Is this shutdown the reason why we have become a soft state over the last decade?http://www.hindu.com/2008/07/15/stories ... 210900.htm
Fighting Pakistan’s ‘informal war’
Praveen Swami
National Security Adviser M.K. Narayanan calls for retaliation against the ISI.
Last week, infuriated by mounting evidence that Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate organised the bombing of the Indian Embassy in Kabul, National Security Adviser M.K. Narayanan proposed a solution:. “I think we need to pay back in the same coin”. “Talk-talk is better than fight-fight,” Mr. Narayanan concluded, “but it hasn’t worked so far.”
Covert deterrence
No Indian official has ever used language that even approaches that deployed by the NSA — but more than a few in its covert services, including the former Intelligence Bureau chief, Ajit Doval, and his Research and Analysis Wing counterpart Vikram Sood, have long made a similar case.
Exactly what is it, though, that advocates of retaliation have in mind?
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Put simply, they argue that India must have covert deterrent capabilities. If a Pakistan-based terrorist group carries out strikes against civilians in Mumbai, the argument goes, India must be able to assassinate its leaders and their financiers. While it makes no economic or strategic sense to start a potentially-catastrophic war to deter terrorism, covert tools can still be used to punish its sponsors.
ts politicians.
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Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s regime did not, however, restrict itself to sending verbal signals to Islamabad. In the mid-1980s, RAW unleashed two covert groups, CIT-X and CIT-J, the first targeting Pakistan in general and the second directed at Khalistani groups. A low-grade but steady campaign of bombings in major Pakistani cities, notably Karachi and Lahore, followed. According to former RAW official and security analyst B. Raman, India’s counter-campaign yielded results by making Pakistan’s terror campaign “prohibitively costly.”
For a variety of reasons, these operations proved short-lived. Prime Minister I.K. Gujral, who took over in 1997, shut down RAW’s offensive operations on moral grounds, pointing to the end of the terrorist campaign in Punjab and the improved situation in Jammu and Kashmir. Earlier, Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao ended RAW’s eastern operations earlier as part of his efforts to build bridges with China and Myanmar.
Indian politicians need to debate Mr. Narayanan’s suggestions seriously, whether or not they see reason to eventually endorse them. So, too, do Pakistanis. If nothing else, the NSA’s comments show just how deep frustration with the ISI’s informal war runs in New Delhi. Pakistan has long feared a nightmarish future where a hostile India dams its water resources in Jammu and Kashmir and throws its weight behind irredentist forces. Each terror bombing against Indians, paradoxically, is bringing that nightmare one step closer to realisation.
http://www.cfr.org/publication/17707/ra ... chlesinger
Weaknesses in RAW
The intrusion of Pakistan-backed armed forces into the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir (GlobalSecurity) in 1999 prompted questions about RAW's efficacy. Some analysts saw the conflict as an intelligence failure. However, RAW officials argued they had provided the intelligence but political leadership had failed to act upon it. The Indian government constituted a committee to look into the reasons for the failure and recommend remedial measures. The report of the Kargil review committee was then examined by a group of ministers, established in 2000. The group recommended a formal written charter and pointed out lack of coordination and communication within various intelligence agencies.
Following the review, a new organization was set up-the National Technical Research Organization (NTRO)-modeled on the U.S. National Security Agency-which would be the repository of the nation's technical intelligence-spy satellites, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and spy planes. The government also decided to create a Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), whose head would be the adviser to the Chief of Staffs Committee and the defense minister. The DIA was empowered to conduct transborder operations.
However, the shakeup of the intelligence apparatus has not removed the problems that persisted, especially relating to the overlap of agency activities, say experts. Earlier, RAW was the only organization permitted to conduct espionage operations abroad. Now both the IB and DIA have also been given the authority to conduct such operations, writes Singh.
There have also been occasional media reports of penetration inside RAW by other agencies, in particular the CIA. Swami writes that RAW is exceptional amongst major spy agencies in maintaining no permanent distinction (Hindu) between covert operatives who execute secret tasks, and personnel who must liaise with services such as the CIA or public bodies, such as analysts and area specialists. "As a result, personnel with sensitive operational information are exposed to potentially compromising contacts," he writes.
Garus,a few questions based on above.
- Are the IB's and DIA's foreign ops are subordinated to RAW? Isn't there a Jt.Directorate for foreign op to prevent turf war b/w the three agencies,clearly delineate roles and put in place a C & C structure?
- If not,then what stops DIA from liquidating the terror camps-since it is authorized to conduct trans-border raids (the 5-km International Border limitation imposed on DGMI doesn't apply)?
Is this agency still underdeveloped and understaffed?
-Considering Hon'ble Verappa oily has already slipped in to the media [appeared on Headlines today scroll] about our proposals for covert ops (shh...don't tell anyone!), do we currently have the capacity to get/nail the 20 musharrafs, for whom we have humbly requested in writing the powerless TSP government to "kindly hand them to us"?
-Has parliamentary oversight become necessary?What are the negatives associated with such a move?Also,how the productivity of such a move going to be ensured?