Kargil War Thread - IV
-
Raj Malhotra
- BRFite
- Posts: 997
- Joined: 26 Jun 2000 11:31
One of the less high lighted portion of Kargill conflict may be that we took back areas which were encroached upon by pak for many years. For instance as per IDR, the escaping helo theory has one more aspect. It stated that a Pak helo pad was bombed. Note - "helo pad".
Also we must remember Mush talk with Aziz about the IAF dropping some bombs on their side
Also there are some stories of IAF approaching some peaks by flying over PoK
Also if there was some talk of some Indian peaks still in Pak hands then there was similar talk of Indians dealing out the same medicine to Pak two fold
Also we must remember Mush talk with Aziz about the IAF dropping some bombs on their side
Also there are some stories of IAF approaching some peaks by flying over PoK
Also if there was some talk of some Indian peaks still in Pak hands then there was similar talk of Indians dealing out the same medicine to Pak two fold
Surya,
The fact is the prior to the invasion was discovered the Pakistani heptrs were very active, even in Indian side of the LoC, based on diaries of Lt Maaz Ullah (?), to what frequency we do not know. Certainly not the "odd helicopter"...Surya wrote:Ok so you are wrong
1. The odd PAF helo scurrying in and out - isnot an operationper se. And definitely not an support ops for troops etc.
I wanted to make a point about them being able to operate in the theatre since they did not have a difficult manpads threat to deal with. But accepted, thats not what my post's language suggests.2. The Pak helo - SSG action was inside PAK terrirtory. An SF unit was sent in on a raid and got daylighted. The SSG unit was dropped on a high point in Gultari. It was not inside Indian territory
I never suppported him.[/i]And karan simply piggy backed on your incorrect story.
Just for the record, that Mi-17 got shot because he, being the only chopper in the formation without flares, lagged too far behind, and thus lost the protection of, the guy ahead of him in the attack. A tactical, calculated risk that was taken in full knowledge of the consequences but, which, tragically, didnt work.Amitabh wrote:nbagga wrote:...... Recall what happened to a Mi-17 on 28 May 1999 in Kargil; the air force stopped its direct helicopter assaults thereafter.
Media reports from the time, suggest that IAF Mi-17s at large were not fitted with flares. If flare systems were fitted even in some airframes, why were the chopper attacks stopped completely? Were the missions too risky to continue?that Mi-17 got shot because he, being the only chopper in the formation without flares
From what I remember from a first hand report, Ved can correct me if I am wrong, the Mi-17's were flare equipped- just that this particular one had a malfunctioning system/ didnt have it. Hence, it was deployed as part of a formation where the other choppers were to cover it.
The withdrawal was partly because of the risks but also because of the PR angle imho. Losing another chopper would have given the pakis a propoganda victory.
The withdrawal was partly because of the risks but also because of the PR angle imho. Losing another chopper would have given the pakis a propoganda victory.
Hi Guys,
I'am midway through the book by Gen. Malik. Certain points that come to fore are:-
1. Total lack of clarity about the nature of intruders. Till 24th/25th May, there was no consensus on the identity of intruders. Couple of things led to this Passe:
a. Total intelligence failure about gauging Pak's intentions. Prior to conflict the Int fraternity had warned about increased jehadi activity in terms of new camps & trg across the Kargil sector in NA. They stuck to this point once the intruders were discovered. This led to the confusion.
b. Local commanders from Brigade commander upward till Army Commander were under the impression that the jehadi's were holding the heights and that this was a local affair. this directly lead to men being send up the hills to try and get them vacated, without any intelligence or proper planning.
It was only after the intercept of conversation between Gen Aziz & Musharraf, that the import of situation was understood.
2. The game of one-upmanship being played by the int agencies. The episode about the conversation intercept is quite revealing.
3. That we were totally foxed by the Pakis.
4. That no posts were vacated in the entire sector except one. But, interesting to note are the gaps in between positions held by us(in tens of Kms).
5. Once the IAF was involved, Pakis got a bit worrried. This was probably on account of them not expecting us to escalate.
6. The whole paki game plan was this:
a. Occupy the heights under the garp of jehadis to revive the militancy in J&K.
b. draw world's attention to J&K problem
c. Create a situation where the sanctity of LOC comes into question.
d. draw India to negotiating table from apoint of weakness.
e. take revenge for siachen
Will post additional material later.
1. Total lack of clarity about the nature of intruders. Till 24th/25th May, there was no consensus on the identity of intruders. Couple of things led to this Passe:
a. Total intelligence failure about gauging Pak's intentions. Prior to conflict the Int fraternity had warned about increased jehadi activity in terms of new camps & trg across the Kargil sector in NA. They stuck to this point once the intruders were discovered. This led to the confusion.
b. Local commanders from Brigade commander upward till Army Commander were under the impression that the jehadi's were holding the heights and that this was a local affair. this directly lead to men being send up the hills to try and get them vacated, without any intelligence or proper planning.
It was only after the intercept of conversation between Gen Aziz & Musharraf, that the import of situation was understood.
2. The game of one-upmanship being played by the int agencies. The episode about the conversation intercept is quite revealing.
3. That we were totally foxed by the Pakis.
4. That no posts were vacated in the entire sector except one. But, interesting to note are the gaps in between positions held by us(in tens of Kms).
5. Once the IAF was involved, Pakis got a bit worrried. This was probably on account of them not expecting us to escalate.
6. The whole paki game plan was this:
a. Occupy the heights under the garp of jehadis to revive the militancy in J&K.
b. draw world's attention to J&K problem
c. Create a situation where the sanctity of LOC comes into question.
d. draw India to negotiating table from apoint of weakness.
e. take revenge for siachen
Will post additional material later.
Got this on email today, old article but neat one
The TELEGRAPH. 6 Mar 2000
LINE OF LOST CONTROL
By
BRIJESH D. JAYAL
The eagerly awaited report of the Kargil Review Committee was finally
tabled in Parliament the other day with portions considered sensitive
duly deleted. The findings bring out grave deficiencies in India's
security management system and highlight that the security framework
formulated by Lord Ismay, recommended by Lord Mountbatten and
accepted by a national leadership unfamiliar with the intricacies of
national security management has remained largely unchanged for fifty
two years. This despite three wars, a growing nuclear threat, a
decade old proxy war in J&K and the ongoing revolution in military
affairs. The committee concludes that the political, bureaucratic,
military and intelligence establishments appear to have developed a
vested interest in the status quo.
The committee opted for exploring only what went wrong rather than
delving into both what went wrong and who was responsible. In their
view this was to enlist the willing cooperation of all concerned.
While there is merit in the argument, one can hardly ignore the fact
that the poor state of our security management is precisely because
authority and accountability do not go hand in hand. Never -the -less
the price of avoiding the principle of accountability in this
particular instance may be worth paying if the lessons that have
emerged are now acted upon by the Government in all sincerity.
Whether this happens is a moot point considering that the Henderson
Brookes report on the 1962 debacle still remains under wraps and the
Arun Singh Committee report on defence expenditure still gathers dust.
The committee has made recommendations that cover a wide spectrum
from security management and apex decision making down to media
relations. It has performed a difficult task with a great deal of
professionalism, finesse and tact. There are however some crucial
missing links.
The key issue was to determine reasons for failure of the security
system to detect Pakistani intrusions. While the report has dealt
extensively with failures of the intelligence system to anticipate
these events, there is silence on the failure of the airborne
tactical reconnaissance system to have located activities close to
the LOC or intrusions within Indian territory. The committee talks of
Winter Air Surveillance Operations (WASO), by helicopters and their
inability to locate intrusions. These are presumably routine Army
Aviation Corps helicopters carrying out visual border reccee. They
are not equipped with sensors to carry out day and night tactical
reccee because this is the designated task of the IAF for which it is
adequately equipped. This writer believes that regular integrated
Army-IAF operations for peacetime monitoring of the LOC would have
detected intrusions well in time not with standing preceding
intelligence failures.
A disturbing conclusion appears to be that of an inter- service turf
battle. It would appear that over the years the Army has been trying
to usurp part of the IAF's tactical reccee role, sometimes at great
cost to itself and national security. Why for example would the
Brigade Commander ask the Army Chief for RPVs which he knew will take
years to induct when he could have demanded routine IAF Tactical
reconnaissance sorties which would have materialized in hours or even
minutes? One has not seen any press reports indicating that the IAF
was not equipped or unwilling for the task! Indeed once the IAF was
committed to the operations considerable tactical reccee was
conducted by it. The committee's silence on this crucial issue is
intriguing.
A study of the summary of the report indicates little mention of the
Air Force apart from the fact that air power was only committed on 25
May after special clearance by CCS. One wonders whether this absence
is due to the fact that the committee believes the IAF had little
contribution to make in peace -time monitoring of the LOC and
consequently in pre- empting events of the nature that occurred.
Again, on the issue of whether Kargil was avoidable, the committee
feels that it would have been possible if a policy of Siachenisation
to plug unheld gaps along a 168 Km stretch had been adopted. It
concluded that such an option would have dissipated considerable
military effort and not been cost- effective. While there is some
merit in this conclusion, one wonders why a combination of selected
posts and intensive tactical reccee by the IAF was not considered a
viable option?
The foregoing discussions raise three vital issues, all of which must
form part of the overall security review proposed by the committee.
The first, that it is time for the services to rationalize roles and
missions to avoid duplication and wastage of scarce resources
specially as the IAF forever finds itself at the receiving end of the
other services trying to usurp some of its clearly designated roles.
Once these are formalized, inter service turf battles must cease. The
second, there is a need towards reorganization for effective
integrated operations in peace and war. This calls for some form of a
joint staff concept- perhaps on the lines proposed by the Arun Singh
Committee. The third and most crucial is the larger issue of air
power. There is a mindset in the Indian security establishment that
considers air power not as an inherent component of military power,
but use of which elevates the conflict to a higher level. This
mindset prevented use of the IAF in 1962 and delayed its use in
Kargil. The world over air power's deterrent value is well
recognized. It is possible that noticing the absence in peacetime of
the combat element of IAF in protecting the LOC, Pakistan General
Staff concluded that the IAF had no role and were tempted to risk
Kargil. When the IAF showed up, the Pakistan Army was clearly on the
defensive. One hopes that these aspects and their impact on the
larger issue of security management have found deliberation in the
classified portion of the report, although from the summary this
appears unlikely.
The committee's recommendation that a thorough review of the national
security system in its entirety be carried out by an independent body
of experts is very welcome. The Government while tabling the report
has accepted this recommendation. This is both welcome and ominous.
Welcome, because this is long overdue. Ominous, because this may be
used as a bureaucratic sleight of hand to defer or block progression
on some of the more urgent recommendations of the committee.
While actual conduct of military operations was outside the purview
of this committee, one hopes that the Chiefs of Staff Committee would
have conducted a joint internal review and drawn appropriate lessons.
These lessons would also need to be integrated within the proposed
review of the national security system. If such an in-service
introspection fails to take place then the spirit of this entire
exercise will have been in vain. The services more than any others
will then bear the brunt as they have done in the past.
One hopes that the committee's report will be deliberated in depth in
Parliament shorn of partisan politics and in the spirit of national
security. If after an exhaustive debate cutting across party lines
the Parliament and the Government resolve to take positive,
identifiable and time bound steps to over come the many weaknesses
afflicting national security management, the message to the armed
forces and the nation will be deeply reassuring.
The TELEGRAPH. 6 Mar 2000
LINE OF LOST CONTROL
By
BRIJESH D. JAYAL
The eagerly awaited report of the Kargil Review Committee was finally
tabled in Parliament the other day with portions considered sensitive
duly deleted. The findings bring out grave deficiencies in India's
security management system and highlight that the security framework
formulated by Lord Ismay, recommended by Lord Mountbatten and
accepted by a national leadership unfamiliar with the intricacies of
national security management has remained largely unchanged for fifty
two years. This despite three wars, a growing nuclear threat, a
decade old proxy war in J&K and the ongoing revolution in military
affairs. The committee concludes that the political, bureaucratic,
military and intelligence establishments appear to have developed a
vested interest in the status quo.
The committee opted for exploring only what went wrong rather than
delving into both what went wrong and who was responsible. In their
view this was to enlist the willing cooperation of all concerned.
While there is merit in the argument, one can hardly ignore the fact
that the poor state of our security management is precisely because
authority and accountability do not go hand in hand. Never -the -less
the price of avoiding the principle of accountability in this
particular instance may be worth paying if the lessons that have
emerged are now acted upon by the Government in all sincerity.
Whether this happens is a moot point considering that the Henderson
Brookes report on the 1962 debacle still remains under wraps and the
Arun Singh Committee report on defence expenditure still gathers dust.
The committee has made recommendations that cover a wide spectrum
from security management and apex decision making down to media
relations. It has performed a difficult task with a great deal of
professionalism, finesse and tact. There are however some crucial
missing links.
The key issue was to determine reasons for failure of the security
system to detect Pakistani intrusions. While the report has dealt
extensively with failures of the intelligence system to anticipate
these events, there is silence on the failure of the airborne
tactical reconnaissance system to have located activities close to
the LOC or intrusions within Indian territory. The committee talks of
Winter Air Surveillance Operations (WASO), by helicopters and their
inability to locate intrusions. These are presumably routine Army
Aviation Corps helicopters carrying out visual border reccee. They
are not equipped with sensors to carry out day and night tactical
reccee because this is the designated task of the IAF for which it is
adequately equipped. This writer believes that regular integrated
Army-IAF operations for peacetime monitoring of the LOC would have
detected intrusions well in time not with standing preceding
intelligence failures.
A disturbing conclusion appears to be that of an inter- service turf
battle. It would appear that over the years the Army has been trying
to usurp part of the IAF's tactical reccee role, sometimes at great
cost to itself and national security. Why for example would the
Brigade Commander ask the Army Chief for RPVs which he knew will take
years to induct when he could have demanded routine IAF Tactical
reconnaissance sorties which would have materialized in hours or even
minutes? One has not seen any press reports indicating that the IAF
was not equipped or unwilling for the task! Indeed once the IAF was
committed to the operations considerable tactical reccee was
conducted by it. The committee's silence on this crucial issue is
intriguing.
A study of the summary of the report indicates little mention of the
Air Force apart from the fact that air power was only committed on 25
May after special clearance by CCS. One wonders whether this absence
is due to the fact that the committee believes the IAF had little
contribution to make in peace -time monitoring of the LOC and
consequently in pre- empting events of the nature that occurred.
Again, on the issue of whether Kargil was avoidable, the committee
feels that it would have been possible if a policy of Siachenisation
to plug unheld gaps along a 168 Km stretch had been adopted. It
concluded that such an option would have dissipated considerable
military effort and not been cost- effective. While there is some
merit in this conclusion, one wonders why a combination of selected
posts and intensive tactical reccee by the IAF was not considered a
viable option?
The foregoing discussions raise three vital issues, all of which must
form part of the overall security review proposed by the committee.
The first, that it is time for the services to rationalize roles and
missions to avoid duplication and wastage of scarce resources
specially as the IAF forever finds itself at the receiving end of the
other services trying to usurp some of its clearly designated roles.
Once these are formalized, inter service turf battles must cease. The
second, there is a need towards reorganization for effective
integrated operations in peace and war. This calls for some form of a
joint staff concept- perhaps on the lines proposed by the Arun Singh
Committee. The third and most crucial is the larger issue of air
power. There is a mindset in the Indian security establishment that
considers air power not as an inherent component of military power,
but use of which elevates the conflict to a higher level. This
mindset prevented use of the IAF in 1962 and delayed its use in
Kargil. The world over air power's deterrent value is well
recognized. It is possible that noticing the absence in peacetime of
the combat element of IAF in protecting the LOC, Pakistan General
Staff concluded that the IAF had no role and were tempted to risk
Kargil. When the IAF showed up, the Pakistan Army was clearly on the
defensive. One hopes that these aspects and their impact on the
larger issue of security management have found deliberation in the
classified portion of the report, although from the summary this
appears unlikely.
The committee's recommendation that a thorough review of the national
security system in its entirety be carried out by an independent body
of experts is very welcome. The Government while tabling the report
has accepted this recommendation. This is both welcome and ominous.
Welcome, because this is long overdue. Ominous, because this may be
used as a bureaucratic sleight of hand to defer or block progression
on some of the more urgent recommendations of the committee.
While actual conduct of military operations was outside the purview
of this committee, one hopes that the Chiefs of Staff Committee would
have conducted a joint internal review and drawn appropriate lessons.
These lessons would also need to be integrated within the proposed
review of the national security system. If such an in-service
introspection fails to take place then the spirit of this entire
exercise will have been in vain. The services more than any others
will then bear the brunt as they have done in the past.
One hopes that the committee's report will be deliberated in depth in
Parliament shorn of partisan politics and in the spirit of national
security. If after an exhaustive debate cutting across party lines
the Parliament and the Government resolve to take positive,
identifiable and time bound steps to over come the many weaknesses
afflicting national security management, the message to the armed
forces and the nation will be deeply reassuring.
The run-up to Kargil was not an intelligence failure but an assessment failure. The main reason is that there were no effective systematic assessment mechanisms in India. Every person in authority does his own assessment. I concluded this in the first BRM article and later in the KRC review article later.
BR Monitor links:
kargil Surprise how and Why?
KRC Report: A commentary
However in fairness India was victim of strategic deception at Kargil. The factors of surprise have been studied and written about. KRC report and amny books talk about the strategic surprise that was achieved at Kargil. KRC mandate was to look into what led to Kargil fiasco. It was not to delve into operational details. One might like it to have gone into that aspect but committees cannot deviate from their mandates.
The consistent evaluation of local intrusion/infiltration to capture heights is a result of group think in the IA and the intelligence agencies. This group think is due to mirroring- expecting the enemy to act like oneself. But is also based on extensive knowledge of the TSP. So TSP acted out of turn or there was a bigger game plan than what was gamed by Indians.
Now let us step back and think if all these people who are the best products of the Indian education system (I kid you not. They all passed the gruelling UPSC exam and the selection board and the number of years of service) were decieved by TSP acting out of the book. Is TSP that brilliant that it can acheive strategic surprise over the best minds of India?
BR Monitor links:
kargil Surprise how and Why?
KRC Report: A commentary
However in fairness India was victim of strategic deception at Kargil. The factors of surprise have been studied and written about. KRC report and amny books talk about the strategic surprise that was achieved at Kargil. KRC mandate was to look into what led to Kargil fiasco. It was not to delve into operational details. One might like it to have gone into that aspect but committees cannot deviate from their mandates.
The consistent evaluation of local intrusion/infiltration to capture heights is a result of group think in the IA and the intelligence agencies. This group think is due to mirroring- expecting the enemy to act like oneself. But is also based on extensive knowledge of the TSP. So TSP acted out of turn or there was a bigger game plan than what was gamed by Indians.
Now let us step back and think if all these people who are the best products of the Indian education system (I kid you not. They all passed the gruelling UPSC exam and the selection board and the number of years of service) were decieved by TSP acting out of the book. Is TSP that brilliant that it can acheive strategic surprise over the best minds of India?
Thats what I meant, actually.JCage wrote:..... just that this particular one had a malfunctioning system/ didnt have it. Hence, it was deployed as part of a formation where the other choppers were to cover it..
Last edited by Ved on 10 May 2006 08:15, edited 1 time in total.
-
Subramaniam
- BRFite -Trainee
- Posts: 12
- Joined: 27 Mar 2005 19:01
very important point-Fully agree.The run-up to Kargil was not an intelligence failure but an assessment failure. The main reason is that there were no effective systematic assessment mechanisms in India. Every person in authority does his own assessment. I concluded this in the first BRM article and later in the KRC review article later.
From the articleA Sharma wrote:Ghosts of Kargil
Idiotic question: Isn't this giving away a lot of information to the pakis? Aren't ways and methods of intel gathering being exposed?Even the military's own covert services made similar determination. In June 1998 the Kargil Brigade Intelligence Team (BIT) reported that ammunition supplies were being dumped and that terrorists had been seen in Skardu, Warcha and Marol awaiting infiltration through the Kargil sector. In August, the BIT and the Intelligence and Field Security Unit reported the presence of terrorists preparing to cross the LoC. Pakistani artillery flowed in as winter approached, a reversal of the normal practice.
They know , we know and we know they know . Wht's point of intel if its not acted upon make some raids cross LoC and then we will see a new ball game till then its all gud.Idiotic question: Isn't this giving away a lot of information to the pakis? Aren't ways and methods of intel gathering being exposed?
Actually, the fact that we knew so much and still took no obvious, timely action must have them worried silly!!satya wrote:They know , we know and we know they know . Wht's point of intel if its not acted upon make some raids cross LoC and then we will see a new ball game till then its all gud.Idiotic question: Isn't this giving away a lot of information to the pakis? Aren't ways and methods of intel gathering being exposed?
http://www.outlookindia.com/full.asp?fo ... rgil&sid=2
May-22 2006 issue
Full interview after registration. Registration is Free (I think)
May-22 2006 issue
Full interview after registration. Registration is Free (I think)
Air Marshal Ashok Goel (retd) was the operations manager with the RAW’s Aviation Research Centre (ARC) before and during the Kargil war. At that time, he was an air vice marshal and a key participant in intelligence gathering operations. In an interview to Outlook, he speaks on the intelligence inputs given to army and political leadership. Excerpts:
What was the situation in the crucial months preceding the Kargil war?
In April ’98, the army and navy chiefs complained to the defence minister of not getting any intelligence from RAW. RAW chief Arvind Dave then called for a meeting, briefed all. We assured that their operational needs would be taken care of. After R.S. Bedi took over ARC, we cut down the transmission of intelligence data to service HQs from 10 days to 48 hours. Intelligence inputs were being given on a real-time basis.
What role did the ARC play before and during the war?
ARC acts when it gets a specific mission. Unfortunately, though General (V.P.) Malik speaks of intelligence failure in his book, the fact is that we were asked to do a mission in October 1998. After that, till May 7, 1999, army headquarters never asked us to fly any mission. Why was there a huge gap of seven months? Someone needs to answer that.
So was there any problem vis-a-vis intelligence gathering?
Perhaps, in October 1998 there was some direction from the political leadership to the intelligence agencies in the run-up to the bus yatra to maintain a low profile. Please understand that in India there is a major problem at the level of acceptance of intelligence. Political masters accept intelligence estimates in keeping with their political considerations. And at that time, the bus yatra fell in line with the political considerations. Anyway, intelligence is the best scapegoat because these agencies work in secrecy and don’t have PR outfits to set the record straight.
What happened after May 7, 1999? This was the time when Malik left for Poland and returned on May 20.
We flew the first mission on May 7 but bad weather prevented us from getting any results. But the missions on May 14, 16 and 18 were extremely successful. It firmly established the presence of Pakistani troops because our May 16 mission revealed six Pakistani Mi-17 helicopters parked in the Mushkoh valley. This was shown to then defence minister and he was shocked. What was shocking is that the army patrols had not been able to detect any of this. That should have convinced army headquarters that this was not a simple jehadi intrusion as claimed later by senior officers. In fact, General Malik called us to his office after the ceasefire and admitted that the ARC’s efforts had helped save the day.
Poet zindabad.Second, Malik writes that with the military tide in India 's favour, Prime Minister Vajpayee called him on July 8 and asked for his reaction on Pakistan 's withdrawal of its forces from the Indian territory . Malik responded that we should not let the enemy escape at a stage when its decimation was imminent. The Prime Minister has obviously made up his mind to end the war, something that he should have shared with his army chief then itself.
No wonder B Raman reacted so strongly.pauldevis wrote:http://www.outlookindia.com/full.asp?fo ... rgil&sid=2
May-22 2006 issue
Full interview after registration. Registration is Free (I think)
Air Marshal Ashok Goel (retd) was the operations manager with the RAW’s Aviation Research Centre (ARC) before and during the Kargil war. At that time, he was an air vice marshal and a key participant in intelligence gathering operations. In an interview to Outlook, he speaks on the intelligence inputs given to army and political leadership. Excerpts:
What was the situation in the crucial months preceding the Kargil war?
In April ’98, the army and navy chiefs complained to the defence minister of not getting any intelligence from RAW. RAW chief Arvind Dave then called for a meeting, briefed all. We assured that their operational needs would be taken care of. After R.S. Bedi took over ARC, we cut down the transmission of intelligence data to service HQs from 10 days to 48 hours. Intelligence inputs were being given on a real-time basis.
What role did the ARC play before and during the war?
ARC acts when it gets a specific mission. Unfortunately, though General (V.P.) Malik speaks of intelligence failure in his book, the fact is that we were asked to do a mission in October 1998. After that, till May 7, 1999, army headquarters never asked us to fly any mission. Why was there a huge gap of seven months? Someone needs to answer that.
So was there any problem vis-a-vis intelligence gathering?
Perhaps, in October 1998 there was some direction from the political leadership to the intelligence agencies in the run-up to the bus yatra to maintain a low profile. Please understand that in India there is a major problem at the level of acceptance of intelligence. Political masters accept intelligence estimates in keeping with their political considerations. And at that time, the bus yatra fell in line with the political considerations. Anyway, intelligence is the best scapegoat because these agencies work in secrecy and don’t have PR outfits to set the record straight.
What happened after May 7, 1999? This was the time when Malik left for Poland and returned on May 20.
We flew the first mission on May 7 but bad weather prevented us from getting any results. But the missions on May 14, 16 and 18 were extremely successful. It firmly established the presence of Pakistani troops because our May 16 mission revealed six Pakistani Mi-17 helicopters parked in the Mushkoh valley. This was shown to then defence minister and he was shocked. What was shocking is that the army patrols had not been able to detect any of this. That should have convinced army headquarters that this was not a simple jehadi intrusion as claimed later by senior officers. In fact, General Malik called us to his office after the ceasefire and admitted that the ARC’s efforts had helped save the day.[/quote]
I am not aware that Pak helicopters were very active.Aditya G wrote:RayC, SHBO was impossible for us given the hostile MANPADS environment. But did SSG troops face the same constraint? AFAIK, Pakistan Army Air Corps helicopters were very active in Indian terretory before the IAF came into the picture and later at least once conducted a mission with SSG as well.
Maybe in the initial stages; but not very active (but then I would know what you mean by very active).
Helicopters flying between ridgelines in a narrow valley and hugging the side (which they do to catch the updraught) would be difficult targets as far as I can guess.
It is interesting to note that 6 Pak Mi 17 were parked in the Mushko Valley. Mushko Valley has a very heavy snowfall and to be frank patrols have found going very difficult. Though in May things become better.
[/quote]pauldevis wrote:[url]
ARC acts when it gets a specific mission. Unfortunately, though General (V.P.) Malik speaks of intelligence failure in his book, the fact is that we were asked to do a mission in October 1998. After that, till May 7, 1999, army headquarters never asked us to fly any mission. Why was there a huge gap of seven months? Someone needs to answer that.
This is a load of bull crap coming from someone with such important responsibility. How can one sit on his a$$ and wait for request to fly additional mission for seven months. Wouldn't a pro-active officer be flying missions on a regular basis as that is what he is supposed to do? How many more such "pass the buck" kinda guys are there still holding such position in Indian security establishment?
The job of a security agent is to be suspicious when there are no reason for him to be suspicious. He has to be vigilant when he has no reason to be vigilant. That is being pro-active.
This is sad.
AS
http://www.flonnet.com/stories/20060519004302300.htm
Ghosts of Kargil
BY PRAVEEN SWAMI
India's former Chief of the Army Staff provokes renewed debate on the intelligence warnings prior to the 1999 Kargil War.
Ghosts of Kargil
BY PRAVEEN SWAMI
India's former Chief of the Army Staff provokes renewed debate on the intelligence warnings prior to the 1999 Kargil War.
By October, RAW was sufficiently concerned about developments to issue an express warning about the prospect of a "limited swift offensive", pointing in particular to the "constant induction of more troops from peacetime locations like Mangla, Lahore, Gujranwala and Okara into Pakistan-occupied Kashmir." Its assertion that a war was possible provoked an immediate challenge by the Director-General of Military Intelligence, and an inconclusive verbal discussion followed.
Given the sheer mass of warnings, it is hard to see what further intelligence could have been provided to India's strategic establishment on the prospect of hostile Pakistani action short of a signed order from the now-President Pervez Musharraf, who took over as Pakistan's Chief of the Army Staff in October 1998. Bar one RAW assessment, no intelligence suggested that an actual war was likely, but the totality of the warnings ought to have made clear the need for an enhanced defensive posture.
confronted with warning after warning about large-scale infiltration, just what did the XV Corps do about the `jehadi bogey'?
Colonel Oberoi's letter was written after General Budhwar failed to respond to verbal pleas for troops, made during his visit to the sector on November 25, 1998. General Budhwar, informal sources said, was dismissive of these warnings, which he saw as alarmist. It would, ironically enough, have reached the 3 Division Headquarters - and possibly the offices of the then XV Corps Commander, Lieutenant-General Kishan Pal - at about the same time as the first reconnaissance groups of Pakistani troops occupied these features.
Despite the summary removal of approximately a quarter of its troops, there is evidence to show that 121 Brigade did act. Troops were withdrawn from the Mashkoh area for just 80 days in the winter of 1999, down from 177 days in 1997 and 116 days in 1998. Yaldor was left undefended for 64 days from February to April, where troops had been withdrawn for 120 days in 1997 and 119 days in 1998. Kaksar, another key area, was undefended for just 38 days, where it was left open for over 200 days in previous years.
Such responses were far from adequate, most experts agree. Like their superiors, 121 Brigade should have acted on its fears by adopting a more aggressive counter-infiltration posture.
Amazingly, General Pal closed his eyes to reality even after the war broke out. At a meeting of the Unified Headquarters in Srinagar on May 24, 1999, General Pal insisted that there "were no concentration of troops on the Pakistani side and no battle indicators of war or even limited skirmishes." Paragraph 4(v) of the minutes of the Unified Headquarters meeting record his claim that the "situation was local and would be defeated locally": a hideous misreading of the situation.
To his credit, moreover, General Malik also intervened to end the suicidal tactics XV Corps used in an attempt to bring an early end to the intrusions.
Prime Minister Vajpayee had, in the winter of 1998-1999, persuaded himself that he was destined to make a historic peace with Pakistan - a delusion founded on the Bharatiya Janata Party's conviction that the Pokhran II nuclear tests had brought strategic stability to South Asia and made conventional war impossible.
Ooops my mistake.JCage wrote:Admin Note Sorry JCage, absolutely No copy pasting from force website . You may however paste a gist of what you read in your own words.
Gist of review from Sawhney:
Malik comes down on procurement deficiencies by MOD, says civilian bureaucrats have no idea. Cites a bureacrat saying : "there are so many rifles at the ordnance factory" so why are you complaining, Malik noting that it takes more than rifles alone to fight a war. This led him to make the statement- we fight with what we have not what we want- leading the PM to ask him why, with him responding that he had to, to retain his izzat within the IA.
Says that neither Pak nor India would have used nukes since neither had set up a command and control system. Sawheny considers this worrying since junior officers would have been unaware of the N scenario if full scale war broke out (and this was an option since cabinet had given clearance for gradual escalation) and hence this was worrying
Malik blames the intel- already covered before
Says that at a briefing when the service chiefs came to tell the GOI what their views were- it was a mess, every bureaucrat and hanger on was in the room to find out "what was going on".
Vajpayee asks Malik as to how the war is going- Malik says enemy is on the run and its an axiom of warfare to decimate the enemy at this stage and not let him escape. But Vajpayee had already made up his mind to end the war and didnt inform Malik.
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Basically it reinforces the fact that Kargil was a necessary wakeup for Indias somnolent establihment
The correct way of doing a job is very rarely like the popular, trigger-happy fast shooting cowboy attitudes the movies depict. One would be surprised at the amount of paperwork and bureaucratic, though necessary, offiacialese that has to be circumvented - in real fact, the more critical the consequences, the greater the deliberations. That is as it should be, to prevent total and uncontrolled chaos.asprinzl wrote:This is a load of bull crap coming from someone with such important responsibility. How can one sit on his a$$ and wait for request to fly additional mission for seven months. Wouldn't a pro-active officer be flying missions on a regular basis as that is what he is supposed to do? How many more such "pass the buck" kinda guys are there still holding such position in Indian security establishment?pauldevis wrote:[url]
ARC acts when it gets a specific mission. ......., the fact is that we were asked to do a mission in October 1998. After that, till May 7, 1999, army headquarters never asked us to fly any mission. Why was there a huge gap of seven months? Someone needs to answer that.
007 all the way! Such independant action has to be written into the rules of engagement, without which nothing will happen. However, the point here is that the driving inputs for any operation are crucial, without which NOTHING can be done - in this case, they were missing.
The job of a security agent is to be suspicious when there are no reason for him to be suspicious. He has to be vigilant when he has no reason to be vigilant. That is being pro-active.
What if there was political decision not to ruffle feathers and hence no orders were given?
Meanwhile India Seminar issue on Kargil circa 1999:
Something like War
Meanwhile India Seminar issue on Kargil circa 1999:
Something like War
Last edited by ramana on 15 May 2006 22:09, edited 1 time in total.
The more we read about Malik the less izzat he commands.
The day was saved by young commissioned and non commissioned officers upto the rank of Lt Col, and may be Cols,
Others were just sitting on their butt and asking jawans and yopung Lts to perform Guns of Navarone style climb up the mountains facing the Nothern Flight Infarty were phiring away...
The day was saved by young commissioned and non commissioned officers upto the rank of Lt Col, and may be Cols,
Others were just sitting on their butt and asking jawans and yopung Lts to perform Guns of Navarone style climb up the mountains facing the Nothern Flight Infarty were phiring away...
There is one point in that if the Intel agencies had briefed the Army about the possible incursions so many times, they could also have sanctioned the sorties by ARC to gather supporting evidence (instead of asking the Army to do so). ARC is basically the tool to gather intel, they are an arm of RAW. if they did not carry out any PR missions, then both RAW and Army should share the blame.