Pakistan nuclear capability, fissile material and sites

[krishnan]

Well do they have the structure and command in place in case such a thing happened? No one even known who has the button

[shiv]

So the Jihadis know where the bums are assembled - probably the best place where they can get all the components together.
If they are lucky, they'll get one without the PALs in place, a clean bomb without all the messy electronic locks.

No Gagan - its a lot lot more complicated than that. The best thing that a jihadi could hope for would be to try and get enriched Uranium with no other bomb components to worry about. That is just the fissile cores alone. I will make a longer explanatory post in due course.

[Gagan]

No Gagan - its a lot lot more complicated than that. The best thing that a jihadi could hope for would be to try and get enriched Uranium with no other bomb components to worry about. That is just the fissile cores alone. I will make a longer explanatory post in due course.

That is the conventional story in vogue these days.
1. The Jihadis want to get their hands on fissile material and do a JDAM on some city in the west or India.
They are reported to have 'sufficient physics' to be able to do so as per India's NSA.
(a) The stated goal is that even if they don't manage nuclear fission, they will create an explosion that will spread a lot of fissile material all around the place, contaminate the surroundings and create terror, which is their goal in the first place.
(b) If the indication of dirty bomb in a western city is a Pakistani Armed Forces Nuclear Weapon (Uranium based 1st generation whichever, Gun design or an implosion design) that is a fizzle, is inefficient but spews fissile material all over the place, but still manages a subkiloton yield, even then the terrorist's purpose gets done.

The point is if all that the terrorists want is enriched uranium or plutonium (too goddamn toxic), wouldn't they be attacking Kahuta or the other enrichment plants? The one at Gadwal, Wah infact seems to have the ability to convert that UHF gas into metallic Uranium.
Why attack AWC, Sargodha, Kamra, and now Mehran? (agreed Mehran is unusual, because the Goth Arms depot attached to Masroor is where the bums are)
These places are where weapons and components are kept, if the Jihadis have control, they can get all the components together, if they are lucky, they might get an assembled bomb.

Pakistan might talk loud about the security infrastructure they have in place at these sites, but this is very scary.
In each of these high profile attempts, the Jihadis have displayed uncanny knowledge and insider intel. It is absolutely possible that people who have formerly served at these bases and are now retired might be giving them intel.

And it is entirely possible, that the Jihadis will be able to rapidly assemble and detonate such a bomb if they can get a hold of the dis-assembled components in a swift attack. Pakistanis' martial armed forces can't be relied upon to be able to deter a swift and determined attack by well trained personnel. Period.

I fear that a fully assembled bomb in the hands of the Jihadis is a matter of when and not if.

Pakistan can't be trusted to retain a nuclear arsenal, they have to be de-nuked of the fizzles that they have now. Those fizzles are of no deterrence value to a power like India, they are instead perfect terrorist weapons.

[shiv]

That is the conventional story in vogue these days.

Gagan - I will post something on this stuff. The "conventional story" has a very strong reason based on science. A fully deliverable bomb has a couple of problems. Triggering and delivery. But I will post details (I am composing the post right now and it is saved on the forum "save post" function. A ready to deliver bomb has a lot more hassles than fissile material. It's not impossible for jihadis to want or get a ready deliverable bomb, but they will need the delivery mechanism to go with it. The fuzing and trigger are related to the delivery mechanism. A nuke bomb cannot just be dropped or instructed to explode. You need to steal all the related paraphernalia. The easiest would be to steal a bomb that has been armed and loaded to an aircraft, - or an entire ready to fire missile. But even after that there are problems.

Fissile material is far more valuable. And easier to steal and convert to a bomb to suit one's own needs. Not easy. But "easier"

[amit]

^^^^
Doc, Gagan,

Reading your posts got me thinking.

Now if we make two very probable assumptions:

1) A rouge nuclear bomb would be aimed for some Indian city if not for anything else it's much easier to deliver logistically than to some Western capital city. And besides we've got to remember that India has been the training/testing ground of new modes of terror.

2) While the the mango Abdul terrorist is a crazy with no brains, I think the handlers (ISI types) are crazy but they certainly have brains and can at least till some point think through a situation.

Now given these two assumptions, I would tend to think a dirty bomb, which spews radiation and causes terror would be the preferred device because the assumption would be - this is my guess - while India will be too confused to immediately react, it would give time to get international pressure to bear on India to not retaliate massively on Pakistan because the actual physical damage would not be much, even though thousands would be affected.

However, a full fledged bomb, even a small one, delivered by, say a rouge PAF officer flying a F sholah would invite instant retribution.

I don't buy the idea that the top terror leadership in Pakistan and the ISI bosses like Hamid Gul are itching to meet their 72s. They love the good life too much. So the calculation could be that a dirty bomb which spews radiation more than causing physical destruction would be the preferred option.

I think India needs to articulate clearly its position on a possible dirty bomb attack. Has it done so?

[Gagan]

Shiv saar, eagerly waiting for your post.

Amit-ji,
From the Taliban POV, their goal seems to be control of Pakistan and then Af-Pak as a whole. They seem to have divided their efforts with one group carrying out operations in Afghanistan against the Americans, and the other (TTP) going all out against Pakistan.

The other Jihadis in Pakistan's Punjab are being held back by the ISI, but the Jihadi foot soldier's sympathies lie with the Talibs.

Now with the talibs' immediate goal being to take control of Pakistan, their immediate target for a JDAM, the most fesable one will be a Pakistani city itself. The day that happens, I'll bet these guys will still be spinning conspiracy theories on how this was a CIA, Mossad, RAW, RAMA job.

Pakistan which has lived by the sword is destined to die by it.

For that JDAM to travel overseas, to target India, or a western city needs the intel, logistics that only the ISI can muster. This is where the ISI's jehadis come in. Groups such as the LET would be ISI's natural JDAM delivery boys.

[amit]

Shiv saar, eagerly waiting for your post.

Amit-ji,
From the Taliban POV, their goal seems to be control of Pakistan and then Af-Pak as a whole. They seem to have divided their efforts with one group carrying out operations in Afghanistan against the Americans, and the other (TTP) going all out against Pakistan.

The other Jihadis in Pakistan's Punjab are being held back by the ISI, but the Jihadi foot soldier's sympathies lie with the Talibs.

Now with the talibs' immediate goal being to take control of Pakistan, their immediate target for a JDAM, the most fesable one will be a Pakistani city itself. The day that happens, I'll bet these guys will still be spinning conspiracy theories on how this was a CIA, Mossad, RAW, RAMA job.

Pakistan which has lived by the sword is destined to die by it.

For that JDAM to travel overseas, to target India, or a western city needs the intel, logistics that only the ISI can muster. This is where the ISI's jehadis come in. Groups such as the LET would be ISI's natural JDAM delivery boys.

Considering that an attack on India is a way to ease pressure and rally jihadis, is there a chance that the ISI could actually facilitate a JDAM so as to ensure there isn't one in Pakjab? If maal goes missing ISI will get to know pronto and it probably would have some intel on an effort to hit a Pak city but may not have the capacity to prevent it, so maybe a pre-emptive on India using LeT? If a JDAM goes off in India, the Talibs would certainly put on hold their own plans in Pakjab because if they carry it out, they could be branded by ISI as Indian stooges. There can be no worse insult for the pure breed.

[Gagan]

I raise this question:
Where in India will a JDAM going off, make India halt in its tracks and not strike back immediately.
Sufficient time for Pakistan's traditional saviours - the international community, to pitch in to hold India back from retaliation.

This has been Pakistan's modus operandi in every war, every major terror attack against India. They just have to ride out the initial period when India might lash out in anger, later on, the international community will bear on on the Nai Dilli leadership and ensure that piss and talks ensue.

My answer: One of the bomb manufacturing or storage locations in India. It will make India turn inwards to investigate if this was one of India's or a true JDAM attack.
And what if that bomb manufacturing location also happened to lie in a major city? That'll be like taking out two birds with one stone for the crazy generals in the Pakistan Army.

[Prasad]

Gagan,
To answer that question, one would need to see what the motive behind a jdam attack would be. Would they want to use it as just another bum, just that its a terribly larger bum to kill more people? Or, especially if its an ISI contracted hit, use it as a political tool (more than a std terrorist bum i.e.).

If its the latter, what is the end game?

a) Do they hit a city like mumbai and rile up the yindoos and then poke fun at their face while the yindoos are faced with nuke cleanup in a major city, massive loss of h&d, tons of ppl killed/injured. Yindoos can't retaliate due to international pressure and pakis white-faced lies that it was rogue elements onlee or chinnaswamy ganguly home-grown terrorists onlee.

Pakis would be utterly stupid to think that the yindoos will sit by and accept western talk about restraint. They will nuke pakiland out of existence. But then when has a paki ever been able to think properly beyond the length of his mijjile.

b) Do they hit ND? And take out a good part of government machinery. Maybe if the PM and cabinet is in ND, and jdam is close enough, they could incapacitate the govt for a while. This could be a precursor for a fullscale assault by PA. Not quite sure what they'd achieve with this though. They can probably gain some inroads in the border areas before IA pushes them back or stops them. Who would retaliate if there is no functioning govt? This would be akin to the fears of the US and roos when they thought the enemy would nuke DC or the Kremlin as a precursor to outright war. Though in our case, pakis raising hara jhanda over lal qila is a wet dream and some nut in ghq might just think its possible.

c) They could hit a nuclear station near a major city. No need to elaborate where. This is the most troublesome because it wont be easy to find out if the station went kaput or if a jdam hit. Will take time to find out and frankly, also the worst target if the pakis want a "terror" tag to it. Investigations will take time and then news about a terror hit will come out slowly or not at all if the govt puts a lid on it. Will it serve a terror purpose? Apart from shutting down a nuke power station, no psychological effect at all. Also, it could be the jdam attack with the least possible chance of a reprisal attack by the yindoos unless MMS goes batshit crazy and thinks the pakis have crossed the neon line and decides to send them back to the stone age. Will be a cold calculated decision and much much later after the attack. Will it be done? I'm sure it will be.

[shiv]

There is a lot of general information about nukes, but very little that is country and design specific so we have to make indirect inferences from the general info and the scanty specifics.

Every nuclear arsenal in the world falls between the following two extremes:

1) Easiest "sure fire" bomb possible with 60 Kg of 90% enriched U235 with fairly rudimentary technology. Pakistan is definitely well past this and terrorist groups supported by Pakistani "nationalists" like Hamid Gul or Xerox Khan definitely have access to the technology to make this "easy bomb". But it probably will weigh 2-3 tons and will need that Orion to deliver it.

2) The opposite extreme has Small, efficient, reliable and safe bombs

I will be as concise as I can - but I just want to point out the problems involved with those four descriptive words

• Small
• Efficient
• Reliable
• Safe

Size and efficiency are related. It is easier to make a bigger, heavier bomb that is efficient (gives more bang per unit weight of U or Pu)

You can have a relatively small, inefficient bomb that is likely to fizzle but gives some yield - maybe even 2 or 5 kilotons. It will be an extremely dirty bomb because a whole lot of fissile material in the bomb will not be used up. Making a small efficient bomb that will say give 20 kilotons for the same size and perhaps lesser fissile material is more difficult.

Since fissile material (enriched Uranium or Plutonium) takes a lot of effort to produce and is very precious most people would like to make efficient bombs that will use up less fissile material to produce a big bang. The easiest is to make it bigger and heavier - but if it is bigger and heavier, it cannot be loaded on to some delivery systems like missiles. But if you want to make it lighter it may not work. It takes some nifty design work to make a bomb both light and use a small amount of fissile material.

Ideally you have to have tested various designs in live testing. Pakistan has not done that. But in the absence of live testing one can do cold testing with no fissile material or with small amounts of fissile material. Either way such testing requires some seriously sophisticated monitoring equipment including high speed X-ray imaging, other types of imaging and a high power computing ability. I am unable to see Pakistan's name among the operators of the top 500 supercomputers of the world. I m sure they have some computing ability - but the faster it is the better.

Given these constraints Pakistan is likely to have taken the route of using existing designs supplied to them by the Chinese. It is likely that they have developed some lighter warheads using composite Uranium plus Plutonium cores - i.e about 15 kg U and 2-3 kg Pu. But unless they have very good simulation, making light and reliable warheads may be a problem.

But the headaches do not end there. Anything that is done to increase efficiency and decrease size increases complexity and decreases reliability. You need a source of Deuterium/Tritium (birathers of Hydrogen) near the warhead for increased efficiency. This stuff is highly reactive and sits right next to damn Pu which is also very reactive. The Pu deteriortates over time.

The conventional explosive that is used to trigger the bomb has to be perfect. it has to be shaped perfectly and timed to explode perfectly to compress the U/Pu properly and it must explode in exactly the correct order. That demands high quality explosive and fancy timers apart from precision engineering to shape 10 or 20 or 30 wedges or flowers of explosive that sit around the fissile core. And like all reactive chemicals it deteriorates over time and needs checking/replacement. The US and Russia have set procedures to check their warheads every few years and replace old stuff. They also know (from previous testing) exactly how long any given warhead can be expected to work. And they have a ready stock of new or recycled fissile material to replace old warheads that they are renewing every few years.

Pakistan has some additional problems. If they have fully assembled warhead - those warheads will have to be close to delivery means. No use keeping 3 warheads ready. They should have at least 10-15. But all these 10 or more will have to be dispersed and if they are dispersed they will need tight security at each storage point that will attract attention and raise suspicion of some valuable item being protected. So it is likely that even a few assembled warheads are kept in one or two places - needing shifting to some other area before use. These warheads probably could be armed in minutes - but unless they are armed they would be useless to steal. Stealing them would only be more difficult to conceal than fissile material and using them would be impossible unless they were stolen/hijacked as soon as they were armed for use against India along with missile launch team or pilot and aircraft.

And because of the uncertainty of degenerating fissile cores and explosive after years of storage it is most likely that Pakistan stores all these things unassembled but in a ready to assemble form. The assembly can't be done by Abduls or army men. It would have to be scientists and engineers - so the bomb materials would be stored in areas that are accessible to these people.

With all these constraints it is my guess that if Pakistan got into a war with India tomorrow - it is likely that they will need at least one week to arm and ready their nukes and I doubt if they would be able to ready more than 30-40. And after readying them they will have to be shifted to spread out delivery areas and mated. Overall - because of all the issues and complexity - I think it is unlikely that Pakistan can collect up more than 100-150 warheads even if they have enough fissile material for 250 warheads.

In my view a JDAM is impossible. Any Pakistani bomb dropped on India will be 100% Pakistani army. JDAMs are 400% impossible without active connivance from Pakistan army and nuke engineers. The issues are too complex for a bomb to be stolen and launched. If a bomb is used - the Paki army is definitely involved

[Gagan]

Shiv saar,
very lucid post. Very very concise.

A few observations from my side:
1. Assembly of the nukes: I wonder if the Pakistani army will always rely on their scientists and engineers to assemble the warheads. I am sure they would want uniformed men to be able to do so quickly. Simply speaking, the faujis severely distrust the civilians.
Either way, whoever is/are the assembler(s), they are liable to be specially targeted by the Jihadis and the like to turn to their side. Pakistan is a very closed society, and such things are easy to find out in a situation where the Jihadis and the Army are blood brothers, where former army officers are themselves Jihadis.

I fear, that once a nuke is spirited out, these guys might be able to assemble them. They might not be able to transport these into India or some other country without official support. But I suspect they can get their hands on them if they really really tired.

2. JDAM on india: Yes of course. There will never be a JDAM in India or the west without Pakistani involvement, period. Any one suggesting otherwise is someone who believes that AQ Khan sold centrifuges flying off in C-130s without the Army knowing.

Again my fear is that, there are nations and media houses which "officially" "accept" that AQ Khan-acted-solo BS.

3. The west's fear is that some jihadi will get his hands on some joo, mix it with some joorea, and try to make joose in noo-york. Just as 'faisal bhai' tried to do. That is why all this talk of dirty low yield bomb.
The other thing I suspect is that instead of that mixing Joo with Joorea trick the sources might be referring to actual Pakistani sarkari bombs, which fall into that category of dirty low yield bombs.

4. If their generation-1 bums are that heavy (like a couple of tons) with the tamper, slow and fast explosive lenses etc (if they are implosion designs) or are of the Gun design, well how the eff are they going to deliver these bums?
The poor F-16 which has been much maligned as the bum carrier flies off Sargodha which is crawling with US personnel.
Their missiles are not advertised with a couple of tonnes throw weight, they only talk of the maximum possible range at say 500-700Kgs throw weight. They are trying to say that their bum weighs 500-700 Kgs.

[shiv]

A few observations from my side:
1. Assembly of the nukes: I wonder if the Pakistani army will always rely on their scientists and engineers to assemble the warheads. I am sure they would want uniformed men to be able to do so quickly. Simply speaking, the faujis severely distrust the civilians.

Either way, whoever is/are the assembler(s), they are liable to be specially targeted by the Jihadis and the like to turn to their side. Pakistan is a very closed society, and such things are easy to find out in a situation where the Jihadis and the Army are blood brothers, where former army officers are themselves Jihadis.

Gagan I doubt if people who are not technically trained in assembling nukes can do it. Faujis may do it under guidance from someone in the labs. But all this wil be in a secuer place. the time to spirit it out is when the assembled nuke is being moved. the assembled nuke i most likely to be moved in case of war with India.

I fear, that once a nuke is spirited out, these guys might be able to assemble them. They might not be able to transport these into India or some other country without official support. But I suspect they can get their hands on them if they really really tired.

I believe this process is non trivial. The fissile core has to be placed within the pit in the explosive capsule and any neutron generator will have to be inserted and charged. The wiring that leads to the conventional explosive needs to be armed, yet kept safe enough not to be triggered en route to the aircraft or even the target. That means the final arming must come at a late stage.

The best time to steal a nuke is when it is loaded on to an aircraft. Best to steal the aircraft (or missile)

[chaanakya]

But the headaches do not end there. Anything that is done to increase efficiency and decrease size increases complexity and decreases reliability. You need a source of Deuterium/Tritium (birathers of Hydrogen) near the warhead for increased efficiency. This stuff is highly reactive and sits right next to damn Pu which is also very reactive. The Pu deteriortates over time.

Shiv, aren't you forgetting about Beryllium 's role in Pu implosion type nooks??

[Amber G.]

Shivji et al -
Nice post(s).
Let me add a few things. Sorry if it is already posted, or people know. What I am posting is basic conventional wisdom, hope this is helpful.
(My remarks are, specific to Pak nuclear scene)
(Disclaimer: This is what I know or what is available in open source so take it FWIW)

For terrorists (Not full support from TSPA/TSP that is , a national level resource)

BCW-1 ( BRF's Conventional Wisdom -1) U is difficult to get, easy to make bomb, while Pu is easy to get but difficult to make a bomb.

Above is conventional wisdom for terrorist nuke in general. To get U235 you need a lot of technology (Caludrons /centifuges etc which are not easy to get, unless you have national level resources) but gun type assembly can be done by Peshawar gunsmiths.
(Though it will be heavy - think in terms of a cannon and few tons)

Pu, on the other hand, is easy to smuggle. Amount of Pu one needs, will fit in a small coffee cup. (A physics prof used to have Pu paper weight, on his desk! (I am not making this up) - No, Pu in solid form, is not dangerous and radiation issued by the paper weight did not pass through skin to do any harm).


For Pakis, a slightly additional calculus: Jhihadis may acquire U235 from centrifuge plants/ dis-assembled bombs/ etc... but my guess would be they will still need >50 Kg of it (more likely > 100 Kg) unless they can get some more refined technical help (Iraq, according to scientist who defected to US had implosion type device for U bomb)
One is still looking at few tons for the whole device. (and in case of a gun assembly - a long/heavy cannon)

For Pu, the implosion type device is not easy to make, (NK could not make it work); nor it is easy to guess/find/fake/jury-rig the codes of an assembled device.

What about dirty-bombs (of radioactivity from fizzled out bomb)?

Fortunately (and we have done lot of calculations, and looked at many different scenarios) it does not seem get that serious..

(I may put a separate post about that but here are basic reasons):

Most (virtually all) of radiation fall-out from actual bomb are gamma-rays etc at the time of explosion and radioactive fission fragments (like Co/Sr etc). Fizzle will not produce these in significant quantities. Pu's toxicity is more of an urban legend..(let me leave it at that.. will not comment in open forum, even though information is well known).

How about exploding gamma ray sources ( Like Co-60 found in Delhi etc )?. Say drive a truckload full of these isotopes and blow it up ... again let me just say any significant quantity will make the Jhihadi, who carries it, die in milliseconds because of radiation. and if the Jhihadi wants to shield it with lead, it will be too heavy to drive)

(There is much more, than what I put above but I wanted to be brief)

HTH

PS - One non-trivial aspect of dirty bomb is panic. After Fukushima, I am amazed at the ignorance peddled by media (and a few idiots who acted as experts). Panic evacuation after a radiation scare may cause hundreds of times more casualty than actual device... For this, authorities and citizens must be educated to learn about radiation, how to monitor it and learn to evacuate orderly without panic.

[shiv]

But the headaches do not end there. Anything that is done to increase efficiency and decrease size increases complexity and decreases reliability. You need a source of Deuterium/Tritium (birathers of Hydrogen) near the warhead for increased efficiency. This stuff is highly reactive and sits right next to damn Pu which is also very reactive. The Pu deteriortates over time.

Shiv, aren't you forgetting about Beryllium 's role in Pu implosion type nooks??

Chaanakya - what I don't know and what I have left out are both probably 100,000 times more than I have written. There is so much publicly available information and it is clear that the non public stuff is huge. But the conclusion is very simple. Nuke bombs are complex beasts. Whether you use Beryllium or Polonium or Deuterium/Tritium adds to the complexity. Add to that the issue of whether the bomb design has a ready made tamper with a slot into which you insert the fissile material or whether you store the fissile material with a tamper around which you assemble the conventional explosive. If you have a choice of bomb components in a storage area - are they all "standard mass produced items" or is each bomb custom finished so that one core has a particular numbered series of components to go with it like tamper and explosive? Answers to such issues are neither available in public nor can they be known outside an inner circle because there is no "standard procedure from textbooks" available to everyone outside that inner circle. That complexity makes it difficult for a person to assemble bombs from components lying around a storage area unless he is part of an insider team, and it also makes it difficult to steal a working bomb and blow it up.

The more complete a bomb assembly is - the closer it is to detonation. Naturally no one wants that detonation to occur at any time except when it is over the target. That means that even a fused and fully armed nuke bomb cannot explode at the "press of a button". The armed weapon will be programmed to ready itself after it is released from an aircraft or launched - and set to explode at a particular altitude. So what would anyone do with a fully armed weapon that he has just stolen? The actual sequence of instructions to explode the bomb would be known only to an insider - so the insider has to be part of a bomb stealing team.

Even a "gun type" Uranium bomb is not that easy simply because the gun has to fire the shell at a fast enough velocity. But the reason for Uranium's relative simplicity is that with a large enough mass of Uranium it is possible to make your gun a "gravity gun" where one lump of Uranium merely falls into another. That is what makes large stores of enriched Uranium the best possible material to steal.

Unfortunately people who talk of terrorists stealing bombs or fissile material do not have enough imagination to think of all the things to do after stealing Uranium. JDAMs cannot occur without governmental connivance. "Dirty bombs" too are difficult messy and probably only worth some panic. Other useful things to do would be to sell the material that is stolen to willing governments and make huge amounts of money. Fissile material in Pakistan can be its lifeline. Pakistan can, if necessary buy its way out of trouble if it agrees to sell its enriched Uranium or Plutonium to legal or illegal entities. Bomb material is so precious that almost any price can be demanded.

[shiv]

A few thoughts about the viability of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. The impressions/opinions are mine so let me start with a disclaimer:

Nukes are too serious to be taken lightly. I can laugh and mock at Pakistani capability and can argue to "prove" that Pakistan can do only limited damage to India while we blast them back to AD 1300 or wherever it is they are headed - but the fact is - even 2 kiloton fizzles are extremely dangerous. Remember that we regularly post news items of terror attacks with 200 or 400 kg of explosives that cause 50 to 200 death (say 100 on a good day).

A 2 kiloton "fizzle bomb" is 2 million kg of explosive. If 200 kg causes 100 deaths, 2 million kg (2 kilotons) could be extrapolated to cause 1 million deaths . OK even if that is exaggerated 10-20,000 casualties is possible even with a "fizzle" that we on this forum have mocked and laughed at in past discussions as "useless". Even if Indian fizzles are worthless i suggest that Pakistani fizzles must be taken seriously. There is also a degree of contradiction in our reactions here. On the one hand we speak of the "terror" caused by a dirty bomb. if a dirty bomb is scary we need to think of how scary a 2 kiloton fizzle may be - causing tens of thousands of deaths apart from being just as dirty as the "dirty bomb".

Long ago I discovered that a Cobalt 60 bomb is impracticable for all but a few nations. Cobalt 60 is not available at pharmacies in the required amounts. The only way in which you can make a Co 60 bomb is to use a thermonuclear explosion to manufacture the Co 60 during the explosion using a suitable tamper and let the explosion spread it around. We can safely leave this out as a technical impossibility for Pakistan.

But as regards Pakistan I believe that some plan of action is required for a future that is safest for India and the world.

The first step in my view is to do the maximum possible to ensure that Pakistan does not use any nukes. This is possible in two ways

1) Buckling to blackmail from Pakistan and agreeing to terrorist Islamist demands to avoid any nukes
2) Guaranteeing the destruction of Pakistan if they use a single nuke and gradually ramping up pressure so that even the threat of using nukes from Pakistan attracts punishment

Unfortunately for India the support to Pakistan from China and the USA makes India vulnerable to blackmail and makes option 2 more difficult for India. Option, 2, of guaranteeing Pakistan's destruction along with punishment even for using threats have to be made attractive for both China and the USA. Right now China and the USA are quite happy to see India being blackmailed and do not see the need to punish Pakistan for making repeated nuclear threats against India.

If China and he USA do not see sense they have to be forced to see sense. And that will occur if jihadis get nuclear material. Everything must be done to set the stage for a jihadi take-over of Pakistan. If China and teh US can see sense in not supporting Pakistan's nuclear blackmail against India there there may be a possibility of helping Pakistan economically in the long term by paying them to hand over their enriched Uranium and Plutonium. But f China and the US cannot see India's viewpoint - a complete jihadi take over of Pakistan is essential and desirable. Things will just have to get worse before they can get better.

[Varoon Shekhar]

"Happy( or at least not unhappy) to see India being blackmailed..." I misquote

India should make it clear that it holds those very same countries responsible for the blackmailing capability in the first place! So any blackmailing, let alone carrying through of the blackmail, is on them i.e their culpability. And also the British. Indians unfortunately seem to lack the gumption/courage/perspicacity to really put this point across.
At least one of these countries is so paranoid about Iran's nuclear capability, that it cooks up stories of some visiting Indian nuclear scientists contributing to the programme. A charge not only trumped up, but utterly false!
So India can rightly accuse a few countries of actively assisting, conniving or deliberately looking the other way, at Pakistan's nuclear programme.

[Dhiman]

If China and he USA do not see sense they have to be forced to see sense. And that will occur if jihadis get nuclear material. Everything must be done to set the stage for a jihadi take-over of Pakistan. If China and teh US can see sense in not supporting Pakistan's nuclear blackmail against India there there may be a possibility of helping Pakistan economically in the long term by paying them to hand over their enriched Uranium and Plutonium. But f China and the US cannot see India's viewpoint - a complete jihadi take over of Pakistan is essential and desirable. Things will just have to get worse before they can get better.

Shiv sir,

If by Jihad you mean repeatedly going to war for religious reasons, then Pakistan is already under Jihadi control and has been for many decades as their creation, their attempt to capture Kashmir, and desire to get strategic depth in Afghanistan (against India) can ultimately be traced solely to their Jihadi instincts. The only issue these days is that there is a split between conservative Jiadist and moderate Jihadist where the moderate Jihadists believe in waiting and buying time while the conservative Jihadhist want all the action now. Ultimately both the conservative Jihadists and moderate Jihadist want the same thing: take over Kashmir, break apart India, etc. That is what they have been eating, sleeping, and living for past 60 years.

Also, there is a clear record of suicidal tendencies in this country both at individual and national levels. Individually there is no dearth of suicide bombers in Pakistan willing to blow themselves up and their is a whole industry and culture ingrained in Pakistan that supports this in the name of Jihad. At the national level this country has taken itself to the brink of anarchy in order to sustain its nuclear/defence capability to wage war against India again for reasons that can be traced down to religious points of views.

The bottom line that I am trying to make here is that they are suicidal from top to bottom and under such a situation, when faced with their final self-created collapse, they will prefer to nuke India rather that go down into middle ages quietly. As long as there are 1000 moderate Jihadists involved in Pakistani nuclear program, 900 may start lamenting at their imminent collapse and thinking about how they will survive in a medieval Pakistan, but at least 100 of them would be willing to load up a bombs in a tata trucks (My apologies to Mr. Tata) and drive it across the border. If a boat with 10 men and weapons can land on gateway of India undetected there is absolutely no reason why mutiple tata trucks with nukes can't cross the border - the concequences be damed because we already live in hell which is collapsing around us and their is a heaven waiting above.

[shiv]

If by Jihad you mean repeatedly going to war for religious reasons, then Pakistan is already under Jihadi control and has been for many decades as their creation,

No argument with that - but that statement has no traction with the US which believes that the army is moderate and secular and Talibunnies are jihadis. I was using the US definition.

If you look at how Pakistan was viewed by the US

1947 to 9/11 (2001): Moderate, secular progressive islamic state, fighting for freedom of oppressed people.

2001 to 2011 : Moderate, secular, progressive but troubled Islamic state fighting a double fight for freedom of oppressed Muslims in Kashmir as well as for freedom of Pakistan from extremist forces.

2011 to : Troubled state with moderate, progressive army that has supported terror but has a valid reason to do that but is now in danger of being overwhelmed. There is an attempt to stop Pakistan from being overwhelmed while continuing its support for fighting dark extremist Hindus of india. Pakistan it seems, is in danger of being overwhelmed by Islamists and by India. Of the two, Hindu India needs to be kept at bay because Pakistanis have sympathies with the islamists who are trying to take over and will not fight the islamists.

India is entirely on its own here. The US cannot defeat the Islamists. The US cannot make Pakistan defeat the islamists, and there is talk that India needs to be checked in order to make headway in America's failing war in Pakistan. That is why Pakistan's nukes are "safe". they are safe in the sense that the Paki army will not use them against the US.

The idea is to make the jihadis that the US fears to control the nukes so the suicidal lunatics can use them against the US as well - so the US can learn the folly of its policies.

[shiv]

Article from Subash Kapila with a typo in the title - but the article is interesting - so posting in full
http://www.eurasiareview.com/pakistans- ... -25052011/

May 25, 2011

By Dr Subhash Kapila

Pakistan’s nuclear weapons arsenal safety has been a source of serious concern for the international community ever since Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal came into existence. Initially, international concerns focused on the unreliability of Pakistan as a ‘responsible stakeholder’ in nuclear stability, Pakistan’s propensity for conflict including nuclear conflict against India and nuclear weapons proliferation to ‘rogue nations’.

Pakistan’s nuclear weapons arsenal safety acquired menacing contours more significantly ever since 9/11when Pakistan emerged as the repository of nuclear weapon’s proliferation and also the repository and citadel of Islamic Jihadi terrorism.

Osama Bin Laden’s 9/11 was hatched, planned, and launched from the soil of Pakistan-Occupied Afghanistan and Pakistani soil itself and facilitated in a major way by Pakistan Army’s notorious intelligence agency, the ISI.

The United States major unstated military concern ever since has been focused on the eventuality of Pakistani nuclear weapons or nuclear materiel’s for making a ‘dirty bomb’ falling into the hands of the various terrorist organizations affiliated to Pakistan Army’s ISI..

From 2006 onwards, Pakistani terrorist organizations at repeated intervals have endangered Pakistan’s nuclear weapons storage sites and production complexes by launching attacks or moving into threatening proximity to locations like the Sargodha Air Base and the Wah military complex. In 2010 they had swooped from Swat to close to another Pakistan Air Force Base housing nuclear strike aircraft and the Pakistan Army was forced to move on threats of direct US military intervention.

Overtly, the United States pretends to agree with Pakistan Army’s assertions that its nuclear weapons arsenal is safe and secure in the hands of Pakistan Army’s special security organizations created for this purpose.

However, the United States misplaced trust on Pakistan Army’s iron-clad guarantees on the safety of its nuclear weapons arsenal is taking a beating and wearing thin with repetitive incidents of Pakistani terrorist attacks on vital Pakistan Army installations and the General Headquarters itself.

In all such terrorists attacks on “High Security& Heavily Fortified Complexes” the common assessment of respected analysts has been that these would not have been possible without ‘insider complicity’ from within Pakistan Army’s security organizations.

This weeks audacious attacks on the Pakistan Navy Aviation Base at Mehran in close proximity of the Karachi International Airport and alongside the Pakistan Air Force Base, once again brings renewed focus on the safety of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons arsenal

It would therefore be in order to renew ones focus on the safety of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons arsenal once again when contextually Pakistan-United States strategic partnership itself stands endangered and dangers of Pakistan’s implosion from within exist. The main theme of this Paper is examined under the following heads:(1) Pakistan Army’s Nuclear Weapons Arsenal: Vulnerabilities of Storage Sites and Location of Production Complexes (2)Imperatives of Constant Shifting & Its Vulnerabilities (3) Islamist Sympathizers Within Pakistan Army Officers and Soldiery (4) The China Factor in Pakistan Army’s Nuclear Weapons Arsenal Safety (5)Pakistan’s Fail-Safe Measures Not Credible

Pakistan Army’s Nuclear Weapons Arsenal: Vulnerabilities of Storage Sites and Location of Production Complexes

Pakistan in the initial stages had selected its nuclear weapons production complexes and storage sites related to its perceived military threat from India. To keep them out of reach from Indian air strikes it sited all its nuclear weapons sites on its Western peripheries or very nearly so.

Ironically, Pakistan Army’s nuclear weapons storage sites and production complexes now fall into the very areas of Pakistani terrorist organizations sway or in close proximity to such areas.

With Pakistan Army having a tenuous hold on its Western frontier explosive regions, its nuclear weapons storage sites and production complexes perforce cannot be shifted. Currently they stand at increased risk of attacks and penetration by terrorist organizations which perceive that the Pakistan Army has sold its soul to the Americans and fighting America’s war against them.

With the Pakistan Army itself as the main target of the Pakistani Taliban and it being besieged on other fronts, one wonders what military effectiveness the Pakistan Army can employ to combat its many threats not the least being the safety of its nuclear weapons arsenal.

Imperatives of Constant Shifting and Its Vulnerabilities

Pakistan Army is faced with a piquant situation where military imperatives exist for it to constantly shuttle its nuclear weapons storage sites even when they are stored in de-mated mode.

More than the Indian strikes threat, the Pakistan Army and its military hierarchy have become paranoid about the likelihood of a United States surgical strike to take out its nuclear weapons arsenal. This is found in the utterances of Pakistani Generals and analysts.

The shuttling around of Pakistan Army’s nuclear weapons offers increased exposure to Pakistani terrorist organizations when such strategic assets are on the move irrespective of the most intense security cover provided.

Another aspect that finds mention in Pakistani discourse on the subject is that the Pakistan Army has the propensity to move its tactical nuclear weapons every time Pakistani terrorist attacks take place against India and the dangers of an Indian riposte. Under such situations Pakistani nuclear weapons assets are once again exposed to increased risk of falling in terrorists hands.

Some even go to the extent of suggesting that Pakistani terrorist organizations may deliberately engineer a Mumbai26/11 type attack so that in the ensuing scenario they can lay their hands on a Pakistan Army nuclear asset.

The reverse should also be accepted as a possibility in that the ISI engineers such an incident in which a plausible deniability exit would exist if it perceives that Pakistan strategic ends are being served.

Islamist Sympathizers Within Pakistan Army Officers and Soldiery

The real threat to Pakistan Army’s nuclear weapons arsenal is not from the terrorists organizations per se. For such organizations to breach the multi-layered security that is claimed to be in place by the Pakistan Army would be a daunting task as breaching each ring would start alarm bells ringing and invite preemptive actions before the inner ring is breached.

The real threat to the safety and security to Pakistan Army’s nuclear arsenal is posed from within by Islamist fundamentalist sympathizers amongst the Pakistan Army officers and soldiery. It is these elements who would act as the Trojan Horse for facilitating an inside access to Pakistani nuclear weapons arsenal.

It is these elements who can be instrumental in passing-on nuclear radioactive materials for a ‘dirty bomb’ to terrorists’ organization. In this connection the reliability of Pakistani nuclear scientists is also worrisome as the past record shows.

The Pakistan Army would like the United States to believe that the selection and screening process for personnel of the security set-up for their nuclear weapons arsenal is stringent and credible. However that argument does not carry weight when a whole string of inside jobs in terrorists attacks against Pakistan military targets are taken into account.

The China Factor in Pakistan Army’s Nuclear Weapons Arsenal Safety

The Pakistan Army’s nuclear weapons arsenal owes its existence, follow-up production of increased number of nuclear weapons and technology updates to China. China therefore has a vested interest in the safety and security of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal. This vested interest arises not from any urges of being a responsible stakeholder in regional nuclear stability and security.

China’s vested interest in the security of the Pakistan nuclear weapons arsenal stems from its strategic imperatives in the continued existence of a credible nuclear weapons arsenal of Pakistan to serve the ends of China’s Grand Strategy focused on India and the United States.

If Pakistan’s nuclear weapons arsenal is breached then surely it would invite United States military intervention and taking out of the Pakistan nuclear weapons capabilities. That would be a strategic catastrophe for China.

Would China be involved or is already involved in the security set-up of Pakistan Army’s nuclear weapons arsenal is something only the United States, Pakistan and China would know?

Relatedly, it was strange that at the PNS MEHRAN attack by the Pakistani Taliban there were both Chinese and US military personnel at the same base. What were the Chinese doing there when the Pakistani Naval Aviation Base had only US origin aircraft stationed there?

Pakistan’s Fail-Safe Measures Not Credible

Much has been written about the credibility of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons security and fail-safe measures put into existence with millions of US dollars spent for this purpose. Much is also talked about the Permissive Action Links (PAL) mechanisms in place.

Experts point out that PAL comes into play only when the nuclear warhead is mated with the delivery system and not before. Therefore even if the United States is in a position to electronically jam Pakistani PAL systems to prevent launch of nuclear strikes, the United States with the information available in the public domain is not in a position to ensure that nuclear warheads or related nuclear materiel enroute for mating do not fall into the hands of terrorists organizations targeting the United States and India.

That can only be ensured by the Pakistan Army and by all current patterns the Pakistan Army either by incompetence or due to complicity with terrorists’ organizations by Islamist fundamentalists within its officers and soldiery, has been unable to ensure.

The credibility of the fail-safe systems of Pakistan Army’s nuclear weapons arsenal is therefore questionable?

Concluding Observations

Pakistan Army’s nuclear weapons arsenal safety stands seriously endangered from the twin dangers of a deliberate operation by Pakistan Army’s former terrorists organizations affiliates and the bigger danger of an ‘insider job’ facilitating the former by Islamist fundamentalists sympathizers within Pakistan Army officers and soldiery. It also adds to the trust-deficit in this critical field.

The Pakistan Army hierarchy has become paranoid about the likelihood of the United States military intervention to take out its nuclear weapons arsenal. This complicates the safety of Pakistani nuclear arsenal in multiple ways. The reliability of the Pakistan Army in such a scenario becomes doubly doubtful.

With dangers of Pakistan’s internal implosion and strategic denouement in US-Pakistan strategic relationship and the ensuing trust-deficit, the credibility and the trust in the Pakistan Army to safeguard its nuclear weapons becomes that much eroded.

The United States alone has to ensure the neutralization of the Pakistan Army nuclear weapons arsenal.

(The author is an International Relations and Strategic Affairs analyst. He is Consultant, Strategic Affairs with South Asia Analysis Group. Email: [email protected])

[shiv]

I would like to ask a few rhetorical questions about the "safety" of Pakistan's nuclear weapons

1. What does "safety" mean. Does it mean not usable till they decide to launch a nuclear attack on India, or does it mean safe from theft/hijacking?

2. What can India do to ensure that it is not at the receiving end of a Pakistani nuclear attack?

3. Is it in Chinese interest to ensure that a nuclear war does not occur between India and Pakistan? What can India do to make it necessary for the Chinese to us their influence and pressure on Pakistan to avoid nuclear war?

4. Is it in US interest to ensure that a nuclear war does not occur between India and Pakistan? What can India do to make it necessary for the US to use their influence and pressure on Pakistan to avoid nuclear war?

Will try and address some of these questions in due course - but would appreciate others' views.

[Lalmohan]

it is in china's interest NOT TO START A NUCLEAR WAR between pakistan and india. simply put, such a war will have economic consequences all over the world, quite apart from destabilising other countries and tensions. at this stage of the game, such a distraction does not suit chinese strategy

It is in china's interest to create instability between india and pakistan, but not have it boil over.

for the US, it never cared about india, but it kinda does now - but for buying american goods and safeguarding asia against china

i think that the bear trap the americans invented in af-pak has neatly turned into an eagle trap. and they managed to do it all by themselves. the dragon has carefully crept around the edges to guage advantage but has not as yet actively participated

as long as central asian and mid east oil flows towards china, they would prefer to keep holding their ring, whilst the americans hold theirs. pakistan has worked itself into the centre of that ring, but is not able to behave itself - causing headaches for both eagle and dragon

they are inevitably both stuck - like the tarpits that trapped mammoths and dinosaurs before them. this makes the islamists happy, but its only the happiness of the wolf feasting on the trapped mammoth, little sensing that the black goo is rapidly heading its way too

so far the indian elephant has stayed away from the tarpit, but has managed to swat the wolves away...

[ramana]

Good summary lalmohanji.
Nice of you to make a precis for sake of the new generation.

---
Shiv, India should watch and get the launchers (missiles, aircarft, donkey carts) first.

[shiv]

Lalmohan - thanks for your thoughts. And yes ramana - that is a good point

I would agree that neither the US nor China would want Pakistan to attack India with nukes. Not because of any particular sympathy for India but because - of the "fallout" (not radioactive fallout, but the consequences). Apart from the disruption of economies and suffering, even a short "limited" nuclear war would, for the first time after world war 2 - show that nuclear war is OK and that it is possible, and that it is possible to seriously upset the "world order" with a few nukes.

But that brings me to the next question - would either China or the US be able to prevent Pakistan from launching a nuke at India? What would they do? Are they willing to do what it takes (i.e use their influence)? If that fails - imagine that one nuclear bomb falls on India. India is bound to retaliate.

What then? Would the US and China beg India not to retaliate? If they did then they would have to punish Pakistan. If they did not punish Pakistan, it means that Pakistan can get away with a nuclear attack. Would they be wiling to punish their ally? I suspect the US may have the forces and means to do that. i suspect that the Chinese do not have that in place and would do no such thing.

Clearly Pakistan the nation (with both guilty and innocent people in it) must be punished if it launches a nuke at India. It will be India's responsibility to do that. China will not do it. Will the US do it?

As I see it, if the US is going to do it they should really be doing it before Pakistan launches a nuke. After Pakistan launches a nuke at India - deterrence has been broken and India will retaliate. The US getting involved at this stage, or the UN getting involved at this stage would be a complete sham.

The long and short of it is that nuclear war must be prevented. I think the US, China and India know that. I know that I have been insisting that I would like to see nukes in non state jihadi hands - out of sheer spite for the US and Chinese actions in the past. But neither the US, nor China nor India have expressed any desire to see any nukes that Pakistan has move into the hands of non-state jihadis.

But will the state jihadis (Pakistan army) not use those weapons? What is preventing them? Clearly they are threatening India at every possible opportunity. Is this empty rhetoric? What leverage does the US have? Trying to make India give Pakistan concessions cannot be a serious option. That would be giving in to nuclear blackmail and making it successful. But the point is that its not just India now. Unkil is "up to here" in it.

[Lalmohan]

shiv-ji, i buy your logic that only the state-actors can deploy, target and use a nuke weapon against india. non-state actors can steal fissile material and disperse it using conventional explosives, creating a fukushima++ incident. JDAM-lite if you will. in fact, if JDAM = state actor then it is "not" a JDAM as such - but lets not get into semantics about the length of one's beard

now this is the really worrying bit - there is already an indian doctrinal response to the normal nuclear explosion. and frankly if bum = pop then retalliation = full is pretty much a given. this is why unkil starts sweating when things start to get out of hand with munna

the jdam-lite does not yet have a proper doctrinal response, mostly because it may not reveal itself in an obvious way (that said, the J's will probably make it eventful and not stealthy)

but then, they wouldn't bother doing it in india (i buy that logic too) - they will definitely target the US or UK/France as the core of the great satan

[Amber G.]

If they are lucky, they'll get one [ Nuclear bomb with all its components] without the PALs in place, a clean bomb without all the messy electronic locks.

Gaganji - Fortunately For Pu bombs , implosion mechanism, one does not have device without PAL (type) in place. IOW unless you can get detailed information from the team who manumitted/assembled the mechanism, it is not easy to disable it. (There is something which is "built into" and not "added to"). If you want I, can explain it further or wiki might help.

[Dhiman]

shiv-ji, i buy your logic that only the state-actors can deploy, target and use a nuke weapon against india. non-state actors can steal fissile material and disperse it using conventional explosives, creating a fukushima++ incident. JDAM-lite if you will. in fact, if JDAM = state actor then it is "not" a JDAM as such - but lets not get into semantics about the length of one's beard

Lalmohan ji,

As with many things in Pakistan, the threat of "nukes falling into the wrong hands" is from inside the establishment run by moderate Jiadhists, but not from attacks carried out by conservative Jihadists (as a sign of protest against the moderate Jihadi establishment). When the time comes, some fraction of those who are supposedly "guarding" the Paki nukes will morph into "non-state actors" and be willing to drive the nukes on an obscure truck to their favorite location.

there is already an indian doctrinal response to the normal nuclear explosion. and frankly if bum = pop then retalliation = full is pretty much a given.

This is no longer good enough as suicidal Jihadis within a collapsing state won't be deterred by presence of a doctrinal response. If it is deterrence that is desired, then a graduated preventive program is needed as and when the threat of loose nukes in Pakistan increases. For example, if Pakistan establishment falls under anarchy, then we better make sure that Paki airspace is clear and no vehicle big enough to carry a nuke (including a camel cart) can not move within TSP within 50 miles of the border.

this is why unkil starts sweating when things start to get out of hand with munna

Lalmohan Sir, IMHO, unkil doesn't care two hoots about who uses nukes on who. What they care about is preserving the world order which allows for their pre-eminence and definitely if there is a Indian response to Pakistani problem, a part of this world order would definitely change.

but then, they wouldn't bother doing it in india (i buy that logic too) - they will definitely target the US or UK/France as the core of the great satan

Sorry sir, everything that has happened in last 60 years only goes to show that they WILL target India. They may keep a few loose nukes around for others also, but rest assured they will target India.

[GuruPrabhu]

Folks,

a quick post about "maal". Please refer to the actinium series in this link:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Decay_chain

As you can see, u-235 and pu-239 both are alpha producers. Those are harmless in the environment. So, it is the subsequent betas that we should focus on. There is the 391 keV from Th-231, but that is puny and also mostly harmless in the environment. So, pretty useless maal.

Further, U-235 has a half life of 700 million years, while the Pu-239 has a half-life of 25k years. So, if I am a smart jehadi who wants to spread radioactivity using a dirty bomb, I will prefer Poo.

However, if I am a smarter jehadi, I will realize that Poo leads to U, so I am still stuck with the 700 million year problem.

Now, if I am a genius jehadi (hehe), I would realize that both U and Poo are useless and the best maal for a dirty bum is the dirty stuff sitting in places like Fuk-D. IOW, reactor spent maal is the maal of choice for jehadi bent of mind.

[chaanakya]

That complexity makes it difficult for a person to assemble bombs from components lying around a storage area unless he is part of an insider team, and it also makes it difficult to steal a working bomb and blow it up.

.......
So what would anyone do with a fully armed weapon that he has just stolen? The actual sequence of instructions to explode the bomb would be known only to an insider - so the insider has to be part of a bomb stealing team.
..............

Unfortunately people who talk of terrorists stealing bombs or fissile material do not have enough imagination to think of all the things to do after stealing Uranium. JDAMs cannot occur without governmental connivance. "Dirty bombs" too are difficult messy and probably only worth some panic. Other useful things to do would be to sell the material that is stolen to willing governments and make huge amounts of money. Fissile material in Pakistan can be its lifeline. Pakistan can, if necessary buy its way out of trouble if it agrees to sell its enriched Uranium or Plutonium to legal or illegal entities. Bomb material is so precious that almost any price can be demanded.

Agree with you on all points , more so with bolded parts.
Narrative and logic is clear. Even non state actor will have to have state sanction to act.
This must be made plain to pakis.

[Lalmohan]

dhiman-ji, depends on who "they" are
LET and friends, yes; but they are not non-state actors, they come with direct blessings
al-q and friends - not interested in india
pukjabi talibs - not immediately interested in india
others... ???

[ramana]

We need to be clear about capabilities and motivations of 1) state actors (TSP uniformed folks), 2) non-state actors (non-uniformed and uniformed jihadis)and 3) those in between (ISI covert operators).

1) Have access to genuine maal from PRC. Their motivation is to prevent IA's dash to Indus. This group wants to prevent Indian retaliation for the miscreant terrorist acts by group 3 in India. The Indian NFU doctrine and CMD address this threat. So this group works under expanded deterrence logic i.e. deter war with India. However Indian NFU is for core deterrence i.e. prevent use of nukes by adversaries.

2) At best can have access to dirty bomb or small yield or low yield fizzles. Each of these has its own ramafications ( pun intended!). As AmberG, Shiv and GP among others have stated many times dirty bomb is not a back breaker for India. Yes will have to clean up but that is more effort won't set back the march of the elephant. GOI has to convey this in no uncertain terms and take precautions that medics and civil defence/Internal security experts deem necessary to mitigate such an event. IOW active civil defence and counter terrorism are the CMD for this threat. Low yield and fizzles will be responded to by NFU/CMD.

3) This group can have access to group 1 assets with plausible deniability. The group 1 will be held accountable per CMD and NFU and hence its not in their interests to "lose" their assets.

Right now we have an armed stalemate with TSP on pretend hair trigger and India on relazed will see what is to be done in the unfortunate turn of events.
However as time flies, India is growing bigger and TSP's irrational stance is weakening their position. Hence the urgency and useless threats or brutus fulmen (useless thunderbolts) from them.


If it weren't for PRC's muddled kingdom world view the mess would have been settled aminicably by now.

Maybe QE2 and its successors will clear up the muddled view!

Or as I said early on PRC is the Lehman bros of this trio.

[asgkhan]

Since the pakistani nukes are nothing but repainted chinese nukes why cant I or the indian babu send out a subtle message to china that in case of any jdam going off we would lose one accidentally in uighurstan ? As all bets would be off. That should send chinese commie morons in a tizzy and ensure that pakistani army's family errr crown jewels are in firm control.

[ramana]

I guess you didn't read the NFU.

It says there will be retaliation on the perpetrators and his allies.

[asgkhan]

Perfidious paki abdul will say non state actor with the help of Indian muslims set off the nuke.
Our WKK brigade will blame NAMO and call it as a payback for gujarat.
US will advise patience joint talks and resolution of kashmeer.
God forbid our prince who cannot find the difference between chicken's ass bone and human bones is in power how clueless he will be.

[ramana]

If a jdam happens there will be unity governemnt with unity of purpose.

[Ravi Karumanchiri]

^^^ Slightly OT, but relevant....

Judging by the DRDO's premium on building very fast missiles and smaller warheads, which presumably would have a lower threshold of use than would very large nukes; I would judge that India's nuclear counterstrike would happen very rapidly, before any external pressure could mount to avert such a counterstrike.

A JDAM attack on India would be followed by a very prompt nuclear counterstrike on Pindi, in the hope that this would be the end of it, and for once, that a civilian government might actually have a chance in Pakistan.

If, in the mean time, any TSP forces with nuclear weapons capability should mobilize, they would be vapourized just as promptly.

I think that India's nuclear counterstrikes would -- as much as possible -- focus on the TSP's nuclear weapons capability/stockpile/infrastructure.

I also think that the prevailing winds over Pakistan at the time, would figure heavily into the Indian targetting calculus. If the prevailing winds over the target blow toward India, the Indian bombs would be bigger, but set to explode at a higher altitude, thus creating the desired blast effects, while minimizing fallout over India.

Conversely, if the prevailing winds blow toward China, and China has been perceived to have been a large-enough problem in the immediate lead-up to nuclear hostilities; I think that an Indian weapon would be set for "ground burst", which would create a lot more fallout for the benefit of China. In this way, it may be possible to nuke China without actually nuking China.

DISCLAIMER: Nothing I've written here should be construed to mean that I advocate nuclear war; just that I think everyone should recognize the potential for it, and the full set of implications/ramifications, so as not to be so stupid as to let it happen. JMT

[ramana]

Ravi, usual doctrine believes in taking out periphery and retaining the core, as a way of escalation control.

In case of TSP the core(Pakjab) should be taken out so the periphery (K-P, Sindh, Baloch) can be freed from the kabila bondage.

[Rudradev]

I think explicit clarity is needed about what exactly we mean when we say "Dirty Bomb".

Are we talking about a Radiological Device, i.e. just a regular bomb that is designed to scatter radioactive material over a given area? As GuruPrabhu suggested, there is no need for Jihadis to have fissile material to build such a device. Gamma-emitting radionuclides from spent reactor fuel will do much better than U-235 or Pu-239 for this purpose.

Or are we talking about a genuine atimbum made from real fissile material, but designed/manufactured poorly so that it produces a low-yield fizzle? The fizzle may be "useless" or "useful" in itself to whatever extent, but such a device will also spread fissile material over the area of activation. However, the fissile material that will be spread, is not nearly as "dirty"/dangerous as some of the other nasty things like Cs-137 from spent fuel (you can even get Co-60 from a CANDU type reactor.)

I think it's important to make this distinction in the public domain, particularly when we talk about Pakistan's capacity for JDAM/Non-state/whatever attacks.

We all know how India will react if something over 5-10 KT+ is employed against us, with a visible mushroom cloud etc. That is a nuclear weapon attack, no doubt about it, and massive retaliation will ensue.

But what about the distinction between a radiological device and a fuski atimbum? What is the doctrine of retaliation in each case? A radiological device might well be far more damaging than a fuski atimbum, depending on what the radiological device contained vs. how much bang the fuski actually yielded up. Yet, a fuski atimbum must be construed as an attack with the intent of causing WMD devastation, even if it didn't work as planned because it was poorly designed.

[RamaY]

JDAM in india would happen in/near a defense research organization.

That will change india's response

[krisna]

Understanding Pakistan's Nuclear Rationale

Three factors shed light on why Pakistan is rapidly increasing its nuclear weapons capabilities: India's fissile material stock; preference signaling; and the concept of moral hazard.

Offsetting India's fissile material stock
Pakistan's main concern regarding India's nuclear capabilities is India's 1,300 kilograms of reactor-grade plutonium accumulated through many years' worth of nuclear waste generated by India's Pressurized Heavy Water Reactors (PHWRs). While PHWRs are the mainstay of India's (peaceful) nuclear energy program, the spent fuel that they produce is rich in plutonium-239 - a driving factor behind India's nuclear weapons program.
India is the only country in the world besides Russia that has been consistently toying with the idea of developing Fast Breeder Reactors (FBRs), which are dependent on plutonium. India runs a small FBR of 13 megawatts at the Indira Gandhi Center for Atomic Research, Kalpakkam. However, a much bigger reactor with a capacity of 500 megawatts is under construction at the same location.
From a Pakistani perspective, India will always have an upper hand in developing a first strike capability should it decide to convert its fissile material inventories to usable weapons, a possibility that threatens Pakistan the most. To offset such a threat, Pakistan believes that it should convert most of its fissile material into weapons while it has the time and resources to do so - a motivation heightened by the growing global momentum to conclude a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty.

Signaling preferences' to other states
Second, the rationale behind Pakistan's desire to increase its arsenal can also be understood through the prism of 'preference signaling'. States often use arms races as a way of declaring their latent or overt preferences regarding the outcomes of decisions being made by other states.
Applying this conceptual framework, Pakistan may be trying to project its dissatisfaction with the Indo-US Civil Nuclear Agreement, which it believes has fundamentally altered the strategic environment in South Asia.
The increase in Pakistan's nuclear capabilities may also be a signal to the West - especially the US - to intervene and cajole India to dampen its bellicose attitude. Pakistan may prefer for the international community to shift its attention to India's development of ballistic missile defense (BMD) as a destabilizing factor in the South Asian strategic balance, instead of focusing on Pakistani-based terrorism. Since Pakistan has no technological or economic wherewithal to pursue BMD, it can only counter India's move by increasing its number of nuclear weapons.

The 'moral hazard' of nuclear weapons
North Korea provides a classic example of moral hazard: it has often used its nuclear assets to create serious security dilemmas in East Asia. Since its neighbors and other power players have an interest in maintaining peace in the region, they have often been more than willing to accommodate North Korea's demands and interests. The moral hazard generated by North Korean nukes, and the willingness of the international community to negotiate the threats posed by Pyongyang, has made North Korea a shrewd bargainer with regard to attaining political and economic privileges.
By redirecting the attention of the international community away from acts of terrorism toward the possibility of nuclear war, Pakistan was able to secure immunity from India's punitive action.

The need for international recognition
Increasing Pakistan's nuclear capabilities would allow it to make economic and political gains. In the future, if the agenda for disarmament gains momentum, the larger a state's nuclear inventory, the better its bargaining position. The same is true of economic opportunities: The threat of economic collapse in a state that holds substantial nuclear weapons capabilities could make the international community more likely to come to the rescue. One of the reasons behind the US' continued financial aid to Pakistan is the necessity of keeping a nuclear armed state functioning as a viable political entity.
Now that they have been incorporated as a fundamental aspect of Pakistan's identity, it is impossible to dislodge the hold of nuclear weapons over Pakistan's international politics. Therefore, India's unilateral efforts to contain the South Asian nuclear tinderbox can only go so far.

brilliant pakis- fine dividing line between genius and schizophrenia. will be a self goal in time. have to wait with patience.
At the same time keep our selves safe.