India to consider sending 120,000 troops to Afghanistan

[Yusuf]

This talk of army offensive in afghanistan is of concern to citizens of India - since the the government has failed to provide sense of security in India - is it prudent for the govt to open a front on foreign land?

Opening a second front will completely drain Pakistans army and its economy. In now way will be able to concentrate on two fronts. Stationing troops on either side of its borders will force Pakistan to act in accordance with international resolutions which it is obliged to act on.

[Sanku]

Well we are happy about Pakistan failing -- but that brings us to RRs point (3) the fall of Pakistan (which is inevitable) must be "handled"; what if the Pashunistan is the next staging ground of Jehadi's for a invasion of India?

It has happened, it can happen, better send our folks there to crush the eggs before the nests get too cozy.

Fall of Pakistan will NOT BE the end of fight for India, merely a tactical victory, like BD, unless suitable conditions are ensured.

[Yusuf]

A broken up Pakistan is not in Indias favor for sure. We dont want to be fighting terrorists belonging to 5 different regions on 5 different fronts.
The fall of Pakistan to the terrorists commonly called Talibanization of Pakistan is not in Indias interest. India along with the international community has to force Pakistan to act against these terrorists and not cut deals with it. Taliban on the Punjab border is not going to increase our sense of security.

[Philip]

Obama has promised to increase US forces in Afghanistan,as the Afghan-Pak morass is the most important US military/diplomatic effort going,more so that even Iraq.The US cannot allow the Taliban to win in Afghanistan,as it will be seen as a catastrophic defeat for the US,with the unleashing in more hotspots of anti-US forces and regimes.Unfortunately,it still sees Pak as an ally,not realising that pak is its greatest danger,still hoping to keep it as a vassal state.Unfortunately,with Chinese nuclear and missile gifting and rapid Islamist indoctrination of its armed forces and other pillars of its establishment,Pak is growing further away from the US and is attracting all major Islamist terrorist groups globally to use its territory as sanctuary,with the Paki army's protection, from where they can indoctrinate,train and execute terrorist ops worldwide.As long as these outfits like the LET,take their orders from the Paki military they will be allowed to stay and mesh their terror efforts along with those that Pak wants executed to further its diabolic plans.Pak is actually a de-facto Islamist terrorist nuclear power.There is no need any longer to worry about Islamist entities getting their hands upon Pak's nuclear weapons,as actually the Paki state is now after 26/11 exposed for what it really is,a fundamentalist, fascist, Islamist nuclear rogue terrorist state.

India should let the US increase its presence on the ground,as the arguments for sending Indian troops there is cloudy.If it is to simply force Pak to divert its forces onto its northern border,it is meaningless.Pak simly has to do what it is doing so well now with US/NATO forces,constant ambushes and IED explosions that are causing the greatest havoc.We will be sacrificing our troops in vain.

[Lalmohan]

if pakistan is breaking up, then iran may well consider adding baluchistan and hazara/shia areas of afghanistan to its portfolio. indian troops caught up in that scenario would be between a rock and a hard place unless the deal with iran is way way deeper than it is now

[Yusuf]

if pakistan is breaking up, then iran may well consider adding baluchistan and hazara/shia areas of afghanistan to its portfolio. indian troops caught up in that scenario would be between a rock and a hard place unless the deal with iran is way way deeper than it is now

Iran has not shown any inclination of expanding its territory. It has no such ambitions.
Besides if Pakistan is breaking up, why will it take Afghan territory?

[JE Menon]

Thanx a million Raja... Will comment when I get the chance...

[RajeshA]

Well we are happy about Pakistan failing -- but that brings us to RRs point (3) the fall of Pakistan (which is inevitable) must be "handled"; what if the Pashunistan is the next staging ground of Jehadi's for a invasion of India?

It has happened, it can happen, better send our folks there to crush the eggs before the nests get too cozy.

Fall of Pakistan will NOT BE the end of fight for India, merely a tactical victory, like BD, unless suitable conditions are ensured.

The Taliban can be dealt with differently. We should look back at Operation Enduring Freedom. The whole Taliban administration came crumbling down and they were forced to retreat into the caves for the next 5 years. The Taliban can be fought better when they are visible and rooted. So the Taliban can only be hit by giving them the administration of some area. However when the Taliban turn into a guerilla force and go underground, then it is next to impossible to hit them successfully.

Secondly India can also consider using suicide bombers against Taliban itself. These bombers as we know are up for hire for a few dollars.

Thirdly Petraeus Doctrine may also be a useful starting point. Arm and train opposing Pushtun tribes and Mullahs to fight the Taliban.

Fourthly we should arm and assist the surrounding ethnicities to the maximum, i.e. the Baluchis, Tadjiks, Uzbeks, Turkmen, Hazara. They should create an impenetrable wall around the Taliban.

Fifthly we should recruit the Pakjabis to do our bidding. The Lizard and the Eagle has been using the idiots for the last 50 - 60 years. It is time, they become our dogs. In return, they will get Indus Water, Food assistance, Bollywood entertainment, cricket matches, political financing and some international respectability. It is time for SDRE to put a leash on the TFTA.

In fact, Talibani upsurge is extremely helpful for India to expand our domination over South Western and Central Asia, as all would be dependent on India's support against a feared Taliban. Those eggs when they hatch, will make sure that there is enough fear around for others to look for security in India's arms. Without it, these ethnicities will again cooperate and target India.

[RajeshA]

if pakistan is breaking up, then iran may well consider adding baluchistan and hazara/shia areas of afghanistan to its portfolio. indian troops caught up in that scenario would be between a rock and a hard place unless the deal with iran is way way deeper than it is now

There is no way Iran will be allowed to encroach upon these lands. Baluchistan has already been a part of India before, even if it was under British Raj, and ways and means can be found to let Baluchistan again become protectorate or part of India. Baluchis are Sunnis and even the ones in Iran are not happy about their occupation by Iranians. Neither West nor the Arabian countries would agree to Baluchistan becoming part of Iran. India too should not allow this.

As far as Hazara/Shia areas of Afghanistan are concerned, the effort should be to hold together the non-Pushtun areas together into a smaller Afghanistan with India having two borders with it, through an expanded Jammu & Kashmir in the east and through Baluchistan in the South-West.

[Yusuf]

Heard of the map the Americans are drawing up of Pakistan?

[RajeshA]

Heard of the map the Americans are drawing up of Pakistan?

Yes, there are a few maps doing the rounds. However sometimes the events on the ground overtake grand plans made by armchair generals.

[Yusuf]

Heard of the map the Americans are drawing up of Pakistan?

Yes, there are a few maps doing the rounds. However sometimes the events on the ground overtake grand plans made by armchair generals.

Apparently, these armchair generals have a lot at their disposal.

[Philip]

Two US viewpoints,reaching the same conclusion,defeat!
Why? US Republican war profiteers have devoured everything!

http://www.alternet.org/audits/119052/t ... ar/?page=4

The Afghan Scam: Why the U.S. Is Certain to Fail in Yet Another War

By Ann Jones,
Tomdispatch.com. Posted January 12, 2009.

We're going to hear a lot about the need for rebuilding projects, military training and political reform -- but it's all one big corrupt operation.

The first of 20,000 to 30,000 additional U.S. troops are scheduled to arrive in Afghanistan next month to re-win the war George W. Bush neglected to finish in his eagerness to start another one. However, "winning" the military campaign against the Taliban is the lesser half of the story.

Going into Afghanistan, the Bush administration called for a political campaign to reconstruct the country and thereby establish the authority of a stable, democratic Afghan central government. It was understood that the two campaigns -- military and political/economic -- had to go forward together; the success of each depended on the other. But the vision of a reconstructed, peaceful, stable, democratically governed Afghanistan faded fast. Most Afghans now believe that it was nothing but a cover story for the Bush administration's real goal -- to set up permanent bases in Afghanistan and occupy the country forever.

Whatever the truth of the matter, in the long run, it's not soldiers but services that count -- electricity, water, food, health care, justice, and jobs. Had the U.S. delivered the promised services on time, while employing Afghans to rebuild their own country according to their own priorities and under the supervision of their own government -- a mini-Marshall Plan -- they would now be in charge of their own defense. The forces on the other side, which we loosely call the Taliban, would also have lost much of their grounds for complaint.

Instead, the Bush administration perpetrated a scam. It used the system it set up to dispense reconstruction aid to both the countries it "liberated," Afghanistan and Iraq, to transfer American taxpayer dollars from the national treasury directly into the pockets of private war profiteers. Think of Halliburton, Bechtel, and Blackwater in Iraq; Louis Berger Group, Bearing Point, and DynCorp International in Afghanistan. They're all in it together. So far, the Bush administration has bamboozled Americans about its shady aid program. Nobody talks about it. Yet the aid scam, which would be a scandal if it weren't so profitable for so many, explains far more than does troop strength about why, today, we are on the verge of watching the whole Afghan enterprise go belly up.

What's worse, there's no reason to expect that things will change significantly on Barack Obama's watch. During the election campaign, he called repeatedly for more troops for "the right war" in Afghanistan (while pledging to draw-down U.S. forces in Iraq), but he has yet to say a significant word about the reconstruction mission. While many aid workers in that country remain full of good intentions, the delivery systems for and uses of U.S. aid have been so thoroughly corrupted that we can only expect more of the same -- unless Obama cleans house fast. But given the monumental problems on his plate, how likely is that?

The Jolly Privateers

It's hard to overstate the magnitude of the failure of American reconstruction in Afghanistan. While the U.S. has occupied the country -- for seven years and counting -- and efficiently set up a network of bases and prisons, it has yet to restore to Kabul, the capital, a mud brick city slightly more populous than Houston, a single one of the public services its citizens used to enjoy. When the Soviets occupied Afghanistan in the 1980s, they modernized the education system and built power plants, dams, factories, and apartment blocs, still the most coveted in the country. If, in the last seven years, George W. Bush did not get the lights back on in the capital, or the water flowing, or dispose of the sewage or trash, how can we assume Barack Obama will do any better with the corrupt system he's about to inherit?

Between 2002 and 2008, the U.S. pledged $10.4 billion dollars in "development" (reconstruction) aid to Afghanistan, but actually delivered only $5 billion of that amount. Considering that the U.S. is spending $36 billion a year on the war in Afghanistan and about $8 billion a month on the war in Iraq, that $5 billion in development aid looks paltry indeed. But keep in mind that, in a country as poor as Afghanistan, a little well spent money can make a big difference.

The problem is not simply that the Bush administration skimped on aid, but that it handed it over to for-profit contractors. Privatization, as is now abundantly clear, enriches only the privateers and serves only their private interests.

Take one pertinent example. When the inspectors general of the Pentagon and State Department investigated the U.S. program to train the Afghan police in 2006, they found the number of men trained (about 30,000) to be less than half the number reported by the administration (70,000). The training had lasted eight weeks at most, with no in-the-field experience whatsoever. Only about half the equipment assigned to the police -- including thousands of trucks -- could be accounted for, and the men trained were then deemed "incapable of carrying out routine law enforcement work."

The American privateer training the police -- DynCorp -- went on to win no-bid contracts to train police in Iraq with similar results. The total bill for American taxpayers from 2004 to 2006: $1.6 billion. It's unclear whether that money came from the military or the development budget, but in either case it was wasted. The inspectors general reported that police incompetence contributed directly to increased opium production, the reinvigoration of the Taliban, and government corruption in general, thoroughly subverting much ballyhooed U.S. goals, both military and political.

In the does-no-one-ever-learn category: the latest American victory plan, announced in December, calls for recruiting and rearming local militias to combat the Taliban. Keep in mind that hundreds of millions of dollars, mostly donated by Japan, have already been spent to disarm local militias. A proposal to rearm them was soundly defeated last fall in the Afghan Parliament. Now, it's again the plan du jour, rubber-stamped by Afghan President Hamid Karzai.

Afghans protest that such a plan amounts to sponsoring civil war, which, if true, would mean that American involvement in Afghanistan might be coming full circle -- civil war being the state in which the U.S. left Afghanistan at the end of our proxy war against the Soviet Union in the 1980s. American commanders, however, insist that they must use militias because Afghan Army and police forces are "simply not available." Maj. Gen. Michael S. Tucker, deputy commander of American forces, told the New York Times, "We don't have enough police, [and] we don't have time to get the police ready." This, despite the State Department's award to DynCorp last August of another $317.4 million contract "to continue training civilian police forces in Afghanistan," a contract DynCorp CEO William Ballhaus greeted as "an opportunity to contribute to peace, stability and democracy in the world [and] support our government's efforts to improve people's lives."

America First

In other areas less obviously connected to security, American aid policy is no less self-serving or self-defeating. Although the Bush administration handpicked the Afghan president and claims to want to extend his authority throughout the country, it refuses to channel aid money through his government's ministries. (It argues that the Afghan government is corrupt, which it is, in a pathetic, minor league sort of way.)

Instead of giving aid money for Afghan schools to the Ministry of Education, for example, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) funds private American contractors to start literacy programs for adults. As a result, Afghan teachers abandon the public schools and education administrators leave the Ministry for higher paying jobs with those contractors, further undermining public education and governance. The Bush administration may have no particular reason to sabotage its handpicked government, but it has had every reason to befriend private contractors who have, in turn, kicked back generously to election campaigns and Republican coffers.

There are other peculiar features of American development aid. Nearly half of it (47%) goes to support "technical assistance." Translated, that means overpaid American "experts," often totally unqualified -- somebody's good old college buddies -- are paid handsomely to advise the locals on matters ranging from office procedures to pesticide use, even when the Afghans neither request nor welcome such advice. By contrast, the universally admired aid programs of Sweden and Ireland allocate only 4% and 2% respectively to such technical assistance, and when asked, they send real experts. American technical advisors, like American privateers, are paid by checks -- big ones -- that pass directly from the federal treasury to private accounts in American banks, thus helping to insure that about 86 cents of every dollar designated for U.S. "foreign" aid anywhere in the world never leaves the U.S.A.

American aid that actually makes it abroad arrives with strings attached. At least 70% of it is "tied" to the purchase of American products. A food aid program, for example, might require Afghanistan to purchase American agricultural products in preference to their own, thus putting Afghan farmers out of business or driving even more of them into the poppy trade. (The percentage of aid from Sweden, Ireland, and the United Kingdom that is similarly tied: zero.)

Testifying before a congressional subcommittee on May 8, 2001, Andrew Natsios, then head of USAID, described American aid as "a key foreign policy instrument [that] helps nations prepare for participation in the global trading system and become better markets for U.S. exports." Such so-called aid cuts American business in right from the start. USAID has even developed a system for "preselecting" certain private contractors, then inviting only those preselected companies to apply for contracts the agency wants to issue.

Often, in fact, only one of the preselected contractors puts in for the job and then -- if you need a hint as to what's really going on -- just happens to award subcontracts to some of the others. It's remarkable, too, how many former USAID officials have passed through the famed revolving door in Washington to become highly paid consultants to private contractors -- and vice versa. By January 2006, the Bush administration had co-opted USAID altogether. The once independent aid agency launched by President Kennedy in 1961 became a subsidiary of the State Department and a partner of the Pentagon.

Oh, and keep in mind one more thing: While the private contractors may be in it for the duration, most employees and technical experts in Afghanistan stay on the job only six months to a year because it's considered such a "hardship post." As a result, projects tend not to last long and to be remarkably unrelated to those that came before or will come after. Contractors collect the big bucks whether or not the aid they contracted to deliver benefits Afghans, or even reaches them.

These arrangements help explain why Afghanistan remains such a shambles.

The Afghan Scam

It's not that American aid has done nothing. Check out the USAID website and you'll find a summary of what is claimed for it (under the glorious heading of "Afghanistan Reborn"). It will inform you that USAID has completed literally thousands of projects in that country. The USAID loves numbers, but don't be deceived by them. A thousand short-term USAID projects can't hold a candle to one long, careful, patient program run, year after year, by a bunch of Afghans led by a single Swede.

If there has been any progress in Afghanistan, especially in and around Kabul, it's largely been because two-thirds of the reconstruction aid to Afghanistan comes from other (mostly European) countries that do a better job, and partly because the country's druglords spend big on palatial homes and services in the capital. But the one-third of international aid that is supposed to come from the U.S., and that might make a critical difference when added to the work of others, eternally falls into the wrong pockets.

What would Afghans have done differently, if they'd been in charge? They'd have built much smaller schools, and a lot more of them, in places more convenient to children than to foreign construction crews. Afghans would have hired Afghans to do the building. Louis Berger Group had the contract to build more than 1,000 schools at a cost of $274,000 per school. Already way behind schedule in 2005, they had finished only a small fraction of them when roofs began to collapse under the snows of winter.

Believe me, given that same $274,000, Afghans would have built 15 or 20 schools with good roofs. The same math can be applied to medical clinics. Afghans would also have chosen to repair irrigation systems and wells, to restore ruined orchards, vineyards, and fields. Amazingly enough, USAID initially had no agricultural programs in a country where rural subsistence farmers are 85% of the population. Now, after seven years, the agency finally claims to have "improved" irrigation on "nearly 15%" of arable land. And you can be sure that Afghans wouldn't have chosen -- again -- the Louis Berger Group to rebuild the 389-mile long Kabul/Kandahar highway with foreign labor at a cost of $1 million per mile.

As things now stand, Afghans, as well as Afghan-Americans who go back to help their homeland, have to play by American rules. Recently an Afghan-American contractor who competed for reconstruction contracts told me that the American military is getting in on the aid scam. To apply for a contract, Afghan applicants now have to fill out a form (in English!) that may run to 50 pages. My informant, who asked to remain anonymous for obvious reasons, commented that it's next to impossible to figure out "what they look for." He won a contract only when he took a hint and hired an American "expert" -- a retired military officer -- to fill out the form. The expert claimed the "standard fee" for his service: 25% of the value of the contract.

Another Afghan-American informed me that he was proud to have worked with an American construction company building schools with USAID funds. Taken on as a translator, he persuaded the company not only to hire Afghan laborers, but also to raise their pay gradually from $1.00 per day to $10.00 per day. "They could feed their families," he said, "and it was all cost over-run, so cost didn't matter. The boss was already billing the government $10.00 to $15.00 an hour for labor, so he could afford to pay $10.00 a day and still make a profit." My informant didn't question the corruption in such over-billing. After all, Afghans often tack on something extra for themselves, and they don't call it corruption either. But on this scale it adds up to millions going into the assumedly deep pockets of one American privateer.

Yet a third Afghan-American, a businessman who has worked on American projects in his homeland, insisted that when Bush pledged $10.4 billion in aid, President Karzai should have offered him a deal: "Give me $2 billion in cash, I'll kick back the rest to you, and you can take your army and go home."

"If Karzai had put the cash in an Afghan bank," the businessman added, "and spent it himself on what people really need, both Afghanistan and Karzai would be in much better shape today." Yes, he was half-joking, but he wasn't wrong.

Don't think of such stories, and thousands of others like them, as merely tales of the everyday theft or waste of a few hundred million dollars -- a form of well-organized, routine graft that leaves the corruption of Karzai's government in the shade and will undoubtedly continue unremarked upon in the Obama years. Those multi-millions that will continue to be poured down the Afghan drain really represent promises made to a people whose country and culture we have devastated more than once. They are promises made by our government, paid for by our taxpayers, and repeatedly broken.

These stories, which you'll seldom hear about, are every bit as important as the debates about military strength and tactics and strategy in Afghanistan that dominate public discourse today. Those promises, made in our name, were once said to be why we fight; now -- broken -- they remind us that we've already lost.

[Philip]

The second viewpoint.

http://www.alternet.org/audits/118038/w ... r_in_2009/

Without a Change of Course, Afghanistan Will Become the U.S.' Next Great Disaster in 2009

By Bill Scheurer, AlterNet. Posted January 9, 2009.

Bush's Final Act: A Bloody War in Gaza
Deepak Tripathi

More stories by Bill Scheurer

Afghanistan will come roaring back onto our TV screens in 2009, with U.S. plans to escalate military operations there. It will crowd out the current Gaza invasion -- like that, in turn, swept away the Iraq occupation, now yesterday’s news -- from our commercial media’s limited attention span.

However, for some of us who work in the peacebuilding field, the war in Afghanistan never left.

Each day, I read articles from Afghani and international press about the violence engulfing that failed state. The U.S. military releases reports of people it has killed, although it never calls them people.

Insurgents, militants, radicals, rebels, terrorists, Taliban and al-Qaida, but never call them people, fellow human beings. Our government reports their deaths like sales figures, production quotas.

We cannot ever call them people -- sons, brothers, fathers, uncles, friends -- because that would challenge our ability to accept their deaths as positive goods, progress in the "war on terror."

We can never allow ourselves to acknowledge that each of these deaths extinguishes a human being who will never breathe again, eat a meal, listen to music, sit with friends or watch a sunset.

We can never allow ourselves to grieve, to recognize that others will grieve, or to feel the shame and failure of what we have done. We did not destroy another person. We merely killed the "enemy."

I am not saying that "we" are "bad" any more than that "they" are "good." I understand conflict. I understand that lives and quality of life are at stake, no matter what we do or don’t do there. All I am saying is that killing is not progress, it is never good. It represents a supreme failure, an ultimate "defeat for humanity" in the words of Pope John Paul II on the eve of the Iraq war.

What if we took a different approach? What if, instead of always trying to win the war, we set about to build the peace. What if we measured building a peaceful world like we measure business success?

In that case, every act of violence anywhere in the world would be recorded as a "defect" in "quality" in our "production" process, not registered as a positive gain. Every act of killing would be recognized as a complete product failure to be scrutinized for what we can learn about how to do things better.

What if we measured building a peaceful world like we measure military success? Every death at the hand of another -- no matter whose death, no matter whose hand -- would be a battlefield defeat to be studied for what we can learn for the next campaign, the next theater of peacebuilding operations.

What if we adopt a public-health model that regards killing as a preventable disease that ends lives before their time? We can set out to eradicate killing, just like we did with smallpox.

We can no longer accept killing as inevitable, much less good. We need to embark on a new policy of "zero tolerance" for killing, by us or anyone else.

President-elect Barack Obama famously said that he wants "to end the mind-set that got us into war in the first place" not just end a particular war. Let us ask him to begin with Afghanistan and to not repeat the mistakes that he saw others make with Iraq. Let's try something different this time.

[RajeshA]

One strategic favor the Americans is doing for the Indians, is of taking TSPA by the collar and make them fight the Pakiban once in a while, thereby accentuating the rift between the Talishtun and the Pakjabis, allowing the Talishtun to spread their influence all over the Pushtun areas in Pakistan, accelerating the break-up of Pakistan.

As far as the other interest of India is concerned, that is, that of seeing to it, that the non-Pushtun ethnicities in Afghanistan are strong and able to withstand Taliban pressure, this too is being looked after to some extent. This could however also have been ensured by India, Iran and Russia working together.

The American presence has also given India some room to build-up our cultural ties with the Afghanistan's educated and 'middle class'.

May be when Petraeus starts his real work under a new President, he will start hardening the capacity of other Pushtun tribes to withstand Taliban overbearance by arming and training them.

But American presence in Afghanistan also has had the detrimental effect of making America dance to Pakistani tunes and throwing its largesse at Pakistan, increasing Pakistan's life expectancy. For this reason only, in case America does not find other secure roots for its supplies into Afghanistan, America would have to withdraw from Afghanistan sooner or later.

As soon as Pakistan starts breaking up, American presence in Afghanistan will become of less use for India. At the moment American presence is primary importance.

India, Iran and Russia now need to step in to make sure, that the Northern Alliance is strengthened.

[chandrabhan]

.There is no need any longer to worry about Islamist entities getting their hands upon Pak's nuclear weapons,as actually the Paki state is now after 26/11 exposed for what it really is,a fundamentalist, fascist, Islamist nuclear rogue terrorist state.

India should let the US increase its presence on the ground,as the arguments for sending Indian troops there is cloudy.If it is to simply force Pak to divert its forces onto its northern border,it is meaningless.Pak simly has to do what it is doing so well now with US/NATO forces,constant ambushes and IED explosions that are causing the greatest havoc.We will be sacrificing our troops in vain.

This is the best description of Pukistan I have read in along time - Short , to the point and blunt. On the issues of troopers on ground in Afghanistan, I am not too enthusiastic for it unless for the right reasons and the gains are quantifiable & Long term. I have repeatedly said that tieing TSP on western front can not be the big reason, has to be others.

[Sanku]

The Taliban can be dealt with differently. We should look back at Operation Enduring Freedom. The whole Taliban administration came crumbling down and they were forced to retreat into the caves for the next 5 years.

I am not in disagreement with most of your post; I however disagree a little here; firstly operation enduring freedom did destroy the Taliban state; however it did not destroy the Taliban and had trouble with phase II.

As such Enduring Freedom is not really a sucessful model for a country which has to be around the Taliban quasi state for ages. We will again have the problem of dealing with fake and real power centers as in Pakiland but far more.

This problem is not going to go away without a constant expeditionary force around. Sort of like Ranjit's Singh tactics.

IMVHO India will have to fight a constant war with brief interludes of peace forever (it has always been so and will always be so) given its Geo-pol location etc. These places are as good as any to hold the line; otherwise it comes home, it always has.

[kasthuri]

It looks like Obama will be sending in more troops just to buy some time to revise a comprehensive strategy in GWOT.

Afghan Conflict Will Be Reviewed

I strongly suspect that his comprehensive strategy could include India - if back channel talks are still active. Any thoughts??

[Rudradev]

But we must also remember that by embroiling ourselves in Afghanistan with a full identification of India with the West will come with a cost. We must realise that there is more terror attacks planned agains India in Pindi HQ, Muridke in Lahore, Binori in Karachi than in Kandahar and even maybe Peshawar. By going in, and being seen as part of US/West, we may end up with more centers and guys planning terror against India.

As usual an astute and well-reasoned analysis from Raja Ram ji.

This point in particular had not been addressed thus far on this thread. Right now, the Baitullahs of the world are too busy fighting TSPA and the US to think of waging terrorist war on India. That is the domain of the ISI's Sarkari Tanzeems, mostly headquartered in Punjab and Sindh. Baitullah has at the most declared an intention to fight India if we invaded TSP, hoping it will win him some relief from fighting the TSPA and the US. Haqqani and others have gone a step further, helping the ISI conduct the attack on the Kabul consulate. However, for the most part they're not too bothered about India.

If we go into Afghanistan as a military presence we will make ourselves the primary target of these TTP and Taliban types by identifying ourselves as part of the Western/US bloc... something we have carefully avoided by only maintaining a civilian aid/assistance-oriented presence in Afghanistan so far. If we put Indian boots on the ground in Afghanistan, the Talibs will be joining hands with the Sarkari Tanzeems to attack, not only the Indian troops there but Indian civilians in Indian cities as well. In effect, not only the troops we send to Afghanistan but also Indian civilians will become the cannon-fodder of America's Afghan war... because after all, it is much easier for the TTP to mount attacks in Mumbai and Bangalore than in Madrid, London or New York.

[ramana]

We have 12 pages of thoughts in case you didnt notice!

The issues are would India get independent command or not and with karzai's invite or as UN force? ISAF is ruled out.

Require independent command.

Raja Ram and Rudradev, One cant have an omlette and not break the egg.

Yes there will be more terrorist attacks on forces in Afghanistan and in India. In case of the former the troops are armed(not carrying flowers) and should take action. In case of latter the presence of troops in Afghanistan should open up more flexibility of response.

[RajeshA]

The Taliban can be dealt with differently. We should look back at Operation Enduring Freedom. The whole Taliban administration came crumbling down and they were forced to retreat into the caves for the next 5 years.

I am not in disagreement with most of your post; I however disagree a little here; firstly operation enduring freedom did destroy the Taliban state; however it did not destroy the Taliban and had trouble with phase II.

As such Enduring Freedom is not really a sucessful model for a country which has to be around the Taliban quasi state for ages. We will again have the problem of dealing with fake and real power centers as in Pakiland but far more.

This problem is not going to go away without a constant expeditionary force around. Sort of like Ranjit's Singh tactics.

IMVHO India will have to fight a constant war with brief interludes of peace forever (it has always been so and will always be so) given its Geo-pol location etc. These places are as good as any to hold the line; otherwise it comes home, it always has.

If the Taliban do not have nuclear weapons, as the assumption is that either the area will be denuked or they would not have the capacity to deliver them, what would be stopping India from using disproportionate use of force, and by that I mean using the biggest conventional and non-conventional bombs at known Taliban positions.

We would consider any attack by the Taliban as an attack by the whole Talibanistan state, and respond with massive force against an enemy having no air defenses, no missiles, nothing modern to defend itself. We will not be fighting to occupy some territory, where we shall be concerned about guerrilla tactics. We will not be fighting to do nation-building and trying to win approval of the people, trying to minimize collateral damage. Moreover Talibanistan would hardly be enjoying good relations with any other country, and as such there would hardly be much international criticism of our retaliation. So our response need not be moderated by fear of comparative reprisal, international criticism or our morality and conscience.

Hamas is fighting 'occupation'. Taliban would be having a country, and a huge one at that. Why should they want to bother us if they are aware of the consequences. The days of old where Pushtun tribal hordes used to come down to the plains of Hindustan and cause havoc are gone.

Kashmiri separatist militants get a easy ride, because Indian security forces have to consider the well-being of Indian citizens, who could get caught up in crossfire. Hamas gets a easy ride because there is severe international spotlight on Gaza and the plight of the Palestinians. Taliban in Afghanistan get an easy ride because US forces are concerned with casualties and public opinion. The Taliban cannot hide behind the label of freedom fighters, if they start attacking India despite having a state of their own. So basically I would expect Taliban to acknowledge India's sovereignty and interests, because violations would involve unnecessary costs and no benefits.

The reason Enduring Freedom Phase I succeeded was because Taliban positions were known and they could be pounded. The part which required the Coalition to hold ground, while Taliban became a guerrilla force, was an abysmal failure. So it is important that when and if India confronts the Taliban we do not try to hold ground, but rather try to destroy everything that gives Taliban succor and comfort.

We would have to be more like the Muslim invaders who attacked India, looted and destroyed it and moved on. Taliban may not have much to protect except their families, and they should be made aware that if they mess up with us, we will mess up with their families and tribes and honor. With time, they will learn to fear the SDRE for his brutality.

The important lesson is: we should not try to hold on to Pushtun territory.

[Sanku]

The important lesson is: we should not try to hold on to Pushtun territory.

Correct and if you see that's the approach I advocate too; but you have to claim overlordship; you can not let the Taliban territory even DEVELOP the capability of a large strike. Too much of a risk of it going there way.

So instead of a large strike after being hit by them; we claim over lordship through forts and expeditionary forces (moder equivalent); and keep hitting them disproportionately after provoking small strikes by them. Never let the "big" strike build up.

Even the unsuccessful (to my mind) op Enduring Freedom needed boots on the ground -- and what we want is far more game changing than that.

[SaiK]

We would have to be more like the Muslim invaders who attacked India, looted and destroyed it and moved on. Taliban may not have much to protect except their families, and they should be made aware that if they mess up with us, we will mess up with their families and tribes and honor.

please ..please!. you don't have be writing an anti-thesis on m-invaders., and we we dont subscribe to this.

a better option is always there.. they are called "surgical operations" .. need a bunch of doctors to do it.. who can do 1 ops per minute - either vasectomy or tubal ligation depending on the type of anti-jihad.

[RajeshA]

The issues are would India get independent command or not and with karzai's invite or as UN force? ISAF is ruled out.

Require independent command.

Raja Ram and Rudradev, One cant have an omlette and not break the egg.

Yes there will be more terrorist attacks on forces in Afghanistan and in India. In case of the former the troops are armed(not carrying flowers) and should take action. In case of latter the presence of troops in Afghanistan should open up more flexibility of response.

There are other forces in Afghanistan who have a much bigger stake in stopping Taliban's advances there than India. Give them weapons, training, organization and money. They are the inheritors of Sher-e-Panjshir, Ahmed Shah Masood's legacy. They can fight the Taliban easily if India, Iran, Russia, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan join hands and support them. Should the USA also extend support, they would be able to break the Taliban's back.

Instead of basing the defense of North Afghanistan on the tribes and clans and warlords, as was the case with Northern Alliance, NATO and USA are trying to mold an artificial construct, the Afghan Army, where soldiers are forced to work with colleagues, with which they do not share any family or tribal bonds, and hence have little motivation to fight and are in it just for the money, and soon corruption takes over.

The organization of the Afghanistan Army has to reflect the Afghanistan Society more closely.

I am afraid an Indian presence in Afghanistan would mean thousands of Indian soldiers becoming prisoner to Pakistani blockade, rather than becoming a threat to Pakistan's security.

[RajeshA]

We would have to be more like the Muslim invaders who attacked India, looted and destroyed it and moved on. Taliban may not have much to protect except their families, and they should be made aware that if they mess up with us, we will mess up with their families and tribes and honor.

please ..please!. you don't have be writing an anti-thesis on m-invaders., and we we dont subscribe to this.

a better option is always there.. they are called "surgical operations" .. need a bunch of doctors to do it.. who can do 1 ops per minute - either vasectomy or tubal ligation depending on the type of anti-jihad.

I'll consider another name for m-invaders, if you can suggest one!

[Sanku]

I am afraid an Indian presence in Afghanistan would mean thousands of Indian soldiers becoming prisoner to Pakistani blockade, rather than becoming a threat to Pakistan's security.

There is that danger -- but we have to make sure it does not happen doesn't it? We were training etc the NA even when Taliban was around, no US has made the mistake of having a rent boy approach and now the rent boys are the one having fun at US expense.

Absentee landlordism stuff does not work (ask me) unless you have a big chacha running the show in your name (EIC/Brits in earlier times) and US now.

We need to "control" the territory, the battle front shifts from Kashmir to Afgan that's all.

[SBajwa]

Bio Warfare anyone?

Anthrax is perfect for terrorists.

anthrax (TR), ebola, Marburg virus, plague (LE), cholera (HO), tularemia (SR & JT), brucellosis (US, AB, & AM), Q fever (OU), machupo, Coccidioides mycosis (OC), Glanders (LA), Melioidosis (HI), Shigella (Y), Rocky Mountain spotted fever(UY), typhus (YE), Psittacosis(SI), yellow fever (UT), Japanese B encephalitis (AN), Rift Valley fever (FA), and smallpox (ZL)[18].

Naturally-occurring toxins that can be used as weapons include ricin (WA), SEB (UC), botulism toxin (XR), saxitoxin (TZ), and many mycotoxins.

Why not lob couple of shells of these at enemy territory? After all from Chenghaz Khan to Ghaznavi and Ghauri did this to us?

[Prem]

Bio Warfare anyone?

Anthrax is perfect for terrorists.

anthrax (TR), ebola, Marburg virus, plague (LE), cholera (HO), tularemia (SR & JT), brucellosis (US, AB, & AM), Q fever (OU), machupo, Coccidioides mycosis (OC), Glanders (LA), Melioidosis (HI), Shigella (Y), Rocky Mountain spotted fever(UY), typhus (YE), Psittacosis(SI), yellow fever (UT), Japanese B encephalitis (AN), Rift Valley fever (FA), and smallpox (ZL)[18].

Naturally-occurring toxins that can be used as weapons include ricin (WA), SEB (UC), botulism toxin (XR), saxitoxin (TZ), and many mycotoxins.

Why not lob couple of shells of these at enemy territory? After all from Chenghaz Khan to Ghaznavi and Ghauri did this to us?

Lets be compassionate and use onlee the most efficient ,fast effecting BW tools. We dont want to see any Paki suffering and dying a slow death in wait for his reward . Just remember , nothing will effect their already dead brain, so onlee physical elimination techniques are suitable to achieve the mission objective.

[NRao]

But we must also remember that by embroiling ourselves in Afghanistan with a full identification of India with the West will come with a cost. We must realise that there is more terror attacks planned agains India in Pindi HQ, Muridke in Lahore, Binori in Karachi than in Kandahar and even maybe Peshawar. By going in, and being seen as part of US/West, we may end up with more centers and guys planning terror against India.

There is a price for not doing anything.

There is a price for going it alone - either a surgical strike or full fledged war or going with the "West".

The price will always be "more centers and guys planning terror against India".

You see THEY see this as spreading Islam.

Which brings me to my fav: Indian leaders currently are not ready for either step for the sake of the nation. The GoI may act for their own skin and business interests. Recall that even TSPA has paid so that these yahoos do not attack TSPA. So, what to talk of India.

After some thought I feel that India has two things to consider: 1) fear and 2) completing the job completely. The prior is self generated due to lethargy or inertia. The latter is due to excessive political interference.

[Raja Ram]

Thanks for the comments folks.

Let me confess, that I had not read a single post on this thread when I posted my own. So I may have missed important points made by others. My apologies

What I have tried to think through and post is to identify what the present situation in Afghanistan is, what the Indian objectives viz a viz Afghanistan and Pakistan should be in it most clear and clutter free form and therefore see how putting 120,000 or any amount of troops for that matter help in achieving those objectives.

What I am not clear and would greatly appreciate your thoughts and comments is the military objectives of the force and how it links to the strategic objectives that I have enlisted. I have an open mind on this issue. Of course there can be a case for deployment but we need to be clear on what we want to achieve.

Then we need to examine if we need a large scale and well dispersed deployment on a permanent basis or a smaller force located at various hubs that can do what is required. All of this is a corollary of what the objectives are for the military.

Military commanders typically insist on a) Clarity of Vision b)Unity of Purpose. It is their taraka mantra for successful missions.

The other point is then to examine of our capability to provide such an expeditionary force and operate this for years on end. Do we have this capability now? Are we prepared to man three fronts instead of two? etc.

Perhaps as a group we can debate and see if we can get a clear case for deployment or otherwise.

ramana ji - I do accept that we cant have omlette without breaking eggs. We need to have a fix on the possible price and the challenges that such an involvement may throw up. After all planning is all about one's progress from cocksure ignorance to thoughtful uncertainity! is it not?

[sudeepj]

The game that Pakistan and Unkil are playing with regards to the whole GOAT effort can be explained in very simple terms.

1) Unkil wants to get rid of AlQaeda 'Global Jihad is us' type Islamists.
2) Pakistan Army wants to retain any Afghan govt. under its thumb and to keep alive an option of Ghazwa-Ae-Hind, preferably through Pakjabi Islamists.
3) There is a huge power asymmetry between Unkil and Pak. This asymmetry can not be brought to bear since Pak collapsing leads to general unpleasantness.
5) Uncle forces Pak Army to hunt down AlQaeda types occasionally and occasionally to mollify Uncle, Pak Army kills random Pakhtoon civilians.

If total war on Pak is not an option for Uncle, then whatever the power asymmetry be between India and Pakistan, total war will never be an option for India. So dreams of 'encircling' with 120,000 Jawans must be laid to rest.

Instead, India should play the same game that Pak is playing. We should not hesitate to hurt with all necessary means, the Pak Army. We should help the Pakhtun Jihadis light a fire under the PakArmys ass. What does this buy us?

1) Leverage over Uncle
2) Pays back Pak in a tit-for-tat ~ general violence
3) What goes of our dad if Pakhtuns take over half of Pakistan?
4) We dont really have any political quarrel with the Pakhtuns. Jihad being a political struggle given a religious cloak, Pakhtuns will not turn on us. Even if they do, first they will turn on Pak Army.
5) Pak army will have to turn on Pakhtuns with their ham handed ferocity. Good for us, internal strife in Pak
6) Pak army may loose its war, good for us, now our war against Islamists is everybodies problem [loose nukes etc.]
7) Pak army wins the war, hehe.. who are you kidding. This is not a possibility.

This will achieve the same thing that 120,000 idea proponents want to.
a) Deny Pakisatans ability to manipulate Afghan Jihadis against India
b) Hit RAPE & RAPETTE life styles
c) LI warfare against Pakisatans
d) Leverage over Uncle. (Note, Leverage and good will are two different things, former far more preferable than the latter)

All said and done, this will reduce PakJab to its historical role of buffer state between India and the West.

[ManuT]

Guys, I would say that India, if it wants to send in troops, should send in to train Afghan Army and Spetsnaz.

Trainers should relieve the ISAF of traning Afghan Army. This will be worthwhile for India in the long run. Like they say 'teach a man to fish...'.

Spetsnaz will work with American Special Forces.

In any conflict with Pakistan, India needs to make sure that West is committed to India's side, by fear and favour.
Fear, meaning - fear of Pakistani Nuclear Weapons. Favour meaning, to prevent a future terror attack on the West.
In addition, India needs to secure its troops positions in the future conflict.

This can only be ensured when we are part of an International Coalition.

[Sanku]

ramana ji - I do accept that we cant have omlette without breaking eggs. We need to have a fix on the possible price and the challenges that such an involvement may throw up. After all planning is all about one's progress from cocksure ignorance to thoughtful uncertainity! is it not?

Dear R^2; I thought we (you) had already nailed what we need the force to do -- it was merely a matter of Pol will.

Anyway (my) summary

1) Broad objectives listed above by you
2) In terms of Charter -- a Bharitya Exp Force (BEF) operating under Hamid Karazi, with the charter to strengthen the security of Afgan govt by assisting in crucial operation as needed, and also to safeguard the Indian civilians.
3) In real terms the charter is -- maintain forts -- use them as bases to find and hunt Taliban. Have Airbases in the north to support these.
4) Have a large Indian civilian presence too; spreading Indian values.

In terms of operating protocol;
1) Have a clear "operating area" division between Indo-Afgan and US-Nato forces.
2) Have your own "predators" sweep down from Afgan into lawless lands.

Its simple -- the question is -- can we force US to give us this space as of now? Perhaps a mini-parakram will help make the pain intolerable and have them ask for "help"

[Kanson]

This dialogue, "All options are open" was first heard from foreign minister followed by other ministers at different times. Now, what could one make out if the dialogue is repeated by Indian Army chief ? What are all those options available for Army chief ? Later today we have this news

Check Pak from Afghanistan: Army Chief

Increasing strategic presence in Afghanistan is “one of the factors” India may consider to put pressure on Pakistan, Army chief General Deepak Kapoor said on Wednesday. He, however, made it clear that the decision would be a political one.

“Changing our strategic policy towards Kabul in terms of raising military stakes is one of the factors that is to be determined politically,” he said. Indian has provided $850 million assistance to Afghanistan, but has steered clear from direct military engagement with Kabul.

[NRao]

Raja Ram,

The Army chief has cracked the egg.

This thread is no longer under the fictitious category for sure. At worst the Lahore Club has been called for a session. India has informed all enemies that India has taken the next step.

All those jihadi networks must be crackling tonight.

[kasthuri]

Raja Ram,

The Army chief has cracked the egg.

This thread is no longer under the fictitious category for sure. At worst the Lahore Club has been called for a session. India has informed all enemies that India has taken the next step.

All those jihadi networks must be crackling tonight.

What is Lahore Club and is there any other info on the troop deployment (other than Army Chief comments)?

[SaiK]

Asked if India, having helped Afghanistan to rebuild infrastructure, should get a strategic presence there to squeeze Pakistan, the General said it was for the political leaders to take a policy decision on the matter.

sope.. the ddmers must be lurking a lot on this thread.

[Philip]

Tx.Chandra.Pak as mentioned,at this moment seems beyond repair.The Zardari regime has capitulated,when it could've obtained massive support from the US/UK/NATO nations to rein in the Paki military species and suppport the civilian govt.What has happened though? From all available evidence,it is the other way round.The Paki military species has instead got the US,etc. to muzzule Zardari and C0.,as the west has succumbed to the hinted blackmail of Paki troops withdrawals on the Afghan front.Asininely,the US/west have not called Pak's bluff,as what goes for warring with the so-called "Afghan Taliban" is actually a charade by Pak-read the article below (..Officials at the center say the Pakistani military frequently ignores or denies requests for specific information about insurgent activities in Pakistan's tribal areas. "There's a hell of a lot of lip service. The Pakistanis talk a good game but don't play a good game," said a U.S. officer who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of military and diplomatic sensitivities. )

It is now so obvious that the US will not sacrifice its ties to the ISI because of decades of collaboration in dirty tricks projects in the region,both also using Dawood,which is why there is little support for India's demand for him to be handed over.US duplicity,is now even more exposed with dabid Milliband's astonishing assertion that the perpetrators of 26/11 should only be tried in Pak!Tell that to an English court my friend and see what happens! Rahul Gandhi should've made short shrift of him and sent him packing instead of a guided tour of Amethi.

In effect,by default,Osama Bin Laden is actually India's best friend in the region,as he and AlQ are the only ones fighting this chicanery by the US and Pak! Osama and his tribe of ungodly species are waging war against thsoe very paki military pigs who are bending over backwards for Uncle Sam.It is these collaborators who in actuality control the Paki nukes and rattle them reguarly when their backsides are in danger.The Paki military is a rogue nuclear entity which is now out of control,posing the greatest danger to the world.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/co ... 236_2.html

U.S.-Funded Intelligence Center Struggles in Khyber Region
From The Washington Post:

TORKHAM, Afghanistan -- Located at the foot of a towering mountain range in eastern Afghanistan, near the border with Pakistan, the $3 million Khyber Border Coordination Center was billed as a first-of-its-kind experiment in intelligence sharing among Pakistani, Afghan and U.S.-led coalition forces when it opened here on a sunny day last spring.

During the ribbon-cutting ceremony March 29, Maj. Gen. David Rodriguez, then the top U.S. commander in eastern Afghanistan, called the U.S.-funded center's opening "a giant step forward in cooperation, communication and coordination." The ceremony, which featured an Army band playing Dixieland, a lavish Afghan feast and upbeat declarations by generals, marked a seemingly historic moment for Afghanistan and Pakistan, which have skirmished over their mutual border for more than 100 years.

But more than nine months later, U.S. officials at the Khyber Center say language barriers, border disputes between Pakistani and Afghan field officers, and longstanding mistrust among all three militaries have impeded progress.

"It's a very useful facility, but it's just going to take a while before they understand what cooperation entails," said Dan Villareal, a military contractor who has worked at the center since its inception.

The stated mission of the center, the first of six slated to open on both sides of the 1,500-mile-long border, is to use the latest technology and intelligence-gathering techniques to track insurgent movements in areas now largely controlled by al-Qaeda and pro-Taliban forces. U.S. military officials have also said they hoped the experimental three-way collaboration would help secure the beleaguered transit route for NATO supplies from Pakistan to Afghanistan.

In the past two months alone, Taliban fighters have mounted about a dozen raids along the route near the northwestern Pakistani city of Peshawar, bringing commercial traffic across the border to a near-standstill several times. Two weeks ago, the crossing here at Torkham was closed for three days while the Pakistani army conducted an operation aimed at halting insurgent raids on convoys.

"If we can limit the enemy activity because of expanded cooperation on both sides, it will not only give freedom of movement in terms of supplies across the border but enhance trade, which will improve the economies of both countries," said U.S. Army Col. Barrett F. Lowe, the officer charged with expanding the Khyber Center's operations.


About three months after the joint center opened, Pakistani and Afghan border-patrol officers at two nearby observation posts exchanged fire after a minor dispute got out of hand. Such skirmishes remain a regular occurrence near the Khyber Pass, where the border drawn by the British in 1893 is considered by both sides to be largely imaginary.

Meanwhile, construction of a second station to the southeast has been delayed by the insurgent attacks along Afghanistan's main highway. The center is scheduled to open in March, but recent photos indicate it is only partially built.

Last month, a marauding band kidnapped two Pakistani officers from the Khyber Center's intelligence-gathering team as they traveled home on leave. The two officers remain in captivity, prisoners of a resurgent cottage industry of abductions in Pakistan's tribal areas. They stand little chance of release unless their families can come up with a combined ransom of about $70,000. The Dec. 7 kidnapping has also complicated relations with a reluctant Pakistani military.

"It's disturbing," Lowe said. "Their kidnapping -- that potentially could have an impact on the Pakistani military's ability to support this effort. They have to think now about how they will get their officers here and whether they can come and go safely."

In an interview in late November, Army Maj. Gen. Jeffrey J. Schlosser, the U.S. commander of coalition forces in eastern Afghanistan, said intelligence-sharing among Pakistani, Afghan and NATO forces has improved but has a long way to go. "It is still, in my mind, in its nascent form," Schlosser said of the Khyber Center.

Although the center opened in March, it wasn't fully staffed and operational until late July. Logistical problems, political wrangling and the Pakistani military's reluctance were the main reasons for the delay, according to people familiar with the center's operations. Officials at the center say the Pakistani military frequently ignores or denies requests for specific information about insurgent activities in Pakistan's tribal areas.

"There's a hell of a lot of lip service. The Pakistanis talk a good game but don't play a good game," said a U.S. officer who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of military and diplomatic sensitivities.

Meanwhile, the area experienced a sharp increase in insurgent attacks. From January 2007 to November 2007 there were at least 431 insurgent attacks along the border. In the same period last year, there were 625 attacks, an increase of 45 percent, according to U.S. military data.

U.S. intelligence experts say the attacks started increasing in 2006, after the Pakistani military struck peace deals with Taliban fighters in Pakistan's lawless tribal areas. The brief respite gave insurgent leaders a chance to devise a strategy aimed at chipping away at NATO's lifeline through the Khyber Pass. Last year, officers at the center watched as that strategy unfolded only a few miles from where they sat.

The center, occupying two hangar-style barracks, is located next to a small U.S. military fort at the foot of a barren mountain ridge. The two-lane highway that serves as the main transit route for NATO supplies is clearly visible from the well-fortified guard towers. Afghan, Pakistani and U.S. officers share not only intelligence there, but also meals and very close quarters.

Much of the officers' working day is spent in an airy control room equipped with five large television and computer screens. While the officers quietly tap away at their keyboards, one of the big screens shows constant feeds from the al-Jazeera news channel. At the back of the room, several U.S. officers man a bank of flat-screen computer monitors and phones marked "Secret."

Another large screen shows real-time video footage taken by the U.S. Predator drones that move in ghostly waves along the border. There are plans to expand the center to make better use of such intelligence, Lowe said. For now, the center has no officers who are expert in analyzing the data sent back by the Predators.

"None of us has the background to be able to interpret what's on the screen," said Villareal, the military contractor. "So it's useful and looks impressive, but it's just like watching TV."

Afghan and Pakistani officers at the center were barred from talking to a reporter during a recent visit. But a glance around the room showed several of them primarily engaged in watching a wrestling match on one of the big TV screens and playing computer solitaire. Their U.S. counterparts, meanwhile, sorted through e-mails from the CIA and other agencies about insurgent activities.

None of the U.S. officers at the Khyber Center speaks Dari, Pashto or Urdu, the local languages. Every decision and bit of information must be conveyed through an interpreter and often through the separate Afghan and Pakistani military command structures. Afghan and Pakistani interpreters sometimes hold back details, Villareal said.

But, Lowe said, the addition of more U.S. staff and technology could help by reducing insurgent attacks and as a result defusing tensions between the Afghans and Pakistanis.

"In this environment, as long as they're talking, then they're not shooting at each other, and that's success," he said.


PS:A magnificent example of how not to run an intel agency with Pak!

[NRao]

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/15/us/po ... ?ref=world

Military Planners, in Nod to Obama, Are Preparing for a Faster Iraq Withdrawal


United States Army soldiers in Afghanistan keeping watch near the Pakistan border. President-elect Barack Obama wants to increase forces in Afghanistan.

By ELISABETH BUMILLER and THOM SHANKER
Published: January 14, 2009

WASHINGTON — Military commanders are drawing up plans for a faster withdrawal of American troops from Iraq in anticipation that President-elect Barack Obama will reject current proposals as too slow, Pentagon and military officials said Wednesday.

The new plans would provide alternatives to a timetable drawn up by the top American commanders for Iraq to bring troops home more slowly than Mr. Obama promised during his presidential campaign. Those plans were described to Mr. Obama last month.

The officials said that Mr. Obama had not requested the new plans, but that they were being prepared in response to public statements from the president-elect and on the basis of conversations between military officials and members of Mr. Obama’s transition team.

Mr. Obama met last week in Washington with his national security team, including Robert M. Gates, the defense secretary, and Adm. Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

A drawdown in Iraq is seen as a prerequisite to any significant American military buildup in Afghanistan, where Mr. Obama is ready to add up to 30,000 troops over the next two years, a near doubling of the current American force there of about 31,000.

The broad outlines of the military plan for Iraq presented to Mr. Obama in December envisioned withdrawing two brigades, or some 7,000 to 8,000 troops, over the next six months, officials said.

American military officials have declined to be more specific about other details in that plan, by Gen. David H. Petraeus and Gen. Ray Odierno, the top American commanders responsible for Iraq. But they have made clear that the plan does not set forth as fast a withdrawal as Mr. Obama pledged during the presidential campaign, when he repeatedly promised to have all combat troops out of Iraq within 16 months of his taking office, or by May 2010.

Officials with Mr. Obama’s transition team say he remains committed to that goal, although he has also said he will listen to the recommendations of his commanders. In an interview on Wednesday, Joseph R. Biden Jr., the vice president-elect, said he was “not prepared to talk about” new troop-level options.

Brooke Anderson, the national security spokeswoman for the Obama transition team, said, “We have had briefings from the Bush administration, including Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, about current plans for Iraq and Afghanistan, and we appreciate the information that has been shared.” Ms. Anderson said that as president Mr. Obama would meet with his commanders “to make a determination to how we move forward to safely redeploy our combat brigades in 16 months.”

Senior military officers say they have anticipated that Mr. Obama will seek speedier options for Iraq troop withdrawals. But they have also expressed uneasiness about a quick withdrawal from Iraq and are unclear at this point about Mr. Obama’s overall strategy in Afghanistan.

“It is more than a question of how fast and how low; it includes calculating how much risk you are willing to take in Iraq,” one senior military officer said of the discussions over a withdrawal.

The official, who asked not to be identified because of the delicacy of discussing war planning before the new commander in chief takes office, said the planning also required defining the future mission for American forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, and goals for where those missions should be in years to come.

“Various options are being drawn up to give the new president choices,” said another senior military officer involved in the process.

Geoff Morrell, the Pentagon press secretary, said Mr. Gates intended to make sure that Mr. Obama, once he is commander in chief, gets to hear directly from all of the senior military officers with a stake in the Iraq and Afghanistan missions before making any decisions.

“The discussions the secretary and the chairman have had with the president-elect and his team have thus far been very broad,” Mr. Morrell said. “They will not begin the process of presenting the president-elect with specific options for a way ahead in Iraq until after the inauguration.”

The current military plan for Iraq was drawn up to meet the recent status-of-forces agreement between the United States and the Iraqi government that calls for both shorter and longer timetables than Mr. Obama’s campaign promise. Under that agreement, all United States combat troops are to be out of Iraqi cities by June and all American forces are to be out of Iraq entirely by the end of 2011. That agreement, however, can be renegotiated.

Even as Mr. Obama prepares for the drawdown in Iraq, some influential Democrats and national security experts have begun voicing concern about his willingness to send up to 30,000 additional American troops to Afghanistan, where the United States has been at war for more than seven years. They say that Mr. Obama has yet to make clear his overall goals beyond calling for more forces, money and diplomacy in an increasingly violent, ungovernable country that the military says presents even more problems than Iraq.

Peter Baker contributed reporting.

[shynee]

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