Bharat Rakshak

Philip wrote:The US is not nibbling at our borders and like pirates grabbing islands in the ICS.

This is a matter of perspective. Even in the last 20 years the US has contributed directly to Pakistan (and China) nibbling at our borders by what it has done "In US interests". But this is OT

Most of the time we seem to view the so called "String of Pearls" and CPEC as a Chinese effort to "dominate" us.

Let me not delve into historical mumbo-jumbo because it can be argued in diametrically opposing ways - but my personal opinions (coming out of my own thought) tell me that:
1. The need to "dominate the world" was a very Islamic and later Christian need. The spread of Islam and the spread of Europeans into South America and later Africa and India were justified by the need to take to these nations the moral superiority of Christian Europe. China has not yet shown a penchant to do that. I see Chinese behaviour more like looting Mongols rather than as moralizing colonizers. The Chinese seek to dominate because they see themselves a strong and now rich, not because they see their system as something that needs to be spread around the world.

2. Chinese actions with regard to the so called string of pearls and the CPEC could also be interpreted as nervousness of how the US and the west can choke China.

The Chinese suffer from some severe geographic maritime disadvantages. Whatever maritime moves that the Chinese can muster are totally dependent on good relations with littoral states in the regions where the Chinese seek maritime trade. But the Chinese have piss poor relations with almost any powerful country whose waters they need to sail past. Include Japan, India and US proxy states in this list. The smaller countries - the Chinese seem to want to intimidate. Chinese promises of investment in smaller nations seem to me more in the form of bribes paid by a gangster to a victim who can be intimidated but bribery is less troublesome. China actually had excellent ships and great maritime trade in the past - all the way to India and beyond - at least up to the Maldives. But they were trading, not conquering or intimidating.

The so called "string of pearls" can be divided up into ports that serve as economic/oil flow security for China and ports that have no such function. Among ports that have no economic security function would be Hambantota and Maldives. If these spots had military utility - it would serve Chine's security. But neither has any military utility given the proximity of India and Diego Garcia as well as china's long logistics lines.

Ports that have economic utility to China are Myanmar - from whose port at Kyaukpyu oil is flowing into China. But this port has little military utilty for china - lying in India's shadow. Gwadar in theory has both military and economic utility - but events seem to be showing that neither is working out for China.

If China had any sense - it would work for a border settlement with India and stop supporting Pakistan. It should become glaringly obvious that over time India has withstood both these assaults from China and the US combined and has actually become stronger. Incidentally - this is a lesson that the US too seems to be learning - having spent decades playing Pakistan off against India - the US finds that its proxy is not winning, India is getting stronger while the US is itself taking a beating from Pakistan. The world is certainly changing. And it's not going to be just China and the US.

I thought it was worth posting the below here.

Army officer scales peak, stumbles across outpost named after her dad - Jayanta Gupta, ToI

A young woman lieutenant in the Indian Army, posted in Tenga, Arunachal Pradesh, was on an initiation tour recently, which took her to a post at Kyapho in the Tawang sector. The post was named "Ashish Top". Her curiosity aroused, she asked how an army post in Arunachal Pradesh got the name. When she did learn who Ashish was, she was speechless. It was her very own father, Ashish Das, who retired as a colonel of the Assam Regiment, who — at that very moment — was at the family's home.

A call from Ashish Top to home followed as soon as she digested the "stunning discovery". "I was at home when I received a call from the commanding officer of the unit manning Ashish Top. He introduced himself and described how my daughter had broken down on coming to know that the post was named after me," Das told TOI.

"I may have told my family of our unit's exploits in that sector in 1986 but my daughter was not even born then," he added. "Even I came to know about this post being named after me only in 2003, 17 years after we beat back troops of China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) and occupied the post at 14,000 feet,"he said.

Das recalled how the 1986 events unfolded. The PLA made deep incursions across the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the Sumdorong Chu Valley of Arunachal Pradesh and began constructing helipads and permanent structures. Later that year, Indian Army chief Gen K Sundarji launched what was to be later known (though never officially acknowledged) as Operation Falcon. An entire infantry brigade was airlifted to a makeshift landing area at Zimithang, near Sumdorong Chu.

"We had to blast our way through Bum La and reached the Sangetsar lake. The Chinese were sitting just across. Our orders were to hold ground and we dug in. Every officer must have made 17-20 copies of wills in the intervening days and handed them over to their adjutants. We started to move forward a few days later and also blasted Kyapho that was snowed in. We did not know that we had crossed the Chinese camp but maintained our position. There were attempts to supply rations by air but the drops landed inside China. I remember surviving on rats. It was only later that skid boards were designed and rations reached us. A helipad was also constructed. There were firefights every day as we proceeded from one bunker to the next," Das said.

He remembers it was Onam when he, along with a small party, set out to return to base when they realised that the PLA was after them. Das (then a captain) opened fire on the Chinese, which forced the latter to give up the chase. The men remained there for three days without food. "There would be heavy firing at night followed by white flares during the day and parleys with the local Chinese political commissar," Das recalled.

shiv wrote:

yensoy wrote:
End game - add Bhutan into the string of pearls.

We give up independent thought when we use existing clichés and rhetorical constructs like "string of pearls" without applying thought or further probing...

Don't get distracted by the terminology here. The point is that Doklam is a strategy - in my opinion - to dislodge Bhutan from its cosy relationship with India and possibly bring it over to the Chinese way of thinking, much like what the Chinese have done in Nepal, Maldives etc. Why? Because powerful countries collect junior allies like kids collect stamps and adults collect money - you never know when it may be useful. You can become philosophical and wonder why we do things, and why we exist and that kind of stuff but in the real world games are played according to set patterns; and the Chinese pattern is to pull in more allies/vassals/subservient states into its orbit, just like a newly rich fellow likes to spend his cash in order to be appear popular & well loved.

Now if you have an alternate theory as to the actions in Doklam, that would be adding value to the discussion.

BTW, a decent article on warming India-China relations in the Dawn: https://www.dawn.com/news/1393790/the-china-india-tango

If as stated in the article (and other media), there is indeed an Indian attempt to downplay the Tibet card and make some overtures to China, it must be because there are some bigger gains in the mid term. I can think only of 3 big items which would be concerns to India larger than Tibet:

• 1. China to stop support of Pakistan

• 2. Amicable resolution of border dispute

• 3. Resolution of trade deficit

Of these, item 3 is fixable by India just by limiting or restricting the willy-nilly import of Chinese goods - any way none of the trade agreements we can have will be permanent so we would not play a "permanent" card for a temporary gain. Item 1 is a concern but honestly do we really care? We know that the Pakis will bite the hand that feeds it, so sooner or later that relationship will come burning down. Which only leaves Item 2 as something worthy of throwing the Tibet movement under the bus, sad as it sounds.

Even if we have a fully demarcated border, game-playing and ally collecting will continue as usual. Salami slicing, hopefully, will end.

yensoy wrote: Don't get distracted by the terminology here. The point is that Doklam is a strategy - in my opinion - to dislodge Bhutan from its cosy relationship with India and possibly bring it over to the Chinese way of thinking, much like what the Chinese have done in Nepal, Maldives etc. Why? Because powerful countries collect junior allies like kids collect stamps and adults collect money - you never know when it may be useful. You can become philosophical and wonder why we do things, and why we exist and that kind of stuff but in the real world games are played according to set patterns; and the Chinese pattern is to pull in more allies/vassals/subservient states into its orbit, just like a newly rich fellow likes to spend his cash in order to be appear popular & well loved.

Now if you have an alternate theory as to the actions in Doklam, that would be adding value to the discussion.

The alternate theory is that the string of pearls is a load of crap that is of zero military value to China and and only 2 of them have questionable economic value. The term is used only to create a kind of mental image of Chinese strangulating us - which is exactly what you have done. It's application to Bhutan is inappropriate and fanciful. Bhutan cannot be part of the string of pearls other than rhetorical comparisons of marbles or stamps that children or adults might collect - which has no relevance as far as I am concerned.

In my view it is childish and naive to imagine that independent states like Bhutan and Sri Lanka and the Maldives have somehow been attuned to "an Indian way of thinking" and that they can suddenly be bought over to a Chinese way of thinking and that the marbles India owned are now suddenly Chinese marbles. Boo Hoo.

These small states are stuck between huge neighbours and cannot fully "go over to the other side" without facing much distress. I believe that too many people - including possibly yourself have this great admiration of China's ability to woo someone and "get them over to the Chinese side" and I hear too many readymade reasons - "They have power" They have money" "They are great" "We are useless" "We don't do this" We don't do that etc.

What I have been trying to point out (as my viewpoint that you are welcome to reject or accept as it suits you) is that even "experts" and authors of articles about Bhutan Myanmar and the Maldives talk a lot of nonsense about countries swinging over to the other side - using a ridiculous rhetorical tactic where they are saying that those nations were all on India's side before that happened. It was never that way. Go back into the history of Bhutan, Sri Lanka and the Maldives and you find that they have - at various times had to deal with other powers - though for Bhutan it has mainly been China which has been trying to coerce them and intimidate them and not woo them. The idea that Bhutan can "suddenly go over" to the Chinese side with no repercussions for them in my view comes only from people who come with a pre-existing belief of Chinese omnipotence and Indian impotence. If you are one such person - I disagree with that premise. There is a dynamic and India is still engaged in a dynamic, and dogmatic conclusions like chess pieces moving to Chinese or Indian squares is pointless rhetoric.

As for Doklam the Chinese were already sitting in Doklam a decade ago and already have a presence in the other Bhutanese "disputed area" further north. So there is no need for any "getting Bhutan to their side" - they had what they wanted until India interfered. Now they are not going to be able to "exchange" Doklam for anything else.

shiv wrote:Most of the time we seem to view the so called "String of Pearls" and CPEC as a Chinese effort to "dominate" us.

Let me not delve into historical mumbo-jumbo because it can be argued in diametrically opposing ways - but my personal opinions (coming out of my own thought) tell me that:
1. The need to "dominate the world" was a very Islamic and later Christian need. The spread of Islam and the spread of Europeans into South America and later Africa and India were justified by the need to take to these nations the moral superiority of Christian Europe. China has not yet shown a penchant to do that. I see Chinese behaviour more like looting Mongols rather than as moralizing colonizers. The Chinese seek to dominate because they see themselves a strong and now rich, not because they see their system as something that needs to be spread around the world.

Shiv, unfortunately, history needs to be looked into. We continue to go back to 1906 when the first demand for a separate Muslim identity within Bharat was made. We go back to Mawdudi, Qutb, Sheikh Waliullah, ibn Abd-al Wahhab to explain away the many things that happen around us all the time.

In case of China, history is as important too, if not more, because the present day Communist China is a continuum of its Imperial past. I will not repeat the arguments posted here many times before as to why an understanding of the past is essential for deciphering the Imperialistic-Communist China (a Communist China demanding Imperial-like obeissance & tributary), why the Confucian notions of harmony & hierarchy are important. So, I will not go into them again.

Coming back to the present, Xi Jinping has unambiguously stated the contours of his China dream which is not only to make China a prosperous nation but also match the success at home with a proud resurrection abroad. In the Feb. 2017 National Security Convention, Xi said two things unambiguously: China wants a new World Order that would be just and China wants to build it. Two, China wants a new security architecture and China wants to build it. China is not so much as trying to go to war and annex countries, but it is more the traditional Chinese mindset of making others acquiesce to the Chinese hegemony and partake the resulting benevolence and goodwill. This must be understood when one talks of 'dominance'. Of course, China realizes that this approach wouldn't work with every nation and hence is prepared for an eventuality if one arises. This is one of the reasons that China desperately wants India to acquiesce into its BRI initiative (there could be other reasons as well) because it would be one significant way to enervate India.

Chin strategy,win the war without fighting.Sun Tzu and all that...Now there was apiece in the Chindu which wanted India to carve out a new NAM,with India taking the lead role,not getting involved in the West/US vs Ru vs China neo-Cold War imbroglio on at the moment.It echoes what I've been saying for long that we must carve out our won destiny and be a magnet for like-minded nations to join with,establishing our own power bloc.I earlier proposed dumping SAARC for SAFE (South Asian Forum Economic) ,where nations pledge not to allow anti-national forces,terrorist,etc. on their territory aimed at member nations.That would automatically rule out Pak who would not be able to sign on! We could like the EU also in the future have a single currency,the Rupee,as it is called in all S.Asian states.Even Mauritius has its own rupee.

Anyway,here is what's happening with the Americans ,trying to counter the Chin threat.

[quote]China is trying to 'win without fighting': US military 'kept up at night' by Beijing's open checkbook and global expansion, while spies fear American universities are being infiltrated
American military and intelligence are increasingly concerned about China

Navy and Marine Corps commanders told Congress that Beijing's 'open checkbook' is 'keeping them up at night'
US is worried about a recent deal in which Chinese companies paid $1.12billion for controlling interest in a deep-sea port, Hambantota, in Sri Lanka
There is also concern that Chinese spies are trying to infiltrate American college campuses through Confucius Institutes
By Ariel Zilber For Dailymail.com and Afp

PUBLISHED: 15:11 GMT, 8 March 2018 |
American military and intelligence officials are growing increasingly concerned about China's expanding global influence which they say is being fueled by its 'weaponizing of capital'.

In testimony before Congress on Wednesday, the top commanders of the United States Navy and the Marine Corps told lawmakers that Beijing's 'open checkbook' is 'keeping them up at night.'

They said the Asian giant is buying up more land and growing in power without firing a shot, enabling it to 'win without fighting.'

'When it comes to China, the bottom line there is the checkbook,' Navy Secretary Richard V. Spencer told legislators on the House Appropriations defense subcommittee, according to The Hill.

Marine Corps Commandant Gen. Robert Neller (above) and Navy Secretary Richard V. Spencer told Congress they were worried about China's 'open checkbook' that was fueling its expanding influence across the globe +5

'Not only in the dollars and cents that they are writing to support their military expansion and their technological work, but what they're doing around the globe ... weaponizing capital.'

Spencer was referring to a recent deal in which Chinese companies paid $1.12billion for controlling interest in a deep-sea port, Hambantota, in Sri Lanka.

The deal has raised concerns, particularly in countries such as India and the US who are known to be worried that such a foothold could give it a military naval advantage in the Indian Ocean.

'Their open checkbook keeps me up at night,' Spencer said.

Marine Corps Commandant Gen. Robert Neller also told lawmakers at the hearing that China is 'playing the long game.'

'Their concern with human rights is not there, they've got big bags of cash. They're buying airfields and ports to extend their reach ... they want to win without fighting,' Neller said.

The Marine Corps commandant said that while China is using money to extend its reach, Russia is building up its military..

'The Russians, I think, are a little more in your face,' Neller said.
'I don't think they want to fight us, personally, but I think they want to be able to impose their will and use intimidation.'

In addition to military concerns over China's growing clout, the CIA is also worried that the Chinese are targeting American college campuses to gain influence over what is taught to students.
Spencer was referring to a recent deal in which Chinese companies paid $1.12billion for controlling interest in a deep-sea port, Hambantota, in Sri Lanka (above)

A classified CIA report, part of which was obtained by The Washington Free Beacon, alleges that the ruling Communist Party in China is offering universities cash in exchange for censoring academic content.

'The CCP provides 'strings-attached' funding to academic institutions and think tanks to deter research that casts it in a negative light,' the CIA claims.

'It has used this tactic to reward pro-China viewpoints and coerce Western academic publications and conferences to self-censor.

'The CCP often denies visas to academics who criticize the regime, encouraging many China scholars to preemptively self-censor so they can maintain access to the country on which their research depends.'
Last month, FBI Director Christopher Wray, told the Senate Intelligence Committee that the agency was investigating dozens of Confucius Institutes on scores of college campuses nationwide. Above is a stock image of Confucius Institute at the University of Kansas

Last month, the director of the FBI, Christopher Wray, told the Senate Intelligence Committee that the agency was investigating dozens of Confucius Institutes on scores of college campuses nationwide.

The Confucius Institute is a Chinese-backed cultural and language center that US intelligence officials fear can be exploited as a tool to spy on Americans.

Wray said that China has been 'exploiting the very open research and development environment that we have.'

US spy agencies are particularly worried about Confucius Institutes on 13 campuses, among them Arizona State, Auburn, Purdue, Stanford, and the University of Washington.

These colleges also host top secret Pentagon research facilities that US authorities worry are targeted by Chinese agents.

China's foreign minister sought Thursday to downplay concerns about Beijing's global ambitions, while also hinting at consequences for countries that don't fall in line on issues like Taiwan.

Pledging that China had no desire to 'replace America' on the global stage, Wang Yi said the Asian nation's path 'is totally different than the one that has already been taken by traditional major powers'.

China's foreign minister, Wang Yi (above), sought Thursday to downplay concerns about Beijing's global ambitions, while also hinting at consequences for countries that don't fall in line on issues like Taiwan +5

'The more China develops, the more it can contribute to the world,' Wang said in a press conference.

Wang spoke as 3,000 members of China's mostly ceremonial national legislature have gathered for their annual meeting in Beijing, where they are set to grant President Xi Jinping a nearly limitless mandate to realise his vision of a resurgent China.

Xi's ambitions are not limited to home: he has clearly articulated his vision of putting China at the centre of world affairs, a position reflecting its Chinese name: 'the Middle Kingdom.'

The departure from the country's long-held stance of keeping a low profile had raised fears abroad of spreading Chinese influence.

Read more: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article ... z59FABcI4r
Follow us: @MailOnline on Twitter | DailyMail on Facebook/quote]

Philip wrote: . . .Now there was apiece in the Chindu which wanted India to carve out a new NAM,with India taking the lead role,not getting involved in the West/US vs Ru vs China neo-Cold War imbroglio on at the moment.

That is the TP Sreenivasan oped that you are referring to perhaps.

However, IMHO, we should not fall back into that NAM sham.

How Xi made his power grab: with stealth & guile - Chris Buckley, NY Times

Some 200 senior Communist Party officials gathered behind closed doors in January to take up a momentous political decision: whether to abolish presidential term limits and enable Xi Jinping to lead China for a generation.

In a two-day session in Beijing, they bowed to Mr. Xi’s wish to hold onto power indefinitely. But a bland communiqué issued afterward made no mention of the weighty decision, which authorities then kept under wraps for more than five weeks.

That meeting of the party’s Central Committee was the culmination of months of secretive discussions that are only now coming to light — and show how Mr. Xi maneuvered with stealth, swiftness and guile to rewrite China’s Constitution.

The decision was abruptly announced only last week, days before the annual session of China’s legislature, the National People’s Congress. The delay was apparently an effort to prevent opposition from coalescing before formal approval of the change by the legislature’s nearly 3,000 members.

The Congress is all but certain to approve the change and other constitutional amendments — the first since 2004 — in a vote on Sunday, sweeping away a rule that restricts Presidents to two five-year terms and has been in the constitution for 35 years. The Congress alone has the power to amend the constitution, by a two-thirds vote, but lawmakers, picked by the party, have always passed proposals presented to them.

Even those who thought they had taken the full measure of Xi’s ambition are surprised by how fast he has moved. “I always thought Xi would seek to stay for three or four terms, and could even introduce a new presidential system after his terms were finished. But I never thought the constitution would be revised so quickly,” said Wu Wei, a former official who advised Zhao Ziyang, the party leader ousted during the mass protests of 1989 in Tiananmen Square.

First proposal

Mr. Xi deployed speed, secrecy and intimidation to smother potential opposition inside and outside the party. He swept past the consensus-building conventions that previous leaders used to amend the constitution. He installed loyalists to draft and support the amendments. And he kept the whole process under the tight control of the party, allowing little debate, even internally.

Mr. Xi first formally proposed amending the constitution little more than five months ago, at a Sept. 29 meeting of the Politburo, a council of 25 party leaders more powerful than the Central Committee, according to an official account issued at the Congress on Monday.

But he did not immediately raise the possibility of removing the term limit, said a retired official, citing a senior serving official. To avoid being seen as dictating changes, Xi let loyal provincial and city leaders quietly promote the idea in his stead, the retired official said. He spoke on condition of anonymity, citing fear of punishment for describing internal discussions.

At that same meeting, the Politburo agreed to purge one of its own members, Sun Zhengcai, who had once been considered a potential successor to Xi, on corruption charges — a warning to others that needed little elaboration.

SSridhar wrote:

pankajs wrote:OTOH, if influence waxes and wane, then this Chinese influence too shall pass one day. So why fear?

That's a philosophical excuse strutted out by lazy, incompetent nations resigned to their fate. The question is what in the meanwhile and how do we wax our own influence.

+100

Nations who are passive and roll over without a fight (really laziness attributed to Chanakian-ness) don't survive, whereas more proactive ones do, though they lose the odd battle.

It's like tigers train hard from when they are cubs to fight off any threat to their territory from other tigers, but that training/alertness/battle-readiness also no doubt helps them prosper in hunting prey for food and fighting off non-tiger predators. A tiger who says, nah, I will be Gandhian, keep moving/conceding when challenged and will wait out the others, won't survive for long.

yensoy wrote:BTW, a decent article on warming India-China relations in the Dawn: https://www.dawn.com/news/1393790/the-china-india-tango

If as stated in the article (and other media), there is indeed an Indian attempt to downplay the Tibet card and make some overtures to China, it must be because there are some bigger gains in the mid term. I can think only of 3 big items which would be concerns to India larger than Tibet:

• 1. China to stop support of Pakistan

• 2. Amicable resolution of border dispute

• 3. Resolution of trade deficit

Or it could be just meek capitulation by the govt and the commie-infested bureaucracy.

SSridhar wrote:

pankajs wrote:IMHO, this principle was understood by Deng Xiaoping when he is supposed to have stated “Hide your strength, bide your time, never take the lead.”, especially the "bide your time" part. Perhaps Deng too was lazy and resigned to the fate.

No, but at that time that Deng made this statement, the US was on its side. China faced no enemies. Nobody had surrounded China trying to strangulate its sphere of influence and/or made its intentions known of hegemonically ruling the world.

What Deng meant was to 're-establish the Middle Kingdom' and then expand it dramatically all over the world rather than being confined to the peripheries which once it was.

We never intended to 'rule' the world as China had always wished for, especially Deng and now Xi. Deng was making plans for an eventual assault on the world (politically, economically and militarily) and that was the meaning of 'Bide for time' and 'rise silently'. We are currently fighting the Chinese on our own turf and in our very backyard. That's the difference.

Added later: 'Then' and 'Now' is OK, but keeping quiet that somehow things will sort themselves out is not.

W.r.t the following,
1. .. at that time that Deng made this statement, the US was on its side. China faced no enemies.
2. We are currently fighting the Chinese on our own turf and in our very backyard.

https://www.economist.com/node/17601475
Less biding and hiding [Dec 2010]

Under Mao, China had often bullied its neighbours, but had now subordinated this part of its foreign policy because co-operation with America was more important. Under Deng Xiaoping, Mao's eventual successor, China even reluctantly accepted America's continuing arms sales to Taiwan.

When the Soviet threat evaporated, China continued to put foreign policy second—this time for the sake of economic development. Again, that required co-operation with America, the best source of demand, technology and investment. Deng summed up the policy in a famous slogan: “Coolly observe, calmly deal with things, hold your position, hide your capacities, bide your time, accomplish things where possible.”

If one is to believe this economist story, China *reluctantly* accepted US arms sales to Taiwan, which is not just its backyard but Province of China if one goes by the Chinese rhetoric. Deng must have been lazy and resigned to the fate. What else explains his "Coolly observe, calmly deal with things, hold your position, hide your capacities, bide your time, accomplish things where possible."

Actually, there is a logical explanation to Deng's realist policy
1. Need for the US support wrt USSR.
2. For the sake of economic development even when the threat from USSR disappeared.

What Deng clearly saw was that once China acquired/reacquired a certain economic heft things would start tilting its way. In the interim it had to "hold your position ... bide your time ... accomplish things where possible" and worked hard to steer relations with America through their inevitable crises.

Clearly Deng has been proven right. We would not be wrong in adopting the same broad strategy i.e. "hold your position ... bide your time ... accomplish things where possible" BUT altered to accommodate our unique situation, local and the global environment.

Note : https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_U ... _to_Taiwan

Bart S wrote:

SSridhar wrote:
That's a philosophical excuse strutted out by lazy, incompetent nations resigned to their fate. The question is what in the meanwhile and how do we wax our own influence.

+100

Nations who are passive and roll over without a fight (really laziness attributed to Chanakian-ness) don't survive, whereas more proactive ones do, though they lose the odd battle.

It's like tigers train hard from when they are cubs to fight off any threat to their territory from other tigers, but that training/alertness/battle-readiness also no doubt helps them prosper in hunting prey for food and fighting off non-tiger predators. A tiger who says, nah, I will be Gandhian, keep moving/conceding when challenged and will wait out the others, won't survive for long.

There are tigers in the world — natural fighting nations — but they are very rare in the world. In Asia, I count only Japan and its samurai tradition as a tiger. Other than that one exception, the world’s tigers are gora onlee.

The P5 is composed of four gora tigers and a cheeni buffalo. The chinese buffalo, because of the large size of its herd, was able to withstand the attack of the Japani tiger despite losing many many members. No matter how powerful, the buffalo is a herbivore after all and will suffer losses in any fight with a tiger. But as long as the herd is large and growing, it can force its will on the land the herd tramples on.

India is far more like cheen than the gora tigers. We too are herbivores in a big herd. Both ours is less organized and the horns are not always pointed in the same direction.

We are in contention with the one plant-eating power in the P5 because we both trample the same grassland. They, like us, are naturally adverse to a straight fight. The horns are dangerous weapons but are not natural to a fight like the fangs and claws of the tiger. The main power of the herd is to use its numbers and its menacing presence to crowd out both predators and competing herds.

Thus Cheen is dangerous to our herd in an entirely different way than the tigers. Talking about Xi as Hitler and the PRC as a modern day Nazi Germany or Imperial Japan is to completely miss the nature of the chini threat.

Well that is my take on tigers and herbivores, anyways.

No, we are NOT fighting cheen anywhere. We are being squeezed by a surrounding herd but where are there any actual “fighting”?

So stop it with this idea we are fighting with Cheen anywhere. Both our herds are crowding together over territory but theirs is much stronger at the moment. We have no fangs and claws but neither do they. We are both SRE herbivores.

To counter cheen, we must devise a plan to tackle a plant-eating herd not a TFTA tiger.

pankajs wrote:Deng must have been lazy and resigned to the fate.

He certainly wasn't however much you want to derive some vicarious pleasure misquoting what I said. But, he certainly wasn't waiting hoping that every "influence too shall pass one day". He was actively working towards ensuring defeating that 'influence'. Whether one 'hides lights' as Deng said or 'shines lights', that is a matter of tactics; but, the strategy cannot be to simply 'hope' that something would go away.

I must point out that in my view I see an attitudinal issue here:

When China speaks of winning without fighting it is some great Chankian strategy. When India does not fight - it is laziness and capitulation. North Korea has not fought anyone since the Korean war - but is doing absolutely fine - cutting deals with all the crooks in the world. After the Iran Iraq war - Iran too has lain low and taken all the "sanctions hits" that were thrown at it and has emerged strong. The US has hit out at everyone and emerged weaker.

So all this generalization seems completely subjective and as clever quotes of convenience to me. In fact, in my view the only generalization is "Nations that hit and nations that don't hit". There is no guarantee whatsoever that one type of nation will always prevail.

pankajs wrote:
Clearly Deng has been proven right. We would not be wrong in adopting the same broad strategy i.e. "hold your position ... bide your time ... accomplish things where possible" BUT altered to accommodate our unique situation, local and the global environment.

Much easier for China to do since they can pull off a strategy over a few decades and even come up with a 50-year and 100-year outlook, due to the single party system. Might work for them but does not work for everyone, even the US sort of envies their system for that. Of course, that has its downsides as well.

India is a noisy democracy where the govt changes frequently and swings from one end to the other in terms of geopolitical outlook, often within the same government it is hard to have consistency. The career foreign policy establishment has been know to have large proportion of incompetent and compromised bureaucrats (MKB etc) over the years and cannot be relied on. The only long term planning attempted have been the disastrous soviet style economic plans but zilch as far as strategic geopolitical planning goes. We do not even have the mechanisms that other noisy democracies have such as dedicated departments (who is our George Friedman?) and think tanks with capabilities beyond passing around tired cliches and regurgitating buzzwords (that actually match everybody else's narrative but our own).

If it all we do pull it off, it will probably be a happy accident, and will be down to the maturity of the general populace, not some attempt by any of the leadership, whether political or bureaucratic.

Bart S wrote:
Much easier for China to do since they can pull off a strategy over a few decades and even come up with a 50-year and 100-year outlook, due to the single party system. Might work for them but does not work for everyone, even the US sort of envies their system for that. Of course, that has its downsides as well.

India is a noisy democracy where the govt changes frequently and swings from one end to the other in terms of geopolitical outlook, often within the same government it is hard to have consistency. The career foreign policy establishment has been know to have large proportion of incompetent and compromised bureaucrats (MKB etc) over the years and cannot be relied on. The only long term planning attempted have been the disastrous soviet style economic plans but zilch as far as strategic geopolitical planning goes. We do not even have the mechanisms that other noisy democracies have such as dedicated departments (who is our George Friedman?) and think tanks with capabilities beyond passing around tired cliches and regurgitating buzzwords (that actually match everybody else's narrative but our own).

If it all we do pull it off, it will probably be a happy accident, and will be down to the maturity of the general populace, not some attempt by any of the leadership, whether political or bureaucratic.

With respect - and I do not mean to hurt you - but the entire post above could have been summed in three words "We are screwed". This is not about you - there are dozens of people and hundreds of posts that say the same thing in different words - like a mournful series of theme books like Mills & Boon rehashed the same love stories.

Of course - some people do give "solutions" none of which are implementable because of reasons stated in the above post - which is comprehensive in covering all possible routes that might come up with an answer other than "We are screwed".

Anyhow - I don't think we are screwed. We have learned to work within our constraints and security-wise there is not much difference from government to government. I am not going to argue - because when the bottom line and consensus is "We are screwed" any alternate opinion is like trying to heat up the ocean with an agarbatti.

We are not screwed. But we ARE screwing ourselves with self-scaring bullsh1t like “String of Pearls” and fearing “encirclement” at every turn.

How being “surrounded” actually impairs anything or anyone much less a nation of a billion plus like ours?

Learn from Cheen, they had the USN squatting right on their doorsteps for decades. They had Japan and Taiwan blocking their access to the Pacific. So why didn’t they just whither and die on the vine?

Not only did they didn’t f-ing go and die but they became a global trading power because the USN, Japan and Taiwan don’t stop goddam merchant ships in peace time.

And you know what? The few PLAN ships in the IOR won’t stop our merchantmen either. So what is the damn problem?

We need to toughen up as a nation. If we dislike the Cheeni presence in the IOR so much then we must be able to initiate a fight to drive them out (which I think we will win) but if we don’t want to start a war then we have better do what Cheen did under its decades long siege by the USN.

And that is to trade and grow and build a MIC so large, so wide and deep that it can change facts on the ground without war.

Sitting around fearing war but not initiating it is not going to help us. Buying the best firangi weapons but not using them in a nice shooting war with Cheen is not going to help us. Contributing the most billions to everyone’s else MIC but our own is certainly not going to help us.

Put away the damn fear. Let’s go fight.

Or if we don’t then do what Cheen did with the US, Japan and Taiwan. And that was to use the market, money and expertise of erstwhile enemies to build ourselves into a global power.

Bart S wrote:

yensoy wrote:BTW, a decent article on warming India-China relations in the Dawn: https://www.dawn.com/news/1393790/the-china-india-tango

If as stated in the article (and other media), there is indeed an Indian attempt to downplay the Tibet card and make some overtures to China, it must be because there are some bigger gains in the mid term. I can think only of 3 big items which would be concerns to India larger than Tibet:

• 1. China to stop support of Pakistan

• 2. Amicable resolution of border dispute

• 3. Resolution of trade deficit

Or it could be just meek capitulation by the govt and the commie-infested bureaucracy.

It could be a immediate payback for FAFT vote?

ritesh wrote:

Bart S wrote:
Or it could be just meek capitulation by the govt and the commie-infested bureaucracy.

It could be a immediate payback for FAFT vote?

If so, it wasn't a particularly good deal for us. The FATF grey list does not radically change facts on the ground in our favour.

shiv wrote: With respect - and I do not mean to hurt you - but the entire post above could have been summed in three words "We are screwed". This is not about you - there are dozens of people and hundreds of posts that say the same thing in different words - like a mournful series of theme books like Mills & Boon rehashed the same love stories.

Of course - some people do give "solutions" none of which are implementable because of reasons stated in the above post - which is comprehensive in covering all possible routes that might come up with an answer other than "We are screwed".

Anyhow - I don't think we are screwed. We have learned to work within our constraints and security-wise there is not much difference from government to government. I am not going to argue - because when the bottom line and consensus is "We are screwed" any alternate opinion is like trying to heat up the ocean with an agarbatti.

Saar,

I totally agree with you that we are not screwed and I in fact have no doubt that we will survive and thrive. However, my concern/frustration is that we are drastically underachieving (not helped by the absence the propensity of our ruling classes to not discuss serious foreign policy much in the domestic discussions) and I am sure this is the sentiment of many others. Whether we are underachieving or not and by how much is open to debate of course, maybe I am just impatient and hotheaded.

kit wrote:

ashish raval wrote:https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/wor ... 221055.cms

Looks like quad is already giving some heartburn. I think quad should commit to 25 ships each with smaller nations to commit 5-10 ships each Indo Pacific region with 100s of ships dotting around.

Australia is the wild card in the quad

Agree. But they are going to be US ally in long run unless they are heavily infiltrated. I doubt that is the case otherwise we coukd have seen Chinese base in Aussie land by now.

ashish raval wrote:

kit wrote:
Australia is the wild card in the quad

Agree. But they are going to be US ally in long run unless they are heavily infiltrated. I doubt that is the case otherwise we could have seen Chinese base in Aussie land by now.

the Aussies are heavily compromised, both at the political and military levels, a matter of time that they are fully under Chinese control. There will be a short period of time where Chinese military will co-exist with the US in nations like Pakistan .. Australia ..

Australia, now overwhelmingly a service based economy is heavily dependent on foreigners (Asians, esp. Chinese). Many top tier universities have 30-50% of foreign enrollments from China and HK. Although they have taken steps recently to diversify away from Chinese influence (including attracting Indian students and tourists), the dependence is still there. Chinese have also invested heavily in ports and infrastructure projects. There have been cases recently where Aussi government declined investment from China, but it was in part due to not loose control over critical national infrastructure. Keeping the country open to Asia, helps Australia tremendously. It brings in capital, investments, people. Aussies have no incentive in pissing China or any other Asian countries off other than occasional dog-n-pony show of strength.

China to become biggest foreign owner of Australian farmland
Asian immigrants altering Aussie suburbs
Chinese group launches fund in Australia, eyes infrastructure

ashish raval wrote:

kit wrote:
Australia is the wild card in the quad

Agree. But they are going to be US ally in long run unless they are heavily infiltrated. I doubt that is the case otherwise we coukd have seen Chinese base in Aussie land by now.

I doubt that China would want to shoot themselves in the foot by pushing for a military base etc at this stage. That would alarm a lot of people and invite severe pushback that would make the move backfire big time. Like a good virus/parasite they are infiltrating the host and multiplying at this point, taking care not to cross the threshold where they kill the host or the hospitable environment.

ritesh wrote:It could be a immediate payback for FAFT vote?

The immediate payback for FATF was the congratulatory note sent by the MEA.

As I said before, it had better be a significant one, if that is true

Bart S wrote:Or it could be just meek capitulation by the govt and the commie-infested bureaucracy.

That can't be true either. We have always stood firmly up to any Chinese bully.

The GDP of Bridges to Nowhere

Developers have learned how to reduce their official borrowing by offloading balance sheet debt to consumers through securitization, as a way to evade borrowing restrictions. For example, in December 2017, China Merchants Group, a state-owned firm, said it would work with China Construction Bank to issue asset-backed notes worth Rmb20 billion to be sold in the interbank market, in what would be China’s largest rental housing securitization. These notes are not included in TSF.

To take yet a third example, in 2017 at least 1 trillion renminbi of debt was converted into equity by the banks that had extended the loans. While this reduces the reported amount of outstanding debt, if the concern is the ability of borrowers to generate the returns needed to service the debt that funded these projects, converting them into equity does not reduce the riskiness of the banking system, nor does it reduce net indebtedness for the country overall. Most, if not all, of these transactions create unreported contingent liabilities even while reducing the growth rate of debt—in this case by more than five percentage points

In China, this is an even bigger problem than quantifying the growth in credit. For most economies, analysts typically use GDP as a proxy for debt-servicing capacity, but while this is more or less appropriate in most economies (in spite of a barrage of criticisms recently in the Financial Times and elsewhere about the usefulness of GDP), measures of GDP growth in most economies are at least systems outputs, which means that they can serve as proxies, however inexact, for activity in their respective economic systems.

In China, however, GDP growth is a systems input. This means analysts cannot treat it in the same way. An input measure cannot tell observers how a system is performing—only an output measure can.

If the authorities are willing to engage in loss-making activities to achieve the GDP growth target, there are two relevant characteristics of an economy like China’s that change the nature of the GDP measure: first, economic activity is much less affected by hard-budget constraints than it is in most other economies; and second, bad debt is much less likely to be written down. Government officials everywhere, and not just in China, would probably be happy to engage in loss-making activities to achieve higher current GDP growth rates and lower current unemployment rates, even though these benefits are only temporary and must be reversed in the future. But they can only do so within the limits of the budget and debt-capacity constraints under which they operate.

Relaxing these limits is what allows them to achieve higher GDP growth rates than what underlying economic growth would dictate. GDP is, according to one widely accepted definition, “the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy,” but it is not always obvious how to determine this market value. Consider two factories that cost the same to build and operate. If the first factory produces useful goods, and the second produces unwanted ones that pile up as inventory, only the first boosts the underlying economy. While inventory piles up, however, both factories will increase GDP in exactly the same way.

In most economies, the operator of the second factory is subject to hard budget constraints and must eventually close the factory. Once this happens, the factory stops producing GDP. In addition, if the facilities are not reassigned to other productive uses, they must be written down, along with the worthless inventory. This process reverses the GDP formerly created by the second factory because it reduces the profits of the entity that owns it (or that lent money to fund it as the loan is written down). Business profits are included in the value-added component of GDP when GDP is calculated, so because of the subsequent losses, the second factory does not add to GDP except over very short periods, after which it is reversed.

This is why countries like China, whose economies are not subject to these two constraints, are able to achieve GDP growth targets that for many years exceed the underlying growth of the economy. The simplest way to think about it, I think, is that if one wants a number that means what GDP growth means in most other economies, China’s reported GDP growth is only a starting point. It must be adjusted by some other relevant systems output number. My best guess is that one should start with reported GDP growth and subtract from it your best estimate of the amount of debt in each period that should be written down to zero.

At the peak of cold war, USSR had 15% growth rate. The belief was USSR would in 20 years get to 30% GDP growth. It is now common knowledge the numbers in USSR were fudged. Similar story with Japan in 1980's. It is the same story in 2018 in China.

One way is to lure Chinese in by making some positive noises about BRI, just obfuscate, show the great Indian bureaucratic tardiness....let them make even more unproductive investments to help their economy collapse under its own weight.

ritesh wrote:

Bart S wrote:
Or it could be just meek capitulation by the govt and the commie-infested bureaucracy.

It could be a immediate payback for FAFT vote?

No, neither.
(i) There was no "meek capitulation" in the past 60 odd years when the bureaucracy was more "commie infested" along with the a pink/read leaning legislature. If at all anything, our position is stronger and our stand is more firm today than ever before.
(ii) Payback for FATF? That is a terrible deal even by the most liberal of Chacha Nehru standards. There is little concrete with the FATF vote, it's not like this is the last straw which will emasculate the Paki army or take away their nukes or divide their land and deny the sea to Punjab. Our foreign policy has been based less on emotion and more on hard interests for the past 40+ years. Nobody in MEA would go for such a deal to relinquish a long-standing and well recognized moral leverage we have with China in order to score a small and temporary moral victory over Pakistan.

AIIB vs BRI
http://www.financialexpress.com/economy ... e/1093478/

India, France security accord has China in mind - AFP

China's mighty strategic shadow hangs over an accord signed by India and France on Saturday aimed at stepping up military cooperation in the Indian Ocean.

Under the deal signed by Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Emmanuel Macron, each country will open its naval bases to warships from the other.

China's territorial ambitions in the South China Sea already worry world powers. And its move into the vast Indian Ocean — stretching from the Suez Canal to the Malacca Strait — has heightened that concern.

Modi and Macron are particularly anxious as China extended its military presence by opening a naval base in the eastern African nation of Djibouti last year.

Beijing is also building up its trading network — the so-called One Belt One Road initiative — which involves many of the Asian and African nations that line the Indian Ocean.

It has built a port in Pakistan's Gwadar, taken a 99-year-lease on Sri Lanka's Hambantota and bought a number of tiny islands in the Maldives.

All of this has alarmed India, which sits at the heart of the Indian Ocean region.

New Delhi experts see Chinese companies investing in assets ranging from airports to the Bangladesh stock exchange as Beijing's trojan horses.

"They essentially work at the behest of the state and all of their investments are actually not commercial investments but strategic investments and they are meant to serve a geopolitical purpose," said Abhijit Singh, an analyst at the Observer Research Foundation, a New Delhi-based think tank.

PM Modi made clear when he came to power in 2014 that boosting India's influence in its immediate neighbourhood was a strategic priority.

His government expressed fury when Sri Lanka let a Chinese submarine make a stopover in 2014. Colombo refused a similar request the following year.

India has stepped up its patrols in the Sunda Strait in the eastern Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf, while boosting its maritime surveillance capability around the Andaman and Nicobar islands off Myanmar, where Chinese warships and submarines have increasingly been on patrol.

Reunion island is in turn a key French territory in the Indian Ocean and Paris also has extensive Pacific interests.

"We have a strong maritime power, a big navy with our nuclear submarines," Macron said in a TV interview on Friday.

France is "very active in this region to preserve collective security and for me India is one of the critical partners to preserve stability in the whole region."

China strongly denies any territorial motive against India despite its huge investments and military moves. "The two countries are partners in development not rivals," said the foreign ministry in Beijing.

Liu Zongyi, a specialist at the Shanghai Institute for International Studies, told AFP that India was using the "China threat" to extend its own military power.

Some international experts have doubts about Modi's response to China in the Indian Ocean and elsewhere.

"On a regional level, the Modi government has not proposed a convincing alternative to the new Silk Road proposed by Chinese leader Xi Jinping. India just does not have the same financial and administrative strength as China," said Isabelle Saint-Mezard, a South Asia specialist at Paris VIII university's institute of geopolitics.

Brahma Chellaney, a professor at the Centre for Policy Research in New Delhi said "India is at last waking up to this new threat."

But he is among many who fear storms in the Indian Ocean.

"For the moment, China cannot take on India in its own strategic maritime backyard," Chellaney said.

"But the country is growing, deploying submarines and the situation could quickly change to India's disadvantage."

Oops. Wrong thread

^^
Depends on our end goal.

If we are to compete with the Chinese for the control of the Pacific ocean and SSC then we do need a substantial fleet increase that will allows us to project power into those areas.

OTOH, if our primary domain remains IOR for the foresable future, say 30 years, our requirement for Carriers/DDG/FFG is quite less even if we are to *assume* that China plans to deploy all 6 carriers and its assorted support vessels in the IOR region.

Firstly, simultaneous deployment of all 6 at the same time in the IOR is logistically *impossible* as Shiv/other saars have pointed out. Only 1/3 of the total force i.e about 2 carries will be available in the zone of action at any time.

Secondly, we already have 2 *unsinkable* carrier permanently deployed in the IOR i.e. the *mother-ship India* and the one of her offspring the *Andaman and Nicobars". And we will perhaps have 1 out of the other 3 in constant patrol in the IOR region. That should even out the odds in our favor in any future contest for the IOR.

The same logic would work wrt DDGs/FFGs. This is not to say we shouldn't build or modernize our Navy but *IF* IOR remains our primary area of concern and we are unlikely to strike out any further on any expeditionary mission our current plans will be sufficient for our limited objectives.

I don’t think the PLAN has a snowball’s chance in hell when it comes to a hot war in the IOR. That is the same case even for their artificial islands off the coasts of the Philippines and Vietnam. The tyranny of geo-graphical distance will not allow them to fight effectively in the IOR until they build up an Amreeki-style network of allies and bases in the IOR — not happening in our lifetimes.

I am more worry about the non-war aspects of the contest. Once they approach 100 blue-water hulls (Type 054, Type 052, Type 055) in 2025 as Jeff Head said then they will start spilling over into the IOR in larger and larger numbers.

With those numbers, even a third in the IOR works out to 33 FFGs and DDGs. That would be near parity with our surface fleet in 2025 (and that is assuming we get all of the P15Bs and P17As by 2025 — very unlikely — and I am not counting possible decommissioning like the Godavaris.)

They can spare even more of their blue-water fleet since they will also have up to 80 corvettes that can patrol out to the first island chain and a massive coast guard that is already their main force in the SCS.

We will still have better crew, intelligence and logistics from a dominant geo-strategic high ground. But you can’t attrite the enemy during peace time and numbers in the global commons mean de facto jurisdiction of areas where they are and you are not.

chola wrote:I am more worry about the non-war aspects of the contest. Once they approach 100 blue-water hulls (Type 054, Type 052, Type 055) in 2025 as Jeff Head said then they will start spilling over into the IOR in larger and larger numbers.

But you can’t attrite the enemy during peace time and numbers in the global commons mean de facto jurisdiction of areas where they are and you are not.

That is exactly the point which some learned folks here are missing. It's not a black and white situation of all-out war. It's the petty harassment, the swinging of votes, the denial of trade opportunities and cutting out from contracts, the foisting of fake cases and penalties - these kind of things which in the end is what a power like China would love to have against their competitors/rivals/enemies available to them via friendly nations/bought out states.

China will not fight a war in the next few decades. It is not their nature, and they may get unhinged if they enter the war zone.

But they will be a huge nuisance in the room. Look at it this way - you and your neighbour in an aeroplane are fighting for the armrest between you. Do you go and punch him in the face? Of course not. But you do everything possible to make it uncomfortable for him to rest his arm.

That's what these mass produced destroyers are for. To supplement their "white destroyers" i.e. Coast Guard vessels, and their nuisance navy - their huge fishing fleet, a good portion of it subsidized and manned by ex PLA types. Most countries will fold when the Chinese shock-and-awe them. Let's taken an example - Philippines. With a China-friendly administration in place, whom do you think they will given the next big contract to? Especially when the Chinese offer them with a proven track record of getting things done, getting it done in time, and with financing to boot.

chola wrote: I am more worry about the non-war aspects of the contest. Once they approach 100 blue-water hulls (Type 054, Type 052, Type 055) in 2025 as Jeff Head said then they will start spilling over into the IOR in larger and larger numbers.

With those numbers, even a third in the IOR works out to 33 FFGs and DDGs. That would be near parity with our surface fleet in 2025 (and that is assuming we get all of the P15Bs and P17As by 2025 — very unlikely — and I am not counting possible decommissioning like the Godavaris.)

USN Pacific Command with it's carriers and DDG did not prevent China reaching 12 trillion, nor prevent their SCS adventures. Nor has USN power stopped Iran from it's adventures.So Chinese numbers will not stop us from growing.

These numbers may be of effect if the ballon goes up. However India and A&N are unsinkable carriers. The only thing we might need to be wary of is Chinese attempt to attempt to capture A&N. So we need long range detection, long range ASHM, ASBM, hypersonic, SSN etc, even if we dont have the surface fleet numbers.

There is an even basic question.

Enquiring minds want to know how do you harass a country and its shipping with a mainland coastline of 6,000+ km, with a fleet of Su30 MKI with the range of 1,500+ km carrying anti-ship Brahmos with a range of 300+ km. This country also sits at one end of a vast ocean with massive open waters all around its coastline. You have to harass this country with 33 DDG and FFG combined.

OTOH, China's trade that has to pass close to India is multiple times more than Indian trade than has to pass SCS. Now the picture wrt Oil is even more skewed against China when it comes to harassment. Harassment, after-all can be a two way street. But most commentary don't even go into that.

To my commoners way of thinking, harassment is very effective at choke points not open oceans, at least not with 33 ships in water body that is the IOR. So lets consider the choke points in the IOR regions. Malacca, Hormuz and Sunda/Lombak. Ignore south of African and Australia for the moment.

1. Malacca > Andaman and Nicobar. Need I say more.
2. Hormuz > If there is an Indo-Chinese contest in the Arabian sea who is likely to win. My bet is India all the way even without any aircraft carriers. Logistics is the first criteria. I just measured the distance between Mumbai and Duqm. It is 1,600 km. Does that ring a bell or two? Anyone? Plus there is the small matter of the US 5th Fleet deployed in the Persian Gulf.
3. Sunda/Lombak > Mera kay, mujhe kay. Not exactly but you get the picture.

BUT there is one sure-shot way to harass India/Indians which is very effective. That is psychological warfare that numbs the mind such that facts don't matter and checking, reasoning, thinking and calculating goes out of the window. Hell the Chinese don't even need to deploy a ship. You just have to read this forum and this thread to realize this.

nam wrote: USN Pacific Command with it's carriers and DDG did not prevent China reaching 12 trillion, nor prevent their SCS adventures. Nor has USN power stopped Iran from it's adventures.So Chinese numbers will not stop us from growing.

Agreed, Nam ji. That is the viewpoint I want to advocate. The USN didn’t stop them so the PLAN won’t stop us.

But what the numbers could mean is that eventually the PLAN can be as big in the IOR as the USN is in the Pacific. And the USN is already in the IOR too. It won’t stop our growth but we must be ready to plan things so we dn’t become third fiddle in our own ocean. We need to make hard dates for IACII and the P15Bs and P17As must come faster and we need more of them and the followons.

pankajs wrote:There is an even basic question.

Enquiring minds want to know how do you harass a country and its shipping with a coastline of 6,000+ km, with a fleet of Su30 MKI with the range of 1,500+ km carrying anti-ship Brahmos with a range of 300+ km. This country also sits at one end of a vast ocean with massive open waters all around its coastline. You have to harass this country with 33 DDG and FFG combined.

You can’t. And as you so correctly noted they are a trading nation and we aren’t, so harassing shipping would ALWAYS hurt them more.

But that again is missing the main threat of a trading nation like Cheen. The PRC are not going to attack our shipping. They will raise the flag to “protect” theirs.

With our surface fleets in rough parity in the IOR they become a default major power in the region with de facto jurisdiction wherever their ships are.

Again, unless we go to war we will not be able take advantage of our overwhelming edge in logistics and crew quality. So it becomes a numbers game on who can put more ships into the IOR.

So no, they won’t harass us but they will make themselves a major presence in the IOR that regional nations, nearly entirely muzzie will come to look to as the balancing power to the US. The day the PLAN becomes larger in the IOR than the IN then that is the day the Indian Ocean becomes a strictly Sino-American game like in East Asia.

chola wrote:

nam wrote: USN Pacific Command with it's carriers and DDG did not prevent China reaching 12 trillion, nor prevent their SCS adventures. Nor has USN power stopped Iran from it's adventures.So Chinese numbers will not stop us from growing.

Agreed, Nam ji. That is the viewpoint I want to advocate. The USN didn’t stop them so the PLAN won’t stop us.

But what the numbers could mean is that eventually the PLAN can be as big in the IOR as the USN is in the Pacific. And the USN is already in the IOR too. It won’t stop our growth but we must be ready to plan things so we dn’t become third fiddle in our own ocean. We need to make hard dates for IACII and the P15Bs and P17As must come faster and we need more of them and the followons.

I would say, do our best to get to the 5 trillion GDP. Given our friends Pak & Chini will make sure we are under threat and invest in tech.

If you compare with Chini, they were similar to our GDP around 2006-07. They didn't even have a carrier. We are building our own. Investing in hypersonic. Chinis waited till they were closer to 5-7 trillion before throwing money. So in another 5 years, we will be closer to that magic figure, we will automatically become one of the top dog.

IOR for us, Pacific for the Chinis, Atlantic for Uncle Sam.

^^^ Yes, economics underpins EVERYTHING. The things that the PRC had done and which we haven’t yet are:

1) use the resources of its wealthy “enemies” to build its industrial base; Cheen would be a giant North Korea today were it not for the investment and markets of the US, Japan and Taiwan; among Indians, only Aamir Khan had figured this out,

2) plan FAR ahead of time; those carriers and the frigates and destroyers being pumped out like sausages today were started 10 to 15 years ago — 052B and 054 were built in small batches of twos until they found the later marks they liked and went full bore; the lead time for naval ships demands it but in our case the MoD and the IN are still fighting over the next carrier while the PLAN is already pre-fabricating the Type 002 CATOBAR in Shanghai and has officially announced plans for the Type 003 CVN.

IOR for us, Pacific for the Chinis, Atlantic for Uncle Sam.

Unkil currently owns all three so we need to keep that in mind and that fact is key to understanding why cheen is in the IOR. The Western Pacific is barred to Cheen by the USN and its allies on the first island chain. Cheen’s strategic outlet is therefore open only to the west.