All the coups so far have been by the military with the consent of the Corps Commanders. We just have seen the transition from one civilian to another civilian government in TSP after the transition from military to civilian led rule. US has provided PALs for TSP nukes, and funded proximate security of weapons and the personnel screening program is with US insights. Yes at present time one has no choice but to rely on these measures which are not internationally verifiable.
However if a rogue or rebel faction seizes power and grabs nukes and launches a nuke it has to be dealt with as a state attack on India. There will be fundamental markers for the advent of a rogue faction seizing power in TSP and would and should be monitored by India. It will not be an overnight bolt from blue event. Recall for instance that Vajpayee greeted Mushy as President just as he was about to declare himself as such. and th Kargil tapes which show the extensive vigilance that India exerts.
Nuclear weapons are mass casualty weapons acquired after extensive infrastructure or geopolitical alliances. And looking at current state of TSP, it survives on dole from its 3.5 friends who only provide it due to the presence of nukes. If such an even occurs they group in power would find itself without the sinews of war.



Rogue entities who have acquired the weapons by benign or hostile actions

So what are we talking about here? We are talking about TTP or some such entity hostile to the existing power groups in Islamabad acquiring nukes or being allowed to acquire nukes by the state. TTP is a Pakistani Pashtun entity confined to FATA/WANA areas and occasionally attacking the state organs in Karachi. It has also shown its presence in Pakjab but not to the extent in other areas. It appears so far to be allowed to persist by the will of the State and not against the will of the State. It would be crushed by the TSP military if they so chose. For it to be able to acquire nukes the situation in TSP has to deteriorate further with breakdown of official organizations like the Army and the police. Again its not an overnight bolt from the blue event but will have precursors and markers to show the way. This scenario is again in the realm of probable but not plausible. Further a group like TTP, under constant drone attack, would find others with whom they have to settle scores before turning a beady eye at India.


Lets us then define

Nuclear Terror

Nuclear Terror is the terror of nuclear weapons being used by any entity against India and Indians. So it is the sum of all fears stated above. And to deal with fear one has to be informed and have insurance in case of the event realization. First of all dirty bombs are no capable of causing prompt mass casualties. Yes it will be bad day but India has suffered much more bad events than this: tsunamis, earthquakes, massive floods, Delhi Market Cobalt 60 radiation event etc. India has an effective disaster management authority, which after initial organizational inertia, does swing into effective action. To back that up the armed forces and the police and civil administration have shown their capability time and again. So dirty bomb is a brutus fulmen or useless thunderbolt. And one should not fear it.

We already talked about the many facets of nuclear terrorism and how India plans or needs to plan to address it. So being fearful is not the answer but to know what makes one fearful and take measure to negate the fear. And to be cautiously optimistic about the future for India.

Also Spinster commented on the 1971 death of Lin Biao or Lin Piao who was the PRC Defense Minister and a decorated war hero who was part of the Gang of Four and he was supposed to be killed in plane crash and most likely executed by Mao in the power struggle. That was an early instance of the PLA leadership revloting against the CPC in Peking. however I did not want to confuse the readers as I wanted to concentrate on the TSP nuclear terrorism.

Looking at the timing it seems to be in the after math of the Kissinger visits to China.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lin_Biao