Bharat Rakshak

Chinese Government Leadership
19th Politburo Standing Committee
Xi Jinping 习近平



Xi Jinping is the President of the People’s Republic of China, General Secretary of the Politburo of the 19th Chinese Communist Party, and Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC). Xi kicked off China’s 19th Party Congress in October by outlining a new political doctrine, called “Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics in a New Era. Xi’s “New Era” ideology was then quickly enshrined in the CCP constitution. Though he has spoken against protectionism and called for the market to play a decisive role in the economy, foreign investors have been disappointed with the speed and quality of economic reform in Xi’s China.

Li Keqiang 李克强



As Premier of the State Council, Li is viewed as an advocate for licensing reform and is considered the architect of China’s free trade zones. Statements from Li have emphasized China’s commitment to economic reform and include promises for further market openings, particularly for the services and manufacturing sectors, though he has offered few concrete changes or details in these remarks.

Li Zhanshu 栗战书

栗战书同志简历

Li Zhanshu is regarded as one of President Xi’s top political advisors. Li first worked with Xi as a fellow county-level Party Secretary in Hebei in the early eighties. Since then, Li has served in Shaanxi, Heilongjiang, and Guizhou, where his main priorities have been economic development and poverty alleviation. A member of the Politburo since 2012, Li’s past remarks have emphasized the importance of the Party and Xi’s leadership. In 2015, he said the Party should lead crucial decisions on economic development, and government agencies should implement these decisions within their scope of responsibility.

Wang Yang 汪洋



As the main interlocutor in the US-China economic relationship, Wang Yang played a crucial role in the negotiation of the Comprehensive Economic Dialogue’s “100-Day Plan,” which resulted in the implementation of some of China’s past commitments on beef imports, credit ratings services, and electronic payment services. Speaking in Washington in 2017, Wang stated, “China's development and progress is a long-term certainty, which offers the most important external environment for foreign businesses to work with China.” During his tenure as Guangdong Party Secretary, Wang was known for encouraging economic, social and political reforms that spurred development. He also turned Guangzhou into a model of transparency by making the city’s budget public in 2009. However, market access liberalizations during this tenure as vice premier in charge of foreign trade and investment have been limited. As the fourth-ranked member of the Politburo Standing Committee, it is widely assumed that Wang will become chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, an advisory body with limited responsibilities.

Wang Huning 王沪宁



Wang Huning is one of Xi’s top political advisors. Wang has most recently served as director of the CCP Central Committee Policy Research Office, the top think tank for the CCP’s leadership. In 2007, Wang was also named a member of the CCP Secretariat. He spent much of his career in academia before becoming a policy advisor. Wang is believed to have helped shape official ideology for at least three administrations and is credited with contributing to the "Three Represents" by Jiang Zemin, the “Scientific Development Concept” by Hu Jintao, and the “Chinese Dream” of Xi Jinping.

Zhao Leji 赵乐际



Zhao replaces Wang Qishan on the Politburo Standing Committee and will assume Wang’s role of heading anticorruption efforts. Zhao is also expected to head the National Supervisory Commission, a body expected to be established next spring as the national anti-corruption watchdog; the new organization may have a status on par with the State Council and the National People’s Congress. Before serving as Party Secretary and Governor of Shaanxi and Qinghai, respectively, Zhao spent most of his career in Qinghai province managing commerce and finance. He also called for creating a “favorable legal environment” to attract foreign investors.

Han Zheng 韩正



Han has been a strong supporter of China’s free trade zone initiatives, which he said could pave the way to greater market reform and more efficient use of government resources. In addition, Han has continued to advocate for foreign investment in China, saying that it will play a crucial role in innovation and growth in Shanghai. Before his appointment as Party Secretary of Shanghai, Han was mayor of the city. Under his leadership, the city saw rapid economic growth and hosted the Shanghai Expo. Han holds a master’s degree from East China Normal University, earning him the title of “senior economist.” As the seventh-ranked member of the Politburo Standing Committee, Han is expected to become executive vice premier of the State Council, with oversight of China’s economy.

Hu Chunhua, 59: Having risen through the same Communist Youth League faction as Li, Hu was the youngest official to make it to the Politburo at the last Congress. Before Xi, his fast rise made him appear like a potential successor.

But his relative lack of experience working alongside Xi compared with contemporaries means few now consider him a candidate for the top job. His appointment to the Politburo Standing Committee could, however, indicate a degree of power-balancing between total Xi loyalists and other networks.

Chen Min’er, 62: The party secretary of Chongqing, Chen hails from the eastern province of Zhejiang, an important location in Xi’s power base. He built a reputation as a loyal lieutenant for Xi during his tenure as party boss of impoverished Guizhou province on the front lines of Xi’s war on poverty.

His real break came in 2017 when he was parachuted into Chongqing after the dramatic takedown of the city’s former party boss, Sun Zhengcai, who was once considered a contender to replace Xi.

Ding Xuexiang, 60: Few current Politburo members up for promotion to the Standing Committee have worked as closely with Xi as Ding. As director of the general secretary’s office, he is equivalent to Xi’s chief of staff.

Their relationship stems from a period working together in Shanghai in 2007, when Ding helped Xi mop up a corruption scandal that felled the city’s party boss. His other position since 2017 on the party’s Central Secretariat, the body that conducts day-to-day operations on behalf of the Politburo, has made him a crucial enforcer of Xi’s policy agenda.

Li Qiang, 63: As party secretary of Shanghai, Li had a rough start to the year. He became the focus of widespread anger during a coronavirus outbreak after city authorities told residents that Shanghai would not go into lockdown — then did just that for two months. But Li is also considered an ally of Xi, having worked under him in Zhejiang, and Li’s forceful response to the outbreak was in line with central government demands to stick with a “zero covid” approach.

Honorable mentions
These four men are far from the only officials eyeing a position at the apex of party power. For the Politburo Standing Committee, other candidates floated by experts include propaganda chief Huang Kunming and the party bosses of Beijing, Tianjin and Guangdong, Cai Qi, Li Hongzhong and Li Xi respectively. Out of those, only the two Lis are not dyed-in-the-wool Xi men.

Beyond the top jobs, even more changes will take place. About half of the 25-member Politburo will be replaced and two-thirds of the positions on the Central Committee could switch hands over the course of reshuffle.

Of particular interest for the United States is who might replace Liu He, an important economic adviser who has been the main point of contact during U.S.-China trade negotiations. He Lifeng, head of the National Development and Reform Commission, the Chinese economic planner, is considered one likely candidate, given his experience governing areas with a focus on international trade and investment.

New positions for the current and former party bosses of Xinjiang, Ma Xingrui and Chen Quanguo respectively, will be closely watched by those concerned about a harsh security clampdown in the region under Xi. If Chen receives a promotion, that would be an official stamp of approval for his hard-line approach.

Analysts also debate whether China will appoint a new foreign minister to replace Wang Yi, who will be 69 by the time the meeting ends. Some argue that Wang is likely to stay on as an influential Politburo member even if he steps aside from the ministry role. His replacement, if there is one, is likely to lean into China’s assertive foreign policy turn under Xi. One option is Liu Jieyi, current head of the Taiwan Affairs Office, the institution responsible for managing Beijing’s increasingly fraught relationship with Taipei. Another is current top vice foreign minister Ma Zhaoxu, who recently underscored the need for a “diplomatic struggle” to protect China’s interests.

Xi holds three key positions: General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, Chairman of the Central Military Commission, and President of China.

He is expected to retain the first two titles at this year’s party congress. State positions such as president and premier won’t be confirmed until the next annual meeting of the Chinese government, typically held in March.


Li Keqiangsaid in March that this year marks his last as premier, a position he’s held since 2013. However, he could remain a standing committee member, JPMorgan analysts said, pointing to a precedent at the 15th party congress.
..
He named four people in the Politburo who could join or stay on the standing committee, and have a chance to replace Li Keqiang as premier.

Han Zheng — Han is a member of the standing committee. Becoming premier would reflect “policy continuity,” Brookings’ Li said.
Hu Chunhua — Hu has close ties to Xi’s predecessor Hu Jintao. Promoting him would signal “leadership unity” with Xi appointing people from outside his faction, Li said.
Liu He — Liu studied at the Harvard Kennedy School in the 1990s. More recently, he led the Chinese delegation in trade talks with the U.S. and has spoken several times with Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen. If Liu became premier it would be for his “international popularity,” according to Li.
Wang Yang — Wang is a standing committee member and was a vice premier from 2013 to 2018. He is known to be market-oriented, and selecting him as premier would reflect “drastic policy change,” Li said.

Analysts at the Asia Society Policy Institute’s Center for China Analysis laid out another scenario in which Xi’s protege Li Qiang, Shanghai Party Secretary and Politburo member, could become premier.

Other loyal Xi allies the analysts named include:

Ding Xuexiang — Politburo member and “essentially Xi’s Chief of Staff, as well as in charge of his personal security, meaning he is among Xi’s most trusted circle,” the Asia Society report said.
Chen Min’er — Politburo member and party secretary of the Chongqing municipality, a job he gained by Xi’s “abrupt ousting” of the prior secretary, Asia Society pointed out.
Huang Kunming — Politburo member and head of China’s propaganda department, who worked closely with Xi in the provinces of Fujian and Zhejiang, the report said.

ramana wrote:Cyrano while I appreciate opinions I would like them to be well reasoned out based on facts and not just opinions.
What you posted is a litany of Macron's faults that you perceive.
How relevant is it to the statement that of the current Western leadership in UK, Germany, and France he is the only one with experience?

ricky_v wrote:https://thediplomat.com/2020/12/china-l ... s-in-2022/

The general secretary of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (Chinese: 中国共产党中央委员会总书记) is the head of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Since 1982, the CCP general secretary has been the highest-ranking official in the People's Republic of China (PRC). Since 1989, the general secretary has been the de facto top leader and the most powerful position in China's political system.[2]

According to the Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party, the general secretary serves as an ex officio member of the Politburo Standing Committee, China's de facto top decision-making body.[3]

The general secretary is also the head of the Secretariat. Since 1989, the holder of the post has been, except for transitional periods, the Chairman of the Central Military Commission, making the holder the supreme commander of the People's Liberation Army.[note 1]

The position of general secretary is the highest authority leading China's National People's Congress, State Council, Political Consultative Conference, Supreme People's Court and Supreme People's Procuratorate in the Chinese government.

The State Council, constitutionally[2] synonymous with the Central People's Government since 1954 (particularly in relation to local governments), is the chief administrative authority of the People's Republic of China.[3] It is chaired by the premier and includes each cabinet-level executive department's executive chief.[4] Currently, the council has 35 members: the premier, one executive vice premier, three other vice premiers, five state councillors (of whom three are also ministers and one is also the secretary-general), and 26 in charge of the Council's constituent departments.[5] In the politics of China, the Central People's Government forms one of three interlocking branches of power, the others being the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the People's Liberation Army (PLA). The State Council directly oversees provincial-level People's Governments, and in practice maintains membership with the top levels of the CCP. Aside from very few non-CCP ministers, members of the State Council are also members of the CCP's Central Committee.

The premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, abbreviated to Premier of China, sometimes also referred to informally as the Prime minister, is the head of government and leader of the State Council of China. The premier is nominally the second most powerful position in China's political system, under General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (paramount leader), and holds the highest rank in the civil service of the central government.

The premier has always been a member of the Politburo Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

The Standing Committee of the National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China (NPCSC) is the permanent body of the National People's Congress (NPC) of the People's Republic of China (PRC), which is the highest organ of state power and the legislature of China. Although the parent NPC has superiority over the Standing Committee, and certain authorities are not delegated, the Standing Committee is generally viewed to have more power, albeit inferior to its parent, as the NPC convenes only once a year for two weeks, leaving its Standing Committee the only body that regularly drafts and approves decisions and laws.

The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, officially the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, is a political body that comprises the top leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). It is currently composed of 205 full members and 171 alternate members (see list).

The Central Committee is, formally, the "party's highest organ of authority" when the National Congress is not in a plenary session. According to the CCP's constitution, the Central Committee is vested with the power to elect the General Secretary and the members of the Politburo and its Standing Committee, as well as the Central Military Commission. It endorses the composition of the Secretariat and the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection. It also oversees the work of various executive national organs of the CCP. The administrative activities of the Central Committee are carried out by the Central Committee's General Office. The General Office forms the support staff of the central organs that work on the Central Committee's behalf in between plenums.

The Committee usually convenes at least once a year at a plenary session ("plenum"), and functions as a top forum for discussion about relevant policy issues. The Committee operates, however, on the principle of democratic centralism; i.e., once a decision is made, the entire body speaks with one voice. The role of the Central Committee has varied throughout history. While it generally exercises power through formal procedures defined in the party constitution, the ability for it to affect outcomes of national-level personnel decisions is limited, as that function has generally been, in practice, carried out by the Politburo and retired party elders who retain influence. Nonetheless, Central Committee plenums function as venues whereby policy is discussed, fine-tuned, and publicly released in the form of "resolutions" or "decisions"

Secretariat of the Communist Party of China Central Committee,[2] is a body serving the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party and its Standing Committee. The secretariat is mainly responsible for carrying out routine operations of the Politburo and the coordination of organizations and stakeholders to achieve tasks as set out by the Politburo. It is empowered by the Politburo to make routine day-to-day decisions on issues of concern in accordance to the decisions of the Politburo, but it must consult the Politburo on substantive matters.

Secretaries of the secretariat (Shujichu Shuji) are considered some of the most important political positions in the Communist Party and in contemporary China more generally. Each secretary of the secretariat is generally in charge of one of the major party departments directly under the jurisdiction of the Central Committee. By protocol, its members are ranked above the vice chairmen of the National People's Congress as well as State Councilors. The General Secretary presides over the work of the secretariat

The Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI)[note 1] is the highest internal control institution of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), tasked with enforcing internal rules and regulations and combating corruption and malfeasance in the party. Since the vast majority of officials at all levels of government are also Communist Party members, the commission is in practice the top anti-corruption body in China.

The vice premiers of the State Council of the People's Republic of China (are high-ranking officials under the premier and above the state councillors and ministers.[1] Generally, the title is held by multiple individuals at any given time, with each vice-premier holding a broad portfolio of responsibilities. The first vice-premier takes over duties of the premier at the time of the latter's incapacity. The incumbent vice premiers, in order of rank, are Han Zheng, Sun Chunlan, Hu Chunhua and Liu He.[2]

The highest-ranked office holder is informally called the Senior Vice Premier or First Vice Premier or Executive Vice Premier, a most prominent case being Deng Xiaoping in the mid-to-late 1970s.

have a question, why is the npc so undermined, is it just nominal power?

According to a tweet by a Beijing-based journalist Stephen McDonnel, the banners had slogans that opposed China's Zero Covid policy, calling for a lockdown and promoting the need for a 'revolutionary change'. Another banner also called Xi a 'dictatorial traitor'. According to a report, the authorities later removed the banners after the videos and images circulated on social media.

Smoke was seen billowing from the roadway where the banners had been placed before being removed in Haidian district.

"Let us strike from schools and from work and remove the dictatorial traitor Xi Jinping," one of the slogans according to a media report.

"We don't want COVID tests, we want to eat; we don't want lockdowns, we want to be free", another banner read.

Think of the Chinese Communist Party’s 20th National Congress, underway in Beijing, as the Marxist-Leninist version of a papal conclave. Dispense with the cardinals’ robes and Vatican ceremony and you still have a world shrouded in opacity and mystery, shaped by the maneuverings of expressionless apparatchiks and the imperatives of an anointed regime always wary of losing its grip over the faithful.

Analysts watching the CCP event, typically staged every half decade, look for its own smoke signals: Which cadres get cycled out of prominent positions? Who ascends to the ranks of the all-powerful Politburo Standing Committee? Whose trusted technocrats are coming to the fore? The public spectacle is highly choreographed, the deliberations stiff and mirthless. But they offer a rare glimpse into an institution that, despite its unquestioned clout and reach, still has to find ways to resolve internal frictions and factionalisms.

This year, though, there’s a new wrinkle. Chinese President Xi Jinping is set to emerge from the meetings with a third five-year term as the party’s general secretary and chairman of its Central Military Commission, two posts that underlie the presidency. Though long in the works, Xi’s extended mandate is in defiance of established convention as his predecessors kept to two-term rules.

Xi has spent the past decade cracking down on potential rivals through the pretext of mass anti-corruption purges, while further restricting the already tiny space afforded to Chinese civil society. His iron hand crushed political freedoms in the semiautonomous coastal city of Hong Kong and placed a dystopian dragnet over the far-western region of Xinjiang, where more than a million people largely from Muslim ethnic minorities were sent to detention camps and countless more became the guinea pigs of an invasive, tech-driven surveillance state.

That China’s regime looks and feels more like a one-man dictatorship under Xi is no coincidence. Across the machinery of the Communist Party, Xi has installed loyal lieutenants in positions of influence. According to the Wall Street Journal, “all but seven of the 281 members of the Communist Party’s provincial-level Standing Committees” are Xi appointees. “It’s not about age any more,” Yang Zhang, a sociologist at American University’s School of International Service, told my colleague Christian Shepherd, referring to the unofficial retirement ages that circumscribed the careers of ambitious party officials. “It’s about whether you are on Xi’s side.”

The meetings this week will cement Xi’s political triumph. But the depth of his control and power can do little to address the uncertainty that faces the Communist leadership at home and abroad. China’s economy is in the midst of a generational slowdown, impacted in part by Xi’s draconian pandemic-era restrictions as well as policies aimed at reining in the private sector. Its global image, meanwhile, has been tarnished by Xi’s assertive nationalism and Beijing’s perceived bullying on the world stage.

At the center of concern over Xi’s next term is the question of Taiwan, the island democracy that the Chinese Communists see as an integral part of their territory and a historical aberration that will inevitably be corrected. Analysts believe Xi, who has previously yoked his legitimacy to unification with Taiwan, is bent on realizing this vision. “He doesn’t regard it as just a slogan. It’s an action plan that must be implemented,” said Chang Wu-ueh, an adviser to Taiwan’s government, to my colleagues. “Before, leaders talked about unification as something to be achieved in the long run. Now, it’s number one on the agenda.”

Delivering an opening address on Sunday from the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, Xi warned that China reserved “the option of taking all measures necessary” when it came to denying Taiwanese independence and pushing through unification. He also spoke of making China a “great modern socialist country” that represents a “new choice” in global politics — a gesture to the geopolitical rupture between China and the West that has started to define Xi’s time in power.

The war in Ukraine has only sharpened tensions around Taiwan. Xi has shown support for Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of his neighbor, while also ratcheting up pressure on Taiwan with saber-rattling rhetoric and greater military encroachments. While projecting greater confidence and might makes sense for a nationalist regime that has invested hugely in its military, Xi’s rule has led to the hardening of anti-Chinese coalitions that have taken shape in the region, including the “Quad” alliance between India, Australia, Japan and the United States. It has also undermined earlier Chinese efforts to build bridges with nations in the West.

“For the world, the positive thing is that Xi reveals the true face of the CCP regime, which is the combination of political repression, economic predation, and ‘adventurist’ ambition in dominating the entire world,” Wu Guoguang, a China scholar at Stanford University, told the Hindustan Times, an Indian newspaper. “If Xi’s two terms have not been sufficient to ‘educate the world,’ here comes his third one.”

For Xi, the biggest challenges will remain at home. On one level, he presides over an undeniable success story. Since Xi came to power in 2012, the Chinese economy more than doubled in size. Its gross domestic product now surpasses the United States when measured based on purchasing power parity. Close to 100 million more people have been lifted out of poverty, according to Chinese state media, leading Xi to declare China’s “complete victory” over poverty last year.

Yet this is not Xi’s story. “China’s growth during Xi’s decade in power is attributable mainly to the general economic approach adopted by his predecessors, which focused on rapid expansion through investment, manufacturing, and trade,” said Neil Thomas, a senior analyst for China and Northeast Asia at Eurasia Group, to CNN. “But this model had reached a point of significantly diminishing returns and was increasing economic inequality, financial debt, and environmental damage.” Xi’s attempts to pivot China toward a more self-sufficient economy less dependent on foreign purchasers have yet to bear fruit and have left seismic disruption in their wake, including the wipeout of more than $1 trillion in market value of some of China’s biggest tech companies.

China’s “zero covid” policy was once hailed by Xi as a measure of Beijing’s superiority over its Western counterparts, which were laid low by the coronavirus in the pandemic’s early stages. But now the sweeping lockdowns still in place over hundreds of millions of people hang like an albatross around Xi’s neck. No matter the evidence, public disquiet and real harm to critical sectors of the Chinese economy, Xi has maintained an uncompromising line, letting what was once a public health response turn into a kind of ideology of autocratic power.

Chinese leadership may also fear the sudden spread of the virus should restrictions be lifted, given the questionable efficacy of China’s own vaccines and the limited immunity accrued by the general population. The consequences appear stark. “While experts had long projected China’s economy would slow as it matured, Xi’s unwillingness to bend this year has expedited that shift in ways that many economists believe could leave permanent scars,” wrote Jonathan Cheng of the Wall Street Journal.

“Xi’s approach has dented consumer confidence and spending — key to China’s goal of transitioning to a more consumer-led economy — while compounding such issues as rising youth unemployment and a deteriorating property market,” wrote my colleague Lily Kuo. “The International Monetary Fund on Tuesday lowered its 2022 growth forecast for China to 3.2 percent from a projection of 8.1 percent last year.”

Xi may appear supreme in his authority this week, but the ground could be slowly shifting beneath his feet as party cadres grapple with the mounting woes facing the country.

“Although the prospect of a leadership challenge or coup remains remote owing to the sheer scale of logistical hurdles and political dangers, Xi’s positioning as a potential ruler for life simply aggravates the incentives for opponents to scuttle his agenda or plot his exit,” wrote Jude Blanchette of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “Authoritarian systems and authoritarian leaders always appear solid on the outside — until suddenly, they don’t.”

Dilbu wrote:Ishaan Tharoor writes in WashPost
Xi’s moment of dominance can’t hide his weakness

Think of the Chinese Communist Party’s 20th National Congress, underway in Beijing, as the Marxist-Leninist version of a papal conclave. Dispense with the cardinals’ robes and Vatican ceremony and you still have a world shrouded in opacity and mystery, shaped by the maneuverings of expressionless apparatchiks and the imperatives of an anointed regime always wary of losing its grip over the faithful.

Analysts watching the CCP event, typically staged every half decade, look for its own smoke signals: Which cadres get cycled out of prominent positions? Who ascends to the ranks of the all-powerful Politburo Standing Committee? Whose trusted technocrats are coming to the fore? The public spectacle is highly choreographed, the deliberations stiff and mirthless. But they offer a rare glimpse into an institution that, despite its unquestioned clout and reach, still has to find ways to resolve internal frictions and factionalisms.

This year, though, there’s a new wrinkle. Chinese President Xi Jinping is set to emerge from the meetings with a third five-year term as the party’s general secretary and chairman of its Central Military Commission, two posts that underlie the presidency. Though long in the works, Xi’s extended mandate is in defiance of established convention as his predecessors kept to two-term rules.

Xi has spent the past decade cracking down on potential rivals through the pretext of mass anti-corruption purges, while further restricting the already tiny space afforded to Chinese civil society. His iron hand crushed political freedoms in the semiautonomous coastal city of Hong Kong and placed a dystopian dragnet over the far-western region of Xinjiang, where more than a million people largely from Muslim ethnic minorities were sent to detention camps and countless more became the guinea pigs of an invasive, tech-driven surveillance state.

That China’s regime looks and feels more like a one-man dictatorship under Xi is no coincidence. Across the machinery of the Communist Party, Xi has installed loyal lieutenants in positions of influence. According to the Wall Street Journal, “all but seven of the 281 members of the Communist Party’s provincial-level Standing Committees” are Xi appointees. “It’s not about age any more,” Yang Zhang, a sociologist at American University’s School of International Service, told my colleague Christian Shepherd, referring to the unofficial retirement ages that circumscribed the careers of ambitious party officials. “It’s about whether you are on Xi’s side.”

The meetings this week will cement Xi’s political triumph. But the depth of his control and power can do little to address the uncertainty that faces the Communist leadership at home and abroad. China’s economy is in the midst of a generational slowdown, impacted in part by Xi’s draconian pandemic-era restrictions as well as policies aimed at reining in the private sector. Its global image, meanwhile, has been tarnished by Xi’s assertive nationalism and Beijing’s perceived bullying on the world stage.

At the center of concern over Xi’s next term is the question of Taiwan, the island democracy that the Chinese Communists see as an integral part of their territory and a historical aberration that will inevitably be corrected. Analysts believe Xi, who has previously yoked his legitimacy to unification with Taiwan, is bent on realizing this vision. “He doesn’t regard it as just a slogan. It’s an action plan that must be implemented,” said Chang Wu-ueh, an adviser to Taiwan’s government, to my colleagues. “Before, leaders talked about unification as something to be achieved in the long run. Now, it’s number one on the agenda.”

Delivering an opening address on Sunday from the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, Xi warned that China reserved “the option of taking all measures necessary” when it came to denying Taiwanese independence and pushing through unification. He also spoke of making China a “great modern socialist country” that represents a “new choice” in global politics — a gesture to the geopolitical rupture between China and the West that has started to define Xi’s time in power.

The war in Ukraine has only sharpened tensions around Taiwan. Xi has shown support for Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of his neighbor, while also ratcheting up pressure on Taiwan with saber-rattling rhetoric and greater military encroachments. While projecting greater confidence and might makes sense for a nationalist regime that has invested hugely in its military, Xi’s rule has led to the hardening of anti-Chinese coalitions that have taken shape in the region, including the “Quad” alliance between India, Australia, Japan and the United States. It has also undermined earlier Chinese efforts to build bridges with nations in the West.

“For the world, the positive thing is that Xi reveals the true face of the CCP regime, which is the combination of political repression, economic predation, and ‘adventurist’ ambition in dominating the entire world,” Wu Guoguang, a China scholar at Stanford University, told the Hindustan Times, an Indian newspaper. “If Xi’s two terms have not been sufficient to ‘educate the world,’ here comes his third one.”

For Xi, the biggest challenges will remain at home. On one level, he presides over an undeniable success story. Since Xi came to power in 2012, the Chinese economy more than doubled in size. Its gross domestic product now surpasses the United States when measured based on purchasing power parity. Close to 100 million more people have been lifted out of poverty, according to Chinese state media, leading Xi to declare China’s “complete victory” over poverty last year.

Yet this is not Xi’s story. “China’s growth during Xi’s decade in power is attributable mainly to the general economic approach adopted by his predecessors, which focused on rapid expansion through investment, manufacturing, and trade,” said Neil Thomas, a senior analyst for China and Northeast Asia at Eurasia Group, to CNN. “But this model had reached a point of significantly diminishing returns and was increasing economic inequality, financial debt, and environmental damage.” Xi’s attempts to pivot China toward a more self-sufficient economy less dependent on foreign purchasers have yet to bear fruit and have left seismic disruption in their wake, including the wipeout of more than $1 trillion in market value of some of China’s biggest tech companies.

China’s “zero covid” policy was once hailed by Xi as a measure of Beijing’s superiority over its Western counterparts, which were laid low by the coronavirus in the pandemic’s early stages. But now the sweeping lockdowns still in place over hundreds of millions of people hang like an albatross around Xi’s neck. No matter the evidence, public disquiet and real harm to critical sectors of the Chinese economy, Xi has maintained an uncompromising line, letting what was once a public health response turn into a kind of ideology of autocratic power.

Chinese leadership may also fear the sudden spread of the virus should restrictions be lifted, given the questionable efficacy of China’s own vaccines and the limited immunity accrued by the general population. The consequences appear stark. “While experts had long projected China’s economy would slow as it matured, Xi’s unwillingness to bend this year has expedited that shift in ways that many economists believe could leave permanent scars,” wrote Jonathan Cheng of the Wall Street Journal.

“Xi’s approach has dented consumer confidence and spending — key to China’s goal of transitioning to a more consumer-led economy — while compounding such issues as rising youth unemployment and a deteriorating property market,” wrote my colleague Lily Kuo. “The International Monetary Fund on Tuesday lowered its 2022 growth forecast for China to 3.2 percent from a projection of 8.1 percent last year.”

Xi may appear supreme in his authority this week, but the ground could be slowly shifting beneath his feet as party cadres grapple with the mounting woes facing the country.

“Although the prospect of a leadership challenge or coup remains remote owing to the sheer scale of logistical hurdles and political dangers, Xi’s positioning as a potential ruler for life simply aggravates the incentives for opponents to scuttle his agenda or plot his exit,” wrote Jude Blanchette of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “Authoritarian systems and authoritarian leaders always appear solid on the outside — until suddenly, they don’t.”

ramana wrote:We should take a bow for calling Xi an Emperor way before these experts.

SSridhar wrote:

ramana wrote:We should take a bow for calling Xi an Emperor way before these experts.

And the CPC as the Imperial Dynasty.

chetak wrote:

SSridhar wrote:

There are three empires today, the hans, the amerikis and the russkis and each of them is leaning towards the "imperialistic dynastic" as they saw and experienced it.

If we are to take selection more seriously within humans, we may fairly ask what rigorous system would be capable of tying together an altered reality of layered falsehoods in which absolutely nothing can be assumed to be as it appears. Such a system, in continuous development for more than a century, is known to exist and now supports an intricate multi-billion dollar business empire of pure hokum. It is known to wrestling's insiders as "Kayfabe".

The Dragon's Stumble
Anil Padmanabhan

NEW DELHI: In 2007, the Chinese economy recorded a stupendous growth of 14.2%. Fifteen years later, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) projects that economic growth will slow to 3.2% this year. In fact, the country may be lucky to log this, given the rapidly deteriorating global situation.

Indeed, this is a stunning slowdown. And that too for an economy which the IMF estimates to be a staggering $20.26 trillion—the second largest in the world behind the United States.

{Large economies plateau and reach asymptotes. Not every nation can expand forever!

The same IMF says China's economy is larger than US in PPP terms. So if the Chinese consume their own goods and XJP success in doubling the GDP in ten years and lifting 100M above poverty and making China a moderately prosperous country would mean the picture is changing.}

More importantly this slowdown coincides with an imminent third term for President Xi Jinping. Surely, while he will be savouring the personal milestone, the President must be worried about the state of the economy. After suffering its worst shock ever, the economy has taken more than just a stumble.

China’s pursuit of a zero-Covid policy has only made a bad situation worse. Foreign manufacturers with a base in China are already scrambling for safety; and the moniker for this is “one-plus”. The decision by Apple to manufacture the iPhone in India is one such example.

{ We don't know what we don't know. Especially about COIVD. Boston Uty created a new variant with 80% fatality in mice. What is to prevent its spread? And India reported a new Omicron Variant just this week. So most likely many countries will adopt similar policies for general safety. As for Apple they follow politics and can see the trend wrt the Biden Admin crackdown on semiconductor personnel. India too could be on the target list. RAND has a study on extending Russia and lists various options. Am sure there are studies on India too.}

Yet the Chinese establishment refuses to blink. It remains steadfast in its commitment to a zero-Covid policy, even while local governments already stretched, struggle to meet their development targets. It is baffling to say the least.

Luckily for me the conversation with Richard Martin, managing director of IMA Asia, for my latest episode on StratNews Global was more than just helpful. Richard unpacked the knots to draw some dramatic conclusions about the present and the troubled future of the world’s second-largest economy.

The Pivot

Logically one would expect that reviving growth would be the big priority for the Chinese authorities. Surprisingly, it is not. In a must see conversation with me for the weekly episode of Capital Calculus telecast on StratNews Global last Thursday, Richard said:

“I think the thing that has become clearer to us about China this year is that it is not so interested in growth. It is not interested in the GDP number, you know; all of us thought it was going to aim for 5%. That is not its goal; not its goal this year, probably not its goal ever in the future, at least under the leadership we have got.”

And this Richard argued is part of a well-thought-out plan:

“It is not really the China we thought we were going to be seeing, you know, they’ve turned away from that concept when they joined the WTO, back in 2001, of becoming a market-led economy. It is going back to being a party-led and a state owned enterprise-led economy. And that’s a pretty big shift.”

{Go back to Confucius society. Traders are at the bottom of the pyramid. And most distrusted as they mingle with the barbarians outside the Middle Kingdom. XJP is a China traditionalist as I showed many times. For him preserving China and remaking it are prime goals. From this lens, it eminent sense to focus on China and stop being a factory to the world. All they get are sticks to behave. Example the Biden Admin sanctions on semiconductor personnel.}[i/]

What then are the new priorities?

“(First) China wants to be a successful Communist Party-led state. And that is a really dominant goal this year that they are paying attention to; you could say, they have sacrificed growth to achieve that goal.

A second thing is they want China to be a powerful national player, at least equal to the United States. So there’s a big push on nationalism and try to force China’s line on global politics, interpret things the way China sees it.

And then the third thing, it really wants to be a technology leader, and of course, that’s leading into a pretty tough battle. At first, it was just with the United States, but it looks it is going to be broader.

So that is I think one of the big things we’ve learned about China this year; they are just not focused on growth and that they’ve got other goals. It is about what China wants to be.”

The Fallout

This big pivot is coming at a severe economic cost. Worse, as the shadows of recession lengthen over the United States and Europe, it means that exports, the one engine which previously powered the Chinese economy, will start to lose more steam. Worse, foreign companies are already beginning to walk the talk on the ‘one-plus’ strategy.

“The Chinese economy is at one of its weakest points in recent memory,” Shehzad Qazi, managing director of China Beige Book, a company that generates large-scale, private data on the Chinese economy, told CNBC. “Compared to year-ago levels, you’re seeing major drops, and almost every sector is struggling.”
{No kidding Sherlock! China is suffering from a massive pandemic and economic sanctions. Everytime the variant is licked a new one emerges. and the same with economic sanctions. Short of war US is piling on sanctions after sanctions. The situation is like FDR and Imperial Japan in WWII.}


The downside risks to the Chinese economy, especially those emanating from the property market which accounts for a third of the country’s national income, are indeed worrying.

Richard echoed Shehzad’s views.

“The other ripple effect you get is the consumer sentiment in China. The National Bureau of Statistics does a survey on this, you know, their own statistics office; it crashed three or four months ago. I mean, since the index came out in 1990, it has never been as low; it has just gone through the floor.

And that is because the average Chinese household has 60% of its wealth tied up in the property. That’s extraordinary over-exposure to the property sector. So if the property sector goes, you can write off the Chinese economy. So the ripple effect is big, more like a tsunami effect.”

{i]{Here XJP's crusade on corruption is a major contributor. Now that he has his third term he might ease off on the property sector. And revive it. One WSJ honcho told that Chian Re is mostly Renminbi debt. And hence can revive it. Its FDI that is toxic}

As the second largest economy in the world and one that is so deeply entwined with the fortunes of so many countries, the implications of a slowing or, worse, an imploding Chinese economy will be devastating.

Interestingly, Richard argues that it could actually work both ways for the Asia-Pacific region:

“There are two big things to watch, which really do affect the rest of the region. One is tourism. Outbound Chinese tourists were gigantic over the last decade, and went from zero per cent of tourism inflow across Southeast Asia to 25-30%. And it really drove Thailand, Philippines, Malaysia and Singapore as well. (It was) Even important for Taiwan, Japan, and Korea. This is not going to restart next year. So that is a loss for everyone.

The second thing is a bit more positive for the rest of the region. We are seeing export operations, relocating, not all of them, but some of them.

You can actually see it in the statistics; go look at U.S. imports statistics, China’s share hit a peak 22% of U.S. imports four or five years ago. Now I think it is down to about 18% and steadily falling. The big winners so far have been Mexico and Vietnam.
{I think with oil prices high, Mexico will benefit most from the US market. But then its mostly re-exports by round-tripping. Vietnam is re-branded Chinese goods. So again its important to get labeling correct.}

I think more will go into Southeast Asia; Malaysia will get some, and Thailand will get some. It will be interesting to see if India is a big mover in this regard.”

It is clear that for President Xi, winning the political battle to claim an unprecedented third term at the helm was the easy part.

The more difficult challenge will be negotiating the economic crisis. Either way, the outcome has grave implications for the world in general and Asia in particular. After all, erosion of economic heft will also mean that much less global clout.


(The author is a columnist and hosts a weekly show called ‘Capital Calculus’ on StratNews Global. Views expressed in this article are personal.)

ricky_v wrote:blast from the past, with a handy table