Steven J Forsberg. United States Naval Institute. Proceedings.
Annapolis: Mar 2007.Vol.133, Iss. 3; pg. 38, 5 pgs
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India’s development of Mauritian islands to its southwest could
substantially expand the reach of its navy.
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In its race to become a regional sea power, India has at times seemed
more like a tortoise than a hare. The potential acquisition of an
aircraft carrier was an annual story for more than 20 years, and
despite the lease of a Soviet nuclear-powered submarine almost two
decades ago India’s submarine force remains entirely conventional.
But even though plans to buy or develop specific systems seem to fall
through with regularity, the overall growth trend of the Indian Navy
is impressive. History has shown that sea power is not easily
acquired in a hurry, and India’s sometimes slow but generally
systematic growth is a sign of maturity more than a symptom of
ineffectiveness. India is thinking ahead.
In particular, the Indian Navy realizes that sea power is more than
just a matter of ships. It is also a matter of geography. Since the
turn of the 20th century, the Indian Navy has been making more
deployments far from its traditional coastal waters, using its
vessels as tools of diplomacy more than as warfighting machines.
India is systematically cultivating close relationships with key
states that can offer its navy a leg up in future contingencies. This
highlights the country’s long-term naval thinking, which appears
designed to make the Indian Ocean a bastion that can serve as a
springboard for naval projection against distant points.
Another Little Dot on the Map
It is probably safe to say that most people have never heard of the
Agalega Islands. There are two of them, a North and a South Island,
located about 425 nautical miles northeast of Madagascar in the
Indian Ocean. The islands are sovereign territory of Mauritius,
which is about 700 miles to the south. Together, the two Agalegas
have about 70 square kilometers of land area populated by
approximately 300 people. The islands’ remote location is the key to
their importance. They are approximately 1,700 nautical miles
southwest of the Indian naval base at Kochin on the southwestern
coast of the Indian peninsula. They are approximately 1,200 miles
southwest of Addu Atoll in the Maldives. And they are also
approximately 960 nautical miles to the west and south of Diego
Garcia.
The Mauritian government has offered India a long-term lease of the
islands, with an eye toward further development. The Indian
government has not yet announced any decision, and no reports
indicate any military aspect to the talks. The development of the
islands could, however, be an important step for the implementation
of Indian Navy plans. Agalega can serve as a small yet important
stepping stone on the path between India and the important shipping
lanes of the Mozambique Channel on the southeast coast of Africa. In
addition, it can help India more effectively close the wide gap
between Madagascar and its southern tip.
The sea lanes around the Horn of Africa serve as a vital route for
supertankers too large for passage through the Suez Canal. Similarly,
large amounts of commerce shipping between Europe and the east coast
of the Americas travel to Asia by way of Cape Horn, and disruptions
in trade routes across the Middle East would make them even more
heavily traveled. The route is thus of great importance to India’s
two chief regional rivals, Pakistan and China, and the ability to
interdict traffic there is of great potential value. In addition,
southeastern Africa is also valuable in terms of Indian economic
investment and diplomacy, and extending Indian naval power into the
area will help foster and protect these ties.
Looking for Energy
Energy-hungry India is looking toward Mozambique and Zimbabwe for
coal, for example. The port of Beira in Mozambique is probably going
to be substantially upgraded as a number of foreign investors develop
regional resources. Mozambique is also a growing regional source of
liquefied natural gas (LNG). India has been attempting to establish
a significant infrastructure for imported LNG, and looking toward the
future, Africa could become an important backstop for supplies from
the volatile Middle East. Nearby South Africa is India’s largest
African trade partner and is increasingly becoming a political and
economic ally.
India and Mozambique have signed a wide-ranging defense cooperation
pact. It envisages joint maritime patrolling of the Mozambique coast
as well as training and technology transfer. Like many developing
nations, Mozambique is hard-pressed to provide even coast guard-type
services, and the assistance of the blue-water Indian fleet could
prove very useful. In 2003 and 2004, for example, Indian warships
provided security for international conferences being held in
Mozambique. In 2004, India flew ten aircraft to South Africa to
participate in exercises-six Mirage-2000s supported by two 11-78
airborne tankers and two 11-76 transports carrying personnel and
supplies. The detachment stopped in Male, capital city of the
Maldives, and at Mauritius to show the flag en-route to South Africa.
Africa is a long way from India, however, and India has been relying
on friendly nations such as Mauritius, Mozambique, and South Africa
for support in deploying forces. India is beginning to show interest
in acquiring its own limited support infrastructure in the region.
For example, it is reportedly planning on opening an intelligence-
gathering facility on leased land in northern Madagascar. Such a
facility could greatly enhance the ability of India to interdict
vessel traffic along the African coast. Indian facilities in the
southwest Indian Ocean will not rival those found to the east, where
a separate Far Eastern Naval Command is based in the Andaman Islands.
But the existence of even a limited support infrastructure would
greatly enhance the ability of India to conduct operations in the
region.
A Key Role for Small Islands?
How could the Agalega Islands fit into this strategy? To start,
Agalega is not going to become a major base. Indeed, its capabilities
will be limited, even with development. The plan is to develop a high-
end resort in addition to fish processing facilities. This will
entail the construction of such basic infrastructure as electrical
production and water and sewage facilities as well as the expansion
of the current airstrip. The island lacks a good natural harbor, and
it is doubtful India would permanently station many (if any) military
people on the island. But remote scraps of land can be of great
importance in a number of scenarios. In an emergency, India could
deploy a small but significant support detachment to the island for
aerial operations as well as for communications and intelligence-
gathering.
The island is currently serviced by Dornier 228 aircraft operated by
Mauritius. The aircraft are license-built in India, which also
operates a number of maritime surveillance versions of the aircraft."
The aircraft have a maximum range of approximately 1,300 nautical
miles, which is about the distance between the Maldives and Agalega.
Thus, India could stage the aircraft to Agalega by way of the
Maldives, and, operating from those two locations, the aircraft could
cover almost the entire Indian Ocean between southwest India and the
Mozambique Channel. Agalega could also serve as a refueling stop for
flights farther on to Madagascar, the Comoros, Mozambique, or South
Africa.
Agalega is also near the maximum range of the Heron unmanned aerial
vehicle (UAV) when flown from the Indian naval base at Cochin. The
very capable medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) UAV could be flown
back and forth on autonomous missions. In the other direction, Herons
taking off from Agalega could provide substantial loiter time over
the Mozambique Channel, perhaps linking directly to the proposed
facility on Madagascar. India may soon be operating more than 60
Herons in addition to numerous other UAV systems.
It had been hoped to expand the runway on Agalega to serve ATR 72
class (72-passenger twin prop) aircraft and perhaps eventually Airbus
A 319-class (120 passenger twin-jet) aircraft. Any resort
development by India would almost certainly entail at least the first
level of airport upgrades to serve an upscale client base. It would
also allow the island to support operations by larger and more
capable aircraft, which would presumably include whatever aircraft
India picks in its latest competition for a new maritime patrol
aircraft to replace the current 11-38 and Tu-142. That aircraft might
be the new Boeing P-8, one of many efforts by U.S. businesses to
supply the Indian military in a post-nuclear-sanctions world.
Agalega might seem a bit superfluous, since India is developing good
relations with regional nations. Aircraft could operate from
Mauritius, the Seychelles, Madagascar, or Mozambique, but having a
separate, isolated, operating location could help India insulate
itself from possible political complications. Even though Mauritius
would retain sovereignty, it would be at arm’s length (similar to the
British on Diego Garcia). Nations that are friendly to India might
nonetheless be leery of allowing combat aircraft (armed maritime
patrol) to operate from their shores. India could use them for
discrete intelligence, logistics, and support functions while using
Agalega as its "combat" base.
What Is a Combat Base?
Once again, it should be emphasized here what is meant by combat.
Agalega is not going to house entire wings of SU-30 aircraft nor are
any battles like Midway likely to be fought off of southwest Africa.
The most likely requirement for the Indian Navy in that part of the
Indian Ocean is to interdict select merchant shipping. The world
economy is very intolerant of blanket blockades that affect major
shipping lanes. To attempt such a total blockage is to invite
interference from other major powers, particularly the United States.
Instead, nations must attempt to identify specific vessels and then
deal with them, while allowing "protected" or "neutral" vessels
reasonably free movement.
To do this, a nation needs first of all good intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. Since the eventual
target vessels will be unarmed (or very minimally armed), large
amounts of weaponry are generally unnecessary. In interdicting ships
going to or coming from Pakistan or China in these waters, for
example, the Indians are very unlikely to find any enemy combatants.
Instead, they will need to weed through all the traffic, identifying
specific vessels to be stopped (boarded or attacked outright). This
is often most effectively done using maritime patrol aircraft and
UAVs. Small patrol craft can handle needed boarding, and it is handy
to have local facilities for intelligence and coordination.
Future Scenario
How might a future contingency play out? Suppose India imposes a
distant blockade on a regional rival. The tourists on Agalega could
be quickly flown off and their quarters filled with an Indian support
detachment. First, the island would serve as a refueling post for
light maritime patrol aircraft and UAV staging to southwest Africa.
second, it would serve itself as an austere operating facility for
said aircraft and UAVs. Flights could be flown between Agalega and
southwest India to detect ships attempting to gain access to the
Arabian Sea via the blue water to the south of India. Rights could
also be flown from Agalega westward, over the Mozambique Channel.
UAVs could be flown on autonomous mode to the channel, where real-
time control and intelligence analysis could be handled by the Indian
facility on Madagascar. With patrol being handled by airborne assets,
Indian surface patrol craft could conduct specific interdiction tasks
while the Indian "blue-water" fleet was engaged elsewhere.
Indian naval growth toward the southwest Indian Ocean could also
serve another important strategic interest. Indian concerns over
possible Chinese intervention from the east mirror the concerns of
the British over Japanese intervention during World War II. The first
option is to block enemy ingress at chokepoints such as the Strait of
Malacca, but what about a "Plan B" if this strategy fails? In mid-
1941 the British Admiralty considered the possibility that Singapore
might be neutralized and that the Japanese would gain free access to
the Indian Ocean. It decided to develop a fallback line that ran
roughly from South Africa to Mauritius to Diego Garcia and then to
the Nicobar Islands. When the Imperial Japanese Navy did indeed
force its way into the Indian Ocean, the British retreated behind
this line, protecting the vital sea lanes around South Africa and to
the Middle East.
Indian Far East Command
It is possible that the Indian Navy is considering a similar
situation. The Indian Far East Command, operating out of the Andaman
and Nicobar islands, is positioned to interdict vessels attempting to
pass through the Malaccan Straits. But its forward facilities are
somewhat limited and, even more important, may in the future be
vulnerable to attack from Chinese aircraft operating from Myanmar. If
Chinese aircraft could neutralize the island facilities and turn the
Bay of Bengal into an aerial contested zone, then there is a
possibility that Chinese units (particularly subsurface) might
transit the Strait of Malacca into the Indian Ocean. In this case the
Indian Navy may decide to retreat behind a defense line similar to
the British one, at least until the situation is favorable for its
fleet to clear the Bay of Bengal. This would keep supply lines open
through the western Indian Ocean and possibly keep Pakistani and
Chinese forces from converging.
Naturally, these are potential future contingencies. The actual
Chinese presence in Myanmar is minimal, despite continued rumors of
bases and outposts in places such as Greater Coco Island, near the
Andaman Islands. China has not yet demonstrated an expeditionary
air force capability beyond its own shores and, even more important,
China and India have reasonably good relations today, even going as
far as to hold joint naval maneuvers. History has shown how growing
rival powers can slide into military conflict, however, and given
some bitter occurences in the past (including Chinese support of
Pakistan), it is reasonable to wonder what the future might bring.
The Indian Navy’s continued development of ties off the East coast of
Africa demonstrates that the Indians are certainly thinking ahead.
Expanding Reach
India continues to systematically expand its naval reach, an
important component of which is its growing presence in the southwest
Indian Ocean. In recent years Indian combat aircraft have deployed to
South Africa and Alaska for exercises. The Indian Navy has conducted
a round-theworld cruise with a training ship. Indian warships have
recently turned up in places as far flung as Guam and Beirut.
Whether India will ever have naval hegemony over the Indian Ocean
remains to be seen. If it ever does, however, it is possible that
small steps (and small islands) such as Agalega will be part of the
path it takes.
Winston Churchill once described Russia as "A giant whose nostrils
have been plugged up." He was referring to the enclosed and cold
waters found on both the Northern and Eastern shores of the nation.
India, on the other hand, is a giant whose nostrils are flared. The
Arabian Sea to the west, the Bay of Bengal to the east, and large
expanses of the Indian Ocean to the south all provide India with free
access to the sea.
Farther from Indian shores, however, are a series of geographic
chokepoints that limit entry into (and exit from) the Indian Ocean.
To the southwest is Cape Horn, to the west the Red Sea. To the east
are the Strait of Malacca as well as the Lombok and Sunda straits. To
the distant southeast are the waters around Australia. In recent
years, Indian naval deployment patterns have demonstrated an
appreciation for all these key points.
The development of a Far Eastern Naval Command based in the Andaman
Islands has extended the eastward reach of the Indian Navy, and now,
developments in Africa are extending its westward reach.
[Sidebar]
Under the Indian Navy ensign, the Talwar-class frigate Tabar
(background) embarks on a mission in 2006. A lease agreement with
Mauritius would give India access to remote Agalega, a naval stepping
stone between the Indian coast and shipping lanes of the Mozambique
Channel.
[Sidebar]
Agalega’s two islands are approximately 425 nautical miles northeast
of Madagascar in the Indian Ocean. The airstrip on Agalega’s North
Island (pictured here) could serve as a refueling post for light
maritime patrol aircraft and staging area for unmanned aerial vehicle
flights.
[Reference]
1. 0 degrees 23 minutes south, 56 degrees 37 minutes east-the
approximate coordinates for the airstrip on North Island.
2. The Encyclopedia Mauritiana at
http://www.encyclopedia.mu/Nature/Geogr ... s/Agalega/
3. Associated Press, "Mauritius asks India to develop remote Agalega
Islands into tourist resort," International Herald Tribune Asia-
Pacific, 25 November 2006.
4. "India eyes coal mines in Mozambique, Zimbabwe," The Times of
India, 11 December 2006,
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/NEWS ... 771009.cms
5. Thomas R. Yager, "The Mineral Industry of Mozambique,". U.S.
Geologic Service Minerals Yearbook, 2005.
6. An example is India’s Petronet project.
http://www.platts.com/Natural%20Gas/Res ... /index.xml
7. "India. South Africa cement ties with Strategic Partnership Pact,"
International Business Times, 29 December 2006,
http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/2006100 ... p-pact.htm
8. "India, Mozambique sign MoU in defense cooperation," People’s Daily
Online, 7 March 2006,
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/20060 ... 48396.html
9. In 2003 India provided ships for the African Union Summit and in
2004 for a three day World Economic Forum meeting. The latter
deployment was of two "Petya"-class patrol craft, the INS Sujata and
INS Savitri.
10. "Sudha Ramachcandran, "Delhi all ears in the Indian Ocean," Asia
Times, 3 March 2006;
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/HC03Df02.html
11.
http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/NAVY/Do228.html
12.
http://www.india-defence.com/reports/840
13. Ireland Blyth Limited press release, 25 February 2004,
Developpement touristique; IBL va de l’avant avec son projet a
Agalega [in French);
http://www.iblgroup.com/news/press/060215150454
14. Ashling O’Connor, "Boeing pitches in as India offers defence
contracts worth $15bn," Times (of UK) online, 4 December 2006;
http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/b ... 658955.ece
15. British Public Records Office, ADM 1/26876 "Director of Plans,
register LD02445/41," 11 July 1941.
16 Greater Coco has often been reported as housing everything from an
intelligence "facility" to a "base" and a "port," none of which seem
to exist. For example, see Andrew Selth, "Chinese Whispers, The Great
Coco Island Mystery," The Irrawaddy. January 2007;
http://www.irrawaddy.org/aviewer.asp?a=6536&z=102
17. "India, China to hold joint naval exercises," The People’s Daily
Online, 6 November 2003:
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/20031 ... 7719.shtml
18. Rajeev Sharma, "300 Indians Evacuated from Beirut," The Tribune of
India Online, 20 July 2006;
http://www.tribuneindia.com/2006/20060721/main3.htm
[Author Affiliation]
Mr. Forsberg, a freelance writer based in Houston, wrote "Is a China-
India Naval Alliance Possible?" in the March 2002 Proceedings. He is
currently attending the Texas Tech University School of Law.
Allrighty!! So chai-biskoot is finally coming to God's own backyard.....
Kerala's first Foreign Minister with a "progressive twist"