A scathing article if ever there was one. A real keeper.Originally posted by Sridhar:
Good column by GP.
http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2004/02/26/stories/2004022600060800.htm
What GP is saying is:
"Look at these jokers. Hacckk thooo.."
Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 20 Feb 2004
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 20 Feb 2004
What GP is saying is:
"Look at these jokers. Hacckk thooo.."
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 20 Feb 2004
Calvin,
I think your are on the right track about the AXK proliferation hungama. What is known is that he and the TSP proliferated the centrifuge technology and weapons designs that were acquired or got gratis. The important thing is even if the Western European countries provided the wherewithal to put together a weapons program its not enough for one still needs the weapon design. Besides they were second tier non weapon states though still bound by NPT treaty obligations. The fact that NSG was setup latter does not matter for the treay went into effect in 1968.
The key/core of the TSP proliferation is the Chinese weapon design from a NWS first tier NPT state. This is being covered up. Even if the arguement is that China proliferated the design to Pakistan in late 70s, that is much before they acceded to the NPT in 1992, the recent traansfers have happened much after the accession. China does bear some treaty obligations to ensure further proliferation by its proliferees does not occur. Another matter is the GP bland statement that the weapons tested at Chagai are of more advanced design. If so what is the pedigree of the Chagai tests for it would be a clear violation of Article II of NPT and the CTBT that China so ceremoniously signed.
Its crucial to collate what designs did TSP proliferate and what was tested at Chagai in order to see how the four letter treaties dear to the non prolif crowd were observed by the treaty adherents.
The GOI silence on the proliferation implications will only blow back on them for the non-prolif mullahs will use the equal equal brush to tar and feather India. GP's article is just a fatuous 'hack- thoo'.
So in summary could you post the links and texts on what designs TSP transferred to Libya and any others? We should put this GP article text too for it states that Chagai ones were different.
I think your are on the right track about the AXK proliferation hungama. What is known is that he and the TSP proliferated the centrifuge technology and weapons designs that were acquired or got gratis. The important thing is even if the Western European countries provided the wherewithal to put together a weapons program its not enough for one still needs the weapon design. Besides they were second tier non weapon states though still bound by NPT treaty obligations. The fact that NSG was setup latter does not matter for the treay went into effect in 1968.
The key/core of the TSP proliferation is the Chinese weapon design from a NWS first tier NPT state. This is being covered up. Even if the arguement is that China proliferated the design to Pakistan in late 70s, that is much before they acceded to the NPT in 1992, the recent traansfers have happened much after the accession. China does bear some treaty obligations to ensure further proliferation by its proliferees does not occur. Another matter is the GP bland statement that the weapons tested at Chagai are of more advanced design. If so what is the pedigree of the Chagai tests for it would be a clear violation of Article II of NPT and the CTBT that China so ceremoniously signed.
Its crucial to collate what designs did TSP proliferate and what was tested at Chagai in order to see how the four letter treaties dear to the non prolif crowd were observed by the treaty adherents.
The GOI silence on the proliferation implications will only blow back on them for the non-prolif mullahs will use the equal equal brush to tar and feather India. GP's article is just a fatuous 'hack- thoo'.
So in summary could you post the links and texts on what designs TSP transferred to Libya and any others? We should put this GP article text too for it states that Chagai ones were different.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 20 Feb 2004
So foggy bottom still claims this was the work of one individual...
The nuclear network - Khanfessions of a proliferator
The nuclear network - Khanfessions of a proliferator
From Janes. Admins: I think this goes away after a while so i am posting the free part.By Andrew Koch, JDW Bureau Chief,
Washington, DC
How the secret nuclear deals of a national hero from Pakistan shook the world.
When Pakistan opened its first international arms exhibition in the port city of Karachi, something was amiss. It was November 2000 and there, among defence industry stalls offering tanks, missiles and rifles, was the booth of A Q Khan Research Laboratories (KRL). The display contained a range of conventional military products, including defence electronics and anti-tank missiles. However, KRL is also a top nuclear weapons laboratory and its employees were distributing stacks of glossy brochures that promised technology for producing a nuclear bomb.
One of the brochures, a 10-page catalogue from KRL's Directorate of Vacuum Science and Technology, offered virtually all the components needed to establish a uranium-enrichment plant. The specialised centrifuge pumps, gauges, valves and other components each have civilian uses, but together provide the means to enrich the rare uranium-235 isotope to a particularly pure grade so that it can be used to fuel a nuclear weapon. If there was any doubt as to what was on offer, a second accompanying brochure under the heading of "nuclear-related products" listed "complete ultracentrifuge machines" and other components needed to build a uranium-enrichment plant.
JDW readily obtained the brochures on the spot and inquired whether all of the listed items were available for sale. Several KRL officials provided positive assurances that all had government approval for export.
The suppliers of that technology, international investigators would later learn, were part of a clandestine network of scientists, manufacturers and middlemen spread across four continents and with Abdul Qadeer Khan - KRL's founder - at its head. They operated a blackmarket of atomic expertise so extensive that it was dubbed a 'Nuclear Walmart' by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Mohammed El Baradei.
Khan "served as director of the network, its leading scientific mind, as well as its primary salesman", US President George Bush said on 11 February. Bush named Buhary Seyed Abu Tahir of Dubai as Khan's deputy and "both the network's chief financial officer and money launderer". According to a Malaysian police report, Tahir has admitted his involvement but claims "it was a loose network without a rigid hierarchy or a head and a deputy".
At its zenith, Vienna-based diplomats and the police report said, the organisation was a wide-ranging network of suppliers and middlemen providing uranium-enrichment components, blueprints and expertise to Libya, Iran and North Korea.
It was Libya that proved the network's ultimate downfall. Following a decision by Libyan leader Col Moammar Ghadaffi to give up the country's weapons of mass destruction, the Libyans provided inspectors with intimate details of their programmes, a diplomatic source said.
Using information provided by Iran, Libya and later an internal investigation by the Pakistani government, officials have started to unravel the network. They said it started in 1976 after Khan fled the European enrichment consortium, Urenco, where he had been working. According to Dutch court documents, he stole Urenco blueprints for the G-1 and G-2 centrifuges, which with modifications became the P-1 and P-2. Just as important, he used his experience and wide contact base from working at the company to build up the network of suppliers.
Khan first used this network to provide the components he would need to establish Pakistan's uranium-enrichment programme at KRL's facility in Kahuta. US sources say they believe Khan initially ordered more centrifuge parts from those suppliers than Pakistan needed, selling the excess to Iran. Then, as Pakistan's own programme progressed and switched from the P-1 to the more sophisticated P-2, Khan sold off the older Pakistani equipment to Iran and then Libya.
Khan has also admitted to helping North Korea develop an enrichment plant, providing design information, equipment for centrifuges, as well as uranium hexafluoride gas, say Pakistani sources. The sources claim that assistance continued from 1997 until about 2000. Even more worrisome, US intelligence officials note, they believe Khan shared with Pyongyang designs and details on how to make a working HEU-based nuclear warhead that could be carried atop North Korea's No Dong missiles. </font>
The largest questions remain about how much successive Pakistani governments knew of Khan's affairs and when they knew it. Following their own investigation, Pakistani officials claim the transfers started in the 1980s and ended by 2001. President Musharraf claims the official Pakistani position is that "no government or military official has been found involved in the activity of proliferation".
Pakistani officials claim they did not suspect Khan until at least 2000 and even then had no hard evidence. Part of the problem, Pakistani officials said, was the difficulty of questioning a national hero like Khan who had enjoyed virtual autonomy in running the Islamabad's nuclear programme for over two decades.
Pakistani military officials now privately admit that Khan's extravagant lifestyle should have led to suspicions that he was conducting secret sales of nuclear expertise. Although a special unit of Pakistani intelligence was responsible for ensuring that nuclear technology did not leak out from KRL, true oversight was sorely lacking.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 20 Feb 2004
From this article Andrew Koch acquired a AXK/KRL brochure advertising its wares in Novemebr 2000.
What did Milton say in Paradise Lost "They also are guilty who are silent in a moral crisis"
As a loyal citizen of the US what did he do? Did he contact the State Dept. Bureau of Non-Proliferation or did he hoard the brochure and drool over it?When Pakistan opened its first international arms exhibition in the port city of Karachi, something was amiss. It was November 2000 and there, among defence industry stalls offering tanks, missiles and rifles, was the booth of A Q Khan Research Laboratories (KRL). The display contained a range of conventional military products, including defence electronics and anti-tank missiles. However, KRL is also a top nuclear weapons laboratory and its employees were distributing stacks of glossy brochures that promised technology for producing a nuclear bomb.
One of the brochures, a 10-page catalogue from KRL's Directorate of Vacuum Science and Technology, offered virtually all the components needed to establish a uranium-enrichment plant. The specialised centrifuge pumps, gauges, valves and other components each have civilian uses, but together provide the means to enrich the rare uranium-235 isotope to a particularly pure grade so that it can be used to fuel a nuclear weapon. If there was any doubt as to what was on offer, a second accompanying brochure under the heading of "nuclear-related products" listed "complete ultracentrifuge machines" and other components needed to build a uranium-enrichment plant.
JDW readily obtained the brochures on the spot and inquired whether all of the listed items were available for sale. Several KRL officials provided positive assurances that all had government approval for export.
What did Milton say in Paradise Lost "They also are guilty who are silent in a moral crisis"
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 20 Feb 2004
Compare the chinese signing treaties as Hitler's Reich once did...
All the countries Hitler signed peace treaties with got unceremoniously invaded. Infact Hitler is said to have remarked "These Riech peace treaties are just preludes to our expansion". Infact Hitler's insistence on keeping his word went so far that he attacked Stalin's Russia since they signed a peace treaty. Stalin felt betrayed and initially lost huge amounts of ground before the Russian winters/ Antonov a/c and their tank busting missiles brought the german advance to a halt.
China's oh so santimonious treaty signing are simply that... veils to cover their expansionist/destablizing intents. The NPT, Panchsheel... etc etc are part of the deception.
All the countries Hitler signed peace treaties with got unceremoniously invaded. Infact Hitler is said to have remarked "These Riech peace treaties are just preludes to our expansion". Infact Hitler's insistence on keeping his word went so far that he attacked Stalin's Russia since they signed a peace treaty. Stalin felt betrayed and initially lost huge amounts of ground before the Russian winters/ Antonov a/c and their tank busting missiles brought the german advance to a halt.
China's oh so santimonious treaty signing are simply that... veils to cover their expansionist/destablizing intents. The NPT, Panchsheel... etc etc are part of the deception.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 20 Feb 2004
The nuclear saga: two major concerns
Moeed Yusuf
From the TFT...
It is in our best interest to focus on the future handling of the proliferation question
Pakistan’s recently discovered role in nuclear proliferation and the ongoing nuclear probe has captured global headlines in the past month. Contrary to official statements from Pakistani authorities, this issue is far from over. We might be past the worst, but serious thought still needs to be given to determine the best course to address what ought to be our two principal concerns: i) regaining our credibility and ii) securing our nuclear assets.
To satisfy these concerns, it is in our best interest to focus on the future handling of the proliferation question. A probe into the past is only likely to provide added opportunity for the international media to exploit the situation. In this regard, it is rather disheartening to note the emphasis being laid by various quarters within Pakistan on exploring the history of this ugly chapter. The aim of all concerned must be to contribute to the situation as it best serves national interest. And lest we quibble on what ‘national interest’ is, in this particular case it is defined by the security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. Clearly, a transparent inquiry into the past is not the answer.
The most obvious line of argument against my contention would be similar to that forwarded by Dr Ayesha Siddiqa in her column “The culture of accountability and dialogue” in TFT (Feb 13-19). For without dwelling in the past, it would be impossible to answer questions that she poses: “why it (financial and general mismanagement in KRL) could not be traced even though it always had a Member Finance on its panel”, “why was it that the mechanism for voicing these concerns (financial embezzlements at KRL) was not there?” “why was it that no system was put in place to audit these (KRL sales and procurement) accounts”? Dr Siddiqa has implicitly treated KRL as any other government organisation. What needs to be kept in mind here is that Pakistan’s nuclear development and thus KRL’s management cannot be compared to any other organisation or programme.
A transparent audit and record of the workings is impossible in any covert operation, let alone in an operation for which the country is willing to pay an unlimited price. Given that the circumstances surrounding Pakistan’s nuclear programme were undoubtedly the most adverse any major covert operation has had to face in recent times, a lack of audit and checks and balances were necessary for the programme to develop successfully. It would have been virtually impossible for the Pakistani programme to survive had such secrecy not been maintained. While Dr Siddiqa is certainly correct in pointing out the lack of accountability in public institutions, the nuclear programme must be exempt from this observation. A probe into KRL’s past would indeed unearth countless flaws in the system of checks and balances. However, these will not in any way be representative of a trend across the board and will be of little utility if one is to apply lessons from this case to other institutions.
What is of paramount importance for the country is to ensure that <u> such an episode is not repeated in the future. </u>
<a href="http://www.uic.com.au/graphics/nfc1-3.gif">click for image</a>
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 20 Feb 2004
Just For Lurking Pakis !!!
Nuclear Fuel Cycles
http://www.isis-online.org/publications/fmct/primer/Section_III.html
Nuclear Fuel Cycles
http://www.isis-online.org/publications/fmct/primer/Section_III.html
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 20 Feb 2004
From TFT.
Home truths
Our mole reports that the real PM was in a tres nasty mood with the Father of our Bum until that fateful meeting in which FOB spilled the beans about who all had been on the take. We hear he named one of PM’s predecessors and quoted a figure of US $ 3 million in cold cash, in return for looking the other way on the North Korea deal. Our mole says it was these home truths about the real PM’s predecessors that got FOB off the hook. Accountability, anyone?
Home truths
Our mole reports that the real PM was in a tres nasty mood with the Father of our Bum until that fateful meeting in which FOB spilled the beans about who all had been on the take. We hear he named one of PM’s predecessors and quoted a figure of US $ 3 million in cold cash, in return for looking the other way on the North Korea deal. Our mole says it was these home truths about the real PM’s predecessors that got FOB off the hook. Accountability, anyone?
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 20 Feb 2004
US should punish TSP for nuke proliferation, says N.P.Jihadi Joseph Cirincione in an NPR program.
Link to site with audio
Link to site with audio
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 20 Feb 2004
'Chinese companies helping Pak missile programme'
T V Parasuram in Washington | February 26, 2004 08:41 IST
A senior United States naval official has said that Chinese companies continue to provide assistance to Pakistan for its nuclear and missile programme.
Deposing before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Vice Admiral Lowell E Jacoby, US Navy Director, Defence Intelligence Agency, said, "Islamabad has recently developed the capability to produce plutonium for potential weapons use."
"Chinese companies remain involved with nuclear and missile programmes in Pakistan and Iran," he added.
The 'most disturbing' example of the trend towards 'secondary proliferation', i.e. proliferation by countries, which previously imported weapons or weapons technology and begin indigenous production and export of those systems, is the linkage of North Korean, Libyan and Iranian enrichment programmes to Pakistani technology.
"India and Pakistan," said Admiral Jacoby, "have well developed nuclear infrastructures and small stockpiles of (nuclear) weapons. Weapons stockpiles in India and Pakistan are expected to grow."
Admiral Jacoby included the western provinces in Pakistan, along with portions of Southern Philippines, Indonesian Islands, Chechnya, rural areas in Myanmar, several areas in Africa and areas in South America, among the 'ungoverned spaces', which include densely populated cities where terrorists can congregate and prepare for operations with relative impunity.
http://in.rediff.com/news/2004/feb/26us.htm
T V Parasuram in Washington | February 26, 2004 08:41 IST
A senior United States naval official has said that Chinese companies continue to provide assistance to Pakistan for its nuclear and missile programme.
Deposing before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Vice Admiral Lowell E Jacoby, US Navy Director, Defence Intelligence Agency, said, "Islamabad has recently developed the capability to produce plutonium for potential weapons use."
"Chinese companies remain involved with nuclear and missile programmes in Pakistan and Iran," he added.
The 'most disturbing' example of the trend towards 'secondary proliferation', i.e. proliferation by countries, which previously imported weapons or weapons technology and begin indigenous production and export of those systems, is the linkage of North Korean, Libyan and Iranian enrichment programmes to Pakistani technology.
"India and Pakistan," said Admiral Jacoby, "have well developed nuclear infrastructures and small stockpiles of (nuclear) weapons. Weapons stockpiles in India and Pakistan are expected to grow."
Admiral Jacoby included the western provinces in Pakistan, along with portions of Southern Philippines, Indonesian Islands, Chechnya, rural areas in Myanmar, several areas in Africa and areas in South America, among the 'ungoverned spaces', which include densely populated cities where terrorists can congregate and prepare for operations with relative impunity.
http://in.rediff.com/news/2004/feb/26us.htm
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 20 Feb 2004
Ramana:
I am completely confused by all these revelations.
The historians in the group will recall that the initial "cold tests" were conducted at the Kirana Hills near Sargodha on Mar 11, 1983. This was a PAEC operation. Mubarakmand and Ishfaq Ahmed were the key people. This test was not successful, but the key is that it was a test of the implosion of the device.
http://www.defencejournal.com/2000/june/chagai.htm
A second test was conducted, and witnessed by Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Lt. Gen. K. M. Arif and Munir Ahmed Khan.
http://www.defencejournal.com/2000/june/chagai.htm
KRL is reported to have conducted its own first test in March 1984 (i.e., a year later) and has conducted fewer "cold tests" than PAEC - suggesting that it was a back-up operation. His claim of nuclear capability was made in Feb 1984 (i.e., before conducting their first cold test).
http://www.defencejournal.com/2000/june/chagai.htm
In July 1984, NYT reported that China had supplied Pakistan with a CHIC-4 in 1983 (yield 25kT), supposedly a "low weight" (200kg) solid core bomb design along with HEU.
In March 1985, the Germans smuggled a complete UF6 manuf. plant to Pakistan. It is only 1986 that US intelligence concluded that Pak could make HEU.
(http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Pakista ... velop.html
The KRL commentary prior to the actual 98 tests is kind of interesting
It appears that AKK was making the case that hte PAEC device was a Chinese one, and that KRL was responsible for actually making HEU (see the 1985 German story), whereas, by implication the PAEC devices were not fueled by Pakistan's HEU effort (i.e., may have been Chinese gifts).
The 2/8 NYT report claims that the design that the Pakistanis gave the Libyans is supposed to be "an implosion type" device similar to what was exploded at Nagasaki. Now, the Nagasaki weapon was a Pu device. So, were the "implosion" designs a Pu based design? Interestingly, China had a Dec 1968 test of a Pu based device (likely implosion, since Pu is tough to build into a gun type). So it would be consistent to say that the Chinese design based on the 1960 tests that was transferred was an implosion type device and still imply it was Pu-based.
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/09/international/africa/09WEAP.html.
Kampani notes that the implosion device was a heavy one 500 kg and for air delivery.
http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/040223.htm
The GP article ( http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2004/02/26/stories/2004022600060800.htm ) referencing the October 1966 test is the much referenced CHIC-4. This was a 1200 lb device designed for the DF2 (CSS1 - Cryogenic - 700 mile range).
The quote above from AKK nots that KRL was also responsible for designing "their own bomb" - which might be the crude device that the NYT articles reference. IOW, the NYT may be referencing two different things - the implosion CHIC-4 (chinese designs) is one bomb, and then the one that AKK developed is another, and yet a third is the one that the CHinese gave PAEC.
The list of tests are noted below.
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/nuke/tests.htm
I am completely confused by all these revelations.
The historians in the group will recall that the initial "cold tests" were conducted at the Kirana Hills near Sargodha on Mar 11, 1983. This was a PAEC operation. Mubarakmand and Ishfaq Ahmed were the key people. This test was not successful, but the key is that it was a test of the implosion of the device.
http://www.defencejournal.com/2000/june/chagai.htm
A second test was conducted, and witnessed by Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Lt. Gen. K. M. Arif and Munir Ahmed Khan.
http://www.defencejournal.com/2000/june/chagai.htm
KRL is reported to have conducted its own first test in March 1984 (i.e., a year later) and has conducted fewer "cold tests" than PAEC - suggesting that it was a back-up operation. His claim of nuclear capability was made in Feb 1984 (i.e., before conducting their first cold test).
http://www.defencejournal.com/2000/june/chagai.htm
In July 1984, NYT reported that China had supplied Pakistan with a CHIC-4 in 1983 (yield 25kT), supposedly a "low weight" (200kg) solid core bomb design along with HEU.
In March 1985, the Germans smuggled a complete UF6 manuf. plant to Pakistan. It is only 1986 that US intelligence concluded that Pak could make HEU.
(http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Pakista ... velop.html
The KRL commentary prior to the actual 98 tests is kind of interesting
http://www.defencejournal.com/2000/june/chagai.htmDr. Khan reminded the DCC that it was KRL which first enriched uranium, converted it into metal, machined it into semi-spheres of metal and designed their own atomic bomb and carried out cold tests on their own. All this was achieved without any help from PAEC. He said that KRL was fully independent in the nuclear field. Dr. Khan went on to say that since it was KRL which first made inroads into the nuclear field for Pakistan, it should be given the honour of carrying out Pakistan’s first nuclear tests and it would feel let down if it wasn’t conferred the privilege of doing so.
It appears that AKK was making the case that hte PAEC device was a Chinese one, and that KRL was responsible for actually making HEU (see the 1985 German story), whereas, by implication the PAEC devices were not fueled by Pakistan's HEU effort (i.e., may have been Chinese gifts).
The 2/8 NYT report claims that the design that the Pakistanis gave the Libyans is supposed to be "an implosion type" device similar to what was exploded at Nagasaki. Now, the Nagasaki weapon was a Pu device. So, were the "implosion" designs a Pu based design? Interestingly, China had a Dec 1968 test of a Pu based device (likely implosion, since Pu is tough to build into a gun type). So it would be consistent to say that the Chinese design based on the 1960 tests that was transferred was an implosion type device and still imply it was Pu-based.
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/09/international/africa/09WEAP.html.
Kampani notes that the implosion device was a heavy one 500 kg and for air delivery.
http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/040223.htm
The GP article ( http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2004/02/26/stories/2004022600060800.htm ) referencing the October 1966 test is the much referenced CHIC-4. This was a 1200 lb device designed for the DF2 (CSS1 - Cryogenic - 700 mile range).
The quote above from AKK nots that KRL was also responsible for designing "their own bomb" - which might be the crude device that the NYT articles reference. IOW, the NYT may be referencing two different things - the implosion CHIC-4 (chinese designs) is one bomb, and then the one that AKK developed is another, and yet a third is the one that the CHinese gave PAEC.
The list of tests are noted below.
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/nuke/tests.htm
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 20 Feb 2004
Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC)
The head of the PAEC, Dr. I. J. Usmani, and Abdus Salam [who won the Nobel Prize in 1979], worked to establish Pakistan's first nuclear power reactor called Kannupp, near Karachi as well as with PINSTECH and SUPARCO.
I. H. Usmani, the chairman of the PAEC who had carefully and painstakingly built up Pakistan's nuclear power infrastructure over the previous decade, tried to dissuade Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Pakistan's newly elected prime minister, from embarking on a nuclear weapons program. Following the fateful Multan conference, Bhutto announced Usmani would head the newly created ministry of science and technology.
Usmani and Abdus Salam resigned in 1974 when Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto wanted to take the development of nuclear technology to, in his words, "its natural conclusion" i.e. the build up of nuclear weapons. Both Usmani and Salam disagreed with this policy.
On 20 January 1972, Bhutto appointed Munir Ahmad Khan head of the PAEC. Munir Ahmad Khan had joined the IAEA in 1958, where he served in the division of nuclear power and reactors until moving to the PAEC. A.Q. Khan initially worked under Munir Ahmad Khan's Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission for a short period. But the pair fell out, and a long and bitter rivalry followed. In July 1976, Bhutto gave A.Q. Khan autonomous control of the uranium enrichment project, reporting directly to the prime minister's office, which arrangement has continued since. Munir, who was criticized in some circles as being against Pakistan acquiring nuclear weapons, remained as head of the PAEC for 19 years until his retirement in 1991 [he died in April 1999].
The head of the PAEC, Dr. I. J. Usmani, and Abdus Salam [who won the Nobel Prize in 1979], worked to establish Pakistan's first nuclear power reactor called Kannupp, near Karachi as well as with PINSTECH and SUPARCO.
I. H. Usmani, the chairman of the PAEC who had carefully and painstakingly built up Pakistan's nuclear power infrastructure over the previous decade, tried to dissuade Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Pakistan's newly elected prime minister, from embarking on a nuclear weapons program. Following the fateful Multan conference, Bhutto announced Usmani would head the newly created ministry of science and technology.
Usmani and Abdus Salam resigned in 1974 when Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto wanted to take the development of nuclear technology to, in his words, "its natural conclusion" i.e. the build up of nuclear weapons. Both Usmani and Salam disagreed with this policy.
On 20 January 1972, Bhutto appointed Munir Ahmad Khan head of the PAEC. Munir Ahmad Khan had joined the IAEA in 1958, where he served in the division of nuclear power and reactors until moving to the PAEC. A.Q. Khan initially worked under Munir Ahmad Khan's Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission for a short period. But the pair fell out, and a long and bitter rivalry followed. In July 1976, Bhutto gave A.Q. Khan autonomous control of the uranium enrichment project, reporting directly to the prime minister's office, which arrangement has continued since. Munir, who was criticized in some circles as being against Pakistan acquiring nuclear weapons, remained as head of the PAEC for 19 years until his retirement in 1991 [he died in April 1999].
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 20 Feb 2004
Ah so! Calvin thanks for the summary. What was the CHIC -4 design? It was a HEU implosion design not Pu. needs much less HEU than the gun type. So it was a big advance when it came out. The NYT reference to Nagasaki is to the technique not the asli maal.
I am going to print these refs that you posted and whiteboard the facts to get a Venn Diagram. Lets try to find the common facts and then analyze the non conformant ones.
I think the AXK model is that they got from China in late 70s in exchange for centrifuge technology. The 1984/85 data from the West is to exert pressure on GOI so can be discounted. When this AXK model didnt work on May 16th, 1998, China gave them new ones which worked on MAy 28th. The May 30 one was a Pu. modelRemember Gohar Ayub's face on CNN.
I am going to print these refs that you posted and whiteboard the facts to get a Venn Diagram. Lets try to find the common facts and then analyze the non conformant ones.
I think the AXK model is that they got from China in late 70s in exchange for centrifuge technology. The 1984/85 data from the West is to exert pressure on GOI so can be discounted. When this AXK model didnt work on May 16th, 1998, China gave them new ones which worked on MAy 28th. The May 30 one was a Pu. modelRemember Gohar Ayub's face on CNN.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 20 Feb 2004
What do you mean Ramana garu?Remember Gohar Ayub's face on CNN
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 20 Feb 2004
The new Chinese designs probably explain the "Pakistan has moved on to more "advanced" designs" comments from the NYT in the Libyan/CHIC-4 test.
Regarding the C-6
http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/asiapcf/9805/30/pakistan.test.one/
<img src="http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/asiapcf/9805/3 ... b.khan.jpg" alt="" />
5/16 GAK - Not of question of "if" but "when"
http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/asiapcf/9805/16/pakistan.nuke.update/index.html
5/26 US says Pak Ready to test
http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/asiapcf/9805/26/pakistan.nuclear/index.html
5/26 Pak - GAK - Tests not imminent, US "guessing"
http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/asiapcf/9805/26/pakistan.nuke.two/
http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/asiapcf/9805/27/pakistan.nuclear/index.html
5/27 Pak claims India about to attack Pakistan
http://paknews.com/main4jun-1.html
http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/asiapcf/9805/27/pakistan.nuclear.pm/index.html
5/28 Pak claims 5 bombs tested
http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/asiapcf/9805/28/pakistan.nuclear.4/index.html
8/7 GAK removed as FM (placating Clinton?)
Regarding the C-6
http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/asiapcf/9805/30/pakistan.test.one/
<img src="http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/asiapcf/9805/3 ... b.khan.jpg" alt="" />
5/16 GAK - Not of question of "if" but "when"
http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/asiapcf/9805/16/pakistan.nuke.update/index.html
5/26 US says Pak Ready to test
http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/asiapcf/9805/26/pakistan.nuclear/index.html
5/26 Pak - GAK - Tests not imminent, US "guessing"
http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/asiapcf/9805/26/pakistan.nuke.two/
http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/asiapcf/9805/27/pakistan.nuclear/index.html
5/27 Pak claims India about to attack Pakistan
http://paknews.com/main4jun-1.html
http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/asiapcf/9805/27/pakistan.nuclear.pm/index.html
5/28 Pak claims 5 bombs tested
http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/asiapcf/9805/28/pakistan.nuclear.4/index.html
8/7 GAK removed as FM (placating Clinton?)
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 20 Feb 2004
Rangadu, On May 30th soon after the Ras Koh hills test, CNN interviewed Gobar. He was ecstatic about that test more than the earlier May 28th one. From the low yield I figured that May 30 was payload for the Hatf/ M11 etc which was more needed for operationalizing their stuff. The heavier model is probably a aircraft delivered model and hence could fall prey to IAF.
-------------
Also in light of the above 5/27 news story alleging India attacking them, please read the book "Pillars of Fire" from the public library for a good yarn.
-------------
Also in light of the above 5/27 news story alleging India attacking them, please read the book "Pillars of Fire" from the public library for a good yarn.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 20 Feb 2004
Thanks Ramana garu. Who wrote that book "Pillars of Fire"?
BTW, here's a good laugh.
Nuclear talks host China hopes to put past as arms proliferator behind it
BTW, here's a good laugh.
Nuclear talks host China hopes to put past as arms proliferator behind it
China, the host of this week's six-way talks on the North Korean nuclear crisis, may be wrestling with a problem partly of its own making, given its past as a major arms proliferator, according to analysts.
While few believe China has directly assisted North Korea's nuclear program, it may have contributed in an indirect manner via its previous sales of sensitive technology to Pakistan.
"It's pretty well accepted that there is a lot of Chinese technology in Pakistan," said Ralph Cossa, the Honolulu-based president of the Pacific Forum CSIS think tank and an expert on proliferation issues.
"It's also pretty well accepted that there has been a transfer of technology and equipment from Pakistan to North Korea," he said.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 20 Feb 2004
Steve Shagan "Pillars of Fire"
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 20 Feb 2004
Pakistan tested nukes for N. Korea in 1998!
US recon flights capture Plutonium vapors not Uranium that KRL produced!
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/27/international/asia/27NUKE.html
Pakistan May Have Aided North Korea A-Test
By DAVID E. SANGER and WILLIAM J. BROAD
Published: February 27, 2004
WASHINGTON, Feb. 26 — The revelations about the international nuclear trading of the Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan have rekindled a debate inside the American intelligence community over an unresolved but crucial strategic question from the last decade: did Pakistan conduct a secret nuclear weapons test in partnership with North Korea?
Startling clues were detected after underground tests that Pakistan carried out in May 1998, when it proved to the world that its own efforts to build nuclear weapons had succeeded. According to former and current American intelligence officials, an American military jet sent to sample the air after the final test in the wastelands of the Baluchistan desert picked up traces of plutonium.
That surprised experts at the Los Alamos national laboratory, because Pakistan said openly that all of its bombs were fueled by highly enriched uranium, produced at Dr. Khan's laboratories.
Among the possible explanations hotly debated after the tests was that North Korea — perhaps in return for the help from Dr. Khan — might have given Pakistan some of its precious supply of plutonium to conduct a joint test of an atomic weapon.
The debate over the 1998 tests was never settled and fell into obscurity, until Dr. Khan confessed last month that he had spread nuclear skills and equipment to North Korea, as well as Libya and Iran, over more than a decade.
Now the old argument has been reignited in the United States' national laboratories, and it gained new urgency in light of multilateral talks this week in Beijing to persuade North Korea to halt and dismantle its nuclear weapons programs. If experts confirm that the 1998 tests involved both Pakistan and North Korea, it would strongly suggest that North Korea can not only produce plutonium but build a weapon, the "nuclear deterrent force" it claimed to possess before the talks.
The Central Intelligence Agency has been urgently preparing a report this week on what North Korea may have gained from Dr. Khan's nuclear dealings, American officials said, to supply new evidence to American negotiators in the Beijing talks.
The on-again-off-again history of the discussion about the Pakistani test contrasts notably with the Bush administration's handling of the intelligence on Iraq's possible nuclear efforts in advance of the war last year. Every clue suggesting that Saddam Hussein might be trying to revive his nuclear arms program was minutely reviewed by several agencies and the White House.
The debate about the 1998 tests has apparently not bubbled up to senior policy makers. In recent days, both President Bush's national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice, and Secretary of State Colin L. Powell said they had no recollection of theories of a joint test.
Pakistan's president, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, is a crucial ally in the administration's fight against terrorism, and American officials do not want to undermine his stability. So there is comparatively little curiosity in Washington about how Pakistan may have secretly helped to arm North Korea.
For years, Pakistan focused on making weapons out of highly enriched uranium, using centrifuge enrichment technology that Dr. Khan stole from Europe, improved in his laboratories and ultimately began to sell. The North Koreans, meanwhile, focused on plutonium, producing a few bombs' worth from the spent nuclear fuel it extracted from its small nuclear reactors making electrical energy. It takes far less plutonium to make a large nuclear explosion, so plutonium missile warheads are smaller and more powerful.
North Korea was forced under a 1994 accord with the United States to freeze its plutonium program. It secretly began purchasing Dr. Khan's uranium enrichment technology, according to both American officials and Dr. Khan's testimony. When caught by South Korea and the United States in 2002, North Korea expelled international inspectors, and now appears to be moving forward with both uranium and plutonium programs. The Bush administration says both must be dismantled if an accord is to be reached.
North Korea has never tested a weapon on its own territory, leading many to wonder whether it can make working bombs. That is why the mystery of the last Pakistani test, on May 30, 1998, is tantalizing.
Of several tests Pakistan conducted then, the last one differed from those that preceded it in other ways besides the plutonium traces it produced. It was 60 miles away from the first test site. The shaft leading to the bomb was dug vertically rather than horizontally, experts said, a lower cost method. The detonation was also smaller. Pakistani officials said they had used a "miniaturized" device, but gave no other details. By all accounts, Dr. Khan was closely involved with that final test.
The next day, asked by a reporter about rumors that Pakistan had once tested a weapon in China, Dr. Khan snapped, "No country allows another country to explode a weapon."
But at the Los Alamos laboratory, some experts believed that might have been exactly what happened. Pakistan, most analysts believed, had insufficient material and experience to make a plutonium bomb.
"It could only have come from one of two places: China or North Korea," said one senior intelligence official involved in the debate. "And it seemed like China had nothing to gain," he said, from providing plutonium to Pakistan.
In a clash between old rivals, the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory raised questions, claiming Los Alamos had erred, experts familiar with the dispute said. The problem was inadvertent contamination of the sample by American researchers, Livermore experts said. Eventually, a consensus emerged that the plutonium did come from Pakistan.
A compromise hypothesis, experts said, was that Pakistan had exploded a uranium bomb with a plutonium experiment on the side.
Robert J. Einhorn, a nuclear intelligence official in the State Department at the time, noted that Pakistan and North Korea had common interests. "The Pakistanis had already purchased long-range missiles from North Korea," he recalled.
But he said it was "speculation" that North Korea supplied plutonium for the test. "It's conceivable that Pakistani testing was providing data that was benefit to the North Koreans, but hard evidence doesn't exist on it," he said.
A senior defense official in the Clinton administration agreed. "We thought the most plausible explanation was that it was a joint test," he said. "But there was nothing that formed compelling evidence."
Eventually the debate faded, until Dr. Khan's admissions. A retired Pakistani military officer said this week North Korean technicians worked at Dr. Khan's lab in 1998. But he said the collaboration was on missiles, and he never suspected Dr. Khan of nuclear proliferation.
Today, skeptics ask why North Korea would have wanted to test a bomb in Pakistan in 1998 when it was thought to have only a limited supply of plutonium. "It doesn't seem logical," a federal nuclear analyst said. Another said some evidence suggested the plutonium was older than the North Korean program.
However, a third analyst urged new analyses. American agents could gather material from the top of the Pakistani test shaft to settle the question of whether it really vented plutonium, he suggested.
Meanwhile, Pakistan has made progress on a plutonium program parallel to uranium, and it "recently developed the capability to produce plutonium for potential weapons use," Vice Adm. Lowell E. Jacoby, the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, said in Senate testimony earlier this week.
David E. Sanger reported from Washington for this article and William J. Broad from New York. David Rohde contributed reporting from Islamabad, Pakistan.
US recon flights capture Plutonium vapors not Uranium that KRL produced!
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/27/international/asia/27NUKE.html
Pakistan May Have Aided North Korea A-Test
By DAVID E. SANGER and WILLIAM J. BROAD
Published: February 27, 2004
WASHINGTON, Feb. 26 — The revelations about the international nuclear trading of the Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan have rekindled a debate inside the American intelligence community over an unresolved but crucial strategic question from the last decade: did Pakistan conduct a secret nuclear weapons test in partnership with North Korea?
Startling clues were detected after underground tests that Pakistan carried out in May 1998, when it proved to the world that its own efforts to build nuclear weapons had succeeded. According to former and current American intelligence officials, an American military jet sent to sample the air after the final test in the wastelands of the Baluchistan desert picked up traces of plutonium.
That surprised experts at the Los Alamos national laboratory, because Pakistan said openly that all of its bombs were fueled by highly enriched uranium, produced at Dr. Khan's laboratories.
Among the possible explanations hotly debated after the tests was that North Korea — perhaps in return for the help from Dr. Khan — might have given Pakistan some of its precious supply of plutonium to conduct a joint test of an atomic weapon.
The debate over the 1998 tests was never settled and fell into obscurity, until Dr. Khan confessed last month that he had spread nuclear skills and equipment to North Korea, as well as Libya and Iran, over more than a decade.
Now the old argument has been reignited in the United States' national laboratories, and it gained new urgency in light of multilateral talks this week in Beijing to persuade North Korea to halt and dismantle its nuclear weapons programs. If experts confirm that the 1998 tests involved both Pakistan and North Korea, it would strongly suggest that North Korea can not only produce plutonium but build a weapon, the "nuclear deterrent force" it claimed to possess before the talks.
The Central Intelligence Agency has been urgently preparing a report this week on what North Korea may have gained from Dr. Khan's nuclear dealings, American officials said, to supply new evidence to American negotiators in the Beijing talks.
The on-again-off-again history of the discussion about the Pakistani test contrasts notably with the Bush administration's handling of the intelligence on Iraq's possible nuclear efforts in advance of the war last year. Every clue suggesting that Saddam Hussein might be trying to revive his nuclear arms program was minutely reviewed by several agencies and the White House.
The debate about the 1998 tests has apparently not bubbled up to senior policy makers. In recent days, both President Bush's national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice, and Secretary of State Colin L. Powell said they had no recollection of theories of a joint test.
Pakistan's president, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, is a crucial ally in the administration's fight against terrorism, and American officials do not want to undermine his stability. So there is comparatively little curiosity in Washington about how Pakistan may have secretly helped to arm North Korea.
For years, Pakistan focused on making weapons out of highly enriched uranium, using centrifuge enrichment technology that Dr. Khan stole from Europe, improved in his laboratories and ultimately began to sell. The North Koreans, meanwhile, focused on plutonium, producing a few bombs' worth from the spent nuclear fuel it extracted from its small nuclear reactors making electrical energy. It takes far less plutonium to make a large nuclear explosion, so plutonium missile warheads are smaller and more powerful.
North Korea was forced under a 1994 accord with the United States to freeze its plutonium program. It secretly began purchasing Dr. Khan's uranium enrichment technology, according to both American officials and Dr. Khan's testimony. When caught by South Korea and the United States in 2002, North Korea expelled international inspectors, and now appears to be moving forward with both uranium and plutonium programs. The Bush administration says both must be dismantled if an accord is to be reached.
North Korea has never tested a weapon on its own territory, leading many to wonder whether it can make working bombs. That is why the mystery of the last Pakistani test, on May 30, 1998, is tantalizing.
Of several tests Pakistan conducted then, the last one differed from those that preceded it in other ways besides the plutonium traces it produced. It was 60 miles away from the first test site. The shaft leading to the bomb was dug vertically rather than horizontally, experts said, a lower cost method. The detonation was also smaller. Pakistani officials said they had used a "miniaturized" device, but gave no other details. By all accounts, Dr. Khan was closely involved with that final test.
The next day, asked by a reporter about rumors that Pakistan had once tested a weapon in China, Dr. Khan snapped, "No country allows another country to explode a weapon."
But at the Los Alamos laboratory, some experts believed that might have been exactly what happened. Pakistan, most analysts believed, had insufficient material and experience to make a plutonium bomb.
"It could only have come from one of two places: China or North Korea," said one senior intelligence official involved in the debate. "And it seemed like China had nothing to gain," he said, from providing plutonium to Pakistan.
In a clash between old rivals, the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory raised questions, claiming Los Alamos had erred, experts familiar with the dispute said. The problem was inadvertent contamination of the sample by American researchers, Livermore experts said. Eventually, a consensus emerged that the plutonium did come from Pakistan.
A compromise hypothesis, experts said, was that Pakistan had exploded a uranium bomb with a plutonium experiment on the side.
Robert J. Einhorn, a nuclear intelligence official in the State Department at the time, noted that Pakistan and North Korea had common interests. "The Pakistanis had already purchased long-range missiles from North Korea," he recalled.
But he said it was "speculation" that North Korea supplied plutonium for the test. "It's conceivable that Pakistani testing was providing data that was benefit to the North Koreans, but hard evidence doesn't exist on it," he said.
A senior defense official in the Clinton administration agreed. "We thought the most plausible explanation was that it was a joint test," he said. "But there was nothing that formed compelling evidence."
Eventually the debate faded, until Dr. Khan's admissions. A retired Pakistani military officer said this week North Korean technicians worked at Dr. Khan's lab in 1998. But he said the collaboration was on missiles, and he never suspected Dr. Khan of nuclear proliferation.
Today, skeptics ask why North Korea would have wanted to test a bomb in Pakistan in 1998 when it was thought to have only a limited supply of plutonium. "It doesn't seem logical," a federal nuclear analyst said. Another said some evidence suggested the plutonium was older than the North Korean program.
However, a third analyst urged new analyses. American agents could gather material from the top of the Pakistani test shaft to settle the question of whether it really vented plutonium, he suggested.
Meanwhile, Pakistan has made progress on a plutonium program parallel to uranium, and it "recently developed the capability to produce plutonium for potential weapons use," Vice Adm. Lowell E. Jacoby, the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, said in Senate testimony earlier this week.
David E. Sanger reported from Washington for this article and William J. Broad from New York. David Rohde contributed reporting from Islamabad, Pakistan.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 20 Feb 2004
jargun all the text please.
BRF was the first one to say that TSP tested somebody else nuke on May 30th. Too bad all our archives got trashed.
I remember Tim was surprized and even George Perkovich was claiming it was Pu from Pokhran had drifted. This is scoop of first order. Wait for them to admit that NK never had a good enough PU program in the first place.
BTW these same experts had said that the Pu sample was lost in Los Alamos labs! So now they found it?
BRF was the first one to say that TSP tested somebody else nuke on May 30th. Too bad all our archives got trashed.
I remember Tim was surprized and even George Perkovich was claiming it was Pu from Pokhran had drifted. This is scoop of first order. Wait for them to admit that NK never had a good enough PU program in the first place.
BTW these same experts had said that the Pu sample was lost in Los Alamos labs! So now they found it?
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 20 Feb 2004
All the leaks are calculated leaks to put the suspicion over to some other country.
THis looks like a big ala-carte of nations testing and passing among themselves so that they have a credible deterrent.
NK and TSP are actually testing tech from the dragon for validation so that the end user in the ME get satisfied.
The dragon is doing work for uncle.
Pakistan May Have Aided North Korea A-Test
By DAVID E. SANGER and WILLIAM J. BROAD
Published: February 27, 2004
ASHINGTON, Feb. 26 — The revelations about the international nuclear trading of the Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan have rekindled a debate inside the American intelligence community over an unresolved but crucial strategic question from the last decade: did Pakistan conduct a secret nuclear weapons test in partnership with North Korea?
Startling clues were detected after underground tests that Pakistan carried out in May 1998, when it proved to the world that its own efforts to build nuclear weapons had succeeded. According to former and current American intelligence officials, an American military jet sent to sample the air after the final test in the wastelands of the Baluchistan desert picked up traces of plutonium.
That surprised experts at the Los Alamos national laboratory, because Pakistan said openly that all of its bombs were fueled by highly enriched uranium, produced at Dr. Khan's laboratories.
Among the possible explanations hotly debated after the tests was that North Korea — perhaps in return for the help from Dr. Khan — might have given Pakistan some of its precious supply of plutonium to conduct a joint test of an atomic weapon.
The debate over the 1998 tests was never settled and fell into obscurity, until Dr. Khan confessed last month that he had spread nuclear skills and equipment to North Korea, as well as Libya and Iran, over more than a decade.
Now the old argument has been reignited in the United States' national laboratories, and it gained new urgency in light of multilateral talks this week in Beijing to persuade North Korea to halt and dismantle its nuclear weapons programs. If experts confirm that the 1998 tests involved both Pakistan and North Korea, it would strongly suggest that North Korea can not only produce plutonium but build a weapon, the "nuclear deterrent force" it claimed to possess before the talks.
The Central Intelligence Agency has been urgently preparing a report this week on what North Korea may have gained from Dr. Khan's nuclear dealings, American officials said, to supply new evidence to American negotiators in the Beijing talks.
The on-again-off-again history of the discussion about the Pakistani test contrasts notably with the Bush administration's handling of the intelligence on Iraq's possible nuclear efforts in advance of the war last year. Every clue suggesting that Saddam Hussein might be trying to revive his nuclear arms program was minutely reviewed by several agencies and the White House.
The debate about the 1998 tests has apparently not bubbled up to senior policy makers. In recent days, both President Bush's national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice, and Secretary of State Colin L. Powell said they had no recollection of theories of a joint test.
Pakistan's president, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, is a crucial ally in the administration's fight against terrorism, and American officials do not want to undermine his stability. So there is comparatively little curiosity in Washington about how Pakistan may have secretly helped to arm North Korea.
For years, Pakistan focused on making weapons out of highly enriched uranium, using centrifuge enrichment technology that Dr. Khan stole from Europe, improved in his laboratories and ultimately began to sell. The North Koreans, meanwhile, focused on plutonium, producing a few bombs' worth from the spent nuclear fuel it extracted from its small nuclear reactors making electrical energy. It takes far less plutonium to make a large nuclear explosion, so plutonium missile warheads are smaller and more powerful.
North Korea was forced under a 1994 accord with the United States to freeze its plutonium program. It secretly began purchasing Dr. Khan's uranium enrichment technology, according to both American officials and Dr. Khan's testimony. When caught by South Korea and the United States in 2002, North Korea expelled international inspectors, and now appears to be moving forward with both uranium and plutonium programs. The Bush administration says both must be dismantled if an accord is to be reached.
Pakistan May Have Aided North Korea A-Test
Published: February 27, 2004
(Page 2 of 2)
North Korea has never tested a weapon on its own territory, leading many to wonder whether it can make working bombs. That is why the mystery of the last Pakistani test, on May 30, 1998, is tantalizing.
Of several tests Pakistan conducted then, the last one differed from those that preceded it in other ways besides the plutonium traces it produced. It was 60 miles away from the first test site. The shaft leading to the bomb was dug vertically rather than horizontally, experts said, a lower cost method. The detonation was also smaller. Pakistani officials said they had used a "miniaturized" device, but gave no other details. By all accounts, Dr. Khan was closely involved with that final test.
The next day, asked by a reporter about rumors that Pakistan had once tested a weapon in China, Dr. Khan snapped, "No country allows another country to explode a weapon."
But at the Los Alamos laboratory, some experts believed that might have been exactly what happened. Pakistan, most analysts believed, had insufficient material and experience to make a plutonium bomb.
"It could only have come from one of two places: China or North Korea," said one senior intelligence official involved in the debate. "And it seemed like China had nothing to gain," he said, from providing plutonium to Pakistan.
In a clash between old rivals, the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory raised questions, claiming Los Alamos had erred, experts familiar with the dispute said. The problem was inadvertent contamination of the sample by American researchers, Livermore experts said. Eventually, a consensus emerged that the plutonium did come from Pakistan.
A compromise hypothesis, experts said, was that Pakistan had exploded a uranium bomb with a plutonium experiment on the side.
Robert J. Einhorn, a nuclear intelligence official in the State Department at the time, noted that Pakistan and North Korea had common interests. "The Pakistanis had already purchased long-range missiles from North Korea," he recalled.
But he said it was "speculation" that North Korea supplied plutonium for the test. "It's conceivable that Pakistani testing was providing data that was benefit to the North Koreans, but hard evidence doesn't exist on it," he said.
A senior defense official in the Clinton administration agreed. "We thought the most plausible explanation was that it was a joint test," he said. "But there was nothing that formed compelling evidence."
Eventually the debate faded, until Dr. Khan's admissions. A retired Pakistani military officer said this week North Korean technicians worked at Dr. Khan's lab in 1998. But he said the collaboration was on missiles, and he never suspected Dr. Khan of nuclear proliferation.
Today, skeptics ask why North Korea would have wanted to test a bomb in Pakistan in 1998 when it was thought to have only a limited supply of plutonium. "It doesn't seem logical," a federal nuclear analyst said. Another said some evidence suggested the plutonium was older than the North Korean program.
However, a third analyst urged new analyses. American agents could gather material from the top of the Pakistani test shaft to settle the question of whether it really vented plutonium, he suggested.
Meanwhile, Pakistan has made progress on a plutonium program parallel to uranium, and it "recently developed the capability to produce plutonium for potential weapons use," Vice Adm. Lowell E. Jacoby, the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, said in Senate testimony earlier this week.
David E. Sanger reported from Washington for this article and William J. Broad from New York. David Rohde contributed reporting from Islamabad, Pakistan.
THis looks like a big ala-carte of nations testing and passing among themselves so that they have a credible deterrent.
NK and TSP are actually testing tech from the dragon for validation so that the end user in the ME get satisfied.
The dragon is doing work for uncle.
Pakistan May Have Aided North Korea A-Test
By DAVID E. SANGER and WILLIAM J. BROAD
Published: February 27, 2004
ASHINGTON, Feb. 26 — The revelations about the international nuclear trading of the Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan have rekindled a debate inside the American intelligence community over an unresolved but crucial strategic question from the last decade: did Pakistan conduct a secret nuclear weapons test in partnership with North Korea?
Startling clues were detected after underground tests that Pakistan carried out in May 1998, when it proved to the world that its own efforts to build nuclear weapons had succeeded. According to former and current American intelligence officials, an American military jet sent to sample the air after the final test in the wastelands of the Baluchistan desert picked up traces of plutonium.
That surprised experts at the Los Alamos national laboratory, because Pakistan said openly that all of its bombs were fueled by highly enriched uranium, produced at Dr. Khan's laboratories.
Among the possible explanations hotly debated after the tests was that North Korea — perhaps in return for the help from Dr. Khan — might have given Pakistan some of its precious supply of plutonium to conduct a joint test of an atomic weapon.
The debate over the 1998 tests was never settled and fell into obscurity, until Dr. Khan confessed last month that he had spread nuclear skills and equipment to North Korea, as well as Libya and Iran, over more than a decade.
Now the old argument has been reignited in the United States' national laboratories, and it gained new urgency in light of multilateral talks this week in Beijing to persuade North Korea to halt and dismantle its nuclear weapons programs. If experts confirm that the 1998 tests involved both Pakistan and North Korea, it would strongly suggest that North Korea can not only produce plutonium but build a weapon, the "nuclear deterrent force" it claimed to possess before the talks.
The Central Intelligence Agency has been urgently preparing a report this week on what North Korea may have gained from Dr. Khan's nuclear dealings, American officials said, to supply new evidence to American negotiators in the Beijing talks.
The on-again-off-again history of the discussion about the Pakistani test contrasts notably with the Bush administration's handling of the intelligence on Iraq's possible nuclear efforts in advance of the war last year. Every clue suggesting that Saddam Hussein might be trying to revive his nuclear arms program was minutely reviewed by several agencies and the White House.
The debate about the 1998 tests has apparently not bubbled up to senior policy makers. In recent days, both President Bush's national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice, and Secretary of State Colin L. Powell said they had no recollection of theories of a joint test.
Pakistan's president, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, is a crucial ally in the administration's fight against terrorism, and American officials do not want to undermine his stability. So there is comparatively little curiosity in Washington about how Pakistan may have secretly helped to arm North Korea.
For years, Pakistan focused on making weapons out of highly enriched uranium, using centrifuge enrichment technology that Dr. Khan stole from Europe, improved in his laboratories and ultimately began to sell. The North Koreans, meanwhile, focused on plutonium, producing a few bombs' worth from the spent nuclear fuel it extracted from its small nuclear reactors making electrical energy. It takes far less plutonium to make a large nuclear explosion, so plutonium missile warheads are smaller and more powerful.
North Korea was forced under a 1994 accord with the United States to freeze its plutonium program. It secretly began purchasing Dr. Khan's uranium enrichment technology, according to both American officials and Dr. Khan's testimony. When caught by South Korea and the United States in 2002, North Korea expelled international inspectors, and now appears to be moving forward with both uranium and plutonium programs. The Bush administration says both must be dismantled if an accord is to be reached.
Pakistan May Have Aided North Korea A-Test
Published: February 27, 2004
(Page 2 of 2)
North Korea has never tested a weapon on its own territory, leading many to wonder whether it can make working bombs. That is why the mystery of the last Pakistani test, on May 30, 1998, is tantalizing.
Of several tests Pakistan conducted then, the last one differed from those that preceded it in other ways besides the plutonium traces it produced. It was 60 miles away from the first test site. The shaft leading to the bomb was dug vertically rather than horizontally, experts said, a lower cost method. The detonation was also smaller. Pakistani officials said they had used a "miniaturized" device, but gave no other details. By all accounts, Dr. Khan was closely involved with that final test.
The next day, asked by a reporter about rumors that Pakistan had once tested a weapon in China, Dr. Khan snapped, "No country allows another country to explode a weapon."
But at the Los Alamos laboratory, some experts believed that might have been exactly what happened. Pakistan, most analysts believed, had insufficient material and experience to make a plutonium bomb.
"It could only have come from one of two places: China or North Korea," said one senior intelligence official involved in the debate. "And it seemed like China had nothing to gain," he said, from providing plutonium to Pakistan.
In a clash between old rivals, the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory raised questions, claiming Los Alamos had erred, experts familiar with the dispute said. The problem was inadvertent contamination of the sample by American researchers, Livermore experts said. Eventually, a consensus emerged that the plutonium did come from Pakistan.
A compromise hypothesis, experts said, was that Pakistan had exploded a uranium bomb with a plutonium experiment on the side.
Robert J. Einhorn, a nuclear intelligence official in the State Department at the time, noted that Pakistan and North Korea had common interests. "The Pakistanis had already purchased long-range missiles from North Korea," he recalled.
But he said it was "speculation" that North Korea supplied plutonium for the test. "It's conceivable that Pakistani testing was providing data that was benefit to the North Koreans, but hard evidence doesn't exist on it," he said.
A senior defense official in the Clinton administration agreed. "We thought the most plausible explanation was that it was a joint test," he said. "But there was nothing that formed compelling evidence."
Eventually the debate faded, until Dr. Khan's admissions. A retired Pakistani military officer said this week North Korean technicians worked at Dr. Khan's lab in 1998. But he said the collaboration was on missiles, and he never suspected Dr. Khan of nuclear proliferation.
Today, skeptics ask why North Korea would have wanted to test a bomb in Pakistan in 1998 when it was thought to have only a limited supply of plutonium. "It doesn't seem logical," a federal nuclear analyst said. Another said some evidence suggested the plutonium was older than the North Korean program.
However, a third analyst urged new analyses. American agents could gather material from the top of the Pakistani test shaft to settle the question of whether it really vented plutonium, he suggested.
Meanwhile, Pakistan has made progress on a plutonium program parallel to uranium, and it "recently developed the capability to produce plutonium for potential weapons use," Vice Adm. Lowell E. Jacoby, the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, said in Senate testimony earlier this week.
David E. Sanger reported from Washington for this article and William J. Broad from New York. David Rohde contributed reporting from Islamabad, Pakistan.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 20 Feb 2004
Jasjit Singh on AXK....
Atomic Agent
-----------------------
Atomic Agent
JASJIT SINGH
THE city of Bhopal has been home to many illustrious Pakistanis. Former foreign secretary Shaharyar Khan is one; Abdul Qadeer Khan, eulogised as the ‘‘father’’ of Pakistan’s nuclear bomb, another. Qadeer, we now know, not only fathered a clandestine programme to make the Pakistani bomb, but also grandfathered a massive proliferation of nuclear bomb-making knowhow. And a black market to help third world Muslim nations acquire their own ‘‘Islamic’’ bombs.
He’s come a long way from his birth to a school-teacher father in Bhopal on April 1, 1936, Qadeer moved to Pakistan only in 1952, after his school education. College wasn’t exactly a breeze. He seems to have taken nearly eight years to get his BSc in 1960. This was possibly because he was also working during this period, variously as a trainee with Siemens in Karachi, as a government inspector of weights and measures between 1959-61.
The stint with Siemens may have been responsible for Qadeer moving to Germany to study. That was the take-off point. Qadeer’s professional education was entirely in western Europe. By 1972 he had reached the level of senior metallurgist/deputy manager at FDO Engineering Consultants in Holland.
Qadeer left the company in 1975, taking with him designs to make bomb material. He landed in Pakistan, all set to boost the nuclear weapons programme started by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto shortly after the 1971 war.
At a personal level, Qadeer claims to be the ‘‘kindest man in Pakistan’’ and keeps a small menagerie of pets. Most mornings he was to be seen taking a handful of peanuts to Margala Hills, not far from his expansive bungalow in Islamabad, to feed monkeys. Colleagues remember him as an ‘‘egomaniacal lightweight’’ given to exaggerating his expertise.
This attribute became evident in January 1987. Speaking to Indian journalist Kuldip Nayar — and stung by his interviewer’s assertion that Pakistani scientists were not capable of making the bomb — Qadeer angrily retorted they had already done so!
Yet, despite widespread assumptions he did little to discourage, Qadeer was never in charge of the actual nuclear weapons development. He did work at the Pakistan Atomic Energy Corporation (PAEC) for a few months in 1976, and was considered a ‘‘showman’’ by its head, Munir Ahmad Khan. But weapon development and eventual testing were carried out by PAEC.
This is why Samar Mubarakmand was in charge of the May 1998 tests at Chagai; and on the first anniversary of those tests admitted Pakistan had tested a nuclear device in the spring of 1983, a test generally believed to have been carried out at China’s Lop Nor site.
But it was Qadeer who made the claim in 1984 that Pakistan had achieved nuclear weapons capability. The army-led establishment of Pakistan was content with the duality, since it provided some sort of cover for clandestine operations.
Qadeer was well suited for a role to project the nuclear programme as an Islamic bomb. Bhutto may have used the term initially, but it is often ignored that General Zia ul-Haq, who brought extensive Islamisation into Pakistan’s society and governance, said in 1986, ‘‘It is our right to obtain nuclear technology. And when we acquire this technology, the Islamic world shall possess it with us.’’
So acquisition and proliferation ran together, the latter if not the former overseen by Abdul Qadeer Khan. He was well rewarded for it — becoming a popular figure in his country, so much so that it won him a presidential pardon this past week, and enough money to, among other things, build himself a hotel in Timbuktu.
Given recent days, he could certainly do with some rest and recuperation. Perhaps a lifetime of it.
Atomic Agent
-----------------------
Atomic Agent
JASJIT SINGH
THE city of Bhopal has been home to many illustrious Pakistanis. Former foreign secretary Shaharyar Khan is one; Abdul Qadeer Khan, eulogised as the ‘‘father’’ of Pakistan’s nuclear bomb, another. Qadeer, we now know, not only fathered a clandestine programme to make the Pakistani bomb, but also grandfathered a massive proliferation of nuclear bomb-making knowhow. And a black market to help third world Muslim nations acquire their own ‘‘Islamic’’ bombs.
He’s come a long way from his birth to a school-teacher father in Bhopal on April 1, 1936, Qadeer moved to Pakistan only in 1952, after his school education. College wasn’t exactly a breeze. He seems to have taken nearly eight years to get his BSc in 1960. This was possibly because he was also working during this period, variously as a trainee with Siemens in Karachi, as a government inspector of weights and measures between 1959-61.
The stint with Siemens may have been responsible for Qadeer moving to Germany to study. That was the take-off point. Qadeer’s professional education was entirely in western Europe. By 1972 he had reached the level of senior metallurgist/deputy manager at FDO Engineering Consultants in Holland.
Qadeer left the company in 1975, taking with him designs to make bomb material. He landed in Pakistan, all set to boost the nuclear weapons programme started by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto shortly after the 1971 war.
At a personal level, Qadeer claims to be the ‘‘kindest man in Pakistan’’ and keeps a small menagerie of pets. Most mornings he was to be seen taking a handful of peanuts to Margala Hills, not far from his expansive bungalow in Islamabad, to feed monkeys. Colleagues remember him as an ‘‘egomaniacal lightweight’’ given to exaggerating his expertise.
This attribute became evident in January 1987. Speaking to Indian journalist Kuldip Nayar — and stung by his interviewer’s assertion that Pakistani scientists were not capable of making the bomb — Qadeer angrily retorted they had already done so!
Yet, despite widespread assumptions he did little to discourage, Qadeer was never in charge of the actual nuclear weapons development. He did work at the Pakistan Atomic Energy Corporation (PAEC) for a few months in 1976, and was considered a ‘‘showman’’ by its head, Munir Ahmad Khan. But weapon development and eventual testing were carried out by PAEC.
This is why Samar Mubarakmand was in charge of the May 1998 tests at Chagai; and on the first anniversary of those tests admitted Pakistan had tested a nuclear device in the spring of 1983, a test generally believed to have been carried out at China’s Lop Nor site.
But it was Qadeer who made the claim in 1984 that Pakistan had achieved nuclear weapons capability. The army-led establishment of Pakistan was content with the duality, since it provided some sort of cover for clandestine operations.
Qadeer was well suited for a role to project the nuclear programme as an Islamic bomb. Bhutto may have used the term initially, but it is often ignored that General Zia ul-Haq, who brought extensive Islamisation into Pakistan’s society and governance, said in 1986, ‘‘It is our right to obtain nuclear technology. And when we acquire this technology, the Islamic world shall possess it with us.’’
So acquisition and proliferation ran together, the latter if not the former overseen by Abdul Qadeer Khan. He was well rewarded for it — becoming a popular figure in his country, so much so that it won him a presidential pardon this past week, and enough money to, among other things, build himself a hotel in Timbuktu.
Given recent days, he could certainly do with some rest and recuperation. Perhaps a lifetime of it.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 20 Feb 2004
Some interesting new info on the Pak Pu sample picked by a U2.Originally posted by jarugn:
Pakistan tested nukes for N. Korea in 1998!
US recon flights capture Plutonium vapors not Uranium that KRL produced!
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/27/international/asia/27NUKE.html
The sample was picked up after the second test - 60 miles away. This tst was NOT picked up on any seismograms. The seismographic record of the first test of Pakland was shown mathematically to be half that of India's test - which was 46-52 Kt - the Pak test was about 22-25 Kt. (all the documentation and math work for this is on BR - please refer before asking Q)
The Pu test was picked up after the second undetected test. The korean bomb may have failed to go off.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 20 Feb 2004
what if AXK is the front man to take the rap? what if he was never the brains behind anything? what if he did a 'bill gates' and was just good at marketing, whilst the real genii were over at PAEC? what if the real proliferators are still getting away with it scott free and AXK is just doing the down time risk for his deal?
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 20 Feb 2004
From the NYT piece, Pakistan May Have Aided North Korea A-Test:
Having moved from a postion that the PU originated from a source outside the Pakistani nuclear test (inadvertent contamination of the PU sample in the US / PU vented by the earlier Indian test) do not wimp out by saying that it is North Korean PU. Try China.
Hint. China’s plutonium programme is older than that of North Korea or Pakistan.
Come on Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos et al.Another said some evidence suggested the plutonium was older than the North Korean program.
Having moved from a postion that the PU originated from a source outside the Pakistani nuclear test (inadvertent contamination of the PU sample in the US / PU vented by the earlier Indian test) do not wimp out by saying that it is North Korean PU. Try China.
Hint. China’s plutonium programme is older than that of North Korea or Pakistan.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 20 Feb 2004
Seems as though the Pakistan / North Korea connection is the flavour of the day.
From the Jakarta Post, by a senior fellow at the NDU. Nothing earth shaking though nor any mention of a North Korean Chagai test :
Fallout of Pakistani revelations on North Korea weapons trade.
Further some rumblings of discontent in the US Senate budget committee about Pakistan articulated to Sec. Powell :
Senators criticize pardon for Pakistan nuclear scientist.
From the Jakarta Post, by a senior fellow at the NDU. Nothing earth shaking though nor any mention of a North Korean Chagai test :
Fallout of Pakistani revelations on North Korea weapons trade.
Further some rumblings of discontent in the US Senate budget committee about Pakistan articulated to Sec. Powell :
Senators criticize pardon for Pakistan nuclear scientist.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 20 Feb 2004
Hello folks
WHile travelling from Varanasi to Delhi in sahara airlines, I read a very interresting article in the inflight nes paper Sahara Times titled
The other proliferator. It is about half a page of Newspaper by some unkown author who neatly summarised the role played by PRC and the winking of uncle.
We at BRF (as ramana garu pointed) have in 1998 itself figured out all this natak by Uncle and PRC.
If I had the power I would publicly cane the naked bottoms of all the Non nuclear Jihadis who advice/ masquarade infront of congressional committees doling out all BS.
Day after day the Janus faced South Asian experts are being exposed in this sordid drama.
Shame shame puppy shame all the monkeys know you name NP Jihadis.
(ramana garu I am still to get hold of a copy of what you wanted, I tried in Allahabad aka Prayag nad in Hyderabad so far no luck If Jagan garu can direct me to the place where I can get them I would more than happy to bring them to Ann Arbor and get them to you.)
As soon as I reach AA i will type out the Sahara Times article folks.
Till then
WHile travelling from Varanasi to Delhi in sahara airlines, I read a very interresting article in the inflight nes paper Sahara Times titled
The other proliferator. It is about half a page of Newspaper by some unkown author who neatly summarised the role played by PRC and the winking of uncle.
We at BRF (as ramana garu pointed) have in 1998 itself figured out all this natak by Uncle and PRC.
If I had the power I would publicly cane the naked bottoms of all the Non nuclear Jihadis who advice/ masquarade infront of congressional committees doling out all BS.
Day after day the Janus faced South Asian experts are being exposed in this sordid drama.
Shame shame puppy shame all the monkeys know you name NP Jihadis.
(ramana garu I am still to get hold of a copy of what you wanted, I tried in Allahabad aka Prayag nad in Hyderabad so far no luck If Jagan garu can direct me to the place where I can get them I would more than happy to bring them to Ann Arbor and get them to you.)
As soon as I reach AA i will type out the Sahara Times article folks.
Till then
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 20 Feb 2004
The other shoe will also fall one day soon. That is how Los Alamos, and AWE(Atomic weapons establishment, UK) conspire to keep serious articles that reveal the truth out of the public domain, their sordidity will be revealed in full, right now they are almost naked. Now all these revelations are proving right what was computed out a long time ago by people on this forum on yields of POK-2, Chagai etc. I am having the last laugh. Ab Douglas tu kya karega?.....
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 20 Feb 2004
Copyright infringement?
http://in.rediff.com/news/2004/feb/27rajeev.htm
India conveniently presents itself as a punching bag. Do not be surprised if India becomes the new 'rogue state', especially if non-proliferation ayatollah John Kerry makes further progress.
http://in.rediff.com/news/2004/feb/27rajeev.htm
India conveniently presents itself as a punching bag. Do not be surprised if India becomes the new 'rogue state', especially if non-proliferation ayatollah John Kerry makes further progress.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 20 Feb 2004
Few months ago a North Korean guy (dont remember his name) actually claimed that Pakistan tested North Korean nukes and NK has several dozen nukes. Nobody paid him any attention.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 20 Feb 2004
Two more pieces of data that I think haven't been mentioned yet. I believe the May 30 test was detected by seismograph - I've seen estimates of 3-6 kiloton yield, although the Pakistanis claimed more. So there's data somewhere.
The second bit is that Owen Bennett Jones (among other sources) notes some confusion among Pakistani spokesmen about how many tests took place that second day. The initial announcement was two, I think - later adjusted to one. I'm in the wrong place to do reference work on this for the next few days, but someone else may recall these issues. There may even have been reports of an undetonated device still in the shaft at the the second site, but I can't dredge up the details from my battered memory at the moment.
The second bit is that Owen Bennett Jones (among other sources) notes some confusion among Pakistani spokesmen about how many tests took place that second day. The initial announcement was two, I think - later adjusted to one. I'm in the wrong place to do reference work on this for the next few days, but someone else may recall these issues. There may even have been reports of an undetonated device still in the shaft at the the second site, but I can't dredge up the details from my battered memory at the moment.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 20 Feb 2004
Here's the linkOriginally posted by SaiP:
Few months ago a North Korean guy (dont remember his name) actually claimed that Pakistan test North Korean nukes and NK has several dozen nukes. Nobody paid him any attention.
TONY JONES: They certainly haven't done any testing of those, sir, how can they have 100 without anybody knowing?
KIM MYONG-CHOL: That is a North Korean technique.
America CIA intelligence always failure, blunder.
Pakistan did testing for North Korea.
That was no problem.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 20 Feb 2004
That was Kim Myong Chol, the Dear Leaders eyes, ears, mouth and most importantly, *wallet*, in the Land of the Rising Sun.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 20 Feb 2004
Hi,
I think the Pakistanis tested two devices, all this talk of six is a stretch - a product of Pakistani Punjabi cultural factors.
> Copy right infringement.
Nahi Nahi, he came up with it on his own.
I think the Pakistanis tested two devices, all this talk of six is a stretch - a product of Pakistani Punjabi cultural factors.
> Copy right infringement.
Nahi Nahi, he came up with it on his own.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 20 Feb 2004
Tim I would like to see a lot more public proof of this before believing it.Originally posted by Tim:
Two more pieces of data that I think haven't been mentioned yet. I believe the May 30 test was detected by seismograph - I've seen estimates of 3-6 kiloton yield, although the Pakistanis claimed more. So there's data somewhere.
Having been through what seismologists have been saying in detail after the 1998 tests it is clear to me that some of the foremost "experts" who publish papers and "give evidence" are liars, they fudge results, contradict themselves and do not know the math involved. These people are not scientists. They are the equivalent of the farts that we find presenting hundreds of papers at medical conferences.
As we can see from the way "non proliferation" has crumbled - it seems to me that a whole generation of "experts" have been talking bullsh1t and basically have no credibility at all.
-
Alok Niranjan
- BRFite -Trainee
- Posts: 48
- Joined: 30 Dec 2003 12:31
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 20 Feb 2004
I am curious about what "older" Pu means. Is there a relative isotope content that can be used to determine the age? I would imagine that one would need to know the original isotope content before any analysis of the residues would be meaningful.Originally posted by arun:
Come on Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos et al.
Having moved from a postion that the PU originated from a source outside the Pakistani nuclear test (inadvertent contamination of the PU sample in the US / PU vented by the earlier Indian test) do not wimp out by saying that it is North Korean PU. Try China.
Hint. China’s plutonium programme is older than that of North Korea or Pakistan.
Could someone please explain this?
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 20 Feb 2004
Shiv,
General agreement. It's like trying to do a jigsaw puzzle without the box (which would give you the picture you were attempting to assemble) or knowing whether you have all the pieces.
Sunil,
You may be right, although again there's a part of my brain that says the seismic data suggested several separate events (but not five on May 28th). Again, I don't have access to my library right now.
I guess the issue I'm trying to get at is that here is a case where Pakistani public officials glitched on an announcement - first it was two tests on the 30th, then it was one. Given the questions about the Pu venting, and the possibility that it might have been a joint test, I find that intriguing and worth poking around at a bit more. Different location, different type of shaft, different type of weapon, explicit talk of "miniaturization", confusion in the public announcements - there may be some meat on this bone.
The assumption by many US analysts has been that Pakistan traded HEU technology for missiles. I think that's possible, although I'm not completely satisfied with it. The revent revelations make me wonder if they didn't trade HEU for Pu, which means going back through a lot of press reports over the last five or six years and doing more data searching. I'll bet that's what is happening at the labs as well - which led to this latest article.
General agreement. It's like trying to do a jigsaw puzzle without the box (which would give you the picture you were attempting to assemble) or knowing whether you have all the pieces.
Sunil,
You may be right, although again there's a part of my brain that says the seismic data suggested several separate events (but not five on May 28th). Again, I don't have access to my library right now.
I guess the issue I'm trying to get at is that here is a case where Pakistani public officials glitched on an announcement - first it was two tests on the 30th, then it was one. Given the questions about the Pu venting, and the possibility that it might have been a joint test, I find that intriguing and worth poking around at a bit more. Different location, different type of shaft, different type of weapon, explicit talk of "miniaturization", confusion in the public announcements - there may be some meat on this bone.
The assumption by many US analysts has been that Pakistan traded HEU technology for missiles. I think that's possible, although I'm not completely satisfied with it. The revent revelations make me wonder if they didn't trade HEU for Pu, which means going back through a lot of press reports over the last five or six years and doing more data searching. I'll bet that's what is happening at the labs as well - which led to this latest article.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 20 Feb 2004
Shiv,
Below is the transcript of the NPR interview of N.P.Jihadi Joseph Cirincione that I posted above.
Very True.As we can see from the way "non proliferation" has crumbled - it seems to me that a whole generation of "experts" have been talking bullsh1t and basically have no credibility at all.
Below is the transcript of the NPR interview of N.P.Jihadi Joseph Cirincione that I posted above.
Mr. JOSEPH CIRINCIONE (Non-Proliferation Project): In the last year we've uncovered probably the most significant hemorrhaging of nuclear weapons technology since the Soviets penetrated the Manhattan Project. Pakistan had a multinational, sophisticated operation selling some of the most advanced nuclear weapons technology in the world. We are now claiming it as an intelligence coup, but not imposing penalties of any kind on Pakistan or any of the senior officials involved in this network.
EDWARDS: The United States went to war in Iraq in part because it feared that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction and might export them.
Mr. CIRINCIONE: We seem to be promoting a double standard in the world where we are cracking down on countries that imported nuclear technology, but we're not doing anything to the country that actually exported this material.
EDWARDS: So the United States has a bit of a credibility problem in this area.
Mr. CIRINCIONE: We do, and it's especially pronounced now. We have a situation where we've basically divided up the world into good guys and bad guys, and the bad guys are prohibited from having nuclear weapons, and the good guys are allowed to have nuclear weapons, even in some cases encouraged. It makes it difficult, one, for countries to get the right message. I mean, are nuclear weapons bad and you shouldn't have them, or are nuclear weapons OK if you're on our side, or if you're important enough to us? And second, it sends a message to our allies how serious is the United States about proliferation, or are there some other agendas operating here and proliferation is just an excuse for cracking down on countries we don't like.</font>
EDWARDS: Will the further uncovering of the network help or hinder the US image, or does it depend on how the United States uses the information?
Mr. CIRINCIONE: Well, rolling up the network is extremely important. The bad news is this was the most extensive network of its kind in history. The good news is we seem to be cracking down on it. But the way we do it is very important. We need Pakistan's full cooperation in this effort, and we don't appear to be getting it.
EDWARDS: So a black market still exists?
Mr. CIRINCIONE: By cracking down on the Pakistan market, even without punishing the individuals, we seem to have eliminated the main source of supply. It's not as if there's some nuclear shopping mall out there that anyone can just walk into. This was a very specific network set up by very specific individuals. We've shut it down for now, but we don't know if those in Pakistan might decide at some future date that it's safe to come out again, or whether the people that they set up in Malaysia, in Dubai might be spawning their own enterprises. It's still out there. It's still at least a latent network.
EDWARDS: Joseph Cirincione is director of the Non-Proliferation Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 20 Feb 2004
Sunil: The data out there supports what you write.
However there are two possibilities, 1+1, 10kt each, or one design #4(China), 20kt. All this talk of 6 is just rubbish. Next Pakistan claimed that it tested all these devices in a single shaft.This is stupid. How would they get the data needed to monitor each device, did they go off as per design etc. So the point is they had no need for all this information since they had been proofed by China, I am just repeating remarks made 4 years ago. Shiv, wait some more the day is not far all the Douglas's and Wallace's will say POK-2 was 60 kilotons, matter of time. Uske baad main aap ke saath coffee piyunga like on another memorable occassion, der hai andher nahi hai.
However there are two possibilities, 1+1, 10kt each, or one design #4(China), 20kt. All this talk of 6 is just rubbish. Next Pakistan claimed that it tested all these devices in a single shaft.This is stupid. How would they get the data needed to monitor each device, did they go off as per design etc. So the point is they had no need for all this information since they had been proofed by China, I am just repeating remarks made 4 years ago. Shiv, wait some more the day is not far all the Douglas's and Wallace's will say POK-2 was 60 kilotons, matter of time. Uske baad main aap ke saath coffee piyunga like on another memorable occassion, der hai andher nahi hai.