Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

[NRao]

Arun,

Sorry. Did not mean to paint you into a corner.

[shaardula]

posting in full. admins please to pardon. imho important take, even if agenda driven.

Pokhran Row
Frontline/The Hindu Volume 26 - Issue 19 :: Sep. 12-25, 2009

R. RAMACHANDRAN

The controversy over the yields of the Pokhran-II nuclear tests still rages, with specialists continuing to question the DAE’s conclusions.

The Shakti-3 site after a nuclear device was detonated underground on May 11, 1998. This photograph was released by the Government of India six days after the test.

SINCE the days of the Shakti series of Pokharan-II underground nuclear tests, conducted jointly by the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) and the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) more than 11 years ago, controversy over the yields of the devices tested, in particular that of the thermonuclear device, or hydrogen bomb (S1), has refused to go away.

The devices of May 11, 1998 – S1, S2 and S3 – were exploded simultaneously as the shafts S1 and S2 were just one kilometre apart and there was the danger of the shock wave from the first large explosion damaging the neighbouring shaft and the equipment therein. Similarly, the sub-kiloton devices of May 13, too, were exploded simultaneously, apparently for reasons of “convenience and speed”. The thermonuclear design yield was limited to 45 kt to avoid any damage to Khetolai village, located 5 km away, the DAE had stated. In a paper published in 2008 in the journal Atoms for Peace, R. Chidambaram, former Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and the leader of the POK2 tests, claimed that thermonuclear weapons of yields up to 200 kt could be confidently designed on the basis of the S1 test.

Soon after the tests, Western analysts, analysing the data of the tests as recorded by seismic stations worldwide, began to doubt the claims of Indian scientists for the combined yields of the May 11 devices and asserted that the actual yields were much lower. These estimates ranged from 10-15 kt to 20-25 kt. However, on the basis of correct interpretations of the regional and global seismic data and on-site measurements of ground accelerations and post-shot radiochemical analysis of the radioactive debris in the shafts, DAE scientists countered these estimates through a number of published papers on the results of the tests that confirm their early estimates (Table 1). While some well-known experts have concurred with the DAE’s claims, the controversy has sort of remained unresolved with many specialists continuing to question the DAE’s analyses and conclusions.

......
(Table 1) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ (Graph 1)

From the DAE’s perspective, the claimed yield values are accurate and these agreed with the estimates of simulations and design values, thus rendering the Shakti campaign successful. DAE scientists also claimed that the tests were sufficient to build a credible minimum deterrent (CMD) and the data gathered in the tests were sufficient to carry out sub-critical tests, if required. In sub-critical tests, the fissile material is prevented from becoming critical and initiating an explosive chain reaction. Such tests will not be forbidden under a verifiable Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) if it should come into force. It was on this basis that the country declared a unilateral moratorium on testing. Continuation of this moratorium is a precondition to India’s civil nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States.

With K. Santhanam, a former DRDO official who was part of the core group associated with the tests, now stating publicly that the thermonuclear test was a “fizzle”, fresh fodder has been added to the controversy. He first made these remarks on August 24 at an in-house meeting of the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) on the CTBT. He has since reiterated the statement to the media as well. “Based upon the seismic measurements and expert opinion from world over,” Santhanam has been quoted as saying, “it is clear that the yield in the thermonuclear device test was much lower than what was claimed. I think it is well documented and that is why I assert that India should not rush into signing the CTBT.”

Clearly, if there is any credibility to this statement, the government’s premise on the claimed CMD posture and the vacation of nuclear threats, its unilateral moratorium on testing as well as its position on the CTBT would seem shaky. In the wake of President Barack Obama’s apparent reversal of the U.S. stand on the CTBT, there could be increasing pressure on India to sign the treaty. What is important is that Santhanam’s assertion seems to be based on “expert opinion from world over”. Strangely, he does not wish to rely on measurements – seismic as well as other – made by Indian agencies and the rebuttals by DAE scientists of the various external “expert opinions”. His claim would have been more convincing had he presented any scientific counter-evidence to the DAE’s claims or challenged its analyses with an independent set of measurements by the DRDO or by responding to the DAE’s claims in technical terms.

Domestic criticism of the thermonuclear test had come from none other than P.K. Iyengar, former AEC Chairman, way back in August 2000. He wrote: “[T]he fusion core [probably] burnt only partially, perhaps less than 10 per cent.” This comment has been wrongly interpreted by various media commentators to mean that the thermonuclear weapon had fizzled. A thermonuclear weapon has a primary fission (or fusion-boosted fission) trigger and a secondary fusion containing the solid lithium deuteride (LiD). Neutrons from the fission are absorbed by Li in the LiD to yield tritium and helium. The tritium in turn combines with deuterium in situ and undergoes fusion, releasing large amounts of energy. Even in the most advanced thermonuclear weapons, efficiency of the secondary fusion is around 50 per cent.

Arguing that the fusion to fission yield ratio in the Pokhran-II test must have been at best 1:1, Iyengar said that while he had no reason to dispute the yield (of 40+ kt) claimed by DAE scientists, he believed that the burn of the secondary fusion core was likely to have been highly inefficient. That is, the amount of LiD used must have been a great deal more than the optimum. He further argued in favour of more thermonuclear tests to improve the fusion efficiency as well as to increase the fusion to fission yield ratio. Iyengar reiterated the argument in a recent article (New Indian Express, September 2). He has further argued that the fusion yield cannot be derived unambiguously from radiochemical analysis as the methodology is complex and subject to large errors. In reality, however, the design ratio was 2:1, with the yield of the boosted fission trigger being 15 kt. According to Chidambaram, detailed radiochemical analysis, too, had validated this as well as the total yield (Graph 1).

Now, since both Santhanam and Iyengar were privy neither to the design of the weapon nor to the details of the radiochemical analysis and other measurements, their arguments are quite speculative. National Security Adviser M.K. Narayanan, in fact, said in a recent interview (The Hindu, August 30): “First and foremost, DRDO has nothing to do with [this aspect of the] tests…. The measurements are not done by DRDO.” And, in any case, unlike Santhanam now and many Western analysts before him, Iyengar has not questioned the yield itself.

Therefore, the question of whether India should conduct more than one thermonuclear test to improve the efficiency of the weapon and to make its nuclear deterrent more credible, particularly in the context of its no first-use policy, and its relevance to India’s stand on the CTBT, is entirely distinct from the need to do more tests if S1 had been a fizzle. It may even be argued that the bogey of a thermonuclear fizzle is now being raised by those who would like India to conduct more tests and not sign the CTBT. Indeed, as Narayanan said, “I think we are going to face pressures from the international community… [It] is going to say that this is one of India’s very devious methods of preparing for a test, that [our] scientists are saying that was a fizzle, therefore India may find it necessary to prove itself once again. This is my worry. I hope it doesn’t happen.”

Irrespective of the unwarranted fallout of the controversy, it is important to know the exact situation with regard to the yield of the Pokhran-II tests even if the evidence is not enough to settle the issue. The only data pertaining to the tests that are globally available are the seismic signals. On the other hand, data from the other close-in measurements, namely, on-site accelerometer measurements of the ground acceleration, CORRTEX (Continuous Reflectometry for Radius vs Time Experiment) measurement of the two-way transit time (TWTT) of an electric pulse through a coaxial cable (which determines the strength of the advancing shock front from the explosion as a measure of the explosive yield), and the analysis of radioactivity in the explosion debris are available only to the agencies involved in the tests. In fact, the radiochemical data and the capacity to analyse them – considered the most accurate means to calculate the yield – exist with the DAE only. It is reliably learnt that though on May 11, 1998, the DRDO set up its own accelerometer to measure the ground acceleration, the instrument malfunctioned and did not record the associated waveform correctly. An independent internal check in this regard, outside the DAE, would have been possible if this had worked. Much of the controversy with respect to the test yields has, therefore, naturally arisen from the seismic data, which were the first to be recorded over the global seismic networks as signatures of an underground nuclear explosion.

An underground nuclear explosion sends up a shock wave near the point of detonation and a small portion of the total energy released is converted into elastic seismic waves. The efficiency with which the wave energy is transmitted through the medium depends on the nature of the surrounding medium, the source characteristics and the coupling of the medium and the source, which depends on the geophysical properties of the rocks in the vicinity of the explosion site. These seismic waves travel through the body of the earth and also along its surface. The former are called body waves, which include both compressional P waves and shear S waves. P waves travel faster than S waves and also their frequency content is greater. At short distances (less than 2,000 km) body waves travel through the crust and top portion of the upper mantle, and these waves are called regional seismic waves. Beyond 2,000 km, body waves travel through the mantle and the core and are called teleseismic waves. Surface waves include two groups of waves, Rayleigh (R) waves and Love (L) waves. At regional distances, a group of higher mode Rayleigh and Love waves, called Lg waves, arrives at the detector before the fundamental L and R waves.

The energy of seismic sources – a measure of the yield in the case of explosions – is measured using a logarithmic magnitude scale. Three magnitude scales are used: body wave magnitude m(B), surface wave magnitude m(S) and Lg wave magnitude m(Lg). The yield Y of a nuclear explosion (in kt) is given by an empirical relation m = a + b log Y, where a and b are not universal constants but are site specific. To arrive at the value of explosive yield, one needs to measure the magnitude and also use site-specific values of the constants a and b. For m(B) in particular, such well-established relations exist only for a few well-known testing sites of nuclear weapon states. While a varies significantly from site to site, b varies in a narrow range 0.75-0.85.

According to S.K. Sikka, one of the key DAE scientists involved in the Pokhran-II tests, a major reason for Western analysts giving a lower yield is the arbitrary use of an a value of a known site, such as the Russian Shagan river site, for an unknown site such as Pokhran. Owing to the anisotropy and heterogeneities in the earth through which waves travel, m(B) can vary, and given a logarithmic m-Y relation, yield estimates would vary considerably even for small differences in m(B). In practice, assuming that errors in magnitudes arising from differences in propagation characteristics from the source to different seismic stations are random, the magnitude of an event is arrived at by averaging all globally measured m(B) values.

In the case of Pokhran-II, the computation of the average was further complicated because of the simultaneity of the tests, which causes P waves emanating from individual explosions to interfere constructively or destructively depending on the direction of detection with respect to the source geometry. Sikka and associates showed that owing to the interference of P waves from the two large signals S1 and S2, the values of m(B) along the line joining the two shafts (east-west) would be lower compared with m(B) values along north-south. For Pokhran-II, the average m(B) estimates of the networks of the International Data Centre (IDC), Arlington, U.S., and the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) are thus smaller, they argued. After making the necessary corrections, they showed that, as compared to m(B) = 5.0 and 5.2 respectively for IDC and USGS, the correct average value was 5.4. This gave a combined yield value for the May 11 tests to be 58±5 kt (Graph 2).

.........
(Graph 2) -------------------------------------------------------------------- (Table 2)

Soon after the Indian announcements of the test yields, Terry Wallace in Seismological Research Letters (SRL) and Brian Barker and associates in Science questioned the Indian yields. In fact, these two papers continue to be cited to challenge the Indian figures. But in their analysis, Sikka and colleagues had also rebutted their conclusions. First, Wallace and Barker used the average USGS and the IDC values of m(B) respectively to calculate the yields, which, according to Sikka, were inaccurate without including interference effects.

Moreover, both used the formula for the Shagan river site for Pokhran, which was inappropriate. DAE scientists pointed out that the Indian plate was different from the Eurasian plate, and in the absence of a site-specific m-Y relation for Pokhran, it was more appropriate to use the formula for the Nevada test site (NTS) (with a = 4.05 instead of 4.45 and b = 0.77) to calculate the Pokhran yields. Using an m(B) of 5.4, this gives 58 kt (Graph 2).

It must be pointed out that while the seismology community has not accepted the DAE’s argument of interference being significant, there has not been any convincing rebuttal based on detailed analysis either. Wallace’s rejection had been rebutted by DAE scientists who pointed out that his use of USGS stations only amounted to a biased selection as they lay within a narrow angle with respect to Pokhran and interference within them would be negligible. In a 2001 analysis in the Indian journal Current Science, British weapon scientists A. Douglas and others concluded that the effect was small. But they too rejected a number of stations as, according to them, their m(B) measurements were corrupted by the arrival of coincidental earthquakes.

Since there is a great deal of site-specific uncertainty (in a) in the determination of the absolute yield from seismic data and b does not vary significantly in the m-Y relation, the relative yields between two tests for a given site can be evaluated with much greater confidence by using the difference in m(B) values and eliminating a. By measuring the ratio of amplitudes of P waves (see picture) at 13 seismic stations common to both Pokhran-I and II (Table 2), Sikka and others have calculated the average change in m(B) to be 0.45. This, in turn, corresponds to a ratio of 4.46 between the yields of Pokhran I and II. A Pokhran-I yield value of 12-13 kt gives Pokhran-II yield to be 54-58 kt.

Clearly, this method of estimating the Pokhran-II yield critically depends on the Pokhran-I yield. It may be recalled that there is controversy over its value as well. On the basis of an apparent statement made by Iyengar that the Pokhran-I yield was 8-10 kt, this is the value that has generally been used by Western analysts instead of the official figure of 12-13 kt. Some, in fact, believe that it was less than 5 kt. A figure of 2 kt has also been stated.

Clarifying this to this correspondent, Iyengar said that local acceleration measurements at Pokhran had given a value of 10 kt, whereas British weapon scientists had measured an m(B) corresponding to 8 kt. “Therefore, we were very happy that our device had worked with an yield in the ballpark we had estimated,” Iyengar said in an e-mail exchange.

According to Sikka, radiochemical analysis of Pokhran-I had been done and it gave a value of 12 kt. Based on post-shot data such as cavity radius, surface velocity and the extent of rock fracturing, an analysis in 1985 has yielded a value of 12-13 kt. This has been accepted by some Western analysts on the basis of international m(S) measurements (Graph 3). But despite this, people like Wallace continue to use a lower figure for Pokhran-I. Interestingly, however, Wallace himself was a co-author of a report of the IRIS Consortium to the U.S. Senate in 1994 that gives a value of 10-15 kt, according to Sikka.

.........
(Graph 3) ------------------------------------------------------------------- (Graph 4)

However, in a post-1998 analysis for the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), Carey Sublette, while generally agreeing with the arguments of DAE scientists, has pointed out that given Pokhran’s sandstone and shale strata over a water table, the plot of yield versus crater morphology fits better with a Pokhran-I value at 8 kt rather than 13 kt. He then goes on to rely on this value to give a lower estimate of around 30 kt for Pokhran-II. In a comparative analysis similar to that of Sikka and Co., Douglas and associates arrive at 0.37 for the average m(B) difference. This corresponds to a yield ratio of 3.1. With Pokhran-I at 13 kt, this gives a Pokhran-II yield of 40 kt. They prefer to use a value of 8 kt and arrive at a Pokhran-II value of 25 kt.

Given the uncertainties in dealing body wave magnitudes and the possibility of introducing bias in analysing m(B) values, renowned seismologist Jack Evernden prefers to use long-period surface waves. These show less scatter compared with short period P waves. Being waves of longer wavelength (60 kilometres), they are less influenced by the small-scale in homogeneities as well as interference effects. In fact, the relationship is almost independent of the site. Soon after the Pokhran-II tests, Evernden used USGS’ m(S) value and calculated the yield to be in agreement with the Indian claims. It may, however, be pointed out that for Pokhran-II very few stations reported m(S) values. Using an m(S)-Y formula due to J.R. Murphy, the value of m(S) = 3.56 estimated by DAE scientists yields a value of 49 kt. Similarly, the use of a formula due to Evernden and G.E. Marsh yields a value of 52 kt, both of which are consistent with DAE figures.

Notwithstanding Iyengar’s reservations about the method, the most reliable estimate comes from the post-shot radiochemical analysis. It may be pointed out that the U.S. has always relied on radiochemical analysis for estimating its nuclear test yields, rather than seismic data. In a 1999 analysis, DAE scientists claimed that the post-shot radioactivity measurements on samples extracted from the S1 site had confirmed that the fusion secondary gave the designed yield.

This radioactivity, apart from unburnt fissile and tritium, consists of (a) fission products from the trigger and the fission component of the secondary (if present); and, (b) activation products due to the high-energy (14 MeV) neutrons produced by fusion, such as sodium-22 and manganese-54, which are produced much more in fusion than in fission. Graph 4 shows the gamma radiation peaks due to fission and neutron-activation products, which are much higher in the case of the thermonuclear sample than in the case of pure fission samples (Graph 1).

According to Chidambaram’s Atoms for Peace paper, “a study of this radioactivity and an estimate of the cavity radius, confirmed by drilling operations at positions away from ground zero, the total yield as well as the break-up of the fission and fusion yields could be calculated.” The yield estimate by this method was 50±10 kt.

But this too does not seem to satisfy Western analysts. According to Sublette, the radiochemical analysis refers to an entirely different method. He argued that the DAE method had inherent limitations arising from the error in measuring the cavity radius. Values lower than the claimed radius of 40 m would substantially bring down the yield value, he said. The upshot of the ongoing story is that notwithstanding the DAE’s detailed arguments and analyses, doubts continue to persist. But that should not prevent the DAE and the government from carrying out a totally objective internal evaluation of the success or otherwise of Pokhran-II.

Since the present AEC Chairman Anil Kakodkar, who was also part of Pokhran-II team, has stated categorically that no more tests are needed, the current controversy, one hopes, will not drive the country’s polity towards more nuclear tests.

[Arun_S]

Worth full reading:
Prostration as high strategy

Aditya Sinha
First Published : 19 Sep 2009 11:51:00 PM IST
Last Updated : 19 Sep 2009 12:07:21 AM IST

The High Table. In India, this refers to our holy grail: the place for those nations that run the world (similar to the high tables at Oxbridge where the top dons dine). A Pakistani bureaucrat friend of mine once, many years ago, laughed at how we Indians were obsessed playing a larger role in the world (his will certainly not be the last laugh). Jawaharlal Nehru thought we could do it on our own. His was not a bad idea.

Those who have been running India the past few years, however, think differently. Ask Jairam Ramesh. The environment minister told US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton that India would not adopt legally binding targets for reducing carbon emissions. The West wants an international agreement on climate change at Copenhagen in December, but India has proven a difficult customer. Jairam is right: why should we be penalised through trade or sanctions if we miss such targets due to the compulsions of economic growth? You could also argue that legally binding targets are an encroachment on India’s autonomy. Of course, Jairam faces opposition abroad; but he also faces hostility from within the very government he serves.

One of those ranged against him is Planning Commission deputy chairman Montek Singh Ahluwalia, the intellectual Siamese twin of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. They are both economic conservatives in awe of the US. Montek has been going around arguing that it is okay to accept legally binding targets, if that’s what the US wants. His argument: “You’re going to have to do this if you want to sit at the High Table”.

Manmohan and Montek believe India cannot get to the High Table on its own; they are obviously not Nehruvians. The problem is that they also think that it’s okay to concede a bit of sovereignty (though that sounds somewhat like becoming just a bit pregnant) just so that we can sit on the High Table. They think that India can get to the High Table by hanging onto the USA’s coattails.

The problem worsens when you take up a more “muscular” facet of our national identity: our nuclear weapons programme. A major scandal has erupted lately in the allegations about the failure of the test of a thermonuclear device (commonly known as the fusion bomb or Hydrogen bomb) in May 1998. It was one of five Pokhran-II tests; it was the most important of those tests; and apparently, it failed. Several foreign scientists had at that time held that the test was a “fizzle”. (On a personal note, my late friend and physicist Jean-Etienne Duboscq had then emailed me, saying the bomb “flunked”, but some misguided patriotism made me ignore him).

There is no shame in failure on your first Hydrogen bomb test (it happens to everyone). It is shameful, however, if the entire establishment colludes to hush it up. Former Atomic Energy Commission chairman P K Iyengar in the Express on September 2 gave a fascinating and thorough argument about why the tests failed; he boldly asserted that we would need to N-test again. Our own V Sudarshan in these columns the same day called for a peer review of the Pokhran-II tests. The former top DRDO scientist K Santhanam not only called the tests a failure but charged the then National Security Adviser Brajesh Mishra with asking for a vote on the results (rather than taking a hard look at the facts). Now other atomic scientists are asking for a peer review.

The problem with this lack of transparency about our nuclear weapons programme lies in the dwindling options before us. US President Barack Obama has made no secret of his wish to bring into effect a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT); the US in July got the G8 to endorse a ban on enrichment and reprocessing equipment to India, making a mockery of the nuclear agreement with America. It would reasonably appear to some that India is slowly being cornered into severely curbing its nuclear weapons programme. Those who think the Indo-US nuclear agreement is de facto recognition of India as a nuclear power have been premature, if not delusional, in celebrating India’s climb in the world pecking order. This lack of transparency in a worsening global scenario does not portend well, for what is at stake is a bit more than a minor encroachment of India’s sovereignty.

Nuclear weapons are the only entry to the High Table. The recognised nuclear powers are the ones who run the world. It’s a club that abhors newcomers or gatecrashers. And while Montek and Manmohan appear to believe that conceding some of your sovereignty, in a friendly and “responsible” way (as opposed to unfriendly and irresponsible Iran and North Korea), will get you to the High Table, the reality is that without nuclear weapons you are more likely to see the High Table in the way that a waiter or a butler sees the family dining table.

An example of India’s actual clout was its inability to get Shashi Tharoor elected UN Secretary-General. Doubts are expressed whether our external affairs ministry can take on the next project: getting India onto the Security Council as a non-permanent member when three vacancies arise on January 1, 2010. The Cabinet minister, S M Krishna, though not incompetent, has been content to do a paint-by-numbers job. In 120 days at South Block he has not said anything substantive on anything. (Even his threats to snub his Pakistani counterpart on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly next week have lacked menace; Home minister P Chidambaram has been more pro-active on Pakistan.) To add to the surrealism at South Block, Krishna’s junior minister Tharoor has been suffering micro-blogging diarrhoea.

Obviously, hanging onto the US’s coattails can get you a purely-for-show arrest of Hafiz Saeed, but not much else. Getting prosecutions for 26/11 — if you’re able to do so and even that is doubtful, given how “the army will do everything to preserve Lashkar”, as Ahmed Rashid says in the coming issue of The New York Review of Books — does not amount to sitting on the High Table. For that, simply put, you need to have your own proper nuclear weapons programme.

Worryingly, it seems that Manmohan Singh will not give up prostration as national security strategy. Yet this week’s pinpricks by China point to the fact that in the coming decades, we will need an uncompromised nuclear weapons programme if we are to conduct diplomacy as equals with our neighbour. Unfortunately, since the “flunked” test was conducted under the NDA, it does not look as if the BJP in its present form can be a vigilant opposition. Also, Manmohan has got assertive with his allies. There doesn’t appear to be much hope for a peer review of Pokhran-II, or for future nuclear testing. For India, it seems, the atomic clock is ticking.

[email protected]

About The Author;

Aditya Sinha is the Editor-in-Chief of ‘The New Indian Express’ and is based in Chennai

[shiv]

Unfortunately based on newly uncovered information that BR-Agni page is dated and require significant overhaul
.<snip>
From what I know now from multiple independent (public and private) sources, there is no FBF weaponized.

Does this mean that the pages were designed with information from private sources which was different earlier (but has changed now)? After all. public source information about possible weapon configurations has been exactly the same from 1998 until late August 2009 when Santhanam came up with some new observations.

[Arun_S]

• \quote]="ramana" S-2 was pure fission and is stated so many places.[/quote
  
  Wasn't it also stated that this was a weaponized version of the POK-1 device?
  How does a <10kt alleged fizzle produce a 25kt yield?

S2 was weaponized version of the basic design from Pok-I. Of course the Pok-I was a pure fission device with a huge 800 kg (IIRC) mass.
Weaponized design thus resulted in reduced explosives mass , newer neutron trigger and smaller physics package to deliver 12 kT by more efficiently using the fissile pit (not Anil Kalkodkar's sliced layers design that is patented to give lower yield due to material discontinuity along the compressive axis).

Dont be confused by the 25 kT fission number to belong to S2. It belongs to S1 which was almost entirely fission and with barely 7% fusion yield.

------------Added later ------------
Raj Malhotra is talking of discussion of many months ago, where I had asserted that design objective of Pok-I was ~25 kt, where as it yielded ~ 8 kt because of engineering flaws amongst others. The weaponized fission device that was tested as S2 was designed and performed per design, yielding 12 kt.

I never paid much attention to S2 Pure fission weaponized bomb yield issue, and took BARC's claims on that front at face value of 12-15 kT. Now with new data points that I have uncovered (and confirmed) something else that I will share later, but in the mean time my above statement is incorrect, and I retract that with regret.

The correct answer that is based on reality is that S2 (a pure fission weapon) was a weaponized version of 1974 Pok-I and had a yield of 20-22 kT. (In the Op-Ed Santhanm states 20-25 kT).

So Raj Malhotra, you caught it correctly. Thanks for cajoling me in that direction.

[vera_k]

Should also note here that Chapter 5 of Ashley Telllis' book (published in 2001), accurately surmised that there was no FBF.

Clearly, the Indian photographs released of the test sites suggest that some sort of detonation did take place in the shaft where the thermonuclear device was located, but the physical evidence suggests that the fission components of the trigger produced most of the fizzle yield, with failure to boost accounting for the inability to secure the fusion yield that Indian scientists claimed they obtained from this test.

[Arun_S]

Unfortunately based on newly uncovered information that BR-Agni page is dated and require significant overhaul
.<snip>
From what I know now from multiple independent (public and private) sources, there is no FBF weaponized.

Does this mean that the pages were designed with information from private sources which was different earlier (but has changed now)? After all. public source information about possible weapon configurations has been exactly the same from 1998 until late August 2009 when Santhanam came up with some new observations.

Shiv ji: I am sneezing today. The symptom can be due to a variety of pathogens from most benign to deadly. Your one guess from miles away means nothing! No?
Number 3 can be arrived by :

• 1+2 =
  1+1+1 =
  3+1-1 =
  9/3 =
  27/9 =

Your guess means nothing! No?

[Arun_S]

Should also note here that Chapter 5 of Ashley Telllis' book (published in 2001), accurately surmised that there was no FBF.

Clearly, the Indian photographs released of the test sites suggest that some sort of detonation did take place in the shaft where the thermonuclear device was located, but the physical evidence suggests that the fission components of the trigger produced most of the fizzle yield, with failure to boost accounting for the inability to secure the fusion yield that Indian scientists claimed they obtained from this test.

As an aside: Ashley Telllis has remarkable capability to look at pictures and determine failure to boost as the reason for failure to secure the fusion yield.
His NPA friends and fraternity in DoE and NSA could also possibly have that talent.

[enqyoob]

Nuclear weapons are the only entry to the High Table. The recognised nuclear powers are the ones who run the world. It’s a club that abhors newcomers or gatecrashers.

In 2 sentences the author makes it unnecessary to read the rest of his garbage. Japan and Germany, despite being widely hated for killing so many people of other nations, have within 60 years of that become very powerful nations. Switzerland controls the money and dirty secrets of the people who control the world.

[vera_k]

As an aside: Ashley Telllis has remarkable capability to look at pictures and determine failure to boost as the reason for failure to secure the fusion yield.
His NPA friends and fraternity in DoE and NSA could also possibly have that talent.

He is reporting the then assessment of the US establishment. Would explain the Clinton administration's insistence on the CTBT and the no-test clause in the IUCNA.

[shiv]

Shiv ji: I am sneezing today. The symptom can be due to a variety of pathogens from most benign to deadly. Your one guess from miles away means nothing! No?
Number 3 can be arrived by :

• 1+2 =
  1+1+1 =
  3+1-1 =
  9/3 =
  27/9 =

Some people arrive at number 4 when number 2 is the answer. No? You have taken pains to point that out yourself. What is amazing is when pots and pans start fighting and one calls the other black.

[Arun_S]

Nuclear weapons are the only entry to the High Table. The recognised nuclear powers are the ones who run the world. It’s a club that abhors newcomers or gatecrashers.

In 2 sentences the author makes it unnecessary to read the rest of his garbage. Japan and Germany, despite being widely hated for killing so many people of other nations, have within 60 years of that become very powerful nations. Switzerland controls the money and dirty secrets of the people who control the world.

A perfect assessment of a section of the establishment.

Japan, Germany, Switzerland were never colonized and owned by a company. India was virtually owned by the East India Co. This de-humanized the status of Indians making them objects like shoes or a bar of soap. Plus, India is "dark" (i.e. it is not a Caucasian country or an honorary Caucasian country). Japan, an honorary Caucasian country fought the current members of the high table. With this historical burden, what are you talking ?

Didn't France use the argument of its historical experiences when committing to its latest tests in the late 1990's?

High Table=P5 equivalent. Despite their power, Japan and Germany are still dependent on the whims of others! What garbage do you see in the article?

Can India get Saeed extradited? Till then, ............. !

[Arun_S]

NPA's is getting wet dreams, thanks to R.Chidambaram and friends covering up truth from Indian Aam-Aadmi.
India's nuclear power a 'myth'

By Dean Nelson in New Delhi
19 Sep 2009

India's status as a nuclear power has been described as a "myth" by the scientist who carried out its controversial hydrogen bomb tests in 1998. He said the device had only "fizzled". The claims by the test director K Santhanam have provoked an outcry in India which treasures its nuclear status as a symbol of its power in Asia where it has been locked in an arms race with both Pakistan and China.

The Indian Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh recently unveiled India's first nuclear submarine as a statement of its naval ambitions.

But according to K. Santhanam, who directed the secret detonations of five Shakt' nuclear devices at their nuclear test site at Pokhran, in the Rajasthan desert, the true test results were covered up and falsely hailed as a success by the Hindu nationalist BJP government.

At the time the then Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee declared: "India is now a nuclear weapons state. We have the capacity for a big bomb now."

Although he stated India's bomb would never be a weapon of aggression, the tests were widely denounced and provoked retaliation from Pakistan which tested its own nuclear device 15 days later.

But Mr Vajpayee's statement was not true, Mr Santhanam has claimed. The data sent to his office revealed the devices had yielded only around half the 45 kilotons it had claimed.

"The decision to declare the hydrogen bomb a success was more of a political fatwa than a considered scientific-technical determination," he said. He has now called for an inquiry into the test results and warned that the creation of nuclear power could not be "based on myths."

[enqyoob]

Will a 4MT TN test get Saeed extradited, Arun, - or stop the next terrorist attack?

The High Table P5 are all countries that have a history of utterly unrestrained violence against other people. The record of killing and/or enslaving millions in all parts of the world with complete equanimity. THAT and nothing else is the criterion for entry to this bunch.

So a "test", whether it is 200kT or 200MT, won't be adequate. Invading some nation and killing a few hundred thousand of its residents, and calling that the "New Whirled Odor" or "Collusion of the Willing" would be required.

More than that, the willingness to send its own young people in uniform to distant corners of the world to die in large numbers in pursuit of national greed, killing the people there in the thousands.

Sorry, Arun, all this screaming for more useless "Tests" of useless weapons is, sadly, useless. India has no interest in "high chairs" to sit at the High Table of infantile goons.

[csharma]

India needs the nuclear deterrent because it has neighbours like China and Pakistan and that is regardless of whether it wants a seat at the high table. Also, I believe India had approached US for a security umbrella after China had tested nukes in 1964. US had refused and India embarked on getting its own deterrent.


With a sufficient deterrent in place, it's economy has to grow at rapid pace to match China in influence.

The understanding was that with POK II, the deterrent was in place. Now there is some controversy about it. I think that is where we are right now.

[enqyoob]

approached US for a security umbrella

I believe US umbrella came with a nice collar and leash. Plus a few bases inside India. The Umbrella would have had multiple ribs pointing at the other nations in the neighborhood. Maybe even a Headquarters Complex, like what Belgium had with NATO HQ. Politely declined by the leaders who are now loudly condemned as wimps and traitors here, but saw accurately that death was preferable to a return to enslavement. Put the money into training Indian youth to learn the discipline(s) to compete and break through the walls built around us.

Today, however, India is blessed with "nationalist" youth whose courage and discipline does not extend to preparing themselves to fight invaders - they want it done for them by "TNs".

OT, I am sure, but the choice b4 India is still the same as it was in 1998 - more "tests" of Doomsday weapons that will be completely useless in the face of conventional-force invasions by anyone, or spend scarce resources trying to develop conventional deterrents.

Musharraf invaded India in 1999, behind his nuclear deterrent. India had probably a 2-to-1 or more advantage in nuclear weapons. What good did that do? The war still had to be won by Indian soldiers climbing cliffs in the night at 6000 meters with their toes falling off due to frostbite because they had no proper boots.

Tomorrow Bangladesh may invade West Bengal, or China Arunachal Pradesh - and the Pure Fission or Boosted Fission or a ten thousand 1MT nukes all ready to be launched in neat rows in Bihar silos - will similarly not be worth diddly. Because India will never use those. A few more strike aircraft, on the other hand, may work wonders.

[ShauryaT]

------------Added later ------------

I never paid much attention to S2 Pure fission weaponized bomb yield issue, and took BARC's claims on that front at face value of 12-15 kT. Now with new data points that I have uncovered (and confirmed) something else that I will share later, but in the mean time my above statement is incorrect, and I retract that with regret.

The correct answer that is based on reality is that S2 (a pure fission weapon) was a weaponized version of 1974 Pok-I and had a yield of 20-22 kT. (In the Op-Ed Santhanm states 20-25 kT).

So Raj Malhotra, you caught it correctly. Thanks for cajoling me in that direction.

This cannot be good. That means ramana read it right?

[abhiti]

Will a 4MT TN test get Saeed extradited, Arun, - or stop the next terrorist attack?

It seems to me narayanan is onto something. He seems to know a plan to get Saeed extradited, let us hear him. So Mr Narayanan I am all ears for how foregoing a TN test get Saeed extradited? If he doesn't get extradited anyway, why are you bringing it up?

[abhiti]

approached US for a security umbrella

I believe US umbrella came with a nice collar and leash. Plus a few bases inside India. The Umbrella would have had multiple ribs pointing at the other nations in the neighborhood.

You are totally out of your mind if you think US will ever provide India with nuclear umbrella against China. I hope people understand it sooner lest we become another Georgia.

[enqyoob]

Abhiti writes:

I am all ears

Dear All Ears:
Wow! Congratulations! I am so happy for you. Do let us know if you grow other organs.

You are totally out of your mind

Thanks for that logical, cogent argument. I am awed. Coming from someone who is "all ears" (presumably ears are entirely outside mind?) that is indeed a great compliment.

[Sanjay]

ShauryaT - not quite. It means that if Arun is correct then S-2 had a 20KT yield and S-1 had a 27kt yield instead of its planned 45kT. It still means the FBF primary for S-1 worked.

What happened after that is still unclear.

[ShauryaT]

ShauryaT - not quite. It means that if Arun is correct then S-2 had a 20KT yield and S-1 had a 27kt yield instead of its planned 45kT. It still means the FBF primary for S-1 worked.

What happened after that is still unclear.

The gap between the way DRDO seems to have read things for S1 and S2 and the way BARC declared them is indeed wide then. What the hell is going on? Either DRDO is stupid or BARC is hiding!

Also, if S2 was between 20-25 kt, a lower range extrapolation of yield of the 5.2 magnitude registered along with the no crater, shaft not destroyed, and the A frame intact would mean S1 fizzled - completely?

[Arun_S]

------------Added later ------------

I never paid much attention to S2 Pure fission weaponized bomb yield issue, and took BARC's claims on that front at face value of 12-15 kT. Now with new data points that I have uncovered (and confirmed) something else that I will share later, but in the mean time my above statement is incorrect, and I retract that with regret.

The correct answer that is based on reality is that S2 (a pure fission weapon) was a weaponized version of 1974 Pok-I and had a yield of 20-22 kT. (In the Op-Ed Santhanm states 20-25 kT).

So Raj Malhotra, you caught it correctly. Thanks for cajoling me in that direction.

This cannot be good. That means ramana read it right?

That was his first reaction too.

Quick recap:

Code: Select all

Test           Claimed           Actual              Notes

S1 (TN)        43 - 45 kt      27-30        FBF Primary fission = 17,   Fusion 2-3 kt, rest from plug and tertiary
S2             12 - 15 kt      20-25         Pure Fission. Weaponized version of 1974 Pok-I
S3             0.2 kt          As Stated  
S4             0.5 kt          As Stated
S5             0.3 kt          As Stated

May-11 Event    55 kT          47 kT       BARC transferred S2 yield to S1 to make believe fusion. Strong  (Pressure wave) seismic diffraction along azimuth. Minimum will show along axis formed by the two shafts, as ~20 Kt

One would be confounded by an apparent outlier from ARC Karnal (20-25 kT).

Pls note that S2 was ~22 kt (confirms by multiple independent sources). However it was reported by BARC as 12-15 kT, and part of its tonnage transferred (to cover-up) to the beleaguered TN that yielded only 27 kT.

Note that these two almost equal explosions will set a very prominent radial interferometric pattern. And Karnal is located on the axis that sees maximum destructive interference. Quick calculation will show that one would expect ARC to report 20-25 kt. given the relative location of pit and relative orientation to ARC sensors; It is impossible for ARC/Karnal to experience 20-25 kt if one explosion (I.e. the 45 kt S1) was 3 times the other.

At distance of 1 km corresponding to P wave propagation phase distance of ~ 150 degree (anisotropic media).

The S1 and S2 location axis lies at ~ 60 deg N and that axis extends to Karnal which has deep sensor (I.e. P wave) For relative orientation of the S1 & S2 pit pls see:
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world ... an-per.htm

Karnal happens be aligned on the S1-S2 axis thus will see maximum destructive interference (due to 30 degree phase offset) and it will experience a signal corresponding to ~ 20 kT.

This unravels yet another aspect of BARC / Shri R.Chidambram that publicly reported 12 kT yield on S2 (and shifted 8 kt of S2, to S1's 27 kT yield), but as Santhanm reported in his article internally BARC agreed with Santham's seismic instrumentation on S2; and that is the reason I think ARC data ripped the foundation off Chidambram's farce of S2 yield transfer to S1.

But recall my earlier post on the ARC/Karnal data? I pointed this implication few pages earlier:

In 1999 and 2000 I took R.Chidambram's claim of 42 kt for S1 and 15 kT for S2 as Brahma Satya and analyzed the effect of seismic interference pattern on Azimuthal plane. Because one explosion was 3 times bigger than the other, the interference pattern on Azimuthal plane was not as impressive. Thus it did not help me justify why the western sensors read lower value.

From what we know today the S1 and S2 were much more comparable and the seismic energy will radiate out with a very significant ratio between maxima & minima depending on azimuthal orientation.

The above factor should be considered when understanding the ARC's 20-25 kt measurement. Few observations:

• 1) If S1 was 42 kT and S2 was 15 kt, the effect of interference will be less significant and the reading will approach the value of 35-57 kT (actual value dependent on relative azimuth)
  
  2) If OTOH S1 was 27 kT and S2 was 15 kt, the effect of interference will be very pronounced and the reading vary 20-42 kT (actual value dependent on relative azimuth)

I will have to pull out or create afresh ( don't have time for that) my spreadsheet with those calculations

---------------- Self edited to correct spelling mistakes and grammar ---------

[Arun_S]

ShauryaT - not quite. It means that if Arun is correct then S-2 had a 20KT yield and S-1 had a 27kt yield instead of its planned 45kT. It still means the FBF primary for S-1 worked.

What happened after that is still unclear.

The gap between the way DRDO seems to have read things for S1 and S2 and the way BARC declared them is indeed wide then. What the hell is going on? Either DRDO is stupid or BARC is hiding!

Also, if S2 was between 20-25 kt, a lower range extrapolation of yield of the 5.2 magnitude registered along with the no crater, shaft not destroyed, and the A frame intact would mean S1 fizzled - completely?

Sorry I could not craft a reply fast enough, before your anxiety shot up, much like Ramana.
Hopefully my above post will show something.

[samuel]

Arun_S,

anxiety definetely up.

Here, just a quick clarification.

Apparently using m(B) differences for estimating yield linearly, one arrives at a 27-30KT POK-2 yield if POK-1 is assumed to be around 8KT (Please see article shaardula quoted on this page). But if this is an estimate of total site yield and not just S1 part, then perhaps Pok-1 was at ~13KT.

However, in a post-1998 analysis for the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), Carey Sublette, while generally agreeing with the arguments of DAE scientists, has pointed out that given Pokhran’s sandstone and shale strata over a water table, the plot of yield versus crater morphology fits better with a Pokhran-I value at 8 kt rather than 13 kt. He then goes on to rely on this value to give a lower estimate of around 30 kt for Pokhran-II. In a comparative analysis similar to that of Sikka and Co., Douglas and associates arrive at 0.37 for the average m(B) difference. This corresponds to a yield ratio of 3.1. With Pokhran-I at 13 kt, this gives a Pokhran-II yield of 40 kt. They prefer to use a value of 8 kt and arrive at a Pokhran-II value of 25 kt.

Are the yields being calculated by you in anyway tied to the value of POK-1 yield as Sikka et al. seem to have done?

Thanks
S

[ShauryaT]

Sorry I could not craft a reply fast enough, before your anxiety shot up, much like Ramana.
Hopefully my above post will show something.

Thanks for the quick and detailed explanation. Let me sleep it over. Thanks.

[ShauryaT]

But if this is an estimate of total site yield and not just S1 part, then perhaps Pok-1 was at ~13KT.

PKI has confirmed that Pok-I was between 8-10 kt, not above 10. Corresponds well to the 5.0 reading.

[shiv]

ShauryaT - not quite. It means that if Arun is correct then S-2 had a 20KT yield and S-1 had a 27kt yield instead of its planned 45kT. It still means the FBF primary for S-1 worked.

What happened after that is still unclear.

So the total yield was 47 kt in the latest avatar of information available. But it was detected as 25 kt by seismologists the world over.

But here is a question that I have suggested earlier but not asked. Where is the evidence that anything nuclear was done at all on May 13th? Why is Chidambaram so credible about his claims of "sub-kiloton" tests. Western analysts who correctly detected the S1 fizzle did mention that nothing was detected on May 13th and some have mentioned that there is no proof other than India's public statements that anything exploded on that day.

Anyone who believes that any "fission test" was done on May 13th 1998 (making a total of 7 tests as suggested by someone) is basically believing R. Chidambaram's words that something was actually tested. What makes R Chidambaram's word correct about those tests?

There is no proof whatsoever that anything worked. The only "indirect proof" is that K Santhanam has said nothing about those tests. But he has come clean 11 years after S1. Maybe he will later clarify and say that nothing worked on May 13th and it was a bluff.

[Arun_S]

Are the yields being calculated by you in anyway tied to the value of POK-1 yield as Sikka et al. seem to have done?

Thanks
S

All that I am saying is the experienced P-wave at Karnal will be ~20 kt. I left to ARC how they did the measurement and methodology, and assume they were accurate. As one can see their reported 20-25 kt agrees with the expected 20 Kt that is based purely on phase interference of two coherent signal sources separated by ~150 degree phase distance. (Coherent because they were fired at the same time).

[ss_roy]

The intractable problem with India is it's geriatric 'white worshiping' political leaders. Get rid of that generation of leaders (all parties) and things will start to change. No nation has ever changed direction without a change in the type of leadership.. type not faction.

[samuel]

Right, I got/know that interference approach. It's common in acoustics.
And as Shaurya just said, PKI did peg POK-1 at 8 - 10KT. That would be consistent with at least some (the more robust) of the two calculations reported in Shaardula's cited article. But, nevertheless, I am shocked at how primitive these methods are; there seems to be no deconvolution, let alone nonlinear source separation. Irrespectively:

- we should expect no cratering at S1 given the yield and depth and curves in article for hard rock/alluvium.
- but was the s2 depth different (sorry, I must know these things); there we saw a crater there for roughly same yield...(unless mechanisms are different).

what may explain that difference?

[shiv]

Recall that three devices were claimed to have been exploded on May 11th
1) Thermonuclear device
2) Weaponised version of 1974 Pokhran test
3) Subkiloton test.

If number 2 above (weaponized version of Pokhran 1974) gave 20 kt and the total yield detected that day was 25 kt - the India's thermonuclear test yielded about 5 kilotons

How does that fit in with the 60 percent yield of Santhanam? Was the thermonuclear test designed to yield 7 kt? Leave alone fusion - even the fission must have fizzled.

[Arun_S]

Right, I got/know that interference approach. It's common in acoustics.
And as Shaurya just said, PKI did peg POK-1 at 8 - 10KT. That would be consistent with at least some (the more robust) of the two calculations reported in Shaardula's cited article. But, nevertheless, I am shocked at how primitive these methods are; there seems to be no deconvolution, let alone nonlinear source separation. Irrespectively:

- we should expect no cratering at S1 given the yield and depth and curves in article for hard rock/alluvium.
- but was the s2 depth different (sorry, I must know these things); there we saw a crater there for roughly same yield...(unless mechanisms are different).

what may explain that difference?

Depth of S1.

One can also ask why they will go through excuciating pain to bury S1 that deep, that 27 kT shakes up teh top without much destruction?

ARC result had no assumption/speculation on 1974 yield.

[Arun_S]

Somehow, it all comes down to a malaise in the Indian psyche where some haphazard and nebulous conception of something (like a status, an event or an object) automatically translates into a reality. The delusion magnifies till reality slaps them hard in the face! Then, they try to argue that they were ACTUALLY never slapped but they swayed out of the way and all this was part of some great strategy.

Nations that were "owned by a Company" and achieved pseudo-Independence through a transfer of power need to go that much extra to demonstrate that they can and will not allow the past to repeat, and "Log Kya Kahenge" be damned. Have a new series of credible tests and then the "Community of Nations" will come around. Till then, India is confined to the third class compartment.

Even TSP has a better status because for its needs, it has a credible deterrent and a "strategic location". People can laugh at TSP and call it "rent boy". India is behaving in a manner that makes anyone believe that its ultimate objective is to become a "rent boy#2".

No, testing again by itself will not get Saeed extradited or a place at the High Table. But, it will demonstrate strength of National character to face upto unpleasant realities and confront them despite the odds which will lead to this goal!

[Anujan]

In 2 sentences the author makes it unnecessary to read the rest of his garbage. Japan and Germany, despite being widely hated for killing so many people of other nations, have within 60 years of that become very powerful nations. Switzerland controls the money and dirty secrets of the people who control the world.

N^3 -- You should also note that Japan and Germany displayed an ability to dish out as much as they got and a willingness to mobilize their country on a mass scale to perpetrate mass murder. They nearly kicked the musharrafs of the allies. These bring a level of respect. If they had not been accommodated, what is the guarantee that they wont do it again ? (think WW1 germany, followed by WW2 germany)

Think of the guys who missed out. The turks and the persians. Why ?

[shravan]

More scientists back Santhanam on Pokhran II
20 Sep 2009

[ramana]

Instead of going after each other as Kilkenny cats(N^3 you will love this analogy) think of what can India do to reduce the US and world sanctions if there is a need to re-proof.

[Satya_anveshi]

Just wanted to post the contents as it is a hot topic and contents liable for modification.

More scientists back Santhanam on Pokhran II
20 Sep 2009

Express News ServiceFirst Published : 20 Sep 2009 02:10:00 AM ISTLast Updated : 20 Sep 2009 09:41:16 AM IST

NEW DELHI: If the views of certain experts are any indication, disquiet is simmering within the country’s top nuclear scientists as there is an apparent bid to “hush up facts” following the sensational disclosure by fellow professional K Santhanam that the thermonuclear weapon tested in Pokhran 2 was a failure.


A Gopalakrishnan, a former chairman of the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, told Express that BARC ex-director R Chidambaram, who is now Principal Scientific Adv iser to the Government of India, was “obviously indulging in a total misrepresentation of facts” in 1998 when he “encouraged” the then NDA government to tell the country that the blasts in the Rajasthan desert were a success.

“He might have several compulsions that made him say this when he knew the true facts. He must have been motivated partly by personal glory,” claimed Gopalakrishnan.

Chidambaram went on to receive the Padma Vibhushan after the May 11 tests.

“All this shows the DAE has been misleading the public and lying on issues. Not only in this instance, but in matters of nuclear safety and independence of safety regulations,” the 72-year-old expert maintained, adding “there are many other instances where an organisation like the AERB has been under pressure from both the PMO and the DAE to distort safety-related investigations.” He said A P J Abdul Kalam, oper ational in-charge of the blasts who later became the country’s president, possessed “very little knowledge” of nuclear weapons or the designs and physics behind them. “Also, he had only a peripheral role in the tests. But the public has since been led to believe Kalam is an expert.” The basic question in any scientist’s mind, Gopalakrishnan says, was “how one can extrapolate or modify a weapon design from the data on one single test — even if it were successful, which in this case was not”. He endorsed the setting up of a peer review for determining the efficacy of the Pokhran 2 thermonuclear device, which Dr Santhanam, a senior DRDO scientist, said failed to perform.

Dr Gopalakrishnan called for a technological committee comprising of international experts to review the “methodology used by Chidambaram and his colleagues to establish their claims”. Dr Chidambaram and S K Sikka — both weapon designers for the thermonuclear device — should “present their methodology to a technical committee involving international experts too. After that you should have a national peer review”.Another former BARC scientist, with intimate knowledge of weapons designing, expressed the doubt whether anybody in BARC had a fullscale understanding of a thermonuclear device.

“The service chiefs should put their foot down and not accept the thermonuclear weapon even if it has been weaponised,” he noted, pointing out that repeated tests for assurance was normal in any scientific endeavour.

BARC ex-head P K Iyengar, a former chairman of the Atomic Energy Board, had argued in an Express article on September 2 that there was need to conduct further tests. Dr Santhanam’s disclosure showed that there was no big explosion of the kind the government claimed, he added.

Another former BARC scientist declared that everybody involved in Pokhran 2 “ought to be cross-examined under oath by a retired Supreme Court judge to get to the bottom of the matter”.

Earlier, Dr Santhanam had pointed out that shaft in which the device was detonated in Pokhran remained undisturbed and “totally intact” after the explosion. And the A Frame, which had a winch to lower personnel and equipment into the shaft for the experiment also escaped the allegedly 45 kilotonne explosion completely unscathed.

Whereas in the case of the smaller fission device, which was tested the same day, the shaft was destroyed and the explosion left a crater 25 metres in diameter. Santhanam argues that if the TN weapon functioned, the crater would have been about 70 meters in diameter.

[samuel]

ok, that clarifies many doubts Arun. Many thanks.
I am ready to do a simulation of this scenario.
My notes:
** The yield calculations do not rely on pok-1 or some other basin, but values consistent with pok-1 pegged at 8-10KT.
** cratering was due to depth difference. s1 was designed for higher yield than s2, nearly twice!
** there is little difference in total yield by internal calculation, it is the apportioning of that to s1-s2 where huge differences lay.

** There remain shiv's external measurement questions -- An article above discusses some of the machinations and rebuttals, e.g. various constants used, but I will try to get in touch with folks at USGS and see if we can pull some data/notes from them.

S

[Anujan]

Instead of going after each other as Kilkenny cats(N^3 you will love this analogy) think of what can India do to reduce the US and world sanctions if there is a need to re-proof.

ramana
Thinking can along three directions

Thread 1: (Objective is to get the bum with minimum takleef) Why does China get away with anything it does ? Tinamen, Spy plane, Tibet, Xinjiang ityadi. It is because they are economically powerful and so integrated into the world economy that they can retaliate in umpteen possible ways. So we will wait till we become economically prosperous and then do whatever we please. We will be sanction proof in 25 years.

Thread 2: (Objective is to sit on the "high table", bum may be traded for that) Nukes are not needed. We have enough to deter Pakistan. Desh-wide nuclear bombing will not occur and is a cold war construct. Lets cooperate with powers that be, maintain the non-proliferation regime and grow economically.

Both are fallacious

Thread 3: (Objective is to explode a bum on the "high table") Test and test now. If sanctioned, bring down the non-proliferation regime by promising weapons cooperation with all countries who get out of the NPT. Realize that all the countries on the "high table" are not respected for their adherence to morality, but a single minded pursuit of their national objectives at the cost of one or more nations.

If you accept three axioms

1. Our security is guaranteed only by a minimum level of force. The danger of SDREs being wiped off due to a nuclear attack is very real
2. The behavior of others are aimed solely at safeguarding their interests. This frequently affects our security. This type of behavior by others have not been moderated by our inaction, cooperation or morally guided actions.
3. Guaranteeing prosperity at a national level brings with it a level of takleef that cannot be avoided.

Then the conclusion is clear. Its time we became bullies. The fault is entirely of the world.