Gents,
Please bear in mind the lessons we have learnt from the past - even if the establishment is forgetting. The existing realities of the Indian COIN and CT scene do not allow a strict adherence to one 'format' of the force. In the Indian context sadly there is no assal uttar.
The COIN and CT forces that you see today are a result of events in history in Independent India:
> BSF was created when Pak Army overran Gujarat Police in 1965
> ITBP was created post the 1962 war but initiated with the fate of CRPF patrol in 1959(?)
> NSG was created because of the botched success of the Paras in Op Bluestar
> SPG was created when Indira Gandhi was assasinated
> SSB and SFF were again a product of 1962
> Force 1 was created and NSG dispersed after 26/11
> RR was created as response to present terrorism in J&K
(AR is the only COIN force from British era).
Now the NSG was created with a vision, that the Army specifically should not be tasked to internal Counter-Terror operations. The same principle governs the decision to create the Rashtriya Rifles. Please dwell on the reason why this was done. These forces give us the skill, experience and discipline of army with the accountability of a police force. Its a mixed bag but one that is required in our context.
Having a CRPF serves their purpose, we cannot look for an only-Army, only-RR or only-CPO solution... its the reality. Else you will have a 2 million man Army fighting under AFSPA under half the Indian landmass. The ultimate solution lies in ensuring that the CRPF especially scales up to be an effective and well respected force.
The GoI has taken initiatives to reduce the confusion with one-border, one-force rule and the elevation of CRPF as India's premier COIN force.
ASPuar wrote:Somnath:
1. Reference your views on mandates, etc. If NSG is a SWAT type police force, and it should be headed by a policeman, then let it also not be officered and staffed at any level by army personnel, because that is patently not their job. As of Now, more than 50% of the staff comes from the army, embroiling them in duties that do not add to their core professional competence. Alas, the police seems not to have the competence to perform these purely police tasks, and so the army is saddled with the burden.
2. Even in terms of mandates, Army officers have been in the past successfully deployed as heads of state police forces (Reference Brigadier CA Quinn, IGP of Mizoram in the 1980s). They seem to have functioned fine as heads of these purely police orgs, so why shouldnt they head police orgs which are functioning with a vast staff strength provided by the army (NSG, for eg)?
3. Your comments about the heads of an organisation being derived from the organisations mandate may be true. But then the MoD secretariat should be headed once again by defence service personnel (it was until 1950, when the military felt like secretariat work was an unnecessary burden) , the ministry of agriculture secretariat by a scientist, the ministry of finance secretariat by an economist or revenue officer, the ministry of power secretariat by a technocrat, the ministry of HRD secretariat by an academic, ad infinitum. Alas, as you will note, that instead, they are all headed by generalist officers of a particular service. Of course, in some ministries at least a modicum of specialisation in the executive secretariat cadre is indeed the case. Railways, and MOSPI, for instance.
4. Correct, BRO and AR are under the "administrative control" of the MoD, but so what? The point is, that AR is a CPO, under the MHA, and BRO is a MOST org, both with their own officer cadres also.
Again, your point eludes me.