China Military Watch - Jan 11, 2011

Misraji · Post by **Misraji** » 15 May 2011 22:32

^^^
Not much but something:

http://china-pla.blogspot.com/2009/08/w ... aryag.html
http://t3.gstatic.com/images?q=tbn:ANd9 ... sH_OsJmZuj

~Ashish

yantra · Post by **yantra** » 16 May 2011 01:42

manum wrote:more you wait...less is the chance of war...and then it happens...
If you start analyzing all the data in the world then you'll be never be able see a war happeing in all the sanity...
War is anything but sanity...so Lets keep guessing what China can do, and why, when,where it can go to war...worst thing to happen is to buy an idea that war is unreasonable in all the respect...
So lets generate more possibilities of biiter battle...
Consider a situation war is inevitable in some time

Agree all wars are insane - but you have to look at your window of opportunity; so will the enemy. What would that window be for China, and vis-a-vis that, what would be India's state of preparedness? I am sure China would not attack us randomly with a hope that they would win. It is always a calculated assault at the point in time we are the weakest - or the opportunity for them the highest. What/when would that point be? And how do we counter our weaknesses and play on our strengths? Very few attacks happen during the change of guard at the top or the time preceding it? Or no? When during the next 10 or 20 yrs would China attack, if at all? How would India counter it at each time-frame and with what?

Accepting that there is going to be a war - when is it likely to be - will give us a window to predict the possible scenarios and out comes. Without constructing the when, where and how, it is just going to be a fairy tale.

JMT

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 16 May 2011 03:43

Chinese "attack" is unlikely. They will huff and puff and try to bring AP down. But, I doubt they will actually attack.

I would like to think that IF China has an encounter of the 4th kind with India that a plan to take most of the islands in the China and other seas diminishes. I suspect that China's first priority is to take Taiwan without a fight. IF that happens then they need to take on the various nations in "their" sea. Only then could they divert their attention to India.

I think all this alla-ballo is to ensure that they have access to the Arabian Sea via Pakistan. Which is why I would demand that Pakistan is broken up. A broken Pakistan is a big crush to China's designs. But then who listens to me?

yantra · Post by **yantra** » 16 May 2011 05:43

NRao - do not worry

You have company and by the billion(s)

We just do not have the "political will" - meaning the top 10 of the country do not agree. Rest all are with you!

Yes, Taiwan is the prize catch for China. They will put their best out there for it and in the bargain, if they can steal AP, or some other land else where, they will. Yes, they need to secure land route to Arabian Sea and Central Asia (Afghanistan, etc). They are trying to needle and nudge India to throw them out of the game/not be an impediment.

If they do want to attack India, then their window is very small - the next 4-5 years. And it is really not worthwhile for them to take that chance!

VinodTK · Post by **VinodTK** » 16 May 2011 05:50

India, China move towards holding joint military exercises

The indications emerged on the eve of the meeting between Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Chinese President Hu Jintao in Sanya and amid apparent Chinese moves to reverse its two-year-old policy of granting stapled visas to Indian nationals hailing from Jammu and Kashmir.

"The joint exercises would be held," a source said here when asked whether the military exercises will resume.

The source pointed out that some level of defence contact like border flag meeting had always been maintained even after high-level military exchanges were suspended after the Northern Army Commander Lt Gen BS Jaswal was given a visa on a loose sheet because he was serving in the state.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 16 May 2011 07:08

All war is a gamble. The best military strategists are able to tweak the gamble to reach a conclusion that can be declared as favorable for them (even if historic analysis shows that it was not, strictly speaking, a victory).

Unfortunately these details are lost in the telling of the story in historic records which say that "X defeated Y in war and ascended the throne of Bingabang."

Supposing no further India-China war occurs for the next 200 years - what will history books say about 1962? Most likely it will be referred to as a short inconclusive was that left China in occupation of some territories claimed by India while leaving Indian in occupation of some territories claimed by China. This is the "current truth" never mind the gory details of how Aksai Chin was taken by China. But what about the East? Mao was a clever strategist. Why did he not solve the problem once for all and take Arunachal Pradesh (or NEFA) as it was then called.

Clearly Chinese strategy was not aimed at solving all problems. It was a quick territory grab followed by withdrawal from places that were probably judged to be difficult to hold. Why did China withdraw at all and not advance? Any Indian will be able to write an entire book on how India was so weak that the Chinese could have got away with it. Clearly the Chinese did not say it that way. The Chinese probably realised that the air force had not been used yet and that the US was sending air forces into India for intervention which would have made life difficult for the invaders in the east.

So they held on to what they got where they could and withdrew from other areas making it seem like this was a victorious withdrawal. All in all the Chinese plan was a good one that gave China some gains and a sense of victory - leaving India with some losses and a sense of defeat.

1947-48 too was a "quick grab of territory" in Kashmir with the war being ended by Nehru taking it to the UN. It is ironic that while the territories of the recalcitrant Nizam and those of Goa were retaken under Nehru's watch, large chunks were lost in the North - particularly in Kashmir. Nehru was the weak leader. Shastri was not weak. Indy Gandhi was not weak. PVNR was not known to be weak. Vaypayee was not known to be weak although he showed clear weaknesses (in retrospect)

MMS has the reputation of being weak. That begs the question of how much individual weakness matters when there is national strength. No matter how weak MMS may be - he has not given away as much territory as Nehru. Both Shastri and Indira Gandhi had to barter away some territorial gains. But both Shastri and Indira were left with a nation reeling from war. One war (1965) was not lost and was a marginal "success" while 1971 was an outright victory. Both left India in a weak state requiring it to give concessions from a position of post war weakness.

The lesson may well be summed up in a series of well known cliches (pardon me if I misquote some of them)
1. The more you sweat in peace the less you bleed in war
2. Speak softly and carry a big stick
3. Heroes die, cowards survive

War between India and China will leave both India and China weaker.

Let me draw a comparison with a boxing natch:

Two boxers spar for a while - and one is declared the winner. At the end both are tired and bleeding, but only one guy wins. Neither is in a position to fight another match at that moment. If, at that moment a third boxer (and maybe a fourth) enters the ring and starts to hit the winner or the loser - he stands to win easily. If China and India exhaust themselves in a war someone else will gain. Neither the Chinese or are we Indians stupid. For war to occur - some extraordinary circumstances must come into play that makes it advantageous for India or China to start a war. But we must prepare to defeat china in a war that China starts without waiting for those "extra ordinary circumstances" to occur. Regarding India starting a war against China to reclaim - say Aksai Chin - I see that as an interesting exercise for forum jingos.

UBanerjee · Post by **UBanerjee** » 16 May 2011 18:37

Supposing no further India-China war occurs for the next 200 years - what will history books say about 1962? Most likely it will be referred to as a short inconclusive was that left China in occupation of some territories claimed by India while leaving Indian in occupation of some territories claimed by China. This is the "current truth" never mind the gory details of how Aksai Chin was taken by China. But what about the East? Mao was a clever strategist. Why did he not solve the problem once for all and take Arunachal Pradesh (or NEFA) as it was then called.

Clearly Chinese strategy was not aimed at solving all problems. It was a quick territory grab followed by withdrawal from places that were probably judged to be difficult to hold. Why did China withdraw at all and not advance? Any Indian will be able to write an entire book on how India was so weak that the Chinese could have got away with it. Clearly the Chinese did not say it that way. The Chinese probably realised that the air force had not been used yet and that the US was sending air forces into India for intervention which would have made life difficult for the invaders in the east.

Exactly - the Chinese crafted their political goals intelligently and did not overextend. Taking bigger portions of NE was "possible" in the physical sense but could easily be counterproductive. When greed and hope trump wisdom, it is easy to throw away an advantage. It was easy to read too much into Indian "weakness", which was somewhat deceptive.

Germany's occuption of Alsace-Lorraine provides an example of what can go wrong.

manum · Post by **manum** » 16 May 2011 19:30

so from text of shiv...I am guessing our CSD is deriving its formulation from what Chinese did to us? This is exactly CSD is based upon...

yantra · Post by **yantra** » 17 May 2011 02:24

Looks like China has border dispute with most neighbors, if not everyone. Importantly, how many of them have the capability to respond in kind, in case of a Chinese aggression? Except for Russia, no one has long-range missiles, nuclear arms, a strong air-force, etc.. Should they only hope and pray Unkil defends them?

http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/china ... putes.html

India

...
Russia

A dispute involving three islands on the rivers that form the border between China and Russia was resolved in October 2004, in a manner King Solomon would have been proud of.

....

Japan

The Senkaku Islands are five unpopulated islands in the East China Sea with a total are of seven square kilometres. They are under Japanese control and are considered part of the Japanese Southwest Islands, but the People's Republic of China and Taiwan each claim them as well, calling them the Diaoyutai Islands and Diaoyu Islands, respectively.
....

Taiwan

The People's Republic of China claims Taiwan, but it is administered by the Republic of China. For more see Taiwan.

Tibet

The Government of Tibet in Exile claims not only the Tibet Autonomous Region under the control of China, but also Qinghai province and parts of surrounding provinces. Tibet in Exile calls the Chinese control of Tibet an illegitimate occupation. For more see the Tibet timeline.

Other disputes

Portions of China's western border with Tajikistan haven't been defined.

A section of the boundary between China and North Korea in the Baitou Mountain area is indefinite....

The Paracel Islands in the South China Sea are administered by China, but claimed by Vietnam and Taiwan. There is also a dispute between China and Vietnam over the maritime boundaries in the Gulf of Tonkin.....

The rich fishing rights and possible oil reserves of the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea are claimed by China, Taiwan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam and possibly Brunei.

chackojoseph · Post by **chackojoseph** » 17 May 2011 23:23

Word is already out that Russians will fail to revive themselves. Chinese will eat up the resources in the Russian far East. Logically, Chinese will get a clout in the Russian decision making. Chinese will dictate the new Asian Order.

RamaY · Post by **RamaY** » 17 May 2011 23:26

^ Did you read Parag Khanna lately?

chackojoseph · Post by **chackojoseph** » 17 May 2011 23:28

Never heard of him , if you are asking me.

RamaY · Post by **RamaY** » 17 May 2011 23:35

Yes. He wrote a book "the next century" or something like that.

Yes, china is migrating populations under the garb of trade. It needs to be seen how far they can extend. It all depends on Russian Demographics and leadership.

manum · Post by **manum** » 17 May 2011 23:38

well he made a presentation on TED.com [youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XRWTyUVh0BQ[/youtube]

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XRWTyUVh0BQ heard him long back.

Please help me with Youtube video's never able to put them in here...

VinodTK · Post by **VinodTK** » 18 May 2011 03:37

^^^ Here you go stick the number after 'v' between You tube quotes

vina · Post by **vina** » 18 May 2011 07:17

shiv wrote:hmmm - clearly there is a lot more that is underwater that helps this thing float. I tried asking my uncle to show me a pic of the Varyag out of water. But no luck. My uncle does tell me that the Varyag displaced 67,000 tons. This ship looks a lot less - its floating so high.

A lot more weight is going to have to be added to equip this boat if it is to float anywhere near the water mark line. Thousands of tons more I would guess. Some of it will be fuel. I don't know if they put ballast in such ships. But I am guessing it's going to have a lot more stuff installed. I don't think men, food and aircraft weigh much. 1000 men - and their stuff - 100 tons. 30 aircraft - Su 27 class - 1000 tons.

This ship is going to need some sea-going trials first.

There is a ship just next to the Varyag that is fully out of the water. Either it is supported on a solid support below or on some kind of floats. I wonder if the Varyag too has some such stuff - its only meters away

You are right. The ship is so high out of the water I would think that it basically is in similar condition as it was when floated out of Ukraine (other than the paint job and refurbishing etc). I think it lacks the propulsion machinery (boiler, steam turbine, shafts, props, I cant see the props which you will see if the ship is so high out of the water, go to a port after a cargo ship has unloaded or as it is launched after building, you can see props sticking out of the water).. Yeah. The bulk of the internal outfitting of machinery is not done yet. I am not sure if the Chinese have the capability to install that class of steam/ gas turbines to drive the ship! Maybe imports of Zorya gas turbines from Ukraine is in order ?.

As it looks like, the ship is a long long way from going out on it's own power even for harbor and basic sea trials.

chackojoseph · Post by **chackojoseph** » 18 May 2011 08:42

There are a lot of cables around the ship which is going into water. Its my speculation that Chinese are using cables to hold it firm.

Thanks folks for pointing out Parag Khana reference. will read them.

abhishek_sharma · Post by **abhishek_sharma** » 18 May 2011 12:10

Sizing the Chinese Military
Asia Policy (July 2007)

By Bernard D. Cole

Rightsizing the People’s Liberation Army Navy: How Much Naval Force Will Beijing Deploy by 2016?

The current Chinese navy—the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)—has since its founding in 1949 labored as an adjunct of the army. It was not until the end of the Cold War and the removal of the Soviet threat that Beijing felt able to direct significantly increased defense resources to modernizing what has throughout its existence been a marginally effective coastal defense force. .... The PLAN of 2016, at three times its present size, will dominate East Asian navies—with the possible exception of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF)—and will offer a very serious challenge to the U.S. Navy when it operates in that region’s waters. Present trends indicate that by 2016 the Chinese navy will allow Beijing to exert hegemonic leverage in maritime East Asia. This essay offers a brief review of PLAN development to 2016.

The Current Composition of the PLAN

China’s surface ship force is on the leading edge of current PLAN modernization. The PRC has launched new ships every year since 2000, following the adoption of a more deliberate but well-funded ship design and commissioning program during the 1990s. Particularly conspicuous are two ship types—destroyers and frigates—both of which are armed with very capable antisurface ship cruise missiles (SSM). The ship classes are all designed to be multi-mission capable, which means they are assigned missions across the spectrum of naval warfare areas, especially antisurface ship warfare (ASUW), antisubmarine warfare (ASW), and antiaircraft warfare (AAW). The ship-building programs launched by the PLAN at the dawn of the
21st century reflect both new confidence in and expertise of the Chinese warship construction industry. China has recently launched three new classes of destroyers and one new class of frigate. The Luyang I, Luyang II, and Luzhou
class destroyers are all gas-turbine powered ships designed with some stealth characteristics and intended to provide the PLAN for the first time with ships capable of area AAW defense.

Submarine Force --- China is currently building and deploying a new class of nuclear attach submarine (SSN), the Shang class. Two of these boats are currently operating, with at least one more under construction. The Shang
strongly resembles the 1980s Soviet-designed Victor III class SSN, although no doubt in comparison it is much modernized. The Shang has been compared to the U.S. Los Angeles class SSN, which although now 30 years old, continues
to form the bulk of the U.S. submarine force. The PLAN has never succeeded in deploying a nuclear-powered
submarine with nuclear-tipped inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBM). The Xia class fleet ballistic missile (FBM) submarine was constructed in 1987 but apparently never regularly patrolled, probably due to engineering problems.

China is building a new FBM: the Type 094, or Jin class. Beijing seems determined to have more than one “leg” to its nuclear deterrent force. A contributing factor may be the desire of the PLAN to have a role in this mission, although FBMs are subject to command and control of the Chinese national command authority (operating through the Second Artillery) and
are not directly under the control of the PLAN. China already deploys the world’s most formidable force of conventionally
powered submarines (SS). At least twelve Songs have been commissioned or are in production. This class appears to be the PLAN’s indigenously produced, conventionally powered submarine of choice for the first three decades of the
21st century. China has also purchased twelve Russian-built Kilo class boats, an SS that hitherto has been one of the very best in the world.

Naval Aviation --- The primary aviation strength of the PLAN lies in its shipborne helicopter fleet. Sixty or so aircraft of either French or Russian design are deployed, most of them on board ship. All fixed-wing aircraft are based ashore, including approximately 48 of the Su-30 fighter-attack aircraft that China has purchased from Russia. This is the PLAN’s only truly modern tactical aircraft, although the 18 JH-7s and 120 J8IIs are the result of indigenous attempts to produce a contemporary fighter aircraft.

China’s naval aviation force—People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF)— also deploys Soviet-designed B-6 bombers employed primarily as vehicles for launching anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM). The PLAAF’s relatively weak patrol and ASW aviation force—with approximately two dozen H-5 and H-6 aircraft operating—apparently continues to provide China’s primary airto-air refueling and electronic warfare aircraft for maritime missions.

Personnel and Training --- The PLAN has during the past decade and a half significantly revised its system of educating and training enlisted technicians. ...

A similar phenomenon is occurring in the PLAN’s officer corps. To expand its base of available, qualified officer candidates, the PLAN has during recent years established several officer accession programs similar to the U.S.
Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC). ...

Looking Toward the Future

The PLAN understands the importance of personnel education and training. Just a decade from now, PLAN personnel will be better educated, more thoroughly trained, and at least as patriotically dedicated to their mission as their predecessors. Meanwhile, platform and material modernization is occurring across all PLAN communities: aviation, surface, and subsurface.
The subsurface community has clearly been selected by Beijing, however, to serve as China’s primary instrument of naval force.

The 2006 white paper on China’s defense continues the strong indications the 2004 white paper gave of the PLAN’s increased stature and perceived value in the eyes of Beijing’s decisionmakers. The national military strategy of
“active defense” includes the navy, which is described as “aim[ing] at gradual extension of the strategic depth for offshore defensive operations and enhancing its capabilities in integrated maritime operations and nuclear counterattacks.” The navy is charged with “build[ing] itself into a modern maritime force…of combined arms with both nuclear and conventional means of operation” and is described as integral to China’s efforts to improve logistics by establishing across the armed services an integrated system of “materials procurement and management.”

China is determined to continue naval modernization across the spectrum: ships, submarines, aircraft, and personnel. The emphasis on improving amphibious and surface combatant forces underscores China’s concern with the Taiwan situation, while the importance of improving joint operational and long-range precision strike capabilities implies direct concern over possible U.S. intervention in that situation. A number of such key strategic regions for China are outlined below.

Taiwan --- China’s number one geostrategic concern is Taiwan’s status. ...

The East China Sea --- The East China Sea is China’s front porch, vital for national defense. These waters contain the nation’s most important fishing grounds, may be the site of rich energy deposits, and are the scene of a sovereignty dispute with Japan. This dispute concerns the Daoyutai (in Chinese) or Senkaku (in Japanese) Islands, a cluster of barren, uninhabited rocks claimed by both nations. Although equidistant (170 km) from the Japanese Ryukyu Islands and Taiwan, the Daoyutai are located on China’s continental shelf as it is defined in the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea (UNCLOS). The Chinese navy of 2016, given even moderate progress, will be able to operate in an East China Sea scenario with surface and air forces that have trained and exercised together, can communicate among units and with
shore stations effectively and in real time both verbally and via computer, share integrated systems, and operate in accordance with commonly accepted tactical doctrine. The continuing submarine modernization program in which
Beijing is so heavily investing will enable China to divide the East China Sea into submarine operating areas assigned to at least 24 modern submarines armed with very effective cruise missiles capable of submerged launch.

Malacca --- Speaking in 2004 President Hu Jintao noted China’s “Malacca dilemma.” He was referring not only to “indigenous” problems such as piracy but also to the possibility of the United States having a “choke hold” on China’s
seaborne energy imports, 80% of which flow through Malacca. Should Beijing decide that the PLAN must be capable of defending South China Sea SLOCs (sea lines of communication) and the Malacca Strait, China would have to make extremely large investments in material and personnel resources, since the Chinese navy is incapable today of carrying out such
a mission. The navy would have to increase the number of state-of-the-art warships from the less than twenty currently deployed to at least double that number.

Conclusion

Driven by the pursuit of national security objectives that are clearly dominated by the goal of Taiwan’s reunification with the mainland, China has over the past decade and a half embarked on a process of PLAN modernization that is sure to extend over the next decade. Currently boasting the world’s most formidable force of conventionally powered submarines, China has been building and deploying a new class of nuclear attack submarine and has launched a ship-building program that each year since 2000 has produced new ships designed to be multi-mission capable. While this ship-building program has demonstrated the increasing expertise of Chinese warship construction, modernization of China’s naval aviation force (although including attempts to produce a contemporary fighter jet) has progressed at a less impressive
pace. These PLAN modernization efforts, combined with a revised approach to education and training of navy personnel, will by the year 2016 put the Chinese navy in position to not only dominate other navies in the East Asian
region but pose a challenge to the U.S. Navy as well. 

nits · Post by **nits** » 18 May 2011 12:50

What will happen in 10 years time when China is even stronger? More of same. We will be stronger too. And with any luck we may not have any Pakistan to bother about.

Shiv sir - Loved that line.... Insha Allah

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 18 May 2011 13:21

chinese seem fond of using radomes over their smaller radar/EW gear kind of like UK/France ships of a older 1980s vintage did. perhaps it gives a more sun tzu psyops approach as in you never know what changes or new kit lie under the kimono?
still doesnt hide the fact that the old russian problem of each eqpt having its own radar/EW (seen in indian ships too) vs truly multifunctional modules and antennas continues to affect all three (Rus, Ind, Chn) - the kirov, kiev, moskva classes were a series of stepped 'verandahs' rising up from deck, each housing a radar/missile complex.

Shrinivasan · Post by **Shrinivasan** » 19 May 2011 09:36

Clearly Chinese strategy was not aimed at solving all problems. It was a quick territory grab followed by withdrawal from places that were probably judged to be difficult to hold...

Exactly - the Chinese crafted their political goals intelligently and did not overextend...

Chinese withdrew from NEFA because it was clearly accepted the world order as Indian Territory, the territories captured by China in J&K (Aksai Chin) we held for 2 reasons.

1) Watershed and proximity to Pak
2) J&K was (and is still) considered a disputed territory between India and Pak

As you both rightly said, it was a quick land grab... thinking of these two pieces, NEFA would have been an easier territory to manage than Aksai Chin considering closeness to Lhasa as well as Terrain.

Austin · Post by **Austin** » 19 May 2011 09:53

China general says his military no match for U.S

"Although China's defense and military development has come a long way in recent years, a gaping gap between you and us remains," Chen said through a Chinese interpreter. He added, "China never intends to challenge the U.S."

Chen made a similar point later at a Pentagon news conference with his American counterpart, Navy Adm. Mike Mullen.

"I can tell you that China does not have the capability to challenge the United States," he said, adding that China's wealth and military strength pales in comparison with that of the United States. He said China's navy is 20 years behind the U.S. Navy.

Chen's remarks were in line with China's strategy of countering U.S. fear of China as a military threat by emphasizing the limited scope of its military reach and advancing efforts to cooperate in areas like counterterrorism and anti-piracy. Chen said he invited Mullen to make his first visit to China as Joint Chiefs chairman.

Chen and Mullen announced several agreements, including a plan for the U.S. and Chinese militaries to conduct jointly a humanitarian assistance and disaster relief exercise in 2012. They also agreed to use a special telephone link to maintain communication between their offices.

The general told reporters that China's recent boost of investment in military power is "compensatory in nature," making up for decades during which modernizing the Chinese economy was given the first priority. Washington often complains that China is too secretive about the purpose and exact scale of its military buildup.

To illustrate his point that China is not a threat, even to Taiwan, Chen noted that some Americans have demanded that China remove or withdraw ballistic missiles positioned on its southeastern coast, across from Taiwan.

"I can tell you here responsibly that we only have garrison deployment across (from) Taiwan, and we do not have operational deployment, much less missiles stationed there," Chen said.

In his speech at the National Defense University, Chen said he was optimistic about the future of U.S.-China military relations, which have suffered repeated setbacks. Early last year China angrily cut off most military-to-military contacts after the United States announced a $6.4 billion arms sale to Taiwan, the self-governing island that China considers a renegade province.

Under the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, which partly defines U.S. relations with Taiwan and China, the Pentagon is obliged to provide Taiwan sufficient defensive arms to ensure its security. In his remarks at the Pentagon, Chen said some U.S. lawmakers, whom he did not cite by name, had told him it is time for the Congress to review that law.

Chen said the U.S. needs to respect China's "core interests," which he said include issues of national unity like Taiwan. The Taiwanese, he said, are considered by all Chinese as "our compatriots and blood brothers and sisters."

The general equated China's position on Taiwan to President Abraham Lincoln's commitment to preserving the Union. Chen quoted Lincoln as saying, "The Union is unbroken."

Asked about Taiwan's long-standing request to buy U.S. F-16 combat aircraft, Chen said such a sale would hurt U.S.-China military relations, but he was not specific. He asked rhetorically why Taiwan would need to buy American weapons if the U.S. sincerely believes its stated policy that Taiwan is part of China.

Chen appeared to question the validity of the U.S. position favoring Taiwan's eventual peaceful reunification with China. He recounted a conversation earlier Wednesday with Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton in which she repeated the U.S. position that "there is only one China in the world and Taiwan is part of China."

He said he told Clinton: "I've heard that comment, that statement, since I was a schoolboy, and I'm hearing the same thing now I'm approaching my retirement age. I wonder when can I really see the reunification of my motherland."

Chen, chief of the general staff of the People's Liberation Army, is leading a delegation of eight Chinese generals on a weeklong visit to the United States. Also on the delegation's itinerary this week are the Army's Fort Stewart, Georgia, the Navy's base at Norfolk, Virginia, and Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada.

rajrang · Post by **rajrang** » 19 May 2011 10:35

shiv wrote: Your objection is valid. In case you missed that part of my post - when 3-4 divisions (say 60,000 men) attack - the actually "cutting edge" of men who are in the frontline doing the shooting/fighting is only about 10,000. the rest are rear echelons. This is true for every army. But I deliberately repeated the point because most people (and possibly you too, i don't know) think that 3-4 divisions means 50,000 men doing the running down slope shooting. If you want 50,000 men attacking, you need 200,000 in the rear.
.

Shiv,

I was under the impression that the teeth to tail ratios were in the region of approximately 0.7 give or take 0.1. Then the 60,000 men would be divided into 24,000 shooting and 36,000 backing them up. So, your figure of 10,000 out of 60,000 doing the shooting is a surprise to me. I would also assume that this ratio will depend upon the nature of a division - namely, armored, infantry (for plains), infantry (for mountains), artillery etc. Can you point me to some source of such information? Thanks!

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 19 May 2011 10:43

long back I read some figures like teeth:tail as being 1:10 for IA, 1:4 for USA and 1:3 for soviet union. and ofcoure it depends on nature of division, how long is its logistical tail, how strong are its logistics and how high its rate of consumption of POL/ammo/food/medicines. methods of counting could also differ for admin reasons or for psyops H&D.

I would imagine our teeth:tail is actually 'better' than USA because we fight close to or on the border and do not have the giant logistical tail the US deploys. the old soviets had this ruthless motto of throwing everything and the kitchen sink into H-hour and only those units that achieved breakthroughts would be resupplied and reinforced, with OMGs passing through the gaps opened into the rear, the rest would be run into the ground and expected to tie up enemy units as best as they could before attrition would render them combat ineffective and third line units would replace them...by which time they expected the OMGs to have done the damage, collapsed large frontages and be in a position to dictate the course of things.

Paul · Post by **Paul** » 19 May 2011 10:48

Per V Longer Teeth:Tail ratiowas 62:38 in the 1960s IA

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 19 May 2011 10:57

iirc the chinese use the ussr heacount and nomenclature for army and af - which means their divisions are around 10k people vs 15-25k in india/west and AF reports in terms of regiments rather than squadrons/wings.
better to compare raw nos hence, rather than dhoti shiver at "X divisions within Y hrs" in tibet.

avg ASL in tibet being 10,000ft with passes at higher alt, I think for serious ops you need people to be there 2 weeks atleast for acclamatization....(true for infantry and armour, not true for more automated rocket and arty regiments) .we should study what is the permanent forces in tibet and how much these are being increased.

rajrang · Post by **rajrang** » 19 May 2011 11:20

Singha wrote:iirc the chinese use the ussr heacount and nomenclature for army and af - which means their divisions are around 10k people vs 15-25k in india/west and AF reports in terms of regiments rather than squadrons/wings.
better to compare raw nos hence, rather than dhoti shiver at "X divisions within Y hrs" in tibet.

avg ASL in tibet being 10,000ft with passes at higher alt, I think for serious ops you need people to be there 2 weeks atleast for acclamatization....(true for infantry and armour, not true for more automated rocket and arty regiments) .we should study what is the permanent forces in tibet and how much these are being increased.

I hear about "dhoti shiver" often in BR. Don't you think that certain amount of shivering may be prudent? Not so long ago, the US painted Iraq to be a military (and WMD) threat to the world including the US! Is that a case of dhoti shiver? During the 19th and early 20th centuries, the British were concerned about the Russian threat to India via Afghanistan. Was this a case of dhoti shiver? I think this served India well, because during the 200 odd years the British ruled India, the traffic through the Khyber pass was opposite in direction to what had been for the previous thousands of years! This in my view was a major win for the British and the people of India, even though according to some opinions the British were "defeated" in Afghanistan.

Please do not start finding flaws in the two examples I have given - the spirit of my question is where do we draw the line for shivering that is prudent?

Shrinivasan · Post by **Shrinivasan** » 19 May 2011 11:57

Conventional Teeth:Tail ratio as propounded by Soviets or even uncle will not apply to Lizard in Tibet, the front would be very far from the bases / military region, the tail needed for just transportation would be huge. Also when IAF / Brahmos / Nirbhay hits the roads / railroads in Tibet, it would disrupt their logistics heavily rendering their frontline troops short on supplies.

In 1962, IA/politicos slept thru the PRC build-up, I don't think this would be the case anytime in the future.

Don · Post by **Don** » 19 May 2011 18:56

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/ME17Df02.html

A SCO canopy for South Asia
By M K Bhadrakumar

Grand visions take time to realize but they seldom die. They may languish but they regenerate and take new unexpected forms. The ''Great Central Asia'' strategy envisioned by the George W Bush administration is most certainly one such grand vision.

The complex intellectual construct involved many strokes: The US would expand its influence into Central Asia by rolling back Russia's traditional and China's growing influence there. Washington would encourage New Delhi to work as a partner in Afghanistan and Central Asia, and lay a new Silk Route via South Asia to evacuate the fabulous mineral wealth of the land-locked region, consolidate its presence in Afghanistan on a long-term footing, and establish itself along Xinjiang and Russia's ''soft underbelly''. In so doing, it would create the conditions needed to win the ''new great game'' in Central Asia.

The strategy was unveiled in an article in the summer 2005 edition of Foreign Affairs magazine by Frederick Starr, chairman of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute at the John Hopkins University. Starr proposed a matrix for a "Great Central Asia cooperative partnership for development" with the US taking the lead, the five Central Asian states and Afghanistan entering as the main members, and India and Pakistan participating.

Starr wrote, ''The main idea of the proposal is to take the US control of the situation in Afghanistan as an opportunity, promote optional and flexible cooperation in security, democracy, economy, transport and energy, and, make up a new region by combining Central Asia with South Asia. The United States is to shoulder the role of a midwife to promote the rebirth of the entire region."

A dream come true
The Bush administration lost no time adopting the tantalizing idea and integrating it into the US's regional policies. In the event, however, the Bush era got dissipated in the Iraq quagmire and the idea of ''Great Central Asia'' languished. Hopelessly distracted by the economic crisis and the war in Afghanistan, the Barack Obama administration, too, neglected the brilliant strategy. Meanwhile, Russia and China grasped its potential and wondered if only it could be turned on its head.

Russian and Chinese diplomats duly got to work and are now ready to unveil their new avatar in the forthcoming summit meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in Astana on June 15. To sum up a long story, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov made a terse remark on May 15 following a meeting of SCO foreign ministers in Almaty, Kazakhstan, ''A few days ago, Afghanistan submitted a request to grant it observer status. The request will be considered at the upcoming [SCO] summit.''

What he didn't say was that earlier in the week, Afghan Foreign Minister Rasoul paid a four-day visit to Beijing and discussed his country's proposal with the Chinese government. The Afghans, Russians and the Chinese seem to have acted in concert and with a speediness that probably took the Obama administration by surprise. The US has been consistently discouraging Kabul from any dangerous liaison with the SCO.

Kabul's ''defection'' constitutes a setback to the US's diplomacy in the Central Asian region, which Washington has been lately insisting is brimming with renewed energy. It certainly weakens the push by the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) push to secure long-term military bases in Afghanistan. Put simply, it reduces Washington's capacity to pressure Afghanistan's President Hamid Karzai.

In turn, it secures for Karzai new benefactors for the stabilization of his country, which on the one hand enables him to significantly reduce the level of his current dependence on the US, while on the other hand compelling Washington to be sensitive to his demands as the leader of a sovereign country.

Lavrov further revealed that India and Pakistan had both submitted formal applications for upgrading their observer status to full membership of SCO and he hinted that the Astana summit would grant the membership. Clearly, Moscow and Beijing have simultaneously steered the Indian, Pakistani and Afghan applications.

This suggests a broad conceptualization and understanding of the emergent regional security scenario in South Asia on the part of Moscow and Beijing. Ironically, Afghanistan is all set now to become the ''hub'' that will bring Central Asia and South Asia together - except that the historic process is taking place not under US stewardship, as Starr conceived, Bush probably wanted and Obama failed to follow up, but under Chinese and Russian partnership.

Moscow-Beijing axis
Evidently, Moscow and Beijing have pressed the pedal to give SCO a decisive push and make it a rival to the NATO as a provider of security for the Central Asian states - and for Afghanistan. This is happening when NATO is claiming in the Central Asian capitals that it is revving up ''strategic'' cooperation with the region. In reality, SCO (which has China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan in the current line-up) will be poaching into the US and NATO's exclusive Afghan preserves while insisting that it is enamored of cooperation with the Western alliance.

The Russian-Chinese coordination on strategic issues is indeed graduating to a qualitatively new level. Central Asia, the Middle East and North Africa are three main arenas where Moscow and Beijing have decided to enter into ''tight cooperation'', to borrow an expression of a Russian news agency.

Moscow and Beijing seem to have arrived at the conclusion that notwithstanding the US's steady decline as a global power, the Obama administration is bent on resuscitating its global strategies as the preponderant world power and that with the winding down of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Washington is likely preparing to give a jump start to the process.

Russia already senses that the Obama administration is dusting up the plans for deployments of missile defense shields in Poland and Romania and is setting up a new military presence in these two countries, challenging the historical primacy of Russia's Black Sea Fleet. Moscow's repeated urges to have more meaningful discussions regarding Russian participation in the US's and the European Union's missile defense program are also not being heeded. The much-touted ''reset'' is losing steam, too.

For both Russia and China, Western intervention in Libya has come as a wake-up call. The developments over Syria, the West's double standards over Bahrain, the determination of the US to prolong its military presence in Iraq beyond the end-2011 cut-off date - these are being seen as tell-tale signs of an overarching, well-thought-out and US-led Western strategy to outflank Russia and China in the Middle East and perpetuate Western dominance over the region in the post-Cold War era.

A recent commentary in the Chinese state-run People's Daily also articulated specific concerns over the strong likelihood of a ''more forceful'', ''more aggressive'' policy toward China. It said:

Washington intends to broaden and strengthen alliances with Asia-Pacific partners (Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Singapore, India, etc.) ... there is no way that Obama will soften his attitude on US-China relations ... Obama believes that the future of the global order will be determined in the Asia Pacific.

If this description of Obama's beliefs is accurate, then one can see his management of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars in a slightly different light: he is winding down these wars not only in order to rebuild America's economy and improve its international standing, but also to recalibrate US foreign policy toward an Asia-Pacific future. In a nutshell, the US overall readjustment of its Asia-Pacific policies comes with tremendous force on its surface.''

New power dynamic
Beijing is obviously jettisoning its reservations about India's inclusion in the SCO. The anticipated US-led shifts in Asia-Pacific would give impetus to Beijing to work on its ties with India and the SCO provides a useful framework to cooperate with New Delhi on regional security issues.

From the Indian perspective, too, working with China on shared concerns such as the stabilization of Afghanistan or the struggle against terrorist activities emanating from Pakistani soil are desirable objectives.

Beijing would be gratified to know that New Delhi has an independent regional policy toward Central Asia and has desisted from identifying with the US's ''Great Central Asia'' strategy. Equally, New Delhi remains skeptical about the prospect of a long-term NATO military presence in Afghanistan.

India's approach to engage Pakistan in dialogue, its calibrated approach to military cooperation with the US and indeed the new sense of ''cooling down'' in the Sino-Indian discords on the bilateral political and diplomatic plane following the high-level exchanges on the sidelines of the recent BRICS summit in China - these would encourage Beijing (and Moscow) to project the SCO as a vehicle for regional security in the South Asian region.

From the Pakistani perspective, too, SCO membership comes at a critical time when Islamabad is torn apart by existential angst of a kind it has never known before. Following the Raymond Davis [1] episode, Islamabad measured up the US's extensive intelligence network within Pakistan, including with various militant groups.

Put plainly, Islamabad suspects US intentions and a transparent working relationship is not going to be easy to put in place. The US Abbottabad operation to kill Osama bin Laden has shaken Pakistan's self-confidence. US-Pakistan intelligence cooperation has ground to a halt.

The impunity with which the US violated Pakistan's territorial integrity, Obama's blunt warning that the US might repeat similar operations, Washington's utter disregard of the groundswell of Pakistani opinion, and Pakistan's own sense of helplessness to safeguard its sovereignty - these will prompt Islamabad to rethink its foreign policy options. China and Russia obviously figure in the Pakistani calculus.

At the same time, India has moved wisely by not only sharing the US's euphoria over the Abbottabad operation. New Delhi also desisted from resorting to rhetoric against Pakistan and lost no time to reiterate that dialogue with Islamabad will continue as earlier planned. There are also nuances in India's Afghan policy with a view to calming Pakistani sensitivities regarding its ties with Kabul.

These overlapping trends have quickened the tempo of regional diplomacy. The same week in which Rasoul proceeded to Beijing also saw Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari visiting Russia and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh undertaking an extraordinary two-day visit to Kabul. Pakistani Prime Minister Yousuf Gilani is also due in Beijing this week.

All these high-level exchanges have essentially sought to break fresh ground in regional alignments. Their leitmotif is the endgame in Afghanistan. Without doubt, regional opinion is vehemently opposed to a long-term US and NATO military presence in Afghanistan.

But the sense in the region is also that Washington will keep pressuring Kabul - just as it is doing in Baghdad - to ram through its geopolitical agenda no matter the regional opposition.

Unsurprisingly, the SCO provides the canopy beneath which regional powers are taking shelter even as the power dynamics are unfolding.

Note
1. Raymond Davis, a contractor with the Central Intelligence Agency, killed two armed men in Lahore in January and although the US said he was protected by diplomatic immunity, he was jailed and charged with murder. He was released in March after the families of the two killed men were paid US$2.4 million in blood money. Judges acquitted him on all charges and Davis immediately departed Pakistan.

Ambassador M K Bhadrakumar was a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service. His assignments included the Soviet Union, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Germany, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kuwait and Turkey.

manum · Post by **manum** » 19 May 2011 19:44

don please when you post such a long article please highlight the parts that construct the essence of the whole article...or you can quote the title or essence...It'll help a bit

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 19 May 2011 20:02

rajrang wrote:
Singha wrote:iirc the chinese use the ussr heacount and nomenclature for army and af - which means their divisions are around 10k people vs 15-25k in india/west and AF reports in terms of regiments rather than squadrons/wings.
better to compare raw nos hence, rather than dhoti shiver at "X divisions within Y hrs" in tibet.

avg ASL in tibet being 10,000ft with passes at higher alt, I think for serious ops you need people to be there 2 weeks atleast for acclamatization....(true for infantry and armour, not true for more automated rocket and arty regiments) .we should study what is the permanent forces in tibet and how much these are being increased.
I hear about "dhoti shiver" often in BR. Don't you think that certain amount of shivering may be prudent? Not so long ago, the US painted Iraq to be a military (and WMD) threat to the world including the US! Is that a case of dhoti shiver? During the 19th and early 20th centuries, the British were concerned about the Russian threat to India via Afghanistan. Was this a case of dhoti shiver? I think this served India well, because during the 200 odd years the British ruled India, the traffic through the Khyber pass was opposite in direction to what had been for the previous thousands of years! This in my view was a major win for the British and the people of India, even though according to some opinions the British were "defeated" in Afghanistan.

Please do not start finding flaws in the two examples I have given - the spirit of my question is where do we draw the line for shivering that is prudent?

OT for this thread

My reply here
http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 1#p1092871

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 19 May 2011 20:06

cheenum wrote:
In 1962, IA/politicos slept thru the PRC build-up, I don't think this would be the case anytime in the future.

Surveillance then was worse in every way. Apart from a misplaced Nehruvian trust of the rizald

ashi · Post by **ashi** » 20 May 2011 06:42

J-10B with AESA/PESA radar

J-10B
J-10B

Don · Post by **Don** » 20 May 2011 06:55

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 20 May 2011 07:19

ashi wrote:J-10B with AESA/PESA radar

J-10B

Interesting photo. The Chinese typically release "agenda photos" that are meant to be pored over, analysed and commented upon - so any comments I make may be ROTFLworthy.

That's a strange truck next to that aircraft. To me it looks like the truck is carrying a cooling tower/heat exchanger for some cooling unit. Even more interesting is the black rectangular thing in front of the port wing. The thing has pyramidal projections and seems to be some sound/radar absorbing material. There is a similar thing lying on the ground as well.

Either the Chinese have put all this together in one photo frame just to get a laugh out of the reactions of puzzled commentators, or they are doing some testing that I am unable to figure out.

Prasad · Post by **Prasad** » 20 May 2011 08:42

Don,
could you please resize the picture? Scrolling sideways is a pain

Btw, what are those dark spots in the picture?

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 20 May 2011 08:47

the black rectangular thing looks like the panels used on the inside of electromagnetic test chambers or sound testing chambers.
http://img.photobucket.com/albums/v699/ ... est_79.jpg
not sure what role it plays outside.

the cooling truck may be to cool/power this radar if run on the ground (radars are usually switched off at ground level to save the aircrew from EM radiation) with the aircraft engine turned off.

maybe they are running it on the ground for some reason, and the test crew hides behind this black absorbent wall for extra safety in the back

abhishek_sharma · Post by **abhishek_sharma** » 20 May 2011 09:05

Sizing the Chinese Military
Asia Policy (July 2007)

PLA Ground Force Modernization Underway in All Military Regions, Preparing for a Variety of Missions
Dennis J. Blasko

The 2004 Chinese defense white paper acknowledged that priority has been given to the navy, air force, and Second Artillery force to strengthen the “comprehensive deterrence and warfighting capabilities” of the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA)—a fact that has been apparent to foreign analysts for about a decade. Despite the precedence given to the other services, ground forces (army) still comprise the vast majority of the PLA. While the Chinese government has not provided an official accounting of the personnel distribution within the 2.3 million-strong active-duty PLA, most estimates usually credit the army with about 1.6 million personnel (about 69% of the force), the navy with about 255,000 (about 11%), the air force with some 400,000 (about 17%), and the Second Artillery with around 100,000 (about
4%). Moreover, though the PLA’s leadership structure is changing gradually, ground force officers continue to retain the majority of leadership positions from headquarters in Beijing down to the local levels. Although the army
is sometimes overlooked when outsiders concentrate on high-technology developments in the PLA, modernization of the ground force is an integral element of the long-term transformation of China’s armed forces. As the PLA
explores more maritime-oriented missions for the 21st century, the army is building forces to maintain its relevance to China’s overall deterrence posture and to PLA warfighting capabilities. This essay provides a brief overview of
this ground force modernization.

...

Organizational Structure

The total active-duty PLA ground force is estimated at 1.5 to 1.6 million personnel and includes: main force units; local defense forces such as border and coastal defense units; most personnel assigned to various local headquarters throughout the country; most personnel assigned to logistics subdepartments including hospitals and supply and repair depots; and the staff, faculty, and students assigned to army-related professional military education academies and schools. Main force units are considered “mobile combat troops” and include group armies with their subordinate divisions, brigades, and regiments as well as independent units under the command of military region or military district headquarters.

As of 2007, main ground force units are organized into eighteen group armies along with a number of independent units (divisions, brigades, and regiments/groups). Maneuver forces (infantry and armored units) consist of approximately 35 divisions and about 44 brigades. These forces are supported by roughly 40 artillery, surface-to-surface missile, air defense, and anti-aircraft artillery divisions and brigades and include various special operations forces, reconnaissance, army aviation, engineer, communications, chemical defense, electronic warfare, and “high technology” units. Currently new weapons and support equipment are entering the ground forces in all corners of the country. Entire units often do not, however, receive a complete complement of weapons for all subordinate elements at the same time. Some units likely
will have mixes of old and new weapons for some time to come. Main force combat and combat-support units currently comprise only about half of the total ground force number (somewhere around 700,000–800,000 personnel).
Among the local forces, an estimated 200,000 army troops are assigned to permanent border and coastal defense responsibilities.

Army reserve units number approximately 40 divisions, 25 brigades, and several regiments. Reflecting China’s preoccupation with attack by long-range aircraft and missiles, fully one-third of the number of PLA reserve divisions and brigades are air defense units. Urban air defense is a major emphasis for the militia, along with repair of infrastructure, such as roads, railroads, and electricity grids that would be required if China were struck by long-range weapons.

Though amphibious training receives the bulk of foreign attention, units in all military regions engage in training for many missions, such as border defense, defense against amphibious operations, high-altitude and desert operations, forest and urban operations, and especially anti-terrorist operations. Active-duty units routinely incorporate reserve units, militia
forces, and civilian support into training scenarios. These efforts are often coordinated in joint military-civilian command posts linked by modern communications and manned by military, party, and government officials. Though many foreigners believe the likelihood of mainland China being attacked is low, PLA ground forces continue the process of developing
capabilities that—if allowed to atrophy—cannot be created instantly or cannot be reconstituted quickly.

...

jai · Post by **jai** » 20 May 2011 12:02

Austin wrote:China general says his military no match for U.S

Asked about Taiwan's long-standing request to buy U.S. F-16 combat aircraft, Chen said such a sale would hurt U.S.-China military relations, but he was not specific. He asked rhetorically why Taiwan would need to buy American weapons if the U.S. sincerely believes its stated policy that Taiwan is part of China.

Chen appeared to question the validity of the U.S. position favoring Taiwan's eventual peaceful reunification with China. He recounted a conversation earlier Wednesday with Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton in which she repeated the U.S. position that "there is only one China in the world and Taiwan is part of China."

US's official position recognizes Chinese claim on Taiwan ?? Wonder what their official position on Aksai Chin and POK is ??

The Cheenees and pukis seem to have taken a leaf out of the Gobbles book - "a lie told a thousand times becomes the truth" and seem to be practicing it as their state policy in all the areas they are lusting after - POK, Tibbet, Taiwan, Arunachal, all the islands in East China Sea etc etc.

Time we learnt the same and became as forceful in our demands on vacation of POK, Tibbet etc. Communication experts believe that effective communication only happens when you match your communication style with your opponent - only then will they truly understand you.

Maybe this is the only way we will be able to get some more respect to our demands leading to some compliance as part of some later settlement. India not even claiming back POK and Aksai Chin is worrisome to say the least.

Lalmohan · Post by **Lalmohan** » 20 May 2011 12:08

the US supports reunification of mainland china and taiwan under a democratic nationalist government...