Yes, the difficulty lies in the possibility of barter of capabilities.
For example most modern drivers of cars can manage to use the car effectively without either knowing how it actually functions and the ability to repair the most significant parts, or the capability to manufacture and create replacements. The first comes from lack of training, and the second comes from the fact that car is a product of a complex chain of industries and industrial processes - that require building up of a a variety of capabilities in science and research.
But both the driver and the manufacturer of the car continue to exist because they form a mutually beneficial relationship. An entity like Pak can survive like the driver as long as it can give some benefit for the producer and supplier of military technology.
The thing is, that if we actually look at so-called profound defeats by which one system replaced another like say the Islamists in CAR or ME, and the British defeat of Indian powers, the much touted superior military capabilities of the victors become dubious. In most cases, to start with they are evenly matched - every opposing force in any war will be superior to the other in some aspects and inferior in other. But what matters is the determination and will to defeat and a clear purpose and plan into the future for the enemy once the war is won.
By that token, Pak has been forced to let USA come in for a long long time - as early as the Punjab famine of 53-54. How much contamination has it brought in to Paki society? [the bare belly stuff or debauchery for private enjoyment was there all along - part of ME culture from long before the USA was born].
Therefore the two points above combined means that Islamism need not be fatally contaminated simply from allowing the suppliers of military capability to come in, and that it may continue to be supplied with such capabilities as long as they deliver tangible benefits for the suppliers, and that they may win wars against equally or superior capable military enemies if they can show sufficient determination to subjugate others and stick to it. These are all "may/can/possible" and by no means I am ascribing assured superiority to Paki imperialism.
However, since its formation the Pak state and army has not won a single war, except some territorial gain by deception and surprise. This shows a feature in Paki Islamists that is consistent from historical periods. The Paki feudals turned Islamist to preserve their hold on the land - right from the advent of Islam when they saw and felt that the north Indian powers were not strong or concerned enough to resist the invaders. These are people who switch sides and allegiances just like that to preserve their property and power. They will never take the risk of pushing aggression to the point where real, credible and concrete threat of complete extinction looms large.
The key is the credible and actual concrete steps to make them extinct as a class and regime - you will see immediate changes.
Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -II
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brihaspati
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
B Ji,
Agreed in toto.
Agreed in toto.
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brihaspati
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
The Pak Land problem and why it leads to failure -3
There is a specific reason why Islamization, Militancy and failed Land Reforms are all linked together into Islamization of the state of Pak. Failing to raise resources through direct taxation and dependence on external aid and investment, failing to control and tax the feudals, the Pak state tried to tackle the problem of rural poverty and potential upheaval through kind of a charity mechanism by appropriating the Islamic dawa institutions. This naturally panicked both the feudals and the dawa networks which provided wealth and power to a lot of theologians. This tri-partite competition led to increasing Islamization of the state itself.
The poor muhajirs were the earliest to demand land-reform even in 1947 but they were staunchly resisted by the feudals in Sindh by raising the counter appeal to Sindhi nationalism, by uniting with the Sindhi middle peasants. However the Punjab famine of 1952-54 revived the issue of land use, since the famine was seen to be the handiwork of the feudal hoarders and only US aid sort of barely helped the country tide over. Since small farms had higher yield ratios, land reform would increase the number of small farmers who were more likely to invest in increasing their yields. (Case of Egypt following Nasser's land reform). However the weak Pak state's feudals scuttled all attempts at land reform, by appealing to Islamic parties to highlight the sanctity of property in Islam.
Some degree of increase of productivity in the 1960s weakened the land reform case but the poverty stricken rural masses restricted the internal market and therefore hamper industrialization. Ayub Khan therefore introduced a land reform bill in 1959, probably under international pressure and the temporary sense of state autonomy under a military junta rule. However the scope of Ayub's reforms were limited in merely fixing the ceiling on private ownership of land at 500 acres of irrigated and 1000 acres of unirrigated land. Moreover, the ceilings were calculated on the basis of individual rather than family holdings which allowed distributed ownership by the feudals using extended families. Moreover, there were exceptions made on yield, to exceed ceilings. This resulted in little damage to feudal power. After the land reform the average land holding per landed elite was 7,208 acres, and in Punjab it was 11,810 acres; The state appropriated only 35% of the land that exceeded the ceilings. Any negative impact of land reform on the feudals were more than compensated by the developmental funds invested into modernizing agriculture whose benefit was directly accruing to the feudals. One side effect was to swell the middle peasantry who were able to buy land from large land owners to increase their average holdings by 33.6% between 1959 and 1969 rather than the lower peasants and were also coopted into the feudal power structure.
The land reform of 1959 was partly successful because it was undertaken under a military junta that enjoyed initial popularity in a society religiously predisposed to authoritarianism and sick of the instability and corruption of the previous "democratic" regimes - somewhat similar in lines to the success of the redistributive policies of Sha in 1963 Iran. But international monetary flows and feudal resistance slowed down this reform.
In 1962 Ayub tried to replace the landed elite with a centrally-controlled power structure extending from the capital to he rural called "Basic Democracies". This was an attempt at an oligarchical transition to a supervised democracy but even here lack of land reforms proved crucial. The rural masses continued to follow the bad gentry and feudals under a tight dependency relationship and the programme failed.
In the early 1970s, Bhutto and the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) tried land reforms, after Bhutto rose to power on public demand for social justice, and the discrediting of the military regime in '71. Bhutto called for a more equitable distribution of economic resources. After taking office in 1971 he quickly nationalized banks, large industries, numerous private enterprises, passed pro-labor laws and redistributive measures, significantly reducing urban poverty.
In 1972 the Bhutto government introduced a new land reform bill, followed Bhutto's severe criticism of feudalism and the promise that large landholders would meet the same fate as the major industrialists. This land reform amounted to reducing the size of land-holdings rather than radically changing the structure of land ownership. The ceilings on land holding were reduced to 150 acres for irrigated and 300 for nonirrigated
land. The bill also allowed for exceptions to these ceilings based on productivity and yield, and use of tractors and tubewells. As a concession to feudals the benchmark figures used for assessing the productivity and yield of farms were those of 1940. However the yield in 1940 was much lower before the agricultural investments and therefore automatically qualified many feudals for exemptions. The average land holding after the 1972 bill stood at 466 acres in Punjab and 566 acres in Sindh (but the Bhuttos, allegedly continued to hold 2,200 acres.) This bill did not ban distributed ownership in extended families.
Bhutto was shaken by possibility of military reasserting itself by taking the side of the feudals, and direct rebellion by the feudals as observed in the civil war in Baluchistan led by the land-holding tribal leaders. Their strong resistance pitted the military against local tribal forces in a bitter guerilla war that continued for much of the 1970s. This raised the spectre of the military coming back as the main power centre and this three cornered struggle between the feudals, PA and Bhutto forced Bhutto to halt the pace of reforms.
The feudals appealed to Islamists forces and forced the the PPP to opening its membership in large numbers to the feudals moving PPP increasingly to the right. Arbitrary interference by the landed elite, and exemptions from the government under pressure from feudal party elements scuttled land reforms. Hence, of the land declared above the ceilings, including the extent allowed by exceptions only 42% was taken over by the government in Punjab and 59% in Sind; the acreage taken over by the government in 1972 was in fact less than in 1959 (0.6 million in 1972 and 1.9 million in 1959) even as the ceilings on land ownership had been reduced. The area resumed by the government amounted to only 0.01% of the total farm area of the country.
The currency devaluation of 1972 was introduced to balance out the favour enjoyed so far by the industrial sector, and tax breaks were provided for purchase of agricultural machinery, increasing profits for feudals. After the two land reforms of 1959 and 1972 still 30% of Pakistan's farm lands were owned by 0.5% of the land owners. Over the years the rising profitability of capitalist agricultural techniques under feudal ownership, meant that feudals took back more land into direct own cultivation rather than rent to tenant peasants. Between 1961 and 1973, 794,042 peasants became wage laborers. The rise in surplus labor pushed down rural wage rates and the two land reforms appear to have benefited only 130,000 families.
In 1975 Bhutto announced that small land owners (those whose land holdings would not exceed 12 acres of irrigated or 25 acres of non-irrigated land) would be exempt from land revenue, and that the government would invest in housing for the rural poor, artisans, farm laborer, and tenants without houses. In 1976 the government again reduced the ceiling on irrigated land, resuming an additional 1.8 million acres. By the end of the 1970s land reforms had benefited only 272,000 out of the total 10 million eligible and only 4.5 million acres of cultivated land (less than 10% of the total) were redistributed.
In 1993 , the provisional prime minister, Moeen Qureishi, who was appointed to oversee fresh elections, enjoying the autonomy of his temporary position and the backing of the military, introduced a progressive agricultural tax as a part of his economic reform plan. The tax was to reduce the state's growing public deficit following the fall in aid and labor remittances from 1988 onwards. Although the tax would at most affect only 1.5% of the feudals, it was vehemently opposed in the parliament. This reform was not implemented by the succeeding governments (including that by the PPP) despite agreements made with the IMF by the Pak government. Under pressure from IMF the government provided for new agricultural income taxes in the budget of 1994-95 but was unable to push them through the parliament owing to resistance from feudals and there has been no succeeding attempts to tax agriculture at all.
Ref:
U.K. High Commission, Karachi, despatchs #18, and 31, 5,8/3/1949, D035/8948, Public Records Office, England.
[Akmal Hussain, "Pakistan: Land Reforms Reconsidered," in Hamza Alavi and John Harriss, South Asia (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1989), p. 59;
Ronald J. Herring, "The Policy Logic of Land Reforms in Pakistan," in Manzooruddin Ahmed, ed., Contemporary Pakistan: Politics, Economy, and Society (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1980), p. 246.
Joel Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp. 204-05.
Hamza Alavi, "The Rural Elite and Agricultural Development in Pakistan," in Stevens, Rural Development, pp. 317-53.
Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan, p.56.
William Bredo, "Land Reform and Development in Pakistan," in Walter Froelich, ed., Land Tenure, Industrialization and Social Stability (Milwaukee, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1961), p.270.
M. H. Khan, Underdevelopment and Agrarian Structure in Pakistan (Lahore: Vanguard,1981).
Feroz Ahmed, "Structure and Contradiction in Pakistan," in Kathleen Goug and H. P. Sharma, eds., Imperialism and Revolution in South Asia (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1973), pp. 174-200.
Burki, "The State and Political Economy," p. 308.
D.A. Low, The Egalitarian Moment: Asia and Africa 1950-80 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); and Ahmad Ashraf, "From the White Revolution to the Islamic Revolution," in Saeed Rahnema and Sohrab Behdad, eds., Iran After Revolution: Crisis of an Islamic State (London: LB. Tauris, 1995), pp. 21-44.
Paula Newberg, "Dateline Pakistan," Foreign Policy 95 (Summer 1994), pp. 163, 166-67.
Herald (Karachi) (July 1994), p. 73.
The Economist, June 29, 1996, p. 34. 58.
There is a specific reason why Islamization, Militancy and failed Land Reforms are all linked together into Islamization of the state of Pak. Failing to raise resources through direct taxation and dependence on external aid and investment, failing to control and tax the feudals, the Pak state tried to tackle the problem of rural poverty and potential upheaval through kind of a charity mechanism by appropriating the Islamic dawa institutions. This naturally panicked both the feudals and the dawa networks which provided wealth and power to a lot of theologians. This tri-partite competition led to increasing Islamization of the state itself.
The poor muhajirs were the earliest to demand land-reform even in 1947 but they were staunchly resisted by the feudals in Sindh by raising the counter appeal to Sindhi nationalism, by uniting with the Sindhi middle peasants. However the Punjab famine of 1952-54 revived the issue of land use, since the famine was seen to be the handiwork of the feudal hoarders and only US aid sort of barely helped the country tide over. Since small farms had higher yield ratios, land reform would increase the number of small farmers who were more likely to invest in increasing their yields. (Case of Egypt following Nasser's land reform). However the weak Pak state's feudals scuttled all attempts at land reform, by appealing to Islamic parties to highlight the sanctity of property in Islam.
Some degree of increase of productivity in the 1960s weakened the land reform case but the poverty stricken rural masses restricted the internal market and therefore hamper industrialization. Ayub Khan therefore introduced a land reform bill in 1959, probably under international pressure and the temporary sense of state autonomy under a military junta rule. However the scope of Ayub's reforms were limited in merely fixing the ceiling on private ownership of land at 500 acres of irrigated and 1000 acres of unirrigated land. Moreover, the ceilings were calculated on the basis of individual rather than family holdings which allowed distributed ownership by the feudals using extended families. Moreover, there were exceptions made on yield, to exceed ceilings. This resulted in little damage to feudal power. After the land reform the average land holding per landed elite was 7,208 acres, and in Punjab it was 11,810 acres; The state appropriated only 35% of the land that exceeded the ceilings. Any negative impact of land reform on the feudals were more than compensated by the developmental funds invested into modernizing agriculture whose benefit was directly accruing to the feudals. One side effect was to swell the middle peasantry who were able to buy land from large land owners to increase their average holdings by 33.6% between 1959 and 1969 rather than the lower peasants and were also coopted into the feudal power structure.
The land reform of 1959 was partly successful because it was undertaken under a military junta that enjoyed initial popularity in a society religiously predisposed to authoritarianism and sick of the instability and corruption of the previous "democratic" regimes - somewhat similar in lines to the success of the redistributive policies of Sha in 1963 Iran. But international monetary flows and feudal resistance slowed down this reform.
In 1962 Ayub tried to replace the landed elite with a centrally-controlled power structure extending from the capital to he rural called "Basic Democracies". This was an attempt at an oligarchical transition to a supervised democracy but even here lack of land reforms proved crucial. The rural masses continued to follow the bad gentry and feudals under a tight dependency relationship and the programme failed.
In the early 1970s, Bhutto and the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) tried land reforms, after Bhutto rose to power on public demand for social justice, and the discrediting of the military regime in '71. Bhutto called for a more equitable distribution of economic resources. After taking office in 1971 he quickly nationalized banks, large industries, numerous private enterprises, passed pro-labor laws and redistributive measures, significantly reducing urban poverty.
In 1972 the Bhutto government introduced a new land reform bill, followed Bhutto's severe criticism of feudalism and the promise that large landholders would meet the same fate as the major industrialists. This land reform amounted to reducing the size of land-holdings rather than radically changing the structure of land ownership. The ceilings on land holding were reduced to 150 acres for irrigated and 300 for nonirrigated
land. The bill also allowed for exceptions to these ceilings based on productivity and yield, and use of tractors and tubewells. As a concession to feudals the benchmark figures used for assessing the productivity and yield of farms were those of 1940. However the yield in 1940 was much lower before the agricultural investments and therefore automatically qualified many feudals for exemptions. The average land holding after the 1972 bill stood at 466 acres in Punjab and 566 acres in Sindh (but the Bhuttos, allegedly continued to hold 2,200 acres.) This bill did not ban distributed ownership in extended families.
Bhutto was shaken by possibility of military reasserting itself by taking the side of the feudals, and direct rebellion by the feudals as observed in the civil war in Baluchistan led by the land-holding tribal leaders. Their strong resistance pitted the military against local tribal forces in a bitter guerilla war that continued for much of the 1970s. This raised the spectre of the military coming back as the main power centre and this three cornered struggle between the feudals, PA and Bhutto forced Bhutto to halt the pace of reforms.
The feudals appealed to Islamists forces and forced the the PPP to opening its membership in large numbers to the feudals moving PPP increasingly to the right. Arbitrary interference by the landed elite, and exemptions from the government under pressure from feudal party elements scuttled land reforms. Hence, of the land declared above the ceilings, including the extent allowed by exceptions only 42% was taken over by the government in Punjab and 59% in Sind; the acreage taken over by the government in 1972 was in fact less than in 1959 (0.6 million in 1972 and 1.9 million in 1959) even as the ceilings on land ownership had been reduced. The area resumed by the government amounted to only 0.01% of the total farm area of the country.
The currency devaluation of 1972 was introduced to balance out the favour enjoyed so far by the industrial sector, and tax breaks were provided for purchase of agricultural machinery, increasing profits for feudals. After the two land reforms of 1959 and 1972 still 30% of Pakistan's farm lands were owned by 0.5% of the land owners. Over the years the rising profitability of capitalist agricultural techniques under feudal ownership, meant that feudals took back more land into direct own cultivation rather than rent to tenant peasants. Between 1961 and 1973, 794,042 peasants became wage laborers. The rise in surplus labor pushed down rural wage rates and the two land reforms appear to have benefited only 130,000 families.
In 1975 Bhutto announced that small land owners (those whose land holdings would not exceed 12 acres of irrigated or 25 acres of non-irrigated land) would be exempt from land revenue, and that the government would invest in housing for the rural poor, artisans, farm laborer, and tenants without houses. In 1976 the government again reduced the ceiling on irrigated land, resuming an additional 1.8 million acres. By the end of the 1970s land reforms had benefited only 272,000 out of the total 10 million eligible and only 4.5 million acres of cultivated land (less than 10% of the total) were redistributed.
In 1993 , the provisional prime minister, Moeen Qureishi, who was appointed to oversee fresh elections, enjoying the autonomy of his temporary position and the backing of the military, introduced a progressive agricultural tax as a part of his economic reform plan. The tax was to reduce the state's growing public deficit following the fall in aid and labor remittances from 1988 onwards. Although the tax would at most affect only 1.5% of the feudals, it was vehemently opposed in the parliament. This reform was not implemented by the succeeding governments (including that by the PPP) despite agreements made with the IMF by the Pak government. Under pressure from IMF the government provided for new agricultural income taxes in the budget of 1994-95 but was unable to push them through the parliament owing to resistance from feudals and there has been no succeeding attempts to tax agriculture at all.
Ref:
U.K. High Commission, Karachi, despatchs #18, and 31, 5,8/3/1949, D035/8948, Public Records Office, England.
[Akmal Hussain, "Pakistan: Land Reforms Reconsidered," in Hamza Alavi and John Harriss, South Asia (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1989), p. 59;
Ronald J. Herring, "The Policy Logic of Land Reforms in Pakistan," in Manzooruddin Ahmed, ed., Contemporary Pakistan: Politics, Economy, and Society (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1980), p. 246.
Joel Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp. 204-05.
Hamza Alavi, "The Rural Elite and Agricultural Development in Pakistan," in Stevens, Rural Development, pp. 317-53.
Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan, p.56.
William Bredo, "Land Reform and Development in Pakistan," in Walter Froelich, ed., Land Tenure, Industrialization and Social Stability (Milwaukee, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1961), p.270.
M. H. Khan, Underdevelopment and Agrarian Structure in Pakistan (Lahore: Vanguard,1981).
Feroz Ahmed, "Structure and Contradiction in Pakistan," in Kathleen Goug and H. P. Sharma, eds., Imperialism and Revolution in South Asia (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1973), pp. 174-200.
Burki, "The State and Political Economy," p. 308.
D.A. Low, The Egalitarian Moment: Asia and Africa 1950-80 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); and Ahmad Ashraf, "From the White Revolution to the Islamic Revolution," in Saeed Rahnema and Sohrab Behdad, eds., Iran After Revolution: Crisis of an Islamic State (London: LB. Tauris, 1995), pp. 21-44.
Paula Newberg, "Dateline Pakistan," Foreign Policy 95 (Summer 1994), pp. 163, 166-67.
Herald (Karachi) (July 1994), p. 73.
The Economist, June 29, 1996, p. 34. 58.
Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
Bji,
Just a personal remembrence from Circa 2002 or 03. During Parakaram one of my acquentences was posted in Islamabad. Subsequent to his return from Islamabad we had a discussion about the internal dynamics of TSP.
One of his comments was on the Issue of land and the fact the 750 (From memeory) families own about 70 % (Again from memory ) of the land under cultivationin in TSP. He was a proponent of land reform in TSP at that time. Saying the lack of modern education is a hinderence for industrialization but the same population could be utilised in their own fields. having said that, I have a feeling if ever he reads your above post then he will agree with you.
Just a personal remembrence from Circa 2002 or 03. During Parakaram one of my acquentences was posted in Islamabad. Subsequent to his return from Islamabad we had a discussion about the internal dynamics of TSP.
One of his comments was on the Issue of land and the fact the 750 (From memeory) families own about 70 % (Again from memory ) of the land under cultivationin in TSP. He was a proponent of land reform in TSP at that time. Saying the lack of modern education is a hinderence for industrialization but the same population could be utilised in their own fields. having said that, I have a feeling if ever he reads your above post then he will agree with you.
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brihaspati
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
Pratysuhji,
I see the land question as something on which all the forces that sustain Pak comes head-on to collide with forces of modernization and "progress", except perhaps on the question of the position of women, and the position of the non-Musilm. Taken rightly forward it is one of the simple issues that open up in a spectacular manner the clash of interests within Pak society. Sort of similar to the way "the salt march" brought in sharp profile the conflict of interest between the state as it existed on India and the people of India.
Any state becomes vulnerable when its fundamental clash of interests with the people it pretends to rule legitimately, is exposed or made commonly visible. It helps for the people to realize in simple terms why the state that rules over them cannot and should not be legitimized by their support.
I see the land question as something on which all the forces that sustain Pak comes head-on to collide with forces of modernization and "progress", except perhaps on the question of the position of women, and the position of the non-Musilm. Taken rightly forward it is one of the simple issues that open up in a spectacular manner the clash of interests within Pak society. Sort of similar to the way "the salt march" brought in sharp profile the conflict of interest between the state as it existed on India and the people of India.
Any state becomes vulnerable when its fundamental clash of interests with the people it pretends to rule legitimately, is exposed or made commonly visible. It helps for the people to realize in simple terms why the state that rules over them cannot and should not be legitimized by their support.
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brihaspati
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
There is a lot of speculation along different lines about the whole scenario regarding potential/scheduled/possible US withdrawal from AFG.
Let us quickly look at possible/estimated players and their objectives here:
Players : USGOV, : US governments
USDEM : democrats
USREP : republicans
USSEC : US secret/covert ops forces
USMIL : US official military
AFTAL : Afghan Taleb
AFLOR : Afghan tribal chiefs and warlords
AFNOR : Afghan northern armed groupings
AFPEP : Afghan common people
PKGOV : Paki Gov
PKFEU : Paki feudals
PKMEL : Paki military elite
PKMCG : Paki military sacrifical goats
PKSEC : Paki secret/covert services, mainly ISI
PKTAL : Paki branch of Talebs
PKZID : Paki jihadis of non-Taleb formality
PKPEP : Paki commons
PKREB : Ethnic or other rebellions against PakGov
IRGOV :Iranian government
IRREB : anti-Iranian current regime forces within Iran
INGOV : Indian Gov
INMIL : Indian military
INSEC :Indian secret services
INVAG : Indian political forces with vague ideology [no fixed positions - anything goes]
INLEF: Indian political forces with various degrees of pretensions for Leftism
INRIG : Indian political forces against "vague" and "Left"
INBIZ: Indian business interests
INPEM : Indian people of Muslim faith
INPNM : Indian commons not of Muslim faith
RCGOV : republic OF china gov == CPC
RCMEL : Chinese military elite
There are 31 players in this list, with some glaring omissions like Russia and KSA. But I have primarily listed here those with some form of direct military or semi-military presence in the region. Here the European forces can be conflated within the US,a s they will primarily act as front under US beck and call [yes even if the Dutch withdraws].
I will start with a brief estimation of potential objectives of each of these players, then will come possible methods, and finally valuation of "payoffs", how far rational can we assume the players to be [for example Islamism can easily affect "rationality" as we understand it].
USGOV, : US government,
economic profits from occupation or presence in afpak
reduction of military casualties
installation and stabilization of pro-US regimes which can prevent terror export to US and hence no electoral penalty
reduction of influence of all other nations that may compete with US objectives, this may include Iran, Russia, China,
Pakistan and India
USDEM : democrats
spoil the party for any future Republican gov
successfully compete with Republicans to become best enhancers of US biz interests internationally and in AFPAK
USREP : republicans
spoil the party for any future Dem gov
successfully compete with Dems to become best enhancers of US biz interests internationally and in AFPAK
USSEC : US secret/covert ops forces
maintain and create operational "successes" in AFPAK to ensure continued funding
assorted political ideological objectives which cannot be processed through US electoral processes including possible
support or preference ordering White>non-White>Christianity>Judaism>Islam>all else
protect pre-existing or pre-developed collaborations with non-US covert networks
USMIL : US official military
use AFPAK as a training ground, for possible future power projection if required in Asia
maintain operational successes and morale by not seen as being defeated "again" after Nam and maintain funding
restrict the political gov to supplier of resources and not really nosing in on what is felt to be military turf
AFTAL : Afghan Taleb
establish and revive historically imagined Islamic Caliphate but this time under Afghan dominance, as a long term
imperialist solution to the chronic Afghan economic crisis - if not at one go then in stages
expansion into Pak territories as the first step in securing resources for further expansion
AFLOR : Afghan tribal chiefs and warlords
maintain personal hold over tribal loyalties and whatever exists of scarce agricultural land
AFNOR : Afghan northern armed groupings
as in AFLOR + neutralization of pashtun dominance
AFPEP : Afghan common people
survive [ if necessary by submitting to Talebs]
PKGOV : Paki Gov
balance the contest for supremacy between feudals, military and Islamists over control of the state and extract
international funds
preference order of conquest of all of Kashmir>detaching Indian controlled Kashmir away from India
long term conquest of the fertile northern Indian plains to sustain feudal society
PKFEU : Paki feudals
maintain absolute control over land and serfs
maintain control over state and military and Islamist institutions to prevent overthrow of feudalism
PKMEL : Paki military elite
maintain the military as an institution that can successfully extract funds internationally
same goal as AFTAL as to Caliphate, but with HQ in Pak so that it is Pak which can survive on imperialist expansion
control islamist armed forces for Caliphate attainment as an additional dedicated force if the state fails
PKMCG : Paki military sacrifical goats
survive as best as possible
either rise in ranks so as to be absorbed into the military elite and hence feudals
or join and sympathize with Islamist radicals who promise Islamist reforms with possible redistribution of power
PKSEC : Paki secret/covert services, mainly ISI
same goal as PAKMEL+ maintain and create operational "successes" in AFPAK to ensure continued funding
assorted political ideological objectives which cannot be processed through electoral processes including possible
support or preference ordering Pakjabi Muslim>non-Pakjabi Paki Muslim>Christianity>Judaism/Hindu>all else
protect pre-existing or pre-developed collaborations with non-Paki covert networks
PKTAL : Paki branch of Talebs
dream goal of establishingthe Islamic Caliphate expanding first into AFG and India
pooling ME Islamic resources to fuel the Caliphate and extraction of funds
PKZID : Paki jihadis of non-Taleb formality
jihad for land, loot and women which feudals have monopolized within Pak
lesser resources than the military/feudals should be matched with choosing soft targets likely to yield rich dividends
and support from feudals and army - such as in Kashmir or other place sin India
PKPEP : Paki commons
survive, and take out the frustration of compromising on a hierarchy of weaker sections : paki muslim man > paki
muslim woman > paki non-muslim man > paki non-muslim woman > goats, donkeys and bears
PKREB : Ethnic or other rebellions against PakGov
protect landed elite control over land and people against Pakjabi landed elite intrusion using ethnicity
protect internal hierarchical repression nevertheless while crying wolf at Pakjabi elite
IRGOV :Iranian government
protect Gulf from US troublemaking through Pak and AFG
pin down US forces and increase US expenditure in AFPAK and potentially enforce loss of face
prevent Balochi separatism
IRREB : anti-Iranian current regime forces within Iran
use any conflict or military covert engagement/expenditure to overthrow Khomeini
reduce Iranian regimes capacity of force projection by separatism
INGOV : Indian Gov
protect Indian electorate from potential nuclear war
protect Indian biz interests internationally
ensure that Kashmir stays put in India
ensure that the feared Muslim factor stays appeased for domestic politics
ensure continued economic growth and integration with global economic markets
INMIL : Indian military
protect the army's capacity for defence
neutralize both Pak and Chinese land grab moves
INSEC :Indian secret services
perform within the best of abilities given Governmental political shenanigans to maintain funding
INVAG : Indian political forces with vague ideology [no fixed positions - anything goes]
maintain grip on personal power
keep weakened the definition of nation and nationalism to facilitate role of individual leader as focus
consolidate birth identity based [clan-dynasty-ethnicity-culture-language-selectively approved victimhood] power
to delink actual performance or contribution from rewards
subject any move on Pak to the above
INLEF: Indian political forces with various degrees of pretensions for Leftism
attain personal power by creating or using any force that is opposed to the rashtra
subject position on Pak to the above
INRIG : Indian political forces against "vague" and "Left"
attain consolidation of nationhood independent of individuals and non-acceptance of the legitimacy of Pak
balance the above consideration with electoral estimates
INBIZ: Indian business interests
ensure that nothing jeopardizes profits from international collaboration
position on Pak dependent on the degree to which any move on Pak by the rashtra may affect international
forces which in turn may affect their businesses
INPEM : Indian people of Muslim faith
protect and enhance Islamic institutions within India
ensure that the conflict with Pak and Jihad is turned into an advantage to claim greater protection of exclusivity
INPNM : Indian commons not of Muslim faith
protect immediate regional and local interests given opportunism of political elite
RCGOV : republic OF china gov == CPC
maintain pressure on India by threatening land grab and support for Pak
preference : India collapses > India lags economically > India loses control over its eastern and northern
regions - flank India and isolate it from CAR-Russia-SEAsia
keep Paki and AFG Jihadis restricted in Pak and India and not reaching Uyghurs
develop and extract mineral resources from AFG more as a model to entice CAR rather than for AFPAK benefit
play the India card to balance out factional infighting within party and PLA
RCMEL : Chinese military elite :
maintain funding to expand
increase the number of potential threats
use AFPAK-India as a test-case to justify the military layout and factional infighting between neo-Maoists and
"pragmatists"
Let us quickly look at possible/estimated players and their objectives here:
Players : USGOV, : US governments
USDEM : democrats
USREP : republicans
USSEC : US secret/covert ops forces
USMIL : US official military
AFTAL : Afghan Taleb
AFLOR : Afghan tribal chiefs and warlords
AFNOR : Afghan northern armed groupings
AFPEP : Afghan common people
PKGOV : Paki Gov
PKFEU : Paki feudals
PKMEL : Paki military elite
PKMCG : Paki military sacrifical goats
PKSEC : Paki secret/covert services, mainly ISI
PKTAL : Paki branch of Talebs
PKZID : Paki jihadis of non-Taleb formality
PKPEP : Paki commons
PKREB : Ethnic or other rebellions against PakGov
IRGOV :Iranian government
IRREB : anti-Iranian current regime forces within Iran
INGOV : Indian Gov
INMIL : Indian military
INSEC :Indian secret services
INVAG : Indian political forces with vague ideology [no fixed positions - anything goes]
INLEF: Indian political forces with various degrees of pretensions for Leftism
INRIG : Indian political forces against "vague" and "Left"
INBIZ: Indian business interests
INPEM : Indian people of Muslim faith
INPNM : Indian commons not of Muslim faith
RCGOV : republic OF china gov == CPC
RCMEL : Chinese military elite
There are 31 players in this list, with some glaring omissions like Russia and KSA. But I have primarily listed here those with some form of direct military or semi-military presence in the region. Here the European forces can be conflated within the US,a s they will primarily act as front under US beck and call [yes even if the Dutch withdraws].
I will start with a brief estimation of potential objectives of each of these players, then will come possible methods, and finally valuation of "payoffs", how far rational can we assume the players to be [for example Islamism can easily affect "rationality" as we understand it].
USGOV, : US government,
economic profits from occupation or presence in afpak
reduction of military casualties
installation and stabilization of pro-US regimes which can prevent terror export to US and hence no electoral penalty
reduction of influence of all other nations that may compete with US objectives, this may include Iran, Russia, China,
Pakistan and India
USDEM : democrats
spoil the party for any future Republican gov
successfully compete with Republicans to become best enhancers of US biz interests internationally and in AFPAK
USREP : republicans
spoil the party for any future Dem gov
successfully compete with Dems to become best enhancers of US biz interests internationally and in AFPAK
USSEC : US secret/covert ops forces
maintain and create operational "successes" in AFPAK to ensure continued funding
assorted political ideological objectives which cannot be processed through US electoral processes including possible
support or preference ordering White>non-White>Christianity>Judaism>Islam>all else
protect pre-existing or pre-developed collaborations with non-US covert networks
USMIL : US official military
use AFPAK as a training ground, for possible future power projection if required in Asia
maintain operational successes and morale by not seen as being defeated "again" after Nam and maintain funding
restrict the political gov to supplier of resources and not really nosing in on what is felt to be military turf
AFTAL : Afghan Taleb
establish and revive historically imagined Islamic Caliphate but this time under Afghan dominance, as a long term
imperialist solution to the chronic Afghan economic crisis - if not at one go then in stages
expansion into Pak territories as the first step in securing resources for further expansion
AFLOR : Afghan tribal chiefs and warlords
maintain personal hold over tribal loyalties and whatever exists of scarce agricultural land
AFNOR : Afghan northern armed groupings
as in AFLOR + neutralization of pashtun dominance
AFPEP : Afghan common people
survive [ if necessary by submitting to Talebs]
PKGOV : Paki Gov
balance the contest for supremacy between feudals, military and Islamists over control of the state and extract
international funds
preference order of conquest of all of Kashmir>detaching Indian controlled Kashmir away from India
long term conquest of the fertile northern Indian plains to sustain feudal society
PKFEU : Paki feudals
maintain absolute control over land and serfs
maintain control over state and military and Islamist institutions to prevent overthrow of feudalism
PKMEL : Paki military elite
maintain the military as an institution that can successfully extract funds internationally
same goal as AFTAL as to Caliphate, but with HQ in Pak so that it is Pak which can survive on imperialist expansion
control islamist armed forces for Caliphate attainment as an additional dedicated force if the state fails
PKMCG : Paki military sacrifical goats
survive as best as possible
either rise in ranks so as to be absorbed into the military elite and hence feudals
or join and sympathize with Islamist radicals who promise Islamist reforms with possible redistribution of power
PKSEC : Paki secret/covert services, mainly ISI
same goal as PAKMEL+ maintain and create operational "successes" in AFPAK to ensure continued funding
assorted political ideological objectives which cannot be processed through electoral processes including possible
support or preference ordering Pakjabi Muslim>non-Pakjabi Paki Muslim>Christianity>Judaism/Hindu>all else
protect pre-existing or pre-developed collaborations with non-Paki covert networks
PKTAL : Paki branch of Talebs
dream goal of establishingthe Islamic Caliphate expanding first into AFG and India
pooling ME Islamic resources to fuel the Caliphate and extraction of funds
PKZID : Paki jihadis of non-Taleb formality
jihad for land, loot and women which feudals have monopolized within Pak
lesser resources than the military/feudals should be matched with choosing soft targets likely to yield rich dividends
and support from feudals and army - such as in Kashmir or other place sin India
PKPEP : Paki commons
survive, and take out the frustration of compromising on a hierarchy of weaker sections : paki muslim man > paki
muslim woman > paki non-muslim man > paki non-muslim woman > goats, donkeys and bears
PKREB : Ethnic or other rebellions against PakGov
protect landed elite control over land and people against Pakjabi landed elite intrusion using ethnicity
protect internal hierarchical repression nevertheless while crying wolf at Pakjabi elite
IRGOV :Iranian government
protect Gulf from US troublemaking through Pak and AFG
pin down US forces and increase US expenditure in AFPAK and potentially enforce loss of face
prevent Balochi separatism
IRREB : anti-Iranian current regime forces within Iran
use any conflict or military covert engagement/expenditure to overthrow Khomeini
reduce Iranian regimes capacity of force projection by separatism
INGOV : Indian Gov
protect Indian electorate from potential nuclear war
protect Indian biz interests internationally
ensure that Kashmir stays put in India
ensure that the feared Muslim factor stays appeased for domestic politics
ensure continued economic growth and integration with global economic markets
INMIL : Indian military
protect the army's capacity for defence
neutralize both Pak and Chinese land grab moves
INSEC :Indian secret services
perform within the best of abilities given Governmental political shenanigans to maintain funding
INVAG : Indian political forces with vague ideology [no fixed positions - anything goes]
maintain grip on personal power
keep weakened the definition of nation and nationalism to facilitate role of individual leader as focus
consolidate birth identity based [clan-dynasty-ethnicity-culture-language-selectively approved victimhood] power
to delink actual performance or contribution from rewards
subject any move on Pak to the above
INLEF: Indian political forces with various degrees of pretensions for Leftism
attain personal power by creating or using any force that is opposed to the rashtra
subject position on Pak to the above
INRIG : Indian political forces against "vague" and "Left"
attain consolidation of nationhood independent of individuals and non-acceptance of the legitimacy of Pak
balance the above consideration with electoral estimates
INBIZ: Indian business interests
ensure that nothing jeopardizes profits from international collaboration
position on Pak dependent on the degree to which any move on Pak by the rashtra may affect international
forces which in turn may affect their businesses
INPEM : Indian people of Muslim faith
protect and enhance Islamic institutions within India
ensure that the conflict with Pak and Jihad is turned into an advantage to claim greater protection of exclusivity
INPNM : Indian commons not of Muslim faith
protect immediate regional and local interests given opportunism of political elite
RCGOV : republic OF china gov == CPC
maintain pressure on India by threatening land grab and support for Pak
preference : India collapses > India lags economically > India loses control over its eastern and northern
regions - flank India and isolate it from CAR-Russia-SEAsia
keep Paki and AFG Jihadis restricted in Pak and India and not reaching Uyghurs
develop and extract mineral resources from AFG more as a model to entice CAR rather than for AFPAK benefit
play the India card to balance out factional infighting within party and PLA
RCMEL : Chinese military elite :
maintain funding to expand
increase the number of potential threats
use AFPAK-India as a test-case to justify the military layout and factional infighting between neo-Maoists and
"pragmatists"
Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
B ji,brihaspati wrote:Pratysuhji,
I see the land question as something on which all the forces that sustain Pak comes head-on to collide with forces of modernization and "progress", except perhaps on the question of the position of women, and the position of the non-Musilm. Taken rightly forward it is one of the simple issues that open up in a spectacular manner the clash of interests within Pak society. Sort of similar to the way "the salt march" brought in sharp profile the conflict of interest between the state as it existed on India and the people of India.
Any state becomes vulnerable when its fundamental clash of interests with the people it pretends to rule legitimately, is exposed or made commonly visible. It helps for the people to realize in simple terms why the state that rules over them cannot and should not be legitimized by their support.
For a free society I may agree with you. But in TSP the mullahs have already declared Land reform unislamic. That by it self may weaken the argument for land reform in that society. Somehow the debate will have to be trigerred in TSP society about Islamism and every thing it entails.
But the trouble is that the moment you try to do so the other guy claims that you are unislamic.
The beauty is that, if, people die in a famin caused by drought or flooding. It is explained away as the will of GOD. Which brings me to a question, how to make people question the will of god?
At what point will a group of people give up on god?
The points raised by you can be answered to a large extent if we are able to answer that question.
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brihaspati
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
^^^That is exactly the reason I raised the issue. I said - this is one issue that brings all the regressive forces to collide - which includes Islamism. If we look at the history of religions, we find that for most of the time a faith may become blind and hardnosed, and can perhaps even maintain that in the face of adversity for some time. But extreme failure to maintain basic living standards and biological aspirations will almost inevitably trigger weakening of authority of the pre-existing theocracy - if the society following the faith is large. Only small communities or sects can go maintaining their faith in the older form but even there things change and become more heterodox over time spent in adversity - e.g. the Jews.
Land reforms is a question that cannot be swept under the carpet of Islamic jurisprudence and ethics forever - that carpet has already accumulated a fair bit of dust and dust-mites.
Land reforms is a question that cannot be swept under the carpet of Islamic jurisprudence and ethics forever - that carpet has already accumulated a fair bit of dust and dust-mites.
Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
brihaspati wrote: paki muslim man > paki
muslim woman > paki non-muslim man > paki non-muslim woman > goats, donkeys and bears
BTW, I understand the Paki obsession with goats. But are donkeys the victims because they are made into suicide bombers? What about bears? Have they been evicted from Tora Bora kave kaamplex to make way for Taliban residences there?
Bji, you are so thorough in your analysis, you have thought of everything down to the minutest detail!
Last edited by Klaus on 04 Aug 2010 11:12, edited 1 time in total.
Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
Which particular school of ulema are most virulent opponents of land-redistribution? The sect of Sunni Islam which boasts highest membership of feudal lords in Punjab is the most influential sect and should be the most verbal opponent of redistribution. AFAIK, it is Barelvis who are majority in TSP. Does the opinion of Ulema belonging to other schools same as this one?
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brihaspati
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
Paki's have made a name for themselves in cruelty to bears, bear baiting and abuse of bears in captivity. Make a search. Same goes for donkeys who are again found to be treated cruelly and worked in brick kilns etc. Goats of course are a different ball game altogether. Multiuse utility object apparently. One particular use is however not a sin in the the theology - even the core texts fail to explicitly ban it even though they spend a a lot of space on excruciating details of acts banned. You just need to "wash" - look for the commentary by Imam Al-Nawawi.Klaus wrote:brihaspati wrote: paki muslim man > paki
muslim woman > paki non-muslim man > paki non-muslim woman > goats, donkeys and bears
BTW, I understand the Paki obsession with goats. But are donkeys the victims because they are made into suicide bombers? What about bears? Have they been evacuated from Tora Bora kave kaamplex to make way for Taliban residences there?
Bji, you are so thorough in your analysis, you have thought of everything down to the minutest detail!
-
brihaspati
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- Joined: 19 Nov 2008 03:25
Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
In Pak all of the Ulema coincide now on the sanctity of "property" - primarily because they are desperately fighting to get and retain control over the funding institutions. I will touch on this "landed" or propertied-theologian networks in the series. They have been made participants in the Paki gov attempted redistribution without touching the feudals - and hence the convergence on "property".Atri wrote:Which particular school of ulema are most virulent opponents of land-redistribution? The sect of Sunni Islam which boasts highest membership of feudal lords in Punjab is the most influential sect and should be the most verbal opponent of redistribution. AFAIK, it is Barelvis who are majority in TSP. Does the opinion of Ulema belonging to other schools same as this one?
-
brihaspati
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
The MQM assassination indicates that someone within Pak is keen on raising the temperature further. This discounts the theory that the ISI-PA is willing to cooperate in the maintenance of the "state" as it exists and fight out those we think are its opponents. The move towards dismantling and discrediting the existing feudal gov is on its way - perhaps helped by other feudals and the army. I would say that the AFG front would cool down compared to what will happen in Pak - or at least both arenas will flare up in tandem - deliberately to keep the western armies busy and distracted. The money is not buying enough of peace and stability. It is not about more money - but a deliberate signal that money or no money, the internal planned transition to a different regime will go ahead.
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brihaspati
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
Methods and moves available to players : USA group
USGOV : US government,
objectives :
(1) economic profits from occupation or presence in afpak
(2) reduction of military casualties
(3) installation and stabilization of pro-US regimes which can prevent terror export to US and hence no electoral penalty
(4) reduction of influence of all other nations that may compete with US objectives, this may include Iran, Russia, China, Pakistan and India
methods/moves :
(1) invest in AFG natural resources extraction and create a dependent comprador beneficiary class as a side benefit who will create a shared corrupted, profit seeking network with US multinational interests and help maintain the extraction infrastructure - a version of KSA dependence model
(2) instruct the military to weaken or destroy if possible all or most the sources of independent military resistance to US dominance of the Afghan state in the near and mid-range future to reduce overall long term military casualties
(3) replace or not replace Karazai with someone more pliable at the risk of discovering a Karazai II or III etc have been the replacement, as part of installation of a pro-US regime strong enough to prevent terror on US soil sourced from AFG. This is however related to other factors in the AFG group and PAK group. For example, using the NA and southern pashtuns to threaten each other, etc.
(4) use AFG bases as centres of subversion and encouragement of subversion within Iran; buy off and threaten into cooperation the NA and prevent them from coming too much under Russian influence; prevent Chinese influence and support for any possible sources of resistance against US presence - this may mean encouraging indigenous guerrillas to attack and destroy or harass Chinese experts and biz interests trying to gain a foothold in AFG - the copper mines could be targets; prevent Paki influence that competes with US direct dominance - including Paki covert support for Pashtun factions. Here the crucial moves to be considered relate to how far to neutralize ISI and PA and Paki Talebs+militants+Paki gov and are subject to considerations about Indo-Pak balance from the US viewpoint.
(5) prevent Indian influence to the degree that it may bolster any independent Pashtun candidate, prevent Indian military presence not only because it may attract more attention from the ISI+PA, but also because such Indian input may take military form towards independent alliance and support to Pashtuns - and therefore dilute Pashtun dependence on USA.
(6) retain control over the heroin production zone in southern AFG where irrigation systems developed by the US in 60's have been turned around to cultivate poppy. Drugs trade generates profits that need not be accountable in national US budget and provides a good resource to fund covert ops in the area. Here of course a wider network running from Shanghai and HK in the east and possible Chinese state involvement in covert pushing of drugs all the way through to Europe dating from colonial British-Chinese drugs trade may be a network which it is impossible for the US alone to control or destroy. Therefore US may not have any option but to make the best out of the situation and at least retain some degree of control while using it for geo-strategic objectives.
USDEM : democrats
objectives :
(1) spoil the party for any future Republican gov
(2) successfully compete with Republicans to become best enhancers of US biz interests internationally and in AFPAK
methods/moves:
(1) withdraw from AFPAK in a way that makes it difficult for any future Rep admin to find an excuse to go back to AFG and say that Dem's messed it up making returning necessary. Here leaning towards withdrawal is out of a greater similarity of thinking with British underlying drives whose imperial experience makes them more shaky in direct imperialism but prefer indirect imperialism. This is in contrast to Reps who are guided by a revivalist Roman mindset or think themselves as the legacy of the Romans.
(2) if there is money to be made in AFG, it has to be made quickly and distributed as much as possible to biz-interests aligned to dems, or entice biz supporters of Reps.
(3) Return of marines, with post conflict problems may also complicate the domestic situation in US, and may have strange and unthinkable consequences electorally. Immediate popular gain in returning the "boys" may be offset by economic and psycho-social fallouts. Therefore decide on the appropriate proportion to return and the phases of return that negative electoral impact is confined as much as possible to serving personnel on duty in AFG and not their additional socio-economic impact on society at large when they return.
USREP : republicans
objectives
(1) spoil the party for any future Dem gov
(2) successfully compete with Dems to become best enhancers of US biz interests internationally and in AFPAK
methods/moves:
(1) prevent withdrawal from AFPAK in a way that makes it difficult for any future Dem admin to escape from AFG. If things turn worse where the Dem admin cannot escape and cannot stay by the time elections arrive that is the best scenario. Here leaning towards intervention is out of the early American settler foundational identity with the Roman Republic in its imperialist phase.
(2) if there is money to be made in AFG, it should not be allowed to be made quickly and distributed as much as possible to biz-interests aligned to dems, enhance dissatisfaction in those biz supporters who are left out.
(3) Return of marines, with post conflict problems may also complicate the domestic situation in US, and may have strange and unthinkable consequences electorally. Immediate popular gain in returning the "boys" may be offset by economic and psycho-social fallouts. Therefore decide on the appropriate proportion to return and the phases of return that negative electoral impact is NOT confined as much as possible to serving personnel on duty in AFG and also triggers their additional socio-economic impact on society at large when they return.
USSEC : US secret/covert ops forces
objectives:
(1) maintain and create operational "successes" in AFPAK to ensure continued funding
(2) assorted political ideological objectives which cannot be processed through US electoral processes including possible support or preference ordering White>non-White>Christianity>Judaism>Islam>all else
(3) protect pre-existing or pre-developed collaborations with non-US covert networks
methods/moves:
(1) targeted assassinations and liquidation of whichever faction is seen momentarily as an obstacle to admin plans
(2) buying moles in "friendly" forces, keep Karazai under pressure, establish rapport with Islamist factions, enhance ethnic and especially Shia-Sunni conflicts and distrust to thwart Iran, buy off the warlords, let non-US groups in AFG take hits from time to time so that forces like India or China or Russia cannot strike deeper roots (or even facilitate such hits), maintain a handle on the drugs trade for profits/privileges and disbursement of favours and incentives to strike at geostrategic enemies.
(3) create a hopefully pliable faction within Taleban in a manner by which the Sha was replaced in Iran with Khomeini, if Karazai plays too much of an independent ethno-nationalist.
(4) Islamists are preferable to any other intervention like that by the Chinese CPC/PLA, or by Indians because Islamist memes are better understood and aligned with EJ ism in US, and hence they should be protected against Chinese or Indians. Islamist-EJ collaboration can also be seen as crucial to the "divine plan" by which the ME conflict accelerates, and delivers the supposed promised sequence of rise and fall of Israel and armageddon with ultimate triumph of Christianity. Therefore helping Islamists against competing forces to a certain degree can be part of the plan. This is a move that cannot be processed through regular democratic and open sanction through the ballot - therefore its most efficient carrying out can best be served by covert ops personnel. Some may even believe the TFTA-ness of some Pashtuns as racial proximity towards the divinely ordained supreme race on earth and hence protected.
(5) Maintain pre-existing covert networks developed with Islamist radicals during anti-Soviet war, for future use in CAR, Russia, Sunni extremism to tackle Iran, and China, as well as potential use to pressurize both Pak gov and Indian regimes.
USMIL : US official military
objectives
(1) use AFPAK as a training ground, for possible future power projection if required in Asia
(2) maintain operational successes and morale by not seen as being defeated "again" after Nam and maintain funding
(3) restrict the political gov to supplier of resources and not really nosing in on what is felt to be military turf
methods/moves:
(1) since 1950, US has not fought a real war with technically matched or near-matched Asian force. Moreover the techniques of asymeetric warfare developed during the Cold War by the west and taught primarily to Islamists of Asia has finally come back to equalize or neutralize any technological advantages US may have. Therefore it is crucial that the US army maintains troop presence to keep a handle on and adjust or retain experience in fighting these sorts of wars. The first round in Iraq has shown that spectacular battle wins need not indicate solid winning of the war. The African near-East experience has also been negative. Cutting losses means less opportunities to train. So mount campaigns and carry out experiments to attain quick successes.
(2) combine political manipulation of the local networks to ensure visible tokens of success for morale and public benefit
(3) resist admin pressure to restrict resource flow by painting a bleak picture, while scared of Islamist backlash as experienced in Iraq and therefore not carrying out the near genocidal methods necessary to subjugate Islamists - which in turn only strengthens the Islamists.
(4) realizing the impossibility of holding the entire country unless near genocidal methods are applied - the only ones proving successful in history both by Afghans who applied it liberally on others and the few who succeeded over Afghans - to concentrate on holding onto urban centres. Maintain air superiority to retain communications and supply between cities. But no protection essentially as and when other forces supply the resistance with appropriate anti-air missiles. the US army has no fall back option if the air-superiority is canceled.
USGOV : US government,
objectives :
(1) economic profits from occupation or presence in afpak
(2) reduction of military casualties
(3) installation and stabilization of pro-US regimes which can prevent terror export to US and hence no electoral penalty
(4) reduction of influence of all other nations that may compete with US objectives, this may include Iran, Russia, China, Pakistan and India
methods/moves :
(1) invest in AFG natural resources extraction and create a dependent comprador beneficiary class as a side benefit who will create a shared corrupted, profit seeking network with US multinational interests and help maintain the extraction infrastructure - a version of KSA dependence model
(2) instruct the military to weaken or destroy if possible all or most the sources of independent military resistance to US dominance of the Afghan state in the near and mid-range future to reduce overall long term military casualties
(3) replace or not replace Karazai with someone more pliable at the risk of discovering a Karazai II or III etc have been the replacement, as part of installation of a pro-US regime strong enough to prevent terror on US soil sourced from AFG. This is however related to other factors in the AFG group and PAK group. For example, using the NA and southern pashtuns to threaten each other, etc.
(4) use AFG bases as centres of subversion and encouragement of subversion within Iran; buy off and threaten into cooperation the NA and prevent them from coming too much under Russian influence; prevent Chinese influence and support for any possible sources of resistance against US presence - this may mean encouraging indigenous guerrillas to attack and destroy or harass Chinese experts and biz interests trying to gain a foothold in AFG - the copper mines could be targets; prevent Paki influence that competes with US direct dominance - including Paki covert support for Pashtun factions. Here the crucial moves to be considered relate to how far to neutralize ISI and PA and Paki Talebs+militants+Paki gov and are subject to considerations about Indo-Pak balance from the US viewpoint.
(5) prevent Indian influence to the degree that it may bolster any independent Pashtun candidate, prevent Indian military presence not only because it may attract more attention from the ISI+PA, but also because such Indian input may take military form towards independent alliance and support to Pashtuns - and therefore dilute Pashtun dependence on USA.
(6) retain control over the heroin production zone in southern AFG where irrigation systems developed by the US in 60's have been turned around to cultivate poppy. Drugs trade generates profits that need not be accountable in national US budget and provides a good resource to fund covert ops in the area. Here of course a wider network running from Shanghai and HK in the east and possible Chinese state involvement in covert pushing of drugs all the way through to Europe dating from colonial British-Chinese drugs trade may be a network which it is impossible for the US alone to control or destroy. Therefore US may not have any option but to make the best out of the situation and at least retain some degree of control while using it for geo-strategic objectives.
USDEM : democrats
objectives :
(1) spoil the party for any future Republican gov
(2) successfully compete with Republicans to become best enhancers of US biz interests internationally and in AFPAK
methods/moves:
(1) withdraw from AFPAK in a way that makes it difficult for any future Rep admin to find an excuse to go back to AFG and say that Dem's messed it up making returning necessary. Here leaning towards withdrawal is out of a greater similarity of thinking with British underlying drives whose imperial experience makes them more shaky in direct imperialism but prefer indirect imperialism. This is in contrast to Reps who are guided by a revivalist Roman mindset or think themselves as the legacy of the Romans.
(2) if there is money to be made in AFG, it has to be made quickly and distributed as much as possible to biz-interests aligned to dems, or entice biz supporters of Reps.
(3) Return of marines, with post conflict problems may also complicate the domestic situation in US, and may have strange and unthinkable consequences electorally. Immediate popular gain in returning the "boys" may be offset by economic and psycho-social fallouts. Therefore decide on the appropriate proportion to return and the phases of return that negative electoral impact is confined as much as possible to serving personnel on duty in AFG and not their additional socio-economic impact on society at large when they return.
USREP : republicans
objectives
(1) spoil the party for any future Dem gov
(2) successfully compete with Dems to become best enhancers of US biz interests internationally and in AFPAK
methods/moves:
(1) prevent withdrawal from AFPAK in a way that makes it difficult for any future Dem admin to escape from AFG. If things turn worse where the Dem admin cannot escape and cannot stay by the time elections arrive that is the best scenario. Here leaning towards intervention is out of the early American settler foundational identity with the Roman Republic in its imperialist phase.
(2) if there is money to be made in AFG, it should not be allowed to be made quickly and distributed as much as possible to biz-interests aligned to dems, enhance dissatisfaction in those biz supporters who are left out.
(3) Return of marines, with post conflict problems may also complicate the domestic situation in US, and may have strange and unthinkable consequences electorally. Immediate popular gain in returning the "boys" may be offset by economic and psycho-social fallouts. Therefore decide on the appropriate proportion to return and the phases of return that negative electoral impact is NOT confined as much as possible to serving personnel on duty in AFG and also triggers their additional socio-economic impact on society at large when they return.
USSEC : US secret/covert ops forces
objectives:
(1) maintain and create operational "successes" in AFPAK to ensure continued funding
(2) assorted political ideological objectives which cannot be processed through US electoral processes including possible support or preference ordering White>non-White>Christianity>Judaism>Islam>all else
(3) protect pre-existing or pre-developed collaborations with non-US covert networks
methods/moves:
(1) targeted assassinations and liquidation of whichever faction is seen momentarily as an obstacle to admin plans
(2) buying moles in "friendly" forces, keep Karazai under pressure, establish rapport with Islamist factions, enhance ethnic and especially Shia-Sunni conflicts and distrust to thwart Iran, buy off the warlords, let non-US groups in AFG take hits from time to time so that forces like India or China or Russia cannot strike deeper roots (or even facilitate such hits), maintain a handle on the drugs trade for profits/privileges and disbursement of favours and incentives to strike at geostrategic enemies.
(3) create a hopefully pliable faction within Taleban in a manner by which the Sha was replaced in Iran with Khomeini, if Karazai plays too much of an independent ethno-nationalist.
(4) Islamists are preferable to any other intervention like that by the Chinese CPC/PLA, or by Indians because Islamist memes are better understood and aligned with EJ ism in US, and hence they should be protected against Chinese or Indians. Islamist-EJ collaboration can also be seen as crucial to the "divine plan" by which the ME conflict accelerates, and delivers the supposed promised sequence of rise and fall of Israel and armageddon with ultimate triumph of Christianity. Therefore helping Islamists against competing forces to a certain degree can be part of the plan. This is a move that cannot be processed through regular democratic and open sanction through the ballot - therefore its most efficient carrying out can best be served by covert ops personnel. Some may even believe the TFTA-ness of some Pashtuns as racial proximity towards the divinely ordained supreme race on earth and hence protected.
(5) Maintain pre-existing covert networks developed with Islamist radicals during anti-Soviet war, for future use in CAR, Russia, Sunni extremism to tackle Iran, and China, as well as potential use to pressurize both Pak gov and Indian regimes.
USMIL : US official military
objectives
(1) use AFPAK as a training ground, for possible future power projection if required in Asia
(2) maintain operational successes and morale by not seen as being defeated "again" after Nam and maintain funding
(3) restrict the political gov to supplier of resources and not really nosing in on what is felt to be military turf
methods/moves:
(1) since 1950, US has not fought a real war with technically matched or near-matched Asian force. Moreover the techniques of asymeetric warfare developed during the Cold War by the west and taught primarily to Islamists of Asia has finally come back to equalize or neutralize any technological advantages US may have. Therefore it is crucial that the US army maintains troop presence to keep a handle on and adjust or retain experience in fighting these sorts of wars. The first round in Iraq has shown that spectacular battle wins need not indicate solid winning of the war. The African near-East experience has also been negative. Cutting losses means less opportunities to train. So mount campaigns and carry out experiments to attain quick successes.
(2) combine political manipulation of the local networks to ensure visible tokens of success for morale and public benefit
(3) resist admin pressure to restrict resource flow by painting a bleak picture, while scared of Islamist backlash as experienced in Iraq and therefore not carrying out the near genocidal methods necessary to subjugate Islamists - which in turn only strengthens the Islamists.
(4) realizing the impossibility of holding the entire country unless near genocidal methods are applied - the only ones proving successful in history both by Afghans who applied it liberally on others and the few who succeeded over Afghans - to concentrate on holding onto urban centres. Maintain air superiority to retain communications and supply between cities. But no protection essentially as and when other forces supply the resistance with appropriate anti-air missiles. the US army has no fall back option if the air-superiority is canceled.
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brihaspati
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
I might have erred in conflating UK with USA in my model. The Brits were not as good hedgers of bets as the American policymakers were. There is an increasing gradient of risk-taking and flexibility as we go from Continental Germanics to Brit Germanics to US Germanics - probably aresult of a filtering of more adventurous and "open" through migration. Those who go the furthest will probably be the most open and flexible tactically if they are able to replace host societies. [Strong host society rejection and discrimination may actually increase orthdoxy an revivalism]
However, power and dominance and imperialist success tends to increase rigidity and inflexibility because identities have to be protected to maintain distinctions and separate out the subjugated. This happened with the Brits earlier than the Americans. Now that the imperial drive and generational imagination is getting weakened, whereas it is still strong in the Americans, the Brits may reverse their trend in the short term and explore flexibility.
However political understandings across international entities are built up over time and they in turn generate persistent networks of mutual and self-interests. The understandings that developed with India developed with the Congress and the derivatives of the Brit built admin setup. Which implies that any change of direction as far as Brits are concerned over the subcontinent may need developing new understandings and networks.
This creates a rpoblem for pre-existing networks that might have developed with Labour dominated UK for the previous decades, which in their turn were perhaps continuations of the post-war setup.
We may need to model the tactical options represented by the Conser-Lab dynamic separately from US as far as AFPAK is concerned in a similar pattern as to DEm-Rep dynamic in USA.
However, power and dominance and imperialist success tends to increase rigidity and inflexibility because identities have to be protected to maintain distinctions and separate out the subjugated. This happened with the Brits earlier than the Americans. Now that the imperial drive and generational imagination is getting weakened, whereas it is still strong in the Americans, the Brits may reverse their trend in the short term and explore flexibility.
However political understandings across international entities are built up over time and they in turn generate persistent networks of mutual and self-interests. The understandings that developed with India developed with the Congress and the derivatives of the Brit built admin setup. Which implies that any change of direction as far as Brits are concerned over the subcontinent may need developing new understandings and networks.
This creates a rpoblem for pre-existing networks that might have developed with Labour dominated UK for the previous decades, which in their turn were perhaps continuations of the post-war setup.
We may need to model the tactical options represented by the Conser-Lab dynamic separately from US as far as AFPAK is concerned in a similar pattern as to DEm-Rep dynamic in USA.
Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
Could David Cameron's recent overtures while at desh be the precursor to such a new unders?tanding? On that note, could continental (or rather sub-continental) desis be adventurous enough to place their bets on the Brits to maintain continued rapport with the Islamists?brihaspati wrote:
However political understandings across international entities are built up over time and they in turn generate persistent networks of mutual and self-interests. The understandings that developed with India developed with the Congress and the derivatives of the Brit built admin setup. Which implies that any change of direction as far as Brits are concerned over the subcontinent may need developing new understandings and networks.
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brihaspati
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
^^^Quite possible. A lot of posturing by GOI in the international domain especially where Islamics are concerned, is determined by an apparent extreme fear of IM reactions. This larger than life perception of threat internally and electorally speaks volumes about how hypocritical self-proclaimed "secularists" are. This is how Islamist leadership in India pose as mouthpieces of IM and negotiate an influence with incumbent GOI's which is disproportionate to their actual impact.
So a similar consideration may affect policy regards UK. A section of the centre-left may be deliberately instructed to play cold with Cameron's overtures to try and desperately reassure the IM, as well as IM networks in the ME.
So a similar consideration may affect policy regards UK. A section of the centre-left may be deliberately instructed to play cold with Cameron's overtures to try and desperately reassure the IM, as well as IM networks in the ME.
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brihaspati
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
Here is a piece which supports the conclusion I had drawn about the short term future in AFG :
http://blogs.channel4.com/world-news-bl ... ight/13526
Is the PA almost foreign in many parts of Pak? Not to the extent of the Americans, definitely, but they fill the boots of AFG army and security forces quite well as far as many areas under Pak occupation, are concerned. PA is practically speaking a foreign army in Balochistan and Balochis in the PA are seen as collaborators with the enemy. The undercurrent of feelings need not be that different even in western Pakjab in contact with the Pashtuns, or in occupied NA.
For many of the Pak residents away from the cities, the Pak gov is a distant chimera in something called Islamabad which issues speeches, but it is the local militants, bad gentry, and feudal landlords who run things. The gov is more present by its absence. Therefore the army is an alien army which is feared because they act in league with the local elite.
Substitute Afghan for Pak in the above report, and it gives a very good approximation of what is most likely in the medium term future for Pak, at least the west of Indus part.
http://blogs.channel4.com/world-news-bl ... ight/13526
Now this is close to my assessment of the future in AFG. What is interesting in this report is that the reporter is perhaps unaware of the uncanny similarity of the situation he describes for AFG, to Pak.Operation Tor Shezada: Why insurgents won’t fight
Friday 30 July 2010 11:28 am
Alex Thomson
Operation Tor Shezada will be completely successful in “clearing” an area because obviously the Americans and British have overwhelming firepower and manpower and can clearly “clear” anything they want whenever they want, with minimal loss of life. Minimal risk, frankly. But that has as much to do with winning the Afghan war as rearing alpacas in Chile.
Because this war is won or lost by holding territory – by eliminating the resistance from local people permanently – so as to allow the writ of the Kabul government to re-establish itself. Well that is the theory. In practice this aim – the only way to win the war – has not been achieved.
If anything, matters are going the other way, 9 years into this.
In practice, NATO does not have the manpower, the Afghan Army does not have the know-how (or the language in Pashtun areas) and everyone pretty much either hates or distrusts the Afghan police and with good reason. Which is why Operation Moshtarak’s progress has been pitifully slow and very bloody and has yet to achieve its aims.
Because the foreign soldiers will soon have to withdraw. The Taliban/insurgents/resistance – choose your own name — will then re-establish themselves. Redeploy into safe houses. Replant their IEDs .
Re-establish their safe firing points. Redesign their sniper positions and ambush zones. And the war will begin again as if the initial push had scarcely happened. And the British and American forces will again be dealing with this and with a people whose motives they do not understand; whose language they do not speak; whose culture is completely alien.
And if you are trying to fight a counter-insurgency war on those terms you are perilously close to fighting it on the terms of the insurgents. They will not meet you head on as you go in on whatever new Pashtun-named Operation it is this week. They will not be there. They will have moved out. To wait for another day.
They have the one weapon NATO craves but sees evaporating before its very eyes: time.
Is the PA almost foreign in many parts of Pak? Not to the extent of the Americans, definitely, but they fill the boots of AFG army and security forces quite well as far as many areas under Pak occupation, are concerned. PA is practically speaking a foreign army in Balochistan and Balochis in the PA are seen as collaborators with the enemy. The undercurrent of feelings need not be that different even in western Pakjab in contact with the Pashtuns, or in occupied NA.
For many of the Pak residents away from the cities, the Pak gov is a distant chimera in something called Islamabad which issues speeches, but it is the local militants, bad gentry, and feudal landlords who run things. The gov is more present by its absence. Therefore the army is an alien army which is feared because they act in league with the local elite.
Substitute Afghan for Pak in the above report, and it gives a very good approximation of what is most likely in the medium term future for Pak, at least the west of Indus part.
Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
Bji, For each of those 31 players can you on a scale of 1 to 100 describe their salience ie relevance to the region of Af-Pak an their flexibility on achieving their objectives again on scale of 0-100, 0 being inflexibility and 100 is total rock of jello.
We can then run some simulations using open source software.
We can then run some simulations using open source software.
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brihaspati
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
can give a tentative estimated value list. But it is ongoing work and imputations are tricky given they are based on a-priori work and ongoing surveys. will email.
Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
brihaspati garu,
could you give some good references of literature by some respectable writers where one can find some figure of how many Hindus have been killed by Muslim invaders in India's history?
could you give some good references of literature by some respectable writers where one can find some figure of how many Hindus have been killed by Muslim invaders in India's history?
Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
Why dont you go by the Islamic chroniclers account of the deeds of their Sultans?
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brihaspati
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
K.S.Lal is the short-cut. However, packhum.org translations of the chronicles in Persian give much more details. Most of them are covered in Eliott and Dowson which is also included in their collection.
Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
ramana garu,
I have no objection to that. Could you offer any references?
I have no objection to that. Could you offer any references?
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RamaY
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
ramana wrote:Bji, For each of those 31 players can you on a scale of 1 to 100 describe their salience ie relevance to the region of Af-Pak an their flexibility on achieving their objectives again on scale of 0-100, 0 being inflexibility and 100 is total rock of jello.
We can then run some simulations using open source software.
this will be interesting. We need to see who would prefer to go to war if their postion is compromised.
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brihaspati
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
try this link : http://persian.packhum.org/persian/RajeshA wrote:brihaspati garu,
could you give some good references of literature by some respectable writers where one can find some figure of how many Hindus have been killed by Muslim invaders in India's history?
Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
brihaspati garu,
Sorry if my caution seems silly here, but it would be helpful if there were sources, who were not tainted with either association to an agenda, and whose research was more or less beyond reproach.
Added Later:
Thank you for the link, garu!
- I have heard of K.S Lal. As I understand, he has support in RSS.
- Will Durant has written a little on this topic, but he is a somewhat old source, who may have not have been very methodical.
- There are others like Koenraad Elst who have shown interest in Muslim atrocities in India, but he is tainted by his association to right-wing Flemish parties.
Sorry if my caution seems silly here, but it would be helpful if there were sources, who were not tainted with either association to an agenda, and whose research was more or less beyond reproach.
Added Later:
Thank you for the link, garu!
Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
RajeshA, There wasa book called "Ghazi Sultans and the frontier states" that talk of the post-Mongol defeat of the Caliphate. The frontier states were setup by Turkish slave dynasties all over the Middle East and by extension in India. There might be some refs in that. The original chroniclers are all in the packham site.
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brihaspati
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
RajeshA ji,
the quantitative estimates of genocide on Hindus are going to be problematic until "Hindus" come to power. Without going too much into this because it will go OT, briefly :
(1) a person's arguments have to be taken on the basis of arguments, references, and logical construction that he places, and a reader should judge the "work" and the arguments placed and not the person or his associations. When I criticize Prof. Ms. Romilla Thapar, I do so on the basis of what she writes as historical "fact", not her possible political affiliations.
(2) Even if K.S.Lal has support of some organization which is looked down upon by certain other political sectors, we have to judge his works by what he says. As for K.S.Lal, what is usually not written is that his major work on the negative impact of Islam, especially with regards to slavery - had its introduction/foreward written by Prof. Muhammad Habib, (father of more pronouncedly "leftist" Irfan Habib), and K.S.Lal was a favourite student of Prof. Habib.
(3) Indirect estimation efforts have started. one of this has been through looking up references to Hindu slaves in waqafnamas by "Sufi" slave masters in CAR. I have placed refs in the "slavery in India" page on wiki. So far not much has been changed in the bulk of the material until early colonial period I have written there. Look at the sections under "Islam".
Source material is always a great place to start from. The Persian texts are dismissed for exaggeration by Thaparites. The slavery refs I have given on wiki actually cautiously counter this dismissal.
Irfan Habib himself discusses the parasitic and anti-productive nature of slavery and other atrocities on non-Muslims in his PhD thesis on the Mughal agrarian system. In a short monograph he denies the presence of strict caste boundaries in Mughal India. Should we then dismiss his works because he associates with and is "tainted" by "Marxists/Marxism"?
the quantitative estimates of genocide on Hindus are going to be problematic until "Hindus" come to power. Without going too much into this because it will go OT, briefly :
(1) a person's arguments have to be taken on the basis of arguments, references, and logical construction that he places, and a reader should judge the "work" and the arguments placed and not the person or his associations. When I criticize Prof. Ms. Romilla Thapar, I do so on the basis of what she writes as historical "fact", not her possible political affiliations.
(2) Even if K.S.Lal has support of some organization which is looked down upon by certain other political sectors, we have to judge his works by what he says. As for K.S.Lal, what is usually not written is that his major work on the negative impact of Islam, especially with regards to slavery - had its introduction/foreward written by Prof. Muhammad Habib, (father of more pronouncedly "leftist" Irfan Habib), and K.S.Lal was a favourite student of Prof. Habib.
(3) Indirect estimation efforts have started. one of this has been through looking up references to Hindu slaves in waqafnamas by "Sufi" slave masters in CAR. I have placed refs in the "slavery in India" page on wiki. So far not much has been changed in the bulk of the material until early colonial period I have written there. Look at the sections under "Islam".
Source material is always a great place to start from. The Persian texts are dismissed for exaggeration by Thaparites. The slavery refs I have given on wiki actually cautiously counter this dismissal.
Irfan Habib himself discusses the parasitic and anti-productive nature of slavery and other atrocities on non-Muslims in his PhD thesis on the Mughal agrarian system. In a short monograph he denies the presence of strict caste boundaries in Mughal India. Should we then dismiss his works because he associates with and is "tainted" by "Marxists/Marxism"?
Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
Hello to all,
Is anyone familiar with this book:
http://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpresseboo ... and=eschol
This is mainly about Bengal. Would appreciate your comments and opinions.
Is anyone familiar with this book:
http://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpresseboo ... and=eschol
This is mainly about Bengal. Would appreciate your comments and opinions.
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brihaspati
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
The book is well known as a relatively balanced and modern treatment of the Islamization question. The issues I have with his theory are as follows :
(1) He selectively uses anecdotal references from Manrique for example to try and prove that the Mughal officials were "neutral" in their policy implementations with regards to Muslim and non-Muslim. But it is the same Manrique who describes how the very same shiqdars imprisoned peasants who defaulted on taxes and other revenue demands [he omits mentioning the details of revenue demands and the excessive burden it created] and sold them in slave markets to retrieve some of the defaulted claims.
In this not only the peasant but the entire family including the wife and children of the peasants who were dragged "crying" to the slave market.
Manucci in addition mentions that Mughal imperial firmans specifically mentioned that such women and children were to be sold only to Muslim buyers. It was a well known practise to convert such slaves with or without manumission. The descendants of such slaves would later typically be manumitted [once their productivity was gone with age] and allowed to settle in the land.
The clearing of land with distributive agenda should have left a more equitable land-ownership pattern which has not happened. We still find a highly skewed land distribution pattern among the Muslims of the Eastern delta.
(2) He does not explain why relatively destitute Muslim immigrants from western India or ME were overwhelmingly given land-grants to clear forest lands compared to non-Muslims. The explanation is only partial in trying to assign cultural resistance in Hindu "upper castes" to take the lead in agrarian expansion. He does this because he omits the analysis of agrarian communities of the mahishyas for example in the western delta and rahr - who are well known for taking initiative in agrarian expansion among the Hindus.
(3) He ignores the vast quantity of folklore that sublays instances of Islamic theologians or administration interfering or imposing their personal greed and biological demands on non-Muslim populations and failing which they would use Mughal (as well as pre-Mughal) Islamic military power to destroy, weaken or replace resisting populations. One example would be the underlying storyline in the well known ballad of Sonai-Madhav-Bhavna Qazi. Even the legendary Shah Jalal of Sylhet actually accompanied a Muslim army sent from Gaur on what appears to have been a well planned campaign based on careful planning of provocation of local non-Muslims and their reaction.
(4) He does not consider at all any treatment of the possible effects of the medieval dry period in India, whcih coincided with the tail end of the Sultanate and advent of the mughals. We know now that it was one of the driest periods known in the last 3000 years as far as rainfall in northern and Gangetic India is concerned. He also ignores or fails to mention archaeological findings of pre-medieval settlements in now forested and still washed by full channels lands in middle and western delta and even eastern delta.
Either this happened because of the climatic disasters or man made causes such as hostilities, unsustainabilty in the face of persistent raids - we are yet to decide.
But more discussion on thsi perhaps belongs to the distorted history thread.
(1) He selectively uses anecdotal references from Manrique for example to try and prove that the Mughal officials were "neutral" in their policy implementations with regards to Muslim and non-Muslim. But it is the same Manrique who describes how the very same shiqdars imprisoned peasants who defaulted on taxes and other revenue demands [he omits mentioning the details of revenue demands and the excessive burden it created] and sold them in slave markets to retrieve some of the defaulted claims.
In this not only the peasant but the entire family including the wife and children of the peasants who were dragged "crying" to the slave market.
Manucci in addition mentions that Mughal imperial firmans specifically mentioned that such women and children were to be sold only to Muslim buyers. It was a well known practise to convert such slaves with or without manumission. The descendants of such slaves would later typically be manumitted [once their productivity was gone with age] and allowed to settle in the land.
The clearing of land with distributive agenda should have left a more equitable land-ownership pattern which has not happened. We still find a highly skewed land distribution pattern among the Muslims of the Eastern delta.
(2) He does not explain why relatively destitute Muslim immigrants from western India or ME were overwhelmingly given land-grants to clear forest lands compared to non-Muslims. The explanation is only partial in trying to assign cultural resistance in Hindu "upper castes" to take the lead in agrarian expansion. He does this because he omits the analysis of agrarian communities of the mahishyas for example in the western delta and rahr - who are well known for taking initiative in agrarian expansion among the Hindus.
(3) He ignores the vast quantity of folklore that sublays instances of Islamic theologians or administration interfering or imposing their personal greed and biological demands on non-Muslim populations and failing which they would use Mughal (as well as pre-Mughal) Islamic military power to destroy, weaken or replace resisting populations. One example would be the underlying storyline in the well known ballad of Sonai-Madhav-Bhavna Qazi. Even the legendary Shah Jalal of Sylhet actually accompanied a Muslim army sent from Gaur on what appears to have been a well planned campaign based on careful planning of provocation of local non-Muslims and their reaction.
(4) He does not consider at all any treatment of the possible effects of the medieval dry period in India, whcih coincided with the tail end of the Sultanate and advent of the mughals. We know now that it was one of the driest periods known in the last 3000 years as far as rainfall in northern and Gangetic India is concerned. He also ignores or fails to mention archaeological findings of pre-medieval settlements in now forested and still washed by full channels lands in middle and western delta and even eastern delta.
Either this happened because of the climatic disasters or man made causes such as hostilities, unsustainabilty in the face of persistent raids - we are yet to decide.
But more discussion on thsi perhaps belongs to the distorted history thread.
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Christopher Sidor
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
Let us assume that Pakistan fragments into some 3-4 entities in the next decade or so. The entities that will most probably arise, will be Sindh, Punjab, Pathanistan and Baluchistan.
Baluchistan will be to west what pakistan is today to west. A staging ground for its forces and its ability to project power to afghanistan and beyond, especially to the countries of persian gulf countries. So India can forget its integration back into Indian Union.
Sindh will eventually merge with India. It has more in common with India then it has with other parts of Pakistan. But what happens to the muhajirs of Sindh. Will they get eliminated in the ensuring violence ? And should india lift a finger to help them?
Punjab and Pathanistan will be the wild card. Will they fight each other, coexist or will they be eventually be overrun by afghans. It is worth noting that the area of pakistan-punjab and pakistan-nwfp have historically been under the control of either kabul or delhi. The current scenario of lahore lording over these lands is unique and an artificial construct.
Also Pathanistan might lead to a balkanization of afghanistan as we know of, into 4-5 constituents.
And another moot point is will india take over PoK and northern areas of Kashmir? Ideally India should. But this would lead to India having borders with the troubled Pathanistan.
Baluchistan will be to west what pakistan is today to west. A staging ground for its forces and its ability to project power to afghanistan and beyond, especially to the countries of persian gulf countries. So India can forget its integration back into Indian Union.
Sindh will eventually merge with India. It has more in common with India then it has with other parts of Pakistan. But what happens to the muhajirs of Sindh. Will they get eliminated in the ensuring violence ? And should india lift a finger to help them?
Punjab and Pathanistan will be the wild card. Will they fight each other, coexist or will they be eventually be overrun by afghans. It is worth noting that the area of pakistan-punjab and pakistan-nwfp have historically been under the control of either kabul or delhi. The current scenario of lahore lording over these lands is unique and an artificial construct.
Also Pathanistan might lead to a balkanization of afghanistan as we know of, into 4-5 constituents.
And another moot point is will india take over PoK and northern areas of Kashmir? Ideally India should. But this would lead to India having borders with the troubled Pathanistan.
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brihaspati
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
The main problem with Balochi integration back with India is because it already has a full fledged independence movement. In the previous version of this thread I had tried to point out this obstacle.
However, there could be situations in the future, where Balochistan may not have an option oether than joining India as a province. But I do not want to alarm our potential Balochi "friends", hence will not go into details.
As for all other regions, it is strategically important that they come under Indian sovereignty. Any other independent formation in Pakjab, FATA, POK, NA, sindh, will mean internationally legitimate entities which will be too weak to sustain themselves and hence on the auction block for the usual suspects to play with, against India.
Both POK and Pakjab and FATA are necessary to have in our bag because these areas block out the interconnecting passages between the Arabian sea, Afghanistan and China. Regionally they form a "star-shaped" format that reaches out and blocks connections in three main directions - the Kashmir Valley/Swat and KKH in the NE, Helmand in NW, Baloch and Arabian Sea to the SW.
Block these out under Indian soverignty - and all the designs of USA, Islamists in CAR and Iran+AFG, PRC - all gets blocked.
However, there could be situations in the future, where Balochistan may not have an option oether than joining India as a province. But I do not want to alarm our potential Balochi "friends", hence will not go into details.
As for all other regions, it is strategically important that they come under Indian sovereignty. Any other independent formation in Pakjab, FATA, POK, NA, sindh, will mean internationally legitimate entities which will be too weak to sustain themselves and hence on the auction block for the usual suspects to play with, against India.
Both POK and Pakjab and FATA are necessary to have in our bag because these areas block out the interconnecting passages between the Arabian sea, Afghanistan and China. Regionally they form a "star-shaped" format that reaches out and blocks connections in three main directions - the Kashmir Valley/Swat and KKH in the NE, Helmand in NW, Baloch and Arabian Sea to the SW.
Block these out under Indian soverignty - and all the designs of USA, Islamists in CAR and Iran+AFG, PRC - all gets blocked.
Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
Baluchis will not join up with India, simply because mostly it is the Baluchi Sardars who control the Azadi Movement there, and an integration in India could mean, they might lose their lands. So for normal Baluchis, it would be good but not for the Baluchi Sardars.
Secondly, Baluchistan would always have to fear its neighbors - Pakjabistan, Pushtunistan, Iran. So their desire for independence may be strong, but it is their capacity to withstand the interference of their neighbors and to stay independent that is questionable.
Even as it is less than patriotic to concede one's inability to secure one's independence, it is still the truth. The Baluchis are aware of these challenges. So even as they become independent of Pakistan, they may consider it prudent to join the Indian Union of their own free volition, as from amongst its neighbors only the Indian Union guarantees them their freedom, their rights, their prosperity and respect.
Secondly, Baluchistan would always have to fear its neighbors - Pakjabistan, Pushtunistan, Iran. So their desire for independence may be strong, but it is their capacity to withstand the interference of their neighbors and to stay independent that is questionable.
Even as it is less than patriotic to concede one's inability to secure one's independence, it is still the truth. The Baluchis are aware of these challenges. So even as they become independent of Pakistan, they may consider it prudent to join the Indian Union of their own free volition, as from amongst its neighbors only the Indian Union guarantees them their freedom, their rights, their prosperity and respect.
Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
Don't think it's realistic to expect them to join India, the core idea running through Baloch independence movement has been about separateness from both India and Pakistan.
Upon Baloch independence, I think we'd come into direct conflict with Iran if we try to take it as they consider it within their sphere of influence, which would probably put us back in square one as far as dealing with Islamist neighbours is concerned.
I think it's best to maintain Afghanistan and Balochistan as buffers between India and Iran in the future.
Upon Baloch independence, I think we'd come into direct conflict with Iran if we try to take it as they consider it within their sphere of influence, which would probably put us back in square one as far as dealing with Islamist neighbours is concerned.
I think it's best to maintain Afghanistan and Balochistan as buffers between India and Iran in the future.
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brihaspati
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
We have to keep in mind the reality of Balochi society. It is not a paradise of liberty and liberal thoughts. One of the primary motivations behind Balochi movement is also the same as in Sindh - that of feudal elite trying to defend control over their land and power over people from the intrusions of the Pakjabi feudal elite. This is where the future situation may get difficult for the Balochi lords to maintain their power and this is what I hinted at in my previous post.
The Iranians are concerned about separatism by Balochis within currently held territories of Iran. This is the second weakness of the Baloch movement. An Indian gurantee and tri-partite negotiation that initially assures the Iranians of "contained" Balochis within current borders may be necessary for Balochis to progress at all towards their objectives.
But in the end - do we really consider Iran under Khomeinis a real friend of India? Let us keep our cards close to our hearts about this, just as the Iranians do also.
The Iranians are concerned about separatism by Balochis within currently held territories of Iran. This is the second weakness of the Baloch movement. An Indian gurantee and tri-partite negotiation that initially assures the Iranians of "contained" Balochis within current borders may be necessary for Balochis to progress at all towards their objectives.
But in the end - do we really consider Iran under Khomeinis a real friend of India? Let us keep our cards close to our hearts about this, just as the Iranians do also.
Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
The Baloch want independence from both Iran and Pakistan. India is not a factor.Carl_T wrote:Don't think it's realistic to expect them to join India, the core idea running through Baloch independence movement has been about separateness from both India and Pakistan.
Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria all sit on a part of Kurdistan, and none wants a part of the other to become independent. So one would see all of them cooperating on keeping the Kurds down.Carl_T wrote:Upon Baloch independence, I think we'd come into direct conflict with Iran if we try to take it as they consider it within their sphere of influence, which would probably put us back in square one as far as dealing with Islamist neighbours is concerned.
Iran would be grateful, if Eastern Baluchistan was a part of India. An independent Eastern Baluchistan would exercise a pull over the Iranian Baluchistan, endangering Iranian unity.
Well if PRC was not interested in buffers, why should India be? Buffers are useful if you are peaceful and the other is aggressive. India and Iran can be good and responsible neighbors. We both have to lose from anything different.Carl_T wrote:I think it's best to maintain Afghanistan and Balochistan as buffers between India and Iran in the future.
Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
Brihaspati Jibrihaspati wrote:
Both POK and Pakjab and FATA are necessary to have in our bag because these areas block out the interconnecting passages between the Arabian sea, Afghanistan and China.
I understand all that you are saying from a strategic point of view but then are we not fiddling with demographics setting ourselves up to become an Islamic country.I am sure there is something I am not understanding.Would you be kind enough to explain because such statements fill people like me with apprehension.In fact the first or second statement of mine while joining Bharat rakshak was to this effect only. I had been a long time lurker here before. Please be kind enough to oblige.
My first post:
Manish_sharma wrote
You are welcome Rohit. See all the garus here are confidant of absorbing porki population within india and secularise them. While the very para you have chosen to hightlight sends shivers down my spine thinking of letting these fanatics be part of our country. All the garus may disagree on many terms but on this all are one.[unquote]
I absolutely second that and such words are IMO sealing the end of indic civilization for ever.
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brihaspati
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
Manishw ji,
I guess my position on this lies strewn around on several threads and in two previous versions of current threads - strategic scenario and strategic leadership. If you can access the early pages in those threads which I think still lie around on BR, and look at my arguments it may clarify what I am saying.
My position in brief is
(1) I am against the ideology and theology and its most persistent theologians. I am not against the common followers of that faith system. I believe that our target for elimination should be the ideology and those who seek to maintain its regeneration, abut the common followers should be "hotly" persuaded by a combination of methods - which may appear both cynical as well as idealistic - to come "out" of the faith or at least cease to practise it. I have given ethnic, and other value-based justifications for this.
(2) We cannot do this "purification" without sovereignty over the land and its people, as outsiders will have legitimate claims and rights and excuses to intervene.
(3) I strongly believe that pure economical pursuits cannot define the ultimate national purpose. Over time it leads to degeneration of the nation because everything ultimately comes to have a valuation in terms of money - your land, your people, your family, your children, your wife or sister or mother, even your ideology and commitments - all become commodities. This is the process I termed "baniafication" of national ideology. I prefer an alternate outlining of national goal of civilizational expansion and be prepared to defend and fuel it - if necessary by war. War or at least preparation for potentially facing it, drives both technology and economics - and according to some analyzers was the single largets factor in driving the engine for technological progress and experimentation with better forms of social organization.
India needs to consolidate its initial national base regionally by bringing all of teh subcontinent under a single rashtra - which again should neither be Muslim nor Christian. I exclude the two faiths, apart from doctrinal issues which I feel goes against continuing human quest for knowledge, because of practical reasons. Both are shared by nations and groups hostile to the idea of India as shown by historical experience and nothing so far to show that any fundamental changes have taken place in that mindset.
Identity needs to be distinct from potential and past enemies os that no thread of betrayal finds a warm spot inside the heart of our nation - subject to cynical and ruthless political military manipulation from outside using religious urgings and cover.
I hope you will be satisfied - this has been laid out in probably hundred of posts before which perhaps may be difficult to repeat again.
I guess my position on this lies strewn around on several threads and in two previous versions of current threads - strategic scenario and strategic leadership. If you can access the early pages in those threads which I think still lie around on BR, and look at my arguments it may clarify what I am saying.
My position in brief is
(1) I am against the ideology and theology and its most persistent theologians. I am not against the common followers of that faith system. I believe that our target for elimination should be the ideology and those who seek to maintain its regeneration, abut the common followers should be "hotly" persuaded by a combination of methods - which may appear both cynical as well as idealistic - to come "out" of the faith or at least cease to practise it. I have given ethnic, and other value-based justifications for this.
(2) We cannot do this "purification" without sovereignty over the land and its people, as outsiders will have legitimate claims and rights and excuses to intervene.
(3) I strongly believe that pure economical pursuits cannot define the ultimate national purpose. Over time it leads to degeneration of the nation because everything ultimately comes to have a valuation in terms of money - your land, your people, your family, your children, your wife or sister or mother, even your ideology and commitments - all become commodities. This is the process I termed "baniafication" of national ideology. I prefer an alternate outlining of national goal of civilizational expansion and be prepared to defend and fuel it - if necessary by war. War or at least preparation for potentially facing it, drives both technology and economics - and according to some analyzers was the single largets factor in driving the engine for technological progress and experimentation with better forms of social organization.
India needs to consolidate its initial national base regionally by bringing all of teh subcontinent under a single rashtra - which again should neither be Muslim nor Christian. I exclude the two faiths, apart from doctrinal issues which I feel goes against continuing human quest for knowledge, because of practical reasons. Both are shared by nations and groups hostile to the idea of India as shown by historical experience and nothing so far to show that any fundamental changes have taken place in that mindset.
Identity needs to be distinct from potential and past enemies os that no thread of betrayal finds a warm spot inside the heart of our nation - subject to cynical and ruthless political military manipulation from outside using religious urgings and cover.
I hope you will be satisfied - this has been laid out in probably hundred of posts before which perhaps may be difficult to repeat again.