In March this year the Indian army leaked news about its new war doctrine called “cold start” Although details of the concept remain classified, what has been released provides some valuable insights. Notwithstanding the optimistic conclusions of most Indian analysts who have conducted a preliminary analysis of the new doctrine, it seems highly futuristic.
The doctrine’s overriding goal seems to be to enhance the Indian military’s offensive punch by transforming the military into a more mobile, technologically effective group. Given that in present-day wars, technological superiority and its effective use, and not excessive manpower prove decisive, this is a step in the right direction.
For the Indian military, this means addressing what is perhaps its biggest weakness – lengthy mobilisation time spanning between two to three weeks. The new doctrine will allow the Indian military to plan and execute a swift and targeted surprise offensive, something that is not possible under the current Indian war doctrine.
In this context, the concept is revolutionary (not to be confused with revolution in military affairs) and could result in a quantum leap in India’s war-fighting capabilities. However, there are serious operational and political impediments to the plan’s implementation. They are likely to keep it dormant for the foreseeable future.
The concept demands near-perfect operational execution for its success. There exists a considerable gap between current Indian capabilities and what is required to make cold-start executable. Two are very important to any fast-paced, targeted military offensive: close air support and logistic support.
The cold start strategy relies on eight “integrated battle groups” conducting swift-targeted operations inside Pakistani territory. The very concept implies the use of highly mechanised units (artillery, armour) on the ground with a key role for integrated air support. To ensure the success of any such operation, the IAF would have to establish complete air superiority and provide continuous close air support to army units on the ground. With the existing force structure, the IAF is unlikely to achieve this.
As Brig. Shaukat Qadir pointed out (“Cold Start: the nuclear side” – Daily Times, May 16, 2004) “although the PAF is greatly outnumbered by the IAF, when supported by our air defense forces, fighting within our own air space, the PAF could extract an unacceptable price from the IAF” This is especially true since under the new concept, where ground movement and air operations would have to be concurrent, the IAF would be unable to precede an army offensive in order to establish air superiority as it can afford to do at present. Most analysts believe the IAF would require around 70 combat squadrons in order to command complete supremacy in the skies, something that is extremely unlikely to materialise in the near future.
Second, an essential aspect of fast-paced, mechanised military operations is the rapid logistic support to fighting units. The Indian army’s current logistic support is mainly ground-based. Given the pace of operations under cold start, a ground-based capability, incapable of timely cross-country transportation, cannot suffice. The concept necessitates an effective role for Army aviation and IAF transport helicopters. Here, the Indian military’s capabilities are modest and unless upgraded manifold, will leave the cold start concept hamstrung, and too risky to be executed. Considering India’s projected military build up, operational impediments to cold start are likely to be overcome, but at their own pace.
But the political impediments to the implementation of cold start are even greater. Indeed, to overcome them New Delhi would need to overhaul its political thinking.
The first is the issue of civilian control over India’s military. India’s political leadership maintains complete control over the military to the extent that the latter’s operational planning and effectiveness is said to be compromised. In order for the cold start concept to be operationally effective, the country’s leadership would have to sanction military action ex-ante, once the decision to mobilise has been taken. The military commanders will have a free (at least freer) hand to unleash full combat potential upfront, without requiring periodic clearances from the DoD.
Although ex-ante political approval does not alter the fundamental civil-military equation, the fact is that this would represent increased operational autonomy for the military, which the Indian military has long desired. Since the Centre remains obsessed with maintaining complete control over the military, it is not likely to accept any development that hints at this tight control giving way – at least not under its current mindset.
Second, cold start would require a change in New Delhi’s mindset as far as war objectives go. The issue here is that of losing its own territory to the enemy. Indian views highlight that Indian leadership’s principal concern in all previous wars has been to not lose its own territory to the enemy (this is of course disputed by the Pakistani strategic enclave). Looking at cold start from this prism provides another reason to doubt if the leadership would be amenable to such a doctrine. In a military conflict where disparity between the two sides is not overwhelming, mobile warfare can result in rapid changes in territorial control.
For India, cold start would blur the division between its strike corps and defensive formations. What have traditionally been defensive formations could now be used for offensive operations. In addition to the frequent change in positions, in such operations, directions of attack change frequently as well, and can result in loss of territory even for the military set to achieve its objective on the whole.
Given the capabilities of Pakistan and India, and presuming that Pakistan alters its war-fighting formations to meet the cold start challenge, a conventional war could very well result in a loss of limited territory for India. This would in no way be acceptable to any Indian government, given the massive political fallout from such a development.
Finally, and most important, is the leadership’s unwillingness to accept the possibility of a nuclear retaliation from Pakistan. Contrary to what the Indian strategists seem to believe, cold start would necessitate that India flirt with Pakistan’s nuclear threshold. There are two aspects to it. First, if Indian forces carry out deep long-range strikes to inflict harm on Pakistani reserves in order to negate it an opportunity to retaliate strategically, a nuclear retaliation would become a realistic possibility.
Second, and less talked about is the fact that even a limited Indian operation cannot guarantee that Pakistan will not consider the nuclear option, or at least threaten to do so. The Indians have argued that Pakistan has proved through Kargil that a limited conflict is possible without tampering with the nuclear red lines. However, while that is so for Pakistan, it does not hold for India. This stems from the fact that Pakistan’s involvement in Kargil or attacks in Kashmir remain a question mark. Pakistan’s denial of any active role absolves it of direct involvement, making Kashmiri struggle groups and Pakistan (the state) two independent targets. This warrants an Indian attack against the struggle groups and not Pakistan (the state). As an Indian strike under cold start would be officially sanctioned and acknowledged, Pakistan’s retaliation against India (the state) would be warranted. Granted, a single or even two or three surgical strikes are not likely to bring unconventional retaliation. But it is almost certain to prompt Pakistan to issue nuclear threats in order to bring international pressure to bear on New Delhi, deterring it from conducting repeat strikes.
The point is that cold start, whether limited in its execution or otherwise, will end up inducing a nuclear dimension to the conflict. No political leadership would be willing to face such a situation, especially if it is almost certain to develop as part of an offensive strategy.
If Indian military’s strength could be brought in line with what cold start envisions, the concept could potentially enhance Indian military’s operational effectiveness. Yet, political impediments are unlikely to allow operationalisation of the concept in its present form. And it is just as well, given that this Pakistan-specific doctrine would upset the balance of power between the two neighbours.
Moeed Yusuf is a Consultant on Economic Policy at the Sustainable Development Policy Institute in Islamabad
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