Syrian Resistance : Strategy and long term implications.
Re: Syrian Resistance : Strategy and long term implications.
Pranav,
Aleppo is/was one the most pro-government cities in the country because its one of the most prosperous. It is the exception not the norm.
Bashar al-Assad's economic reforms over the last decade broke the social contract with people in the countryside that the Syrian Baathist revolution was based on. Damascus and Aleppo prospered at everyone else's expense.
But even in the piece you posted above, its clear just how divided a single Sunni family (typical Sunni family for Aleppo, not Syria as a whole) in one of the most pro-regime cities can be.
The daughter (and perhaps mother) was pro-Arab Spring until things got frightening; the son is out fighting on the streets, and the father blames both sides. That's not a family the regime can count on for much.
One thing the article doesnt mention is that Aleppo was one of the last places where protests started - given what had happened elsewhere those who went out had already lost all faith in the government.
Once again, consider what it means that the regime had to mount a full scale assault on Rastan, the home of the Assad's most trusted Sunni Baathist comrades, and the most important source of Sunni military recruitment. Consider what it means that the Tlasses of every generation, young and old were sidelined, and then defected.
After Hafez al-Asad's death bit by bit the Baath Party stopped being a national movement and turned into an Alawi clique starting from the top.
Just the same way that Nasser's movement turned into a small clique under Sadat near the end, and then Mubarak. The same thing took place with all of the other regimes. Its not a good way to retain mass support.
Aleppo is/was one the most pro-government cities in the country because its one of the most prosperous. It is the exception not the norm.
Bashar al-Assad's economic reforms over the last decade broke the social contract with people in the countryside that the Syrian Baathist revolution was based on. Damascus and Aleppo prospered at everyone else's expense.
But even in the piece you posted above, its clear just how divided a single Sunni family (typical Sunni family for Aleppo, not Syria as a whole) in one of the most pro-regime cities can be.
The daughter (and perhaps mother) was pro-Arab Spring until things got frightening; the son is out fighting on the streets, and the father blames both sides. That's not a family the regime can count on for much.
One thing the article doesnt mention is that Aleppo was one of the last places where protests started - given what had happened elsewhere those who went out had already lost all faith in the government.
Once again, consider what it means that the regime had to mount a full scale assault on Rastan, the home of the Assad's most trusted Sunni Baathist comrades, and the most important source of Sunni military recruitment. Consider what it means that the Tlasses of every generation, young and old were sidelined, and then defected.
After Hafez al-Asad's death bit by bit the Baath Party stopped being a national movement and turned into an Alawi clique starting from the top.
Just the same way that Nasser's movement turned into a small clique under Sadat near the end, and then Mubarak. The same thing took place with all of the other regimes. Its not a good way to retain mass support.
Re: Syrian Resistance : Strategy and long term implications.
Yes! Even at the very end there were Gaddafi supporters in Ben Ghazi even. Remember that late bombing run and that attempt to attack from the South and the oil fields damage. Even now there are several towns that fly the green Gaddafi flag.
Even in his worst phase though Gaddafi could not bring himself to do what Bashar is doing. Pulverizing his own Capital city with Mortars and shells. Gaddafi could not bring himself to do that to Tripoli and he undoubtedly could have.
It is odd that that the most megalomaniacal types are twisted by both their love for country and absolute power. In some ways it is normal for a human being to become twisted this way. True evil lies elsewhere. As those smiling family photo's of Nazi's swimming by the lake and singing Kumbaya with their children before returning to their day jobs of gassing entire families shows. True evil always comes from 'normal' looking folks.
WRT the conflicted Sunni family this is always how civil wars go. What did they expect. When the guys at the top have lost the 'perceptions' battle it is all over. For regular people perceptions are reality. Those who were privileged and prospered under the ancien regime will always be shocked, 'SHOCKED', at the fact that the large majority are unwashed masses who have been abandoned by the regime. They destroyed an ATM, for gods sake. Savages!
Even in his worst phase though Gaddafi could not bring himself to do what Bashar is doing. Pulverizing his own Capital city with Mortars and shells. Gaddafi could not bring himself to do that to Tripoli and he undoubtedly could have.
It is odd that that the most megalomaniacal types are twisted by both their love for country and absolute power. In some ways it is normal for a human being to become twisted this way. True evil lies elsewhere. As those smiling family photo's of Nazi's swimming by the lake and singing Kumbaya with their children before returning to their day jobs of gassing entire families shows. True evil always comes from 'normal' looking folks.
WRT the conflicted Sunni family this is always how civil wars go. What did they expect. When the guys at the top have lost the 'perceptions' battle it is all over. For regular people perceptions are reality. Those who were privileged and prospered under the ancien regime will always be shocked, 'SHOCKED', at the fact that the large majority are unwashed masses who have been abandoned by the regime. They destroyed an ATM, for gods sake. Savages!
Re: Syrian Resistance : Strategy and long term implications.
looking at what's happening in syria i remembered tom clancy's act of war book. There in the book he says kurdish militants plan something similar and try to force a war between syria and turkey which would engulf entire region. But as usual uncle sam comes and saves the world. [ot]In the book there a druze spy from mossad. That was 1st time i heard of druze community.[/ot]
One thing this rebellion got for kurds is more empowerment in syria. Once finally dust settles down can the kurds believe they went few more steps ahead of getting their own country??
One thing this rebellion got for kurds is more empowerment in syria. Once finally dust settles down can the kurds believe they went few more steps ahead of getting their own country??
Re: Syrian Resistance : Strategy and long term implications.
And now, having seen the depravity of the new rulers, there are very likely more Gaddhafi supporters today than there were before the NATO war.Theo_Fidel wrote:Yes! Even at the very end there were Gaddafi supporters in Ben Ghazi even.
There is no evidence that the foreign backed rebels in Syria are supported by anybody other than a very small minority of criminal elements. Most people seem to view them with revulsion. The fact that the foreign-backed fighters don't want elections is also telling.
Re: Syrian Resistance : Strategy and long term implications.
Pranav,
There has been an election in Libya and the evidence points to nothing of the kind. Libyans are filled with hope for the future and not poison about the past.
You are simply uninformed and wrong on Syria too.
There has been an election in Libya and the evidence points to nothing of the kind. Libyans are filled with hope for the future and not poison about the past.
You are simply uninformed and wrong on Syria too.
Re: Syrian Resistance : Strategy and long term implications.
xposted
Reuters carried this story on 20th JulyRony wrote:Did any one pick this up ? Iran's propaganda machinery - Press TV is reporting that
Blast hits Saudi intelligence building, killing deputy spy chief
A blast has hit the builing of Saudi intelligence service in Riyadh, killing deputy of the newly-appointed intelligence chief Prince Bandar bin Sultan, according to reports.
The explosion took place on Sunday when Bin Sultan’s deputy was entering the building, Yemen's al-Fajr Press quoted eyewitnesses as saying.
Saudi media have so far refrained from showing any reaction to the blast.
The United States' closest Arab ally is a firm supporter of the Syrian rebels now battling in Damascus to oust President Bashar al-Assad and is mending fences with Washington after a disagreement over last year's Arab uprisings.
"Bandar is quite aggressive, not at all like a typical cautious Saudi diplomat. If the aim is to bring Bashar down quick and fast, he will have a free hand to do what he thinks necessary. He likes to receive an order and implement it as he sees fit," said Jamal Khashoggi, an influential Saudi commentator.
Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal has described arming the rebels as "a very good idea". Saudi Arabia and Qatar are believed to be funding and sending weapons to the Syrian insurgents, Arab officials say.
As Syria's crisis enters a potentially decisive stage in the aftermath of Thursday's assassination of top security chiefs in a bomb blast, Riyadh's princely rulers are concerned about blowback from Assad's allies in Iran.
With Syria in flames, Iraq still weak and Egypt navigating an uncertain transition towards democracy, Saudi Arabia now stands alone as the Arab world's most stable major nation.
Ottaway said Bandar had previously negotiated with both Syria and Iran, as well as with Russia, a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council that has vetoed resolutions against the Assad government written by Riyadh.
"He wants to see Saudi Arabia flex its muscles, particularly if the Americans are there with him," he added.
Re: Syrian Resistance : Strategy and long term implications.
re. discussion of a coastal Alawite stronghold and sectarian internal displacement;
This via Reuters; http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/sns- ... ory?page=1
This via Reuters; http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/sns- ... ory?page=1
For months before, Tartous had been a tourism and party scene for Alawites and Syrian elites seeking an escape from the unrest and uncertainty gripping the rest of the country.
...
Long-time residents estimate that nearly half of Syria's entire Alawite population has relocated to Tartous province since the uprising started. Finding an apartment in the city that swelled from 900,000 to 1.2 million inhabitants is now a matter of luck, real estate agents say.
...
It remains unclear if the fear that has eclipsed the mood of defiant confidence in Tartous will last or be a passing panic.
But more and more cars with Damascus plates are arriving, and Alawites from the shaken capital say the message is clear.
"The (bomb attack) was a strike to the core. If they were able to get to the inner circle, what else is there?" said Abu Ali, 48, a furniture salesman from Damascus, where rebels began battling the army in the capital this week.
Re: Syrian Resistance : Strategy and long term implications.
Nightwatch:
http://www.kforcegov.com/Services/IS/Ni ... 00138.aspx
http://www.kforcegov.com/Services/IS/Ni ... 00138.aspx
Syria: Opposition fighters attacked the provincial police headquarters in the Qanawat district of old Damascus, news services reported on the 19th . Gunfire was intense for an hour, a Qanawat resident said.
Rebels also claim to have attacked and seized three border crossing huts, two on the Turkish border and one on the Iraq border. These attacks confirm the vulnerability of border guards in every country, including the US.
Comment: The most frustrating challenge in evaluating the Syrian security situation is the lack of precision that would make opposition reports about fighting subject to verification. Western news reports proclaim that the battle for Damascus is in progress, with fighting occurring for five days. The impression is of major combat forces engaged and the city in panic. The imagery recalls The North Vietnamese Army rolling into Saigon in 1975, but western news reporters are not allowed to travel in Syria.
NightWatch attempted today to put the battle imagery to the test by plotting the neighborhoods in greater Damascus in which shooting has been reported in the past five days. Reporting on neighborhoods is not consistent so some activity in some city blocks almost certainly has been omitted.
The reports indicate shooting has taken place in six neighborhoods. There are at least 24 of them in Damascus. The six neighborhoods are in the southern suburbs-al Tadamon, al-Midan, Qaa, Nahr, Aisha and Mezzah. If there are others that Readers have noted NightWatch invites feedback in order to construct a more accurate picture of the exchanges of fire.
The clustering effect of the location of the neighborhoods shows that the opposition shooters infiltrated from the south into old, congested neighborhoods with narrow passageways, according to satellite imagery.
Whole neighborhoods are not in insurrection. Shooting seems to take place at the intersections of selected streets by small numbers of fighters, an economy of force tactic when manpower is in short supply. The government forces in the neighborhoods appear to be militia or paramilitary forces that are backed up by more heavily regular forces and some helicopters.
The Syrian government is taking a page from the Israeli count-terror playbook of responding with asymmetric force. That explains the helicopter attacks, mortar fire, the occasional tank unit and artillery shelling. The Syrians are conserving manpower by using firepower.
The numbers involved, based on the duration of the firefights do not seem large nor particularly threatening in a military sense. The blocks in the neighborhoods are dispersed so that the government extermination efforts are tedious.
In a living systems analysis, it also is clear that the fighters have support, aid and comfort, places to eat and sleep in the nearby residences. That makes the supporting civilians targets of the government's asymmetrical counter-fire. The opposition holds hostage the people on whom they rely for support and cover.
This substrate of the fighting is obscured by the sensational attacks. The two sensational attacks this week could succeed because Syrian authorities have attempted to maintain normal security conditions in Damascus for as long as possible. It is a big city to try to secure. This week's attacks and bombings will force changes to the security regime in Damascus, making such attacks more difficult in the future.
The satellite photos of Damascus posted by al Jazeera, for example, confirm that the outbreaks of shooting reported in the media are rather localized and that most of Damascus remains unaffected. On a satellite image of Damascus, this week's street fighting is pretty small stuff. If the government forces can't handle it, they don't deserve to stay in power.
These observations in no way diminish the significance of five days of shooting in the southern neighborhoods of Damascus. This analysis concludes that it signifies government security lapses as much as opposition capabilities.
The threat posed by the opposition fighters does not seem sufficient to put the government at near term risk, unless leaders panic or have been bought off. If the government were to collapse, it would be the result of other considerations.
Reports that Bashar al Asad relocated to a presidential residence in Latakia have been denied by the Syrian government. He remains in the sprawling presidential palace complex in western Damascus.
Iran's defense minister and Hezbollah leader Nasrallah both praised Syrian efforts to defend itself from the US, Israel, Saudi Arabia and outside terrorists.
Re: Syrian Resistance : Strategy and long term implications.
the reality of daily life in one of the better run post-Assad towns
http://world.time.com/2012/07/24/a-disp ... ated-town/
http://world.time.com/2012/07/24/a-disp ... ated-town/
Re: Syrian Resistance : Strategy and long term implications.
CJ Chivers, who has tended to get these things right, Libya say, unlike other always wrong analysts, says the IED dooms the Syrian army. No army, no Assad. The irony of all this is creepy....
http://cjchivers.com/post/27621199997/s ... on-the-new
http://cjchivers.com/post/27621199997/s ... on-the-new
This is where the I.E.D. fits in. Once the armed opposition mastered the I.E.D. and spiked with bombs much of the very ground that any military seeking to control Syria must cover, and Syria’s army lacked a deep bench of well-trained explosive ordnance disposal teams and the suites of electronic and defensive equipment for its vehicles to survive, then the end was written. Because the Syrian army is ******. And its troop must know it.
But even if it firms up, the army’s problem will still be the same. It cannot operate in a tactically meaningful way in much of its own country, it has no local Sunni proxy to take its place and it has no time to find one, the more so in a climate of Sunni anger. It can fight and it can kill; sure. But it cannot operate in a way that it gets stronger, and its foes get weaker. With I.E.D’s. in large-scale use against an army ill-equipped to counter them, the dynamic works the opposite way. And where can the army go?
Considered in this war’s social and demographic context, with the Alawite-dominated military deployed in the midst of an armed and now bomb-savvy, Sunni-dominated population that loathes its government and has suffered terribly under its hand, there will almost certainly be a time, not too far off, when you will be referring to the Syrian army in the past tense.
Bomb by bomb it lost momentum. And now, bomb by bomb and stand-off by stand-off, until it breaks and ancient forms of battlefield ugliness overtake its units, the Syrian army’s most likely end seems clear. Timing? You won’t get me to guess. But the rest, as they say, is details – bloody as they will be.
Re: Syrian Resistance : Strategy and long term implications.
Turks have moved 22 bus loads of troops to the border. Specialist teams trained with dealing with chemical weapons have been placed on standby.
Re: Syrian Resistance : Strategy and long term implications.
Chivers has it fundamentally wrong. Insurgencies are not won or lost by weapons, but by politics.Theo_Fidel wrote:CJ Chivers, who has tended to get these things right, Libya say, unlike other always wrong analysts, says the IED dooms the Syrian army. No army, no Assad. The irony of all this is creepy....
http://cjchivers.com/post/27621199997/s ... on-the-new
IEDs can not and do not prevent the Syrian army from being able to concentrate forces in sufficient quantity and strength to successfully assault any FSA held area.
The fundamental problem the Syrian military has is a shortage of troops to hold the areas it takes.
Why is that? Because the bulk of both its own troops and the Syrian population can not be trusted.
That is a political problem that can not be fixed by any number of IED jammers and well trained bomb disposal teams.
It would still find itself taking territory, withdrawing, and then retaking it all over again when the FSA reappears, and each time with a few more casualties.
IEDs inflict more casualties each time and tie up more troops and logistics, but they do not change the underlying dynamic.
Re: Syrian Resistance : Strategy and long term implications.
Asad is losing about 50-60 troops each day on each offensive in the north. That gives you the scale of attrition. You can imagine Damascus must have that level of injuries too
Re: Syrian Resistance : Strategy and long term implications.
Shyam,
Assad would be able to afford those losses if he could trust the reserves or the 'Popular Militia' forces that had been raised to deal with a foreign invasion.
What's worse too is that some of those losses are really defections to the FSA.
Its the loss of national support, not IEDs thats bringing down the regime.
Assad would be able to afford those losses if he could trust the reserves or the 'Popular Militia' forces that had been raised to deal with a foreign invasion.
What's worse too is that some of those losses are really defections to the FSA.
Its the loss of national support, not IEDs thats bringing down the regime.
Re: Syrian Resistance : Strategy and long term implications.
Johann, I'm talking just casualties in one major military hospital. They say they receive around 50-60 dead soldiers each day
Re: Syrian Resistance : Strategy and long term implications.
Well the politics has been against the Assad group for a looong time. As it has been against the Burmese Junta as well. There have been many a rebellion and it has always been clear that the vast majority of the Sunni hated him. Yet so far the rebellions have always been put down mostly through superiority of arms and bloody mindedness. What Chivers is pointing out is that it is the Syrian army that is doomed. He makes no claim about the political set up. IED's give the FSA operating room. Something they did not have and so could not expand earlier. The Syrian army has no counter and is doomed. He is an on the ground guy pointing out what is happening on the ground. I tend to believe him.
Re: Syrian Resistance : Strategy and long term implications.
It says something when Iraqi refugees flee Syria and go back to Iraq..
Here is mama Clinton talking of safe havens within Syria in rebel held areas..as rebels show gains and hold them, Unkil may get bolder with next steps instead of working behind scenes.
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/25/world ... wanted=all
Here is mama Clinton talking of safe havens within Syria in rebel held areas..as rebels show gains and hold them, Unkil may get bolder with next steps instead of working behind scenes.
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/25/world ... wanted=all
Re: Syrian Resistance : Strategy and long term implications.
Video shows SA-7 manpads have reached Syria. Not sure if they can fire them or know how to operate. The Libyans did figure out how to operate them. These things typically come in crates of 2, so undoubtedly more are present. Civilian aircraft should stay as far away as possible.
Re: Syrian Resistance : Strategy and long term implications.
This Syrian spring is to protect KSA and nobody else.
Re: Syrian Resistance : Strategy and long term implications.
Now those are to shoot down Syrian AF and Helicopter gunships, obviously the source of those SA7 is simple to deduct.
The largest buyer of Chinese arms is the Culinary Institute
The largest buyer of Chinese arms is the Culinary Institute
Re: Syrian Resistance : Strategy and long term implications.
Theo,Theo_Fidel wrote:Well the politics has been against the Assad group for a looong time. As it has been against the Burmese Junta as well. There have been many a rebellion and it has always been clear that the vast majority of the Sunni hated him. Yet so far the rebellions have always been put down mostly through superiority of arms and bloody mindedness. What Chivers is pointing out is that it is the Syrian army that is doomed. He makes no claim about the political set up. IED's give the FSA operating room. Something they did not have and so could not expand earlier. The Syrian army has no counter and is doomed. He is an on the ground guy pointing out what is happening on the ground. I tend to believe him.
Chivers misses the point, and I'm sorry to say it appears that you do as well. The Syrian army is not doomed by IEDs, but by the rot within its ranks.
There is a tested and tried formula for counter-insurgency - money, macadam and manpower, applied doggedly. Mayhem is optional.
Manpower is the hardest of all to substitute for. You have to not just take areas, but hold them and patrol the population centres, the highways and byways and borders, and have troops to spare to take and hold the next area, and the next. Until there is no room for the insurgent to operate.
My point was that manpower is the great Achilles heel of the Syrian army today, unlike in previous uprisings.
There is no shortage of Syrian soldiers per se, but there is a desperate shortage of *reliable* soldiers.
That shortage is not because of IEDs - if the Syrian army was reliable it could easily absorb the losses experienced so far given its reserve system and call-up powers. Syria has a labour surplus.
Hundreds of thousands of men in uniform and eligible for duty who would answer the instantly call to fight an Israeli or American invasion will not answer the call to fight the protestors or the FSA.
That is also why, if the Syrian population turns against the FSA - as the Algerian population did during the civil war there - the FSA is doomed. IEDs or not.
Re: Syrian Resistance : Strategy and long term implications.
Surely trained Turkish/Qatari/US personnel would be available to operate them. Logical counter to that would be distribute MANPADs to disaffected minorities in Turkey, Bahrain etc.Theo_Fidel wrote:Video shows SA-7 manpads have reached Syria. Not sure if they can fire them or know how to operate. The Libyans did figure out how to operate them. These things typically come in crates of 2, so undoubtedly more are present. Civilian aircraft should stay as far away as possible.
Re: Syrian Resistance : Strategy and long term implications.
another crisis brewing, this time in Iraq, Kurdish Forces Stop Iraqi Army Advance Near Syrian Border Syria.
Re: Syrian Resistance : Strategy and long term implications.
Pranav,Pranav wrote:Surely trained Turkish/Qatari/US personnel would be available to operate them. Logical counter to that would be distribute MANPADs to disaffected minorities in Turkey, Bahrain etc.Theo_Fidel wrote:Video shows SA-7 manpads have reached Syria. Not sure if they can fire them or know how to operate. The Libyans did figure out how to operate them. These things typically come in crates of 2, so undoubtedly more are present. Civilian aircraft should stay as far away as possible.
Special forces are much more likely to be used to train the FSA than actually fight on their behalf.
BTW the Syrian army has huge stocks of SA-7s and SA-14s.
The FSA is capturing heavy weapons from Syrian forces not just in battle, but in raids on armories and barracks.
Weapons like the SA-7 that aren't used up by the time Assad falls are going to be hot commodities in the regional and global black market. The real threat is going to be civilian aircraft.
Re: Syrian Resistance : Strategy and long term implications.
First Assad charge at Aleppo ends with 12 tanks destroyed and 100+ dead soldiers. Assad should be more careful with his equipment. These not losses he can sustain. Meanwhile, due to completely stripping the country side of military presence, several military bases with tons of arms and ammunition have fallen to the FSA. One on the East of Aleppo, has yielded 4 tanks and 12 AA guns from my count on a video. Libya style 'technicals' are now starting to show up in battle. If anything by focusing on Aleppo he is making the FSA stronger.
I'm not sure what Assad hopes to gain by risking his most loyal soldiers and equipment at Aleppo. The Misrata, Libya experience shows that this can end very very badly. There is a 80% chance that Assad will win, but are the horrific losses he will sustain worth it? Also for such urban combat the American learnt the hard way that overwhelming force is required, Often 6:1 type advantage to minimize losses. Anything less and the attacking force could find itself annihilated, re: Misrata, Libya.
One notable difference from Libya is that the Syrians mostly do not wildly discharge weapons into the air during demonstrations. There is an odd shot or two during but nothing more. This speaks to military training and experience.
-------------------------------------
Johann,
The SAA was well on its way to terrain domination using just superior weaponry. The SAA has never had the manpower to overwhelm the country. Almost every tactic of the FSA had been countered and the FSA was on the run. The army had no problems holding on to its border posts for instance. What Chivers is pointing out, and I agree with him, is that the IED is weapon the FAA has ZERO ability to counter. It is the weapon that turned the FSA from being the hunted into the hunters they are today. This is what forced SAA to remain in the bases as the FSA gradually took over the countryside. It is this control of the countryside that has now translated to attack on the cities. Defections from within the SAA only truly started once there were safe areas with Syria the soldiers to disappear to. Even now I doubt more that 10%-15% of the actual 'teeth' for the SAA has actually defected. Many defections, like Tlass type folk seem to be more 'tail' type operators.
I'm not sure what Assad hopes to gain by risking his most loyal soldiers and equipment at Aleppo. The Misrata, Libya experience shows that this can end very very badly. There is a 80% chance that Assad will win, but are the horrific losses he will sustain worth it? Also for such urban combat the American learnt the hard way that overwhelming force is required, Often 6:1 type advantage to minimize losses. Anything less and the attacking force could find itself annihilated, re: Misrata, Libya.
One notable difference from Libya is that the Syrians mostly do not wildly discharge weapons into the air during demonstrations. There is an odd shot or two during but nothing more. This speaks to military training and experience.
-------------------------------------
Johann,
The SAA was well on its way to terrain domination using just superior weaponry. The SAA has never had the manpower to overwhelm the country. Almost every tactic of the FSA had been countered and the FSA was on the run. The army had no problems holding on to its border posts for instance. What Chivers is pointing out, and I agree with him, is that the IED is weapon the FAA has ZERO ability to counter. It is the weapon that turned the FSA from being the hunted into the hunters they are today. This is what forced SAA to remain in the bases as the FSA gradually took over the countryside. It is this control of the countryside that has now translated to attack on the cities. Defections from within the SAA only truly started once there were safe areas with Syria the soldiers to disappear to. Even now I doubt more that 10%-15% of the actual 'teeth' for the SAA has actually defected. Many defections, like Tlass type folk seem to be more 'tail' type operators.
Re: Syrian Resistance : Strategy and long term implications.
Theo,
Our little discussion is a wonderful encapsulation of exactly why so many conventional militaries fail so badly at counter-insurgency.
IEDs have provided a tactical substitute for the ATGMs and RPGs that the FSA lacks, yes.
But IEDs are not the reason that the Syrian army is running around from one hot spot to another (Homs to Idlib to Rastan, back to Homs, Damascus and now Aleppo), while unable to secure the areas they have already taken.
I can point out dozens of villages that the Syrian army has taken and retaken four or five times in a row, and then pulled out of. They did not pull out because of IEDs. They pulled out because the forces were badly needed elsewhere. In each case they did damage to the village, hoping that the villagers would learn the lesson and not provide shelter to the FSA. It never worked
Its the classic (failed) response of a state with a manpower problem facing an insurgency. You cant win without a sustained grassroots presence which can provide and carrots as well sticks, preferably through locals.
The loyalty problem is not simply about defection. It is about obedience to orders that require firing on civilian areas.
In the early stages of the protests many units refused orders to open fire.
The regime response was to arrest large numbers of officers, and shoot those who appeared to waver - but that requires presence of security units in large numbers to monitor officers in the field.
Only a fraction of the Syrian Army's combat potential is being fielded, and the reason isn't just maintenance and availability. Its because the regime would rather have units confined to barracks with unloaded weapons, than have them in the field armed and unsupervised. It takes a lot fewer resources to manage the risks that way.
Our little discussion is a wonderful encapsulation of exactly why so many conventional militaries fail so badly at counter-insurgency.
IEDs have provided a tactical substitute for the ATGMs and RPGs that the FSA lacks, yes.
But IEDs are not the reason that the Syrian army is running around from one hot spot to another (Homs to Idlib to Rastan, back to Homs, Damascus and now Aleppo), while unable to secure the areas they have already taken.
I can point out dozens of villages that the Syrian army has taken and retaken four or five times in a row, and then pulled out of. They did not pull out because of IEDs. They pulled out because the forces were badly needed elsewhere. In each case they did damage to the village, hoping that the villagers would learn the lesson and not provide shelter to the FSA. It never worked
Its the classic (failed) response of a state with a manpower problem facing an insurgency. You cant win without a sustained grassroots presence which can provide and carrots as well sticks, preferably through locals.
The loyalty problem is not simply about defection. It is about obedience to orders that require firing on civilian areas.
In the early stages of the protests many units refused orders to open fire.
The regime response was to arrest large numbers of officers, and shoot those who appeared to waver - but that requires presence of security units in large numbers to monitor officers in the field.
Only a fraction of the Syrian Army's combat potential is being fielded, and the reason isn't just maintenance and availability. Its because the regime would rather have units confined to barracks with unloaded weapons, than have them in the field armed and unsupervised. It takes a lot fewer resources to manage the risks that way.
Re: Syrian Resistance : Strategy and long term implications.
Johann.
Yes, I agree. Conventional military should not be tasked with a counter insurgency. The unfortunate thing is if the Army is destroyed, as now seems inevitable, there won't be a stabilizing force in place. This is not Libya after all....
------------------------------------------
Assad claiming that Salahuddin area in Aleppo has been retaken and rebels driven out. Rebels deny anything of the kind.
Yes, I agree. Conventional military should not be tasked with a counter insurgency. The unfortunate thing is if the Army is destroyed, as now seems inevitable, there won't be a stabilizing force in place. This is not Libya after all....
------------------------------------------
Assad claiming that Salahuddin area in Aleppo has been retaken and rebels driven out. Rebels deny anything of the kind.
Re: Syrian Resistance : Strategy and long term implications.
This is the kind of thing I meant when I said the loyalty problem within Assad's system is the greatest obstacle to hanging on, IEDs or not;
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503543_162- ... commander/
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503543_162- ... commander/
(CBS News) TRIPOLI, Lebanon - At first, the man with the bullet wound was reluctant to speak to us.
Then, in a rush of words, he began to tell of his double life in Syria.
"I was a member of the Ba'ath Party," Housam told CBS News from his hospital bed in Tripoli, northern Lebanon, referring to the party and the government of Syrian President Bashar Assad. Housam arrived clandestinely to Tripoli a few days earlier, to have a bullet removed from his left shoulder.
....
For 13 months, Housam led parallel lives in western Syria, near the central province of Homs. His hometown came under intense siege from the Syrian Army for months this spring, and Homs is considered one of the strongholds for the opposition in the now-17-month-old conflict.
"I worked for the Assad government in the day and at night I would fight with the rebels," he explains proudly from his hospital bed. "I was elected to my position (in the government) twice," he adds, smiling broadly and over the ruse he was able to maintain for so long.
Re: Syrian Resistance : Strategy and long term implications.
Obviously, at least this time around the FSA will not be able to hold its ground indefinitely against a numerically superior combined arms assault backed by airpower.Theo_Fidel wrote:Assad claiming that Salahuddin area in Aleppo has been retaken and rebels driven out. Rebels deny anything of the kind.
The very fact that they occupied central Aleppo, however briefly, was a statement in itself.
FSA locals will probably conduct a fighting retreat when it makes sense to do so, but the foreign jihadis will hang around looking for martyrdom. I hope they get it in spades. These are the kinds of dynamics that makes it very hard for local resistance and foreign jihadis to get along.
Re: Syrian Resistance : Strategy and long term implications.
Here is a map of conflict areas courtesy BBC.
Re: Jihadi's.
Whats new. They were like that in Libya too. Suicide bombing and harikari missions that end in slaughter. Got to love the end of that Journalist kidnap story. Story is 4 FSA types got wind of it, and went in and b$tch slapped the 50 jihadi's, released the journalists, read the riot act and walked out without a shot fired. I think it is pretty clear who is in charge.

Re: Jihadi's.
Whats new. They were like that in Libya too. Suicide bombing and harikari missions that end in slaughter. Got to love the end of that Journalist kidnap story. Story is 4 FSA types got wind of it, and went in and b$tch slapped the 50 jihadi's, released the journalists, read the riot act and walked out without a shot fired. I think it is pretty clear who is in charge.

Re: Syrian Resistance : Strategy and long term implications.
Manaf Tlass role is to get the other senior military leaders to lay down arms and join revolution.
Re: Syrian Resistance : Strategy and long term implications.
I've walked up down and around the Aleppo citadel. Its a very, very formidable piece of work with commanding views of the entire city.
The FSA and foreign jihadis have choice - use it as a stronghold to draw out the process of Assad retaking the city, and dent regime confidence? Or risk having a UNESCO world heritage site battered by artillery and airpower.
The FSA and foreign jihadis have choice - use it as a stronghold to draw out the process of Assad retaking the city, and dent regime confidence? Or risk having a UNESCO world heritage site battered by artillery and airpower.
Re: Syrian Resistance : Strategy and long term implications.
What ever we do we must be on the winning side
And everything else will fall in place automatically
And everything else will fall in place automatically
Re: Syrian Resistance : Strategy and long term implications.
What about Dresden,Cologne,the monastery at Monte Cassino in WW2? The Allies had no compunction in razing these world heritage sites to the ground,and I'm not talking about the war crimes of Hiroshima and Nagasaki! In our day too,what happened in Iraq?
The problem in Syria right now is that there is a virtual civil war between an authoritarian regime supported by Russia and China in the main, and a motley group of mercenaries ,funded by the west (NATO) and the Sunni sheikdoms and the Saudis. Neither wants to engage in genuine negotiations,as the civil war has become a proxy latter-day CW-2 conflict between east and west.Syria could eventually end up as the M-E's Vietnam,with the added danger of sucking in Israel and the possibility of direct clashes between western (NATO) and eastern (Russian) military forces.
Aleppo is going to be a bloodbath whichever ay one looks at it.The hope is that the civilians -the majority of them get out of the city before it ends up in the pages of history...another ruin.The dear Lord forbid that the conflict spreads to Lebanon and Israel and the nightmare of Iran entering the ring if it too is attacked!
Syria once again exposes the utter bankruptcy of the UN in conflict rssolution,which stands fully exposed.It is nothing as I've said for decades but a bordello,where the P-5 get to screw the rest of the world,where non-voting rotating UNSC members get only the priviliges of "peeping toms",while the whole sleazy circus is run by an obliging "adam".In the current scenario by "Bunkum Moon"!
The problem in Syria right now is that there is a virtual civil war between an authoritarian regime supported by Russia and China in the main, and a motley group of mercenaries ,funded by the west (NATO) and the Sunni sheikdoms and the Saudis. Neither wants to engage in genuine negotiations,as the civil war has become a proxy latter-day CW-2 conflict between east and west.Syria could eventually end up as the M-E's Vietnam,with the added danger of sucking in Israel and the possibility of direct clashes between western (NATO) and eastern (Russian) military forces.
Aleppo is going to be a bloodbath whichever ay one looks at it.The hope is that the civilians -the majority of them get out of the city before it ends up in the pages of history...another ruin.The dear Lord forbid that the conflict spreads to Lebanon and Israel and the nightmare of Iran entering the ring if it too is attacked!
Syria once again exposes the utter bankruptcy of the UN in conflict rssolution,which stands fully exposed.It is nothing as I've said for decades but a bordello,where the P-5 get to screw the rest of the world,where non-voting rotating UNSC members get only the priviliges of "peeping toms",while the whole sleazy circus is run by an obliging "adam".In the current scenario by "Bunkum Moon"!
Re: Syrian Resistance : Strategy and long term implications.
I'm sure they would prefer to have Assad destroy it so that the western media can indulge in the usual orgy of outrage.Johann wrote: The FSA and foreign jihadis have choice - use it as a stronghold to draw out the process of Assad retaking the city, and dent regime confidence? Or risk having a UNESCO world heritage site battered by artillery and airpower.
Re: Syrian Resistance : Strategy and long term implications.
Foreign sponsors are the ultimate authority for both Jihadis and FSA.Theo_Fidel wrote:I think it is pretty clear who is in charge.
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Re: Syrian Resistance : Strategy and long term implications.
Unconfirmed reports say Saudi Arabian spy chief Prince Bandar bin Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al Saud has been assassinated.
The death of 63-year-old Prince Bandar has been confirmed, the Paris-based Voltaire Network reported on its website on Monday, citing unofficial sources.
The international non-profit organization, which publishes a free website (voltairenet.org) in eight languages (Arabic, English, French, German, Italian, Portuguese, Russian, Spanish), said that Prince Bandar was killed because of his role in the July 18 deadly bombing in Damascus.
The bombing killed at least four high-profile Syrian security officials, including Defense Minister Dawoud Rajiha and his deputy Assef Shawkat who is also President Assad's brother-in-law.
There’s no confirmation or denial yet from Saudi officials, nor from the Syrian government.
Bandar, who served Saudi Arabia as an ambassador to the United States from 1983 to 2005, was named the kingdom’s Secretary General of the National Security Council in 2005. On 19 July 2012, he was appointed Director General of the Saudi Intelligence Agency by King Abdullah.
Many analysts said his promotion was a reward for the role he played in organizing the attack in Damascus.
Saudi Arabia has been at the forefront of anti-Syria plots in recent months. And, the latest report is a new indication of escalating hostility between Damascus and Riyadh.
Re: Syrian Resistance : Strategy and long term implications.
Just goes to prove how important it is to nurture intelligence operatives close to other governments in other countries.
Perhaps this would make the Saudis think twice about how far they want to push the situation!
Perhaps this would make the Saudis think twice about how far they want to push the situation!
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Re: Syrian Resistance : Strategy and long term implications.
Bandar was a close friend of Bush family. He was the Saudi point man for 9/11 operation. Many secrets died with him.
Last edited by Altair on 31 Jul 2012 19:01, edited 1 time in total.
Re: Syrian Resistance : Strategy and long term implications.
Assuming he died that is...