Johann wrote:brihaspati wrote:
The Muslim world has always fought and argued against each other, about their internal power equations - but it does not change one single bit theie attitude towards the non-muslim.
This is simply not true - Muslim powers routinely ally with non-Muslims against their Muslim rivals. Realpolitik usually triumphs over ummah-wide solidarity.
The Saudis and the Israelis tacitly working against Iran. Iran siding with Armenia against Azerbaijan. The Northern Alliance with Russians, Indians and the West against the Taliban. Jordan, Turkey and Israel and America against Syria. America and Qatar against Qadaffi's Libya.
Don;t see what is contradictory to what I said! I said that Muslims have always fought against each other about their internal power equations.
But it does not change one single bit their attitude towards the non-Muslim.
Yes Muslims have always used non-Muslims for their internal power struggles, but such use does not change their attitude - their ultimate target for the non-muslim, that is to enslave and convert, pillage, rape and loot. You seem not to take into account the complete consistency throughout the historical period - between actual manifestation of this strategy and long term thinking on the ground - and their theological textual precedence logic. Its there in the ahadith - and this long term strategy of using the kaffir to gain power, but in the long term always have the secret plan and goal to crush that same kaffir, preferably in gender selective way, and destroy every other traces of every other culture - as much as feasible.
Mubarak compromised early on with teh islamists, after seeing his erstwhile leader - a more left leaning leader shot beside him. Note that Mubarak was not assassinated at the same time. Note how the Iraqi king was killed, and who took initial power - a left leaning commander of the army. He was then eliminated to bring Saddam's uncle to power. The movement against the Shah was launched by leftists, and a section of the left leaning army - especially the AF. But using this, Khomeini was brought in - and then the liberal section of the Iranian fringe "secular" element was wiped off. Look at further west along North Africa - and you will see that second half of the 20th ecentury sawa progressive and carefully stage managed increase of Islamist influence in these countries - and turning them from potnetially secular path towards mullahcracy.
Sorry but in the real world there is always a lot more fog of war and friction. No state or group is really able to shape events that closely.
There's also real problems with the details of the narrative you're offering. Sadat was certainly not more 'left leaning' than Mubarak He let out the Islamists imprisoned by Nasser to use them in the power struggle over succession after Nasser's death in 1970. Sadat also reversed the nationalisations and capital controls from 1974 ('Infitah') onwards. But they wouldn't have been any use if Nasser's ideology hadn't been discredited by the massive defeat of 1967, and the corruption of the secular army driven state he'd built. Nasser's nationalism, his land reforms, his extension of education and other services to the masses had been incredibly popular, but like leftists everywhere he ran into the problems of maintaining the momentum of growth. The number one investor in the Egyptian economy in the 1970s under Sadat was the Saudis and the Gulf states, and the number one destination for Egyptian expat labour was the Gulf. Ultimately the Saudis did more for Egypt than the Soviet Union, and the result was the strengthening of conservative forces over those of the seculars and Marxists. Just as Nasser before him allowed the Marxists to work in society so long as they and the Soviets supported him, Sadat and later Mubarak allowed conservative and soft Islamists to do the same so long as they opposed his opponents, such as the Salafi Jihadis.
Its difficult to claim that Aref was somehow more Islamically oriented than the King of Iraq. Its also hard to argue against the fact that Saddam began to rely on traditional forms of authority - mullahs and tribal leaders only during after the Gulf War of 1990. Again when economic failure and military disaster strike in the post-colonial era it has made the Islamists more powerful against the status quo.
Khomeini was the first to launch opposition to the Shah after Mossadeq, going back to 1963. He would have been executed except that the death penalty can not be applied to ayatollahs, and he was promoted to ayatollah by his fellow clerics to prevent this from happening. In any case in the end Khomeini's legacy is a mixed one - mosque attendance rates in Iran plummeted in the decades since the revolution. Just as the leftists were discredited by bad government, Islamists are being discredited by the same.
I am not sure that this is the fact on the ground. You recognize the transition from Nasser to Sadat, as more Left to less-left and more of Saudi-ism, and the patronage or virtual tolerance of the growth of the islamists more and more as Egypt progresses from Nasser-to Sadat-to Mubarak. But you are not seeing the placement of Nasser as a so-called "pseudo-left-progressive nationalist face", that was used throughout the colonies managed by the Brits in the 40's and 50's.
Leftism is needed to initially get on board the "liberal sections", of nascent post-imperialist societies, and use them to replace the older feudal forces who had proved to be unreliable bastions of continued post-imperialist control. Typically these are the later versions of elite - in historical terms - than the feudal collaborators, more in tune with post-imperialist or neo-imperialist global economics, and more convenient to do "business" with.
This is also about killing two birds with one stone. Once the initial state structure continuity is assured, the liberal sections can be culled and eliminated if they prove to be unruly. If they prove loyal, no problem either. So you can effectively rule by proxy. Yes look at the details of Egypt in the 40's and 50's and 60's - you will see this process exactly. [Yes even the Suez nationalization issue too].
Of course, Islam was thought to be a good antidote to communism, in Islam majority zones, and hence the culling of liberals was ultimately done in a staged manner to push Islamists into power gradually.
Mubarak was the second in line to succeed. At that time. Check. He was seated apparently next to the one eliminated. Mubarak, on coming to power immediately opened negotiations with the Islamists. Not every MB leader was persecuted. Note who were and who weren't.
The Iraqi king was replaced by a professed "Marxist" officer who had led the coup. It was his aide who turned [or had been working all along] for the "uncle" of Saddam, and replaced the "Marxist" in an equally bloody coup - and was known as an Islamist/conservative.
Khomeini's movement was not the first one to challenge the neo-monarchy. There was a long history of leftist "urbanite" uprising against the ruling regime, and in fact the mullahcracy had always played a more collaborative role with colonial influences, and did not resist the shah when he anointed himself [or as per the Brit blueprint]. The resistance that was at all religiously touched, were by small fringe groups of "sufi" dissenters, and not the grand ayatollate in general - except the eleder family members of Khomeini. But again note that Khomeini must have had "guardian angels" - a typical feature of colonial politics, by which certain families are chosen to lead charmed lives - or individuals.
The greater resistance, organized at that - was by the urban leftist and liberals or seculars. This aspect is usually suppressed nowa days, to push up Khomeini's role - a la JLN - as the sole "liberator". Khomeini's charmed life of escape to France and shipping at western initiative at the right moment should have made the facts clear on ground for you. Moreover, it was the leftist/liberal upsurge against the shah - that was the backdrop used to raise both the Soviet bogey as well as replace the shah who had outlived his use.
Afghanistan - the same process. Indonesia - the same process. Algeria, the same process. Tunisia, the same process. Libya, the same process.
You will see that the essential conflict in the ME over modernity is not over consumption goods, or technology itself, it is about the fundamental infrastructure of knowledge creation that leads to such consmuption goods. Modernity is about problematization and exploration of given alternatives, and not submission to presumed claims or beliefs. Muslims have always wanted the products of that exploration, but they have consistently rejected the infrastructure for that exploration - which goes completely against Islam.
I don't think its simple. The mullahs certainly don't like forms of knowledge that sideline them, thats for certain, and in places like Pakistan and Afghanistan they can wage a war on secular knowledge. But in literate socities, the non-clerical lay Islamists like the Muslim Brotherhood have already sidelined them. These are people whose degrees in engineering and medicine and law are as important to their status as their zeal for Islamising the system.
The most consistent problem Muslims have with modernity is the effect on patriarchy. The Muslim Brotherhood has actually come to terms with the kinds of old fashioned 19th century nationalism that is quite patriarchal, seeing the family as the building bloc of the nation, with educated mothers as the key site where the nation is reproduced.
Sure, and that is why Morsi has introduced a more Sharia-aligned constitution after sidelining the clerics! Please compare the statements of the AA Islamic uni's most "respected" and prolific clerics - and with that of the MB, or unspoken but implementations of MB. There is no sidelining where it really matters.
In every case, the fundamental conditioning that is almost totalitarian in nature in every Islamic community - predestines every clash with "subversive" element of modernity - towards jihad. It leads more to rejection of modernity in ideological terms as much as a near-gloating adoption of the tools of modernity to intensify that jihad.
Of course there's been reactionary responses to the undermining of Islam. But just where has modernity been successfully rolled all the way back? It keeps surging back in. Even in Iran and Saudi Arabia the majority of people's lives continue to be transformed by modernity despite the best efforts of a clerical power structure.
I don't deny that forces of modernity constantly bang at the door. But the coercive ideological hold that islamist educational and propaganda networks hold once they are allowed to persist - always wins.
Nationalists should not be equated to Islamists. islamists are tansnationalists in their long term agenda, and nationalists only as short term tactical moves.
If nationalism was such a big deal, Egyptians, or Iranians, or a host of other Islamic countries in the ME and north Africa would have been bristling over the imposition of Arabic script and Arab cultural practices eliminating their "national" characteristics.
Sorry B, but nationalism usually works by turning *living* cultural and community markers and institutions into political ones. Arabic and Islam have been deeply embedded in the lives and culture of the vast majority of Egyptians for over a millennium. Are you going to claim that Russian nationalism should require rejection of the Cyrillic script and the Russian orthodox Church as Byzantine impositions? I mean you can do that of course, but its got nothing to do with the reality of how nationalism actually works.
Cyrillic script cannot be compared to imposition of Arabic on Egypt. Cyrillic was used because there was no script for the Kievan Rus at the time - but they had a language that was very much within the so-called IE group.
The language did not change significantly apart from loanwords. However, when Arabic was imposed, it replaced the Coptic/hieratic entirely - and there are traces of how it was done, destruction of libraries - [whatever was left after the Christian loving], manuscripts, and the priesthood, and other standard measures of the Islamic.
This is something you will see all over the Arab and Muslim world - people take their countries seriously, which is why borders haven't just dissolved in a see of Sunni brotherly love. Being an Islamist who insists that you have to be Muslim to be *really* Egyptian doesn't mean that he thinks being Egyptian and Yemeni is the same thing.
There is nothing incompatible between Islamism and nationalism - Hamas screwed over the Muslim brotherhood in Syria to ally with Hafez al-Assad in 1992 because it was busy representing the interests of Palestinians, not Syrian Sunnis. Today Morsi in Egypt has shown no more and no less favour to Hamas in Gaza because it needs World Bank loans and US military aid. Sympathetic as they are, at the end of the day Egyptian national interests come before Palestinian interests.
To an extent true. But where it matters for us is about support for jihad against the non-Muslim. This remains a very fluid issue. Also the very dependence on external forces, might mean more of a danger - as has happened in the past with Indo-Pak dynamic.
Once again, despite initial rhetorical Islamist denunciation of nationalism, they've had to give way because they can't fight the insidious nature of modernity on Muslims, especially once they're literate.
The vast majority of religiously observant Muslim Egyptians I've met are incredibly nationalistic - they are hugely proud of Egypt's role as the intellectual centre of the Arab world, and think they're its natural leaders. While its only good and right that the paganism of the Pharaohs gave way to Islam the Pyramids are great because they're a proof that the Egyptians are in fact especially bright. Egyptian Arabic is distinctive, and anyone speaking a foreign dialect of Arabic - say a Muslim Libyan (whom all Egyptians wrongly assume are loaded with cash) - will be screwed with much higher prices when trying to negotiate in the Souq, no differently from a non-Muslim Westerner who can speak only Modern Standard Arabic. If I speak in local dialect on the other hand, everything changes.
Its no different with the Syrians for example, who feel they're the natural leaders of the Arab world, with an ancient Semitic past going all the way back to the invention of the alphabet. They pride themselves on being more cosmopolitan and historically better at integrating Hellenic/Roman/European influences while remaining true to their culture - i.e. being modern and Arab. They like to think the average Syrian is better of than the average Arab outside the Gulf, and the result is that theyre much more honest and dignified than the rest. They're also convinced they're physically the most attractive, which other Arabs more or less agree with.
And on and on it goes. The bottom line is people believe in their countries.
I stumble upon the bolded part. I did not expect this from you, but perhaps I should not have expected. That line gives an entirely different perspective on what you have written, but that is not for this thread. I am not sure archeologists like Hawas would agree with your sentiment, but I realize where you are coming from.
