Bharat Rakshak

Former Revolutionary Guard tells 'Post' that such a blow to Fordow nuke facility would harm Iran drastically.
Iran's Ahmadinejad at Natanz nuclear facility Photo: Ho New / Reuters
Iranian dissident-turned CIA operative Reza Kahlili told The Jerusalem Post on Monday that an alleged blast at the Fordow nuclear installation in Iran is "the largest case of sabotage in decades."

Although it has not yet been verified, a report by Kahlili, according to which a massive blast rocked Iran's key Fordow nuclear installation last week, continued to spread on Monday.

Speaking to the Post on Monday, Khalili expressed confidence that the alleged blast will receive "further coverage in the US," and that "more information" will become available to verify the incident.

"This is the center of the Iranian nuclear program. It's essential for the regime, its activities, and its nuclear program. If such a blow was given to Fordow, it definitely harms [Iran] drastically. They were reaching for 20 percent uranium enrichment, and were increasing output," he added.

Situated near the holy Shi'ite city of Qom, the existence of the Fordow enrichment plant, dug deep into a mountain, was kept secret by Iran, until it was discovered by Western intelligence in 2009, and the question of how long it had been in operation remains unanswered.

Kahlili, a pseudonym used to protect him from the Iranian regime, published A Time To Betray in 2010, in which he described a journey which took him from the Islamic Revolutionary Guards to being a CIA operative in the 1980s. He now resides in California, and says he is in touch with a number of insiders in the Iranian intelligence and security communities, as well as with the office of Iran's supreme leader.

Asked why satellite imagery was not being released of rescue efforts at Fordow, Kahlili said only state intelligence agencies have access to live satellite feeds. "Why don't they put it out? My only assumption is that no one wants to take credit because of what the consequences could be by the regime," he said. "This is a very sensitive time. I'm sure that soon, very soon, more information will leak out. Chatter will get loud enough to provide further information." Kahlili went on to say that the "first suspicion is Israel" within the Islamic Republic. "I have verified information that there was a meeting [called by Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali] Khamenei. A decision was made to act in Lebanon. A request was made to [Hezbollah chief Hassan] Nasrallah to vacate southern Lebanese villages. Islamic Republic Guards are on their way there. A decision has been made to prepare for missile launch from a certain area in Lebanon against Israel," he said.

Khalili said one of the sources who initially leaked information of the blast came from within the security forces guarding Fordow, adding that precise information of the attack was not being released in order to protect the source. "The source has been collaborating for a long time," he said. A second source came from the Iranian Intelligence Ministry, he said, adding that it was very difficult to safely get information out of Iran.

Iranian authorities have not yet made any progress in their attempt to enter Fordow, Kahlili asserted, adding, "I fear there is radiation involved." Iran's defense ministry dispatched drilling vehicles, "the same they used to carve tunnels and create underground facilities, to see if they can make any headway in opening emergency exists, because they collapsed. Among those stuck in the facility are dozens of foreign nationals. These are contracted scientists," he said.

Kahlili said a second mysterious blast occurred in Tehran last week, at an IRGC base called "21 Hamza." "There are injuries, and there have been arrests of IRGC members who are being questioned. The Intelligence Ministry suspects sabotage," he added.

Carl wrote:Oman is very close to Iran - the only Gulfie that has defied US pressure and maintains close and positive relations with Iran. It was also close to India, until its strange behavior recently, coinciding with the upturn in anti-India vibes coming out of Iran itself.

Carl wrote:shyamd ji, thanks.

President Bashar al-Assad's chances of staying in power are "shrinking by the day,", Dmitri Medvedev said on Sunday in Russia's sternest criticism of the Syrian regime to date.

President Bashar al-Assad's chances of staying in power are "shrinking by the day", Dmitri Medvedev said on Sunday Photo: REUTERS
By Richard Spencer, Middle East Correspondent6:00AM GMT 28 Jan 2013
Mr Assad, a Russian protégé who has survived thanks in part to Moscow's use of its veto at the United Nations security council, made a "grave, perhaps fatal error" in his failure to initiate political reform earlier, Prime Minister Medvedev said.
"He should have acted much more quickly and reached out to the peaceful opposition which was ready to sit at the negotiating table with him," he said in an interview with CNN on the sidelines of the Davos World Economic Forum conference.
"It seems to me that his chances of staying are shrinking day by day."
Mr Medvedev’s unexected intervention is unlikely to have a major effect on Russian policy, which is directed personally by President Vladimir Putin.
Mr Putin’s over-riding concern is to preserve a key ally and prevent a geopolitical triumph by either the United States or Islamists - a clear possibility if he dropped his backing for Mr Assad. Russia, by Syria’s own admission, continues to provide arms to Damascus.
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Assad shown at ceremony for Prophet Mohammed's birthday 24 Jan 2013
Russia, by Syria's own admission, continues to provide arms to Damascus.
Mr Medvedev himself went on to say that a compromise had to be found that did not lead to Mr Assad being "executed like Gaddafi or be carried to court sessions on a stretcher like Hosni Mubarak" – referring to the deposed leaders of Libya and Egypt.
But his words are an indication of the seriousness of Mr Assad's predicament.
By contrast, Laurent Fabius, the French foreign minister, last week, suggested that there were no imminent signs of Mr Assad being forced out, with regime air attacks currently keeping rebel forces at bay.
Oxfam, in a report published on Monday, said there had been a sharp increase in the number of refugees in the past week – threefold in Jordan alone. In total, about 670,000 people have fled the country, on top of millions more who have left their homes for safer areas.
A United Nations appeal for £1.5 billion to provide aid, though, has reached only three per cent of its target, and criticism is growing of countries which support either side in the conflict not doing enough to deal with the consequences.
Justine Greening, the international development secretary, announced that Britain would provide £21 million to bring its total aid package to £89.5 million, and called on other countries to do more to help Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan, the neighbours playing host to most of those fleeing Syria.
"It's clear the humanitarian crisis is going to be a protracted one," she told The Daily Telegraph, while on her way from visiting a camp in Jordan to a donors' conference in Kuwait. "We need countries attending this conference to provide help."

Frederic C. Hof | January 29, 2013

The prospect of the Syrian opposition forming a provisional or transitional government brings to the fore fundamental decisions for the United States: decisions that would have to be taken or openly reaffirmed before Syrian Opposition Coalition President Moaz al-Khatib visits Washington sometime in February. Washington’s enthusiasm for the emergence of a government offering an alternative to the Assad regime is somewhere between well-guarded and non-existent. This is because the very process of governmental formation would force the Obama administration to make tough decisions in the full light of day.
As noted previously, the creation of a viable, credible alternative to the Assad regime in the form of a transitional government would be an essential step toward stripping that regime of much of the residual support it has and therefore hastening its end. The mainstream opposition (civilian and armed) has written and spoken extensively on why Syrian minorities should welcome the replacement of Assad’s faux secularism with real civil society and rule of law in which Syrian citizenship would eclipse all political distinctions based on sect, ethnicity, and gender. Yet without a real alternative, one featuring actual names and a specific, credible program, why should the unconvinced be anything but skeptical? Why should they believe what they hear from opposition figures purporting to speak for those who would bring to an end the family business? The Assad regime has been as familiar as it has been corrupt, as predictable as it has been incompetent, and as persistent as it has been brutal. For millions of Syrians, they see Bashar al-Assad as the devil they know.
It would probably be difficult to find anyone in the Obama administration who would disagree with this analysis. Indeed, the United States’ recognition of the Syrian Opposition Coalition in December 2012 as “the legitimate representative of the Syrian people” would be meaningless without the implicit understanding that those who legitimately represent 22.5 million Syrians have the right to constitute a government. And yet, were such a government to establish itself on liberated Syrian territory, would the United States recognize it as the Syrian government? Would it help to defend that government against the Assad regime’s likely efforts to strangle it in the cradle? Would it enter into a security assistance relationship with the new Syrian government? Would it organize an international effort to fund the new government at levels that would enable it to meet the humanitarian, essential services, and law-and-order needs of its constituents?
These questions must be answered—and answered definitively—before the Syrian Opposition Coalition can reasonably undertake the establishment of such a government. For example, the administration could explore security assistance by supporting Turkey through steps consistent with a mutual defense treaty that Ankara could enter into with the new Syrian government, and by establishing a decisive American role in determining how (and to whom) weapons provided by others flow into Syria. Likewise, the establishment of a governmental alternative to the Assad regime must be accompanied by a financial means to enable it to succeed. This does not mean that the American taxpayer should be placed at the head of the queue, but the Unites States could leverage its influence to create an international fund to support the new government. American leadership in designing and organizing the structure of support is vital. Without this leadership, one of two things will happen: either the new government will not be formed, or it will be formed and will likely fail. What these outcomes would have in common is victory for a regime that President Obama demanded step aside in August 2011.
All of this adds up to a dilemma for President Obama and his interagency Syria team. They know that given enough time Bashar al-Assad will wreck Syria and leave in the middle of the Levant an ungovernable space akin to Somalia or Libya. They know that creating a clear, attractive alternative to Assad is an essential step toward saving Syria before salvation itself becomes impossible. Yet they remain wedded to a limited strategy that—while achieving some gains by strangling the regime economically, isolating it diplomatically, helping Syrians desperately in need of humanitarian relief, and delivering material assistance to local councils inside Syria—leave others with the primary task of removing a regime whose persistence is dreaded by all of Syria’s neighbors. It is not as if American contributions to the Syrian revolution have been unimportant. The danger is that they are becoming irrelevant as the prospects for a peaceful, managed transition recede and a fight on the ground becomes all-important.
The possibility of the Syrian opposition forming an alternative government offers the Obama administration a choice it does not welcome: either reconsider its basic strategy or tell the opposition (and our allies and friends) not to count on the United States to do the things that would give a new government the chance to succeed. The former could be wrenching, as key administration officials see Syria as a beckoning morass: the mother of all distractions for a second Obama term dedicated to accomplishing an ambitious agenda at home and creating a sustainable and stable security architecture in Asia. Yet the latter could be disastrous; given enough rope Assad will take Syria straight to the gallows, and the consequences of that hanging will be felt by 22.5 million Syrians and all of their neighbors for decades to come. Will the United States be able to avert its glance as the tsunami of Syrian state failure washes refugees, terrorists, and weapons of mass destruction over the region?
The Syrian revolution may fail even if the United States does everything it can reasonably do to support it. There should be no illusions about the 82nd Airborne Division dropping in on Damascus or any American boots on the ground. Although Assad will never return the genie to the bottle and rule as he did before mid-March 2011, it is conceivable that his sectarian strategy—ironically and catastrophically enabled by anti-Assad Gulf donors sending money and arms to extremists trying to dominate the Syrian armed opposition—will indeed succeed in keeping him alive as a militia chieftain or destroying Syria. And even if the Syrian opposition received everything it needs to establish an alternative government, they might not succeed in overcoming the daunting challenges.
The Syrian revolution is not America’s to win or lose. The American Revolution was not France’s to win or lose. Yet without the support of France, American independence could have been deferred indefinitely and disastrously. Without American support, the uprising of Syrians against a regime willing to assault their dignity and take their lives in addition to picking their pockets, might have died an early death. Yet now a point of decision has arrived. For the Syrian opposition to form a government offering all Syrians a credible and convincing alternative to the Assad-Makhluf family clique, the United States will have to step up its game. Reluctance to do so is understandable. Failure to do so could be disastrous.
Frederic C. Hof is a senior fellow of the Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East at the Atlantic Council and the former Special Advisor for Transition in Syria at the US Department of State.

Libya: Comment: On the 26th, Milan's Corriere della Sera published an article by an Italian journalist describing conditions in Libya, with special focus on eastern Libya, the region around Benghazi. Excerpts follow.

He wrote that Westerners are leaving eastern Libya. Businessmen, diplomats, and representatives of humanitarian organizations are leaving, along with the technicians who work in the oil industry.


"Rome considers that the Libyan authorities are currently 'incapable of ensuring effective control over the territory' against the Islamic fundamentalist threat. Thus 'travel in eastern, central, and southern Libya is absolutely discouraged unless motivated by stringent professional requirements which cannot opportunely be postponed.'"


Benghazi "is riven by feuding. The security forces are nowhere to be seen. The central government does not exist. The secessionist movement is growing. Garbage is rotting in the streets, and crime and the kidnapping industry are spreading...."


"Darnah, the coastal city nestling at the foot of the 'green mountains' …is now seen as an independent al-Qa'ida republic...."


" 'Al-Qa'ida's road blocks now control the roads in Darnah. They may comprise over 1,000 armed men. Their militia groups are spreading to the villages and they are occupying other cities such as Bayda in an attempt to reach Benghazi,' Libyan intelligence sources told us. The next deadline is the celebrations planned to the mark the second anniversary of the revolution. Violence is expected and terrorist attacks are feared also in Tripoli."

Comment: Darnah and Bayda are east of Benghazi on the coast road to Egypt. In Benghazi 17 February is the anniversary of the first anti-Qadhafi demonstration in 2011. The Italians have closed their consulate.

The Italian journalist suggests that al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb is position to take over eastern Libya, including secession from the rest of Libya. That raises a hypothesis that the Mali adventure might partly have been intended to divert attention from developments in Cyrenaica - eastern Libya.

Eastern Libya is lost, if the Italian journalist's report is close to accurate. Expect increased violence.

Mali: Update. Residents of Gao, in eastern Mali, hunted down and beat suspected Islamist extremists who had not fled the town. Malian troops bundled the men into an army truck Tuesday, their hands bound behind their backs.

Comment: As yet Malian and French authorities have provided almost no details about casualties on either side. The French refuse to embed journalists with their forces.

Israel fears Syrian arms may fall into Hezbollah's hands, and has strengthened its northern defences
Continue reading the main story
Syria conflict

The Syrian military has confirmed that Israeli jets have carried out an air strike on its territory, but denied reports that lorries carrying weapons bound for Lebanon were hit.

It said in a statement that the target was a military research centre northwest of the capital Damascus.

Two people were killed and five injured in the attack, it said.

Lebanese security sources, Western diplomats and Syrian rebels say an arms convoy was hit near Lebanon's border.

The attack came as Israel voiced fears that Syrian missiles and chemical weapons could fall into the hands of militants such as Lebanon's Hezbollah.

BBC Middle East correspondent Wyre Davies says none of the reports can be verified, although some well-placed diplomats and military sources say they would not be surprised if Israel had acted, given the recent instability in Syria.

Israel and the US have declined to comment on the incident.

The Lebanese military and internal security forces have not officially confirmed the reports, but say there has been increased activity by Israeli warplanes over Lebanon in the past week, and particularly in recent hours.

Hezbollah fears
The army statement, quoted in Syria's official media, said: "Israeli fighter jets violated our airspace at dawn today and carried out a direct strike on a scientific research centre in charge of raising our level of resistance and self-defence."

The centre, in Jamraya, northwest of the capital Damascus, was damaged in the attack, along with an adjacent building and a car park, the statement said.

It said that "armed terrorist gangs", a term the government uses to describe rebel groups, had tried and failed repeatedly to capture the same facility in recent months.

The statement specifically denied reports that an arms convoy had been hit.

Hours earlier, unnamed Lebanese security sources reported that Israeli warplanes had struck lorries carrying missiles towards the Lebanese border

The Associated Press quoted a US official as saying the lorries were carrying Russian-made SA-17 anti-aircraft missiles.

Correspondents say Israel fears that Lebanese Shia militant group Hezbollah could obtain anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles, thus strengthening its ability to respond to Israeli air strikes.

However, an attack on the Syrian side could cause a major diplomatic incident, they say, as Iran has said it will treat any Israeli attack on Syria as an attack on itself.

The attack came days after Israel moved its Iron Dome defence system to the north of the country.

Israel has also joined the US in expressing concern that Syria's presumed chemical weapons stockpile could be taken over by militant groups, although there is no evidence that the convoy was carrying such weapons.

Analysts say Israel believes Syria received a battery of SA-17s from Russia after an alleged Israeli air strike in 2007 that destroyed a Syrian nuclear reactor.

The US government said in 2008 that the reactor was "not intended for peaceful purposes".

Prince Muqrin bin Abdulaziz al Saud Prince Muqrin is seen as a cautious moderniser

The former head of Saudi intelligence, Prince Muqrin bin Abdulaziz al Saud, has been named the country's second deputy prime minister by King Abdullah.

The appointment puts Prince Muqrin third in line to succeed the 89-year-old Abdullah.

The second in line to the throne and first deputy prime minister, 77-year-old Prince Salman, is reportedly in ill health.

Prince Muqrin is said to share the king's commitment to cautious reform.
Continue reading the main story
Analysis
image of Bill Law Bill Law Middle East analyst

The biggest winner in this appointment may be the interior minister Mohammed bin Nayef.

The naming of the 52-year- old as head of the country's most powerful ministry last year ruffled feathers among other contenders to succeed King Abdullah.

The interior minister is part of the younger generation and the feeling is that King Abdullah wants to give that generation more time to learn the ropes while his younger half-brother Prince Muqrin, who is seen as a compromising figure, handles the day to day business of running the country.

King Abdullah has moved to curb the power of hardline clerics by, amongst other things, limiting the fatwas they can issue.

He ordered a reorganisation of the religious police, installing a moderate as chief in the wake of growing public resentment.

The king opened a coeducational university and has given women the right to vote, albeit in largely irrelevant municipal elections. He has also pushed for fiscal reform and more meaningful economic diversification.

But Abdullah's health is said to be fragile after several back operations and long periods of recuperation.

And a source close to the royal family said that Prince Salman is about to leave the country and be absent for a month for health reasons.

Many observers had thought Prince Muqrin's removal as intelligence head last year meant that his stature was diminished. However Friday's announcement puts him at the top of the kingdom's power structure.

As concerns grow about Prince Salman's health, the duties of deputy prime minister are likely to fall more and more to Prince Muqrin.

Michael Stephens, an analyst at the Qatar-based Royal United Services Institute (Rusi) think-tank, described the move as "buying time for the next generation".

Prince Muqrin, 67, is one of the youngest sons of Saudi Arabia's founding King Abdul Aziz.

Mr Stephens described Prince Muqrin as "liberal-minded" and well liked in Washington and London.

"He will continue Abdullah's policy of slow and cautious change and ensure his legacy as a moderniser is secure," he said.

brihaspati wrote: Two words came to mind :
"Assadfall" -an event declared to be surely happening, but forever
"Sunnispeak" - speaking hopes out aloud to oneself and then believe they have already happened

WASHINGTON—Defense Secretary Leon Panetta accused Iran's paramilitary force of an intensified campaign to destabilize the Middle East by smuggling antiaircraft weapons to its militant allies.

Iran's export of so-called manpads—antiaircraft missiles that can be carried by a single person—represent what Mr. Panetta called a dangerous escalation.

"There is no question when you start passing manpads around, that becomes a threat—not just to military aircraft but to civilian aircraft," Mr. Panetta told The Wall Street Journal in an interview describing shifting threats to the U.S. as he prepares to leave his post. "That is an escalation."

Western officials have long worried about the spread of such weapons and the risk they pose to airline passengers as well as to military helicopters and jets. Recent U.S. intelligence pointed to new efforts by Iran to smuggle manpads, but few shipments had been intercepted before Jan. 23, when Yemen, aided by the U.S., intercepted a boat carrying the weapons.

"It is one of the first times we have seen it," Mr. Panetta said.

U.S. investigators said evidence indicated the missiles were supplied by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Tehran's paramilitary force.

Iranian officials didn't respond to requests for comment about distributing weapons to regional allies.

Mr. Panetta said the U.S. is stepping up efforts to counter the Iranian threat, and is leading a multination exercise in the United Arab Emirates though Feb. 7 to improve the interdiction of Iranian arms and other weapons. The defense secretary called the exercise critical to building up Arab capabilities to help halt Iranian arms transfers, including the smuggling of manpads.

The disclosures by Mr. Panetta came as he prepares to step down after 19 months as defense secretary, a period marked by an intensified focus on Iran as concerns mount about its nuclear ambitions, an expanded campaign of drone strikes against militants in several countries, and the emergence of a new al Qaeda haven in Africa.

Chuck Hagel, whom President Barack Obama has nominated to succeed Mr. Panetta as civilian leader of the U.S. military, is skeptical of military intervention but has said he agrees with the administration's policy of considering all options in dealing with Tehran's nuclear program.

Mr. Hagel's views on Iran have been subject to withering Republican criticism, in particular his vote while serving as a senator from Nebraska against labeling the Revolutionary Guard a terrorist group. However, at his confirmation hearing Thursday he endorsed the administration's strategy of isolating Tehran, including the Revolutionary Guard.

Senior U.S. officials said the antiaircraft weapons intercepted on Jan. 23 likely were headed to northern Yemen's Houthi separatists, who are fighting the U.S.-backed government in San'a and have also clashed with Saudi forces. Iranians also have stepped up aid to rebels in the south of Yemen in recent months, when previous shipments have involved mainly cash, small arms and explosives, U.S. officials said.

The weapons are a major concern for Israel, which borders territory controlled by Iran's allies. U.S. officials also believe Iranians are shipping similar weapons to Hamas militants in the Gaza Strip and have in the past shipped weapons to Syria and Hezbollah.

Extremists in Gaza long have used rockets in their conflict with Israel. Manpads could give them the capability to shoot down Israeli aircraft. The concern about Iranian arms proliferation has grown as an uprising has made Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's position more precarious.

Underscoring Israeli concerns, U.S. and Western officials said Israel this week struck a convoy in Syria carrying antiaircraft missiles that officials said were being transferred to the Iranian-backed militant group Hezbollah in Lebanon. Syria disputed that account, and said Israeli warplanes bombed a research facility near Damascus.

Mr. Panetta is preparing to leave the administration, after leading the Central Intelligence Agency and Pentagon, with a U.S. war in Afghanistan beginning to wind down and an extremist threat rising in Africa.

The administration initially sent mixed messages about its level of support for the French military campaign in Mali, launched on Jan. 11, against al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, or AQIM, and its militant allies.

Mr. Panetta, however, has been a vocal proponent of the operation, and said he believes a consensus is emerging on a way forward.

"They [France] acted because of what they saw AQIM doing. I've commended them because I think it was the right step to take. And I think now, there really is a recognition that this is an opportunity now to be able to make sure that not only do we confine AQIM but ultimately we defeat them," Mr. Panetta said.

Mr. Panetta, after taking over as CIA director in 2009, sought to build up counterterrorism efforts against al Qaeda's affiliates in northwest Africa.

Today, he said, the U.S. still lacks the full range of capabilities to deal with the terrorist threat there. "We're not even close," Mr. Panetta said. "There is a lot of work that needs to be done."

Mr. Panetta said the U.S. response to the threat from groups such as AQIM was complicated by the difficulty of coordinating regional partners, the vastness of the area where the group operates, and by Washington's focus on more immediate threats, particularly Yemen-based al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.

"Part of the problem was everybody was concerned about it, but, operationally, it took a lot more work to try to kind of build the kind of infrastructure you needed to go after them," Mr. Panetta said. "In just the natural system of prioritizing, we were going after them where they represented the biggest threat. And then suddenly…AQIM started to expand and started to then gain control of these communities."

Mr. Panetta said a campaign in North and West Africa would require the U.S. to set up a robust network of informants on the ground. Likewise, the U.S. needs a constellation of bases, a process that got a boost on Monday when the U.S. signed a security agreement with Niger. The U.S. is considering putting surveillance drones there.

"All of that demands time," Mr. Panetta said.

More important, Mr. Panetta said, the White House has to make a series of policy decisions about whether AQIM and its allies in North and West Africa "represent an imminent threat to our country."

Write to Julian E. Barnes at [email protected] and Adam Entous at [email protected]

HARD TALK

Last Updated : Monday, February 04, 2013 12:13 PM


Hussein Shobokshi


The Arab world can do a lot of good to itself by carefully following the democratic progress in India. India, the world’s largest democracy, continuously manages to inspire the world in politics and, of course, in its economy. The “big news” in India these days seems to be the return of the Gandhi family to the forefront of Indian politics in a big way.

Rahul Gandhi, the grandson of Indira Gandhi and the son of the late Rajiv Gandhi, has become the Congress Party’s “vice president”. The president is his mother Sonia, an Italian-Indian widow who opted to play the back room role of king-maker rather than becoming king herself. She took her time to “prepare” her son for the unforgiving political limelight of Indian politics.

Rahul Gandhi finally decided to make a move. It is a timely, planned move to capitalize on the great in-fighting that is eating up the chances of the opposition. Mr. Gandhi, however, has proved to be quite a reluctant and timid politician in many situations. He was engaged over the past 12 months in a failed state election campaigns in Gujarat and in Uttar Pradesh. This experience seems to be paying off and somehow helpful to him and to his avid supporters. He learned how to energize the party and prepare it for the upcoming general elections which could launch him to the coveted post of prime minister just like his father, grandmother and great-grandfather Nehru.

His appetite for this kind of accomplishment was seen in a spirited speech he gave recently when he accepted his new post wherein he bluntly called for a new “revolution” in India, asked for a much more open government and decentralized governing system. His talks also did not miss the chance to poke fun at his own party when he said that he would like it to be more representative for all of India, whether toward the poor farmers or urbanites.

All of this is part of an ongoing effort to build the right image for the future leader with a “magnate” to his last name. There is a great sense of hope and, therefore, the acceptance of the 42-year-old Gandhi, particularly in the villages of India where his messages on education, reforms and farming policies hit a strong chord.

Mr. Gandhi has a very good chance of winning the big prize as long as no other party surprises and no other strong candidate comes up — a very unlikely possibility. Indian politics and the conventional wisdom that comes with it think it is Gandhi’s moment now and a serious fight from the opposition will not take place.

As for the lesson that Arabs can learn from this, it is simply this: there is a huge difference between going legitimate through the proper democratic channels and creating a dynasty by shoving sons into the throats of people by means of brutal force like what Saddam, Gaddafi, Mubarak, Assad and Ali Saleh did. Simply look at the difference and compare!

Egypt's foreign currency reserves fell nearly 10 percent in a single month in January, according to figures released by the central bank Tuesday that provided stark new evidence of a dangerous deterioration in the economy amid political turmoil on the streets.

The new figures throw further into doubt Egypt's ability to qualify for a badly-needed $4.8 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund that would shore up investor confidence and free up a wave of loans that it has requested from other lenders.

Egypt is also in talks for a $900 million loan from the European Union, $500 million from the African Development Bank and $450 million from the United States. It is finalizing talks for $1 billion from Turkey.

The political turmoil, in part, has held President Mohammed Morsi back from implementing unpopular austerity measures such as raising taxes and cutting subsidies that are key to obtaining the IMF loan.
His government is not expected to carry out the measures until after parliamentary elections to be held sometime in the coming months. Morsi is thought to be holding back for fear of further inflaming violence and perhaps to not risk losing votes for his Islamist group, the Muslim Brotherhood, which now dominates the government.

Drones reportedly carry out strikes without Yemeni government permission

The US Central Intelligence Agency has been operating a secret airbase for unmanned drones in Saudi Arabia for the past two years.

The facility was established to hunt for members of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, which is based in Yemen.

A drone flown from there was used in September 2011 to kill Anwar al-Awlaki, a US-born cleric who was alleged to be AQAP's external operations chief.

US media have known of its existence since then, but have not reported it.

Senior government officials had said they were concerned that disclosure would undermine operations against AQAP, as well as potentially damage counter-terrorism collaboration with Saudi Arabia.

The US military pulled out virtually all of its troops from Saudi Arabia in 2003, having stationed between 5,000 and 10,000 troops in the Gulf kingdom after the 1991 Gulf war. Only personnel from the United States Military Training Mission (USMTM) officially remain.

'High-value targets'
The location of the secret drone base was not revealed in the US reports and the Saudi government has not yet commented.

Continue reading the main story
Analysis


Bill Law
Gulf analyst, BBC News
The revelation that US drone strikes against militants in Yemen have been launched from a secret base inside Saudi Arabia will be an embarrassment for the government in Riyadh.

King Abdullah has embarked upon a gradual process of reform in the face of a conservative religious elite who strongly object to the presence of foreign non-Muslim troops in the country.

Saudi Arabia is home to Islam's two holiest sites and the deployment of US forces there in the 1990s was seen as an historic betrayal. The campaign for their withdrawal became a rallying cry for al-Qaeda and its late Saudi-born leader, Osama bin Laden.

However, construction was ordered after a December 2009 cruise missile strike in Yemen, according to the New York Times.

It was the first strike ordered by the Obama administration, and ended in disaster, with dozens of civilians, including women and children, killed.

US officials told the newspaper that the first time the CIA used the secret facility was to kill Awlaki.

Since then, the CIA has been "given the mission of hunting and killing 'high-value targets' in Yemen" - the leaders of AQAP who government lawyers had determined posed a direct threat to the US - the officials added.

Three other Americans, including Awlaki's 16-year-old son, have also been killed in US strikes in Yemen, which can reportedly be carried out without the permission of the country's government.

The Washington Post reported that President Barak Obama's counter-terrorism adviser, John Brennan, a former CIA station chief in Saudi Arabia, played a key role in negotiations with the government in Riyadh over building the drone base.

Saudi Arabia is home to some of Islam's holiest sites and the deployment of US forces there was seen as a historic betrayal by many Islamists, notably the late leader of al-Qaeda, Osama Bin Laden.

It was one of the main reasons given by the Saudi-born militant to justify violence against the US and its allies.

Leaked memo
The revelation of the drone base came shortly after the leaking of a US justice department memo detailing the Obama administration's case for killing Americans abroad who are accused of being a "senior, operational leader" of al-Qaeda or its allies.


Anwar al-Awlaki was among three Americans killed in drone strikes in Yemen in 2011
Lethal force is lawful if they are deemed to pose an "imminent threat" and their capture is not feasible, the memo says. The threat does not have to be based on intelligence about a specific attack, since such actions are being "continually" planned by al-Qaeda, it adds.

NBC News said it was given to members of the US Senate intelligence and judiciary committees as a summary of a classified memo on the targeted killings of US citizens prepared by the justice department.

The latter memo was written before the drone strike that killed Awlaki.

Under President Obama, the US has expanded its use of drones to kill hundreds of al-Qaeda suspects in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Yemen. It says it is acting in self-defence in accordance with international law.

Critics argue the drone strikes amount to execution without trial and cause many civilian casualties.

Senators are expected to ask Mr Brennan about drone strikes, the memo and the killing of Awlaki on Thursday when he faces a confirmation hearing on his nomination to become the new CIA director.

IDSA will Live Webcast the Conference on its website from February 13-15, 2013 from 1000 hours onwards.

Day One (13 Feb 2013)

Inaugural Session: Key Note Address by Hon’ble Raksha Mantri
Session I: Political Transformation in West Asia: Prospects for Peace, Stability and Prosperity
Session II: Future of Political Transformation in West Asia
Session III: West Asia’s Security Dynamics-I: Role of Extra-Regional Powers

Day Two (14 Feb 2013)

Special Address by Mr. Faleh Al Faid, National Security Advisor, Iraq (tbc)
Session IV: West Asia’s Security Dynamics-II: Role of Regional Powers
Session V: India and the Gulf
Session VI: Nuclear Issues in West Asia

Day Three (15 Feb 2013)

Special Address by Shri Shivshankar Menon, National Security Adviser, Government of India
Session VII: Roundtable on Role of Asia in Evolving Security Dynamics and Architecture of the Gulf Region
Session VIII: Panel Discussion on Way Ahead

RamaY wrote:LoC firing: OIC backs Pak, asks India to allow fact-finding mission

Dipak Kumar Dash, TNN | Feb 7, 2013, 05.02AM IST
NEW DELHI: The Central Public Works Department (CPWD) is likely to construct the border fence between Oman and Yemen. Only two Indian agencies - CPWD and Engineering Projects India Ltd (EPIL) - were shortlisted in a secret bidding by the Oman government.

Sources said that the Oman government wanted to give the contract to an agency outside Oman and Yemen to avoid controversy, and consequently India was approached.

Government officials said that CPWD had quoted Rs 1,600 crore for the 288-km-long fence work, which is likely to be completed within four years. "We have a good track record in installation of fences along border. It's a prestigious project for us," said a government official.

A delegation from Oman government held talks with CPWD officials on Wednesday. Sources said that the modalities would be worked out soon.

A nine-member delegation from Oman had also visited India a few ago to see security arrangements at the international border, adjoining Pakistan, which includes the fencing work. Oman wants to fence its international border adjoining Yemen as it is concerned with the growing presence of al Qaeda in its neighbouring country.

Earlier, CPWD had made a presentation to an official delegation from Oman that included installing fences, lights and carrying out electrification of barbed wires along its eastern and western frontiers.

An Indian agency bagging such a project assumes significance since Oman is one of New Delhi's most trusted allies in the Gulf region.

The border fencing is a part of Oman's bid to prevent a Tahrir Square-like uprising from Yemen.

The most likely arc? Made in Belgium for American-designed anti-tank weapons. Sold and shipped to Col. Muammar el-Qaddfi in Libya after he deposed King Idris, upended relations with the United States and sought fresh sources for arms. Seized decades later by looters who carted away the Brother-Leader’s arms stockpiles and turned part of his own arsenal against him, and cached or sold the rest. Smuggled to Mali for use by Islamists who overran the country’s north. Visible again now after the Islamists were smacked from the air in Konna during a French-led military attack, and lost custody of their weapons, too.

Arms and ordnance can sometimes point to history in remarkably rich ways. The NR-160 projectile seen in the top photograph, above, appears to be about as rich a case as they come. It’s a marker of the see-saw (and alternately naive and cynical) contests for primacy in North Africa, and just as much an artifact of its times as Patty Hearst’s M-1 carbine. It also underlines the costly and lingering effects of the West’s military intervention in Libya, during and after which NATO and most of the allied nations showed little interest and took little action to stop the flow of weapons that the NATO air campaign helped accelerate.

A hat-tip or eleven: The photographs above were made by Rich Valdmanis, the deputy chief correspondent in West Africa for Reuters, who, with David Lewis and Eric Gaillard, was the first to take the trouble to document the presence of 106-millimeter projectiles in contested territory in Mali. Mr. Gaillard filed a photograph of one of the projectiles to the wire service, the use of which helped us to identify the weapon, check it against our registry of weapons and ordnance known to have been in Libya, and then, with a timely dash into the records by Damien Spleeters, an independent arms researcher, to work backward through export licenses in Belgium’s state archives and sketch more of the history. Mr. Valdmanis and Mr. Lewis also provided local tactical context, and Mr. Valdmanis shared the photographs above. Tyler Hicks meanwhile scoured Konna and found more samples of Belgian 106s in former Islamist positions. Neil Corney and James Bevan added regional insight, and John Ismay’s archival digging on America’s cold war military engagement with Libya, and how it failed, interlocked neatly with this fresh case. Three other friends from the ordnance field pitched in, but they prefer to keep their names out of it.

The result is here, on the NYT, with Tyler’s photographs.

We say it often: data-sharing and collaboration between field and archival researchers are often essential to illuminating the complexities and far-flung connections that show how arms actually move about the world. Look away from those annual reports that tell you, with assumed gravitas, which countries exported what dollar amounts of weapons. They tell you very little, and almost nothing about how weapons actually find their way to war.

ABOUT THE PHOTOGRAPHS

A NR-160 projectile in Konna, damaged and separated from its cartridge case. The NR-160 is a high-explosive anti-tank round fired through the M40 series of recoilless rifles. Bottom, markings on the bottom of a companion 106-millimeter round from P.R.B., the same Belgian manufacturer. This is a HESH round. Both by Rich Valdmanis. More about 106s, HESH rounds and North Africa here, with sad and grisly video by Andre Liohn. There’s plenty more to say. But other leads are stacked up this morning. Best get to them.

HYDERABAD: The state government plans to open its doors to Saudi Arabian companies for investment in information technology and pharmaceutical sectors to strengthen bilateral relations.

While ambassador of Saudi Arabia to India Saud Mohammed Al Sati, who is here on a short visit, did not comment on whether a Saudi consulate would be set up in the city, sources in the government said talks were held towards that effect. Hyderabad could well be home to the second Saudi consulate after Mumbai.


There are around three lakh expatriates from the state working in Saudi Arabia and leaders from the state during the day said the government was eager to provide all facilities for setting up the consulate in Hyderabad.

Al Sati said the Saudi government would do everything to help build stronger ties between the two countries. The envoy said Saudi business delegations which hitherto restricted themselves to Bangalore and New Delhi in the past, would now visit Hyderabad also to indentify business opportunities. Interacting with senior Congress leaders and the media, Al Sati said all pending issues would be resolved at length as well. Commenting on the new policy of making it mandatory for pilgrims to book a tasneef-registered hotel for people going on Umrah pilgrimage, Al Sati said, "There is a framework, an agreement between the governments of Saudi Arabia and India. We will see if there is a way to make things easier for the pilgrims."

Expressing the government's decision of inviting investments from the Kindgom, former minister Mohammed Ali Shabbir said, "The ambassador met the chief minister on Thursday. Our government fully supports the single window system in which investments in fields of information technology, biotechnology and pharmaceuticals from Saudi firms will be invited."

He further said the government wants students from Saudi Arabia to pursue an education in medicine and engineering in Hyderabad, which boasts of good facilities.

"There are around 125 Saudi students in the city but more in cities like Bangalore and New Delhi. The government has welcomed students to take admission in technical courses. The director general of police has met the ambassador and assured him that Hyderabad is a safe place," Shabbir told the media.

He also met the director general of police V Dinesh Reddy later in the day to discuss issues regarding Saudi nationals and students living in Hyderabad and the Kingdom.

Council on Foreign Relations:Qatar in Mali: Which Side Are They On?

by Elliott Abrams

January 22, 2013

In the last decade the influence of Qatar has grown greatly, fueled by its vast oil and gas revenues and by the skill of its leaders. Whether that influence is being used positively, or in ways that comport with American interests, are separate matters.

In Mali, there is good reason to question whether Qatar is helping the government of that country and those coming to its aid–France and France’s allies (including the EU, United States, and the nations of West Africa)–or helping the Al Qaeda-linked rebels. As long ago as last summer this question was being asked in France, due to the Qatari presence in northern Mali and its aid to areas controlled by the Islamist groups; the mayor of the town of Gao was quoted as saying “the government of France knows who is supporting the terrorists. There is Qatar, for example….” The same article quoted a specialist at the Sciences-Po in Paris saying “In the same way that Qatar has provided special forces to lead opposition to Gaddafi, we think a number of element Qatari special forces are now in northern Mali to ensure the training of recruits who are in place there, especially Ansar Dine.” The French weekly Le Canard Enchaine wrote last June that ”Based on information collected by the [Directorate of Military Intelligence], the Tuareg rebels of the MNLA, Ansar Eddine, AQIM, and Mujao were assisted with dollars from Qatar.”

Accusations are not proof, and there appears as yet to be no proof. There is a Qatari Red Crescent society presence in northern Mali, and there are programs that Qatar says are providing humanitarian assistance only. But an article at the web site Open Democracy by the French analyst Mehdi Lazar sums up the background well:

the presence of Qatari forces in Mali has been, and continues to be, a strategy used increasingly in Africa, especially since the Arab Spring. The emirate became involved in the financing of political parties such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Tunisia and Egypt in 2011 and 2012, was involved in mediation in Darfur which was held in Sudan in 2011 and engaged in the NATO coalition that fought the regime of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011 (similarly, Qatar has also funded rebel fighters in Libya). Besides the presence of the Qatari Red Crescent humanitarian aid in Mali, one may speculate about other possible reasons for their presence in this part of the Sahel.

If the assumption of funding, even training and arming Islamist groups by Qatar forces in northern Mali is confirmed, then it is possible to draw several conclusions.

Firstly, this intervention would provide the emirate with a simple but risky strategy to greatly increase its influence in West Africa and the Sahel. Indeed, Qatar could greatly increase its influence in the mediation between the Malian government, ECOWAS, the northern rebels, and even France. This would increase its political clout on the continent, taking advantage, as it often does, of a favourable political environment. In the case of Mali, it is a failed state with a sudden power vacuum in the North, due both to the Tuareg rebellion in the North and the coup in the South. Add to this, the fortuitous presence in the Sahel of many fighters together with the weapons used in the recent war in Libya, alongside the presence in the North of young and unemployed Tuaregs opposed to the Malian state, and one can see how it might be possible to fund the rebels.

Using this combination of favourable factors, the emirate can see a way to continue making its influence heavily felt in Africa, work also undertaken in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia. In this respect, as in the case of Qatari engagement in Syria, two factors are in common. Firstly, after the success of the Libyan campaign, the emirate feels confident in being able to directly intervene abroad a power perspective. In addition, as in Syria, the presence of the emirate in Mali, if it is real, should be viewed in the context of a twofold competition: first with Saudi Arabia to control the Sunni Islamic world, but also to strengthen the power struggle of Sunni Muslims against Shiite Muslims (because the axis Iran – Syria - Hezbollah remains strong while the Shia in Iraq rises).

Another common point, but this time with Libya, is that Mali is seen as a potential owner of large reserves of natural gas and has a need for infrastructure development; two areas in which Qatar specializes. It could therefore, in the event of good relations with the leaders of an Islamic state in northern Mali, exploit the subsoil rich in gold and uranium, and prospect the country’s oil and gas potential.

Finally, geographically, Mali is also an axis of penetration into black Africa and West Africa where Qatar is pursuing its influence through the purchase of resources and agricultural land, as well as the funding of places of worship.

The subject of the Qatari role is now attracting more attention, for example in a January 22 story in France 24 entitled “Is Qatar Fueling the Crisis in North Mali?” That there has long been a Qatari presence in the north seems clear, but whether it is purely humanitarian or–as some argue–means Qatari aid to and influence over the Islamist and even terrorist groups remains uncertain. Given the new French role in Mali, and American support for it, this aspect of Qatari foreign policy is already proving deeply controversial–and rightly so.

Gulf force begins war games in Kuwait
Kuwaiti armed forces take part in a military parade in Kuwait City on March 3, 2012. Joint Gulf force the Peninsula Shield began a 17-day exercise in Kuwait on Sunday, as officials said the war games were not related to unrest in the region.
Kuwaiti armed forces take part in a military parade in Kuwait City on March 3, 2012. Joint Gulf force the Peninsula Shield began a 17-day exercise in Kuwait on Sunday, as officials said the war games were not related to unrest in the region.

AFP - Joint Gulf force the Peninsula Shield began a 17-day exercise in Kuwait as officials said the war games were not related to unrest in the region.

"The exercise was prescheduled and agreed for years. It is unrelated to any regional or political events," the head of Kuwaiti army public relations, Brigadier Abdulaziz al-Rayes, was cited as saying by the KUNA news agency.

It aims at "activating the concept of joint defence... and implementing the unified defence strategy of the Gulf Cooperation Council states," he said.

The main part of the exercise will take place in the Kuwaiti desert, but naval and air forces will also feature in the manoeuvres slated to end on February 26, coinciding with Kuwait's national day celebrations.

General Rayes did not give details of troop numbers taking part, but did say the exercise would include units from Kuwait's national guard and the interior ministry.

Kuwait marks its 51st independence from Britain on February 25 and the 22nd anniversary of liberation from seven months of Iraqi occupation on February 26 in which units from the Peninsula Shield took part.

The Peninsula Shield force was formed by the six GCC member states -- Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates -- in 1982 as a 5,000-strong force but has since expanded to more than 30,000 troops.

Two years ago, Peninsula Shield troops were deployed in Sunni-ruled Bahrain to help the kingdom's security forces confront protests led by the Shiite majority.

Kuwait has witnessed street protests in the past several months by opposition groups calling for the dissolution of the pro-government parliament elected on December 1 after the emir amended a controversial electoral law.

Feb 12, 2013 12:00 AM EST
Americans didn’t keep promises to opposition leaders. Now they’ve turned against the U.S. By Mike Giglio.


In mid-August, a well-connected Syrian activist drove to the border city of Gaziantep in southern Turkey to meet two officers from the CIA. The officers had set up shop in a conference room at a luxury hotel, where representatives from a handful of opposition groups lounged in the lobby, waiting for their turn at an audience.
Aleppo, Syria

The activist, who had been a journalist before the conflict, came with three colleagues from Aleppo, the Syrian commercial capital that had recently turned into the main theater of the war. Inside the room, two casually dressed Americans were rolling up maps from the previous meeting. The Americans introduced themselves as CIA officers and said they were there to help with the overthrow of Syria’s authoritarian president, Bashar al-Assad.

The activist declined to be named for this article, because he didn’t want to be connected publicly to U.S. intelligence. He is respected in Aleppo, and I first met him, in another southern Turkey hotel, at a State Department–funded training seminar for activists, where he was a keynote speaker. According to the activist, the officers questioned the group about creeping Islamism in the rebel ranks. Were Aleppo rebels supportive of democracy? Hostile to the West? What about al Qaeda? Then the officers asked how they could help. The activists wanted armed support for the rebels in Aleppo—in particular, surface-to-air missiles—but the officers explained that America worried such weapons could fall into the hands of extremists. “Let’s leave military matters aside,” one of the officers said. The group made a list of things like satellite phones and medical supplies, and the officers promised to be back in touch soon. “We are here to help you bring down Assad,” one of the officers repeated.

However, in the months since, that activist, as well as many senior figures in the rebellion, have begun to suspect that the United States has no intention of living up to its promises. In a turn of events resonant of Iraq, many who had once been eager to work with the Americans feel betrayed, and some see meetings like those in Gaziantep as little more than a hostile intelligence-gathering exercise.

At the time of the meeting, the war against Assad had been intensifying, and the big question was whether the international community would step in to help the rebels with weapons or even a no-fly zone. In the absence of an intervention, official U.S. policy was to provide only nonlethal support—and that policy remains. But in Gaziantep, sources said, the CIA officers blurred that line.

I spoke with three of the men present when the rebel battalion Liwa al-Fatah met with the CIA in August, just before the Aleppo activists were in the room; two of them—Haytham Darwish, a defected Syrian colonel who led the battalion at the time, and a civilian liaison named Ali Badran—agreed to let me use their names. The men said the officers proposed a two-step plan. First, they would supply Liwa al-Fatah with telecommunications equipment. If the rebels proved reliable, weapons would then be sent their way. The officers didn’t say who would provide the weapons, but Saudi Arabia and Qatar, two U.S. allies, were known to be channeling support to rebel groups. “They said, ‘We can’t promise you now, but in the future, the weapons will be there,’” one of the meeting participants told me. “Which is a promise, actually.” The officers, these rebels added, said the communications equipment would arrive in a matter of weeks.

The Gaziantep meetings had been arranged by Firas Tlass, a Syrian businessman who once had deep ties to Assad. Tlass’s father, Mustafa, had been the country’s feared minister of defense for three decades, while his older brother, Manaf, was a close friend and top aide to Assad before a highly publicized defection in July. Firas Tlass had done well under Assad, but he too had switched sides, vowing to spend his own money to help fund the revolution.

In a phone interview in January, Tlass told me he had been present at the meetings with the Aleppo activists and the Liwa al-Fatah rebels, and he confirmed their accounts. He said that he had arranged a number of similar meetings with the CIA, and that promises like the ones the officers made in Gaziantep were commonplace—including the indirect promise of arms. “They promised to provide telecommunications devices, and afterward, if the rebels proved effective and honest, then they would [help] provide military support,” he said. Tlass told me that the Americans had kept none of those promises, that not even the communications equipment or hospital supplies had materialized. He then accused America of pushing a dark agenda in Syria—working to keep the war going instead of helping with the overthrow of Assad. “America,” Tlass said, “is trying to prolong the Syrian revolution.”
Aleppo, Syria

Destroyed government tanks in a rebel-held neighborhood of Aleppo. (Moises Saman/Magnum)

In June anonymous U.S. officials leaked word to The New York Times that CIA officers were in southern Turkey vetting rebel groups to determine who might receive support from American allies. But Tlass’s suspicion echoed those of many senior rebels and opposition members I spoke with, who had become convinced that rather than help them receive support, America was mainly in the business of keeping it from coming their way.

One influential opposition figure, who is well connected to senior rebels and, like Tlass, once had ties to the Syrian government, said that he’d recently cut off his CIA contacts; while he still considered some officers to be friends, he complained that he was losing credibility among his rebel sources for the broken promises that came from the meetings he’d arranged. “The Americans are using the lies to get information,” he said. “If you ask any rebel in Syria right now, he will say America is our enemy.” He added that officers had even asked him to make a list of rebel officers who could be trained to fire surface-to-air missiles but nothing had apparently ever come of it. (This narrative was echoed by a prominent rebel commander who also told me he’d recently submitted such a list to his CIA contacts at their request. He too was still waiting, though he was more optimistic, and said he thought he detected a new seriousness in the U.S. promises to help. “This is the last chance for America,” he said.)

A broad spectrum of rebel groups is fighting in Syria, and CIA officers may have kept their promises to some. Still, I interviewed a number of senior opposition members and rebel commanders based in Turkey and Jordan—and operating out of northern and southern Syria—and all complained bitterly of either broken promises or a general lack of U.S. support.

Some analysts who have been in close contact with the Syrian opposition say that antipathy toward America has lately spiked. Salman Shaikh, director of the Brookings Institution’s Doha Center, told me that many rebel and opposition leaders have lost faith in their American contacts. “I’m afraid there are people who just don’t want to waste their time with U.S. intelligence any more. There have been a lot of broken promises,” Shaikh said. “The levels of anger and mistrust are off the charts. And I’m not sure it’s redeemable.” Shaikh said he suspects that some quarters of the U.S. government believed that the Syria policy would eventually become a more aggressive one. But, he added, “I think that the guys at the top are very reluctant.” CIA officers on the ground in Turkey may likewise have expected a green light that hasn’t come.

The movement of arms in southern Turkey operates in a fog. Opposition supporters collect money and arms from sympathetic individuals and governments, then send them across the porous border. When rebels do receive weapons, they often assume that the shipments have the stamp of U.S. approval, since they seem to arrive with the permission of America’s Turkish allies. (When I asked an official with the Turkish Foreign Ministry about the shipments this past summer, he replied, “Just because the weapons are coming from Turkey doesn’t mean that Turkey is the one providing the weapons.”) But even the rebels who receive these weapons remain suspicious of American intentions.

One recent evening in the southern Turkish city of Antakya, I sat in a small cellphone shop owned by a local man named Malik Dalyan. As usual, the shop swarmed with Syrian rebels and activists buying more phone credit. My translator struck up a conversation with one of the regulars, who invited us to accompany him to the border for a weapons drop that night. We agreed and waited in the man’s house for the lead smuggler, drinking beer.
Aleppo, Syria

A rebel in a makeshift jail in Aleppo, guarding suspected pro-Assad forces. (Moises Saman/Magnum)

At around 10 p.m., a man with luxuriant, long gray hair and a matching beard entered the house in a crisp gray suit. His name was Abdulrahman al-Halaq, but the rebels know him as ZaZa, one of the area’s most powerful smugglers. It became clear that the night’s weapons drop had an aura of legality around it so I asked ZaZa if he approved of my plans to come along. “Even if you were my own brother, I would kill you if I saw you there,” he said.

ZaZa said most shipments consisted of machine guns, and that heavy weapons and surface-to-air missiles had never materialized. He also said that even these weapons were in short supply—just enough, in his estimation, to keep the balance from tipping to either side. “They give us 10 bullets so that when we run out we have to come back for more. If they gave us 20, we could advance, but they don’t want that,” he said. “They just want to balance the power of the regime.”

Like many shipments, ZaZa added, the upcoming one had instructions for how it should be distributed inside Syria. He wouldn’t say where he got his orders, but he believed they had the mark of Turkish intelligence, and by extension the CIA. He scoffed. “Neither Turkey nor America can control where the weapons go,” ZaZa said. “The rebels distribute them however they like.

By Joel Greenberg and Babak Dehghanpisheh, Published: February 9

JERUSALEM – Israel’s recent airstrike in Syria, which according to Western officials targeted weapons destined for the militant Lebanese group Hezbollah, could mark the start of a more aggressive campaign by Israel to prevent arms transfers as conditions in Syria deteriorate, according to analysts in Israel and Lebanon.

Israel’s readiness to strike again if necessary heralds a new and more volatile phase in the regional repercussions of Syria’s civil war, which has raised concerns in Israel about the possible transfer of advanced or nonconventional weapons to Islamist militant groups.

Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak all but acknowledged that Israel carried out the strike near Damascus on Jan. 30, saying it was “proof that when we say something we mean it.” An Israeli cabinet minister had warned before the attack that Israel could act against transfers of chemical weapons to militant groups.

Amos Yadlin, a former chief of Israeli military intelligence who directs the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv, said in an interview that while future Israeli action could be expected, it would depend on specific calculations of the advantages and risks of such strikes.

Four types of weapons

Israel, he said, has defined four types of weapons whose transfer to militant groups would not be tolerated: advanced air defense systems, ballistic missiles, sophisticated shore-to-sea missiles and chemical weapons.

In accordance with this policy, Yadlin said, “any time Israel will have reliable intelligence that this is going to be transferred from Syria to Lebanon, it will act,” although specific decisions to strike would be subject to assessments of the military value of the attack, the risk of escalation and the positions of foreign powers.

“As the Syrian army becomes weaker and Hezbollah grows more isolated because of the loss of its Syrian patron, it makes sense that this will continue,” Yadlin said, adding that Israeli responses would be weighed each time and “not happen automatically.”

The real dilemma facing Israeli officials, Yadlin said, is not whether to attack, but whether inaction would mean a greater threat later. “The correct comparison is the risk of escalation now and the risk of having a much more formidable enemy and many casualties in future hostilities,” he said.

Analysts in Lebanon also predicted more Israeli strikes if advanced weapons transfers were attempted.

“Israel is trying to create a sense of deterrence,” said Elias Hanna, a retired general and a professor at the American University of Beirut. “The other side tries to test and erode the system.”

According to Israeli assessments, Hezbollah has amassed about 60,000 rockets and missiles since a 2006 war with Israel. Israeli officials say these include some Scud-D ballistic missiles, with a range of more than 400 miles, supplied by Syria in recent years. Along with other shorter-range missiles from Syria and Iran, Hezbollah’s arsenal can reach anywhere in Israel, the officials say.

The transfer to Hezbollah of advanced antiaircraft systems, such as the SA-17 ground-to-air missiles said to have been the target of the Jan. 30 strike, would not only threaten Israel’s reconnaissance flights over Lebanon but also Israeli airspace, according to an Israeli official monitoring the buildup of such weapons.

“They are mobile. They can be hidden and can pose a very big problem for the Israeli air force,” said the official, who is not authorized to speak to the media.

The Israelis say they are also concerned about the possible transfer to Hezbollah of coastal missile systems supplied to Syria by Russia, specifically Yakhont cruise missiles with a range of more than 180 miles, which could endanger not only Israeli vessels but also Israeli oil rigs in the Mediterranean. In the 2006 war, an Israeli naval ship was hit by a Chinese-designed shore-to-sea missile fired by Hezbollah.

As the fighting in Syria intensifies, “there are more tangible indications that such weapons could reach Lebanon,” the official said.

Syria’s chemical weapons arsenal, including bombs and rockets tipped with chemical warheads, remains for now under government control, according to Israeli assessments.

“The [intelligence] monitoring of the Syrian chemical weapons depots is quite strict, so there’s a fairly good chance that any movement would be detectable,” said Dany Shoham, a former military intelligence analyst and an expert on unconventional weapons at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies at Bar-Ilan University.

Escalation risks

Nizar Abdul Kader, a Lebanese analyst and retired general, said that Israeli reconnaissance missions are keeping an eye on roads between Syria and Lebanon and that any preparation for movement of advanced weaponry is likely to provoke an Israeli strike. He said Hezbollah has stored heavy weapons and long-range missiles in Syria but is not likely to expose them by transferring them under current conditions.

With the Syrian army preoccupied with internal fighting and Hezbollah wary of jeopardizing its position in Lebanon as its Syrian sponsor weakens, neither is likely to risk wider conflict by retaliating against Israel for the Jan. 30 strike, according to the Israeli official and analysts.

“The Syrians are interested in keeping the civil war in Syria, where they are militarily much stronger than the rebels,” Yadlin said. “Against external forces, they would be inferior.”

“If Hezbollah attacked [Israel], they would basically be admitting that the air defense system was on its way to them, infuriating the Russians” who supplied the weapons to Syria with the understanding that they would not be moved to Hezbollah, he said.

Still, Yadlin cautioned, every additional Israeli strike would raise the risk of escalation.

“The decision makers have to reevaluate every time,” he said. “It’s not a mathematical equation.”

Dehghanpisheh and Suzan Haidamous reported from Beirut.

shyamd wrote:Must read
Did the CIA Betray Syria’s Rebels?