Deterrence

Prem · Post by **Prem** » 06 Oct 2009 02:16

Samuel Sir,
Threat picture should be simple, If Bharat goes so goes the rest who has facilitated the destruction of India. If India cant do it now ,it should not stop working on it as this is the only way to deter Chinese and Friends company.

samuel · Post by **samuel** » 06 Oct 2009 02:54

Let's wait for the blowback Prem ji, on the forum I mean. There will be plenty of opposing views that will be useful to consider. But if someone is willing to put down a threat matrix and construct a risk table that would be a great first step before we come to decisions.

I want to just emphasize that the numbers on the previous page should probably be subject to refinement.

So, if you were to counter them, how would you go about it? Suppose someone said, but in this day and age who is going to go to such a full scale war and bring upon so much destruction on their economies. Even one bomb on 3-gorges would be a nightmare and set China back. Does that not deter? Then, what is the response? on the one hand, such a statement could come from a genuine place of extreme reluctance to wield nuclear weapons. On the other hand, it could come from a myriad of political considerations that impinge on the very developmental pathway one envisions for India or themselves or even brf.

I would propose that we try to work to get these motivations without judging them. It will be clear in the end which are for the nation and which are for the group or individual etc. By sticking to a stance of keeping things simple, sense as that makes, we lose out on the opportunity to reach out and lose out on the opportunity to smoke out. Both. Let things be what they are and just titrate, perturb and reason with what comes by till it falls out. That is why I am a little reluctant to get rigid but will happily recommend constructing a "threat matrix" before we decide on "what the deterrence is" (which will also take a bit of research).

JMT
S

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 06 Oct 2009 03:03

Before we go too far, please take a look at:

Estimated Chinese Nuclear Forces 2006 (about middle of the page)

China first deployed the DF-2A, with a range of 3100 Kms and a yield of 3.3 Mt in 1971

Then, a 13,000 Kms range missile with a 4-5 Mt in 1981.

The latest seems two missiles with a range of 7000 - 11000 Km with an unknown yield.

But in 1991 they deployed a missile that hosted a yield of 200-300 Kt.

Do NOT bother with Pakistan for the time being. For where was Indian strategic thinking between 1971 and 1991? When India should have been really worried. Right? For during that time - it seems to me - India did not have ANY deterrence AT ALL and china should have had a lot of sway in threatening India and perhaps even doing much harm.

samuel · Post by **samuel** » 06 Oct 2009 03:04

I think the notion that India had no deterrence at all in the cold-war world is a bit misleading.
We should look into what the relationship with the soviets was more closely there.

S

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 06 Oct 2009 03:06

OK, found refs to the DF-31 and 31A missiles. They host 100 Kt to 1 Mt. Deployed between 2006 and now.

Also note that they are reducing their yield/missile - perhaps due to the improved accuracy of their missile. Have not yet checked the CEP.

China seems to have between 150 to 200 missiles. I suspect it is about 250 - 300.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 06 Oct 2009 03:07

samuel wrote:I think the notion that India had no deterrence at all in the cold-war world is a bit misleading.
We should look into what the relationship with the soviets was more closely there.

S

Well......................................................... which is what I said in totally different words: Venn diagram.

I would not be surprised (and please this is a dream guess on my part) that some data has exchanged hands to model some basic things.

Please do NOT reference this post.

samuel · Post by **samuel** » 06 Oct 2009 03:10

So, is US the sugar daddy now?
Any estimate on how many 31 types are deployed?

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 06 Oct 2009 03:15

US?

That judgment has to be made based on policy decisions being made in ND. For, it seems that just based on Indian scicom capabilities things are not THAT reliable. So, what is the confidence with which an Indian leader (fro instance) could tell Clinton in 1999 or so that India will level Pakistan, IF ....... Expand that statement: bluff, true based on only Indian capabilities, .........................

Does we all see confidence in Indian leadership? Or has anyone detected even a slight lack of it?

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 06 Oct 2009 03:17

10 have been deployed they claim. Has a CEP of 300-500 meters!!!!!

samuel · Post by **samuel** » 06 Oct 2009 03:19

We are getting hockey pucked again, it seems like not much has changed since the brits left.
While the soviets sugared us with peace and friendship, providing a pretty stable nuclear umbrella in cold war MADness (please correct),
that's lifted. We have one smiley and a fizzle-sizzle shakti and nothing much to scramble with to meet up.
We got nothing but save a one or two week conventional punchout with China and if we go nuclear, I believe we are toast.
The only thing that ensures our well being is to run to a sugar daddy. China wants to be that sugar daddy, and the US does, neither will let us
go anywhere and we don't lift ourselves by the bootstraps. Everyone's got a finger in our country.
Instead, we worry about whether one hit to 3-gorges will do the trick...why is that?
JMT of course
S
PS: Thanks on those numbers. should we multiply factor of 1.5 fudge to totals?

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 06 Oct 2009 03:22

samuel,

That was not the direction I would have taken the discussion in.

Clearly Santhanam is very concerned about deterrence (and rightly so). One of the questions I would have for him is why is that India did not feel threatened in the earlier years when China had so many weapons to threaten India and India had none. Why now, when India has something.

Just an academic question.

Imagine. 1962, then 65 with Pak, 71 again with Pak with a bloody nose, Kargil. And, all those years in between when things were hot and cold.

I have to suspect that it was the USSR. Perhaps Russia has decided to carry over that responsibility too. Dunno.
_____________________________________

No, no, no.

Not numbers.

Policy. Strategic policy.

samuel · Post by **samuel** » 06 Oct 2009 03:25

What really was the strategic policy then;
an implicit alignment with soviets with a public nonalignment face?
What is the strategic policy now --
we gotta start lining up with yanks without pissing the chinese off too much?

Otherwise, please educate. Happy to learn here or on some other thread.

S

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 06 Oct 2009 03:30

I do not know pre-2000. Did India have one?

Today, whatever the NFU/nuclear doc is, I think someone like SSridhar is far better at it than me.

The point being in those days China had a ton of nukes and India had .......................

Today India has something and we feel more threatened?

All I am trying to figure out is what are we so afraid of.

Comments?

Will duck for a while.

samuel · Post by **samuel** » 06 Oct 2009 03:35

We are afraid now because we don't have a sugar daddy.
We were not so afraid then because there was a soviet daddy.
and a geopolitical situation that kept china hemmed reasonably in, while it grew. Later after the cozying up with US, if china had moved south, the soviets would've freaked!
If you read books from the period and describing soviet-indian relationships, boy it sounds better than the sound of music. There can be only one reason for that, really.
Now, it is the counter to US. That's scary.

S

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 06 Oct 2009 03:37

Before I duck, China stats:

1971 : 16 missiles, range 3100 Kms, each with 3.3 Mt yield
1980 : 22 missiles, range 5500 Kms, each with 3.3 Mt yield
1981 : 20 missiles, range 13000 Kms, each with 4-5 Mt yield
1991 : 35 missiles, range 2100 Kms, each with 200-300 Kt yield (India centric???)
2006 : 10 missiles, range 7300 Kms, each with 100-1000 Kt yield
2007+: ??? missiles, range 11000 Kms, each with 100-1000 Kt yield

___________________________________________________________________________________--

Or Indian leaders are not scared because the Venn diagram has been modified

samuel · Post by **samuel** » 06 Oct 2009 03:38

Why not print out the soviet stats, too?
In 1991 Russia had 40,000 nuclear warheads.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russia_and ... estruction

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 06 Oct 2009 04:08

My weekend work.....

While reading the numerous threads after K. Santhanam’s revelations, I came to some conclusions on the process by which Indian elite makes its policy decisions.

---------------------------
Indian Strategic Elite and the Nuclear Question

Despite George Tanaham’s RAND report there is an Indian strategic elite consisting of: scientist-strategists, military- strategists, and civilian strategists. These three groups are responsible for charting the Indian nuclear strategy.

Scientist-strategists were the early pioneers, Scientists like Drs. H Bhabha, V. Sarabhai, H.N. Sethna, Raja Ramanna, M.R. Srinivasan, PK Iyengar were the well known proponents of this group of strategists. Being aware of the power of the atom they helped formulate the initial strategy. The main aims of the group are: acquire, demonstrate and retain the nuke capability.
Military-strategists- Some well known members are: K.K. Nayyar, Raja Menon, Brajesh Jyal, Gurmeet Kanwal. However the doyen of this group is Gen Sundarji. His principle contribution to the nuclear strategy was : Minimum credible deterrent based on Realist school of International Relations. It is based on proven warheads on proven delivery vehicles. When his strategy was formulated, only fission weapons were envisaged without further tests. His doctrine is contrary to the prevailing political view that nukes are symbolic weapons of power. A key component to the strategy is that the deterrent requires reliable delivery vehicles which are solely in DRDO’s purvey. The 1998 tests before the proofing of the required delivery vehicles was factor for later events. The main aims of this group are: acquire, proven weapons deployed in the forces.

Civilian-strategists – All members not belonging to above two types are included in this group. The civilian-strategists include four broad sub-divisions: maximalists-seek what ever the front ranking powers have (B. Karnad, B. Chellaney et al), minimalists- seek the bare minimum to maintain a nuclear deterrent based on a borderline pacifist world view (Dr. C. Rajamohan et al), disarmament strategists: some former Ministry of External Affairs officials, peace activists(Praful Bidwai et al) and chatterati (Achin Vanaik)- seek disarmament of India as first step of global disarmament ideally and together with others as a maximum position, and lastly political-strategists- seek to support the government stand and build support or consensus behind it. The principal doyen of this grouping is Dr. K. Subramanyam. The main aims of this group are: acquire, demonstrated weapons with out jeopardizing the international status of India. The Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE) in 1974 was a break with the civilian-strategists dogma. The 1974 PNE broke the consensus this group had built up and they quickly reacted to prevent the follow-thru of the test. Again the 1998 tests, broke the consensus that these groups re-forged after the 1974 PNE and caused great dissension. However this time this group was not able to reverse the situation due to the atmospherics in the neighborhood and the constant wars after the tests: Kargil, Operation Parakram and unrestricted terrorism from Pakistan and the unsettled borders with China.

One common theme of all three groups(except the disarmament and chatterati groups) is that nuclear weapons are required only to deter China. The crafting of the No First Use (NFU) doctrine is a clear indication of that. This doctrine clearly states that nukes will not be used on Pakistan unless in retaliation. On all other issues( Force posture, Force composition, Nuclear doctrine, International treaty negotiations etc) these three groups dissent often vehemently. The interaction between these groups can be seen by the opinion-editorials and speeches in the Indian news media.

Consensus

Even before Independence the scientist- strategists embarked on a program to acquire nuclear capability which received official approval of PM Nehru after Independence and were at the forefront of developing the strategy. The consensus was to acquire all the technologies that are required to demonstrate nuclear capability in all aspects- electrical power and weapons without overt demonstration. Until 1960s the emphasis was on the symbolic and prestige value of the nuclear technology and the pursuit of power reactors were an indication of that thinking. Weapons research wasn’t pursued with any seriousness and people were content to give the impression that the acquisition was an easy task. The literature of the Fifties (Beaton, Maddox et al) seeks to address the question when will India test and it was a given that they would. After the twin blows from China of 1962 aggression and the first nuclear test in 1964, the consensus shifted to seeking a nuclear umbrella from the West and failing that to retain a capability to acquire the technology by staying out of the NPT. The 1971 victory and the creation of Bangladesh reduced the threat from Pakistan. However superpower interventions and inducements to PRC, forced the pace and resulted in 1974 PNE. However again the consensus was that the technology would not be weaponized.

Again the events in 1970s and 1980s overcame peaceful thinking- Pakistan acquisition of nuclear technology and weapons from Western Europe and China forced the Indian decision. Again the acquisition was not demonstrated and led to instability. In 1990s the CTBT, was forced and had India in its Entry-into-Force clause and there were repeated moves to break out: 1995 Rao, 1996 ABV and finally the political system decided to take the heat and sanctioned the 1998 tests during NDA government. The scientists chose the technologies to demonstrate and there was little input from other groups. The tests broke the national consensus on retaining weapon capability without demonstration. In addition the underperformance of the TN device did further damage to the consensus and re-arranged the strategic elite in all the three segments. Some of those who were scientist-strategists(officials) moved to the political-strategist spectrum and within the civilian-strategists spectrum the groups were further re-shuffled with the political-strategists managing to come to primacy. The important thing is the disarmament-strategists also coalesced into this latter group. In addition it put the rationale of Gen. Sunderji’s doctrine of Minimum Nuclear Deterrent (MND) which was based on fission weapons at risk.
------------------

Hope its all kosher and passes the tests.

Prem · Post by **Prem** » 06 Oct 2009 04:15

Pak, India urged to bring CTBT into force
http://www.thepakistaninewspaper.com/ne ... p?id=14710

Look who attended the meeting

Besides co-commissioners Gareth Evans and Yoriko Kawaguchi, those attended the meeting included Frene Noshir Ginwala (South Africa); Gen. (retired) Klaus Naumann (Germany); Baroness Shirley Williams (U.K.); Nobuyasu Abe (Japan); Louise Frechette (Canada); Prasad Kariyawasam (Sri Lanka); Rory Medcalf (Australia); George Perkovich (US); Maj. Gen. Sheikh Md Monirul Islam, Md. Mosharraf Hossain and Nahida Sobhan (all Bangladesh); Brajesh Mishra, Satish Chandra, Shyam Saran, Maj. Gen. (retired) V.R. Raghavan, Narendra Sisodia, K. Subrahmanyam, and B.G. Verghese; Lok Raj Baral and Madan Kumar Bhattarai (both Nepal); Rifaat Hussain, Tariq Osman Hyder, Gen. Talat Masood and Brig. (ret.) Naeem Ahmed Salik (all Pakistan).

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 06 Oct 2009 05:08

RAND :: 1992 :: Indian Strategic Thought

112 pages.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 06 Oct 2009 05:12

RAND :: 2001 :: India's Emerging Nuclear Posture

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 06 Oct 2009 05:15

RAND :: India's Emerging Nuclear Posture

Seems to be in seven parts, each a 100+ pages!!

sid_ashar · Post by **sid_ashar** » 06 Oct 2009 05:21

Why is the NFU policy sacrosanct in the Indian context? If India decides to abandon it, wouldnt the whole strategic and deterrence paradigm shift significantly? From what I read, seems like India does not have a operational/deployed nuclear arsenal and that seems consistent with a NFU stance but seems a little ridiculous, considering the neighbourhood we live in.

Abandoning the NFU would force at least the Chinese to rethink before embarking on any adventures.

The NFU is I guess government policy but its not something that has to be endorsed by parliament or any other agency. I would think that it could be changed. Has India benefitted (other than the moral high ground, which is worthless IMHO) in any way with this defensive posture?

Sid

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 06 Oct 2009 05:25

This is a free product, but will need to go through the process to check it out:

RAND :: The Changing Political-Military Environment: South Asia

The security environment in South Asia has remained relatively unsettled since the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests of May 1998. The author explores the impact of these tests on relations among India, Pakistan, and China and examines the future course of the policies of these nations toward each other. He finds that five major geopolitical contingencies should concern the United States during the next decade: (1) major subcontinental war; (2) stagnation and state failure in Pakistan; (3) "high entropy" proliferation of strategic technologies; (4) a high-intensity Indo-Pakistani arms race; and (5) a high-intensity Sino-Indian arms race. U.S. sanctions leveled on both India and Pakistan in the wake of their nuclear tests have constrained engagement on a military-to-miltary level. But the renewal of American relations with both India and Pakistan offers new, even if small, opportunities in the near term. The real value of continuing to engage India, however, will be manifested only over the longer term, when the growth of both Chinese and Indian power in Asia will create new opportunities for the U.S. Air Force.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 06 Oct 2009 05:27

RAND :: 2001 :: Limited Conflicts Under the Nuclear Umbrella

WRT Kargil.

Again, five pdf based chapters (free) to down load.

Prem · Post by **Prem** » 06 Oct 2009 05:33

Ramana Ji,
You have pretty accurately assesed the last 50-60 years of indian efforts, thinking and strategy to balance and deter the strategic threat to India with homegrown capabality achieved with hard work .Since now the conssesus among major policy players is broken now, the issue seems to now how to move forward and consolidate the gains and this is where Indians have to put a joint front and not quibble and waste the available oppertunites . This is where we are all stuck now, suspicious of everything and every one with huge Trust deficit lacking in confidence .

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 06 Oct 2009 06:05

Anything is OK - as long as there is deterrence. Disagreements are all over the place - even our friends China has them.

Folks,

BTW, check out the latest Newsweek - plenty on the topic of nukes and associated topics. Iran is kicking up a ton of dust and bringing the topic to the forefront.

http://www.newsweek.com/

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 06 Oct 2009 06:28

samuel wrote:To get to some simple numbers (probably simplistic, but we can refine)

Arsenal of 100 x 25KT weapons will allow us to target ~ 10 city-sized targets.
Between China and Pak, that's about 5 each. Then we only got blanks.
In return, about 400 x 1MT devices stare us along with a few KT type from west.
Each MT leads with high probability to collapse of indian city, delhi size. Even with
100 x 1MT cities, that's nearly every major city in India.
So either, pakistan goes, china survives, and we go or china and pak survive and we go.

Arsenal of 100x100KT weapons will allow us to target about 25-30 city-cized targets.
Now we can do some serious damage but its bye bye here too, easily.

At 250 x 250 KT weapons, we can target nearly every major city and installation of both.
And leave some for a repeat. That's where I'd place my deterrent and gear testing to get to.
Build TN, lightest payload, develop 250-300KT class weapons, all modes of delivery. End.

Please note that it is not the size of the enemy's arsenal but the number of targets we deem necessary
and the desired/accomplishable kill probability that will determine what we need. The objective is to guarantee
the end of that civilization if it attacks us with nuclear or weapons of mass destruction of any kind.

Please also note that unlike the time since 1962, we don't have the soviets to bank on. So, we don't have a pact
we can count on, even indirectly to come to our help. We have to have this ourselves (unless the whole idea is to
create public opinion to fold into the US structure, as it appears to be happening).

JMT
S

Samuel many people have come up with their own views of nuclear exchange scenarios. Sanjay (on the forum) has written a book where he refers to Gen Sunderjis views. Others including K Subrahmanyam and Bharat Karnad too have their views - all available on a Bing search.

I myself wrote up my own views of scenarios at least twice before in this series of threads, but let repost a view of mine from another thread

In my personal opinion - there are two views that seem to be current among the supporters and wielders of nuclear weapons. I am not offering answers - only attempting to point out differences of viewpoints. I currently subscribe to one of these viewpoints and I will state which one after I state my view. I am not forcing anyone to accept my view and do not intend to be critical of those who do not share my view and promise to viciously counter-attack anyone who attempts to mindlessly belittle those who share my view with mockery or sarcasm.

One view is the need to show a huge bomb. It is not enough to have a bomb but it is necessary to demonstrate the capability of completely decimating an adversary. Anything less than that will not cause fear and will not deter. I am talking glass parking lot here - nobody left alive for miles around. Entire cities flattened in one go.

The other view is my view. The ability to decimate anyone is unnecessary. What is needed is the ability to inflict massive suffering. Injuring large numbers of people and making them run for help which they will not get - and letting them die slowly over days or weeks is far more effective in extracting revenge than mercifully killing off everyone. This is because live people will demand action from their leadership to save them. Live but injured people without hope will exert a far greater effect on the morale of fighting forces. If people are dead and the leadership survives - the leadership has less of a burden. It is dealing with 25 million people with horrific burns and radiation sickness along with 5 million rotting dead bodies that is true suffering rather than the smooth blue jannat of total decimation. Heaven comes after death. Hell needs to be right here. For this, you do not need such big bombs, but you need larger numbers of smaller, dirtier bombs and delivery vehicles. However you also need one heck of a lot of fissile material to waste.

suryag · Post by **suryag** » 06 Oct 2009 07:08

Shiv ji,
I have often seen that you prefer to go the halal route than the jhatka one. The problem with killing only a few millions and leaving the rest injured is that you are leaving behind a mass of people who have living memories of how their near and dear ones died. We also need to understand that the injuries in people could vary from say 50 to 0 % radiation burns and people who got away with mild injuries will come at us with greatest force to avenge the death of their near and dear ones. For example if in a family of five(3 in the case of PRC courtesy one child policy) you kill three and injure the two, and think that the surviving two will silently resign to suffering for the rest of their lives then that is not right. If not anything the two will be baying for blood and can go to any lengths to cause harm to the perpetrators.

In addition to this the CCP will also indulge in vicious propaganda and make sure they have an army of nothing to lose people raring to go at the Indians. Even if it is not instantaneous reaction these injured people will for their lives carry the burden of revenge and would even impart the knowledge of suffering to their kids. We definitely dont want to create so many vengeful citizens baying for our blood. We also cannot defeat them militarily to force a Japan type outcome.

Benjamin · Post by **Benjamin** » 06 Oct 2009 07:09

I very well understand your view and do appretiate it.

However, our supreme aim should be our survival. We have to try and ensure that most of the nuclear missile/delivery systems installations are destroyed in the first attack.

If we use bombs of lesser yield to make them suffer, there are more chances that more of those warheads will survive and that will be a burden for our BMD shield.

Instantaineous strike- first strike-allout strike - against both China and Pakistan, only under below circumstances.

1. Both china and pakistan wage war against india.
2. Intelligence of imminent nuclear attack.
3. China gaining military victory in a conventional war.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 06 Oct 2009 07:48

suryag wrote:Shiv ji,
I have often seen that you prefer to go the halal route than the jhatka one. .

In this particular instance my views are based on two separate, but related views

1) In a nuclear war with China or even Pakistan, India cannot "win" in the conventional sense of the term. It is important to ensure that we cause them both pain so they cannot claim victory

2) Of course India can win any nuclear war against virtually anyone (except the US and Russia) in the Mao Dzedong sense of "winning" Even if only 300 million Indians are left alive India has "won". That means India is wiling to lose 800 million people. This is exactly what Mao told Nehru about his views on nuclear war (as per Gurmeet Kanwal)

I believe that anyone who refers to "jhatka" and "big bum" needs to get real about whether nuclear war is good even if we are well prepared. Just because we have 10,000 x 10 megaton bums does not make nuclear war more pleasant or winnable.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 06 Oct 2009 07:53

Benjamin wrote: However, our supreme aim should be our survival. We have to try and ensure that most of the nuclear missile/delivery systems installations are destroyed in the first attack.

I believe that this is impossible. I think most people including you have an over optimistic view of how much damage can be done by even 1000 X 1 megaton bombs on a nation the size of even Pakistan, leave alone China.

Do you know the land area of Pakistan?

Do you know how much land area is damaged (at the maximum - including "mild" damage) by a 1 megaton bomb?

Just calculate what percentage of the land area of Pakistan can be devastated by 1000 one megaton bombs. The percentage is so small that even Pakistan can hide at least some of its missiles from such a first strike.

Are we willing to accept 4 Pakistan nukes of 15 kilotons on 4 Indian cities and then claim victory?

uddu · Post by **uddu** » 06 Oct 2009 07:58

ramana wrote:The principal doyen of this grouping is Dr. K. Subramanyam.

There is a video on the internet in which he says that we must have minimum nuclear deterrent capability and rather than act unilaterally act in co-operation with major powers to sort out issues. This means if China causes any trouble run to unkil and complain. So it's unkil, aunt and poodles who will be providing protection rather than our capabilities.

Shiv, no one needs war. But if there is a nuclear war, its about finishing off the enemy completely. The second part is same for everyone. So let's wish that there is no nuclear war, but if it happens, there is no way except death for the participating nations.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 06 Oct 2009 08:07

uddu wrote: But if there is a nuclear war, its about finishing off the enemy completely. .

Uddu have you personally done, or come across calculations regarding the number of nukes needed to "finish off" an enemy completely"?

May I respectfully suggest that you do some Binging/Googling for info and calculate what it might take to "finish off" even Pakistan, let alone China and post you calculation on here?

I am certain your views will metamorphose when you see how big the world is and how small we are.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 06 Oct 2009 08:16

NBC capable tanks anyone? Some are expected to survive a direct hit!!!! Nuclear hit.

There is nothing called "finish" them of. All nations should, by now, have a game plan in place to save the "top most" people in pretty much all fields. The US has saved up all metals to restart a nation.

RamaY · Post by **RamaY** » 06 Oct 2009 08:34

Shiv-ji

I am confused one more time.

If India cannot destroy TSP completely even with 100000x1MT bums, how can you write-off India when faced with a PRC+TSP nuke attack?

By your logic isn't it a good idea to throw, say 16468x1Mt bums against PRC and 2747x1MT bums on TSP? When no one can be destroyed completely, isn't it a good idea to destroy as much of enemy capability as you can?

I really do not understand the difference between a 10000x25KT nuke force and a 10000x1MT nuke force. Would it really make a difference for an SDRE nation like India? If not isn't it a good idea to have a 10000x1MT nuke force so India can claim to be a big guy and save some cow-dung so the future generations can generate nuke-energy and improve our e-con-omy?

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 06 Oct 2009 08:35

A One megaton bomb has a circle of destruction for which moderate damage (or worse) occurs in a circle up to 113 sq km. Mild damage (or worse) occurs up to 180 sq km. If you had 1000 x 1 megaton bombs you could hit/affect perhaps a maximum of 200,000 sq km (but less than 25% of this if you are looking at destroying hardened bunkers)

Pakistan has a land area of 800,000 sq km. If Pakistan distributes 60 nukes dispersed equally all over its land surface - 75% of them will escape your "first strike" of 1000 one megaton bombs. You can then sit back and expect 3 bombs each on 15 Indian cities.

China has a land area of 3 million sq km.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 06 Oct 2009 08:38

RamaY wrote:Shiv-ji

I am confused one more time.

If India cannot destroy TSP completely even with 100000x1MT bums, how can you write-off India when faced with a PRC+TSP nuke attack?

self deleted

m mittal · Post by **m mittal** » 06 Oct 2009 08:56

Seems to me like a lot of wet dreams.......

Prem · Post by **Prem** » 06 Oct 2009 09:04

Since Indians believe in AVATAR, will the advent of AVATAR change any strategic equation wrt PRC ?

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 06 Oct 2009 09:09

RamaY wrote: When no one can be destroyed completely, isn't it a good idea to destroy as much of enemy capability as you can?

I really do not understand ..

I also don't understand. Why do you want to half-destroy an enemy when you should be vinaash-ifying him completely? That is defeatist no. I thought I was the guy who was constantly being a wimp.

I may be wrong no? Why blindly accept my argument? I would like you to reassure me and tell me how to destroy the enemy completely, or alternately explain what advantage is to be gained by leaving a part of him intact to hit us back with nukes?

How many nukes is courageous and patriotic Bharat willing to absorb before our victory starts becoming a little sour because we were defeatist and did not destroy the enemy completely - accepting wimp like arguments from me? Alternately how many nukes do we need to "destroy the enemy completely"?