India Nuclear News And Discussion

Gerard · Post by **Gerard** » 23 Jul 2009 17:30

Sanku wrote:Wonder why? What was special about May 2003?

This perhaps?
He was sworn in as the prime minister on May 22, 2004,

Vajpayee was PM in May 2003

Indira Gandhi was PM when the Civilian EUMA was signed

Sanku · Post by **Sanku** » 23 Jul 2009 17:47

This perhaps?
He was sworn in as the prime minister on May 22, 2004,
Vajpayee was PM in May 2003

Indira Gandhi was PM when the Civilian EUMA was signed

Yes I know I did put in my post that MMS came to power in 2004. So it would be Vajpayee, I guess I didnt draft the post correctly and hit post by mistake what I meant was why did GoI become friendlier w.r.t. inspections in 2003, even when Vajpayee was in power and we were still getting to terms with the Strobe-Jaswant Singh talks.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 23 Jul 2009 17:50

vera_k wrote:End user pact brings India into non-proliferation mainstream

So it's more about non-proliferation than about any arms deals?

After 123, NSG, etc, this is a fig leaf for India.

Sure, it will allow someone to inspect every part that is imported. WRT nuclear parts it is meant to keep track of any dual-use parts that are imported. BUT, that was always expected and India had already agreed to that - it has also abided by that moto for eons.

However, before we get into emasculation, etc, India still has a non-civilian side of the equation - or do we already believe that side is also invaded by this agreement?

My read is that the US has actually elevated the status of India as a WS. Not entirely in the club, but for the most part it is there.

Gerard · Post by **Gerard** » 23 Jul 2009 18:11

The IAEA Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol negotiated by Kakodar codified this.

These explicitly acknowledge non-safeguarded facilities (i.e. strategic military) and the islanding of safeguarded facilities, beyond which IAEA inspections have no relevance. No NNWS state party to the NPT has such rights.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 23 Jul 2009 18:22

The point I am trying to make is that no matter what India imports - nuclear, def, or anything else, two things:

1) All the agreement states is that the US needs (by their law) to verify that the imported item is being used for the intent it was imported for. So, as long as India (and other nations too) declare what India is using the imported item for and uses it for that singular reason - then it is fine with the US

2) WRT "proliferation". This agreement has nothing to do with the strategic side of Indian anything - nukes, def, industries, etc, etc, etc. For the simple reason India will not import anything for that side - thus no inspectionS (IAEA or US)

The problem India has with this agreement is allowing a US inspector to visit a restricted area where these imported items may/could be (as in a F-16 or F-18). They are working that out (it seems to me). They have imported a few items and agreements have been reached for each of them. The US is trying to avoid reaching one agreement per item imported - wants a catch-all agreement, which India is trying to avoid.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 23 Jul 2009 18:24

And, IF the three phase stuff works, it is in India's interest for such agreements to work. India would expect to export her own techs at that time - some 30 years or so down the road - without the recipient proliferating.

Sanku · Post by **Sanku** » 23 Jul 2009 18:32

NRao wrote:And, IF the three phase stuff works, it is in India's interest for such agreements to work. India would expect to export her own techs at that time - some 30 years or so down the road - without the recipient proliferating.

Right but that would be the right time to sign then wouldnt it. 30 years later.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 23 Jul 2009 18:35

Sanku wrote:
NRao wrote:And, IF the three phase stuff works, it is in India's interest for such agreements to work. India would expect to export her own techs at that time - some 30 years or so down the road - without the recipient proliferating.
Right but that would be the right time to sign then wouldnt it. 30 years later.

For India to sign with the country India is supplying the techs to - yes.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 23 Jul 2009 18:47

One more issue. Clinton "mis-spoke" on ENR in ND.

In US pledges to defend Gulf against Iran she had a golden opportunity to clarify her ENR stand in ND. She so far has not corrected it nor have any of her aids - the aids in fact have made plenty of other comments (EUA and nonproliferation for instance).

So, I suspect that India has been allowed to enter the Club. They have to now make a seat for India to sit at the table.

Kanson · Post by **Kanson** » 23 Jul 2009 19:22

ppatil wrote: Here is Bob Einhorn's view on the subject.

A semblance of that principle should be preserved by excluding from permissible cooperation with India equipment, materials, and technology related to enrichment, reprocessing, and other sensitive fuel-cycle facilities. This would permit India to acquire uranium, enriched fuel, and nuclear reactors, but would retain the ban on transfers of those items most closely related to a nuclear weapons program.
Hate to be wet blanket in all these threads, but it is most likely that Clinton misspoke. This article is from 2005.

Should the US Sell Nuclear Technology to India? – Part I

I will go back to my now

Patil, going by your quote, H. Clinton hasn't mis-spoken. What Bob Einhorn conveys is in agreement with Clinton remarks and Daryl Kimball is wrong:

“As I understand [the] question, it was whether we oppose the transfer of processing and enrichment technology, well, clearly we do not,” she said. “We have just completed a civil nuclear deal with India. So if it is done within the appropriate channels and carefully safeguarded, as it is in the case of India, then that is appropriate.”

Second, other reports suggests the same thing.
1.

At an off-the-record interaction with Indian analysts here on Tuesday, a senior U.S. official initially said “India won’t be affected” by the draft NSG rules. But he added he was on “thin ground” and that Bob Einhorn, Ms. Clinton’s special adviser on non-proliferation, was better placed to clarify U.S. policy.

2.India may not be hit by G-8 raising bar on nuke tech transfer

Second, the real target of the G-8, or NSG, is not India, which is not a proliferation threat, but Iran, which is. If ENR technology was to be denied to non-NPT countries, it would leave Iran within the tent and keep India out. However much the world may dislike the Indian nuclear deal, that is really not anyone's intention.

Pls note the mentioning of word Iran and come back see what Clinton has said:

So, if it is done within the appropriate channels and carefully safeguarded, as it is in the case of India, then that is appropriate. But we are very much opposed to unauthorized and inappropriate transfers that unfortunately can take place by certain countries or non-state actors doing so. So, there is a right way to do it and there is a very wrong way. We are seeking the advice and suggestions from India about how we can prevent the unauthorized and dangerous transfer of nuclear technology and material which poses a threat to the entire world.

and further

Describing it as a "landmark event", the US has said the end-user monitoring (EUM) arrangement agreed during Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's visit has brought India into the nuclear non-proliferation mainstream

Going by all these , one can see, this is all about EUV and non-proliferation than denial of ENR to India.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 23 Jul 2009 21:48

I have not found a recent quote from Bob Einhorn - one AFTER he became a sidekick to Clinton.

All of his quotes - that I have found - predate the appointment and were specifically aimed at Bush's attempt to revise 123.

Watching others change direction, I am fairly confident so will Bob. Despite him having bad dreams of nuclear clouds in Mumbai and Jakarta and ..............

Austin · Post by **Austin** » 23 Jul 2009 23:47

Gerard wrote:
quoting ex BARC official
Was the person named? Did he/she play any part in the tests? Is Karnad still advocating multi-megaton warheads?

The point is no matter how you look at it from the pessimistic to optimistic view , in both view one thing common which is "doubt" , there is this oh this did not work at all to , even if this worked this one test is not good enough to make it into a credible TN weapon.

Even if you take the middle ground there is still that BIG doubt , and deterrence is not credible if there is doubt.

The scientist are not certain and doubts exist in scientific community , the military is not confident.

If this is a bluff game well may be this may or may not help , but takes us no where.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 24 Jul 2009 00:15

The doubt is removed if one claims a boosted version of credible yield.
And Gerard is alluding to that.

It doesnt matter what type of hammer is so long as it delivers the blow.

Now that the Arihant is to be underway this matter should be laid to rest.

Gerard · Post by **Gerard** » 24 Jul 2009 00:22

a credible TN weapon

Interesting word.

Credible.

How do you decide on the credibility of a statement? By looking at the achievements of the person making it?

We have statements from RC and AK et al. They claim to have achieved a certain yield and stated they can scale up the design to 200kt.

Now both have actually designed nuclear weapons. Reportedly AK even assembled the first one with his own hands. When someone who has actual weapon design knowledge makes a statement about yields etc, I (as someone who knows nothing about building nuclear bombs) tend to find them more credible than contrary statements from people who have never built a bomb, know nothing about building bombs and have never even seen a bomb in real life.

Other people seem to share my biases. Take Andre Gsponer
http://eprintweb.org/S/authors/All/gs/Gsponer

In his ITER article he writes

This is why the pusher/tamper is sometimes called the “third-stage” of a
thermonuclear weapon. For example, assuming as in Fig.4 that the yield is 150kt
if the pusher/tamper is made of U 238 , the yield will be 300kt if the pusher/tamper is
made of U 235 . On the other hand, if the pusher/tamper is made of a lead or bismuth,
the yield will be significantly lower, on the order of 50kt. This is most probably
what the Indian scientists have done in 1998 in order to be able to detonate the
device at a relatively low depth into the ground, and to minimize the background
signals which may overload the measuring instrumentation.

Finally, if plutonium is used for the pusher/tamper a yield somewhat higher
than with enriched uranium is obtained. This is why using plutonium for the “third
stage” is providing the highest possible yield for a given design. This option has
been implemented in some of the French thermonuclear weapons, and was an
important justification for the French fast-breeder program, as it could be for the
Indian plutonium reprocessing/recycling program

He seems to find RC and AK's claim credible. No doubts here.

Now I don't find RC and AK credible because Gsponer says so. I take RC and AK on their own merit. What Gsponer writes does reinforce my perceptions however. After all, RC and AK (and others) built the first Indian bombs.

And I find it interesting how easy it is for some to doubt the credibility of Indian scientists who have spent their entire working lives building the bomb for India, to not only doubt, but to call them traitor, sellout, liar etc; To call for their arrest and imprisonment yet this European physicist doesn't doubt.

JE Menon · Post by **JE Menon** » 24 Jul 2009 02:06

And Abdul Kalam was there too, at the press conference immediately thereafter. He is no babe in the woods either, and all of them would have had to lie, know they were lying and lie repeatedly. And they were all fairly deeply involved at one level or another - and certainly well enough informed. It is hard for me to accept reasonably that all these people who actually did the stuff were involved in propagating falsehood without dissenting, while the only people who were prepared to be honest were retired.

So it is really a question of whom you want believe, and perhaps more importantly, why.

Prem Kumar · Post by **Prem Kumar** » 24 Jul 2009 04:26

IMO, the issue is not one of whether the TN weapon was a boom or bust. I think we will never know the full truth and people have to live with their opinions one way or the other.

The issue is one of the yield. The highest yield we tested was 45KT. I dont want to question the reasons given for the yield to be downgraded - because its speculative territory again. The point is - if we have never tested a 150 or a 200 KT weapon, how do we know we will get that yield? That's my biggest gripe with the voluntary moratorium - a premature abortion of testing. To use a crude phrase: "If r@pe (sanctions) was unavoidable, we might as well have laid back and enjoyed it (keep testing)"

Its like the situation with the Agni series - there is no point in speculating or showing graphs that demonstrate that A3 will have a 12K range. If we havent tested it at that range, then it will not be deployed at that range during wartime.

That's what makes the deterrent not as strong as it should be.

Gerard · Post by **Gerard** » 24 Jul 2009 05:11

You are assuming that a full yield proof test is necessary to have confidence in the device.
It may be desirable, but is it necessary? Let me play devil's advocate for a bit...

If, as claimed, the material used for the secondary pusher/tamper - Pb/depleted U/LEU/HEU/Pu - determines the total yield of the weapon - e.g. from <50kt to >300kt - and the secondary works, then going to full yield requires just substitution of the material. There is no need to test this to full yield.

While you and I may desire a full yield test, the people who actually designed and built the weapon have confidence in the scalability of their design. If they aimed for a certain yield and got that yield from the test, what does that say?

Likewise the designers of the "Fat Man" Hiroshima bomb were confident of their design. There was no test prior to combat use. Today with the advances in computing power and simulation ability, why are we so eager to doubt the abilities of the Indian scientists who actually build the bomb?

Has any Israeli weapon been tested? Have their missiles been tested to full range? Does anyone doubt the credibility of their arsenal? Does it not deter their enemies?

Gerard · Post by **Gerard** » 24 Jul 2009 05:39

it will not be deployed at that range during wartime.

Ideally one should have full yield and full range proof tests (or as near to them as possible) prior to induction by the military. But the ideal is not always possible.

French President Chirac justified their last test series on the need to proof test the TN-75 warhead. The US and Russia are limited by the TTBT to test yields <150kt and make do with reduced yield tests but they have greater test experience and data.

The French were forced to curtail their test series. India doesn't exactly have the freedom of action to test as it wishes. The current environment is not one that would welcome renewed testing. So, for now, India makes do with the 1998 test series data. But who knows what the geopolitical environment will be like in a decade. How strong will India be? What other countries might go nuclear? We may very well see the full yield tests.

Sanatanan · Post by **Sanatanan** » 24 Jul 2009 08:09

You are assuming that a full yield proof test is necessary to have confidence in the device.
It may be desirable, but is it necessary? Let me play devil's advocate for a bit...

If, as claimed, the material used for the secondary pusher/tamper - Pb/depleted U/LEU/HEU/Pu - determines the total yield of the weapon - e.g. from <50kt to >300kt - and the secondary works, then going to full yield requires just substitution of the material. There is no need to test this to full yield.

Gerard,

With genuine curiosity, I venture to ask this question as a lay person in the realm of explosive devices (of all types, not just nuclear):

Would, for example, the dimensions and, may be, other specification details, of the "tamper/pusher" be the same irrespective of whether it is made of Pb, Depleted U, LEU, HEU, or Pu? Are they interchangeable one-is-to-one?

If there could indeed be constructional differences arising from differences in their physical or mechanical or chemical or nuclear properties or manufacturing methods adopted - for example forging Vs casting - then there may be a case for an argument that the replacement design should be proven by test.

Kanson · Post by **Kanson** » 24 Jul 2009 08:25

Prem Kumar wrote:IMO, the issue is not one of whether the TN weapon was a boom or bust. I think we will never know the full truth and people have to live with their opinions one way or the other.

The issue is one of the yield. The highest yield we tested was 45KT. I dont want to question the reasons given for the yield to be downgraded - because its speculative territory again. The point is - if we have never tested a 150 or a 200 KT weapon, how do we know we will get that yield? That's my biggest gripe with the voluntary moratorium - a premature abortion of testing. To use a crude phrase: "If r@pe (sanctions) was unavoidable, we might as well have laid back and enjoyed it (keep testing)"

Its like the situation with the Agni series - there is no point in speculating or showing graphs that demonstrate that A3 will have a 12K range. If we havent tested it at that range, then it will not be deployed at that range during wartime.

That's what makes the deterrent not as strong as it should be.

Your question is quite valid. In addition to what Mr. Gerard replied let me put it this way.

If you are technically minded, then after the sucessful burn of Primary and Seconday, irradiating the tertiary(tamper/pusher) is a child's play. At tertiary only fission is taking place. Which is as good as simple Primary. But in case of POK-II we tested FBF with Secondary. More difficult to get is fusion.

And you may have further doubts whether fusion fully happened or not. To answer that question I ask you to go through the Operation Castle conducted by US during 1950s. You may find from that BARC claim of scaling from 45 KT to 200 KT is quite possible and you may get satisfication that whether it is partial burn or full burn, net result is we can very well have an N warhead with yield in the range of 200KT. And as Gerard pointed out, warheads of most BM have the yield of around 100KT that includes China too. So we are well placed to deter the adversary.

Its like the situation with the Agni series - there is no point in speculating or showing graphs that demonstrate that A3 will have a 12K range. If we havent tested it at that range, then it will not be deployed at that range during wartime.
That's what makes the deterrent not as strong as it should be.

Who claimed that A3 got 12k range. WWhich official proclaimed as that so. It is one thing to ride on fantasies and take that one to the extent of saying we havent tested that to 12k and we dont have deterent is height of ...what to say.

Our only adversaries are Chian and Pka. What we have to concenterate at present is whether we have missiles with enough range to deter both these nations from attacking India With respect to that, our missiles are callibrated and tested. So tel me, with the range that A3 is tested, can both these nations can be detered.

Arun_S · Post by **Arun_S** » 24 Jul 2009 12:44

Gerard wrote:
a credible TN weapon
Interesting word.

Credible.

How do you decide on the credibility of a statement? By looking at the achievements of the person making it?

We have statements from RC and AK et al. They claim to have achieved a certain yield and stated they can scale up the design to 200kt.

Now both have actually designed nuclear weapons. Reportedly AK even assembled the first one with his own hands. When someone who has actual weapon design knowledge makes a statement about yields etc, I (as someone who knows nothing about building nuclear bombs) tend to find them more credible than contrary statements from people who have never built a bomb, know nothing about building bombs and have never even seen a bomb in real life.

For credibility one can talk to the leader of Shakti series (RC, AK and Kalam worked under him if one cares for Operation Shakti campaign team and its hierarchy ) and all your doubts will vanish, just like mine.

Other people seem to share my biases. Take Andre Gsponer
http://eprintweb.org/S/authors/All/gs/Gsponer

In his ITER article he writes

This is why the pusher/tamper is sometimes called the “third-stage” of a thermonuclear weapon. For example, assuming as in Fig.4 that the yield is 150kt if the pusher/tamper is made of U 238 , the yield will be 300kt if the pusher/tamper is made of U 235 . On the other hand, if the pusher/tamper is made of a lead or bismuth, the yield will be significantly lower, on the order of 50kt. This is most probably what the Indian scientists have done in 1998 in order to be able to detonate the device at a relatively low depth into the ground, and to minimize the background signals which may overload the measuring instrumentation.

Finally, if plutonium is used for the pusher/tamper a yield somewhat higher than with enriched uranium is obtained. This is why using plutonium for the “third stage” is providing the highest possible yield for a given design. This option has been implemented in some of the French thermonuclear weapons, and was an important justification for the French fast-breeder program, as it could be for the Indian plutonium reprocessing/recycling program

He seems to find RC and AK's claim credible. No doubts here.

Now I don't find RC and AK credible because Gsponer says so. I take RC and AK on their own merit. What Gsponer writes does reinforce my perceptions however. After all, RC and AK (and others) built the first Indian bombs.

And I find it interesting how easy it is for some to doubt the credibility of Indian scientists who have spent their entire working lives building the bomb for India, to not only doubt, but to call them traitor, sellout, liar etc; To call for their arrest and imprisonment yet this European physicist doesn't doubt.

Indian pusher/tamper was neither made of a lead, bismuth or U238. It was a fully loaded baby. One can appreciate the degree of under-performance from that, because one will realize that fissile 3rd stage will generate much yield even if second stage generated no yield. The people who need to be convinced are not RC/AK but their team leader, DRDO and Services (As customers BARC serves them and needs to convince and deliver to them; + Customer is always right, and having toiled around the design team, they dug the wells and know how deep it was; they know their stuff enough, they are not naive to understand what is the expected yield versus what was seen).

Arun_S · Post by **Arun_S** » 24 Jul 2009 12:49

Cross posting from ATV/Arihant thread:
------------------------------------------------------

Austin wrote:
Gerard wrote: The yield of the Sagarika warhead is not known. It could very well be a 90-100kt TN one.
If our TN fizzled out by most estimates how can we get that 90 - 100 kt figure ?

Correct.
There is a very big difference between what one has been demonstrated and what one wishes. Deterrence come from what is credibly demonstrated not from wishful statements.

Powers that need be concerned know that TN fizzled (second stage fusion yield << 10 Kt). In current setup the only way India can climb out of the TN hole is to field two sets of high energy Laser facilities for Inertial Confinement, one for weapons program and identical one open for civil research (for others to see) so that no one is any doubt that Indian weaponeers have relevant setup for validating TN weapon in relevant energy regimes. Of course to keep the system honest India will need two autonomous and independent teams of physicists (not engineers) and mathematicians owning the design verification and stewardship.

Unless the above gets done Indian TN weapons credibility will stay put at <<10 Kt secondary yield and weapon yield <45Kt.

One can't fight against reality. Take it for what it is worth, and I do not wish to argue further.
------------------------------------------------------

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 24 Jul 2009 12:56

Q.What is the difference betwen Hillary Clinton and Hubbie Bill?

A. Hillary "mis-spoked",Bill "miss-poked"!

Gerard · Post by **Gerard** » 24 Jul 2009 20:11

Arun_S wrote:For credibility one can talk to the leader of Shakti series (RC, AK and Kalam worked under him if one cares for Operation Shakti campaign team and its hierarchy ) and all your doubts will vanish, just like mine.

K Santhanam?

The Quantum Leap

I think India is much better off after May 1998. First, Pakistan's weapons have been forced out of the closet. Our option, which had been on oxygen since 1974 (if not earlier), came out of the icu. Our status is no longer 'ambiguous' and the people of India feel relieved that national security interests are protected. Secondly, the asymmetry with respect to China stands largely removed and it is worth emphasising that deterrence is not just about numbers alone. In an evolutionary way, when India's longer-range missiles—through flight tests, manufacture and induction—reach maturity in the coming years, China's policy towards India may well go through some accommodating revisions. Also, China's nuclear and missile support to Pakistan could decline in the years ahead.

Indo-US nuclear treaty: A good deal

Why the nuclear deal is just not done

Reading these articles, one does not get the impression he harbors any doubts about the TN test.

You wrote (a while back)

Arun_S wrote:One comment on that BR Missile article by Shri Santhanam was "but America has capped Indian ability to realize and mount that small TN payload on its missiles with this India-US civil nuclear...

Yet he says on the TV (from outlook article above)

Dr Santhanam replied with an emphatic ‘no’ when he was asked whether India was compromising on its national security....Dr Santhanam said he thought it was going to be a win-win deal for India.

And a decade before he said
India capable of making Neutron Bomb: Santhanam

I am confused

. These are not the statements of a man doubtful over ignition of the TN secondary.

It is quite peculiar that the views you attribute to him are so at variance with his published opinions.

Kanson · Post by **Kanson** » 24 Jul 2009 20:57

NRao wrote:I have not found a recent quote from Bob Einhorn - one AFTER he became a sidekick to Clinton.

From the link

Einhorn insists that the American willingness to cooperate on nuclear matters with a state not party to the NPT, based on its commitment to being a responsible nuclear power, signals a “radical departure” from global norms, weakening the entire system of nonproliferation. Yet, he says, a few measures may limit the collateral damage done by the bilateral deal. If India, for example, agrees to freeze production of fissile materials and maintain its tough stance vis-à-vis Iran, some of the deal’s harm may be undone.

and we have
1.this

Sharing a vision of a world free of nuclear weapons, both sides agreed to move ahead in the Conference on Disarmament towards a non-discriminatory, internationally and effectively verifiable FMCT.

2. On the tough stance vis-a-vis Iran, what he means that whatever been transfered from US to here should be safe whithin the confines of India and not reach Iran not only that including Indian help. H. Clinton statements reflect the same.

So, if it is done within the appropriate channels and carefully safeguarded, as it is in the case of India, then that is appropriate. But we are very much opposed to unauthorized and inappropriate transfers that unfortunately can take place by certain countries or non-state actors doing so. So, there is a right way to do it and there is a very wrong way. We are seeking the advice and suggestions from India about how we can prevent the unauthorized and dangerous transfer of nuclear technology and material which poses a threat to the entire world.

Gerard · Post by **Gerard** » 24 Jul 2009 21:01

Sanatanan wrote:If there could indeed be constructional differences arising from differences in their physical or mechanical or chemical or nuclear properties or manufacturing methods adopted - for example forging Vs casting - then there may be a case for an argument that the replacement design should be proven by test.

Indeed. On the other hand, would not these be more readily simulated, instead of requiring explosive testing? Could these not be tested by irradiating models (via KALI etc) ?

As a layman, I would prefer to see full yield testing prior to induction. Yet I am hesitant to second guess the people who actually do this stuff.

negi · Post by **negi** » 24 Jul 2009 21:31

I don't know what is the obsession with yields , specially when we have already detonated a thermo nuclear device with a 45kt yield. Given the devastation caused by the Hiroshima and Nagasaki sized bombs and the population density of major cities of our potential adversaries I think a 45kt bomb is a pretty decent deterrent .

RU and US stockpile is nasty example of what a crazy quest for higher yield and zillion warheads leads to.

Our major concern should be to ensure the survivability of our arsenal in event of a preemptive strike and of course the 'effectiveness' and the 'range' of the delivery platforms.We shall celebrate deepawali at the right time until then it is 14 year wanvaas for us

.

Kanson · Post by **Kanson** » 24 Jul 2009 21:36

"Customer is king" is bandied about by companies who are interested in increasing business and profits by appeasing the customer to the extent of reaching their interest. Neither BARC nor DRDO operate on the sole premises of maximizing profits and the phrase more relevant would be "Indian interest is the King" for these organizations.

One said "Customer" interested in the foreign maal went to the extent of sabotaging Arjun MBT test trials in favour of that. Can the same phrase "Customer is King" is valid here ?

Sanku · Post by **Sanku** » 24 Jul 2009 23:17

negi wrote:I don't know what is the obsession with yields , specially when we have already detonated a thermo nuclear device with a 45kt yield. Given the devastation caused by the Hiroshima and Nagasaki sized bombs and the population density of major cities of our potential adversaries I think a 45kt bomb is a pretty decent deterrent .

Without taking size in the yes or no yield debate, the obsession with yield is based on a simple factor.

Higher yield == smaller size warhead == longer range.

Sanku · Post by **Sanku** » 24 Jul 2009 23:18

Kanson wrote: One said "Customer" interested in the foreign maal went to the extent of sabotaging Arjun MBT test trials in favour of that. Can the same phrase "Customer is King" is valid here ?

Highly avoidable to post anti IA propaganda without proof, in general given that Arjun saga stinks for reason other that IAs role best avoidable.

Rahul Shukla · Post by **Rahul Shukla** » 25 Jul 2009 00:13

Gerard wrote:Likewise the designers of the "Fat Man" Hiroshima bomb were confident of their design. There was no test prior to combat use.

Saar, minor correction only... from wiki-shastra

Trinity was the first test of technology for an atomic weapon. It was conducted by the United States on July 16, 1945, at a location 35 miles (56 km) southeast of Socorro, New Mexico on the White Sands Proving Ground, headquartered near Alamogordo. Trinity was a test of an implosion-design plutonium bomb. Using the same conceptual design, the Fat Man device was dropped on Nagasaki, Japan, on August 9.

vera_k · Post by **vera_k** » 25 Jul 2009 00:14

The Politicsparty reporter says that the EUVA/EUM allows the US to inspect military nuclear facilities. The non-proliferation aspect makes sense if this is so. How does this happen and for what?

http://www.politicsparty.com/surrender.php

Gerard · Post by **Gerard** » 25 Jul 2009 00:18

Rahul Shukla wrote:Saar, minor correction only... from wiki-shastra

My mistake... the Little Boy Hiroshima bomb

Gerard · Post by **Gerard** » 25 Jul 2009 00:22

vera_k wrote:The Politicsparty reporter says that the EUVA/EUM allows the US to inspect military nuclear facilities.

Utter Nonsense.

Is India going to buy equipment for its military nuclear facilities from the US? The US will sell India equipment to be used in military nuclear facilities? The US will violate the NPT?

India is shutting down CIRUS, after spending a great deal of money and time in refurbishing it.
It is totally replacing the core of the APSARA reactor (the first and oldest reactor in all Asia BTW) so as to avoid having foreign inspectors around. It will do all this and then invite US inspectors over for tea?

Vikram_S · Post by **Vikram_S** » 25 Jul 2009 02:18

sanku wrote:Highly avoidable to post anti IA propaganda without proof, in general given that Arjun saga stinks for reason other that IAs role best avoidable.

Sorry Sanku, but its not propoganda..
Some of the actions undertaken by the Army to stop Arjun induction were totally without ethical considerations
Please be aware that trial evaluators who gave the Arjun favorable comment were even verbally attacked by superiro officers who wanted opposite results
Many many such things have happened, and finally it took huge hue and cry all the way upto MOD level before these incidents stooped.
Posting more will drive the thread OT, so I shall stop

Gerard · Post by **Gerard** » 25 Jul 2009 03:46

Muddy policy hurdle faces India-U.S. nuclear deal

U.S., India begin sensitive talks on atom fuel supply

Nuke deal: Just Rs100cr cover for accidents

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 25 Jul 2009 05:35

Gerard wrote:Muddy policy hurdle faces India-U.S. nuclear deal

The India-U.S. civilian nuclear deal, already hit by procedural delays, may face a new hurdle: the Japanese partners of top U.S. nuclear firms may need to convince Tokyo and get approval to do business in India.

Analysts say this could mean India and Japan may need to sign a nuclear deal first, adding to the multiple policy and regulation hurdles that have already delayed commercial implementation of the India-U.S. pact.

What crap. They did not know this before?

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 25 Jul 2009 06:39

Japanese always pull this stunt of not supporting unpeaceful activities. They say everything others do is unpeaceful. However they control all the inputs needed for peaceful and unpeaceful activities. In other words the IUCNA with US will be held up due to Japanese actions. So those two sites will be barren. Koi baat nahin!

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 25 Jul 2009 07:12

I would have thought, that when India said X number of reactors by 2020, that India (and US) would have taken Japan into account. As Indians we are very much used to a delay, that is nothing new. But, this could take India a few lives!!!

And, remeber those Chinese reps at the NSG, the ones who left in a hurry after voting noyes at NSG, they I bet missed their connection at Narita (Tokyo Airport).

negi · Post by **negi** » 25 Jul 2009 09:56

^ I am not much perturbed about Japan's tallel than mountain 'values' , infact to be honest it is obvious that India neither has the cash nor men & material to start work with all the three Reactor suppliers (RU,FR,US) simultaneously . If US needs time to convince Jpn...fine , GOI can always engage the French to start their work at the respective allocated site . Let GE and Westinghouse

in the mean time.