Consortium of Indian Defence Websites
https://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/
KARACHI: At least 12 people including a Shia doctor and three madressa students were killed and several others injured in different incidents of violence in the port city, DawnNews reported on Wednesday.
The latest incident took place near Continental Bakery in Gulistan-i-Jauhar neighbourhood when unidentified attackers killed three students of an Islamic seminary. Two students sustained bullets wounds also. They are reportedly in critical condition at Jinnah Postgraduate Medical Centre (JPMC).
Enraged people took to the streets after the incident. They set ablaze push carts and forced local shop keepers to shut their businesses.
Police and Rangers personnel reached the site to disperse the angry mob.
The incident followed yet another high-profile Shia killing in the same area when Doctor Haider Raza was gunned down by unidentified attackers in front of Darul Sehat Hospital. Another man accompanying Raza in his car was injured in the attack. His identity is yet not known.
Jafaria Alliance and Pakistan Shia Ulema Council condemning the attack demanded an early arrest of the culprits.
Earlier during the day, a bomb weighing 13 kilograms was defused near Khalid Bin Waleed road in Karachi’s PECHS area.
The key event in Sunni-Shia violence was actually Khomeini's success in dominating the Iranian revolution's and his subsequent decisions toshiv wrote:I am unable to go into the history of violence in shia-sunni relations but the two major events that have apparntly sparked bloodshed between shias and sunnis are Zia's Islamization of Pakistan and the American invasion of Iraq.
In Pakistan there has been a proliferation of sunni groups killing shias. in Iraq there is an ongoing shia sunni conflict. There was relative peace between shias and sunnis in Iraq as long as Saddam ruled - and now that is gone and there is utter chaos.
I believe that the Americans are clearly taking sides with the sunnis - with their relationship with sunni nations like KSA, Pakistan and Egypt. On the other hand, it may be argued (as the Indian shia cleric says) that the Americans seek to provoke conflict between Muslims to keep them divided. But the Muslims are divided anyway and it was not Americans that provoked anti-shia conflict in Pakistan.
Johann wrote: In the end this really does come down to a political conflict between Riyadh and Tehran, and their buckets of oil money. The day that conflict ends, or even dies down, the Sunni-Shia conflict will retreat from the streets, from the khutbas and back into fatwas and counter-fatwas that hardly anyone reads. This possibility is far from remote.
Here is an interview of an Indian shia cleric that is very interesting.VikasRaina wrote:1. Do Sunni's convert to Shia and vice versa or even that is wajib-ul-qatl ?
2. Other than Palestinian conflict and Jew conspiracy in any event of the world, Do Shia and Sunni look at the larger geo-political world with the same glasses or do we see them reacting differently to events that do not impact them directly.
e.g. How does election in India appear to a distant Sunni as compared to a Shia.
or Do Shia care about events in Egypt as much as Sunni's do ?
or How do Shia react to Chinese Uighur conflict ?
Answer to this Question will tell me if there is any hope left for RoP followers or if we are barking up the wrong tree.
Mahan Abedin - What is the extent of Iran's influence over Indian Shiite Muslims?
Seyed Mohammad Asgari - Naturally Indian Shiites, as well as many Indian Sunnis, were delighted at the establishment of an Islamic Government in Iran in 1979. Muslims in general were emboldened by Iran's raising of the Islamic banner across the world. As far as Indian Shiites are concerned, for the past thirty years they have been delighted by Iranian successes and conversely depressed by Iranian setbacks. If there is disturbance in Iran then the Shiites in India become emotionally and psychologically distressed.
The vast majority of Indian Shiite Muslims follow two Iranian Marjaa Taqlid [11] (Sources of Emulation). The majority follow Grand Ayatollah [Seyed Ali] Sistani, who is based in Iraq but is of Iranian origin. Most of the rest follow Grand Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei, the leader of the Islamic Revolution. However, the great majority of Indian Shiites regard Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamanei as a political leader, even if they don't follow him in a Taqlid (Emulation) context.
Mahan Abedin - Who is your Marjaa Taqlid?
Seyed Mohammad Asgari - I follow Grand Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei. I have personally known him since before the victory of the Islamic Revolution. I regard him as unequalled in honesty and commitment and in possession of the deepest religious, scientific and political knowledge.
Mahan Abedin - To what extent are Indian Muslims, in particular Shiites, supportive of the Islamic Republic of Iran?
Seyed Mohammad Asgari - Religious Shiites universally support the Islamic Republic. This support is extensive and has a lot of conviction behind it. For example, if the leader of the Islamic Revolution Grand Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei, issues a command then religious Shiites feel duty bound to follow. As far as more secular Shiites are concerned, although they support the Islamic Republic, they don't feel committed to its future survival and success
Mahan Abedin - Do Indian Shiites view the Kashmir conflict differently to Indian Sunnis?
Seyed Mohammad Asgari - Initially the Shiites had the same aspirations about Kashmir as the Sunnis. But when the sectarian and political problems in Pakistan escalated from the mid 1990s onwards some Shiites reached the conclusion that Kashmir might suffer even worse if it was in Pakistani hands. This perception is reinforced by a steady stream of stories painting a bleak and difficult life for many Shiite residents in Pakistani-held Kashmir. However, I must stress that there are differences of opinion in the Shiite community and there are many Shiites who dissent from this view. In any case, Shiites are not happy with the present situation in Kashmir either. Clearly India has a problem in Kashmir and there is a widespread feeling that injustices are being inflicted on the Muslim population in Indian-held Kashmir.
This is exactly the behaviour we discussed earlier on. Sunnis and ShiatAlis would join together against the kafir Indians. When it comes to Ahl-e-Kitab, they may or may not, for that depends upon the exigencies of the situation. But, against a kafir nation, they would sink their differences temporarily.shiv wrote:Seyed Mohammad Asgari - Initially the Shiites had the same aspirations about Kashmir as the Sunnis. But when the sectarian and political problems in Pakistan escalated from the mid 1990s onwards some Shiites reached the conclusion that Kashmir might suffer even worse if it was in Pakistani hands. This perception is reinforced by a steady stream of stories painting a bleak and difficult life for many Shiite residents in Pakistani-held Kashmir. However, I must stress that there are differences of opinion in the Shiite community and there are many Shiites who dissent from this view. In any case, Shiites are not happy with the present situation in Kashmir either. Clearly India has a problem in Kashmir and there is a widespread feeling that injustices are being inflicted on the Muslim population in Indian-held Kashmir.
No Vikas. No prism is intended to be conjured up.VikasRaina wrote:Shiv, I see the prism that we look at Shia-Sunni relations is same as Pakjabi-Sindhi relations.
Bottomline, we need to neutralize both of them. It is like posters on BRF were preaching till yesterday that TSP Sindhi are peace loving Indic-like while it is the pakjabi's that are problem till the yellow matter appeared all across the room.
Very interesting indeed. Have saved the link.shiv wrote: Here is an interview of an Indian shia cleric that is very interesting.
http://religion.info/english/interviews ... 0wAzY-wdox
Do read the whole thing, but relevant to part of your question
Mahan Abedin - To what extent are Indian Muslims, in particular Shiites, supportive of the Islamic Republic of Iran?
Seyed Mohammad Asgari - Religious Shiites universally support the Islamic Republic. This support is extensive and has a lot of conviction behind it. For example, if the leader of the Islamic Revolution Grand Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei, issues a command then religious Shiites feel duty bound to follow. As far as more secular Shiites are concerned, although they support the Islamic Republic, they don't feel committed to its future survival and success
In India the Muslim press generally condemned the severity of the military action, but not always in such unequivocal terms as were used by the national press. Some Muslim journals felt the government of Pakistan had no other recourse left to it to obtain a modicum of law and order in East Bengal. They supported their stance with reports of the atrocities perpetrated by Bengali mobs in Dacca, Rajshahi and Chittagong in the days immediately before the military action and which had been glossed over in the national press in general. When an unequivocal condemnation of the Pakistani action was issued by Maulvi As'ad Madani, a Congressite Muslim, the Jamiat Times, for example, wrote this rejoinder (Delhi; 23 April 1971): "You don't know what brutalities were committed by the Bengalis against the non-Bengalis. You should ask the grieving relatives in Delhi. Destiny never forgives a tyrant." A similar opinion was expressed by Maulana Minnatullah Rahmani of Monghyr (Bihar) when he refused to sign the statement of condemnation circulated by Jayaprakash Narayan on behalf of the Insani Biradari. The Maulana said, "Why must you now condemn Pakistan when earlier you did not condemn India for communal riots? The Bengalis did more brutal things to the non-Bengalis." (Reported in the Jamiat Times of 11 June 1971.)
Read full section under Phase 4 after the war.Phase Four (After the War)
For a majority of Indian Muslims, the pervasive mood in the days immediately after the war was a mixture of despair, confusion, and anger. In terms of actual acts and deeds, of course, they behaved no differently from their non-Muslim compatriots, but emotionally, unlike the latter, they could be neither jubilant nor sanguine. The following quotation from Haqeeqat (Lucknow: n.d.) conveys well the feelings at that time:
"The chief reason for the resentment of the Muslims is that the event of the independence of Bangladesh and her severance of all ties with Pakistan was generally celebrated in India as if the 'victory' had been gained against the Muslims themselves. Insulting and provocative slogans were raised against them in public meetings in this country. A second reason is that the Muslims in general do believe that the war was primarily fought for the purpose of destroying the integral unity of Pakistan. Our Ministry of Information hands out all sorts of propaganda but does nothing to dispel the dejection and resentment of Indian Muslims" (Quoted in Sidq-i-Jadid; 21 January 1972).
How confused and desperate their thinking was at that time can also be gauged from a most outrageous explanation offered by Nida-i-Millat of Lucknow. In its issue of 16 January 1972, it reprinted prominently an item from the Akhbar-al-Alam-al-Islami, the official journal of the Rabita-al-Alam-al-Islami (Muslim World League), published from Mecca. According to the undisclosed sources of the organisation, 300 Zionist agents were sent by Israel to Bangladesh for the purpose of fomenting trouble and training Bengali rebels. It was also asserted that Rahman Sobhan, a prominent economist and radical of Bangladesh, had met in Paris with Daniel Cohn-Bendit ("a Jew"), who then went on to Israel to arrange for the agents while Rahman Sobhan himself came to India to coordinate plans with Indian communists. After reprinting this illuminating report, the worthy editor of Nida-i-Millat added the following comment: "We are abstaining from commenting on this article because only the future will tell what the facts were and what actually caused the secession of East Pakistan. We only desire our country to be aware of the delicate (nazuk) sentiments and feelings of the Muslim world, especially of the Arabs."
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain all cracked down hard on their Shia populations after 1979. The result was a cycle of bombings, hijackings, and more repressions through the early 1980s.shiv wrote:Johann there was no real shia-sunni conflict until the Iran-Iraq war ended. That was followed by Zia massacring shias in Gilgit in 1988. Then Saddam went apeshit - and attacked Kuwait - so much for his putative role as protector of sunni monarchies. Finally it was Operation enduring freedom that led to today's shia sunni conflict - which may be sponsored by Tehran and Riyadh, but is being fought in Pakistan, Iran, Syria and Bahrain.
Because this started with Khomeini's dream of becoming the spiritual leader the ummah as a whole, including Sunnis. Its a rather unusual ambition for a Shi'a Ayatollah, and its rooted in his very specific version of the Islamic revolution. Its this ambition that attacks the Al-Saud/al-Wahhab team on their home turf, which is what they care most about.What exactly makes you believe that the possibility of Tehran and Riyadh reaching accommodation is "far from remote"? I can't see any incentive for them to do that - or any advantage to either side. Also it keeps the arms industries of arms exporting nations in good working order, so who might want to end this juicy conflict?
We should entertain going one step further by entering into an entente with Iran. It has win-win potential all across the board and would get the overt support of Russia, without much of a resistance from the west, if they are smart enough to understand that if Iran-US cannot patch up, then it is in US interests too, to keep Iran at least within the tent, instead of pissing from outside, even if allied with opponents and other future competitors. I am putting India in the competitor category against the US.ramana wrote:From Indian point of view I would like KSA to be cut down oto size by having the East KSA which is Shia majority are assert their Westphalian/self determination rights.
This is for the Ibn Saudi constant support of terrorist against India.Plain no hard feelings. As Old Testament says "An eye for an eye...." and all that. I really dont care for their internal politics but supporting terrorists against India should have consequences.
Johann you have provided a secular explanation for a religious issue and have tippy-toed around one vital aspectJohann wrote:Shiv,
It takes money to put out a message. It takes money to sustain organisations.
Around 97 per cent of Pakistan's 180 million population is Muslim, the vast majority Sunnis.
Violence against Shia Muslims, who make up around 20 per cent, has been growing in recent years, much of it led by extremist sectarian groups such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi.
<snipping out news of Hindu, Christian and Ahmedi killings in Pakistan as OT here>
"Minorities in Pakistan are increasingly feeling insecure since the present government came to power in June last year," he told reporters.
Peace talks with the Pakistani Taliban could have "immense repercussions" on religious minorities, he warned.
The Taliban, whose seven-year insurgency has claimed thousands of lives, want to impose strict sharia Islamic law across Pakistan.
"It is a choice of the government if it wants to have negotiations with the Pakistani Taliban but these negotiations should not come at the cost of religious minorities and women," said Rehman.
Nearly 200 Shiites were killed in the first seven weeks of 2013, most in two huge bombings in the southwestern city of Quetta, a flashpoint for sectarian violence.
The rights group said that since the present government came to power the trend had shifted from large-scale attacks to individual killings targeting Shiite doctors, lawyers and intellectuals.
WASHINGTON, April 25, 2014 – Last week, the world’s first ever “Anti Shia Alliance” convention was held in Jakarta, the capital city of Indonesia. The event was attended by thousands of participants, who called for “jihad” against Shia Muslims. Several government officials were in attendance. During the conference, a Shiite journalist who was covering the program for Ahlulbait Indonesia, reported being detained, interrogated, and beaten by group organizers and attendees.
The alliance is a coalition of various groups who all maintain an anti-Shia agenda, including the Anti-Heresy Front, led by Ahmad bin Zein al-Kaff.
The convention resulted in an “Anti Shia Declaration” which reads as follows:
The anti-Shia declaration
The alliance is a preaching forum to promote virtues and prevent abominable acts.
The alliance will take any necessary measures to maximize the prevention of the proliferation of heretical teachings by Shia followers.
The alliance will forge good relations with other preaching organizations.
The alliance will demand that the government immediately ban Shia and revoke all licenses for foundations, organizations and institutions owned by Shiites.
In a speech, bin Zein al-Kaff said “It’s time that we declared jihad against them…We should not tolerate them anymore.”
Another part of the alliance, the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) had its members attend wearing black ski masks and camouflage clothing, with shirts that said “Heresy Hunters.”
The Jakarta Globe quotes the group’s leader, Tardjono Abu Muas, as saying “We all have to understand that Shia has tainted the true Islamic teaching… Our government should be like the Malaysian government.” The Malaysian government has increasingly banned the practice of Shia Islam within their country, and has been criticized by Human Rights Watch for human rights violations against the Shiite minority.
Another leader in the organization, Athian Ali said that more than 100 Muslim clerics attended the event.
READ ALSO: Controversial 9/11 Museum set to open in New York
The Jakarta Globe writes that anti Shia attitudes are a key component of upcoming elections in Indonesia, “[The Anti Shia Alliance] was borne out in the message to the crowd from Muhammad Al Khaththath, the secretary general of the Indonesian Ulema and Congregation Forum, or FUUI, which in 2012 issued a call to build ‘anti-Shiite posts’ saying ‘We will support any candidate who wants to make an MOU to purge the Shiites from Indonesia. If [Subianto] is ready to do that. he will become the president.’ ”
Ahmad Cholil Ridwan, a leader from the Indonesian Council of Ulema (MUI), attended the event and also spoke of the need to “purge the Shiites” from the country.
According to the Jakarta Globe, announcements made before the convention stated the Anti-Shia Alliance event would be “attended by officials including West Java Governor Ahmad Heryawan and Ahmad Cholil Ridwan, a leader of the Indonesian Council of Ulema, or MUI, the highest Islamic authority in the country.”
After extensive backlash, the West Java Governor announced he would not attend the Anti Shia Alliance meeting, but refused to speak out against the convention. Instead, Governor Heryawan sent his assistant, Ahmad Hadadi, who openly supported the conference.
READ ALSO: Muslim clerics stay one step ahead of Zionists with anti-Mars fatwa: a sort-of-satire
According to DureanAsean, Indonesia has a history of antipathy towards Shias, reporting “[Indonesian] Religious Affairs Minister Suryadharma Ali previously called Shia Islam heretical, saying that it deviated from principal Islamic teachings.
“Persecution of Shia followers has escalated in the past few years. In 2012, Tajul Muluk, a Shia leader from Sampang, East Java, was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment for blasphemy.
“In the same year, a mob set fire to dozens of Shiite homes in Sampang, killing two Shia followers and forcing hundreds of others to take refuge in Sidoarjo, around 100 kilometers away.”
The Jakarta Post reported that after the Sampang burning “Some [victims] were even forced to convert to Sunni beliefs if they wished to return home.”
Last year, Indonesian Shiite leader Iklil Al Milal protested a decision to give an award to President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono for religious tolerance in Indonesia. “We are living as if in prison. We no longer get food rations and there has been no security guarantee from the state,” said Milal at a public forum, speaking to conditions Indonesian Shias faced after the Sampang attacks.
“Today the population of Shia’s in the country is approximately one million, they are distributed all around the country, however, they are mainly found in Jakarta-which is the capital city of Indonesia, Bandanogh and Sowra,” says Imamreza.net. The same website also claims that Shiites originally entered the country when grandchildren of Sayyid Ali al-Uraidhi, son of the Shiite Imam Jafar Sadiq, migrated to Indonesia with his family members in the 9th century CE.
Read more at http://www.commdiginews.com/world-news/ ... oj1kkuI.99
'Absolute power corrupts absolutely' is the famous quote. But I think its not true. Its not the power that corrupts. Power only enhances the ability to carry out the intentions. Money, power, technology, tools, skills, ...etc increase the abilities. How those abilities will be used are determined by two factors:shiv wrote:Johann you have provided a secular explanation for a religious issue and have tippy-toed around one vital aspectJohann wrote:Shiv,
It takes money to put out a message. It takes money to sustain organisations.
Two things here
1. Message
2. Money
If the money goes the message will not go. It may just become dormant.
Now please tell me what the message is. it is just as important that everyone knows and understands the message that all this money is spreading and what message it is that can lead to bestial killing provided the money is there.
Would you be able to say something about the message that is being spread with money. What is the message? What are the origins of the message? Will the message disappear or merely hide if there is no money. Would the message restart murder once money becomes available. is there any chance that the message will lead to more war and more killing of people? Can anything be done about the message? If so, what can be done?
Link to postjohneeG wrote:So, what can the preacher do?
Well, preacher turns to the only other topic that never fails to engage people: 'us vs them'.
There are several variations of 'us vs them' theme that preachers of different ideologies can indulge in. Eg: men vs women, boys vs men, infants vs old men, animals vs humans, liberal vs conservative, traditional vs modern, faithful vs unfaithful, ...etc.
Regardless of that particular variation, the larger them is always 'us vs them'. Obviously, in such a theme, the 'other' is dissed and cussed. This is why 'hate' gets propagated. Basically, this means that even if the present 'enemy' or 'other' is removed, the preacher/ideology will find some other 'enemy' or 'other' to stay relevant. The preacher or ideology needs the 'other' because they depend on 'us vs them' theme to stay relevant to their audience.
That means any ideology that wants to avoid ending up in such negative 'us vs them' theme should develop intellectual/philosophical or artistic/creative components within their ideology.
johneeG wrote:Creative pursuits would mean arts like music, dance, acting, poetry, writing, acting, even fighting(or martial arts), games...etc. These activities also have lot of scope for exploration that a preacher can use to preach to his audience without boring them.
Both creative and intellectual pursuits have a common thing: In these activities, a person is competing with self. It is a sort of self-improvement mechanism. In a way, the activity becomes just a tool or method to improve oneself.
One finds that Bhaarathiya religions have a huge amount of philosophy and arts department. This allows the practitioners and preachers to engage themselves in lots of activity that involves philosophy or arts without boring themselves. Getting bored seems to be the biggest worry in the world. Mind craves some activity...any activity. An empty mind is a devil's workshop. If the mind is not constructively engaged, it will turn to destructive activities/thoughts. The same applies to ideologies.
Ideologies that lack philosophy and arts component provide a challenge to the preacher to come up with something engaging to his audience. This is a very difficult job. Almost any topic becomes stale after it is repeated sometimes. But a preacher has to live all his life preaching something or the other! If there are no preachers, then the ideology will die.
Link to postjohneeG wrote:But, there is a negative in this aspect for the preacher or the ideology:
If the people start seriously practicing intellectual/philosophical or artistic/creative components, then they are less likely to listen the regular preaches of the preacher. As I said, people are likely to look at their own intellectual/artistic pursuits as a self-improvement mechanism. So, they will give greater importance to it and the importance of the preacher(or even the ideology) gets reduced. Why would a preacher/ideology want to encourage a component that is likely to reduce his/her own power?
Another danger for the preacher or ideology from intellectual/artistic pursuits is that those pursuits can be decoupled from the ideology and pursued independently by the people. If people start following intellectual/artistic pursuits after decoupling it from the ideology, the ideology becomes completely sidelined and faced extinction.
But, generally, the reason these intellectual/artistic components are not developed by all ideologies is because it is not easy to develop them. It requires a certain amount of talent, dedication, skill, technology, money, free-time, ...etc. And its not possible for a single person to do that suddenly. Its built over time gradually or passed down from previous generations. For both such activities to occur, there needs to be a relative peace or stability. If there is a lot of instability in the society, then it is unlikely for such components to develop.
People who practice intellectual/artistic pursuits would need patrons. That means some people would need to be ready to give money to these people. That means there needs to be respect for intellectuals or artists. Only in an environment where the intellectuals/artists are respected, can the intellectual/artistic pursuits possible.
Shiv,shiv wrote:Johann you have provided a secular explanation for a religious issue and have tippy-toed around one vital aspectJohann wrote:Shiv,
It takes money to put out a message. It takes money to sustain organisations.
Two things here
1. Message
2. Money
If the money goes the message will not go. It may just become dormant.
Now please tell me what the message is. it is just as important that everyone knows and understands the message that all this money is spreading and what message it is that can lead to bestial killing provided the money is there.
Would you be able to say something about the message that is being spread with money. What is the message? What are the origins of the message? Will the message disappear or merely hide if there is no money. Would the message restart murder once money becomes available. is there any chance that the message will lead to more war and more killing of people? Can anything be done about the message? If so, what can be done?
Last month the world commemorated the 20th anniversary of the Rwandan Genocide. Dignitaries from around the world delivered speeches to mark the occasion, but UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon’s statement was perhaps the most remarkable, as he admitted that the United Nations was “ashamed” of its failure to prevent the mass killing. At the same time Ban was making this statement, a Shia doctor was gunned down in Karachi, Pakistan by sectarian terrorists, as part of a self-avowed campaign to “make Pakistan a graveyard” for all Shias.
Despite the escalation of targeted killings of Shia leaders and large-scale bombings of Shia neighborhoods, the Pakistani government and international community have failed to apply the lessons from cases like Rwanda in recognizing the early warning signs of an impending genocide perpetrated by sectarian terrorist groups. While the murder rates of Shias in Pakistan is nowhere close to the 800,000 Tutsis killed in Rwanda, members of the international community are duty-bound to prevent mass killing events before they occur.
The Shia’s plight must be understood in the context of Pakistan’s position within the larger sectarian struggle between Sunnis, largely supported by Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, and Shias, supported by Iran and its close allies. Pakistan walks a tightrope in this conflict as it shares a border with Iran, but relies on Saudi Arabia for aid and political patronage. This international tension has domestic implications with 20 percent of Pakistan’s population belonging to the Shia faith, amounting to nearly 25 million people who are being threatened with extermination by sectarian outfits.
To understand the threat that Pakistan’s Shias face, one must look to the Convention on the Punishment and Prevention of Genocide, to which Pakistan is a signatory. Under the Convention, a genocide occurs when a party has the intent to destroy a religious, ethnic, or racial group “in whole, or in part” and acts on that intent by killing, injuring, or deliberately causing conditions leading to the physical destruction of that group.
The Convention applies to all people, including private groups that are perpetrating genocidal acts in a country without direct assistance from the state. Under the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), all countries are obliged to recognize if such acts are taking place and take steps to punish past transgressions while preventing future acts.
In the context of Pakistan, the two elements to prove genocide are clearly satisfied: terrorist groups like Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) have openly committed brutal murders of Shias with the self-avowed purpose of “cleansing Pakistan” of their presence. The attacks against Shias have basically taken three forms. First, high profile community members like doctors, lawyers and judges have been targeted in drive-by shootings in Karachi. Second, Shia religious processions and pilgrims have repeatedly been targeted in mass-shooting attacks. Third, Hazara Shias have been attacked en-masse in the city of Quetta, with several car bombings that have left hundreds dead in the last three years.
This has led to a mass exodus of Hazaras from Balochistan, with as many as 30,000 leaving the province over the last five years, according to some estimates. Many have left because they believe the government refuses to acknowledge the concerted campaign against them, and is therefore not taking steps to protect them.
Sectarian groups like Laskar-i-Islam (LI) and LeJ use various methods to terrorize Shias and force them to leave their homes, including the distributing threatening pamphlets, as occurred in Peshawar on April 16, 2014. Further, these groups often accept responsibility for vicious attacks on Shias, and express their genocidal intent in promising future attacks. This was certainly the case when the “Principal of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi” issued an open letter declaring that all Shias were “wajib-ul-katl” or “worthy of killing” in the aftermath of an attack that left eight Hazaras dead.
Despite these openly violent assertions, the government of Pakistan continues to deny the existence of genocide against Shias. As such, there are no official statistics on the number of victims, which would be a key component in understanding the level and frequency of violence perpetrated by sectarian militants. It is difficult to assess the level of political or military support these sectarian groups enjoy; however, there are a few issues that have raised concern in the past.
First, the Pakistani judiciary has been woefully ineffective at punishing acts of terrorism, especially when the victims were religious minorities. One need only look to the case of Malik Ishaq, a co-founder and leader LeJ, who has been arrested and released from jail several times, despite being implicated in the murder of hundreds of Shias. Sectarian groups often target judges and prosecutors in order to intimidate the court and its officers.
Second, many blame Islamist dictator General Zia Ul-Haq for creating these sectarian militant groups to use as proxies in Kashmir and Afghanistan in the 1980s. The groups have long since turned their violence inward toward Pakistan’s religious and ethnic minorities. Many fear the pattern from the 1980s may now be repeating itself as Syria witnesses an influx of Pakistanis entering the country to fight alongside anti-Shia militant groups opposing the Bashar al-Assad government. This could wreak havoc on Pakistan when these battle-hardened operatives return home and turn their guns on the nation’s minorities, especially Shias.
Additionally, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, a Zia protégé, has been accused of being soft on these groups while leading his socially-conservative political party, the Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PMLN). This claim was given credence by the fact that the PMLN was distributing a monthly stipend to Malik Ishaq’s family while Ishaq was in jail for one of his forty-four different criminal charges relating to 70 murders, many of them Shias.
Further, some also believe that anti-Shia rhetoric is seeping into the mainstream of politics. For example, Maulana Ludhanvi, the leader of the Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat (ASWJ) recently won a national assembly seat. In campaigning for the seat, Ludhanvi promised, “At the moment I can raise a voice for my anti-Shia mission only at a local level and from my local mosque. But when I get the microphone in the [National] Assembly, the whole nation and the whole world will listen…”
All of these examples are consistent with the early warning signs of genocide identified by international legal scholars like Barbara Harff, who created an analytical rubric that examines “trigger events” for genocide, such as assassinations of community leaders, impunity for genocidal actors, or political instability. Accordingly, in her annual Global Watch List, Harff has repeatedly identified Pakistan as a high-risk country for mass killings targeting religious minorities, including the Shia community.
Even though the administration has not openly acknowledged the potential for genocide against Shias, there are indications that the government, or parts of it, is taking note of the growing problem. For example, the Ministry of Interior recently admitted to the Senate that more than 2,000 Shias have been killed in sectarian attacks over the last five years. Similarly, Punjab provincial police have recently begun targeting “sectarian outfits,” which has already resulted in the arrest of suspects believed to be involved in eighteen attacks that left 16 Shias dead. Furthermore, the government is in the process of passing anti-terror legislation like the Pakistan Protection Ordinance and the Fair Trial Act, which could be used to effectively prosecute sectarian militants in the future.
Pakistan and the international community at large have a responsibility to protect populations vulnerable to genocidal acts, and the first step towards this protection is realizing the scope of the problem. If the government of Pakistan were to recognize that anti-Shia attacks are early warnings of a campaign that has the potential to endanger the lives of more than 20 million Shia citizens, it could begin collecting official statistics on Shia murder rates. It could also use already existing legislation criminalizing hate-crimes to prosecute members of these groups. In addition, the government could utilize the powers that were recently granted to it under the anti-terror laws to tackle the sectarian violence.
At the same time, the international community could assist with resources and scholarly advice while applying diplomatic pressure to force Pakistan’s government to more vigilantly punish and prevent anti-Shia campaigns by terror groups. If the UN is truly “ashamed” of its failure to prevent the genocide in Rwanda, it must use early warning signs and diplomatic pressure to abide by the mantra of genocide prevention: “Never again.”
Latest official figures show extremist groups have killed more than 2,000 Shia Muslims in recent years across different regions of Pakistan, Press TV reports.
According to Pakistan's Interior Ministry, at least 2,090 people, most of them Shia Muslims, were killed by terrorists over the past five years.
The figure was revealed on Friday in a written reply from the ministry to a question by lawmakers in Pakistan’s Senate, the upper house of parliament.
However, lawmakers from different political parties have contested the statistic, saying the number of victims could be much higher than reported.
Several Pakistani lawmakers also strongly condemned the ongoing massacres of Shia Muslims in Quetta, Parachinar, Karachi and Gilgit-Baltistan.
Meanwhile, at least four people were killed when a roadside bomb targeting a bus carrying Shia Muslim worshippers exploded in the southern port city of Karachi.
Pro-Taliban groups have launched a violent campaign against Shia Muslims and appear to have widened their terror campaign in major Pakistani cities.
According to local sources, militants affiliated to Taliban and al-Qaeda terrorist groups have killed thousands of Shia Muslims in the country.
The killing of Shias in Pakistan has sparked international outrage, with rights groups and regional countries expressing concern over the ongoing carnage. Still, those behind the violence are rarely caught or punished.
Shia Muslims in Pakistan say the government must take decisive action against the forces involved in the targeted killings. They also accuse Islamabad of failing to provide security for the Muslim community.
In Pakistan, Shia organizations along with members of the civil society have staged several protests to denounce the targeted killing of innocent Shias across the violence-wracked country.
Pakistan has been experiencing violence since 2001, when Islamabad joined the so-called US war on terror. Pakistani sources say nearly 50,000 people have lost their lives in the violence.
The Sunni militants who seized the riverside town of Buhriz late last month stayed for several hours.
The next morning, after the Sunnis had left, Iraqi security forces and dozens of Shiite militia fighters arrived and marched from home to home in search of insurgents and sympathizers in the rural community, dotted by date palms and orange groves.
According to accounts by Shiite tribal leaders, two eyewitnesses and politicians, what happened next was brutal.
“There were men in civilian clothes on motorcycles shouting ‘Ali is on your side,’ ” one man said, referring to a key figure in Shiite tradition. “People started fleeing their homes, leaving behind the elders and young men and those who refused to leave. The militias then stormed the houses. They pulled out the young men and summarily executed them.”
The killings turned the town 35 miles (about 56 km) northeast of Baghdad into a frontline in Iraq’s gathering sectarian war.
In Buhriz and other villages and towns encircling the capital, a pitched battle is under way between the emboldened Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the extremist Sunni group that has led a brutal insurgency around Baghdad for more than a year, and Iraqi security forces, who in recent months have employed Shiite militias as shock troops.
On the eve of national elections on Wednesday, Iraq is fast returning to the horrors of its recent past. Security officials, tribal figures and politicians fear ISIS might choke off the capital as an earlier incarnation of the group did in the years following the invasion by U.S. forces. Then, Sunni extremists set off multiple car bombs around Baghdad on an almost daily basis, and killed Shiites with impunity.
The vote this month and the race to form a new government will be contentious, with multiple Shiite lists vying for the premiership — Sunnis and Kurds looking for plum posts — and Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki determined to stay in office.
Moderation is a rare commodity. Some of Iraq’s Sunni politicians have denied ISIS’s existence in Anbar and blamed all troubles on al-Maliki, even if it means ISIS continues to grow.
In turn, militia groups have joined the Iraqi military’s combat missions against the insurgents, and sent fighters to battle Sunni rebels in Syria.
Defense of Baghdad
Asaib Ahl al-Haq and Kataib Hezbollah, two groups once suppressed by the American military and sponsored by the Iranians, make up the bulk of the Shiite militia fighters aiding the Iraqi security forces. According to three senior Shiite politicians, individual Asaib and Kataib members and others now defend Baghdad as part of an organization, attached to the prime minister’s military office, called the Sons of Iraq, a name formerly associated with Sunnis who battled al-Qaida.
Al-Maliki briefed senior Shiite politicians about the new paramilitary group in a meeting about the war with ISIS on April 7, where he expressed frustration about the military’s performance fighting in cities and towns, according to two people who attended the session.
Al-Maliki told senior Shiite political figures that they had formed groups “of mujahedeen and Sons of Iraq . . . on the periphery of Baghdad”; he called the fighters “better than the army” at “guerrilla warfare,” according to the meeting minutes read to reporters and confirmed by a second person who attended.
Shiite lawmaker Amir al-Kinani, a critic of al-Maliki, attended the session and said the group, which has been in existence for a year, was drawn primarily from the ranks of Asaib and Kataib.
“They have executed several operations in the belt of Baghdad and Diyala. They made qualitative operations there in Buhriz,” he said. “They are . . . jihadists ready to die.” Others aware of the initiative described it as an effort to absorb Iraq’s armed Shiite hardliners within the state.
Al-Maliki’s spokesman denied any militias are fighting for the government or belong to a new organization that reports to him. “We don’t have people who kill themselves to kill others and are considered as martyrs,” said Ali Mussawi. “There is nothing like this.”
The spokesman for police and military operations in Baghdad province also dismissed the accounts. “Such allegations are baseless and wrong, launched by those who were infuriated by the victories achieved by our security forces,” said Brig. Saad Maan.
Asaib has also publicly denied any such involvement in the fighting in Iraq. But security officers, political figures and Shiite and Sunni residents tell a different story.
One volunteer fighter, who calls himself Abbas, said he had joined the new Sons of Iraq and fought three months in Abu Ghraib. He said his battalion reported to the prime minister’s office of commander in chief. “We are all Shiites, and when people learn we are Shiites there to free them and fight against ISIS they welcomed us in,” Abbas said.
The person who introduced him said Abbas was from Asaib, but he said he was just a laborer who volunteered along with 750 mostly Shiite young men from around western Baghdad.
The men had been gathered at an airport base in western Baghdad, and were then given military fatigues, M16s and shipped to fight in a 750-strong battalion around Zaidan, west of Baghdad, and in Latifya, south of Baghdad, he said.
He and others quit when the government did not pay them after three months, but he spoke proudly of combat operations.
“When we found (the terrorists) in a house, we killed them. We burned the house or demolished it. We burned those houses because we didn’t want them to be a shelter for terrorists.”
He estimated they destroyed 25 or 26 homes.
When the killing in Buhriz ended, residents and the mayor of neighboring Baquba counted at least 23 dead. Local Shiite officials said terrorists killed any civilians. But ordinary citizens — Shiite as well Sunni — say regular people died at the hands of the militia.
Innocent people died
The lawmaker al-Kinani confirmed that innocent people died in Buhriz at the hands of Sons of Iraq Shiite paramilitary forces but called it the cost of the need to expel ISIS from the area. “Yes of course civilians died. I am not defending the killing. (But) ISIS is killing people, they are killing the (Shiites). They are killing even the Sunnis,” al-Kinani said. “When the Sons of Iraq entered the area . . . they were thinking of only killing ISIS, so there weren’t any war prisoners.”
Other Shiites are horrified by what happened, and feel confused about how to face the threat of ISIS, who they now worry will overrun them.
Al-Kinani, other politicians and tribal figures say the Shiite paramilitary forces are now assisting the army in areas around Baghdad to fight the insurgency, in part due to desertions and the decimation of some army units.
In recent days the groups have fought through a farming area called Ibrahim Bin Ali within 16 miles (25 km) of Baghdad. If the area falls, ISIS will have a foothold into Shiite parts of Baghdad.
Atrocities were filmed
Security has deteriorated fast over the last four months. In December, al-Maliki launched a campaign against ISIS in their heartland west of Baghdad. Fighting descended into a series of brutal atrocities, often caught on video and in photographs by both militants and Iraqi soldiers.
Iraqi soldiers say they have been trapped in and around the western city of Ramadi. They say they have run low on tank shells, lack aerial cover and armored vehicles, and have been hit by high casualties and desertion rates.
In March and April, ISIS seized a dam in Fallujah, flooded farmland on the outskirts of Baghdad in Abu Ghraib, and drained offshoots of the Euphrates river; the Iraqi government evacuated the main prison for Sunni detainees in Abu Ghraib because of the ongoing clashes; and militants, thought to be from ISIS, bombed the country’s oil pipeline to Turkey.
Last week, an intelligence officer who focuses on Anbar used a map to show how ISIS has free range from Anbar’s western desert down to the borders of the Shiite provinces of Hilla and Karbala and across the northern provinces of Mosul, Kirkuk and Salahuddin. In Anbar, the fighting has displaced at least 420,000 people. Ordinary citizens feel that the government has declared war on them.
Soldiers have deserted
It has been equally devastating for the military. Military personnel and Iraqi officials say several thousand soldiers have deserted; and well over 1,000, if not more, have been killed. The government has yet to release formal numbers.
Soldiers in Anbar speak with desperation. “We are dumped by our military leadership in these deserted houses in the middle of the orchards, without enough ammunition, without night binoculars,” said one soldier from Ramadi.
His battalion has 120 of its original 750 soldiers; most have deserted and he vows to do the same.
One army officer said Iraq’s Special Forces, who have led the fight against the insurgency, are now taking defensive positions to avoid more casualties.
In part, he blamed graft in Iraq’s military. “It starts from taking cuts from food allocation money, sums for repairing and maintaining Humvee and armored vehicles and finally fuel supplied for each regiment,” the officer said.
Even divisional commands are now for sale, according to a senior Baghdad general. He told the story of a peer who had been offered such a command in northern Iraq for $1 million, with the agreement he would pay the sum back in two years. When the general asked where he would raise this money, he was told he could collect protection fees from local businesses and extract a fee from trucks at highway checkpoints. He should aim to pay off $50,000 every month.
The spokesman for the Interior Ministry and Baghdad security operations, Brig. Saad Maan, dismissed the allegations as “lies and baseless accusations.”
In Salahuddin province it is ISIS that is at the center of money-raising scams.
Fake checkpoints dot the roads, with men in uniforms looking to kill anyone in the security forces.
A video released by ISIS last month showed men in police uniforms capturing a pro-government Sunni fighter. One of the ISIS members bragged: “You arrest our leaders and we pay in dollars to set them free, but when we catch you, we slaughter you.”
QUETTA: The death toll in Sunday’s suicide attack in Taftan — a Pakistani town located at the Pak-Iran border — rose to 30. Of them, the bodies of 21 pilgrims were airlifted to Kohat district of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa on Monday.
Officials of Chaghai administration told The News that 21 bodies of the carnage were identified as residents of Kohat district.Reports from Taftan said that over 200 pilgrims who crossed the Pak-Iran border and entered the Taftan Tehsil on Sunday evening took accommodation in two hotels, Hashmi Hotel and Murtaza Hotel, when the bombers attacked the pilgrims.
The officials said that the bodies of the deceased were removed to the morgue of a local hospital while the authorities had informed the heirs and later they were flown to their native hometowns.
Previously, the death toll was reported as 23 with many injured.Official sources from Taftan said that a case against unknown attackers was registered and further investigations are in
progress. However, the authorities are clueless about the attackers despite the passage of 24 hours of the incident.
Agencies add: Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has directed the relevant authorities to take action against perpetrators of the pilgrims attack returning from Iran in Taftan. He directed the Inspector General FC to personally lead the operation against terrorists. The prime minister termed the task a big challenge for the law enforcing agencies in Balochistan.
Balochistan Chief Minister Dr Abdul Malik Baloch has also condemned terrorist attack terming it an inhuman act while the provincial Home Minister Mir Sarfaraz Bugti said, “foreign hand was involved in terrorism in Balochistan”.
In a statement he said Balochistan has long border with neighbouring countries and terrorists have their training camps in mountainous areas. “There are 34 camps in a neighbouring country’s mountainous areas where terrorists get training and later, carryout sabotage acts and attacks on innocent people in Balochistan,” he said.
Patron-in-Chief Pakistan People’s Party Bilawal Bhutto Zardari also condemned the brutal attack on the innocent pilgrims in Taftan.In a statement on Monday, Bilawal expressed sympathies with the grieved families and said that he can feel their pain being the son of Shaheed Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto who was martyred by the terrorists.
Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) condemned the continuing genocide of Shias in Pakistan especially pilgrims in Balochistan.According to a statement, PTI’s Core Committee observed that this growth in sectarian killings is clearly a part of proxy wars being fought on Pakistani soil.
Despite these attacks the government has failed to provide security to the Shia community in general and the pilgrims in Balochistan in particular.Meanwhile, the Hazara Democratic Party, Majlis Wahdatul Muslimeen and Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Fiqa-e-Jaferia had condemned the Taftan attack and termed it failure of the government.
Meanwhile the Iranian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman also strongly condemned the recent terrorist attack on the pilgrims in Balochistan province.“The Islamic Republic of Iran condemns terrorist actions on innocent people from any tribe and religion in Pakistan, and hopes that recurrence of such terrorists acts against the defenseless people will be prevented through the adoption of the necessary measures,” Afkham said on Monday.
BAGHDAD — Iraqi army soldiers abandoned their weapons and fled the northern Iraqi city of Mosul on Tuesday, as Sunni militants freed hundreds of prisoners and seized military bases, police stations, banks, the airport and the provincial governor’s headquarters. The attacks widened the Sunni insurgency in Iraq and were among the most audacious assaults on the government since the American military withdrawal more than two years ago.The rout in Mosul, the second-largest Iraqi city after Baghdad and an important center of the country’s petroleum industry, was breathtaking in its speed and appeared to take government officials by surprise, not to mention residents of the city and surrounding Nineveh Province. A major humiliation for the government forces in Iraq’s Sunni-dominated areas, the defeat also reflected the stamina of the Sunni insurgency, which has been growing with the war in neighboring Syria.Mosul was the last major urban area of Iraq to be pacified by American troops before they left, and the violence there now threatens to broaden into the adjacent autonomous Kurdish region of northern Iraq, which has its own armed forces, the peshmerga. Osama al-Nujaifi, speaker of Iraq’s Parliament and a brother of Nineveh’s governor, called on the authorities in the Kurdistan autonomous region to send reinforcements to fight the Sunni militants. BasNews, an independent news agency in Erbil, capital of the Kurdistan autonomous region, reported on Monday that Kurdish military forces had already been ordered to the outskirts of Mosul to protect Kurds threatened by the Sunni insurgents. Iraqis at a checkpoint near the Iraqi city of Arbil on Tuesday. Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki ordered a state of emergency for the entire country. Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki ordered a state of emergency for the entire country and called on friendly governments for help, without mentioning the United States specifically. His Shiite-led government has been increasingly struggling to deal with the resurrection of Sunni militancy in Iraq since the American military departure at the end of 2011 after eight years of war and occupation.In Washington the State Department spokeswoman, Jen Psaki, said in a statement that the United States was “deeply concerned about the events that have transpired in Mosul,” and that the Obama administration supported a “strong, coordinated response to push back this aggression.” The statement said the administration would provide “all appropriate assistance to the government of Iraq” but did not specify what aid might be forthcoming.
By midday on Tuesday, militants belonging to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, one of the strongest extremist groups, were in control of much of central and southern Mosul, according to witnesses. Local officials claimed that many of the fighters were jihadists who had swept in from the porous border with Syria, who have increasingly operated with impunity in that region even as President Bashar al-Assad has reclaimed ground lost to the insurgents elsewhere in Syria.
As hundreds of families fled Mosul, the bodies of slain soldiers, police officers and civilians were seen lying in streets. “They took control of everything, and they are everywhere,” said one soldier who fled the city, and gave only his first name. Zuhair al-Aaraji, a member of Parliament from Mosul, said that government security forces fled from some places without firing a shot. “They left their weapons and their equipment and ran away,” he said. “All these weapons are under the control of the militants now.
Around 40 Indians working on projects near the Iraqi city of Mosul were kidnapped by suspected ISIS militants when they were being evacuated from the area ravaged by the war between the Shia-dominated government in Baghdad and Sunni jihadis.
A worried Indian government responded to the crisis by getting in touch with Iraqi authorities and by dispatching former ambassador to Iraq Suresh Reddy. Reddy, recently appointed as special envoy to Asean and known to have contacts among Iraqis, was on his way to Mosul.
National security advisor A K Doval is coordinating the rescue effort.
The 40 Indians are construction workers. There are around 46 Indian nurses in Tikrit, the hometown of late Saddam Hussein. Some 14 of the nurses want to leave while others are still willing to hang on, said sources.
However, it is recognized that bringing back the hostages is going to be a huge challenge. There is no authority whose writ runs in Mosul and adjoining areas. Also, while the preliminary estimate has it that the abductors were from ISIS, there is no confirmation, nor a clue to the specific gang which carried out the abduction.
The Sunni-Shia overtones of the clash have seen the official forces being forced on to the back foot. ISIS rebels are believed to be not more than 60km from Baghdad
, then 
, followed with 
and 
.
.The Sunni-Shia divide is increasingly engulfing Muslim societies in many parts of the world in spasms of internecine violence. The latest developments in Iraq with the Islamic State of Iraq and [Greater] Syria (ISIS) making rapid advances towards Baghdad are an ominous reflection of the deepening of sectarian animosities within contemporary Islam. The potential impact of the current turbulence will be felt far beyond West Asia and North Africa. The developments also indicate — especially in light of the marginalisation of the Muslim Brotherhood and other mainstream Islamist outfits in Egypt, Syria and to a limited extent in Tunisia — that political Islam or Islamism will now be championed with much more lethal effect by groups that profess allegiance to radical Salafism, such as the ISIS.
Islamism, defined broadly, is an ideological construct based on a political reading of Islam in both its history and textuality. It argues that the primary duty of a Muslim is to strive for the establishment of an Islamic state, without which Islam will remain a ‘house half-built.’ Salafism (or Wahhabism) is a theologically puritanical approach that argues for a literal reading of the scriptures, shunning all accretions in matters of faith and life. What is common between the two, however, is that they both operate on a binary notion of the world.
The coming together of Salafism and Islamism is nothing new as al-Qaeda perfectly represented the merger of the otherwise irreconcilable worldviews of the two radical streams. In fact, Osama bin Laden and Ayman Al-Zawahiri personified this coming together of radical Salafism and uncompromising Islamism. The former’s worldview can be traced to the atavistic theology of the 18th century Saudi theologian-activist Sheikh Mohamed bin Abdul Wahhab, while the latter inherited the nihilistic fanaticism of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood icon Syed Qutub. But it is with the outbreak of civil war in Syria that we saw the ‘coming out’ of this dangerous concoction from its hideouts in Afghanistan, Yemen and North Africa. The giant strides they are now making in Iraq are indicative of the changing contours of Islamism on the one hand and the new-found role that this brand of Islamism invented for itself against the portentous backdrop of the Sunni-Shia divide.
Origin of the divide
The origin of this divide — the principal fault line within Islam — goes back 14 centuries to the very beginning of Islam. Interestingly, there was nothing religious about it at the beginning as it was a purely political dispute over which an entire theological and jurisprudential edifice was superimposed later on in order to canonise and perpetuate it into a distinctive clerical order. At the core of the dispute was an impassioned argument over whether the principle of succession in the nascent Muslim state should be dynastic or meritorious. The majority of Muslims in the early years of the faith chose merit over dynasty and argued that the prophet’s temporal and spiritual successors should be selected on the basis of their competence, seniority, knowledge and experience. A minority disagreed and said the basis of succession should be familial rather than meritorious. They believed the temporal and spiritual leadership of Muslim society should remain confined to the descendants of the prophet forever.
They thought Ali — the younger cousin and son-in-law of the prophet — deserved the honour, as he was not only a staunch companion of the prophet but also his closest family member by virtue of birth and marriage. Shia is an abbreviation for Shia’t Ali, the party of Ali, and is built around the victimhood of the prophet’s family following his death. The Sunnis do not dispute the importance of Ali and do not disparage him in any way; they consider him one of the greatest companions of the prophet along with the others, including the three other caliphs who preceded Ali in the seat of power. In a way, the difference between Sunni and Shia approaches to Ali is comparable to the difference between Islamic and Christian approaches to Jesus Christ. While both the religions converge on the greatness of Jesus as a man of God, they diverge on questions of his divinity and deification. Just as no Muslim will ever disparage Jesus, no Sunni will ever speak ill of Ali. Like in the case of the two Semitic religions, it was the differences and not the commonalities that were given accent throughout history, resulting in an entrenched culture of de-sacralisation and demonisation of the other on both sides. The fact that the two sects chose to follow totally different references in their respective approaches to jurisprudence and theology widened the gulf further over the centuries. With the exception of the Quran, which in any case has been susceptible to multiple and often contradictory interpretations, there are no religious or historical references that the Sunnis and Shias agree on.
Point of agreement
What is most interesting in this context is that both the sects agree on the need for an Islamic political system on earth. While the Islamists on both sides argue for the primacy of an Islamic state, the others express minor disagreements on questions of prioritising an Islamic state over those of building an Islamic society. No known mainstream religious organisation among both the sects rejects the idea of an Islamic majoritarian state as a desired eventuality. There is total consensus among all that justice will flourish only in such a state where the Sharia would replace all other sources and methods of legislation. What about justice for those who belong to other faiths or no faiths is a minor detail glossed over by self-righteous rhetoric.
This brings us to one of the most exasperating paradoxes in Islamic history. While the only consensus that ever existed across the sects in Islam has been on the desirability of (an immediate or eventual) Islamic state governed according to the Sharia, the principal divide of all times in Muslim society happened because there was no clear concept of a state or political system in Islam. It goes without saying that the method of electing the ruler is the most basic part of any political system, the absence of clarity on which triggered the first and foremost split among the Muslims. The festering wounds of that split continue to bleed the community to this day.
The Quran and the Prophet’s rich traditions left the choice of political systems or the nature of the state to the wisdom of the people and their circumstances. The followers, however, persisted with their delusional search for a theocratic utopia, denuding a faith of its humane core in the process. The Quran stressed on persuasion in matters of faith while the Islamists saw coercion (with the state being its ultimate and most legitimate instrument) as the only method for preservation of the faith. Iran will do all it can to stop the ISIS warriors in their tracks. ISIS will be happy to eradicate the Islamic Republic of Iran. But both will marshal the same set of arguments for the establishment and perpetuation of an Islamic state as well as for the disempowerment of each other in their respective spheres of influence.
In Iraq, for instance, Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki and his cohorts will be perfectly happy to replicate the Iranian Vilayat-e-Faqih model of state in Iraq and disenfranchise the Sunni minority. The ISIS will be delighted to establish their model of Islamic state and disenfranchise the Shia majority. Both parties will advance the same arguments to justify and Islamise their brutalities. Creation of a hell here in the name of the hereafter is the fundamental objective of all varieties of Islamism, despite their invocation of justice and divine will in every other sentence they write or speak.
(Shajahan Madampat is a cultural critic and commentator.)
