India-Russia: News & Analysis

[Karan Dixit]

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's recent summit with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev in Moscow has injected 'a new freshness' into India-Russia relations which are now 'back on a very solid track,' the Russian envoy said here Monday.

http://www.calcuttanews.net/story/577407

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NEW DELHI: Russia on Monday said it would prioritise the manufacturing of the nuclear reactors ordered by India despite a full order book position, and said the granting of reprocessing rights was not a problem.

http://www.thehindu.com/2009/12/15/stor ... 591100.htm

[Philip]

Johann,with regard to the Iranians and Russian N-tech,we all know the stakes are very high there with the threat of an Israeli attack at any time,or at the very least huge international sanctions against Iran given Iran's intransigence and inability to reassure the international community about its N-weapons ambitions.The last Israeli strike at a Syrian secret N-enrichment plant bears this out.Russia and the international community and Israel have been trying to work together to arrive at a compromise and selling S-300s and N-reactors would ignite matters.That is why the Iranians are in a pickle and why the Russian supply of reactors in India at Koodamkulam is progressing smoothly.

India and Russia have in the past workd together at thumbing their noses at the US,when the US imposed sanctions regarding cryogenic tech for our civilian space programme.They supplied a few engines and assisted us with developing our own engine.It has also assisted us with the development of our SSBN and leasing Akula SSGNs too.Catch any western nation assisting us in like manner! It is the US and the west from their track record who have always tried to stunt India's technological development,especially after P-2 and we have not forgotten the delays in the LCA project and even still many India establshments are barred from importing US tech eqpt.The sordid history of the Tarapore N-plant and US fuel is a still painful scar for the Indian nuclear establishment. Once bitten twice shy.It is why the Russians and the French are in pole position to grab the lion's share of the Indian nuclear reactor bonanza.The longer the US delay in clearing up our queries and giving us solid guarantees for the lifetime support whatever might happen,they will be left with the radioactive crumbs to feast on later!

[Johann]

Philip,

There's no question that the Russians are willing to do business where the West isnt. However, theyre not willing to stick their neck out for anyone.

In the event of serious international friction and controversy, they will freeze any deal.

Russia talks like a revisionist power, but behaves like a status-quo one. Why shouldnt they? They're part of the G-8 and P-5.

[Johann]

Sanjay,

In my previous post I talked about the Chinese failure to compel a Vietnamese pullout through the invasion. However, the invasion created an even deeper Vietnamese dependence on the Soviets which came to haunt Vietnam in the late 1980s and since.

The non-bolded bits of the extract you put up are the bits that directly affect the Soviets:

Bruce Elleman argued that "one of the primary diplomatic goals behind China's attack was to expose Soviet assurances of military support to Vietnam as a fraud. Seen in this light, Beijing's policy was actually a diplomatic success, since Moscow did not actively intervene, thus showing the practical limitations of the Soviet-Vietnamese military pact. ... China achieved a strategic victory by minimizing the future possibility of a two-front war against the USSR and Vietnam."

Soviet weakness vis a vis China despite overwhelming military advantage, combined with Soviet influence on Vietnam is what ultimately compelled the Vietnamese agreement pullout from Cambodia in 1988. The Soviets agreed to every one of Deng's demands for normalisation - Soviet withdrawal from Mongolia and Afghanistan and Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia.

Vietnamese dependence on the Soviets to arm them and economically under-write them gave them few options.

The border war strengthened Soviet-Vietnamese relations. The Soviet military role in Vietnam increased during the 1980s as the Soviets provided arms to Vietnam; moreover, Soviet ships enjoyed access to the harbors at Danang and Cam Ranh Bay, and Soviet reconnaissance aircraft operated out of Vietnamese airfields.

The Vietnamese although firmly part of the international communist movement had done their best to be neutral in the Sino-Soviet competition for loyalty from various communist parties. This became harder in the 1970s since Moscow had much more advanced weapons and could offer more economic aid to offer than Beijing.

Despite this the Vietnamese never wanted to be as reliant on the Soviets to the point that they had to give them basing rights in the hope that it might deter the Chinese.

For example, India resisted pressure from Brezhnev for naval basing rights from 1969 to 1971. A very close analogy would have been if China had invaded in 1971, the Soviets had done nothing, and in the aftermath India had granted basing rights in Vizag to the Soviet navy, hoping to use a direct Soviet presence as a deterrent, and also hoping that it would make it harder for the Soviets to avoid direct involvement in another Chinese invasion.

In contrast, India *reduced* its reliance on the Soviet Union from the early 1980s onwards, and the result was that it wasnt nearly as exposed to either Soviet or Western pressure in the Soviet Union's retrenchment and collapse. Vietnam is still recovering.

Another quote from your link captures the difference between Deng's strategic approach and the Soviet-Vietnemese one, and the questionable impact of the Soviet presence;

The precise dimensions of the frontier operations were difficult to determine, but its monetary cost to Vietnam was considerable.

This is even starker when you compare Vietnamese and Soviet growth rates on one side, and the Chinese on the other.

China in other words used the border war to economically drain the Vietnamese, and through them the Soviets at minimal economic cost to itself.

Is it surprising then that the Vietnamese and the Soviets agreed to Chinese terms?

To draw a very loose analogy to the present, does the American presence in Pakistan protect Pakistan from Indian vengeance, given Indian focus on economic growth, or does it render Pakistan more vulnerable to Indian pressure through the Indo-US relationship?

[Karan Dixit]

Over the coming weeks India and Russia plan to sign several agreements aimed at deepening their co-operation on the PAK-FA fifth-generation fighter programme, which in India is referred to as the Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA) programme.

http://www.domain-b.com/aero/mil_avi/mi ... ments.html

[Rudradev]

A lot had changed between 1971 and 1979. By the time China invaded Vietnam, the US was out of its Southeast Asian imbroglio, and the Soviets were concentrating on Afghanistan.

In 1971 it was the Americans who had limited resources to dedicate to the assistance of their Pakistani allies, being involved in Vietnam at the time... so a little pressure from Soviet subs encouraged the Americans to back off from bullying India. In 1979 the tables were turned, and the Soviets were getting ready to commit their resources to Afghanistan. Then, the Chinese calculated they could afford to attack Soviet allies with impunity.

Firstly, you are a little confused about the dates. The Sino-Vietnamese war took place from February to March of 1979. The Soviets did not invade Afghanistan until December, but the tipping point for the decision was in October of 1979 when Amin's Khalq faction of the Afghan communist party liquidated Taraki, the head of the Parcham faction, and Moscow's preferred client. So no, the Soviets were not even considering intervention when the Chinese invaded. The earliest point at which intervention was considered (and dismissed) by the Politburo was following the revolt of the Afghan Army in Herat under Ismail Khan on March 17th, the day after the Sino-Soviet war ended.

Secondly, the US and Soviet Union had their own set of mutually understood rules about conflicts between their friends and clients, whether the theatre was the subcontinent, or the Middle East, or Southern Africa, and the understanding was that you didn't invade each others friends. The Chinese however had their own set of rules.

So your contention is that the entire process of preparing the Soviet 40th Army to move into Afghanistan was undertaken, quite abruptly, in the two months between October and December 1979?

Sorry, you're the one who is confused about the dates. The Soviets had a treaty in place with Nur Mohammed Taraki's PDPA as of December 1978, allowing for military intervention to take place on Kabul's request. From that point onwards it was obvious that they were readying themselves for military action if required to back up their political intervention. The Sino-Vietnam war took place in February-March 1979; by April the Soviets had sent helicopters into Afghanistan, and by June they had sent tanks and BMPs to secure Kabul and Bagram.

There is little doubt that, as I stated, the Soviets were concentrating on Afghanistan and considering the possibility of military intervention at the time Deng invaded Vietnam.

Oh, the Chinese got the "measure" of Brezhnev in 1969 all right. Mao calculated that the Russians would accommodate and turn tail in a tactical retreat which the Chinese could eventually capitalize on as a strategic victory.

They were completely wrong. The Chinese raided Zhenbao Island on March 2, 1969, ambushing the Soviet garrison there. That was the provocation.

The answer from the Soviets involved storming Zhenbao Island and keeping up such a ferocious artillery barrage against the Chinese troops deployed along the Ussuri that the Chinese folded in complete humiliation.

End result: Some 31 Soviet troops dead... against 800-1000 Chinese.

The Chinese learned the lessons of 1969 well.

Dig deeper Rudradev. The clashes continued until September. Chinese pressure continued to increase, and the Soviets continued to get more worried about the situation.

The Chinese manpower losses were disproportionately heavy, but that was also typical of Chinese operations against the UN in Korea.

The Soviets were worried enough that they made it clear (via their defence attache in Tehran) that they would have to resort to tactical nuclear weapons to stop a major Chinese offensive - they made it clear that this would be on Russian soil.

The Soviets also sounded out the Americans about the possibility of a joint, or at least unopposed attack on Chinese nuclear facilities. This is the same proposal the Americans had made to the Soviets in 1963-64. The Americans enjoyed returning the same answer the Soviets had given back then.

Ultimately its the Soviets who asked for border talks with the Chinese in order to defuse tensions, which began in October of 1969.

The Chinese demonstrated that the Soviet Union was keener on avoiding conflict than they were, that Russia was not confidant of its conventional military advantage, and that no matter what happened the two superpowers would never gang up on it. In addition it signaled to all the skeptics that the Sino-Soviet break was definitive.

I'm afraid the contention you make in your last paragraph above is quite unsupported by the verbiage going before. The willingness of the Americans to engage in a joint operation against Chinese nuclear facilities with the Soviets, is quite irrelevant. The Chinese learned perfectly well that they were not going to take Soviet territory by force, because of the hugely damaging response their initial adventures at Zhenbao (and their later attempts at Xinjiang) provoked.

In fact, Mao warmed to the idea of rapprochement with the United States, partially because he realized that his China was no match for the Soviet Union following the drubbing they received at Brezhnev's hands in 1969.

Also, it was the Chinese who invited Kosygin for border talks...he stopped by in Beijing on the way home from Ho Chi Minh's funeral in September 1969. The CCP did not want a war situation that would have concentrated further power into the PLA's hands, already greatly strengthened as a result of the cultural revolution, the purging of many leaders including Liu Shaoqi, and the subsequent enervation of the civilian party's political authority.

Hand-waving apart, the Chinese had recognized that further provocation of the Soviets would have led to an internal as well as an external disaster in 1969.

Two years later, there wasn't any question that the Chinese were influenced to keep out of the Bangladesh War by our treaty with the Soviet Union.

The Chinese avoided initiating war with India in 1965 without either Western or Soviet warnings, even though the Sino-Pakistani alliance was in effect.

The PRC however has always chosen the time and place of its conflicts with care, unlike the Pakistanis. For example it has never allowed itself to fight two major opponents at the same time. At that point the PLA was pouring troops in to North Vietnam, and preparing for a war with the US should the Americans go north to save South Vietnam.

Lin Biao's failed coup and subsequent attempted defection to the Soviet Union in September of 1971 was a political earthquake for the PLA and CPC. There was absolutely no chance that Mao would initiate a war with anyone at this point.

There's a connection to the Ussuri river clashes here. Internally it also had the advantage of mobilising China to a full war footing, which finally ended the factional madness of the cultural revolution. The PLA under Lin Biao took over the management of all major institutions, replacing the different Red Guard groups, and Lin was elevated to the number two spot in the party, putting total power just within his reach. Lin's failure to seize power, and his fall meant that Lin's chosen commanders within the PLA were also purged. Mao always ensured there was little likelihood of war when he launched a major purge - whether it was 1944, or 1966, or 1971.

As you yourself indicate, China did not come to Pakistan's aid in 1965 chiefly because they were committed to Vietnam at the time. This was certainly not the case by 1971.

Mao's own vulnerability to an internal putsch was far less in 1971 than in 1944. The degree to which Lin Biao had been sidelined at the time of his desperate coup attempt is obvious from the fact that the PRC was already pursuing rapprochement with the USA at that time, something that Lin fervently opposed. Within weeks of Lin's disappearance over Mongolia, the top ranks of the PLA had already been purged of Lin's appointees.

Even in 1966, Mao was not shy continuing China's military involvement in Vietnam despite proceeding with the Cultural Revolution at home; so there is little basis to contend that internal purges would have made him reluctant to intervene in the 1971 India-Pakistan war (where he had so much to gain by resolving Kashmir in China's favour, if successful).

The fact that the US was tied up in Southeast Asia, and the recent bruising the PLA had received at the USSR's hands in 1969, seem to me far more compelling reasons for Mao's reluctance to assist the Pakistanis in 1971.

[Rony]

Rudradev garu and Johann , a far more compelling reason why china did not intervene in 1971 bangladesh liberation war apart from the soviet angle was the drubbing it got at 1967 Nathu La and Chola clashes with the Indians. I am just reading V.Longer's excellent book "Red Coats to Olive Green : The History of the Indian Army 1600- 1974" . There are some interesting details in the book on the 1967 clashes. While many non-Indians dont even know that the Indians and the Chinese clashed in 1967 (in which the chinese lost) , many Indians simply ignore those clashes in the larger scheme of things. People who are used to see china through the 1962 lens also needs to look at china through 1967 lens to get the overall picture.

[Rudradev]

Rudradev garu and Johann , a far more compelling reason why china did not intervene in 1971 bangladesh liberation war apart from the soviet angle was the drubbing it got at 1967 Nathu La and Chola clashes with the Indians. I am just reading V.Longer's excellent book "Red Coats to Olive Green : The History of the Indian Army 1600- 1974" . There are some interesting details in the book on the 1967 clashes. While many non-Indians dont even know that the Indians and the Chinese clashed in 1967 (in which the chinese lost) , many Indians simply ignore those clashes in the larger scheme of things. People who are used to see china through the 1962 lens also needs to look at china through 1967 lens to get the overall picture.

Rony, you are right that not many people remember Nathu La or recognize its significance. It is partially by virtue of the battering our artillery gave the PLA at Nathu La, that the foundation for Sikkim's accession (eight years later) was established. The IA established dominance in that sector against Chinese incursions. The Chinese got a bloody nose and learned a valuable lesson; that the IA was no longer the outfit they had overwhelmed in 1962, and had now become a force to reckon with.

Nathu La showed that we could handle the PLA in a one-on-one situation. 1971, however, was a very different picture. Eastern Command was engaged in a full-scale invasion of East Pakistan. Northern and Western Commands were deployed against West Pakistan. In addition there was the maritime threat posed by the United States, which took the shape of the USN's Task Force 74 advancing into the Bay of Bengal.

Executing a two-front war in addition to guarding against a maritime threat of unknown magnitude on our flank, what could the IA have done if the Chinese had also attacked in the Eastern Himalayas or in Ladakh? Despite the IA's valour and professionalism, it would have been too much for us to handle. Henry Kissinger was actually entreating Zhou En Lai to join in exactly such a Paki-US-Chinese gangbang of India, which would have had disastrous results.

This was surely a tempting occasion for the Chinese to resolve their border disputes with India, at a time when they were guaranteed of US support and we were already embroiled on two fronts. Since the IA had proved its increased mettle at Nathu La, that's all the more reason why the Chinese would have been keen to exploit our disadvantage by attacking during the 1971 war.

Ultimately, the Paki-US-Chinese gangbang of India did not happen, and nor did the US themselves dare to become directly involved beyond dispatching the Enterprise Carrier Battle Group. I don't think one can honestly minimize the enormous significance of the Indo-Soviet friendship treaty in deterring that eventuality.

[Yogi_G]

Was watching Russia Today for a while, they were covering the copenhagen meet, here are some things I observed in their coverage,

1. As against our desi media makes out of India and China jointly holding their post against the west, the RT channel said that the US and China slogged it out against each other in the summit. No mention of India-China Vs US. Only China Vs US.
2. Mention of India was made along with SA and Brazil.
3. The duel between USA and China in the cop summit was etrmed as "battle between the superpowers", yes they used the term super power for China.

Not that it matters what the channel think about India, but points to be noted.

[putnanja]

Not just Russian channel, but the entire western media reported it as a US-China spat. I think it is good for India as China is shown up as a big polluter along with US.

[ramana]

Rony Can we have a scan of only those pages about Nathu La?

Thanks, ramana

[Johann]

So your contention is that the entire process of preparing the Soviet 40th Army to move into Afghanistan was undertaken, quite abruptly, in the two months between October and December 1979?

Sorry, you're the one who is confused about the dates. The Soviets had a treaty in place with Nur Mohammed Taraki's PDPA as of December 1978, allowing for military intervention to take place on Kabul's request. From that point onwards it was obvious that they were readying themselves for military action if required to back up their political intervention. The Sino-Vietnam war took place in February-March 1979; by April the Soviets had sent helicopters into Afghanistan, and by June they had sent tanks and BMPs to secure Kabul and Bagram.

There is little doubt that, as I stated, the Soviets were concentrating on Afghanistan and considering the possibility of military intervention at the time Deng invaded Vietnam.

Rudradev,

I don't think you read my post very carefully. Please go back and re-read it. Also please familarise yourself with Soviet Red Army strength and posture in the period for context.

The Soviets did not begin planning for the possibility of large-scale intervention until the Herat uprising which began the day *after* the Sino-Vietnamese war ended, on March 17th. Over 100 Soviet advisors were killed in the mutiny of the Afghan 17th Division and the subsequent DRA Air Force bombing to put it down. It was only at that point that the collapse of the Afghan communist party's rule appeared to a serious threat, and preparation for the option of military intervention began.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan involved only 4 divisions - the 103rd Guards Airborne Division, the 3rd and 108th Motor Rifle Divisions, and an additional division's worth of troops (an air assault regiment and two motor rifle regiments).

Following the Herat uprising in March these divisions were placed on 3-day alert, and forward deployed within the Turkemenistan Military District close to the border. That was the initial strength of the 40th Army, which was only stood up in May 1979 to provide an umbrella command.

However, the Politburo was still not yet in favour of major intervention; they even turned down Taraki's plea for three divisions in July. It was not until news of Taraki's assassination by Amin in October that their view changed.

The 40th Army's initial order of battle was unsuited for counterinsurgency, but the Soviet politburo did not plan or anticipate on direct participation in the counter-insurgency. Their objective for the "Limited Contingency of Soviet Forces" was to depose the Khalqi faction of the party, install the Parchamis, and provide security as they rebuilt the party, state and army and prosecuted the war against the rebels.

For context the Soviets had 51 divisions in the Far East at the time of the invasion of Afghanistan. The number of divisions on the Chinese border actually *increased* to 54 divisions by 1982, even as the Soviets were increasing troop levels in Afghanistan simultaneously.

So the Afghan war in no way altered the military balance of power with the PRC. In fact China is the main reason the Soviets were never able to commit the kind of troop strength the Afghan war demanded.

The Chinese learned perfectly well that they were not going to take Soviet territory by force, because of the hugely damaging response their initial adventures at Zhenbao (and their later attempts at Xinjiang) provoked.

In fact, Mao warmed to the idea of rapprochement with the United States, partially because he realized that his China was no match for the Soviet Union following the drubbing they received at Brezhnev's hands in 1969.

... Hand-waving apart, the Chinese had recognized that further provocation of the Soviets would have led to an internal as well as an external disaster in 1969.

Rudradev,

You have missed the fundamental context of the Sino-Soviet conflict, particularly in the Brezhnev years.

The Chinese attacks of March-August 1969 were not about territory. They were about testing Soviet intentions, much like the invasion of Vietnam in 1979.

Mao initiated the Sino-Soviet split against Khrushchev, but it was a largely ideological conflict for the first five years waged through speeches, attempting to split or woo parties, and through sanctions and aid.

Under Brezhnev in 1966 initiated a massive military build up on the Chinese border, quite possibly as a hedge against the radicalism of the Cultural Revolution, or the possibility of a major anti-Mao, Soviet friendly split within the CPC.

In any case by 1969, the number of divisions along the Chinese border had increased from 13 to 30, with 3 divisions in Mongolia, and large numbers of nuclear IRBMs and MRBMs moved to the area.

The Soviets invaded Czechoslovakia in August 1968 when the Czechoslovak Party was breaking away from the CPSU, and the 'Brezhnev Doctrine' was declared, which stated Moscow would intervene if any communist party deviated from the Moscow line.

The build up in the far east actually built up momentum after the Czech invasion, with over 250 combat aircraft and 180 transports shifted to the border, and the Trans-siberian railway closed to all foreigners while troops were moved on it.

Given that the CPC had led the revolt of communist parties since 1960-61, along with Albania, the continuing Soviet military led them to believe they might be next. Fundamental decisions had to be made, but that required a clear understanding of the limits of Soviet will.

The Soviet response to the Chinese attacks was of enormous restraint, aimed at avoiding general war. Despite conventional and nuclear superiority the Soviets did not strike in to Chinese territory proper, refused to use airpower, and placed a number of feelers asking for restraint and de-escalation.

It was clear at that point that the Soviets lacked the political will to invade or strike, and the military build-up was intended as intimidation and leverage. This considerably expanded Chinese freedom of action - they no longer needed to remain on alert for war.

When Deng listed the conditions for normalisation of ties in 1979 they were the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Mongolia and Afghanistan, the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia, and the reversal of the Soviet military buildup on the Sino-Soviet border. Gorbachev accepted these conditions, and the Sino-Soviet conflict ended and talk of territorial dispute vanished.

Also, it was the Chinese who invited Kosygin for border talks...he stopped by in Beijing on the way home from Ho Chi Minh's funeral in September 1969.

Kosygin invited himself to Beijing on a refueling stopover request because the Chinese refused to engage with the Soviets at the Hanoi.

Here is a quote from Gao Wenquian's biography of Zhou Enlai;

Aleksei Kosygin, the Soviet premier, planned to corner Zhou at Ho Chi Minh's funeral in September 1969, and urge him to tone down the hostile rhetoric. Zhou anticipated this maneuver, and was well aware that the Soviets had planned to play a China card with the United
States, which was then embroiled in the Vietnam War. A show of solidarity by the USSR and China might further weaken U.S. resolve on the ideological war front. Zhou, an old friend of Ho Chi Minh, flew in one day ahead of the state funeral to pay his respects to the late North Vietnamese leader and returned to China the same day. Kosygin, however, could not be entirely thwarted. Besides, both China and the Soviets wanted to goad the United States. Kosygin made a stopover at the Beijing airport on his way back to Moscow from Hanoi. In the VIP lounge, he and Zhou worked out a formula for easing border hostilities. After Kosygin was back in the air on his way to Moscow, Zhou reworked the language of their communique deleting words like "fraternal" and "friendly" that might appear to overemphasize the rapprochement and give the United States the impression that all was well between the Chinese and the Russians. The Soviets did their part by repudiating the agreement once Kosygin was back in Moscow.

Kosygin had been driven to this by the extreme obduracy of the Chinese who were out to test the Soviets to the limits. During and after the first round of clashes on Damansky Island Kosygin had tried to call Zhou, but the operator had refused to connect him declaring 'we dont talk to revisionists'.

Mao's own vulnerability to an internal putsch was far less in 1971 than in 1944. The degree to which Lin Biao had been sidelined at the time of his desperate coup attempt is obvious from the fact that the PRC was already pursuing rapprochement with the USA at that time, something that Lin fervently opposed.

The cultural revolution was a purge launched by Mao on his own terms to give him totalitarian control over the party and state.

The struggle with Lin Biao was something completely different. It was the first serious attempt to seize power from Mao from within the Party and to physically eliminate him.

Lin Biao's power base was in the PLA, not the state bureaucracy or foreign ministry, which was under Zhou Enlai.

Its not at all clear that Lin Biao had deep ideological commitment against Mao's decision to pursue detente with the US against the Soviets.

The main figure in the coup plan 'project 571' was Lin Liguo, Lin Biao's son, a senior officer in the PLAAF. Lin Liguo was like many red princes a person who had access to all that was forbidden to ordinary Chinese. He had a taste for the Beatles and foreign literature, and rather than opposing Mao's rapprochement, blamed Mao for China's isolation from both Moscow and Washington over the previous decade and the suffering it had produced in China. His other source of disgruntledment was the way that Mao used and destroyed people to retain absolute power - he anticipated (correctly) that his father might be next.

The seriousness of the crisis can be seen from the fact that the CPC has never fully discussed what happened in 1971, and it remains a taboo subject today even within the Party.

Even in 1966, Mao was not shy continuing China's military involvement in Vietnam despite proceeding with the Cultural Revolution at home;

From early 1965 onwards the PRC had repeatedly and publicly warned that they would intervene if the US invaded North Vietnam, just as they had entered the conflict when US forces entered North Korean territory in 1950. This was the result of the escalating US air campaign and psychological warfare against North Vietnam from March 1965 onwards, along with the massive troop buildup in South Vietnam.

By early 1966 Johnson Administration had repeatedly assured the Chinese through multiple channels that despite their escalations, they had no intention of invading North Vietnam, which was Mao's chief concern. Mao then went ahead and launched the cultural revolution in May 1966.

Chinese troops in North Vietnam 1966-68 were not engaged in combat - they basically provided rear area services for the Vietnamese by building ports, railway lines, airfields, etc managing logistics and providing rear security. Once he no longer feared US invasion, their larger value for Mao in this period was counter-balancing Soviet influence in Vietnam.

Within weeks of Lin's disappearance over Mongolia, the top ranks of the PLA had already been purged of Lin's appointees...so there is little basis to contend that internal purges would have made him reluctant to intervene in the 1971 India-Pakistan war (where he had so much to gain by resolving Kashmir in China's favour, if successful).

Any military campaign requires several months of careful planning - India for example began its preparations for the war in April-May of 1971, after the Pakistanis launched 'Searchlight' to repress Mujbur Rehman and his his supporters.

The Tibetan plateau was at the most extreme end of the PLA's logistical chain. Pre-positioning stocks and raising troop levels given the limited infrastructure was an enormous challenge for them, and required a great deal of advance planning. They had sufficent troops for internal security, and enough to deter any Indian operations, but certainly not enough for any offensive operations.

From most accounts Lin Liguo began his planning in 1970. In China most of the PLA command's time in 1971 was taken up in a game of chess between Lin Biao and Mao as they struggled to place their loyalists in key positions, or remove their opponent's loyalists, as they attempted to develop intelligence on each others plans, and prepared contingency plans for open power struggle.
Mao in particular instituted orders that made any and all troop movements a matter for his authorisation (via Zhou), effectively locking down the PLA.

By the time the struggle peaked in September 1971, the PLA was in no position to mount a campaign. There was little chance they could be ready with planning, troops and stocks for a war in December.

[Igorr]

An interesting video about Russian student women qualified for honor guard and military parades.
[youtube]JqQZWsYzUh8&fmt[/youtube]

[Johann]

Some insights in to the particular financial obstacles the Russian military-industrial complex faces, and thus an area for potential reform;

...modernization of these kinds of plants can only be carried out with secure government funding. And it further notes that there is plenty of financing available for this. The problem is that while money for the coming calendar year is usually allocated in November, it doesn’t reach the intended recipient until the end of the third quarter (i.e. August-September). And not all recipients receive all of the sums they have been allocated.

This uncertainty means that they cannot order new equipment until the money arrives. At this point, they are faced with a legal requirement to spend all allocated money in the current fiscal year (i.e. before December, as the fiscal and calendar years in Russia match). Since the complex (and often unique) equipment that is required for real modernization to occur needs several months to be designed and built, it cannot be ordered in August-September.

But the money that is received must be spent on something, or else it will not only be lost, but the recipient is likely to receive a reduced allocation for the following year. So the money is spent on cheap standard equipment, which is not strictly needed for modernization, but at least the money isn’t going completely to waste. And the recipient can send in reports to the government stating that new technologies have been purchased, the percentage of new equipment at the factory has increased, etc. But in real terms, no actual modernization has occurred.

The question of what this money is doing from November to August is left unanswered, though two options strongly suggest themselves — either there is corruption and the money is used to accrue interest for private individuals or there is bureaucratic incompetence in the administration and it just takes a long time for money to be transferred to the intended recipient. Most likely, both of these factors are at play.

http://russiamil.wordpress.com/2009/12/ ... bad-shape/

[Karan Dixit]

Russia has launched the process of installing weapons on the first of three stealth frigates being constructed by it for India at a Kaliningrad-based naval shipyard under the $1.6 billion deal signed in 2007.


http://www.business-standard.com/india/ ... a/81852/on

[Sanjay M]

from BiBi:

Russian Population Rising Again, Says Putin

Atlanticists/Euro-centrists/Johann will quickly shout it down as lies, of course. They will argue that it's biologically impossible and immoral for the Russians to increase their numbers, and how it's a foregone conclusion that Russians will go extinct by 2038.

[Gerard]

Putin trumpets first Russia population growth since 1995

[Johann]

from BiBi:

Russian Population Rising Again, Says Putin

Atlanticists/Euro-centrists/Johann will quickly shout it down as lies, of course. They will argue that it's biologically impossible and immoral for the Russians to increase their numbers, and how it's a foregone conclusion that Russians will go extinct by 2038.

Well Sanjay, its always nice to have people announce to the world what I think - it saves me the trouble of having to think for myself

Russia is not going to disappear.

Its certainly possible that the decline in population may be bottoming out but it will however be a number of years before it is clear whether that's actually the case.

In previous discussions here its been noted that Russian birth rates had been increasing after 1999, the high death and emmigration rates of healthy young adults was the biggest single demographic problem.

We would have to compare the reduction in death rates to reduction in the emmigration rates. Emmigration from Russia to North America and EU has certainly taken a big hit with the recession. Meanwhile, there's still immigration by ethnic Russians from the rest of the former Soviet Union.

We'll have to see what happens to the overall population dynamics after economic growth resumes in those emmigration destinations.

The other factor is spending on social services, including medical services which have been rising but are now under fiscal pressure because of peak oil/gas.

[Jarita]

^^^^ Can we import all Indian Leftists to Russia
They need people, we have leftists..

[Sanku]

from BiBi:

Russian Population Rising Again, Says Putin

Atlanticists/Euro-centrists/Johann will quickly shout it down as lies, of course. They will argue that it's biologically impossible and immoral for the Russians to increase their numbers, and how it's a foregone conclusion that Russians will go extinct by 2038.

Clearly there is too much doomsday "Russia is dying, now" kind of thought that are truly misplaced. But yes, Russia and India can have a productive association in manpower field.

If Indians can work in the Arabian hell holes with no hopes of long term stay, no reason if Russia calls for temp workers of all sorts Indians wont get there either, and Indians are the best manpower resources anyway (and not only from Russian perspective of avoiding a Chinese demographical invasion)

[Jarita]

Old video but would any Indian leaders react like this to troop movements in China

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oV0jbfVT ... re=channel

[Rudradev]

So your contention is that the entire process of preparing the Soviet 40th Army to move into Afghanistan was undertaken, quite abruptly, in the two months between October and December 1979?

Sorry, you're the one who is confused about the dates. The Soviets had a treaty in place with Nur Mohammed Taraki's PDPA as of December 1978, allowing for military intervention to take place on Kabul's request. From that point onwards it was obvious that they were readying themselves for military action if required to back up their political intervention. The Sino-Vietnam war took place in February-March 1979; by April the Soviets had sent helicopters into Afghanistan, and by June they had sent tanks and BMPs to secure Kabul and Bagram.

There is little doubt that, as I stated, the Soviets were concentrating on Afghanistan and considering the possibility of military intervention at the time Deng invaded Vietnam.

Rudradev,

I don't think you read my post very carefully. Please go back and re-read it. Also please familarise yourself with Soviet Red Army strength and posture in the period for context.

The Soviets did not begin planning for the possibility of large-scale intervention until the Herat uprising which began the day *after* the Sino-Vietnamese war ended, on March 17th. ...

I have read it carefully enough to realize that it is like most of your posts... full to the brim with an apparent barrage of "facts" that bear little relevance to the matter at hand. And as often, you attempt to spin this disparate melange of data into an entirely unrelated conclusion.

The Soviets signed a defense treaty with Nur Mohammed Taraki in December 1978 that allowed for Soviet armed intervention at the behest of the Afghan government. They signed such a treaty exactly because they wanted a foot in the door for military intervention, given the interest of the Americans in undermining the PDPA regime with fundamentalist Islamic terrorism.

It was not lost on the Politburo, the Kremlin or the Red Army that the existence of this treaty implied the likelihood of military intervention... no matter what opinion any of those factions might have had of the advisability of such intervention. And it certainly wasn't lost on the Chinese, who took advantage of the Soviets' absorption with Afghanistan to mount an invasion of Soviet ally Vietnam.

The Chinese learned perfectly well that they were not going to take Soviet territory by force, because of the hugely damaging response their initial adventures at Zhenbao (and their later attempts at Xinjiang) provoked.

In fact, Mao warmed to the idea of rapprochement with the United States, partially because he realized that his China was no match for the Soviet Union following the drubbing they received at Brezhnev's hands in 1969.

... Hand-waving apart, the Chinese had recognized that further provocation of the Soviets would have led to an internal as well as an external disaster in 1969.

Rudradev,

You have missed the fundamental context of the Sino-Soviet conflict, particularly in the Brezhnev years.

The Chinese attacks of March-August 1969 were not about territory. They were about testing Soviet intentions, much like the invasion of Vietnam in 1979.

The Chinese invasion of Vietnam was not nearly as much about testing Soviet intentions, as it was about ending the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia so that the pro-Beijing Khmer Rouge could return to power in Phnom Penh. The PRC realized that the Soviets, preoccupied with Afghanistan, were not going to interfere... and attempted, unsuccessfully, to oust the Vietnamese from Cambodia.

Both the Sino-Soviet conflict of 1969 and the Sino-Vietnamese conflict of 1979 were instances of China attempting to expand its territorial influence beyond its borders, and failing because its military adventures were defeated.

The Soviet response to the Chinese attacks was of enormous restraint, aimed at avoiding general war. Despite conventional and nuclear superiority the Soviets did not strike in to Chinese territory proper, refused to use airpower, and placed a number of feelers asking for restraint and de-escalation.

It was clear at that point that the Soviets lacked the political will to invade or strike, and the military build-up was intended as intimidation and leverage. This considerably expanded Chinese freedom of action - they no longer needed to remain on alert for war.

The Soviets had no interest in attacking Chinese territory proper; that's why it was and remained a border conflict. It was not a question of political will, simply of an invasion of China not being a significant priority, territorially or politically, for Moscow. Brezhnev's threat to punish splittist political parties was directed at East European Communist nations, regarded as vulnerable to ideological destabilization by the West. Whatever kind of "splittist" Mao was, he would never pose the sort of threat that an Imre Nagy or an Alexander Dubcek did to the ideological heart of Soviet Communism.

China had no need to "test" Brezhnev's intentions by initiating, of all things, a border war. The 1969 aggression was an attempt to grab territory adjoining Manchuria and Xinjiang while the Soviets were distracted, and the precisely calculated hammering that China received at Soviet hands dissuaded them from provoking Moscow again in 1971.

When Deng listed the conditions for normalisation of ties in 1979 they were the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Mongolia and Afghanistan, the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia, and the reversal of the Soviet military buildup on the Sino-Soviet border. Gorbachev accepted these conditions, and the Sino-Soviet conflict ended and talk of territorial dispute vanished.

Is that why, per your own post, the Soviets continued to have

51 divisions in the Far East at the time of the invasion of Afghanistan. The number of divisions on the Chinese border actually *increased* to 54 divisions by 1982...

?

Also, it was the Chinese who invited Kosygin for border talks...he stopped by in Beijing on the way home from Ho Chi Minh's funeral in September 1969.

Kosygin invited himself to Beijing on a refueling stopover request because the Chinese refused to engage with the Soviets at the Hanoi.

Here is a quote from Gao Wenquian's biography of Zhou Enlai;

Aleksei Kosygin, the Soviet premier, planned to corner Zhou at Ho Chi Minh's funeral in September 1969, and urge him to tone down the hostile rhetoric...

Now I'm sure a Chinese biographer (of Zhou Enlai no less) would be a perfectly reliable source of unbiased information about a conflict in which the Chinese got their bums handed to them by the Soviets.

Mao's own vulnerability to an internal putsch was far less in 1971 than in 1944. The degree to which Lin Biao had been sidelined at the time of his desperate coup attempt is obvious from the fact that the PRC was already pursuing rapprochement with the USA at that time, something that Lin fervently opposed.

The cultural revolution was a purge launched by Mao on his own terms to give him totalitarian control over the party and state.

The struggle with Lin Biao was something completely different. It was the first serious attempt to seize power from Mao from within the Party and to physically eliminate him.

Lin Biao's rise to power was certainly linked to the Cultural Revolution, wherein by virtue of being the "last man standing" as so many other senior officials were purged, he ascended to the status of Mao's heir apparent.

Even in 1966, Mao was not shy continuing China's military involvement in Vietnam despite proceeding with the Cultural Revolution at home;

From early 1965 onwards the PRC had repeatedly and publicly warned that they would intervene if the US invaded North Vietnam, just as they had entered the conflict when US forces entered North Korean territory in 1950. This was the result of the escalating US air campaign and psychological warfare against North Vietnam from March 1965 onwards, along with the massive troop buildup in South Vietnam.

By early 1966 Johnson Administration had repeatedly assured the Chinese through multiple channels that despite their escalations, they had no intention of invading North Vietnam, which was Mao's chief concern. Mao then went ahead and launched the cultural revolution in May 1966.

I find it hard to believe that Mao (in 1966) would have trusted the word of the Johnson administration sufficiently to abandon preparedness for a conflict on China's very borders. Especially when the deployment of US ground forces in South Vietnam expanded from 3,500 in March 1965 to 200,000 in December 1965.

Within weeks of Lin's disappearance over Mongolia, the top ranks of the PLA had already been purged of Lin's appointees...so there is little basis to contend that internal purges would have made him reluctant to intervene in the 1971 India-Pakistan war (where he had so much to gain by resolving Kashmir in China's favour, if successful).

Any military campaign requires several months of careful planning - India for example began its preparations for the war in April-May of 1971, after the Pakistanis launched 'Searchlight' to repress Mujbur Rehman and his his supporters.

The Tibetan plateau was at the most extreme end of the PLA's logistical chain. Pre-positioning stocks and raising troop levels given the limited infrastructure was an enormous challenge for them, and required a great deal of advance planning. They had sufficent troops for internal security, and enough to deter any Indian operations, but certainly not enough for any offensive operations.

By the time the struggle peaked in September 1971, the PLA was in no position to mount a campaign. There was little chance they could be ready with planning, troops and stocks for a war in December.

The Chinese had been deployed in the Ladakh plateau and the Eastern Himalayas for nearly a decade by 1971. They may not have had enough of a logistical chain to mount a major campaign into the Indian plains, but neither would such a campaign have been necessary to assist the Pakistanis.

The Chinese undoubtedly had the strength to intervene on behalf of Pakistan by salami-slicing into Indian territory while the IA were occupied with the Bangladesh war. The PLA maintained a state of readiness to seize opportunities for territorial expansion along the Indo-Tibetan border throughout the 1960s. They had attempted a thrust just four years previously at Nathu La, and were certainly in a position to try again with the IA's Eastern Command otherwise occupied. A similar thrust from Aksai Chin would have severely constrained India's options in the Partapur sector, for instance.

There is much the Chinese could have done in the way of limited military intervention to assist the Pakistanis against us in the 1971 war. A major reason why they stood down rather than explore any of those options, was the existence of the Indo-Soviet defense pact. This assured Beijing that any adventurism against India would escalate to another thorough drubbing of the PLA at the hands of the Soviets.

[Karan Dixit]

MOSCOW, RUSSIA - Russia will lease one of its newest nuclear-powered submarines to India in the second half of this year, Itar-Tass news agency quoted a Russian Defence Ministry official as saying on Tuesday.

http://www.asiaone.com/News/AsiaOne+New ... 91402.html

[sum]

What, second half this year??

Wasn't it supposed to be this month?

[Chinmayanand]

Russian mafia may be behind PMO cyber attack

[Masaru]

Russian Oil Pipeline Makes Splash in Asia

ESPO crude's advantage over competing blends is its proximity to the oil refineries of northeastern Asia. The new $2 billion terminal, at the Pacific coast port of Kozmino, is five days' sailing time from markets in China, South Korea and Japan. Producers in the Middle East, Africa and Latin America face journeys of at least two weeks.

This would throw a spanner in the nascent Malacca strait strategies of IN/US-N.

[Lilo]

Why Russia Still Matters in the Asian Century

[joshvajohn]

What is this in India?!

http://www.hindu.com/2010/01/28/stories ... 571000.htm
We are shocked and deeply outraged: Russia

Special Correspondent

NEW DELHI: Russia expressed outrage over the alleged rape of a nine-year-old child from the country and warned that it would ask its nationals not to visit Goa if the local police continued to investigate offences as inefficiently as it was probing an earlier rape of a Russian.

In a statement, the Russian embassy said:

“We are shocked and deeply outraged by the reports about the disgusting incident in India’s well-known resort in Goa, when a 9-year-old child from Russia became another victim of a rapist. The Embassy reiterates its grave concern over the growth of criminal cases against Russians in Goa.

“Last December, a 25-year old Russian woman was criminally assaulted and raped. Investigation of that case is being conducted inefficiently. Earlier the police had registered several other cases of assaults and abuses of Russian tourists in Goa.

“Increased criminal activities in the State, which has become popular among Russian tourists, cause damage to its reputation. We expect that the Indian authorities should immediately take strict and efficient measures to ensure the safety of Russian citizens. Otherwise, we will have no other option but to recommend Russian tourists to refrain from visiting Goa.”

[Chinmayanand]

^^ This is sad. I hope the Central Govt takes appropriate action for dealing with the miscreants involved and for the safety of other tourists.The state police is so lax that it doesn't do anything till it gets a kick in the musharraf from higher ups.

[ramana]

After all that flak the Aussies got it would be troublesome if police security isnt stepped up and the perpetrator/s brought to justice speedily.

[arun]

X Posted.

The Russians are having takleef with India's proposal to award a tank simulator deal for the T-Series MBT's to non-Russian entities :

Russia objects to T-72/T-90 simulators: Friend turns 'foe' in tank battle simulator deal

So much for the Russian Lobby usual barking over not being approached for the Sims!!!
This is what Zen and CAE/TATA have to say

CAE, however, denies infringing Russian IPR. CAE India President, H J Kamath, told Business Standard, “No proprietary or OEM software or equipment is needed for the simulator. No original equipment has been used, nor do we need any data or source codes from Russia. Everything has been simulated.”

Zen Technologies is equally emphatic. The company’s President, Kishore Dutt Atluri, says, “We don’t need any information from Russia. The physics of the T-72 and T-90 tanks are well known.”

Interestingly, CAE is also engaged in developing a full-crew simulator for the Arjun tank, which is made by the Defence R&D Organisation, for which the DRDO has given permission.

[Philip]

deleted - copyright

[Philip]

Check into this insightful paper.Events are taking place right now at "breakneck speed" across Europe and the GUlf,wit US moves to install missiles in former Warsaw Pact member nations,plus the beating of war drums against Iran.An "explosion" is predicted which will affect even India and Indo-Russian realtions depending upon the drift/tilt towards the US seen right now.

In the third public warning on NATO expansion since last month, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad recently said "The West's ultimate goal is not Iran, but India and China" and "named the recent concentration of NATO forces around India and unrest in Pakistan as an argument." He added that NATO now "almost completely surrounded Russia" and advocated that "Russia should respond to the deployment of NATO forces along its borders." [23]

http://www.opednews.com/articles/2/Impe ... 1-935.html
Impending Explosion: U.S. Intensifies Threats To Russia And Iran

Excerpt:

Former Joint Chief of Staff of the Russian Armed Forces retired general Leonid Ivashov was less restrained in his reaction. He recently told a major Russian radio station that U.S. missile strategy "remains unchanged" vis-a-vis that of the former George W. Bush administration and missiles in Romania are an integral component of Washington's plan to "neutralize Russia as a geopolitical competitor" [8] in the Black Sea and in general. In fact Washington's plans are to destroy the strategic balance in the European continent two and a half months after the expiration of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). Recent announcements concerning U.S. missile deployments near Russia have been interpreted by some observers as intentionally designed to bury START negotiations and any hope for a treaty for the limitation and reduction of strategic offensive arms.

A Russian military analyst, Alexander Pikayev, said of the above dynamic that "US/Russia relations were improving but these proposals really don't help the situation. This situation is a time bomb. If these plans go ahead it could cause big problems in five to ten years time." [9]

On February 11 Moldovan political analyst Bogdan Tsirdia warned that the U.S. "is very consistently moving NATO infrastructure in Russia's direction," specifically mentioning American bases in Romania and Kyrgyzstan, and added "the US wants to create another base in Georgia."

He added in relation to the Black Sea in particular that "in the near future the US will have a conventional arms advantage over Moscow in the region....[T]he United States is turning the Black Sea into an American lake to control transit in the region." [19]

[Karan Dixit]

NEW DELHI | India and Russia are negotiating a new contract on the delivery of 42 Su-30MKI to the Indian Air Force, an Indian newspaper reported on Tuesday, according to RIA Novosti, citing military sources.

http://www.defpro.com/news/details/13526/

[biswas]

NEW DELHI | India and Russia are negotiating a new contract on the delivery of 42 Su-30MKI to the Indian Air Force, an Indian newspaper reported on Tuesday, according to RIA Novosti, citing military sources.

http://www.defpro.com/news/details/13526/

Does this mean the MMRCA contract will remain at its original 126 instead of the possible 200 units option?

[Karan Dixit]

Biswas,

The new air-superiority fighters will come on top of the 230 already contracted from Russia in three deals worth a total of $8.5 billion.

I hope this answers your question if not then may be some gurus can answer it.

[VinodTK]

PREVIEW-Arms, energy to dominate Russia's Putin India trip

India, Russia for joint venture to produce GPS receivers

[Philip]

Biswas,in another thread I quoted our former COAS,ACM Fali Major in an interview,where he said that the "MMRCA would be replaced by the PAK-FA from around 2017..."
Now if this is true and reflects IAF thinking,then the MMRCA is merely a medium sized multi-role interim fighter to make up numbers until the stealthy 5th-gen birds start being inducted.We have also seen in numerous posts the viewpoint both within and without,that the exstign Flankers in service are superior to any of the MMRCA birds,with the Typhooon perhaps being closest in comparison.many alaysts have prefered the IAF to induct "more of the same"-aircraft already in service,and the superlative Sukhoi has proven itself around the world.Now even the currnt version,the MKI is goping to be upgraded using some of the tech to be found on the 5th-gen fighter.

Therefore,what is the point in buying at a far greater cost per unit an inferior western aircraft and its dated tech? This probably explains why the extra SU-30s are being acquired,keeping in mind the sudden unveiling of the dragon's claws and the arrogance of the PRC leadership against India on the issues of Arunachal Pradesh,PLA incursions and Tibet.

[Rony]

As per German Deutsche Welle

Putin's India visit part of Russia's balancing act with Asia's rising powers

On the surface, two countries such as Russia and India signing arms deals and agreements should not raise too many eyebrows but experts believe that this increasing level of cooperation is an indication of the importance Moscow places on maintaining good relations with the main international players on the sub-continent and surrounding region.

Stanislav Secrieru, an expert at the Centre for European Policy Studies, believes that Putin is not only looking to secure military contracts but Russian involvement and influence in the region, in the face of expanding Chinese and Indian power.

Russia holds residual influence in the region," Secrieru told Deutsche Welle.

"However, China's and India's rise will further diminish Russia's position in the region over time. Russia's relations with China already display some asymmetry with Beijing actively counter-balancing Russia in the post-Soviet world, while India does not feel like a junior partner anymore and has managed during the last few years to equilibrate its relationship with Russia."

"Hence, power dynamics in the region indicates that in the mid- to long term, Russian influence will decline with China most probably assuming a more prominent role."

Secrieru believes that Russia is not trying to trump China by cosying up to India but that Moscow is attempting to maintain a balanced relationship with Asia's two great emerging powers.
Relations with China are more intensive because of the frontier and the Central Asian neighborhood Russia shares with it but Moscow has strived to maintain the equilibrium and ease any suspicions on the Indian side," he said. "The economic crisis and strong performance of China and India only reconfirmed for Moscow that it needs to foster a balanced relationship."

Relations with India are also part of Russia's broader strategy to geographically diversify its economic external relations. Moscow thinks that its economic relations are unbalanced, with the EU accounting for almost 52 percent of Russian trade turnover. Moscow believes that this focus on Europe could constrain its freedom of action on the international stage so relations with India are important to the expansion of Russia's global agenda.

As India continues its steady rise to regional and international prominence, it becomes an attractive partner for countries like Russia who hope to maintain a level of involvement in the sub-continent's politics. In turn, India gets the benefits of Russia’s energy resources, its help in achieving military modernization and the opportunity to expand its technological, chemical and pharmaceutical industries into the Russian market.

"Russia needs open markets and India is one of these," Rahr said. "India has welcomed Russia unlike the EU which demands Moscow to develop more European attitudes and policies in return for the more relaxed trade agreements. So Russia now has the opportunity to sell arms and hi-tech equipment to India and in return, India gets Russia's expertise and technology to help with its civil nuclear program."

"India gets a lot from the relationship with Russia. They have traditional ties going back decades. India-Russia ties survived the Cold War because there were no ideological clashes between them, as there were with China, and India never had any fear of the Soviet Union. So the relationship has endured."

[Philip]

Let's give Premier Putin a warm welcome from all of us at BR.Russia has been our oldest and most loyal friend especially in times of crisis.True there have been shortcomings after the demise of the Soviet Union,but these commercial blemishes pale into insigniificance when one takes an overview of the entire Indo-Russian relationship.The relationship is now on the upward direction again as Russia has re-emerged as a global superpower being the largest exporter of energy apart from its traditional strengths.Thanks to Premier Putin and Pres.Medvedev,Russis is resurgent and the Putin/Medvedev govt. has a huge popular mandate to bring Russia out from the cold.The stupid attempt by the US and NATO to constrain Russia behind the Urals,just as China is trying to keep India forever stunted below the Himalayas is doomed to similar failure.

However,there is a lot of work to be accomplished before Indo-Russian relations match that high point achieved during the Indira-Brezhnev era.In the 21st century,there exists new and different opportunities for Indo-Russian relations to flourish instead of remaining within the traditional parameters.Let's hope that Premier Putin's visit will enlarge ties to mutual interest very substantially.