Levant crisis - III
Re: Levant crisis - III
one gent named ahmed kafrouma (who is syrian but sounds moroccan / algerian by surbame) , the Emir of the tabqa airport region has been killed by a SYAF strike on a command post.
SyAF seems to have a good intel network and moles despite poor equipment- they have bagged some good high level targets.
SyAF seems to have a good intel network and moles despite poor equipment- they have bagged some good high level targets.
Re: Levant crisis - III
bitter comment by shia militia from zahra and nubl (whose siege was broken by the iranians) about lack of support even by SAA in south aleppo which the JN and allies are viciously attacking day and night


Re: Levant crisis - III
maghawir al bahr with a russian 'adviser'


Re: Levant crisis - III
the syrian govt seems willing to concede ground slowly in south aleppo in favour of clearing more areas around damascus and capturing the vital oil and gas rich areas upto deir azzor.
the disconnect is the iranians want to attack Idlib and relieve more besieged shia towns Fuah and Kafraya just like they broke the long siege of Nubl and Zahra and see it as a committed religious duty, pro-iran clerics in iraq have also sent their militias to join in. but with Iran not fielding air wing, and ruaf small and busy on many fronts this is not feasible unless iran ships its own air wing and artillery. russians might also be fooled into thinking some peaceful solution to the aleppo front is possible. or maybe just buying time and keeping on shelf until events gather pace and pieces align more favourably elsewhere.
the disconnect is the iranians want to attack Idlib and relieve more besieged shia towns Fuah and Kafraya just like they broke the long siege of Nubl and Zahra and see it as a committed religious duty, pro-iran clerics in iraq have also sent their militias to join in. but with Iran not fielding air wing, and ruaf small and busy on many fronts this is not feasible unless iran ships its own air wing and artillery. russians might also be fooled into thinking some peaceful solution to the aleppo front is possible. or maybe just buying time and keeping on shelf until events gather pace and pieces align more favourably elsewhere.
Re: Levant crisis - III
we see news like these followed by vicious jaish al fateh attacks where syrians inevitably lose ground...
Ivan Sidorenko @IvanSidorenko1 4h4 hours ago
#Syria #Aleppo Reports say Truce Coordination Centre in #Hmeimim Airbase announced 48 hour truce in Aleppo starting Night of June 16
Ivan Sidorenko @IvanSidorenko1 4h4 hours ago
#Syria #Aleppo Reports say Truce Coordination Centre in #Hmeimim Airbase announced 48 hour truce in Aleppo starting Night of June 16
Re: Levant crisis - III
hezbollah returns to south aleppo front after a month to help the NDF cope with the jihadis
https://www.almasdarnews.com/article/he ... st-rebels/
they are supposedly rotating some 10-15k fighters through syria at any given time.
they are also rooting out IS/JN closer home in the qalamoun mountains, ghouta etc.
https://www.almasdarnews.com/article/he ... st-rebels/
they are supposedly rotating some 10-15k fighters through syria at any given time.
they are also rooting out IS/JN closer home in the qalamoun mountains, ghouta etc.
Re: Levant crisis - III
RuAF extends protective cover to deir azzor defences during a sandstorm
https://www.almasdarnews.com/article/ru ... rm-clears/
https://www.almasdarnews.com/article/ru ... rm-clears/
Re: Levant crisis - III
i am expecting a move on tabqa soon, they had a few days now to rest, replenish supplies and scout all the daesh defences. they can attack from many directions including the resafa crossroads further up toward raqqa.
one reason for delay could be hold the ball outside penalty area to study IS countermoves and which places they choose to defend .... since SAA is not having the strength to keep on going to raqqa immediately, they probably want to capture this place minimum fuss and not face a two sided attack from IS.
one reason for delay could be hold the ball outside penalty area to study IS countermoves and which places they choose to defend .... since SAA is not having the strength to keep on going to raqqa immediately, they probably want to capture this place minimum fuss and not face a two sided attack from IS.
Re: Levant crisis - III
RuAf can go to Deir Ez Zor but not South Aleppo.
interesting.
I think for them securing Raqqa & DeZ are more important from their geo-strategic perspective, as they are possible pipeline entry points from Iraq/Kurdistan.
http://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2016/06/15 ... -ceasefire
interesting.
I think for them securing Raqqa & DeZ are more important from their geo-strategic perspective, as they are possible pipeline entry points from Iraq/Kurdistan.
http://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2016/06/15 ... -ceasefire
Re: Levant crisis - III
news from Idlib:
More news of terrorist defensive lines collapse at Jabal al Turkman and with potential ramification on Jabal al Akrad.
https://twitter.com/agitpapa/status/743208058059374592
Should all of this is confirmed by tomorrow, it will be key to know how fast the allies can move toward Badama, any fast approach toward Badama would turn rats up side down and Jisr would be in mortal danger, even without Kabaneh liberated.
More news of terrorist defensive lines collapse at Jabal al Turkman and with potential ramification on Jabal al Akrad.
https://twitter.com/agitpapa/status/743208058059374592
Should all of this is confirmed by tomorrow, it will be key to know how fast the allies can move toward Badama, any fast approach toward Badama would turn rats up side down and Jisr would be in mortal danger, even without Kabaneh liberated.
Re: Levant crisis - III
It seems like they have stopped getting support from inside turkey.
this is on latakia/turkey/idlib border.
https://twitter.com/FGunay1/status/743209319395659776
Kabanah is still the toughest defensive position for the terrorists, when it falls, Al Ghab and northern Idlib will be for the taking of the SAA+allied forces.
this is on latakia/turkey/idlib border.
https://twitter.com/FGunay1/status/743209319395659776
Kabanah is still the toughest defensive position for the terrorists, when it falls, Al Ghab and northern Idlib will be for the taking of the SAA+allied forces.
Re: Levant crisis - III
pressure on the ghab plain and jisr would force the orcs to lay off south aleppo and move to defend their keep...
that would be a deft way of relieving pressure than costly direct counterattack in south aleppo
imo deir and raqqa oil and gas are vital to long term survival of any assadist / pro rus regime, and ownership of aleppo is not as vital as that strategically but sentiment wise and business wise(2nd largest city) it too is vital to credibility of any govt...i guess they will turn their attention on aleppo when these other objectives are met. resources are pretty thin and the NDF unsuitable for either offense or hard defence.
Rus is focussed on checkmating any american machinations in the east via SDF and occupy as much land as possible.
that would be a deft way of relieving pressure than costly direct counterattack in south aleppo
imo deir and raqqa oil and gas are vital to long term survival of any assadist / pro rus regime, and ownership of aleppo is not as vital as that strategically but sentiment wise and business wise(2nd largest city) it too is vital to credibility of any govt...i guess they will turn their attention on aleppo when these other objectives are met. resources are pretty thin and the NDF unsuitable for either offense or hard defence.
Rus is focussed on checkmating any american machinations in the east via SDF and occupy as much land as possible.
Re: Levant crisis - III
wonder why turkey is abandoning its own creation in latakia?
Fer G @FGunay1 8h8 hours ago
Turkmen accounts are speaking of treason from political & army officials. As a result "rebels" are mass-retreating in Latakia
Fer G @FGunay1 8h8 hours ago
Strange things happening in Latakia, Turkish army has closed lots of army posts & moved trucks&buses used for reinforcements
Fer G @FGunay1 8h8 hours ago
Turkmen accounts are speaking of treason from political & army officials. As a result "rebels" are mass-retreating in Latakia
Fer G @FGunay1 8h8 hours ago
Strange things happening in Latakia, Turkish army has closed lots of army posts & moved trucks&buses used for reinforcements
Re: Levant crisis - III
maybe turdogan's letter to putin may explain it if the contents are leaked.
this is so complicated, because various actors are constantly reaching agreements with each other and wheels within wheels always moving.
this is so complicated, because various actors are constantly reaching agreements with each other and wheels within wheels always moving.
Re: Levant crisis - III
a bunch of card players at the table each vying to double cross the other.
maybe assadists agreed to let the turkomans hammer afrin later in exchange for latakia (and perhaps part of Idlib)?
rus and usa could have some secret agreement on rojava and the disposition of Idlib emirate - as night follows day it will just emerge as a new nerve center of world terror if left alone to flower into emirate.
yesterday the iranian kurdish militants had a fight with the govt troops in iran and claim to have killed 10. there are some 10+ kurd militias strung out between iran to afrin. relations between YPG and Peshmerga are not so good, as YPG feels pesh who is american munna and better equipped, tend to boss them around or claim free credit. some kind of border crossing between them is always closed or open depending on state of relations. ypg feels they deserved more credit and aid for sinjar and saving the yezidis and assyrian christians. they are highly strung and suspicious if amrika will support their goal of linking up with Afrin and destroying the azaz pocket. so far they are cool with SAA on paper.
maybe assadists agreed to let the turkomans hammer afrin later in exchange for latakia (and perhaps part of Idlib)?
rus and usa could have some secret agreement on rojava and the disposition of Idlib emirate - as night follows day it will just emerge as a new nerve center of world terror if left alone to flower into emirate.
yesterday the iranian kurdish militants had a fight with the govt troops in iran and claim to have killed 10. there are some 10+ kurd militias strung out between iran to afrin. relations between YPG and Peshmerga are not so good, as YPG feels pesh who is american munna and better equipped, tend to boss them around or claim free credit. some kind of border crossing between them is always closed or open depending on state of relations. ypg feels they deserved more credit and aid for sinjar and saving the yezidis and assyrian christians. they are highly strung and suspicious if amrika will support their goal of linking up with Afrin and destroying the azaz pocket. so far they are cool with SAA on paper.
Re: Levant crisis - III
one needs to look at ukraine & syria together. And then also look at island of traquility in region. Israel.
then the game plan becomes more evident. the players are playing to the death here. Israel runs low on natural resources like water, arable land, land for settlements etc. They need to expand in next 10-20 years for which the seed is being sowed now.
Only place that has rivers, water, land in their vicinity is Syria. And that is the reason this conflice will not subside until the zionist state is left untouched. they are playing for everything here.
isis taking over land bordering Israel is most convenient, because isis is a terror group and israel and usa can easily employ shock & awe weapons to clear isis from bordering areas in 1 week. I am sure isis or nusra will not even resist if the formidable force of israel & usa come calling, they will just pack up bags and leave the neighbourhood.
Crimea, and ukraine's black sea coast is important because it is the ancient homeland of the oghuz turks from whom the khazars and turk converts to judaism came from. They now fillibuster as the real deal in west. Ukraine is their back up plan, if Syrian war fails or it takes Israel down with it for some reason, the ancient khazarian homelands on black sea coast is being kept prepped for resettlement of these new immigrants. that is where Yatsenyuk, porosheko, kolomoyskiy find themselves at the forefront of this drama. that is also why USA has to micromanage Ukrainian politics with not even a fig leaf for president. Only a chosen can be president there, they need direct control over there.
both syria and ukraine thus are wars for Israel. And russia knows this, they know about all hillary emails, and all democrat plans and what not. Either you have to clear syria completely or else this war is not going to stop, it will just take different forms and continue. This is why as soon as Syria gets cold Ukraine gets hot, and as soon as Ukraine goes cold action shifts back to Syria.
and yes, in a sense the turks (and their descendents) rule the world. You could say that seeing how everyone is running to serve Israel's interests. France, britain, germany, poland all know which side of their bread is buttered.
then the game plan becomes more evident. the players are playing to the death here. Israel runs low on natural resources like water, arable land, land for settlements etc. They need to expand in next 10-20 years for which the seed is being sowed now.
Only place that has rivers, water, land in their vicinity is Syria. And that is the reason this conflice will not subside until the zionist state is left untouched. they are playing for everything here.
isis taking over land bordering Israel is most convenient, because isis is a terror group and israel and usa can easily employ shock & awe weapons to clear isis from bordering areas in 1 week. I am sure isis or nusra will not even resist if the formidable force of israel & usa come calling, they will just pack up bags and leave the neighbourhood.
Crimea, and ukraine's black sea coast is important because it is the ancient homeland of the oghuz turks from whom the khazars and turk converts to judaism came from. They now fillibuster as the real deal in west. Ukraine is their back up plan, if Syrian war fails or it takes Israel down with it for some reason, the ancient khazarian homelands on black sea coast is being kept prepped for resettlement of these new immigrants. that is where Yatsenyuk, porosheko, kolomoyskiy find themselves at the forefront of this drama. that is also why USA has to micromanage Ukrainian politics with not even a fig leaf for president. Only a chosen can be president there, they need direct control over there.
both syria and ukraine thus are wars for Israel. And russia knows this, they know about all hillary emails, and all democrat plans and what not. Either you have to clear syria completely or else this war is not going to stop, it will just take different forms and continue. This is why as soon as Syria gets cold Ukraine gets hot, and as soon as Ukraine goes cold action shifts back to Syria.
and yes, in a sense the turks (and their descendents) rule the world. You could say that seeing how everyone is running to serve Israel's interests. France, britain, germany, poland all know which side of their bread is buttered.
Re: Levant crisis - III
deep state making its disquiet known...
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/06/15/how ... e-erdogan/
How Do You Solve a Problem Like Erdogan?
BY JOHN HANNAHJUNE 15, 2016 - 6:39 PMfacebooktwittergoogle-plusredditLinkedIn email
Houston, we have a problem. A serious problem. Slowly, but inexorably, Turkey is headed off a cliff. The signposts ahead are bleak indeed. Despotism. Terrorism. Civil war. Just over the horizon, scenarios like “failed state” and “forced partition” are coming into view. The day may be approaching when U.S. policymakers, much as they’d prefer not to, will finally be forced to grapple with the question: What do you do with a NATO ally gone seriously bad?
Turkey’s depressing, seemingly irreversible descent into one-man rule continues apace and may even be accelerating. Five weeks ago, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan ordered the resignation of Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, who just six months prior had led their Justice and Development Party (AKP) to a major electoral victory, securing nearly 50 percent of the vote and a large parliamentary majority.
So what was Davutoglu’s transgression? What malfeasance had he committed that justified summary dismissal and humiliation? None — save, apparently, the sin of being insufficiently obsequious to Erdogan. As my colleague at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Aykan Erdemir, has pointedly noted, Davutoglu’s slavish compliance for nearly two years with 90 percent of Erdogan’s agenda was simply no longer good enough. Only total, 100 percent submission to the new Sultan is now deemed acceptable.
What appeared most intolerable to Erdogan was Davutoglu’s inadequate enthusiasm for the president’s monomaniacal desire to jam a new constitution down the throat of a dangerously polarized society — a constitution that would dispense with Turkey’s parliamentary system in favor of an executive presidency, or more accurately, an imperial presidency. This new role would lend ex post facto legitimacy to Erdogan’s consolidation of absolute power and to his systematic, multi-year, extra-constitutional assault on nearly every major public and private institution in the country — the military, judiciary, media, private business, civil society — that might serve to check his totalitarian impulse.
In Davutoglu’s place, Erdogan commanded the AKP to install his hand-picked successor. For a ruling party that has dominated the commanding heights of a major nation for almost 15 years, you might expect such a decision to be grounds for some degree of discussion, debate, even competition among ambitious politicians with their own records of independent accomplishments and their own visions for Turkey’s future.
You’d be wrong. Instead, the order came down from Erdogan’s thousand room palace that one Binali Yildirim — and only Yildarim — would replace Davutoglu as leader of the AKP and as Turkey’s new prime minister. Yildirim has been part of Erdogan’s inner circle for decades, an absolute loyalist certain to do his bidding. In a display of party discipline that would have made Lenin proud, more than 1,400 AKP delegates thereupon saluted smartly, sang paeans of praise and obedience to their great “chief” Erdogan, and voted unanimously to confirm his chosen candidate.
For his part, Yildirim dutifully made clear that he would be little more than a cipher for Erdogan’s will to power. “Mr. President,” he pledged, “we promise that your passion will be our passion, your cause will be our cause, your path will be our path.” Lest any doubt remain about his priorities, Yildirim for good measure declared: “The most important mission we have today is to legalise the de facto situation … by changing the constitution. The new constitution will be on an executive presidential system.”
Yildirim also underscored that he would support unquestioningly Erdogan’s other misadventure, Turkey’s all-out war against the Kurdistan People’s Party (PKK). Ten months of renewed conflict across the cities and towns of the country’s predominantly Kurdish southeast have resulted in levels of devastation that have at times exceeded the worst days of the PKK insurgency in the 1990s. Unlike in the past, the center of gravity of this latest round of fighting has been concentrated in urban areas, not the mountains, inflicting much wider damage on civilian populations caught in the crossfire. More than ever, Turkey’s conflict with the PKK risks morphing into a more generalized Turkish-Kurdish conflict, something that begins to look more like a civil war than a limited counter-terrorism campaign.
The promise of Erdogan’s 2013 ceasefire with the PKK is now long dead, discarded when it became evident that mobilizing nationalist sentiment against Kurdish terrorism offered a more reliable pathway for advancing his despotic ambitions than an ambiguous peace process. But the long-term price that Turkey may yet pay for Erdogan’s short-term gain could be high indeed — not just in lives lost and property destroyed, but in an entire generation of Kurds across the country’s southeast growing increasingly radicalized and convinced that they have no future in remaining part of the Turkish state.
The danger is magnified when one looks at Turkey’s demographic trends. Kurds already comprise something like 20 percent of the country’s population. But ethnic Kurds today are estimated to have fertility rates that may be twice as high as those of ethnic Turks. Erdogan has obsessed over this data for years, repeatedly warning that Turkey faces a demographic time bomb; indeed, just last week, he excoriated Turkish women for using contraceptives. But all to little avail. According to some projections, that could mean that within a generation more than half of Turkey’s military-age population will come from Kurdish-speaking households. To the extent that Erdogan’s policies today are working overtime to fan the flames of ethnic resentment and Kurdish nationalism, he may indeed be dooming Turkey’s long-term geographic viability. The specter of outright partition in the southeast is almost certain to grow larger.
That threat, of course, has been greatly exacerbated by the civil war in neighboring Syria, and the emergence of a self-governing Kurdish entity on Turkey’s southern border — one that happens to be dominated by the PKK’s Syrian affiliate, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), and its militia, the People’s Protection Units (YPG). Two years ago, Erdogan might have sought to co-opt the PYD into a broader strategy to influence, shape, and ultimately tame the region-wide Kurdish awakening under a Turkish umbrella, consistent with his successful outreach to Iraqi Kurdistan and the PKK peace process. Instead, Erdogan chose to interpret the rise of Syria’s Kurds as a mortal threat that had to be crushed — even if that meant indulging all manner of Sunni jihadists, including the Islamic State.
Needless to say, that policy has been a strategic disaster for Turkey. Erdogan’s apparent readiness in late 2014 to allow the Islamic State to massacre Kurdish civilians in the Syrian town of Kobani alienated millions of Turkish Kurds. It also led to a serious breach with the United States, as America intervened, over Erdogan’s objections, to help the YPG defend Kobani and inflict a major defeat on the Islamic State. Ever since, U.S. military cooperation with the YPG has steadily deepened as the group has become Washington’s most effective and reliable partner on the ground in combating the Islamic State in Syria. Its successes, both on the battlefield and in relations with the United States, despite Erdogan’s increasingly shrill protestations to the contrary, have inevitably fueled Kurdish ambitions on both sides of the Turkish-Syrian border.
Meanwhile, Turkey’s less-than-vigilant record in combating the Islamic State has now come back to haunt the country. As Turkey has come under growing international pressure in the last year to more fully support the anti-Islamic State coalition by shutting down the group’s Turkish lifeline, the Islamic State has struck back with a vengeance, launching a steady string of mass casualty attacks in Turkish cities. These atrocities come on top of several other terrorist bombings perpetrated by a militant PKK offshoot since the resumption of fighting in the southeast. Both Istanbul and Ankara have now been struck multiple times. The frequency of the attacks, as well as the death toll, are rising rapidly. The growing sense of danger and instability on multiple fronts is having a devastating impact on Turkey’s vital tourist industry, threatening further damage to an increasingly shaky economy.
The catalogue of Turkey’s downward trajectory doesn’t stop there. Erdogan recently forced through a law that would lift the immunity of parliamentary deputies, for the primary purpose of criminally prosecuting members of the pro-Kurdish People’s Democratic Party, or HDP, for their alleged links to the PKK. They would join a growing list of others, including journalists, academics, and civil society activists, who have been accused of supporting terrorism for raising questions about Turkey’s policies toward the Kurds and the war in Syria. Even more Orwellian: Almost 2,000 people have been charged with the crime of insulting Erdogan. Let that sink in for a moment.
And then consider the spectacle that played out during Erdogan’s March trip to Washington when he unleashed thugs from his security detail to assault peaceful demonstrators on the streets of Washington, who had shown up to protest a speech he was giving. For good measure, the same goons also sought to forcibly evict from the audience duly invited Turkish journalists known to be critical of the Erdogan. Extraordinary, really, when you think about it: the hubris of a foreign leader who thought nothing of attempting to extend the reach of his expanding despotism to the heart of the world’s greatest democracy and defender of free speech. A warning sign, you think?
More immediately threatening to U.S. interests: Turkey’s not-so-stellar record on the Islamic State has been compounded by even more active support for other Sunni jihadist groups fighting in Syria, including al Qaeda’s local branch, Jabhat al-Nusra. Meanwhile, a handful of operatives from Palestinian terrorist group Hamas enjoy safe haven in Istanbul. And Erdogan has been brazen in his threats to manipulate the flow of refugees out of Turkey as a weapon of extortion against the European Union, demanding benefits ranging from large-scale financial assistance to visa-free travel for Turks. “We can open the doors to Greece and Bulgaria anytime and put the refugees on buses,” Erdogan warned EU officials in late 2015. “[W]e can tell [the Europeans]: ‘Sorry, we will open the doors and say goodbye to the migrants.’” In a closed-door briefing to U.S. lawmakers last January, Jordan’s King Abdullah II said that Erdogan “believes in a radical Islamic solution to the problems in the region” and the “fact that terrorists are going to Europe is part of Turkish policy.”
U.S. officials have been waking up as well to the emerging catastrophe that is Erdogan’s Turkey. Last summer, a year after the Islamic State declared its caliphate in Iraq and Syria, Obama told a press conference that thousands of foreign fighters were still pouring into the region via Turkey. While allowing that not every wannabe jihadist could be stopped, Obama said that “a lot of it is preventable — if we’ve got better cooperation, better coordination, better intelligence, if we are monitoring what’s happening at the Turkish-Syria border more effectively.” Why in the world a NATO ally of more than six decades was still not providing that kind of essential support to the U.S.-led war effort was left for others to ponder. Instead, Obama simply noted, “This is an area where we’ve been seeking deeper cooperation with Turkish authorities who recognize it’s a problem but haven’t fully ramped up the capacity they need. And this is something that I think we got to spend a lot of time on.”
Obama’s assessment of Erdogan was much blunter in an extended interview published in the Atlantic two months ago. The interviewer, Jeffrey Goldberg, wrote, “Obama acknowledged that he initially viewed Erdogan, mistakenly, as the sort of moderate Muslim leader who would bridge the divide between East and West — but Obama now considers him a failure and an authoritarian, one who refuses to use his enormous army to bring stability to Syria.” Ouch.
The president is right, of course — as far as he went. Erdogan is a failure. But he is also a growing threat to U.S. interests. His policies are certainly endangering the well-being and stability of Turkey, a vital member of NATO. But they are also fanning the flames of extremism and terrorism beyond Turkey’s borders — in Syria and the Middle East for sure, but increasingly in Europe as well. The country that is supposed to be a reliable bulwark for security and stability on NATO’s southern flank is fast becoming a major source of risk to both the alliance’s democratic values and, and more importantly, its interests.
What, if anything, can be done about it is, as always, a much more challenging proposition. Given Erdogan’s absolute domination of Turkish politics, he is very much the problem. Were he to exit the scene or start acting in a more restrained manner, much could change for the better. But neither of those scenarios appears likely. For years, people have speculated that some of the AKP’s more responsible leaders would finally say enough is enough, split the party, and establish a truly serious center-right opposition to short-circuit Erdogan’s rapidly advancing authoritarianism. But one after another, from former President Abdullah Gul to former Deputy Prime Minister Bulent Arinc to Davutoglu himself, these figures of independent stature have been kicked to the curb and humiliated by Erdogan, only to balk at taking him on and saving Turkey from his mounting excesses and outrages.
There are a handful of other developments — admittedly, low-probability events, true black swans, really — that could throw a wrench into Erdogan’s works were they to emerge. The eruption of another mass protest movement, like the one that rocked Erdogan’s government in 2013 in Gezi Park, involving millions of citizens taking to the streets in peaceful protest for an extended period of time, could in theory give pause to his headlong rush for the imperial presidency.
Some kind of military intervention also can’t be dismissed entirely — especially if coupled with widespread popular opposition to Erdogan’s rising despotism and disregard for Turkey’s existing constitution. Though conventional wisdom maintains that Erdogan’s trumped-up court cases against the Turkish officer corps early in his tenure successfully neutered the military of any residual instinct to ever again play a role in the country’s politics, a few analysts have recently raised doubts about that assessment. The suggestion is that starting in 2014, and especially since his resumption of all-out war against the PKK, Erdogan has increasingly come to rely on a tactical alliance with the military to confront some of their common domestic opponents, thereby inevitably resurrecting the military’s power, its standing, and perhaps its ambitions. Should Turkey’s situation continue to deteriorate, the theory goes — increased terrorism, political strife, and worsening relations with traditional Western partners, for example — it’s not unthinkable that the military would turn on Erdogan in order to “save” Turkey from his road to Islamist dictatorship and state failure.
One more possibility that is very much off the radar: a resurfacing of the huge corruption scandal that implicated the AKP, and even Erdogan himself, in December of 2013. Erdogan made the cases against him, his family, and some of their closest AKP cronies disappear in 2014 by means that amounted to the near total subversion of the Turkish justice system — a genuine abomination and travesty against the rule of law. Thousands of prosecutors, judges, and police involved with bringing the scandal to light were summarily purged and replaced by AKP loyalists. Bye-bye corruption scandal, hello imperial presidency.
Or maybe, just maybe, not. In a bizarre twist, the Turkish-Iranian businessman at the heart of the corruption scandal, Reza Zarrab, was arrested when he tried to enter the United States three months ago for a family vacation at Disney World. The U.S. attorney for the southern district of New York, Preet Bharara, wants to prosecute Zarrab for his role in a massive scheme to evade sanctions on Iran — a scheme in which Turkey and Turkish officials allegedly played a critical role thanks to tens of millions of dollars in bribes paid by Zarrab.
It seems likely that Bharara will limit the case to the narrower issue of sanctions evasion and Iran. But what if he decides to broaden it to include Zarrab’s Turkish activities? Interestingly, in a pre-trial bail hearing, Bharara’s brief for the court incorporated detailed information from the jettisoned Turkish corruption investigation, citing payments that Zarrab allegedly made to ministers in Erdogan’s government, as well as a charity headed by Erdogan’s wife. It’s certainly not beyond all possibility that in an effort to save his own skin, Zarrab might offer to spill the beans entirely on the extent to which politicians at the very highest levels of the Turkish government were up to their necks as willing accomplices in his criminal enterprise to undermine U.S. policy toward Iran. Exactly what kind of impact such a bombshell coming out of an American court case would have on Erdogan’s political fate in Turkey is anyone’s guess. The fact that within a few days of arresting Zarrab, Bharara’s following on Twitter skyrocketed from a few thousand to over 200,000 suggests that a lot of Turkish citizens believe the impact could be fairly substantial.
Beyond Zarrab, what should U.S. policy toward Erdogan be? It’s a truism that Erdogan is a master at manipulating U.S. and European criticism to his own advantage, amping up the anti-Western diatribes, which have become a staple in his playbook, for political survival. That said, Erdogan knows that a sustained impression that he is bungling relations with Turkey’s most powerful ally could be risky for him at home — especially in light of the fact that his policies have already engendered enormous tensions in Turkey’s ties with most of its neighbors, many countries in Europe, and especially with Russia, thanks to Turkey’s shoot down of a Russian jet over Syria last November.
Accordingly, Washington should lose any reluctance to be plainspoken when Erdogan takes actions that threaten our interests in Turkey’s trajectory, both at home and beyond its borders. The Turkish people should not be left wondering whether the United States supports Erdogan’s assault on Turkey’s democracy, free speech, and the rule of law. They should be clear about U.S. concerns that Erdogan’s war against the PKK is not winnable militarily, and that the faster a peace process can be resurrected with the Kurds, the more likely Turkey will be able to avoid literally ripping itself to pieces. They should know that we are wise to Erdogan’s dangerous dalliance with Sunni jihadism, in Syria and elsewhere, and highly disapproving. And they should be left with no doubt that any effort by Erdogan to weaponize the refugee tragedy to undermine and destabilize our European allies is unacceptable.
To its credit, the Obama administration has been doing more of this of late. This has been evident in the president’s criticism of Turkey’s efforts against foreign fighters and the dismal view of Erdogan revealed in the Atlantic interview. Other instances: When Erdogan attended a nuclear summit in Washington in March, his push for a formal White House meeting with Obama was turned down, an alleged snub much remarked on inside Turkey. Last month, the State Department expressed concern that Erdogan’s push to lift parliamentary immunity posed a threat to free speech in Turkey. But perhaps of greatest significance has been the administration’s persistent willingness to brush off Erdogan’s persistent wailing about America’s expanding military relationship with the YPG in Syria.
There is a much bigger move that the U.S. should seriously consider: finding a suitable replacement for Incirlik, the Turkish air force base that has been so important to U.S. and NATO military operations in the Iraq-Syria theater, both today and in years past. America’s reliance on Incirlik has without question increased U.S. reluctance to take issue with Erdogan’s most destructive policies, conferring on him great leverage. Indeed, despite urgent U.S. requests, Erdogan only granted American planes the right to fly from Incirlik a year into the war against the Islamic State, and only in conjunction with his controversial decision to relaunch Turkey’s war against the PKK. And while the Obama administration has been unwilling to accede to Erdogan’s demands that it sever ties with the YPG, concerns about jeopardizing U.S. access to Incirlik have almost certainly constrained the scope of U.S. cooperation with Syria’s Kurds, hindering the speed and effectiveness of the anti-Islamic State campaign.
A U.S. decision to study basing alternatives to Incirlik would be a powerful shot across Erdogan’s bow, a clear warning that Washington would not allow its interests to be held hostage to his dangerous policies indefinitely and would be prepared to hedge its bets in favor of more reliable and willing partners. Iraqi Kurdistan, the United Arab Emirates, and Jordan, might top the list.
The problem of Erdogan’s Turkey has been building for years. And for years, U.S. officials have sought to avoid dealing with it, hoping beyond hope that the problem wasn’t as bad as they feared, or that it might somehow resolve itself, sparing them the need to confront difficult decisions with respect to a historical, longstanding ally that happens to occupy some of the most geo-strategically important territory on earth. But providence has not intervened to spare us. Instead, the Erdogan problem is getting worse, metastasizing, creating greater and greater risks for U.S. interests. Sooner or later, a day of reckoning is likely to come. The United States should start preparing now to mitigate the damage
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/06/15/how ... e-erdogan/
How Do You Solve a Problem Like Erdogan?
BY JOHN HANNAHJUNE 15, 2016 - 6:39 PMfacebooktwittergoogle-plusredditLinkedIn email
Houston, we have a problem. A serious problem. Slowly, but inexorably, Turkey is headed off a cliff. The signposts ahead are bleak indeed. Despotism. Terrorism. Civil war. Just over the horizon, scenarios like “failed state” and “forced partition” are coming into view. The day may be approaching when U.S. policymakers, much as they’d prefer not to, will finally be forced to grapple with the question: What do you do with a NATO ally gone seriously bad?
Turkey’s depressing, seemingly irreversible descent into one-man rule continues apace and may even be accelerating. Five weeks ago, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan ordered the resignation of Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, who just six months prior had led their Justice and Development Party (AKP) to a major electoral victory, securing nearly 50 percent of the vote and a large parliamentary majority.
So what was Davutoglu’s transgression? What malfeasance had he committed that justified summary dismissal and humiliation? None — save, apparently, the sin of being insufficiently obsequious to Erdogan. As my colleague at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Aykan Erdemir, has pointedly noted, Davutoglu’s slavish compliance for nearly two years with 90 percent of Erdogan’s agenda was simply no longer good enough. Only total, 100 percent submission to the new Sultan is now deemed acceptable.
What appeared most intolerable to Erdogan was Davutoglu’s inadequate enthusiasm for the president’s monomaniacal desire to jam a new constitution down the throat of a dangerously polarized society — a constitution that would dispense with Turkey’s parliamentary system in favor of an executive presidency, or more accurately, an imperial presidency. This new role would lend ex post facto legitimacy to Erdogan’s consolidation of absolute power and to his systematic, multi-year, extra-constitutional assault on nearly every major public and private institution in the country — the military, judiciary, media, private business, civil society — that might serve to check his totalitarian impulse.
In Davutoglu’s place, Erdogan commanded the AKP to install his hand-picked successor. For a ruling party that has dominated the commanding heights of a major nation for almost 15 years, you might expect such a decision to be grounds for some degree of discussion, debate, even competition among ambitious politicians with their own records of independent accomplishments and their own visions for Turkey’s future.
You’d be wrong. Instead, the order came down from Erdogan’s thousand room palace that one Binali Yildirim — and only Yildarim — would replace Davutoglu as leader of the AKP and as Turkey’s new prime minister. Yildirim has been part of Erdogan’s inner circle for decades, an absolute loyalist certain to do his bidding. In a display of party discipline that would have made Lenin proud, more than 1,400 AKP delegates thereupon saluted smartly, sang paeans of praise and obedience to their great “chief” Erdogan, and voted unanimously to confirm his chosen candidate.
For his part, Yildirim dutifully made clear that he would be little more than a cipher for Erdogan’s will to power. “Mr. President,” he pledged, “we promise that your passion will be our passion, your cause will be our cause, your path will be our path.” Lest any doubt remain about his priorities, Yildirim for good measure declared: “The most important mission we have today is to legalise the de facto situation … by changing the constitution. The new constitution will be on an executive presidential system.”
Yildirim also underscored that he would support unquestioningly Erdogan’s other misadventure, Turkey’s all-out war against the Kurdistan People’s Party (PKK). Ten months of renewed conflict across the cities and towns of the country’s predominantly Kurdish southeast have resulted in levels of devastation that have at times exceeded the worst days of the PKK insurgency in the 1990s. Unlike in the past, the center of gravity of this latest round of fighting has been concentrated in urban areas, not the mountains, inflicting much wider damage on civilian populations caught in the crossfire. More than ever, Turkey’s conflict with the PKK risks morphing into a more generalized Turkish-Kurdish conflict, something that begins to look more like a civil war than a limited counter-terrorism campaign.
The promise of Erdogan’s 2013 ceasefire with the PKK is now long dead, discarded when it became evident that mobilizing nationalist sentiment against Kurdish terrorism offered a more reliable pathway for advancing his despotic ambitions than an ambiguous peace process. But the long-term price that Turkey may yet pay for Erdogan’s short-term gain could be high indeed — not just in lives lost and property destroyed, but in an entire generation of Kurds across the country’s southeast growing increasingly radicalized and convinced that they have no future in remaining part of the Turkish state.
The danger is magnified when one looks at Turkey’s demographic trends. Kurds already comprise something like 20 percent of the country’s population. But ethnic Kurds today are estimated to have fertility rates that may be twice as high as those of ethnic Turks. Erdogan has obsessed over this data for years, repeatedly warning that Turkey faces a demographic time bomb; indeed, just last week, he excoriated Turkish women for using contraceptives. But all to little avail. According to some projections, that could mean that within a generation more than half of Turkey’s military-age population will come from Kurdish-speaking households. To the extent that Erdogan’s policies today are working overtime to fan the flames of ethnic resentment and Kurdish nationalism, he may indeed be dooming Turkey’s long-term geographic viability. The specter of outright partition in the southeast is almost certain to grow larger.
That threat, of course, has been greatly exacerbated by the civil war in neighboring Syria, and the emergence of a self-governing Kurdish entity on Turkey’s southern border — one that happens to be dominated by the PKK’s Syrian affiliate, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), and its militia, the People’s Protection Units (YPG). Two years ago, Erdogan might have sought to co-opt the PYD into a broader strategy to influence, shape, and ultimately tame the region-wide Kurdish awakening under a Turkish umbrella, consistent with his successful outreach to Iraqi Kurdistan and the PKK peace process. Instead, Erdogan chose to interpret the rise of Syria’s Kurds as a mortal threat that had to be crushed — even if that meant indulging all manner of Sunni jihadists, including the Islamic State.
Needless to say, that policy has been a strategic disaster for Turkey. Erdogan’s apparent readiness in late 2014 to allow the Islamic State to massacre Kurdish civilians in the Syrian town of Kobani alienated millions of Turkish Kurds. It also led to a serious breach with the United States, as America intervened, over Erdogan’s objections, to help the YPG defend Kobani and inflict a major defeat on the Islamic State. Ever since, U.S. military cooperation with the YPG has steadily deepened as the group has become Washington’s most effective and reliable partner on the ground in combating the Islamic State in Syria. Its successes, both on the battlefield and in relations with the United States, despite Erdogan’s increasingly shrill protestations to the contrary, have inevitably fueled Kurdish ambitions on both sides of the Turkish-Syrian border.
Meanwhile, Turkey’s less-than-vigilant record in combating the Islamic State has now come back to haunt the country. As Turkey has come under growing international pressure in the last year to more fully support the anti-Islamic State coalition by shutting down the group’s Turkish lifeline, the Islamic State has struck back with a vengeance, launching a steady string of mass casualty attacks in Turkish cities. These atrocities come on top of several other terrorist bombings perpetrated by a militant PKK offshoot since the resumption of fighting in the southeast. Both Istanbul and Ankara have now been struck multiple times. The frequency of the attacks, as well as the death toll, are rising rapidly. The growing sense of danger and instability on multiple fronts is having a devastating impact on Turkey’s vital tourist industry, threatening further damage to an increasingly shaky economy.
The catalogue of Turkey’s downward trajectory doesn’t stop there. Erdogan recently forced through a law that would lift the immunity of parliamentary deputies, for the primary purpose of criminally prosecuting members of the pro-Kurdish People’s Democratic Party, or HDP, for their alleged links to the PKK. They would join a growing list of others, including journalists, academics, and civil society activists, who have been accused of supporting terrorism for raising questions about Turkey’s policies toward the Kurds and the war in Syria. Even more Orwellian: Almost 2,000 people have been charged with the crime of insulting Erdogan. Let that sink in for a moment.
And then consider the spectacle that played out during Erdogan’s March trip to Washington when he unleashed thugs from his security detail to assault peaceful demonstrators on the streets of Washington, who had shown up to protest a speech he was giving. For good measure, the same goons also sought to forcibly evict from the audience duly invited Turkish journalists known to be critical of the Erdogan. Extraordinary, really, when you think about it: the hubris of a foreign leader who thought nothing of attempting to extend the reach of his expanding despotism to the heart of the world’s greatest democracy and defender of free speech. A warning sign, you think?

More immediately threatening to U.S. interests: Turkey’s not-so-stellar record on the Islamic State has been compounded by even more active support for other Sunni jihadist groups fighting in Syria, including al Qaeda’s local branch, Jabhat al-Nusra. Meanwhile, a handful of operatives from Palestinian terrorist group Hamas enjoy safe haven in Istanbul. And Erdogan has been brazen in his threats to manipulate the flow of refugees out of Turkey as a weapon of extortion against the European Union, demanding benefits ranging from large-scale financial assistance to visa-free travel for Turks. “We can open the doors to Greece and Bulgaria anytime and put the refugees on buses,” Erdogan warned EU officials in late 2015. “[W]e can tell [the Europeans]: ‘Sorry, we will open the doors and say goodbye to the migrants.’” In a closed-door briefing to U.S. lawmakers last January, Jordan’s King Abdullah II said that Erdogan “believes in a radical Islamic solution to the problems in the region” and the “fact that terrorists are going to Europe is part of Turkish policy.”
U.S. officials have been waking up as well to the emerging catastrophe that is Erdogan’s Turkey. Last summer, a year after the Islamic State declared its caliphate in Iraq and Syria, Obama told a press conference that thousands of foreign fighters were still pouring into the region via Turkey. While allowing that not every wannabe jihadist could be stopped, Obama said that “a lot of it is preventable — if we’ve got better cooperation, better coordination, better intelligence, if we are monitoring what’s happening at the Turkish-Syria border more effectively.” Why in the world a NATO ally of more than six decades was still not providing that kind of essential support to the U.S.-led war effort was left for others to ponder. Instead, Obama simply noted, “This is an area where we’ve been seeking deeper cooperation with Turkish authorities who recognize it’s a problem but haven’t fully ramped up the capacity they need. And this is something that I think we got to spend a lot of time on.”
Obama’s assessment of Erdogan was much blunter in an extended interview published in the Atlantic two months ago. The interviewer, Jeffrey Goldberg, wrote, “Obama acknowledged that he initially viewed Erdogan, mistakenly, as the sort of moderate Muslim leader who would bridge the divide between East and West — but Obama now considers him a failure and an authoritarian, one who refuses to use his enormous army to bring stability to Syria.” Ouch.
The president is right, of course — as far as he went. Erdogan is a failure. But he is also a growing threat to U.S. interests. His policies are certainly endangering the well-being and stability of Turkey, a vital member of NATO. But they are also fanning the flames of extremism and terrorism beyond Turkey’s borders — in Syria and the Middle East for sure, but increasingly in Europe as well. The country that is supposed to be a reliable bulwark for security and stability on NATO’s southern flank is fast becoming a major source of risk to both the alliance’s democratic values and, and more importantly, its interests.
What, if anything, can be done about it is, as always, a much more challenging proposition. Given Erdogan’s absolute domination of Turkish politics, he is very much the problem. Were he to exit the scene or start acting in a more restrained manner, much could change for the better. But neither of those scenarios appears likely. For years, people have speculated that some of the AKP’s more responsible leaders would finally say enough is enough, split the party, and establish a truly serious center-right opposition to short-circuit Erdogan’s rapidly advancing authoritarianism. But one after another, from former President Abdullah Gul to former Deputy Prime Minister Bulent Arinc to Davutoglu himself, these figures of independent stature have been kicked to the curb and humiliated by Erdogan, only to balk at taking him on and saving Turkey from his mounting excesses and outrages.
There are a handful of other developments — admittedly, low-probability events, true black swans, really — that could throw a wrench into Erdogan’s works were they to emerge. The eruption of another mass protest movement, like the one that rocked Erdogan’s government in 2013 in Gezi Park, involving millions of citizens taking to the streets in peaceful protest for an extended period of time, could in theory give pause to his headlong rush for the imperial presidency.
Some kind of military intervention also can’t be dismissed entirely — especially if coupled with widespread popular opposition to Erdogan’s rising despotism and disregard for Turkey’s existing constitution. Though conventional wisdom maintains that Erdogan’s trumped-up court cases against the Turkish officer corps early in his tenure successfully neutered the military of any residual instinct to ever again play a role in the country’s politics, a few analysts have recently raised doubts about that assessment. The suggestion is that starting in 2014, and especially since his resumption of all-out war against the PKK, Erdogan has increasingly come to rely on a tactical alliance with the military to confront some of their common domestic opponents, thereby inevitably resurrecting the military’s power, its standing, and perhaps its ambitions. Should Turkey’s situation continue to deteriorate, the theory goes — increased terrorism, political strife, and worsening relations with traditional Western partners, for example — it’s not unthinkable that the military would turn on Erdogan in order to “save” Turkey from his road to Islamist dictatorship and state failure.
One more possibility that is very much off the radar: a resurfacing of the huge corruption scandal that implicated the AKP, and even Erdogan himself, in December of 2013. Erdogan made the cases against him, his family, and some of their closest AKP cronies disappear in 2014 by means that amounted to the near total subversion of the Turkish justice system — a genuine abomination and travesty against the rule of law. Thousands of prosecutors, judges, and police involved with bringing the scandal to light were summarily purged and replaced by AKP loyalists. Bye-bye corruption scandal, hello imperial presidency.
Or maybe, just maybe, not. In a bizarre twist, the Turkish-Iranian businessman at the heart of the corruption scandal, Reza Zarrab, was arrested when he tried to enter the United States three months ago for a family vacation at Disney World. The U.S. attorney for the southern district of New York, Preet Bharara, wants to prosecute Zarrab for his role in a massive scheme to evade sanctions on Iran — a scheme in which Turkey and Turkish officials allegedly played a critical role thanks to tens of millions of dollars in bribes paid by Zarrab.
It seems likely that Bharara will limit the case to the narrower issue of sanctions evasion and Iran. But what if he decides to broaden it to include Zarrab’s Turkish activities? Interestingly, in a pre-trial bail hearing, Bharara’s brief for the court incorporated detailed information from the jettisoned Turkish corruption investigation, citing payments that Zarrab allegedly made to ministers in Erdogan’s government, as well as a charity headed by Erdogan’s wife. It’s certainly not beyond all possibility that in an effort to save his own skin, Zarrab might offer to spill the beans entirely on the extent to which politicians at the very highest levels of the Turkish government were up to their necks as willing accomplices in his criminal enterprise to undermine U.S. policy toward Iran. Exactly what kind of impact such a bombshell coming out of an American court case would have on Erdogan’s political fate in Turkey is anyone’s guess. The fact that within a few days of arresting Zarrab, Bharara’s following on Twitter skyrocketed from a few thousand to over 200,000 suggests that a lot of Turkish citizens believe the impact could be fairly substantial.
Beyond Zarrab, what should U.S. policy toward Erdogan be? It’s a truism that Erdogan is a master at manipulating U.S. and European criticism to his own advantage, amping up the anti-Western diatribes, which have become a staple in his playbook, for political survival. That said, Erdogan knows that a sustained impression that he is bungling relations with Turkey’s most powerful ally could be risky for him at home — especially in light of the fact that his policies have already engendered enormous tensions in Turkey’s ties with most of its neighbors, many countries in Europe, and especially with Russia, thanks to Turkey’s shoot down of a Russian jet over Syria last November.
Accordingly, Washington should lose any reluctance to be plainspoken when Erdogan takes actions that threaten our interests in Turkey’s trajectory, both at home and beyond its borders. The Turkish people should not be left wondering whether the United States supports Erdogan’s assault on Turkey’s democracy, free speech, and the rule of law. They should be clear about U.S. concerns that Erdogan’s war against the PKK is not winnable militarily, and that the faster a peace process can be resurrected with the Kurds, the more likely Turkey will be able to avoid literally ripping itself to pieces. They should know that we are wise to Erdogan’s dangerous dalliance with Sunni jihadism, in Syria and elsewhere, and highly disapproving. And they should be left with no doubt that any effort by Erdogan to weaponize the refugee tragedy to undermine and destabilize our European allies is unacceptable.
To its credit, the Obama administration has been doing more of this of late. This has been evident in the president’s criticism of Turkey’s efforts against foreign fighters and the dismal view of Erdogan revealed in the Atlantic interview. Other instances: When Erdogan attended a nuclear summit in Washington in March, his push for a formal White House meeting with Obama was turned down, an alleged snub much remarked on inside Turkey. Last month, the State Department expressed concern that Erdogan’s push to lift parliamentary immunity posed a threat to free speech in Turkey. But perhaps of greatest significance has been the administration’s persistent willingness to brush off Erdogan’s persistent wailing about America’s expanding military relationship with the YPG in Syria.
There is a much bigger move that the U.S. should seriously consider: finding a suitable replacement for Incirlik, the Turkish air force base that has been so important to U.S. and NATO military operations in the Iraq-Syria theater, both today and in years past. America’s reliance on Incirlik has without question increased U.S. reluctance to take issue with Erdogan’s most destructive policies, conferring on him great leverage. Indeed, despite urgent U.S. requests, Erdogan only granted American planes the right to fly from Incirlik a year into the war against the Islamic State, and only in conjunction with his controversial decision to relaunch Turkey’s war against the PKK. And while the Obama administration has been unwilling to accede to Erdogan’s demands that it sever ties with the YPG, concerns about jeopardizing U.S. access to Incirlik have almost certainly constrained the scope of U.S. cooperation with Syria’s Kurds, hindering the speed and effectiveness of the anti-Islamic State campaign.
A U.S. decision to study basing alternatives to Incirlik would be a powerful shot across Erdogan’s bow, a clear warning that Washington would not allow its interests to be held hostage to his dangerous policies indefinitely and would be prepared to hedge its bets in favor of more reliable and willing partners. Iraqi Kurdistan, the United Arab Emirates, and Jordan, might top the list.
The problem of Erdogan’s Turkey has been building for years. And for years, U.S. officials have sought to avoid dealing with it, hoping beyond hope that the problem wasn’t as bad as they feared, or that it might somehow resolve itself, sparing them the need to confront difficult decisions with respect to a historical, longstanding ally that happens to occupy some of the most geo-strategically important territory on earth. But providence has not intervened to spare us. Instead, the Erdogan problem is getting worse, metastasizing, creating greater and greater risks for U.S. interests. Sooner or later, a day of reckoning is likely to come. The United States should start preparing now to mitigate the damage
Re: Levant crisis - III
Lavrov suspects West of keeping al-Nusra handy for ousting Assad
http://tass.ru/en/politics/882488[quote]
One has the impression that some sort of gambling is underway, that some would like to keep Nusra handy in some form to eventually use it for the overthrow of the regime," he said. "At least, I put a straight question to John Kerry. He vowed it was not so. But then it remains to be seen why the Americans, given the opportunities they have, are unable to pull the groups they cooperate with out of the territories controlled by the bandits and terrorists."
According to Lavrov, Moscow is urging the United States to be more patient on the Syrian issue.
"I’ve seen John Kerry’s statement (to the effect patience regarding the future of Bashar Assad was wearing thin - TASS) and I found it surprising," Lavrov said. "Normally Kerry is a self-reserved politician. I don’t know what happened. I saw US Department of State’s explanations of what Kerry said, too. One should be more patient."
"As for the essence of what Kerry found so worrisome - and he said that patience was wearing thin because we are allegedly unable to do to Bashar Assad what we ostensibly should have done - I can say that we’ve made no pledges to anyone to do anything. We’ve given no promises," Lavrov said. "We agreed that all those who work on the Syrian settlement should be guided by the agreements within the International Syria Support Group, enshrined in the UN Security Council’s resolution."
US Secretary of State John Kerry, speaking in Oslo on Wednesday, said that ceasefire in Syria was in jeopardy. "Russia needs to understand that our patience is not infinite, in fact it is very limited with whether or not Assad is going to be held accountable," Kerry said. Also, Kerry promised that the United States "is prepared to hold accountable members of the opposition" who have been involved in continuing violence.
[/quote]
More:
http://tass.ru/en/politics/882488
http://tass.ru/en/politics/882488[quote]
One has the impression that some sort of gambling is underway, that some would like to keep Nusra handy in some form to eventually use it for the overthrow of the regime," he said. "At least, I put a straight question to John Kerry. He vowed it was not so. But then it remains to be seen why the Americans, given the opportunities they have, are unable to pull the groups they cooperate with out of the territories controlled by the bandits and terrorists."
According to Lavrov, Moscow is urging the United States to be more patient on the Syrian issue.
"I’ve seen John Kerry’s statement (to the effect patience regarding the future of Bashar Assad was wearing thin - TASS) and I found it surprising," Lavrov said. "Normally Kerry is a self-reserved politician. I don’t know what happened. I saw US Department of State’s explanations of what Kerry said, too. One should be more patient."
"As for the essence of what Kerry found so worrisome - and he said that patience was wearing thin because we are allegedly unable to do to Bashar Assad what we ostensibly should have done - I can say that we’ve made no pledges to anyone to do anything. We’ve given no promises," Lavrov said. "We agreed that all those who work on the Syrian settlement should be guided by the agreements within the International Syria Support Group, enshrined in the UN Security Council’s resolution."
US Secretary of State John Kerry, speaking in Oslo on Wednesday, said that ceasefire in Syria was in jeopardy. "Russia needs to understand that our patience is not infinite, in fact it is very limited with whether or not Assad is going to be held accountable," Kerry said. Also, Kerry promised that the United States "is prepared to hold accountable members of the opposition" who have been involved in continuing violence.
[/quote]
More:
http://tass.ru/en/politics/882488
Re: Levant crisis - III
this is the US supported formation via Jordan border...tanf crossing
Hassan Ridha @sayed_ridha 53m53 minutes ago
Warplanes belonging to either #SyAAF or #RuAF carried out air raid on the 'New Syrian Army' at Tanf killing/wounding several #Syria
these people and various "FSA" are the big green area east of the corridor to Daraa border crossing that SAA has forced open
Hassan Ridha @sayed_ridha 53m53 minutes ago
Warplanes belonging to either #SyAAF or #RuAF carried out air raid on the 'New Syrian Army' at Tanf killing/wounding several #Syria
these people and various "FSA" are the big green area east of the corridor to Daraa border crossing that SAA has forced open
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- BRF Oldie
- Posts: 14045
- Joined: 11 Aug 2016 06:14
Re: Levant crisis - III
Sounds like they have brought in 220GHz equipment. End of ISIS' immunity in sandstorms.Singha wrote:RuAF extends protective cover to deir azzor defences during a sandstorm
https://www.almasdarnews.com/article/ru ... rm-clears/
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- BRF Oldie
- Posts: 14045
- Joined: 11 Aug 2016 06:14
Re: Levant crisis - III
Copying what UBCNews&Analy-e-sys had suggested weeks ago.There is a much bigger move that the U.S. should seriously consider: finding a suitable replacement for Incirlik, the Turkish air force base that has been so important to U.S. and NATO military operations in the Iraq-Syria theater, both today and in years past. America’s reliance on Incirlik has without question increased U.S. reluctance to take issue with Erdogan’s most destructive policies, conferring on him great leverage. Indeed, despite urgent U.S. requests, Erdogan only granted American planes the right to fly from Incirlik a year into the war against the Islamic State, and only in conjunction with his controversial decision to relaunch Turkey’s war against the PKK...A U.S. decision to study basing alternatives to Incirlik would be a powerful shot across Erdogan’s bow, a clear warning that Washington would not allow its interests to be held hostage to his dangerous policies indefinitely and would be prepared to hedge its bets in favor of more reliable and willing partners. Iraqi Kurdistan, the United Arab Emirates, and Jordan, might top the list.
Re: Levant crisis - III
NE latakia jihadi area. the bald vertical area in the east in the Al-ghab plain which used to be a grassy swamp but was drained and heavily cropped later on....that opens to the gates of Mordor in the north - jisr al shughour - scene of another massacre in the past when a small detachment of SAA in a hospital desperately tried to save civilians as jihadis camped on hillsides all around gunned them down one by one as they tried to escape...

here is a video of that - only a lucky few managed to escape the JN jihadis swarming all over and firing AA cannons at close range, along with heavy artillery. saa old timers and relatives of those in that event are looking forward to settling account.

here is a video of that - only a lucky few managed to escape the JN jihadis swarming all over and firing AA cannons at close range, along with heavy artillery. saa old timers and relatives of those in that event are looking forward to settling account.
Re: Levant crisis - III
They are planning to take out Assad in a final way or at least threatening to do so to force him to flee.
http://www.usnews.com/news/politics/art ... ria-action
http://www.usnews.com/news/politics/art ... ria-action
Re: Levant crisis - III
naturally one should ask what is Israel doing in crimea
US and Israeli Drones shot down over the Crimea
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_taR2VcKQKY
US and Israeli Drones shot down over the Crimea
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_taR2VcKQKY
Re: Levant crisis - III
turdogan is in deep sh1t.
turdogan gets caught up in fake degree scandal
In a new scandal to darken the palatial doorsteps of Ottoman Sultan wannabe and eternal weasel, Recep Tayyip Turdoghan, the public has been informed that their favorite rodent son of Istanbul has been somewhat less than honest. That scandal has now taken some hold in Turkey and threatens to undermine his rule. It appears the Sultan of Sleaze has falsified his academic record. It also appears he knew it was falsified and participated zealously in knitting the lie.
Opponents of erdoghan are snapping at him like starved crocodiles, relying on Article 101 of the Turk Constitution which some claim requires the president of the republic to have a college degree.
He claims to have attended and graduated from the Marmara University Economic and Commercial Sciences Department in April of 1981. Sounds pretty dull, doesn't it ? Yet, upon closer examination, several news sources learned that the department from which he obtained his degree did even exist until 1983! Moreover, to really spice things up, the man who revealed the strange case of Mr. erdoghan, a reporter by the name of Ergun Poyraz, was convicted in a kangaroo court of “defaming” Erdoghan in his book titled “Children of Moses” in which the author propounded the theory that Erdoghan and his wife were closet Jews working for the Zionist Abomination. He was sentenced for that and for his alleged complicity in the Ergenokon conspiracy to 29 years in prison.
Even more sinister is the notary public who signed the attestation on Erdoghan’s fake diploma. He has never been found despite high-level efforts. In fact, the rector of the university claims they have no original of the degree.
the turds obviously are in perfect sync with their fake degree pakistani cousins. How similar they are !!
turdogan gets caught up in fake degree scandal
In a new scandal to darken the palatial doorsteps of Ottoman Sultan wannabe and eternal weasel, Recep Tayyip Turdoghan, the public has been informed that their favorite rodent son of Istanbul has been somewhat less than honest. That scandal has now taken some hold in Turkey and threatens to undermine his rule. It appears the Sultan of Sleaze has falsified his academic record. It also appears he knew it was falsified and participated zealously in knitting the lie.
Opponents of erdoghan are snapping at him like starved crocodiles, relying on Article 101 of the Turk Constitution which some claim requires the president of the republic to have a college degree.

He claims to have attended and graduated from the Marmara University Economic and Commercial Sciences Department in April of 1981. Sounds pretty dull, doesn't it ? Yet, upon closer examination, several news sources learned that the department from which he obtained his degree did even exist until 1983! Moreover, to really spice things up, the man who revealed the strange case of Mr. erdoghan, a reporter by the name of Ergun Poyraz, was convicted in a kangaroo court of “defaming” Erdoghan in his book titled “Children of Moses” in which the author propounded the theory that Erdoghan and his wife were closet Jews working for the Zionist Abomination. He was sentenced for that and for his alleged complicity in the Ergenokon conspiracy to 29 years in prison.
Even more sinister is the notary public who signed the attestation on Erdoghan’s fake diploma. He has never been found despite high-level efforts. In fact, the rector of the university claims they have no original of the degree.

the turds obviously are in perfect sync with their fake degree pakistani cousins. How similar they are !!
Re: Levant crisis - III
RBTH (Defense): T-72 tank adapted for urban warfare, based on lessons learned in Syria. Good article.
http://rbth.com/defence/2016/06/02/russ ... ing_599529
In other news
Germany developing 130 mm tube and ammunition to counter T-80, T-90 and Armata T-14 tanks, and a new heavy tank to replace the Leopard II. The new ammunition is reportedly based on a tungsten or depleted uranium projectile.
http://rbth.com/defence/2016/06/16/germ ... nks_603691
http://rbth.com/defence/2016/06/02/russ ... ing_599529
In other news
Germany developing 130 mm tube and ammunition to counter T-80, T-90 and Armata T-14 tanks, and a new heavy tank to replace the Leopard II. The new ammunition is reportedly based on a tungsten or depleted uranium projectile.
http://rbth.com/defence/2016/06/16/germ ... nks_603691
Re: Levant crisis - III
Syrian Army advances over isis corpses to raqqa (photo+video)
http://www.fort-russ.com/2016/06/photos ... -over.html
http://www.fort-russ.com/2016/06/photos ... -over.html
Re: Levant crisis - III
The collapse of NE Latakia terrorist defensive lines is almost complete, there is roughly a tiny as 1 km by 3 kms from the allied forces front line and the Turkish border. Rats are done in Latakia and so goes all their sophisticated terrorist training camps. The road to Badama and Jisr is getting quite cleared, the only missing point is Kabanah, it must fall so the allied forces can advance straight to it with its flanks protected. It has been a great victory so far, in only 4 days.
https://twitter.com/Gjoene/status/743544808426344448
https://twitter.com/Gjoene/status/743544808426344448
Re: Levant crisis - III
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roman_inf ... nic_tribes
fascinating...goes to show for every 1000 fighters, there has to be 1 deep thinker processing and finding solutions based on imperfect data...a human equivalent of our ML systems today.
fascinating...goes to show for every 1000 fighters, there has to be 1 deep thinker processing and finding solutions based on imperfect data...a human equivalent of our ML systems today.
Re: Levant crisis - III
meet assad's new friend
Reuters
Turkey's determination to prevent an autonomous Kurdish region emerging in northern Syria could see it ease up on demands for President Bashar al-Assad's immediate exit, as it overhauls a foreign policy that has left it more isolated than influential.
Days after taking office last month, new Prime Minister Binali Yildirim - a close ally of President Tayyip Erdogan - said Turkey needed to "increase its friends and decrease its enemies", in what appeared a tacit admission that his predecessor's policies had left the NATO member sidelined.
Under former Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, Ankara was insistent on Assad's departure as the only way of stabilising Syria, setting it at odds with Assad's ally Russia and distancing it from a U.S.-led coalition more focused on the fight against Islamic State.
Erdogan - who wields ultimate power in Turkey, including over foreign policy - has been one of Assad's fiercest critics but analysts say changing circumstances on the ground could force a softening of his rhetoric.
Turkey's worst nightmare in Syria has come true: Russian support has enabled Assad to remain in power, while Kurdish militia fighters have benefited from U.S. support as they battle Islamic State, bolstering their position in territory adjacent to the Turkish border.
Yildirim's government has outlined four areas of policy where it wants to take new steps: Israel, Russia, the European Union and Syria, the last motivated in part by a realisation that Assad's demise could benefit the Kurdish militia.
"Assad is, at the end of the day, a killer. He is torturing his own people. We're not going to change our stance on that," a senior official from the ruling AK Party told Reuters, requesting anonymity so as to speak more freely.
"But he does not support Kurdish autonomy. We may not like each other, but on that we're backing the same policy," he said.
Ankara fears that territorial gains by Kurdish YPG fighters in northern Syria will fuel an insurgency by the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which has waged an armed struggle in Turkey's southeast for three decades.
The groups do not deny links. The PKK founded the YPG as a Syrian organisation a decade ago and both are inspired by Abdullah Ocalan, who led the PKK from its inception and lived in Syria shortly before his capture in 1999. He remains in jail.
Conflict in Turkey's southeast has flared anew since a ceasefire with the PKK collapsed last July - fuelled in part, according to the Turkish authorities, by weapons and fighters crossing the border from Syria.
That leaves Turkey with few easy options, according to Mehmet Yegin, an analyst at Ankara-based think-tank USAK: relaunching peace talks with the PKK, which the government has so far ruled out, or indirectly relying on Assad as a buffer.
"The only thing that can change is Turkey can stop insisting that Assad must go," he said.
OVERTURES TO MOSCOW
A softer stance on Assad could in theory help smooth relations with Russia, which have been severely strained since Turkey shot down a Russian fighter jet near the Syrian border last November. The dispute has cost Turkey billions of dollars in lost tourism revenues and trade sanctions.
Erdogan sent President Vladimir Putin a message on Sunday, to mark Russia's national day, expressing a desire for an improvement in ties, Turkish presidential sources said. Turkey's EU affairs minister Omer Celik meanwhile said on Tuesday that Turkey had not known the jet was Russian when it was shot down after entering Turkish air space near the border.
But such efforts to assuage Russian anger look unlikely to bear fruit until Putin himself is ready.
"Russia insists on the conditions it set at the beginning. They expect Turkey to apologise and pay damages. Reconciliation looks hard unless Russia takes a step back," said Sinan Ulgen, chairman of Istanbul-based think-tank EDAM.
As Yildirim and his team adjust foreign policy in the wake of Davutoglu's departure, there are also few signs of significant progress in relations with the European Union, despite Brussels' reliance on Ankara to maintain its side of a landmark deal on migration.
Turkey's decade-long accession talks with the EU have largely stalled, with some leaders in Europe increasingly concerned about what they see as a creep towards authoritarianism as Erdogan seeks to broaden his powers.
The migrant deal, criticised by rights groups, has sharply cut the number of refugees and migrants reaching Greece, giving EU leaders breathing space after more than a million arrived last year. But the bloc is treading a difficult line, facing accusations of compromising its values by failing to be critical enough of Turkey's record on rights and freedoms.
In a sign of tensions, the EU's top envoy to Ankara quit on Tuesday after displaying what Celik said was disrespect for Turkish values and for Erdogan. The envoy had made critical comments in the Turkish media about Ankara's implementation of the accord.
Of the new government's four foreign policy priorities, that leaves only efforts to restore ties with former ally Israel showing any immediate signs of progress.
Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said last week Turkey was just one or two meetings away from normalising relations, after diplomatic and military ties were cut in 2010 when Israeli commandos stormed a Turkish ship in an aid flotilla to Gaza, killing 10 Turks.
Turkey wants Israel to end a sea and air blockade of the Gaza Strip but Israel has ruled out ending its embargo of the Palestinian territory.
"There are creative solutions to be found, and I think that both sides have the political will to find a solution," a Turkish official familiar with the efforts said, adding a deal could be within reach.
"I cannot tell you any time line, but we are very close."
(Additional reporting by Ece Toksabay in Ankara and Dan Williams in Jerusalem; Editing by Nick Tattersall and Pravin Char)
Reuters
Turkey's determination to prevent an autonomous Kurdish region emerging in northern Syria could see it ease up on demands for President Bashar al-Assad's immediate exit, as it overhauls a foreign policy that has left it more isolated than influential.
Days after taking office last month, new Prime Minister Binali Yildirim - a close ally of President Tayyip Erdogan - said Turkey needed to "increase its friends and decrease its enemies", in what appeared a tacit admission that his predecessor's policies had left the NATO member sidelined.
Under former Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, Ankara was insistent on Assad's departure as the only way of stabilising Syria, setting it at odds with Assad's ally Russia and distancing it from a U.S.-led coalition more focused on the fight against Islamic State.
Erdogan - who wields ultimate power in Turkey, including over foreign policy - has been one of Assad's fiercest critics but analysts say changing circumstances on the ground could force a softening of his rhetoric.
Turkey's worst nightmare in Syria has come true: Russian support has enabled Assad to remain in power, while Kurdish militia fighters have benefited from U.S. support as they battle Islamic State, bolstering their position in territory adjacent to the Turkish border.
Yildirim's government has outlined four areas of policy where it wants to take new steps: Israel, Russia, the European Union and Syria, the last motivated in part by a realisation that Assad's demise could benefit the Kurdish militia.
"Assad is, at the end of the day, a killer. He is torturing his own people. We're not going to change our stance on that," a senior official from the ruling AK Party told Reuters, requesting anonymity so as to speak more freely.
"But he does not support Kurdish autonomy. We may not like each other, but on that we're backing the same policy," he said.
Ankara fears that territorial gains by Kurdish YPG fighters in northern Syria will fuel an insurgency by the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which has waged an armed struggle in Turkey's southeast for three decades.
The groups do not deny links. The PKK founded the YPG as a Syrian organisation a decade ago and both are inspired by Abdullah Ocalan, who led the PKK from its inception and lived in Syria shortly before his capture in 1999. He remains in jail.
Conflict in Turkey's southeast has flared anew since a ceasefire with the PKK collapsed last July - fuelled in part, according to the Turkish authorities, by weapons and fighters crossing the border from Syria.
That leaves Turkey with few easy options, according to Mehmet Yegin, an analyst at Ankara-based think-tank USAK: relaunching peace talks with the PKK, which the government has so far ruled out, or indirectly relying on Assad as a buffer.
"The only thing that can change is Turkey can stop insisting that Assad must go," he said.
OVERTURES TO MOSCOW
A softer stance on Assad could in theory help smooth relations with Russia, which have been severely strained since Turkey shot down a Russian fighter jet near the Syrian border last November. The dispute has cost Turkey billions of dollars in lost tourism revenues and trade sanctions.
Erdogan sent President Vladimir Putin a message on Sunday, to mark Russia's national day, expressing a desire for an improvement in ties, Turkish presidential sources said. Turkey's EU affairs minister Omer Celik meanwhile said on Tuesday that Turkey had not known the jet was Russian when it was shot down after entering Turkish air space near the border.
But such efforts to assuage Russian anger look unlikely to bear fruit until Putin himself is ready.
"Russia insists on the conditions it set at the beginning. They expect Turkey to apologise and pay damages. Reconciliation looks hard unless Russia takes a step back," said Sinan Ulgen, chairman of Istanbul-based think-tank EDAM.
As Yildirim and his team adjust foreign policy in the wake of Davutoglu's departure, there are also few signs of significant progress in relations with the European Union, despite Brussels' reliance on Ankara to maintain its side of a landmark deal on migration.
Turkey's decade-long accession talks with the EU have largely stalled, with some leaders in Europe increasingly concerned about what they see as a creep towards authoritarianism as Erdogan seeks to broaden his powers.
The migrant deal, criticised by rights groups, has sharply cut the number of refugees and migrants reaching Greece, giving EU leaders breathing space after more than a million arrived last year. But the bloc is treading a difficult line, facing accusations of compromising its values by failing to be critical enough of Turkey's record on rights and freedoms.
In a sign of tensions, the EU's top envoy to Ankara quit on Tuesday after displaying what Celik said was disrespect for Turkish values and for Erdogan. The envoy had made critical comments in the Turkish media about Ankara's implementation of the accord.
Of the new government's four foreign policy priorities, that leaves only efforts to restore ties with former ally Israel showing any immediate signs of progress.
Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said last week Turkey was just one or two meetings away from normalising relations, after diplomatic and military ties were cut in 2010 when Israeli commandos stormed a Turkish ship in an aid flotilla to Gaza, killing 10 Turks.
Turkey wants Israel to end a sea and air blockade of the Gaza Strip but Israel has ruled out ending its embargo of the Palestinian territory.
"There are creative solutions to be found, and I think that both sides have the political will to find a solution," a Turkish official familiar with the efforts said, adding a deal could be within reach.
"I cannot tell you any time line, but we are very close."
(Additional reporting by Ece Toksabay in Ankara and Dan Williams in Jerusalem; Editing by Nick Tattersall and Pravin Char)
Re: Levant crisis - III
apparently, there is some dissension with in the the US diplo ranks concerning Obama's Syrian policy......
http://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/dozen ... ad-n594156
http://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/dozen ... ad-n594156
Re: Levant crisis - III
There should, GOTUS SD and Foreign Policy in ME and Indian Sub Continent is completely contrary to American values. It is this contradiction here which gives many of us ill feelings and tending to overlook the the Good things USA does to India with respect to Trade, good economic opportunities to many Indians etc.TSJones wrote:apparently, there is some dissension with in the the US diplo ranks concerning Obama's Syrian policy......
http://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/dozen ... ad-n594156
Re: Levant crisis - III
this turkish city bordering latakia called 'gaziantep', it's ancient name is antioch. It is one of the important centres of christianity. If turkey wants to do an ottoman redoux, many things can slip between the net. I really don't see Israel, or west ending this the good way. Only Russia can be a winner here. Turkey has opened the door, some tough guy needs to put his foot in that door.
Israel & it's backers have all the money but it doesn't have the manpower to back it's geostrategic ambitions, those who have men and barely enough money will carry the day.
ha ha ha
US State dept moment of wisdom
Israel & it's backers have all the money but it doesn't have the manpower to back it's geostrategic ambitions, those who have men and barely enough money will carry the day.
ha ha ha
US State dept moment of wisdom
Re: Levant crisis - III
US again threatening airstrikes on Syrian govt:
https://www.yahoo.com/news/dozens-u-dip ... html?nhp=1
https://www.yahoo.com/news/dozens-u-dip ... html?nhp=1
Re: Levant crisis - III
Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said last week Turkey was just one or two meetings away from normalising relations, after diplomatic and military ties were cut in 2010 when Israeli commandos stormed a Turkish ship in an aid flotilla to Gaza, killing 10 Turks.
These lines do not tell u another important story . This was the incident in which the famous ex US marine Kenneth O'keffe was involved singha. he is now a big thorn in the backsides of his native country and israel.
These lines do not tell u another important story . This was the incident in which the famous ex US marine Kenneth O'keffe was involved singha. he is now a big thorn in the backsides of his native country and israel.
Re: Levant crisis - III
what did he do? I am lost on that.
Antioch iirc was one of the 5 centers of early christianity, with alexandria, jerusalem, constantinople and rome. once the other 4 fell to islam one by one, rome became the top one by default.
Antioch iirc was one of the 5 centers of early christianity, with alexandria, jerusalem, constantinople and rome. once the other 4 fell to islam one by one, rome became the top one by default.
Re: Levant crisis - III
good cop-bad cop act. the current potus is not interested and neither is trump. their only hope is hillary next year.Y. Kanan wrote:US again threatening airstrikes on Syrian govt:
https://www.yahoo.com/news/dozens-u-dip ... html?nhp=1
Re: Levant crisis - III
No gaziantep is not Antioch, its a different oneSingha wrote:what did he do? I am lost on that.
Antioch iirc was one of the 5 centers of early christianity, with alexandria, jerusalem, constantinople and rome. once the other 4 fell to islam one by one, rome became the top one by default.
Below is the one, it is also in Turkey
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antioch
Re: Levant crisis - III
>> Antioch iirc was one of the 5 centers of early christianity, with alexandria, jerusalem, constantinople and rome. once the other 4 fell to islam one by one, rome became the top one by default.
it is an ancient centre of eastern christianity. Rome was centre of catholicism. Jersusalem was a centre for obvious reasons. Alexandria is coptic. russian goals in syria is also is to secure the christian bases like latakia, malamoun, homs etc. All coastal areas in Syria next to meditteranean was where the erstwhile crusaders used to camp out and built forts in. All the natives of such places are progeny of these crusaders and natives. This is how they motivate the troops, hey you are protecting christendom (a very powerful motivating factor). So then by progression, why not take back what was lost to the ottomans as well. But first the turks must slip up, which they will for sure under erdogan, only matter of time.
>>No gaziantep is not Antioch, its a different one
Below is the one, it is also in Turkey
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antioch
that is the town proper, but ancient antioch, which used to the entire area today known as gaziantep, which is a name given by the invaders, was always syrian land. This is like changing an Indian name of a town to ghazi-abad. That is gazi-antep.
it is an ancient centre of eastern christianity. Rome was centre of catholicism. Jersusalem was a centre for obvious reasons. Alexandria is coptic. russian goals in syria is also is to secure the christian bases like latakia, malamoun, homs etc. All coastal areas in Syria next to meditteranean was where the erstwhile crusaders used to camp out and built forts in. All the natives of such places are progeny of these crusaders and natives. This is how they motivate the troops, hey you are protecting christendom (a very powerful motivating factor). So then by progression, why not take back what was lost to the ottomans as well. But first the turks must slip up, which they will for sure under erdogan, only matter of time.
>>No gaziantep is not Antioch, its a different one
Below is the one, it is also in Turkey
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antioch
that is the town proper, but ancient antioch, which used to the entire area today known as gaziantep, which is a name given by the invaders, was always syrian land. This is like changing an Indian name of a town to ghazi-abad. That is gazi-antep.
Gaziantep was formerly known as Antep and is still sometimes referred to by that name. It’s location is approximately 100 kilometres from the Syrian Border. Called Antioch in ancient times, it is one of the longest continually inhabited cities in the world.