Kakodkar, Chidambaram are misrepresenting facts
Dr A. Gopalakrishnan
The government in its desperation has fielded both AEC chairman, Dr Anil Kakodkar, and the PM’s principal scientific adviser, Dr R. Chidambaram, to come out and defend the nuclear deal. The Hindu newspaper published their interviews on August 10 and 11.
The justifications given by these two officials were not only hollow in view of the focused and informed criticism levelled by several analysts outside the government, but were also devoid of any logic or scientific basis strong enough to elicit public trust in the government’s position.
Dr Kakodkar is undoubtedly one of the very best nuclear engineers in the country. His contributions to the establishment of indigenous nuclear technology base in India are well-known and appreciated. He has a very good understanding of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and the associated legal issues. As such,
I am deeply disappointed that he is allowing himself to be used by this government, in these last stages of negotiations, to paint an incorrect picture of what has been achieved in the 123 Agreement.
As for
Dr Chidambaram, in the past two years, he has not spoken on the nuclear deal and now the PMO has put him forward to defend the deal. We should not forget that his assertion in 1998 that the country had successfully conducted one thermonuclear weapon test, and therefore need not test again, was strongly repudiated at that time by both national and international nuclear weapon experts. That with one failed test you can design and build reliable thermonuclear weapons in future is a myth which only Dr Chidambaram continues to believe. In 1998, it was based on his "scientific advice" that the then Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee, declared a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing and almost got to the brink of signing the CTBT. The very same scientist is now advising the current PM that there is no need to conduct any more weapon tests and, therefore, the Hyde Act stipulations and the 123 Agreement in this regard can be accepted.
We need to examine closely what Dr Kakodkar recently stated during his lukewarm support of the nuclear deal. In justifying the need for import of reactors, he says, "Even in the programme of 20,000 MWe of nuclear power by 2020 … there was a provision for eight imported LWRs of 1,000 MWe each." However, in Table 11 of the DAE document titled "A Strategy for Growth of Electrical Energy in India," the DAE admits that based on the indigenous programme and depending solely on uranium available in India, we will be able to generate about 7,860 MWe of power from heavy-water reactors and 89,500 MWe of power from fast breeders by 2042. The additional power we may be able to get from the 8,000 MWe imported LWRS, and by using their resulting plutonium in breeder reactors will only be a total of 34,000 MWe. So are we not satisfied with the growth of a totally indigenous programme, including thorium breeders, which will produce about 97,360 MWe by 2042 (and a whopping 205,560 MWe of totally indigenous nuclear power by 2052, according to the DAE), especially when this can be done with no associated foreign shackles?
Why didn’t Kakodkar highlight this statistics from his own department’s document, instead of making the country feel that foreign reactors are a necessity for establishing a healthy three-stage programme? These DAE estimates also belie the PM’s assertion that he is getting into this deal mainly to enhance India’s energy security.
Asked about the cloud of uncertainty still existing about the uninterrupted supply of fuel for imported reactors, Dr Kakodkar gives a convoluted reply which clearly skirts the central weakness of the 123 Agreement, which the Indian negotiators are trying their best to hide.
I have last week pointed out in detail that it was a blunder to copy in toto Section 15 of the March 2006 Separation Plan as Article 5.6 in the 123 Agreement of July 2007, which merely makes a promise to take up the matter of fuel assurance with the US Congress and get the laws (read it as Hyde Act 2006) amended to get us this assurance. Only in December 2006, the Congress had thrown out the administration’s identical request on behalf of India, while formulating the Hyde Act. Dr Kakodkar fully understands this deficiency, but goes along with this deliberate misrepresentation of the truth on behalf of the government, even though he has no counter-point to offer for the criticism levelled.
He appears to rely on the naïve confidence conveyed to him by the PMO and the MEA that the Americans have "committed" to get this done, and resigns himself to the plea that this is the "best we could get." But certainly this is not good enough for the country, and we are shocked to find a person of his standing trying to defend the indefensible.
Dr Kakodkar also keeps parroting the PMO position that the 123 Agreement provides for "corrective measures that India may take to ensure uninterrupted operation of its civilian nuclear reactors."
What are these magical measures which the Indian establishment has in mind, and why are they kept in such high secrecy? The answer is that there are no such measures possible, and it is purely a bluff to mislead Indian Parliament and the public. A retaliatory measure could have been to withdraw the reactors from IAEA safeguards, if fuel supply is denied. But after signing a safeguards agreement to keep these reactors under perpetual safeguards, such a step will attract serious international action against India, including a Chapter 7 resolution at the UN Security Council, leading to severe sanctions on the country. Or do these measures we are thinking of include clandestine purchases of fuel from illegal sources? India will never do that, since we have always maintained an impeccable record on nuclear imports and will not stoop to that level under any circumstance. So, in spite of layers of consultations built into this 123 Agreement and the overwhelming mutual confidence and bonhomie between the PM and US President George W. Bush, the imported reactors in India, and all the downstream industries which depend on them, will remain on stand-still when fuel supply is interrupted.
On the granting of US permission to reprocess foreign spent-fuel, the agreement says the mutual consultations for this purpose will start in six months from the date of the request and it will be completed in one year. What if it takes several years instead, because of deviatory bickering by the US?
The only countercheck to prevent the US from delaying the final, one-time approval is to insist that India will not place purchase orders for any US nuclear reactor until this permission is formally granted, along with Congressional approval. Why didn’t Dr Kakodkar insist on a clause to this effect incorporated in the 123 Agreement?
On the supply of technologies and equipment for reprocessing, enrichment and heavy-water plants, the agreement says an amendment to this agreement is required. On related dual-use items, it is stated that this will be subject to national laws. So, there is no success achieved in these areas by our team, and the PM’s promises to Parliament stand unfulfilled. And yet,
Dr Kakodkar says "…there is a positive forward-looking provision on transfers. It prevents an outlook of targeting these facilities… So it is a satisfactory arrangement." I disagree with his assessment.
Lastly, look at Dr Kakodkar’s unconvincing and evasive answers to all crucial queries put to him. Asked, "Are you satisfied in all these areas?", he says, "I think so." At another place, he says "…the unilateral moratorium on testing remains as such… So, I think it is satisfactory." Regarding transfer of sensitive technologies, the questioner asks "Does it mean it requires the ratification of Congress?" and Dr Kakodkar says, "I think, perhaps yes." The questioner continues: "So, there is full civil nuclear cooperation?" The answer he gives is, "I think so." Finally, he is asked, "In sum, do you feel that this agreement is in consonance with the July 18, 2005 Joint Statement and the Separation Plan?" And, Dr Kakodkar says, "I think so… I already said this is a satisfactory arrangement."
Are these the kind of answers we expect from an AEC chairman who fully participated in four days of negotiations with the Americans and signed off an 123 Agreement as fulfilling the PM’s promises to Parliament? His answers do not carry conviction and he has no valid justifications to present.
Dr Kakodkar being a man of integrity, technical excellence and ethical roots, appears to be in a great dilemma, trying to strike a balance between what his conscience tells him to do and what the PM, the PMO and the MEA are compelling him to do. Many of us who have known him for decades would have liked to see him take a more courageous stand in the interest of the nation.
Dr A. Gopalakrishnan, a former Chairman of the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board of Indian government, can be reached at agk37@hotmail.com