Rudradev wrote:
So your contention is that the entire process of preparing the Soviet 40th Army to move into Afghanistan was undertaken, quite abruptly, in the two months between October and December 1979?
Sorry, you're the one who is confused about the dates. The Soviets had a treaty in place with Nur Mohammed Taraki's PDPA as of December 1978, allowing for military intervention to take place on Kabul's request. From that point onwards it was obvious that they were readying themselves for military action if required to back up their political intervention. The Sino-Vietnam war took place in February-March 1979; by April the Soviets had sent helicopters into Afghanistan, and by June they had sent tanks and BMPs to secure Kabul and Bagram.
There is little doubt that, as I stated, the Soviets were concentrating on Afghanistan and considering the possibility of military intervention at the time Deng invaded Vietnam.
Rudradev,
I don't think you read my post very carefully. Please go back and re-read it. Also please familarise yourself with Soviet Red Army strength and posture in the period for context.
The Soviets did not begin planning for the possibility of large-scale intervention until the Herat uprising which began the day *after* the Sino-Vietnamese war ended, on March 17th. Over 100 Soviet advisors were killed in the mutiny of the Afghan 17th Division and the subsequent DRA Air Force bombing to put it down. It was only at that point that the collapse of the Afghan communist party's rule appeared to a serious threat, and preparation for the option of military intervention began.
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan involved only 4 divisions - the 103rd Guards Airborne Division, the 3rd and 108th Motor Rifle Divisions, and an additional division's worth of troops (an air assault regiment and two motor rifle regiments).
Following the Herat uprising in March these divisions were placed on 3-day alert, and forward deployed within the Turkemenistan Military District close to the border. That was the initial strength of the 40th Army, which was only stood up in May 1979 to provide an umbrella command.
However, the Politburo was still not yet in favour of major intervention; they even turned down Taraki's plea for three divisions in July. It was not until news of Taraki's assassination by Amin in October that their view changed.
The 40th Army's initial order of battle was unsuited for counterinsurgency, but the Soviet politburo did not plan or anticipate on direct participation in the counter-insurgency. Their objective for the "Limited Contingency of Soviet Forces" was to depose the Khalqi faction of the party, install the Parchamis, and provide security as they rebuilt the party, state and army and prosecuted the war against the rebels.
For context the Soviets had 51 divisions in the Far East at the time of the invasion of Afghanistan. The number of divisions on the Chinese border actually *increased* to 54 divisions by 1982, even as the Soviets were increasing troop levels in Afghanistan simultaneously.
So the Afghan war in no way altered the military balance of power with the PRC. In fact China is the main reason the Soviets were never able to commit the kind of troop strength the Afghan war demanded.
Rudradev wrote:
The Chinese learned perfectly well that they were not going to take Soviet territory by force, because of the hugely damaging response their initial adventures at Zhenbao (and their later attempts at Xinjiang) provoked.
In fact, Mao warmed to the idea of rapprochement with the United States, partially because he realized that his China was no match for the Soviet Union following the drubbing they received at Brezhnev's hands in 1969.
... Hand-waving apart, the Chinese had recognized that further provocation of the Soviets would have led to an internal as well as an external disaster in 1969.
Rudradev,
You have missed the fundamental context of the Sino-Soviet conflict, particularly in the Brezhnev years.
The Chinese attacks of March-August 1969 were not about territory. They were about testing Soviet intentions, much like the invasion of Vietnam in 1979.
Mao initiated the Sino-Soviet split against Khrushchev, but it was a largely ideological conflict for the first five years waged through speeches, attempting to split or woo parties, and through sanctions and aid.
Under Brezhnev in 1966 initiated a massive military build up on the Chinese border, quite possibly as a hedge against the radicalism of the Cultural Revolution, or the possibility of a major anti-Mao, Soviet friendly split within the CPC.
In any case by 1969, the number of divisions along the Chinese border had increased from 13 to 30, with 3 divisions in Mongolia, and large numbers of nuclear IRBMs and MRBMs moved to the area.
The Soviets invaded Czechoslovakia in August 1968 when the Czechoslovak Party was breaking away from the CPSU, and the 'Brezhnev Doctrine' was declared, which stated Moscow would intervene if any communist party deviated from the Moscow line.
The build up in the far east actually built up momentum after the Czech invasion, with over 250 combat aircraft and 180 transports shifted to the border, and the Trans-siberian railway closed to all foreigners while troops were moved on it.
Given that the CPC had led the revolt of communist parties since 1960-61, along with Albania, the continuing Soviet military led them to believe they might be next. Fundamental decisions had to be made, but that required a clear understanding of the limits of Soviet will.
The Soviet response to the Chinese attacks was of enormous restraint, aimed at avoiding general war. Despite conventional and nuclear superiority the Soviets did not strike in to Chinese territory proper, refused to use airpower, and placed a number of feelers asking for restraint and de-escalation.
It was clear at that point that the Soviets lacked the political will to invade or strike, and the military build-up was intended as intimidation and leverage. This considerably expanded Chinese freedom of action - they no longer needed to remain on alert for war.
When Deng listed the conditions for normalisation of ties in 1979 they were the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Mongolia and Afghanistan, the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia, and the reversal of the Soviet military buildup on the Sino-Soviet border. Gorbachev accepted these conditions, and the Sino-Soviet conflict ended and talk of territorial dispute vanished.
Rudradev wrote:Also, it was the Chinese who invited Kosygin for border talks...he stopped by in Beijing on the way home from Ho Chi Minh's funeral in September 1969.
Kosygin invited himself to Beijing on a refueling stopover request because the Chinese refused to engage with the Soviets at the Hanoi.
Here is a quote from Gao Wenquian's biography of Zhou Enlai;
Aleksei Kosygin, the Soviet premier, planned to corner Zhou at Ho Chi Minh's funeral in September 1969, and urge him to tone down the hostile rhetoric. Zhou anticipated this maneuver, and was well aware that the Soviets had planned to play a China card with the United
States, which was then embroiled in the Vietnam War. A show of solidarity by the USSR and China might further weaken U.S. resolve on the ideological war front. Zhou, an old friend of Ho Chi Minh, flew in one day ahead of the state funeral to pay his respects to the late North Vietnamese leader and returned to China the same day. Kosygin, however, could not be entirely thwarted. Besides, both China and the Soviets wanted to goad the United States. Kosygin made a stopover at the Beijing airport on his way back to Moscow from Hanoi. In the VIP lounge, he and Zhou worked out a formula for easing border hostilities. After Kosygin was back in the air on his way to Moscow, Zhou reworked the language of their communique deleting words like "fraternal" and "friendly" that might appear to overemphasize the rapprochement and give the United States the impression that all was well between the Chinese and the Russians. The Soviets did their part by repudiating the agreement once Kosygin was back in Moscow.
Kosygin had been driven to this by the extreme obduracy of the Chinese who were out to test the Soviets to the limits. During and after the first round of clashes on Damansky Island Kosygin had tried to call Zhou, but the operator had refused to connect him declaring 'we dont talk to revisionists'.
Rudradev wrote:Mao's own vulnerability to an internal putsch was far less in 1971 than in 1944. The degree to which Lin Biao had been sidelined at the time of his desperate coup attempt is obvious from the fact that the PRC was already pursuing rapprochement with the USA at that time, something that Lin fervently opposed.
The cultural revolution was a purge launched by Mao on his own terms to give him totalitarian control over the party and state.
The struggle with Lin Biao was something completely different. It was the first serious attempt to seize power from Mao from within the Party and to physically eliminate him.
Lin Biao's power base was in the PLA, not the state bureaucracy or foreign ministry, which was under Zhou Enlai.
Its not at all clear that Lin Biao had deep ideological commitment against Mao's decision to pursue detente with the US against the Soviets.
The main figure in the coup plan 'project 571' was Lin Liguo, Lin Biao's son, a senior officer in the PLAAF. Lin Liguo was like many red princes a person who had access to all that was forbidden to ordinary Chinese. He had a taste for the Beatles and foreign literature, and rather than opposing Mao's rapprochement, blamed Mao for China's isolation from both Moscow and Washington over the previous decade and the suffering it had produced in China. His other source of disgruntledment was the way that Mao used and destroyed people to retain absolute power - he anticipated (correctly) that his father might be next.
The seriousness of the crisis can be seen from the fact that the CPC has never fully discussed what happened in 1971, and it remains a taboo subject today even within the Party.
Rudradev wrote:Even in 1966, Mao was not shy continuing China's military involvement in Vietnam despite proceeding with the Cultural Revolution at home;
From early 1965 onwards the PRC had repeatedly and publicly warned that they would intervene if the US invaded North Vietnam, just as they had entered the conflict when US forces entered North Korean territory in 1950. This was the result of the escalating US air campaign and psychological warfare against North Vietnam from March 1965 onwards, along with the massive troop buildup in South Vietnam.
By early 1966 Johnson Administration had repeatedly assured the Chinese through multiple channels that despite their escalations, they had no intention of invading North Vietnam, which was Mao's chief concern. Mao then went ahead and launched the cultural revolution in May 1966.
Chinese troops in North Vietnam 1966-68 were not engaged in combat - they basically provided rear area services for the Vietnamese by building ports, railway lines, airfields, etc managing logistics and providing rear security. Once he no longer feared US invasion, their larger value for Mao in this period was counter-balancing Soviet influence in Vietnam.
Rudradev wrote:Within weeks of Lin's disappearance over Mongolia, the top ranks of the PLA had already been purged of Lin's appointees...so there is little basis to contend that internal purges would have made him reluctant to intervene in the 1971 India-Pakistan war (where he had so much to gain by resolving Kashmir in China's favour, if successful).
Any military campaign requires several months of careful planning - India for example began its preparations for the war in April-May of 1971, after the Pakistanis launched 'Searchlight' to repress Mujbur Rehman and his his supporters.
The Tibetan plateau was at the most extreme end of the PLA's logistical chain. Pre-positioning stocks and raising troop levels given the limited infrastructure was an enormous challenge for them, and required a great deal of advance planning. They had sufficent troops for internal security, and enough to deter any Indian operations, but certainly not enough for any offensive operations.
From most accounts Lin Liguo began his planning in 1970. In China most of the PLA command's time in 1971 was taken up in a game of chess between Lin Biao and Mao as they struggled to place their loyalists in key positions, or remove their opponent's loyalists, as they attempted to develop intelligence on each others plans, and prepared contingency plans for open power struggle.
Mao in particular instituted orders that made any and all troop movements a matter for his authorisation (via Zhou), effectively locking down the PLA.
By the time the struggle peaked in September 1971, the PLA was in no position to mount a campaign. There was little chance they could be ready with planning, troops and stocks for a war in December.
