ramana wrote:At a cursory level, you appear right. However, I want to point to you to look at the Naval acquisitions in 2021.
1 SSBN (Arihant extended class)
2 SSK (Scorpene class)
1 Destroyer
1 IAC (Vikrant class)
Ramana sir,
I understand your optimism regarding how much *this* GOI has achieved in terms of policy and taking a stance. However, at the end of the day budgetary allocations towards defence determine our ability to withstand the kind of coercion the Pak-PRC combine can throw at us. We have to do more on that front. Let me explain further.
For instance, lets check PLAN build rates. USN is now on record stating they have fallen behind, are unlikely to catch up and will hence have to reconsider their strategy. The USN vet who submitted that analysis to the US Congress has openly stated the same that PLAN build rates have now crossed the rubicon.
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/ne ... s?from=mdr
This is last years for PLAN alone.
The year's haul included one Type 094A ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), two Type 075 helicopter landing docks (LHD), three Type 055 cruisers, seven Type 052D destroyers, six Type 056A corvettes, six Type 082II mine countermeasure vessels, one cable-laying ship and three Type 927 surveillance ships.
Now I've been one of those who've openly and repeatedly pointed out QA/QC issues with PLA gear. But the above is simply overwhelming in terms of excess capacity added.
To put it simply, even if they have 20%-30% lower serviceability, the amount they can deploy is increasingly overhauling what we have. The number disparity has grown to be that great.
The only saving grace for us is their focus on the SCS/Taiwan, but in an all out conflict, they can and will divert forces towards us.
And we need to look at the IAF too. While the IAF has stagnated at a mere 30 odd squadrons, the PLAAF is adding more and more infra & also providing counters to most of our top end gear to PAF. The IAF is the only force with the ability to rapidly swing between the theaters.
Also please read Rohitvats' 49 points summary of the last two years of LAC confrontation.
I've read RV's summary - but I'd also point out we have already "lost" disputed territory in the PRC salami slicing during the UPA era, and with current force levels, we simply cannot get it back without significant loss. Even now they have bottled us up in several sectors by having us waste our time in negotiations as versus forcing their retreat. The problem is if we ratchet up our resistance and it goes "hot", we will be at a disadvantage in some time, given how much they are investing in infrastructure.
Coming to the IA itself, RV himself has noted in the past that our existing Pak formations have been cannibalized to move them to the PRC border. Now, we've lost our reserves. We've already moved significant elements of one strike corp. So either we heavily build up the ground forces or at least the AF to support a proper offensive posture. Ravi Rikhye who tracks orbat closely has also noted we are now bereft of extra formations and the "buffer" that we once had no longer exists.
Our arty holdings while better than before are still in red tape. Tube arty continues to be dogged by no orders and OFB delays.
Now, the one thing in our favour is terrain - chokepoints, and the large distances for the PLA to traverse are in our favor. But that's only with one front. If both front's are activated, we are going to face a severe challenge, primarily because we have ignored airpower. That was and is the decisive force that could swing things our way.
If the PLARF enters the fray, almost all our AFB are vulnerable. A mere 5 squadrons of S-400 cannot protest us from BM Salvos. That's 10 batteries. RV has calculated an optimistic 6 batteries per squadron in his assessment. However, the std Russian regimental set is 2 batteries, and GOI documentation in the past indicated 10 S-400 firing units.
A S-400 battery cannot defend against BMs and air breathing targets simultaneously with optimal efficiency. The MRSAM deliveries have only commenced and are at best of some use against TBMs. We haven't invested in the desi-BMD either to accelerate it. Only now is it picking up. DRDO's budget is at 60% of ask. Again, budgetary shortfall.
So, to fight the PLARF threat and CM threat, we are dependent on dispersal, to ensure we dont lose our aircraft assets. Most of our parallel AFB are not hardened either. Due to limited budgets, limited hardening has been done at select bases.
Meanwhile, PLA is increasingly going to rely on real time satellite data to target our scarce assets.
https://www.indiatoday.in/news-analysis ... 2021-10-01
The Jilin-1 constellation, named after Jilin province, where the company is based, would have 138 individual high-performance optical remote sensing satellites which amongst them would cover every inch of the Earth's surface at a maximum revisit gap of 10 minutes only. According to the company, Jilin-1 satellites deliver high-quality remote sensing information and product services for agricultural and forestry production, environmental monitoring, smart city, geographical mapping, land planning and other fields.
In August 2020, the South Asia Monitor reported that Pakistan had purchased real-time satellite data, from China, that could provide it the precise position of Indian Army camps across the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir. The satellite data that was being purchased came from the Jilin-1 constellation.
In September 2020, 9 Jilin-1 satellites were launched at one go from a platform on the Yellow Sea atop a Long March-11 rocket. That was the first time that China launched satellites at sea, it used the smaller Long March-11 for the purpose but could still have a payload of 9 satellites because of the small size of the Jilin-1 Gaofen (GF) series satellites. The Jilin-1 GF satellites are built on a lightweight structural design having an integrated electronics system and carrying a high-resolution ultra-light low-cost camera that keeps the weight of each satellite at 40kg.
The issue is that with a mere 30 squadrons - one of the lowest numbers in the IAF's recorded history, attrition affects us far harder than the PLAAF.
Consider that because of budget shortfalls, we are yet to order the Su-30 upgrade, the additional 2 Phalcons, the additional IFR, let alone the discussed 33 additional fighters (MiG-29s and Su-30s). In contrast, the PLAAF added many times that number of assets. We've delayed the Tejas Mk1A order due to budgetary issues and the aircraft have a lead time of 20-24 months post order, as is industry standard.
In such a milieu, our window of vulnerability will increase unless we drastically improve budget availability,, with a realization PRC is just biding its time. And Pak may well be roped in with sufficient incentive.
For instance, the IAF, during conflict - has to simultaneously take off and fight despite BM/CM barrages. Has to maintain air superiority. Has to act as flying artillery for limited ground offensives. Has to also undertake deep interdiction against strategic targets. Has to engage in OCA/DCA. And if nukes get involved - they are the only force capable of stopping the TELs from launching. With a mere 30 squadrons, they can't do all of this. And in terms of airframes we have only added 36 Rafales, and have ordered Tejas pretty late (till Mk1A arrives, we have to make do with Bisons). At the very least the budgetary wherewithal for additional munitions, upgrades and force multipliers should be provided, as well as allowing them to accelerate their SAM umbrella. And only with additional budget will the IAF support the Tejas MWF. Otherwise they regard it as a multi-year devpt program taking away "their funds" from their huge need for more immediate airframes.
Hence, given the above, my significant concern is while we have done a lot, the sheer shortage of budgetary resources is severely limiting our options.