Indian Nuclear News & Discussion - 04 Aug 2007

[John Snow]

Rangudu garu>

Might is Right.

Right is endowed by any one, it is just exercised.

Choice is option to exercise.

What was right prior to 123 is now becoming a choice, between punitive consequences or compliance.


The might og GOTUS is exercised (to an extent) thru COTUS, take for instance there was a motion to penalise Canada for trade with CUBA.

This is nothing but simple encroachment (via diluting the right to choice)
What they did to Canada the want to do to India wrt to trade with Iran.

[Prabu]

US to call special NSG meeting to push N-deal4 Aug 2007, 1618 hrs IST,Chidanand Rajghatta,TNN




WASHINGTON: The Bush administration is ready to convene a special session of the Nuclear Suppliers Group this fall to specifically discuss and approve the U.S-India nuclear deal so that the agreement can get final Congressional approval before the end of 2007, a key U.S official said on Friday.

Briefing a small group of correspondents on issues surrounding the landmark deal, US Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns, the principal negotiator on the US side, offered the following broad timeline which would allow the agreement to kick in, in 2008: New Delhi has to sign a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency; the US will immediately convene a special NSG meeting and will play "sherpa" in getting approval for the deal from its 44 other members; the administration will then formally notify Congress and seek a quick vote possibly in the November-December timeframe.

"We hope to see a repeat of the strong bipartisan support the agreement had in Congress when it last voted for it," Burns said.

But ahead of that, Burns said the US will be very active in supporting India in its efforts to convince the 45-nation NSG that it should get the same kind of international treatment in terms of civil nuclear trade as Washington would have just given bilaterally.

The NSG is scheduled to meet in September, but Washington was not averse to calling a special session to discuss the India deal, he added.

Burns rejected the suggestion that the text of the 123 Agreement was still fuzzy, and some issues, like offering India reprocessing rights, were prospective and needed further work. He insisted that the US had committed firmly to reprocessing, using the present tense in the text. But New Delhi needed to first set up dedicated facility, an Indian assurance that Burns said helped break the deadlock during the talks.

As a measure of how much Washington acceded to India on the reprocessing issue, which he identified as the one which 'bedeviled' talks, Burns pointed out that Japan and Euraton alone among US allies had been accorded reprocessing rights, and the agreement with Japan ran into 400 pages.

On the sensitive issue of any possible nuclear testing by India and its fallout on the agreement, Burns said, "India retains its sovereign rights (to test) and the US retains its legal obligations (to take punitive action)."

"We expect and hope that the future of U.S and India will be about nuclear energy and there will be no reason for a nuclear test," he added, suggesting that tests were an anachronism in the present age.

Still, the agreement deals implicitly with the hypothetical Indian test under mitigating circumstances by addressing issues of fuel guarantees and compensation despite US retaining its right of return.

Burns also asserted that the deal does not violate either in letter or spirit the enabling Hyde Act, a criticism emanating from the non-proliferation lobby.

On Friday, the Arms Control Association, a non-proliferation votary, dubbed the finalized 123 agreement as 'A bad deal gets worse.'

"The administration appears to have once again agreed to virtually all of India's demands at the cost of US national security and non-proliferation interests,"

Daryl Kimball, ACA's executive director and Fred McGoldrick, a former senior official with the US State Department, wrote in their review.

The agreement, they said, would give India preferential treatment that the U.S has not even given to states that have assumed all the obligations and responsibilities of the NPT, "including assurances of fuel supply and advance consent to carry out sensitive nuclear activities that are unprecedented."

Asked if there was any time during the negotiations that lasted two years and two months if the two sides feared failure, Burns said that was never an option.

"This process was unique that it came from the top town and begun by the heads of government in July '05," he said.

"They wanted it to happen and they expected us to be skillful enough to bring it off,â€

[Calvin]

India first tested a nuclear device in 1974 , inspiring the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which it, like Pakistan and Israel, never signed, and which its agreement with America perhaps fatally undermines.

This is not accurate, the NPT was signed before 1974. You may be confusing NPT with NSG.

[Calvin]

enqyoob: The biggest elephant in the room when nuclear plants are being funded is the cost of insurance, which in the US is subsidized by the USG.

[Vipul]

India retains right to explode nuclear device: US.

Washington: The US has said India retains the "sovereign right" to explode a nuclear device but hoped that such a situation will not arise.

"India retains its sovereign rights, but the US retains its legal rights as well," Under Secretary of State Nicholas Burns told a group of journalists here on Friday when asked whether New Delhi has the right to test.

Noting that the agreement has taken into account the "worst case" scenario, he said "but we hope very much that it (Right of Return of nuclear fuel and technology) won't be necessary because we hope that conditions that prompt" it "will not materialise."

Burns suggested that New Delhi may not explode an atomic device as "advanced nuclear powers", like the US and UK, "largely do not test nuclear weapons" in the modern world.

He said the US preserved the "legal right" to recall fuel and technology but that would be the "choice" of the President of the day and "not automatic".

"If you look ahead and you try to envision what would constitute a discontinuity of supply, how would that happen.

There are four or five or six ways that could happen and only one of them has to do with a nuclear test," Burns said.

"If somehow supplies for environmental reasons, for political reasons is discontinued to India, then of course India has the benefit of working with the US and other countries in construction of a strategic fuel supply reserve that could help it, if there is discontinuity," he said.

[bala]

use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes

ARTICLE 2 - SCOPE OF COOPERATION only talks about nuke energy for peaceful purposes i.e. the strategic program on nukes is not in scope and hence anything that India does with its weapons including testing is out of bounds, legally speaking. Of course the US has its rights to act howsoever it needs to, but India's Nuke testing does not break the 123 agreement.

Nicholas Burns just reiterated this piece of nugget. He also says this on US rights to act upon Nuke test: the "choice" of the President of the day and "not automatic".

[NRao]

Some of these key items are up in the air, but, circumstantially it will be up to India to dictate terms. Reserves are key. As is ability to build indigenous complete fuel cycle systems. Then a number of Laws and treaties will become superfluous.

[vsudhir]

India first tested a nuclear device in 1974 , inspiring the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which it, like Pakistan and Israel, never signed, and which its agreement with America perhaps fatally undermines.

This is not accurate, the NPT was signed before 1974. You may be confusing NPT with NSG.

Note true.

The NPT was formed after 1974 with the grandfathering clause that 1968 is the (arbit) cutoff for inclusion into the NPT as an NWS.

[Calvin]

The NPT was formed after 1974 with the grandfathering clause that 1968 is the (arbit) cutoff for inclusion into the NPT as an NWS.

Could you point us to a reference that indicates that this is the case? Most of the references I have, suggest that the NPT was opened for execution in 1968, and entered into force in 1970 after ratification by the US, USSR and UK and 40 other countries.

Are you sure you are not confusing NPT with NSG?

[BSR Murthy]

NPT
Opened for signature 1968.
Entered into force 1970.
Treaty extended indefinitely 1995

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, also Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT or NNPT) is an international treaty, opened for signature on July 1, 1968 to limit the spread of nuclear weapons.

The treaty was proposed by Ireland, and Finland was the first to sign. In New York City, on May 11, 1995, the parties to the treaty decided by consensus to extend the treaty indefinitely and without conditions.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_No ... ion_Treaty

TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Notification of the entry into force

1. By letters addressed to the Director General on 5, 6 and 20 March 1970 respectively, the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are designated as the Depositary Governments in Article IX.2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, informed the Agency that the Treaty had entered into force on 5 March 1970.

2. The text of the Treaty, taken from a certified true copy provided by one of the Depositary Governments, is reproduced below for the convenience of all Members.

http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Docume ... irc140.pdf

[nkumar]

BJP's reaction: Makes some good noises about legislation regarding foreign policy.

BJP rejects nuke deal, wants JPC

By RAMESH RAMACHANDRAN

New Delhi, Aug. 4: A combative BJP on Saturday said the 123 agreement compromised India’s nuclear weapons programme and demanded that the government put the next steps of the civil nuclear pact with the US on hold. It sought to remind Prime Minister Manmohan Singh of the dictum "trust but verify" and suggested that a vital issue of national concern could not be acceptable until due diligence is conducted by a joint parliamentary committee. [IMO, this is fair enough, if US's Congress can scrutinize, then why not JPC?]

"The BJP is of the clear view that this agreement is an assault on our nuclear sovereignty and our foreign policy options. We are, therefore, unable to accept this agreement as finalised," senior BJP leader and former minister of finance and external affairs Yashwant Sinha said, reading from the text of the "preliminary comments" released by the party on Saturday.

The statement read: "We demand that a joint parliamentary committee be set up to examine the text in detail; that, after it has submitted its report, parliamentary approval be secured before this deal is signed; and that all further action on it should be suspended until this sequence is completed." Mr Sinha, who was joined by former Union minister Arun Shourie for the news conference at the BJP headquarters, said no effort was made by the UPA to evolve a national consensus on this vital issue of national concern before making commitments to the US. The BJP has, therefore, demanded that appropriate amendments be made to the Constitution and laws to ensure that all agreements that affect the country’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and national security are ratified by Parliament. [Sounds OK, there should be enough checks and balances]

The formal response came after the BJP top brass met on Friday evening at former Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee’s residence. Leader of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha L.K. Advani, Leader of the Opposition in the Rajya Sabha Jaswant Singh and Mr Yashwant Sinha attended that meeting, besides Mr Vajpayee.

Mr Sinha reiterated his party’s "serious reservation" that the nuclear pact with the US would adversely affect India’s nuclear weapons programme. He said: "In the separation plan prepared under the surveillance of the US, two-thirds of our reactors will be put in the civilian category under safeguards. The recently refurbished Cirus reactor will be shut down. In the course of time, 90 per cent of our reactors will be in the civilian category. In the ongoing negotiations in the Committee of Disarmament in Geneva, we have agreed to work together with the US for the early conclusion of the FMCT (Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty). We appear to have given up our insistence on international verification and all countries complying. All these, along with the intrusive provisions of the Hyde Act, are bound to have a stultifying effect on our strategic nuclear programme."

Can’t India overcome some of those concerns by setting up more military reactors, a reporter wanted to know. Mr Sinha replied that India can set up more military nuclear facilities if she wants to, but the BJP has "serious differences" with the UPA over adequacy of fissile material, especially after the Manmohan Singh government’s decision to shut down the Cirus reactor, which in his estimation produced about half of the fissile material. He was not particularly happy with Article 10 (6), which suggested that the "status of all inventories of material subject to this agreement" will be reported to the US. "Even the uranium mined in India will be accounted for," he feared. [IAEA "perpetual" inspections are good enough, why should inventory be part of the agreement?]

Mr Sinha asserted that the size of India’s nuclear deterrent will change from time to time on the basis of threat perception and that judgment could not be surrendered to anyone else. Also, the credible minimum deterrent depended on what India’s neighbours were doing. "You give me the threat perception in 2020 and I will give you the number of bombs needed," a combative Mr Sinha told the reporter who wanted to know how many bombs would satisfy the BJP. "[The 123 agreement would suggest that] threat perception is dependent on the determination by the US President whereas it is the government of the day, here in India, that must make that determination," he said.

He reminded the UPA that the 123 agreement is bound by the Hyde Act and there is no escaping it. "The fact remains that the US retains the right to recall all the supplies that it has made to India under this agreement. What is worse is that under Article 16 (3) despite the termination of this agreement, the safeguards in perpetuity will continue to apply so long as any material or equipment or any of the byproducts thereof remain on Indian soil," he pointed out. "Are the safeguards coterminous with the agreement? Where is it defined," he wondered aloud.

Mr Sinha chided the Manmohan Singh government for believing that no reference to testing in the text of the 123 agreement is a matter of great comfort for India. "Does the UPA expect the country to adopt an ostrich-like attitude in the face of a gathering storm in our neighbourhood," he asked. "This view is entirely untenable," he said. "When national laws apply, which includes the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and the Hyde Act of 2006, which specifically forbid nuclear tests, where is the question of India having the freedom to test once we enter into this agreement? In other words, we are being forced to accept a bilateral CTBT (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty) with more stringent provisions than the multilateral CTBT." He said the government has been "spreading canards" that the deal recognises India as a de-facto nuclear power. "Nothing," he said, "could be further from the truth."

Mr Arun Shourie, in turn, said: "The inspections that India would be subject to would be equivalent to that applicable to the non-nuclear weapons states." He also said that the commitments of the US on fuel supplies were vague and futuristic. "The agreement is supposed to lead to full civil nuclear cooperation between the two countries yet Article 2 (2) (d) talks of cooperation relating to aspects of the associated nuclear fuel cycle. Aspects mean parts and hence all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle are not covered under this agreement," he said. He sought to dismiss the argument that insofar as energy security is concerned, nuclear energy is better than oil supplies. "Nuclear supplies are controlled by an even tighter cartel than the oil supplies," Mr Shourie countered. He felt that the harnessing of thorium as part of India’s three-stage programme offered real promise of energy security. "That would make the country completely self-sufficient in nuclear fuel and there will be no need to look for even an ounce of uranium," he said.

Both Mr Shourie and Mr Sinha added that the American assurances on transfer of sensitive nuclear technology were prospective in nature and they cautioned that the US will retain the right of end-use verification of all its supplies. Mr Sinha said: "This will ensure that American inspectors will roam around our nuclear installations, a fear which was completely discounted by the Prime Minister while replying to the Rajya Sabha debate on August 17 last year."

Mr Sinha suggested that the agreement did not refer to the spent fuel from the Tarapur reactor, which has been accumulated over the last 33 years. Asked whether the BJP would join hands with the Left in opposing the deal, he said: "We have made valid demands. If the Left and the UNPA back us we have no problems." He took a dig at the Left parties, saying, "We would like a partner that would back us the whole hog and not leave midway." He elaborated: "We had demanded a sense of Parliament on the nuclear deal but the Left backed out."

[nkumar]

China's reaction: Hardens border dispute.

China hardens border dispute

By Seema Mustafa

New Delhi, Aug. 4: China has responded to the quadrilateral initiative for democracy and the growing relations between India and the United States by visibly hardening its position on the boundary issue. The new Chinese foreign minister, Yang Jiechi, has overturned the earlier understanding between India and China that re-drawn borders would not disturb settled populations by stating recently that the mere presence of settled populations does not affect China’s territorial claims.

[nkumar]

Scicom's reaction:

US might get chance to inspect India N-sites

By Olga Tellis

Mumbai, Aug. 4: Dr Placid Rodriguez, former director, Indira Gandhi Research Centre and Dr M.R. Srinivasan, former chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, whilst saying that the 123 agreement has addressed most of India’s concerns, felt that India had to make compromises on its expectations of full civilian nuclear cooperation.

Dr Placid Rodriguez also observed that the Prime Minister had assured the nation that the US inspectors will not be allowed to walk all round the nuclear facilities. However Article 10 of the agreement in para 4 says that if the International Atomic Energy Agency decides that the application of IAEA safeguards is no longer possible, the supplier and recipient should consult and agree on appropriate verification measures. This provides space for the US inspectors to walk into India’s nuclear establishments.

Dr Rodriguez said that the final 123 agreement was not a full civilian nuclear agreement in terms of Article 5(2). It excludes the transfer of nuclear technology, heavy water production technology and sensitive nuclear facilities, heavy water production facilities and major critical components of such facilities. The agreement says that they may be transferred only after an amendment to this agreement. Transfers of dual-use items that could be used in enrichment and reprocessing of heavy water production facilities will be subject to the parties’ respective applicable laws, regulations and licence policies. Dr Rodriguez, who is currently visiting professor at IIT Madras and president of the India Nuclear Society, said: "This is sensitive nuclear technology as it is essential for our closed fuel cycle and heavy water reactors. Our representative said that the US has given prior consent for reprocessing safeguarded nuclear material, but nowhere in the actual draft is there mention of the word prior. They have not given their consent for reprocessing. Getting this consent will take a year."

The agreement says "consultations on arrangements and procedures will begin within six months of a request by either party and will be concluded within one year. US undersecretary of state for political affairs Nicholas Burns said that they will have to go to Congress for the final consent. "So there is just a play of words. There is no indication that the end will be positive or favourable to India. There are a lot of loopholes," said Dr Rodriguez.

He is of the view that the US administration will find it more difficult to sell the agreement to the US Congress than Prime Minister Manmohan Singh will have selling it to the Opposition. [Of course, since we do not have laws corresponding to Hyde] He said 22 US congressmen already have come out against the agreement saying it’s a violation of the Hyde Act. Mr Burns says that their (the US) national laws will be binding above all else in the agreement.

Dr Srinivasan, who is a member of the National Security Advisory Board, said that he does not believe that the 123 draft will effect our own nuclear power programme — namely the three-stage programme of producing electricity through the heavy water, fast breeder reactor and use of thorium.

On the fact that the agreement did not provide for transfer of technology for enriching uranium, heavy water and reprocessing of spent uranium, Dr Srinvasan said the US maintains that it has not given the technology to anyone else. He said: "We had interpreted the agreement to include the transfer of these technologies. We have our own technologies in these areas but we wanted their technology for industrial purposes to build commercial size plants." In heavy water, he said, India had technology for commercial-sized plants but in reprocessing and enrichment India has technology for semi-commercial-sized plants.

Dr Srinivasan said "we can get the technology from France or Russia but we hope that they will use their own principles for exports and don’t go by what the US says and does." The Nuclear Suppliers’ Group is currently toeing the US line.

We also have a Tellis batting for us !!!

[enqyoobOLD]

BJP to ratify 123 Agreement

Not for me to 2nd-guess the geniuses of the BJP such as Puneesh Taneja and Dim Nath Mishra, but aren't these guys walking into a trap? MMS will let Parliament vote on it (no amendments are pemitted, anyway) and the UPA has the votes to ratify it.

Effect: BJP will have lost the right to about it.

It would have been so much smarter to ignore this, then pass a new law like I had suggested, and call that the defining National Law that the 123 talks about.

[Rahul Shukla]

Article 14 - Termination And Cessation Of Cooperation:


1. Either Party shall have the right to terminate this Agreement prior to its expiration on one year's written notice to the other Party...


2. Before this Agreement is terminated pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article, the Parties shall consider the relevant circumstances and promptly hold consultations, as provided in Article 13, to address the reasons cited by the Party seeking termination. The Party seeking termination has the right to cease further cooperation... if it determines that a mutually acceptable resolution of outstanding issues... cannot be achieved through consultations...


3. If a Party seeking termination cites a violation of this Agreement as the reason for notice for seeking termination, the Parties shall consider whether... the violation could be considered as material. No violation may be considered as being material unless corresponding to the definition of material violation or breach in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. If a Party seeking termination cites a violation of an IAEA safeguards agreement as the reason for notice for seeking termination, a crucial factor will be whether the IAEA Board of Governors has made a finding of non-compliance.


4. Following the cessation of cooperation under this Agreement, either Party shall have the right to require the return by the other Party of any nuclear material, equipment, non-nuclear material or components transferred under this Agreement and any special fissionable material produced through their use. A notice by a Party that is invoking the right of return shall be delivered to the other Party on or before the date of termination of this Agreement. The notice shall contain a statement of the items subject to this Agreement as to which the Party is requesting return. Except as provided in provisions of Article 16.3, all other legal obligations pertaining to this Agreement shall cease to apply with respect to the nuclear items remaining on the territory of the Party concerned upon termination of this Agreement.


6. If either Party exercises its right of return pursuant to paragraph 4 of this Article, it shall, prior to the removal from the territory or from the control of the other Party, compensate promptly that Party for the fair market value thereof and for the costs incurred as a consequence of such removal. If the return of nuclear items is required, the Parties shall agree on methods and arrangements for the return of the items, the relevant quantity of the items to be returned, and the amount of compensation that would have to be paid by the Party exercising the right to the other Party.


7. The Party seeking the return of nuclear items shall ensure that the timing, methods and arrangements for return of nuclear items are in accordance with paragraphs 5, 6 and 7. Accordingly, the consultations between the Parties shall address mutual commitments as contained in Article 5.6. It is not the purpose of the provisions of this Article regarding cessation of cooperation and right of return to derogate from the rights of the Parties under Article 5.6.

In reference to Article 14 (1) & (2) of the IUCNA (123 agreement);

So a 1 year notice is required for termination of agreement in the event of a fallout b/w India and US. Prior to such termination 'consultations' are called for under Article 13 (b). However, again according to Article 14(2), the other party reserves the right to terminate cooperation based solely upon the 'determination' that resolution of issues is not possible through such consultations which, in effect means, that the US can terminate cooperation under IUCNA provisions on any day, at any hour, at any time - period!


In reference to Article 14 (3) of the IUCNA (123 agreement);

The US will consider 'testing' as a material breach of the 'spirit' of 123 Agreement and the 'letter/provision(s)' of the Hyde Act. According to The Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties, (Link-Wikipedia);

Article 60(3) - Termination or suspension of the operation of a treaty as a consequence of its breach

A material breach of a treaty... consists in: (a) a repudiation of the treaty not sanctioned by the present Convention; or (b) the violation of a provision essential to the accomplishment of the object or purpose of the treaty.


Article 62 - Fundamental change of circumstances

1. A fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred with regard to those existing at the time of the conclusion of a treaty, and which was not foreseen by the parties, may not be invoked as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from the treaty unless: (a) the existence of those circumstances constituted an essential basis of the consent of the parties to be bound by the treaty; and (b) the effect of the change is radically to transform the extent of obligations still to be performed under the treaty.

2. A fundamental change of circumstances may not be invoked as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty: (a) if the treaty establishes a boundary; or (b) if the fundamental change is the result of a breach by the party invoking it either of an obligation under the treaty or of any other international obligation owed to any other party to the treaty.

3. If, under the foregoing paragraphs, a party may invoke a fundamental change of circumstances as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty it may also invoke the change as a ground for suspending the operation of the treaty.

In reference to Article 14(4) of the IUCNA (123 Agreement); So it is a 'right' but not an 'obligation'. Since US Congress will never allow all this radioactive junk to cruise towards the US coastline, we can effectively discount the possibility that the US will ask for such items to be returned and sent back to US.

Uncle has made sure there are plenty of references in the agreement that will allow, in the event of termination of this agreement, for such radioactive materials to be unavailable for use and safeguarded under IAEA supervision in India itself. So if jingos are celebrating assuming that disruption of cooperation will be 'too costly' for the US, they are dead wrong. See Article 10 for reference;

1. Safeguards will be maintained with respect to all nuclear materials and equipment transferred pursuant to this Agreement, and with respect to all special fissionable material used in or produced through the use of such nuclear materials and equipment, so long as the material or equipment remains under the jurisdiction or control of the cooperating Party.

2. Taking into account Article 5.6 of this Agreement, India agrees that nuclear material and equipment transferred to India by the United States of America pursuant to this Agreement and any nuclear material used in or produced through the use of nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment or components so transferred shall be subject to safeguards in perpetuity in accordance with the India-specific Safeguards Agreement between India and the IAEA [identifying data] and an Additional Protocol, when in force.

The only time-specific provision is in regards to termination of cooperation, and as I explained above, even that is unenforceable if Uncle 'determines' that issues cannot be resolved by consultations. There is no time frame specified for return of fuel/equipment and/or determination and submission of compensation for such fuel/equipment being returned, and/or for environmental and technical evaluations to be completed etc. etc. Neither do I see any 'punitive' measures being specified (monetary or otherwise) in case the resolution of issues such as cooperation, return of fuel and equipment, and compensation etc. takes a decade and a half or more.

Now comes Article 14 (7) which states;

It is not the purpose of the provisions of this Article regarding cessation of cooperation and right of return to derogate from the rights of the Parties under Article 5.6.

And Article 5.6 (c) states,

In light of the above understandings with the United States, an India-specific safeguards agreement will be negotiated between India and the IAEA providing for safeguards to guard against withdrawal of safeguarded nuclear material from civilian use at any time as well as providing for corrective measures that India may take to ensure uninterrupted operation of its civilian nuclear reactors in the event of disruption of foreign fuel supplies.

Also per Article 16(3);

Notwithstanding the termination or expiration of this Agreement or withdrawal of a Party from this Agreement, Articles 5.6(c), 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 15 shall continue in effect so long as any nuclear material, non-nuclear material, by-product material, equipment or components subject to these articles remains in the territory of the Party concerned or under its jurisdiction or control anywhere, or until such time as the Parties agree that such nuclear material is no longer usable for any nuclear activity relevant from the point of view of safeguards.

And if I understand correctly, that means that enrichment/reprocessing may continue (Article 6), fuel will continue to be stored in secure locations (Article 7), physically protected per certain standards [Article 8], off-limits for military use/diversion (Article 9), under IAEA safeguards (Article 10), pending resolution of disputes by parties via 'consultations' which again dont have to happen anyway if the US 'determines' that disputes cannot be resolved via such consultations (Article 15).

So in essence, the US can walk away anytime with minimal impact. Chai-pani will continue to be served while details of compensation/transport are being worked out. In the meantime, all radioactive fuel/material sits pretty in India under prepetual IAEA safeguards and supervision.

The only effective 'corrective measures' that India can/may take have been delegated to an upcoming Indo-IAEA agreement where again Uncle reigns supreme.

Some say that the only safeguard to US termination of cooperation is our fuel-reserve. However, given the new 'National Reprocessing Facility' being set up with Uncle provided expertise (unless I am mistaken), Uncle doesnt have to take back every radioactive brick/screw to inflict severe pain - just the critical components necessary to operate such reprocessing facility.

[Gerard]

Which army will enter India to disable its reactors and facilities?

[Sanjay M]

Which army will enter India to disable its reactors and facilities?

What if "security council" puts sanctions on us?

[Gerard]

Like in 1974 and 1998 ?

Countries with populations > 1 billion, with enormous internal economies and a massive military don't get sanctioned, especially if they have ICBMs and SSBNs... they get accommodated...

[Sanjay M]

Then what's stopped us from testing for the past 10 years, or for the 25 years before that?

[JCage]

Indias economic development has taken off in the 90s. And so has its military development.

Gerard has a point. The bigger India gets, the bigger its footprint, the less amenable others will be in pushing India around.

[H.B.Krishna]

Then what's stopped us from testing for the past 10 years, or for the 25 years before that?

Guts or the lack of it on the part of political class (Two parties, one Government....Crowded... )

BTB, Do you mean to say our Scientist have a completely new design w.r.t 1998 design, that warrant testing? We test to validate new designs, not to shove off that bedbug on our back! TSP (Fearing Adminullas, I went to Madrassa to correct my vocabulary ) testing or Chi.COM testing will provide us a reason to improve our designs that crop up in mean time.

[H.B.Krishna]

It occurs to me, that the assumption of all people who are skeptical of 123 is that we are going to get 100% Unkle's stuff. Hmm what a smart Bengaloorean does when he gets offer from one MNC ?? We got offer from Big Unkil Inc, fine thanks, our new'Clear CV jus got better! Ok, we have notice period...get a better offer(s). If none gets into our way, innocently show up to Unkil Inc!

Am I missing some points here ?

With so many things in our favour, probably I can afford to play Warcraft III peacefully

NB: Congrats Samuel for your promotion in BR

[Rye]

Rahul Shukla wrote;

Some say that the only safeguard to US termination of cooperation is our fuel-reserve. However, given the new 'National Reprocessing Facility' being set up with Uncle provided expertise (unless I am mistaken), Uncle doesnt have to take back every radioactive brick/screw to inflict severe pain - just the critical components necessary to operate such reprocessing facility.

Please note the article about the Indo-Rusatom other JVs, especially the bit about NPCIL being in charge of maintenance and keeping the plant in shape...(and then connect the tea leaves)...

link

KOLKATA: Nuclear Power Corp of India’s JV negotiations with four of the world’s top nuclear equipment suppliers have been put on fast-track. It is in talks with two US vendors, General Electric and Westinghouse, France’s Areva and Russia’s Ros-Atom. The talks assume significance following the release of the draft text of the ultra-sensitive Indo-US civilian nuclear technology sharing deal on Friday.

“Friday’s development is yet another advance towards the Indo-US nuclear deal. We are in exploratory talks with General Electric, Westinghouse, Areva and Ros-Atom for a possible JV. Discussions will now be taken to the next level so that NPCIL can expedite the process once the civilian nuke deal is signed,â€

[Gerard]

But how will China vote?

China queers pitch on N-fuel

The official said they have received reports that China has been quietly lobbying against India with countries known for their hardline position on non-proliferation issues, like the Scandinavian nations and New Zealand.

[Rangudu]

Rangudu garu>

What was right prior to 123 is now becoming a choice, between punitive consequences or compliance.

How so? If India and the US have a distant relationship, how come the consequences for India after an n-test be any better as compared to a time when the relationship is closer due to the n-deal?

Do you expect the US to conduct a Kumbh Mela in honor of India's n-test if the deal did not go through? If anything, the reaction would be more hostile.

[Rahul Shukla]

Which army will enter India to disable its reactors and facilities?

G Saa'r,

Perhaps no such army is needed given the 'good boys' of the world order that we are. We still have the Tarapur fuel stored up dont we?

[mandrake]

I want to ask some very simple questions,

1. Why are we asking for foreign reprocessing and heavy water facility dont we have them in place already and Indian in design?

2. Excluding from where they are can we use enriched Uranium from the enrichment facilities in our 3 stage programme? Is there a need of such?. if yes the 3 stage programme using them need to come under sareguards? what about IPR then?

3. Are FBR and reprocessing facilities same thing?

[svinayak]

August 04, 2007
Press Statement issued by Shri Yashwant Sinha & Shri Arun Shourie on Indo-US nuclear deal

Preliminary comments of the BJP on the Agreement between the Government of India and the Government of the USA concerning peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

1. The BJP has been expressing its reservations regarding the Indo-US nuclear deal from the very beginning. When the Joint Statement was issued at the end of the visit of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to Washington in July 2005, Shri Vajpayee issued a statement in which he expressed his reservations about the deal, specially with regard to its impact on our strategic nuclear programme. He had expressed his apprehension at the proposed separation plan of our nuclear facilities between civilian and military. Later, when the separation plan was presented to Parliament, we expressed our opposition to it. We warned the Government of India when the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House International Relations Committee of the US Congress adopted the draft bills for enabling this cooperation between the two countries. We protested strongly when the Hyde Act was passed by the US Congress. We have consistently opposed the deal in Parliament whenever discussions on this deal have taken place.

None of our fears and apprehensions was ever given serious consideration by the Government of India. No effort was ever made by it to evolve a national consensus on this vital issue of national concern before making commitments to the US.

The text of the bilateral 123 Agreement has been made public on Friday, August 3, 2007. We have looked at the text and our preliminary comments are as follows:

(i) Each party is required to implement this Agreement in accordance with its national laws and regulations and its licence requirements. There is no doubt, therefore, that the implementation of this Agreement shall be governed by the provisions of the Hyde Act of 2006, the US Atomic Energy Act of 1954, which are its national laws on this subject, and its licensing requirements relating to the supply of nuclear materials to India {article 2(1)}. The confidence with which US officials have asserted that the Agreement is Hyde act bound flows from this provision. Which act will India enforce on the US?

(ii) The Agreement is supposed to lead to full civil nuclear cooperation between the two countries yet article 2(2)(d) talks of cooperation relating to "aspects of the associated nuclear fuel cycle". Aspects mean parts and hence all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle are not covered under this Agreement.

(iii) According to article 5(2) of the Agreement sensitive nuclear technology, heavy water production technology, sensitive nuclear facilities and major critical components of such facilities can be transferred to India only after an amendment to this Agreement has been carried out. The provision for such transfer should have been included in this Agreement itself instead of leaving it to a future amendment. It is a peculiar arrangement.

Under the same provision, the US will retain the right of end-use verification of all its supplies. This will ensure that American inspectors will "roam around our nuclear installations", a fear which was completely discounted by the Prime Minister while replying to the Rajya Sabha debate on 17.8.2006.

(iv) As far as fuel supplies are concerned, the commitment of the US in the Agreement is vague and futuristic. "The US is committed to seeking agreement from the US Congress to amend its domestic laws". This assurance in article 5(6)(a) of the Agreement and the assurances contained in article 5(6)(b) of the Agreement is not only bad drafting but deliberately repeats an old assurance given by the US at the time of the separation plan and remains as evasive as it was then. According to article 5(6)(c), the India specific Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA is to be negotiated on the basis of these evasive assurances and requires India to place its civilian nuclear facilities under safeguards in perpetuity.

(v) India is required under this Agreement to establish a new national reprocessing facility dedicated to reprocessing safeguarded nuclear material under IAEA safeguards. If it is an agreement between two equal parties with reciprocal commitments, is the US accepting a similar provision for its reprocessing facilities? Is any such facility being created in any country belonging to the Nuclear Five?

(vi) Following the cessation of cooperation under this Agreement either party shall have the right to require the return by the other party of any nuclear material, equipment, non-nuclear material or components transferred under this Agreement and any special fissionable material produced through their use. {article 14(4)} Thus, notwithstanding the sugar-coated language which has been used in the Agreement to soften the blow, the fact remains that the US retains the right to recall all the supplies that it has made to India under this Agreement. What is worse is that under article 16(3) despite the termination of this Agreement, the safeguards in perpetuity will continue to apply so long as any material or equipment or any of the by products thereof remain on Indian soil.

Clearly, therefore, with regard to fuel supplies, reprocessing rights and the right to recall the equipments supplied, the US has maintained its position as in the Hyde Act. India, on the other hand, has accepted legally enforceable commitments in perpetuity.

There is nothing in the Agreement regarding the reprocessing of the spent fuel of Tarapur which has accumulated over the last 33 years.

Nuclear testing has not been mentioned in the Agreement. According to the Government of India this is a matter of great comfort for us. This view is entirely untenable. When national laws apply, which includes the NPT, the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and the Hyde Act of 2006 which specifically forbid nuclear tests, where is the question of India having the freedom to test once we enter into this agreement? In other words, we are being forced to accept a bilateral CTBT with more stringent provisions than the multilateral CTBT.

In his very first statement in 2005, Shri Vajpayee had raised the issue of the financial cost of separation of our facilities between civilian and military. The Government of India has kept mum on this. To this cost has now been added the cost of setting up a dedicated reprocessing facility, the cost of holding strategic fuel supplies for the life time of all our future reactors and the cost of mammoth and intrusive IAEA inspections.

In the separation plan prepared under the surveillance of the US, two thirds of our reactors will be put in the civilian category under safeguards. The recently refurbished CYRUS reactor will be shut down. In course of time, 90% of our reactors will be in the civilian category. In the ongoing negotiations in the Committee of Disarmament in Geneva, we have agreed to work together with the US for the early conclusion of the FMCT. We appear to have given up our insistence on international verification and all countries complying. All these, along with the intrusive provisions of the Hyde Act are bound to have a stultifying effect on our strategic nuclear programme.

The BJP is of the clear view that this Agreement is an assault on our nuclear sovereignty and our foreign policy options. We are, therefore, unable to accept this Agreement as finalised.

We demand that a Joint Parliamentary Committee be set up to examine the text in detail; that, after it has submitted its report, parliamentary approval be secured before this deal is signed; and that all further action on it should be suspended until this sequence is completed.

The manner in which this agreement has been pushed through, leads us to further demand that appropriate amendments be made in the Constitution and laws to ensure that all agreements which affect the country's sovereignty, territorial integrity and national security shall be ratified by Parliament.

(Shyam Jaju)
Office Incharge

[nkumar]

1. Why are we asking for foreign reprocessing and heavy water facility dont we have them in place already and Indian in design?

In heavy water, India has technology for commercial-sized plants but in reprocessing and enrichment India has technology for semi-commercial-sized plants. - This is the opinion of Dr Srinivasan.

[Rahul Shukla]

Lately I have been a bit curious to find out what reactors/products the US/French/Russian giants have to offer and their usefulness in Indian context in addition to other technical properties. Here are links to pages of official websites that provide a treasure trove of information in regards to nuclear energy, nuclear reactors, fuel-cycles, lifecycle costs and management services etc. provided by these companies.

In particular, GE's nuclear energy page has a really nice 'interactive reactor' feature. It shows the layout of various buildings in a simulated GE reactor and provides more information about that structure and its role when you click. Areva and TVEL pages are also very good.


General Electric (USA) - Clicky

Westinghouse (USA)- Clicky


Areva (FRA) - Clicky


Center of Nuclear Energy and Industry (RUS)- Clicky

Rosenergoatom (RUS) - Clicky

TVEL (RUS) - Clicky

TENEX (RUS) - Clicky


And of course, our beeloved; NPCIL (IND) - Clicky

[Arun_S]

I want to ask some very simple questions,

1. Why are we asking for foreign reprocessing and heavy water facility dont we have them in place already and Indian in design?

We have it, but being the produce of one organization it is not necessarily the lostest cost or most efficient types. When we go for commertical power generation to stay competitive and busines sense says that all faces of commercial power plants be most relaible and lowest cost. Thus international trade is good for economic / business sense. So if there is a commercial vendor that does it better & cheaper, India should have access to it. Reprocessing i svery cost intensive thus lots of newthings will keeping evolving.

3. Are FBR and reprocessing facilities same thing?

FBR is power plant.

Reprocessing is seperate and i sa plant to consume the spent fuel and recover and reconstruct new fuel rods.

[menon]

BJP to ratify 123 Agreement

************************
Effect: BJP will have lost the right to about it.

It would have been so much smarter to ignore this, then pass a new law like I had suggested, and call that the defining National Law that the 123 talks about.

I am really not sure this agreement is in our favor or against it. Reading it legally, it can be a boy or a girl. It will depend on a lot of externals.
As N^3 said let us have a national equivalent of Hyde. Talking is not enof. We have enof talent here to prepare a draft legislation and send it to all MPs.
The element should be basically that any breach of this agreement should bring unbearable costs to the US of A.
If people give me the elements and when we are agreed on the elements I can draft. I have legislative drafting experience.
On another issue I have a feeling that there will be little US contributions to the reactors and critical components maybe sourced through Russia and France who will not follow the US diktats. So that the right to return will be just chimerous. Am I right please?

[enqyoobOLD]

Ease up, I wouldn't advise making any resolution against anyone.

The bill should be something that says:

The GOI shall ensure that any agreement with any foreign country is subject to the following:

1. No compromise of Indian sovereignty.
2. No constraints on India's relations with other countries.
3. Imposition of sanctions against India by any nation will be regarded as a hostile act, and will result in forfeiture of any assets located in India, or promissory notes held by corporations headquartered in that nation.

That's it. No micro-analysis, no mention of nukes, or tests, or reprocessing, or anything else.

[BSR Murthy]

I am really not sure this agreement is in our favor or against it. Reading it legally, it can be a boy or a girl. It will depend on a lot of externals.
As N^3 said let us have a national equivalent of Hyde.

I am not a lawyer, but, the agreement seems quite reasonable to me. The pluses of the agreement outweigh the potential minuses hands down. Yes, we can have an equivalent of Hyde, but, what is the purpose? It is not a zero sum, tit for tat game after all. There is a termination clause to get out of the agreement if either party has a problem.

The element should be basically that any breach of this agreement should bring unbearable costs to the US of A.

I guess you could do this if you really don't want a deal with the US. No country would agree to "unbearable costs". I think we are over-analyzing the agreement. Frankly, we are looking this gift horse in the mouth and I hope we would not miss out on this historic opportunity to get out of nuke/tech isolation.

[CRamS]

I wonder if it would be possible to come up with a piece software to simulate this deal and check out the consequences if this, this, and this happens down the road. A kind of intelligent agent-based software that that acts according to Unkil's motives, namely, castrate India of its nukes. The inputs will be somelting like India going ahead with its strategic nuke prgram, or reacting to TSP/Chincom hanky panky, and the output should be what provisions, in what order/sequence etc from the 123 that Unkil will be able to invoke to thwart India.

[menon]

Ease up, I wouldn't advise making any resolution against anyone.

The bill should be something that says:

The GOI shall ensure that any agreement with any foreign country is subject to the following:

1. No compromise of Indian sovereignty.
2. No constraints on India's relations with other countries.
3. Imposition of sanctions against India by any nation will be regarded as a hostile act, and will result in forfeiture of any assets located in India, or promissory notes held by corporations headquartered in that nation.

That's it. No micro-analysis, no mention of nukes, or tests, or reprocessing, or anything else.

I fully agree. But my pet demand has been derecognistion of patents of any country that imposes sanctions against india or otherwise jeopardises our national interests.
What sayest thou?

[NRao]

the agreement seems quite reasonable to me

Slow nite.

Which agreement?

The one above the waves? Perhaps.

There should be plenty below the waves, the ones we will never see, but by which the two govts will operate.

Time to move on. India will get complete cycle help. And, the US will throw in AESA code for giggles.

Next battle: IAEA, followed by Indo-Chicom battle in the NSG.

This is funn-ny.

[BSR Murthy]

Which agreement?

India US 123 agreement.

What is AESA code?

[bala]

Nuclear deal treats India as 'special and exceptional'

The biggest message that the 123 Agreement conveys is that India is special and exceptional, observes K Subrahamanyam, the legendary strategic thinker. "India has been considered exceptional in the civilian nuclear energy sector. No other country has a similar agreement with the US. There were two considerations in the nuclear agreement between China and the US. One, China was signatory to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and it was a Nuclear Weapons State. When it signed a similar treaty with Japan, it treated it as a NPT signatory country. But in this case, India is treated as a country with advanced nuclear technology and, we are not signatories to the NPT. We are special and exceptional."

His son Dr Subrahmanyam Jaishankar -- currently India's high commissioner to Singapore -- was a member of the team that negotiated the 123 Agreement under the leadership of National Security Advisor M K Narayanan, former foreign secretary Shyam Saran and current Foreign Secretary Shiv Shankar Menon.

Subrahamanyam said it is given that the nuclear proliferation regime is not within the power of the US alone to change. So this could be the best deal that could be done with the US. It has never happened before that an entire international nuclear regime was being changed for one country, he said. India has this advantage.

"Australia and China signed a treaty whereby Australia would supply uranium to the latter. Here, Australia will determine the separation of civilian and strategic nuclear plants. But in our case, India has the right to decide about the separation plans," he said.

Once again, he severely criticised the Left parties and Bharatiya Janata Party, who have been opposing nuclear cooperation with the US.

"Last week, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh met (then prime minister Atal Bihari) Vajpayee and told him, 'I have completed what you started.' And that is true. The BJP is opposing it because they could not sign the deal and get the credit while the Left parties are opposing the deal because they have to oppose anything that has to do with the US. Even if India gets the net concession of $10 billion, they will oppose it," Subrahamanyam noted.

"Joe Biden (US Senator Joseph Biden, chairman of the powerful Senate Foreign Relations Committee), while speaking on the India-US nuclear deal, said he did not like this deal and that he would have negotiated this deal differently, but still he supported it because he could not afford to alienate India. This is the way Indian politicians should behave; they should keep the country's interest above party interests," he added.

[Arun_S]

Bala: I and some others here knew who Indian India's high commissioner to Singapore is. (It helps to have met Shri K Subramanium). So when High commissioner Jaishankar was called in to lead the nuclear negotiations, we knew the bearing and the pedigree of Indian leader. Though I was bit nervous of how much of Subramanium.Sr has rubbed into Subramanium.Jr.

I say job well done by Indian team. Keep it up.