Will remove if it has been posted, but the most amount of info I could find in one place (No URL for the moment):
India's war doctrine: “Cold Start”-implications for its neighbours?
The implications of India's new war doctrine for Pakistan and China.
[Gp Capt (Retd) S M HALI]
"Dreams float on an impatient wind,
A wind that wants to create a new order,
An order of strength and thundering of fire."
The above is a quote from a poem ascribed to Dr. Avul Pakir Jainulabdeen Abdul Kalam, father of India's Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme and is available on the website 'Indian Missiles' which is dedicated to him with the caption: “It was the brilliant Dr. APJ Abdul Kalam who breathed life into ballistic missiles like the Agni and Prithvi, which put China and Pakistan well under India's missile range.”
It appears that India wants to take the dream of Dr. Abdul Kalam, now India's President to new dimensions. Its new war doctrine, aptly named Cold Start was “unveiled” to the public by India's Army Chief Gen N.C. Vij on 04 March 2004 while inaugurating a two-day seminar on 'Army 2020: shape and size and structure and general doctrine for emerging challenges'. As reported by The Indian Express of 05 March 2004, he said, “With warfare scenario undergoing dramatic changes, the Indian Army has drafted a new war doctrine which would be finalized soon after it is circulated within the service as well as incorporating suggestions from the defence think tanks.
For reasons of security, the Indian Army Chief General N C Vij did not go public with the details of the new doctrine but the central idea revolves around replacing the age-old concept of mobilization of forces and Strike Corps spearheading the attack. The salient features of the new war doctrine, which calls for rewriting the war-book, are:
• Changed world doesn't allow massing of troops, invites diplomatic intervention
• Out go Strike Corps spearheading attack. Eight integrated battle groups to lead thrust into enemy territory
• Aim for 'total destruction of objective' but spare enemy's strategic potential to avoid nuclear response
• Focus on precision capability and hard impact since massive air, land campaigns not possible
According to The Indian Express of 06 March 2004's report titled: 'No eyeball to eyeball any more in new war doctrine', by Shishir Gupta, more details are provided: “While many in the forces may take credit for this doctrine, the then Western Army Commander Lt General Vijay Oberoi was one of the first to root for this strategy. Present Army Vice Chief Lt General Shantano Choudhary has refined the concept keeping in mind the existing nuclear environment. Gen Oberoi, who retired as Army Vice Chief in 2002, presently heads an Army think tank called CLAWS. This doctrine, debated at the last tri-Services military commanders conference, will be on the agenda again during the commanders' conference next month. The new doctrine does not believe in dividing the forces into defensive or attack formations. India's three Strike Corps - Mathura-based I Corps, Ambala-based II Corps and Bhopal-based XXI Corps - will be there only for training purposes. The war will be fought through eight battle groups with integrated elements from the IAF and Navy. Backed by tank regiments, heavy artillery, missile regiments and the air force, the battle groups will go for limited but lethal destruction on enemy territory. The Navy with its carrier-based fighters will have the key role of supporting the battle groups. Ships will also launch missiles like the Russian Klub. The idea is to destroy, not to hold or capture territory.
“This concept was first war-gamed during Exercise Vijay Chakra in the Thar desert by Gen Oberoi in 2001 and synergized between the three forces during Exercise Brahmastra later that year. Still being war-gamed, a part of it was on view at Exercise Divya Astra in Pokharan this week. This strategy was fine-tuned once the threat of nuclear war dawned on the security establishment. It was done by Gen Choudhary, then commander of the Jalandhar-based XI Corps, and his counterparts in IAF and Navy. Measuring the force application during war time, they took into account the nuclear threshold of the adversary.”
'Divya Astra' (divine weapon) was organized at the Mahajan Firing Ranges (Rajasthan), on March 1, 2004 by the Indian Army and Air Force as a massive firepower demonstration of the new long-distance multiple weapon firing ranges from a variety of weapon systems, comprising: tank columns, infantry combat vehicles, MI-35 attack helicopters, MiG-21 and MiG-23 jet fighters. Some of the systems demonstrated included the Krasnopol precision-guided ammunition fired from the 155-mm Bofors guns. Krasnopol is guided onto the target by a laser designator operated by an observer close to the target. The GRAD BM 21 multi-barrel rocket launchers consisting of 40 tubes with 122-mm rockets displayed their lethality. Among the weapons and equipment on display were the infantry weapons including automatic grenade launchers (AGLs), under barrel grenade launchers (UBLs), the Dragunov sniper rifle and the Carl Gustav 84-mm rocket launcher. The Army also unveiled its long range reconnaissance and observation system, integrated observation equipment and radars. The Israeli-made Searcher UAV also demonstrated its capabilities by taking high-resolution pictures of ''enemy activity'' from very high altitude.
The timing of this “disclosure” of India's new war doctrine is of interest. Why have India's top military commanders returned to their drawing board to work on this new war doctrine: the 'Cold Start' strategy while a highly hyped peace process is underway? What is the implication of announcing that hard strikes can be launched without massing of troops? Is it only to conceal their aggressive designs from an unsuspecting enemy and deny him the flexibility of response or to stealthily achieve the odious aim of belligerence before the watchful international opinion plays its role in thwarting the iniquitous plan?
The fact is that the main aim of this exercise appears to put pressure on Pakistan prior to the peace talks. Read another story in the Indian Press on the same date (March 6). This time in Asia Times titled: 'India frets over Pakistan-Bangladesh nexus', the correspondent Sultan Shahin “reveals” that: “According to Indian intelligence assessments, Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) is actively trying to realize its plan for a sovereign Islamic state in India's northeast, with full support from fundamentalist elements within Bangladesh government, army, bureaucracy and intelligence. Sources in India's Ministry of Home Affairs have told Asia Times Online that it has regularly been receiving reports of increased ISI activity in Bangladesh, and of tacit support extended to the ISI by the authorities there. With the ceasefire on the Kashmir border, militant outfits are increasingly using Bangladesh as training ground rather than Pakistan-administered Kashmir, according to the sources. There are also reports that Pakistan nationals owing allegiance to different terrorist outfits have been using Dhaka as a transit point for entering India and Nepal, as well as an escape route. Delhi has on several occasions raised the issue with Bangladeshi authorities. But Dhaka has repeatedly denied all similar reports and statements made by Indian government officials, including Deputy Prime Minister and Home Minister Lal Krishan Advani.”
After this (startling) revelation, herein lies the rub: “Though ruling Indian politicians will not make an issue out of the alleged ISI activity for the next couple of months until general elections are over - the achievement of peace on the borders is a major poll plank for the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) - Asia Times Online has learnt that central as well as state intelligence officials are deeply concerned at the growing influence of the ISI at various levels in Bangladesh, and of the activities of a variety of secessionist militants and Islamic fundamentalists, many of whom have found refuge in Bangladesh.”
The columnist attempts to drag in Khaleda Zia's regime too, in direct contravention to the SAARC spirit of brotherly relations revived during the Islamabad summit of January 2004. “…This has been particularly the case since the Bangladesh visit of Pakistan President General Pervez Musharraf in July 2002, when additional ISI personnel were posted at the Pakistan High Commission in Dhaka. The situation became even more favourable for the ISI after the assumption of power in October 2001 by the present four-party coalition led by Prime Minister Khaleda Zia's Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), with the help of pro-Pakistan fundamentalist elements.”
Hindustan Times columnist Vishal Thapar, in his report titled: 'Army banks on divine weapon' throws more light on the subject.
“Army Chief General N.C. Vij, who witnessed the demonstration, emphasized that the demonstration was not intended to send a message to anyone but acknowledged that it represented preparations for conventional war. 'Hypothetically, there's always space for conventional war. That's why armies exist. I don't want to talk of war at the time of peace talks (with Pakistan). But preparedness diminishes chances of war. This exercise is part of our training. It is not to convey a message to anyone,' General Vij said, stopping short of terming it the Indian version of 'Shock and Awe'.”
India has been trying to rationalize the change in its war strategy through its defence analysts and think tanks ever since its troops withdrawal (read capitulation) after nearly a year long mobilization along Pakistan's international boundary following the December 13, 2001 (stage-managed) attack on the Indian Parliament. Praveen Swami, columnist of The Hindu presents the views of former Indian Army Chief in her article (February 6, 2004) titled: 'Gen. Padmanabhan mulls over lessons of Operation Parakram'. The noted columnist states “Problems with India's military doctrine, and a lack of clarity within the Union Cabinet and on its war objectives may have undermined Operation Parakram at the very outset. In an exclusive interview to The Hindu, the former Chief of the Army Staff, General S. Padmanabhan, has thrown new light on the reasons for the failure of Operation Parakram; the massive build-up ordered in the wake of the December 13, 2001, terrorist attack on Parliament House. He was responding to criticism that a slow mobilization of the troops 'gifted' Pakistan time to prepare its defences - and eventually meant that the Operation had to be called off. Gen. Padmanabhan argues that significant military gains could have been achieved in January 2002, had politicians made the decision to go to war. These objectives, he says, could have included 'degradation of the other force, and perhaps the capture of disputed territory in Jammu and Kashmir. They were more achievable in January, less achievable in February, and even less achievable in March. By then, the balance of forces had gradually changed.'
“Critics of Gen. Padmanabhan's management of Operation Parakram have argued that air strikes against terror training camps could have been carried out within days of the December 13 outrage. The Army, in turn, said that it needed time to prepare for the escalatory consequences of such attacks. Pakistan, Army planners believed, had an interest in taking the conflict towards a nuclear flash-point as soon as possible. The Army believed the best prospects of avoiding such a situation was having forces in place that could rapidly secure war objectives.
According to Gen. Padmanabhan, the kinds of limited strikes some were pushing for would have been 'totally futile'. 'If you really want to punish someone for something very terrible he has done,' he said, 'you smash him. You destroy his weapons and capture his territory.' 'War is a serious business,' he continues, 'and you don't go just like that. When December 13 happened, my strike formations were at peace locations. At that point, I did not have the capability to mobilize large forces to go across.'
Military doctrine -
problems
Part of the problem appears to have been India's defence-oriented military doctrine, which assigns most formations to hold ground against enemy attack. Offensive roles are largely assigned to three strike formations, the Mathura- based 1 Corps, the Ambala-based 2 Corps and the Bhopal-based 21 Corps. Unlike these strike formations, most other Corps can at best carry out very limited offensive tasks. India, Gen. Padmanabhan's remarks suggest, could have ended up starting a war from which it would have gained very little, and that too at great cost.
Doctrinal baggage, he accepts, crippled India's early options in 2002. 'You could certainly question why we are so dependent on our strike formations,' he said, 'and why my holding Corps don't have the capability to do the same tasks from a cold start. This is something I have worked on while in office. Perhaps, in time, it will be our military doctrine.' Gen. Padmanabhan's new book, 'The Writing on the Wall - India Checkmates America 2017,” among other things, describes a fictional war in which India retakes the Haji Pir pass in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir.
Correctives being taken
Efforts are now under way to rectify some of these problems in doctrine identified in the course of Operation Parakram. The present Army Chief, Gen. Nirmal C. Vij, has pushed through an ambitious modernization of India's ground forces. New weapons systems are now being introduced which will allow each Corps a limited offensive capability of its own, reducing dependence on the strike formations. India's Special Forces are also being re-equipped to improve their ability to operate behind enemy lines for considerable lengths of time, and could play a key role in a future war.”
The answer to this multi-pronged attack of brow beating and maliciously maligning, lies in India's ambitions of becoming a superpower and a full fledged member of the UN Security Council so that it can continue its hegemonic designs undeterred. Pakistan's being declared as the newest member of the elite club of 'Most non-NATO Ally' has caused chagrin in the minds of the Indian Defence planners as well as its External Affairs specialists. Seema Mustafa of Deccan Chronicle in her article titled: 'Heartache for India' published on 20th March 2004, makes a frank admission of India's anguish, but showers unprecedented praise on the Pakistani President. It makes an interesting viewpoint from the other side of the divide hence it is being quoted here in toto: “India is aggrieved about the United States decision to confer major non-Nato ally status on Pakistan. The gesture confirms what foreign policy experts have known all along but the government has remained in denial mode about: the United States has a special relationship with Pakistan, so special that India can only remain a secondary partner no matter how hard it tries to change this reality. And the good Lord knows, we are trying very very hard to win over Washington and keep it firmly on our side. US Secretary Colin Powell came to New Delhi and said the usual about Pakistan's nuclear programme, how he expected Pakistan to plug all the loopholes etc etc. Meaningless words really.
“But he had our South Block mandarins hopping up and down with glee: see, they need us, they love us, they are fed up with Pakistan, Powell is going to talk tough to Musharraf, we always knew that Pakistan could not get away with all this for too long.
“The spin doctors gave their usual spin to the visit, the media reported the details faithfully, and the sun appeared to be shining until the Secretary of State landed in Islamabad. He did not even wait to meet Pakistan President General Pervez Musharraf. He announced the decision to make Pakistan a major non-Nato ally after a meeting with Foreign Minister Khurshid Mehmood Kasuri.
“Obviously New Delhi, choosing to wear blinkers in so far as its relations with Washington are concerned, had not seen this coming. There was no reaction except unofficially. The foreign office was seething, former diplomats were furious, policy makers tried hard to look for the silver lining, and at the end of the day India sat back without a response or even a knee jerk reaction.
“Some solace was found in the fact that Powell said on board the flight out of Pakistan that he could consider the same status for India. And judging from the initial response here, we are clearly jumping over this assurance too. Solace in crumbs thrown to a nation that had once taken pride in her sovereignty and her independence. Tragic.
“It is amazing how unwilling Indian policy makers are to factor home truths into their assessments of the South Asian situation. It is almost as if an admission of reality is anti-national. And true nationalism is that which denies reality, and revels in an illusory 'feel good' climate.
“Learned veterans writing volumes on India-Pakistan relations these days refuse one, to acknowledge the leadership qualities of President Musharraf and two, his importance for the US. Instead they are always seizing on straws that might momentarily suggest otherwise, to convince themselves, the government and the people of India that all is well, Pakistan can never be a real ally for the US, and if we are patient we will emerge as the real victors. In that the US will be forced to recognize us as the real allies. Perhaps, but then again perhaps not. The Americans, in their brief history, have never felt very comfortable with democracies. They like to engage with democracies, they like to improve military relations, they like to build on trade and business but they are always hesitant, politically, to forge links that they will not be in a position to control. The dynamics of Indian politics certainly makes her uncontrollable. There is no certainty whether the BJP will come back to power at the end of these elections, whether the Congress will be able to make a serious bid for power, or whether one of the regional mavericks might be catapulted into the Prime Minister's chair by the sheer force of circumstances. The US might today be in a position to control India's foreign policy to a greater extent than ever before, but it is helpless when it comes to her domestic politics that continues to defy the best predictions of even her own political leadership.
“Pakistan, on the other hand, has always been a natural ally for Washington. Ever since the days of the Cold War. Washington and Islamabad have developed links over the years that have penetrated the cold walls of the Pentagon to ensure that these respond to the test of time. Pakistan is predictable simply because it has that huge institution, the military, that remains in control regardless of who is in power at any point of time. Washington has always been very comfortable with Pakistan's military; it understands this institution, its compulsions, its limitations and has a fairly good idea of its pressure points that can be pressed as and when required.
“To put it very simplistically, it will be a very foolish USA that will discard dependable Pakistan for unpredictable India. Having said that, let us look at the general. New Delhi is very resistant to looking at the general, and needs dark glasses to even move its eyes in his direction. We prefer looking at warts and moles, and are not very happy when we look at a smiling, clear eyed man in military uniform who still looks as if he has the world under his feet.
“Yes, President Musharraf does give this impression and even though he is being pushed and shoved by the Americans, he continues to act as if he is in total command and will take so much and no more. The so much does keep increasing, but it is done so gradually that Pakistan is now divided between parties like the MMA who insist that he is an American stooge, and those who feel that they are more secure under him than they would have been under any other political leader after 9/11.
“President Musharraf is a commando. He packs into his every action, the thoroughness and the authority of the commando. He meets Laloo Prasad Yadav and you get the impression that he has read up every little fact about the Bihar leader, following his visit to Pakistan with deep interest. He meets the Indian cricket team, and rattles out figures and statistics that bowl them over.
“He meets Prime Minister Vajpayee when relations between India-Pakistan are at breaking point and floors the entire hall with the famous handshake in Kathmandu. Pakistan's father of the bomb is accused of proliferation, the world expects Pakistan to be hit by the mounting flak, but again the general ensures that he and his country are off the hook. To the point where Washington is left answering awkward questions while President Musharraf is left free to treat the world to homilies of nuclear piety. These are not mean feats.
“These require audacity, cunning, intelligence, confidence and a charisma that the general certainly does not lack. He is being swung around by the Americans, at least that is what we all think, but he is able to give the impression that he is an equal partner in the merry go round. And if he is not actively turning the wheel, he is definitely still in a position to determine the speed. After all he has been able to convince the Americans that he is their best bet in Pakistan.
'He is the only army commander who they can rely on. Not just to support the US probably most of the senior command in Pakistan's army has a special relationship with Washington today but to deliver. For one, he is a liberal and does not draw his inspiration from Islamic fundamentalism. Two, he is a professional army officer and fired by his own vision of a modern Pakistan does not hesitate to take on the mullahs at any point in time. He dares.
'There are not many in Pakistan, not even from the so called political class, who can take on the extremists and tell a gathering of tribal elders that they are sheltering 600 al-Qaeda and Taliban operatives and they better hand them over. The current offensive in the tribal areas is unprecedented in the history of Pakistan.
“The Americans need Pakistan. And they need President Musharraf for he has become indispensable to them. They will make all the necessary noises of criticism, as and when required, but the truth again lies in Colin Powell's assertion that Washington is more than prepared to accommodate the general's political interests to keep him effective in this crucial war against terrorism.
“One must remember that the US was more than willing to take its finger off the non-proliferation trigger in Pakistan's case and went along willingly with Musharraf's “scapegoat formula.” He is the only leader at the present point in time, and Pakistan is the only country, that can actually make the difference for US President George W Bush between victory and defeat in this election year.
“The operation in the tribal areas has brought Washington closer than it ever has been to apprehending key Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders, and again there are not many in Pakistan who could send 70,000 troops into Fata while they entertained the Indian cricket team to tea and dahi bhallas.
“India, under the astute leadership of the BJP, has been burrowing itself into the US lap in the hope that it will emerge as the favourite child. In the process it has been getting its little carrots, largely in the form of economic and military returns.
“Washington is getting into every crucial aspect of Indian decision making, with the naval, air and land military exercises working more to its benefit than that of India. After decades of trying the Americans have got access to our mountain and jungle training institutes, key strategic training centres that the Indian military had guarded zealously. Even without a history of proliferation, India is under as much pressure as Pakistan to fall in line on this front.
“Politically we have got little. New Delhi has had to set aside its objections on terrorism and enter into a peace dialogue with the military general it had balked from doing business with. Kashmir remains the core issue, and is up there for discussion. It is on top of the agenda.
Powell during his visit made placatory noises that lulled New Delhi into a sense of deep security, until he shattered it with the major non-Nato ally status for Pakistan. The implications can have major repercussions for the region, and it is strange that the Indian Foreign Office was unable to respond to the move. It appears that the flourishing US-India relations have, in real terms, shackled India while they have given the United States the space to strengthen relations with Pakistan. Someone has to think again. And me fears it might just have to be India.”
It would be prudent for the defence planners of Pakistan not to be cowed down by India's new war doctrine and its buying spree of weapons, delivery systems, jet trainers, Phalcon Radar, aircraft carriers, its missile tests and neither be lulled into a false sense of security by its being declared most non-Nato ally and to take India's peace overtures with a pinch of salt and not let their guard down. After all the Indian President himself provides the clue in his poem quoted in the beginning of this article; India's burning desire of creating a “new order,
An order of strength and thundering of fire.”
About the Author
Group Captain S M Hali has served in Pakistan Air Force for thirty years. During his air force career, he has flown over 4500 hours and worked on various command and staff appointments, which include the command of a squadron, duties as Air and Naval Attaché and Director Public Relations for PAF. He is a Graduate of PAF Staff College, Joint Services Staff College, has Honours degree in Business Administration and Masters in Mass Communication and is currently pursuing an M Phil degree in Mass Communications.
He has produced a Drama serial Shahpar, about 40 TV documentaries and ten motivational songs videos. He has authored over two hundred and fifty articles for various national and international dailies and magazines. He has hosted and participated in numerous TV and Radio talk shows. He writes a regular weekly column in daily Nawa-i-Waqt and also contributes periodically to a number of English dailies and Journals including the Defence Journal.
For his meritorious services, the Government of Pakistan has conferred on him Sitara-e-Imtiaz (Military).