CT & COIN Operations in India: News, Images and Discussion

[Rahul M]

Very important issues that RahulM raises - that of Convoy security.

I heard of one incident from orissa a few years back, a relatively large group of CRPF personnel/state police (hazy memory) + their weapons were being sent to a camp in a maoist infested area.

the district collector decided that it was too risky to send the weapons as the maoists were looting weapons, so the police were sent without the weapons ! the maoists attacked that night and killed virtually every unarmed policemen, people who were trained to respond with a gun but who were without one due to the folly of the IAS officer. the arms convoy reached the spot the next day (there had been no communication b/w the groups) and the maoists promptly looted the whole weapons cache too.

[ASPuar]

Very important issues that RahulM raises - that of Convoy security.

I heard of one incident from orissa a few years back, a relatively large group of CRPF personnel/state police (hazy memory) + their weapons were being sent to a camp in a maoist infested area.

the district collector decided that it was too risky to send the weapons as the maoists were looting weapons, so the police were sent without the weapons ! the maoists attacked that night and killed virtually every unarmed policemen, people who were trained to respond with a gun but who were without one due to the folly of the IAS officer. the arms convoy reached the spot the next day (there had been no communication b/w the groups) and the maoists promptly looted the whole weapons cache too.

Bihar police had a policy of not giving weapons to policemen in Maoist infested areas, because it would cause them to attack the station to take the weaponry.

[sudeepj]

I dont understand. What do you mean they cant steal a chopper? I mean, its true... but so what? Are you suggesting ground ops should be stopped? I dont think thats a good idea, for very many reasons.

Anyway, what if they start using AA weapons? Then theres a whole new, and terrible dimension to this fight.

No, I meant that a chopper is one way to bring firepower to bear without risking it being pilfered and used against the state.

So what if they start using AA weapons? Even the vaunted LTTE was not able to lay its hands on much AA weaponry, how will the maoists? And even if they do, it cant be much worse than what just happened.

As to tactics taking time, the whole point of updated tactics is that they are developed fast, and can ameliorate emergent tactical scenarios.

I am just not sure that CPOs can modify their tactics fast enough to cope with the threats.

[Brahmananda]

centre's strategy wont work till the states take the threat seriously, its the state who deal with internal problems within their territory, the state police should be the spearhead like in AP, each state must have its own large force of atleast 15000+ members of highly trained people for anti factionist operations. even with better equipment the centre i believe wont have much of an effect on the maos because they use hit, run and disperse tactics. they assemble for attacks, attack and disperse, tracing every single individual member or small groups or sections of them becomes even harder in those jungles. Hence even so far in hunt operations, the forces only kill a few at once and not in a mass. so you need real hard local intel from villages, tribes, with maos mingling in these villages and tribes, any whiff of central forces get their alarm bells ringing as well. So we need a more localized approach and prevent their fingers from passing on intel on our operations. Central troops are more vulnerable because they have a bigger footprint and maos can easily gather intel on them . Its harder for them to trace down local forces. most of the greyhounds are recruited from naxal affected areas, people who know the terrain and territory they often have to cover. I think all states must have such an anti factionist force to counter armed rebellions and even if maos are whiped out there could be another form of future rebellion, who knows. so yeah 15000+ really well trained personnel force per state trained in local terrain, just dedicated to quickly quell factions and maos should be a must. just like Quick reaction teams or SWAT teams are also a must for all state police forces for protecting towns, cities etc. Then the centre can focus on the global picture of taking out national level criminal assets primarily finding financial supporters, sympathists, logistics, flow of arms and ammo for the maos etc. I think it'll be easier to deal with them if we have 15000 or so men per state than having to send more than 50000 central forces to a few states to take them out. This way we can prevent the spread and each state will have enough force levels to counter them.

with tactics such as set trap, hit/ambush and disperse, even with armed helos and fighters, it wont make much difference because tracking these small groups become harder and they just cant go shooting at every small group they see or bombing them. Besides with fighters and helos flying across the enemy will still remain in hiding they are cowards and cowards never take up a fight they cant control and they fight togther as one unit with co-ordination. we will always require ground level intel and confirmation of targets, one can use uavs or quiet little birds flying high and monitoring large areas of jungles day and night and naxal hit zones. spotting suspicious movements and waiting for massive gatherings of people in areas where people should't be at all. when you spot them, dont rush to hit them, just observe and learn, cant just kill them because killing leads to dead ends, we need more answers, the maos are slowly spreading across the country and on the long run we'll be very effective with state police spearheading shadow and quiet ops while centre focuses on national level. even with many of their old illegal arms factories destroyed they still have arms and ammo, rpgs, mortar, ieds etc. They are a well armed force and a network, so it will be a long and drawn out battle if the centre actually sends troops who arent suited for such ops. Centre should pull out of these areas while gradually each state raises its own massive anti factionist force trained to meet local, cultural, language, behavioural and terrain requirement.

The maos are a force rooted in the ground, cant kill them from the air, you need to get close, look them in the eye and pull the trigger, because chances are you wont id them till your up close and personal. they can wear civilian clothes, mingle in villages and tribes, even give central forces wrong intel and lead them into traps. well trained state units will have better and quicker results.

We cant compare the maos to insurgent pukis, the crpf is well trained to deal with puki insurgents and fidayeen attacks but maos operate usually in lagre numbers and often show up in over 100 for such brazen attacks and info suggests that they have organized thmselves into companies and platoons, BSF, ITBP dont belong in such roles, these forces should stick to their mandate of protecting our frontiers and not get engaged into internal fights like this.

[cbelwal]

The comparison between the Jihadists and Maoists does not hold any merit. The jehadis use urban terrorism tactics and their primary aim is to create fear. They do not have the capacity to overthrow a government (no matter what they claim !).

The Maoists on the other hand are graduating into a full fledged professional army and its orbat is taking shape. They already have command and training structures and company / batallion level commanders. They have a budget of 1400 cr. and they are willing to 'pay' their soldiers Rs. 3000 pm salary.

And they are highly motivated. An excerpt from their training methology:

"......Her first assignment was to teach A B C D to the uneducated in the camp. On another assignment she struck a policeman with ten lathi blows while another comrade slit his throat ..."

And they are capable of cool calculated strategic thinking:

"They can now bring many sectors of Indian economy to their knees. But they don't want to do it today. They know that if they do that now, the state will come very hard on them. They are not fully prepared to face the onslaught of the state machinery. So, they would rather go very slowly," Home Secretary Gopal K Pillai had said recently.

IMO people are deluding themselves if they think Maoists is a Law and Order problem. It is becoming the second 'Indian' army. Will people profess using air support against an invading army ?

[ASPuar]

Cbelwals post rings true. But what sort of Air ops would you use, and against what target? You cannot say that anyone in an area is declared a maoist, and now the shooting gallery is open! Our own citizenry is out there, essentially hostage to the Maoists.

GK Pillais comments make for frightening reading, btw. Hes the home secy, and he should know. It is time this menace was wiped out once and for all, but I dont think the CPOs, in their current config are capable of doing it.

[cbelwal]

For starters the government should stop making statements which sound like "no matter how many die, air power will never be utilized". Give the security agencies complete freedom to develop strategies for using air power with a mandate to avoid civilian casualties and allow them unrestricted access to full range of army and air force assets. With complete operational freedom and military's guidance the CPO's can use air power as they deem necessary and as the situation demands.

Another aspect of using choppers is the psychological impact in Maoist cadres. So far the leaders have recruited innocent tribals showing them the SLR equipped Pandu as the only representative of state power. The tribals learn that the Pandu can be conquered by sheer numbers and believe this war can be won. They need to know that going against the Indian state also involves fighting heavy machine gun and rocket equipped helicopters against which their land mines, 5.56mm, 7.76mm and 12 bore ammunition is useless.

Mao Zedong may have won the war in China in 1930's but at that time the concept of air power was only taking shape.

But what sort of Air ops would you use, and against what target? You cannot say that anyone in an area is declared a maoist, and now the shooting gallery is open! Our own citizenry is out there, essentially hostage to the Maoists.

[kittoo]

The comparison between the Jihadists and Maoists does not hold any merit. The jehadis use urban terrorism tactics and their primary aim is to create fear. They do not have the capacity to overthrow a government (no matter what they claim !).

The Maoists on the other hand are graduating into a full fledged professional army and its orbat is taking shape. They already have command and training structures and company / batallion level commanders. They have a budget of 1400 cr. and they are willing to 'pay' their soldiers Rs. 3000 pm salary.

And they are highly motivated. An excerpt from their training methology:

"......Her first assignment was to teach A B C D to the uneducated in the camp. On another assignment she struck a policeman with ten lathi blows while another comrade slit his throat ..."

And they are capable of cool calculated strategic thinking:

"They can now bring many sectors of Indian economy to their knees. But they don't want to do it today. They know that if they do that now, the state will come very hard on them. They are not fully prepared to face the onslaught of the state machinery. So, they would rather go very slowly," Home Secretary Gopal K Pillai had said recently.

IMO people are deluding themselves if they think Maoists is a Law and Order problem. It is becoming the second 'Indian' army. Will people profess using air support against an invading army ?

This day was really really bad. Now I have forgotten about pakistan etc....there is only one thing in my mind right now- maoists.
And to worsen it there is this feeling that nothing is being done.

[negi]

One can spin zillions of scenarios around the use of air assets but this discussion is not about it , the point is why handicap oneself when one is not sure about the strength of the adversary (thanks to our intelligence) . For instance when our men ambushed had there been couple of Mi-17s loitering with armed troops we could have taken the attackers by surprise . Hell even 10-12 APCs would have sufficed .

And this from horse's mouth

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/indi ... 768339.cms

"We were totally outnumbered. And they had far too much ammunition. How could just 80 of us fight more than 1,000 of them? It's unfair to even expect us to fight back when there was no way to do so. We got no time and no opportunity to retaliate. I saw my mates drop one after another before my eyes," said CRPF jawan Pramod Kumar (39), who witnessed 75 of his battalion colleagues massacred on Tuesday morning. He is one of the fortunate seven who got out of the ambush alive.

"Another company was sent to rescue us. But by the time they arrived, there was nobody left to be saved."

Are we trying to say that we do not have enough capability to track down movement of a mob as big as one consisting of 1000 or men ? Ah I forgot no use of air assets , choppers are only for bringing in the injured or dead .

I have always believed this problem has deteriorated to a level where we need to bring in the IA , we have had enough of thumb twiddlers thinking too much about their vote banks and misplaced sensitivities , a well coordinated seek and destroy mission is what is required to sort the mess asap , the longer the time spent in neutralizing these cretins higher will be the price in terms of men and material what nation will have to pay eventually .

[sunny y]

I saw my mates die one after another

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/indi ... 768339.cms

We were totally outnumbered. And they had far too much ammunition. How could just 80 of us fight more than 1,000 of them? It's unfair to even expect us to fight back when there was no way to do so. We got no time and no opportunity to retaliate. I saw my mates drop one after another before my eyes," said CRPF jawan Pramod Kumar (39), who witnessed 75 of his battalion colleagues massacred on Tuesday morning. He is one of the fortunate seven who got out of the ambush alive.

According to Kumar, it was a mistake to have some jawans take the anti-landmine vehicle. "That vehicle was in front. We were walking behind it. Suddenly there was a blast and the vehicle went up in the air. All the jawans inside were killed in an instant. We lost about 15 men in that single explosion. Thereafter, it was mayhem," he recalled.

[Brahmananda]

also the CRPF made some foolish mistakes it seems, firstly they split up into two groups, they were 120 in total, they split up into groups of 82 and 38, the larger group was attacked, secondly they have clearly strayed away from the guideline set before them, the use of vehicle in land mine infested areas is dire negligence, they were just 4 km away from base camp, also shows a intel failure. Jungle warfare guideline clearly suggest no vehicle to be used in red terror lands. they should have walked and thus no vehicle explosion, no chaos, they could have atleast countered them and force those idiots to turn back. i am sure 120 CRPF jawans have enough fire power to counter a 1000 or atleast hold them back. spilitting up was a big mistake , vehicle another big mistake. the link below has some nice observations. hopefully lessons learned here.

http://naxalwatch.blogspot.com/

[Rahul M]

"That vehicle was in front. We were walking behind it. Suddenly there was a blast and the vehicle went up in the air. All the jawans inside were killed in an instant.

has to be a pretty massive IED for that to happen. I don't think putting men inside MPV is a mistake, in most cases these survive the landmines and the soldiers inside can provide fire from a protected position, almost like a bunker.

the problems with tactics are apparent even in this short report, why would you divide your troops piecemeal and let the maoists destroy them piece by piece? why wasn't there any advance scout party ? that is one of the most basic tenets of convoy security.

Jungle warfare guideline clearly suggest no vehicle to be used in red terror lands.

EDIT, see later. a bulletproof vehicle is used by soldiers on foot as cover and also serves as a firing post.

edit : OK, I read the report from which your comment came, in gerard's post.
that means, the security forces have acknowledged that the MPVs being used are not expected to hold up against the IEDs in use, that is frightening indeed !
that's as bad or even worse than iraq.

[Gerard]

Troopers ignored warfare manual in Maoist den

Irrational strategy, flawed operations', say experts

[Craig Alpert]

ANTI-LANDMINE VEHICLE - By defination is used to WITHSTAND a LANDMINE attack (ofcourse it depends on the the sheer volume and size of the landmine and the vehicle used against it) sort of like armor and armor piercing bullets.
Either the mine used in the explosion was a lot more powerful than what the vehicle was suppose to protect, OR the vehicle did not do it's job.
From what they knew that everytime there is an ambus they are outnumbered, commonsense is to make sure you have the upper hand, by knowing WHO you are up against. What they need is UAV's like Raven or Netra which can warn them of their terrain and identify targets well before they walk into this trap. AGAIN the fact that they could not identify that the mine was planted in the Night, brings out the lack of NIGHT FIGHTING capapbility. What's more is that they can use Foilage Penetration Radar (but something tells me India does not have this capability YET!) borrow from the Yehudis if they have, GOOD OLE' states MIGHT lend them some.. Tacticts NEED to be updated, the fact that weapons are stolen, they need to account for that as well, Infiltrate their networks, find out HOW they are training, WHERE, WHEN, WHY and with WHOM! Find these and case solved!

[Craig Alpert]

LOW RES: PICS Naxal attacks: A bloody timeline

[Brahmananda]

well rahul bhai they do have a guide line for fighting a guerilla force and driving into land mine infested regions is sheer stupidity no matter how good the protection level is, a large blast will always disorient a group and will end up creating too much noise and offcourse a confused soldier is easy to kill. Instead of using vehicles as shields ,they should may be use ballistic shields or even morchas for cover they are easily available and are very effective in counter typical rifle rounds like 303, 7.62 ak and SLR rounds.

[Aditya G]

CRPF capabilities and response aside, what boggles me is CPIM's ability to concentrate and coordinate a battalion sized fighting force.

This truly is the bloodiest day in Indian COIN ops.

[Aditya G]

The gory details...

http://www.thehindu.com/2010/04/07/stor ... 680100.htm

RAIPUR/KHAMMAM: In their deadliest attack on paramilitary forces yet, Maoist rebels killed 74 members of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and 2 policemen from the Chhattisgarh police and destroyed an Armoured Personnel Carrier (APC) in the early hours of Tuesday in Chhattisgarh's Dantewada district.

The attack took place in the Mukrana forest, about 540 km south-east of the State capital Raipur. Seven injured personnel were evacuated by helicopter to the Maharani Hopital in Jagdalpur.

“A joint operation involving one company of the CRPF's 62nd Battalion and troops from the Chhattisgarh Police were ambushed by the Maoists this morning,” confirmed Police spokesperson Inspector-General R.K. Vij. “The force was returning to base camp after a three-day area domination exercise.” Apart from the 73 foot soldiers and policemen, Deputy Commandant of the 62nd Battalion Satyavan, Assistant Commandant B.L. Meena and Head Constable R. Siyaram Dhruv of the Chhattisgarh Police were killed in the attack.

The following account has been pieced together from press statements issued by the Chhattisgarh police and interviews with sources in the security forces and intelligence sources in Chhattisgarh, Andhra Pradesh and Delhi. A comprehensive account shall be possible only after interviews with the survivors.

The ambush occurred at about 5.30 a.m. when one company of the 62nd Battalion of the CRPF, and between 30 and 40 men from the Chhattisgarh police, was returning from the area domination exercise. While the troops were proceeding on foot, the APC was proceeding along a dirt track.

Four kilometres short of the CRPF Camp in Chintalnar, a massive Improvised Explosive Device (IED) was detonated under the armoured vehicle, killing the lone driver, even as the troops came under heavy suppressive fire from a raised hillock bordering the path.

Troops rushed to take cover behind the trees, only to find that the Maoists had booby-trapped the trees with anti-personnel IEDs. Soldiers who stayed in the open were gunned down by Maoists using automatic weapons. In all, 75 members of the security forces were killed and seven injured. All their weapons were taken away by the Maoists.

In the second phase of the incident, reinforcements were rushed from the CRPF camp in Chintalnar, Dornapal and Chintagufa to rescue the survivors. According to a press note circulated by the Superintendent of Police, a vehicle brought to ferry the injured and the dead to safety was also blown up using an IED, killing the driver and pushing the toll up to 76.

The planners

Sources in Andhra Pradesh told The Hindu that the attack was planned by Kosa, Leader of the Dandakaranya Special Zonal Committee of the CPI Maoist and was executed by three Maoist companies led by Ganeshanna and Ramanna, two top leaders from the same Committee. The Maoists trailed the security forces for the better part of two days before working out the route of return and laying the ambush.

The sources said the CRPF violated two basic doctrines of jungle warfare. “First, never return to the camp along the same route that you left,” said a counter-insurgency expert with experience in Chhattisgarh, “Second, if you must, you have to clear and secure all raised terrain and hillocks.” Neither of these precautions was followed, said the source.

[Aditya G]

Anubhai Bharwad (C), father of Indian Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) head constable Haribhai Anubhai Bharwad, carries the Indian national flag, which was draped over Bharwad's coffin, to give to his grandson Bharat during the cremation in Bamangam, Matar Taluka, some 70 kms. from Ahmedabad, on March 20, 2010. Bharwad belonged to CRPF's 168th battalion and was on a road opening assignment when Maoist rebels triggered a an improvised explosive device (IED) which killed two CRPF troopers and injured three others on March 18, 2010 in a thickly forested area in Chhattisgarh state.

[Aaryan]

I don’t know how many of you have lived in naxal infected area but I have lived in those area for few years and let me say the actual condition on grounds is very different out of possible 1000 naxalites, who attacked more then 900 must be foot soldiers who are attracted to guns and money and the power that comes with gun and have no clue who was Mao or what he said, only 100 or less might have some ideological connection. Many times these foot soldiers come with them due to fear. Their real strength comes from their thinkers ( Mostly city based) and those who have political connection (many M.L.A from jharkhand are either naxal commanders or have very good relation with them). Now a days it’s a very good source of income. In addition, the naxals have infiltrated the local police and local administration in good numbers in due course of time. Plus the central forces are not familiar with local language, and geography. One day they are posted in J&K or N.E and the next day may find them self in Baster. Also the naxals have much better local intelligence system.

What wee need to do is to follow the Greyhound pattern, where they picked up most of there officers from locals, this may boost the intelligence gathering capacity. Also they must be given little bit of freedom and their hands should not be tied in the name of human rights and civilian control over the forces. Also we need to post some one from central forces as S.P( Operation) with jurisdiction over the anti naxal operations. Air surveillance and support is a must and so is the co-ordination between different states and the operational heads of every district.

Can write a lot more but will wait for response. If I have crossed my limits please delete the post.

[ramana]

Troopers ignored warfare manual in Maoist den

Irrational strategy, flawed operations', say experts

The S O B are blaming the victims.

[Shameek]

The S O B are blaming the victims.

Just what I was about to write. Like its their fault that they had inadequate training/equipment/doctrine. Pathetic finger pointing.

The tactics are frighteningly similar to Afghanistan. Set off an IED to cause confusion. Booby trap all surrounding cover with IEDs to kill anyone trying to hide. Shoot everyone in the open with a high volume of fire. Then of course steal their weapons. These guys are quickly turning into a small sized army and a very big headache for the country.

[Carl_T]

carl, there are no such 'bases'. base is where a bunch of naxals are, they may be at one place tonight and another tomorrow. most of these places will be co-located with an otherwise innocent village. air power has to be limited to surveillance, cas-evac and enveloping moves. but I don't think ATM we have a large enough commitment of either helos or personnel for the last option. deploying UAV round the clock will be a costly but attractive proposition but again, we don't have UAV's with SAR in our inventory right now AFAIK. UAV's with thermal cameras will be of limited use only.
at the end of the day there is no alternative to having boots on the ground in a 10:1 ratio or more.

I understand that they move around without fixed assets, but considering how big an insurgency this is, there are no "command centres"?

Don't mean to go OT, but is this essentially a monolithic movement built around a personality cult in the form of LTTE? It seems much bigger than that.

IMHO these insurgents don't seem to be interested in making "symbolic" attacks, but their attacks seem much more strategic - to attack security forces and instruments of the state in order to gain control of areas.

I think we need to focus on this district by district, win the peripheral districts and secure them so that maoists will not be able to enter, while slowly moving inwards.

[Brahmananda]

well guys CRPF guys did make some grave errors violating the strict doctrine of jungle movement. heavy price to pay for not following known war doctrines. CRPF is a very well trained organization and the jawans regularly counter insurgents in the the north, they do get jungle warfare training before going into the field and they do get lots of lessons but mistakes were still made, proving that CRPF is not the right force for the task. Skilled as they are, one cant fight maos on the local levels like forces like greyhounds. Thousands of Greyhound type local state police elite units must be part of every state and they should spearhead the ops against the maos who recruit locally and adapt their tactics according the state and environment they operate it. Centre should focus on curbing the spread of these pests at a national level going after arms suppliers, factories, financiers etc.

However the CRPF did make mistakes and hopefully some valuable lessons have been learned. i also hope this event has further strengthened the resolves of both state and centre police forces to co-ordinate their work better. I think they need to put in place a pay rise and increase the pay of both state and central police forces and equip them better. dont know why BSF, ITBP are also taking part in anti mao ops. why cant these forces stick to their core roles? We already have a massive shortage of cops in the country, time to raise the number but atleast 100%. We arent even at half the UN's average recommended police force per 10000 people.

[Jagan]

The S O B are blaming the victims.

Just what I was about to write. Like its their fault that they had inadequate training/equipment/doctrine. Pathetic finger pointing.

.

I will play the devil's advocate - there was something seriously wrong with the leadership at many levels (State, Batallion, Company) that would allow you to get caught in an ambush that allows you to lose 80% of your strength.

A signfiicant portion of the blame will certainly rest on the CRPF leadership. If they didnt have the training and doctrine, they should have refused to be deployed. If they had the training then they will shoulder the blame for using incorrect tactics / ignoring intel / showing overconfidnece / underestimating the enemy.

Would an army patrol of 120 men walk / drive into such an ambush and suffer such horrible casualities?

[Jagan]

Prior to this, such a large casuality incident was a non-COIN related one from NEFA.

In the late 50s, an Assam Rifles patrol into a remote tribal area were received with fear by the Thagin tribe. The tribe leader welcomed the patrol as ruse but in the night the tribe turned around and massacred 72 or 73 of the troopers.

[Raja Bose]

The Naxals just borrowed from the same tactics NVA and VC used to apply to wipe out US units. They applied a V shaped ambush, straddled the lead vehicle which forced those on foot to take cover on the sides of the road, but those areas had been planted with anti-personnel mine which probably killed most of the policemen. The ones who escaped could only move back onto the road which was raked with gunfire and made into a killing ground. The policemen did not have a chance - they were literally caught between a hammer and an anvil. From what it looks like, they had no basic equipment such as radios, no radio contact with the outside, only guns, ammo on man-pack basis and food/water. BPJs usually will not be used for such long drawn ops (multiple nights) and anyways would have proved useless against the anti-personnel mines.

Added: From reading the different accounts, I have a feeling they used the tactics they learnt from the LTTE and tied claymores to trees - that will cause devastating casualties in a short duration.

[Craig Alpert]

Lone option before govt: Hit back hard

....................
The discussions in government on Tuesday centred on regrouping and, after carefully analysing what had gone wrong in the encounter in the vastness of Dantewada's forests, to press ahead with the offensive to clear Maoist-infested areas in Orissa, Chhattisgarh, Maharashtra, Jharkhand, Bihar and West Bengal.

There were reports that the national security council that met on Tuesday dwelled on the Maoist attack, but it is understood that its meeting had been called to discuss border infrastructure. The meeting was intended to bring about swifter coordination between the Army, defence ministry, Border Roads Organization, environment ministry and related ministries and agencies.

The challenge before the Centre is as much political as the government has argued that Maoists are aiming at nothing less than overthrow of the democratic government and the very least requirement for any engagement was a ceasefire. Home minister P Chidambaram has said that Maoists should end violence for talks, but he now has his answer. He appraised Prime Minister Manmohan Singh about the situation.
..............................
Tuesday's killings could help the government argue its point, but it will also need to demonstrate that it can back its words with a steely resolve to take on the ultras in their backyard and last the course. Articulating government's course of action, home secretary G K Pillai said the Centre's resolve was "further strengthened". Obviously, retreating is not an option.

"All I can say at this moment is that our resolve is firm and in the coming days and months, we will give a much firmer and fitting reply to the murderers (Maoists)," Pillai said.

Expressing shock over the "very high" casualty of CRPF personnel, Chidambaram said something must have gone "drastically wrong" in the joint operation with the state police. "The casualty is very high and I am deeply shocked at the loss of lives... This shows the savage nature of CPI (Maoist) and their brutality and the savagery they are capable of," he said.

Sources in the ministry said Chidambaram instructed paramilitary forces to pull up their socks and display best possible coordination with states to step up operations against the ultras.

At the same time, the government ruled out use of air power in the fight against Maoists. Pillai said, "I don't think we need to use air power at the moment (in the anti-naxal operation). We can manage with what we have. Our strategy is unfolding and we should be able to manage without air power." He, however, made it clear that air power would be used only for evacuation and for mobility of troops. .

[Raja Bose]

Also notice that the ambush was done towards the end of the 2/3 day mission. Basically the unit was tracked since it left camp and they didnt even realize that the hunter had become the hunted. Then towards the end of the mission (where I can bet nothing untoward happened and there was no serious contact since that would have made the policemen wary and cautious), when the troopers were more relaxed, tired and looking forward to reaching the camp, they sprung the ambush. This speaks of volumes of training, support, intelligence and planning skills by these pigs. And add to that the fact that they knew exactly how the policemen would react to an ambush and any type of counter-ambush drill they might have been taught.

[Rahul M]

The gory details...

http://www.thehindu.com/2010/04/07/stor ... 680100.htm

The sources said the CRPF violated two basic doctrines of jungle warfare. “First, never return to the camp along the same route that you left,” said a counter-insurgency expert with experience in Chhattisgarh, “Second, if you must, you have to clear and secure all raised terrain and hillocks.” Neither of these precautions was followed, said the source.

this is what I was talking about, why would a relatively large force move without an overwatch detail scouting ahead and on the flanks ?

as RB says it was the end of an operation and the group was tired. since they were so near their camp, they could have sent a group to cover the retreat ?

[D Roy]

yep.

if an assault party is returning home, shouldn't their movement be monitored properly , with an escort party sent out to bring them in as they near base?where was chopper back-up? shouldn't a chopper be detailed to escort these guys back to base?

and yes where are the scouts? employing scouts is warfare 101 . it has been done by armies since Mauryan times.

and how long does it take to send in reinforcements and a relief party?


It seems that Dantewada was not part of the government's "taking back territory" program till 2011.

[Rahul M]

X-post

No medical evacuation plan for paramilitary forces

“We are lucky if we get information about an attack within the golden hour, let alone evacuating people in 60 minutes”

ASP sahab, this was what I was talking about.

Despite having about 20 battalions of Central paramilitary forces and an additional 6,000 State policemen (exact troop figures are confidential), in the Bastar Zone alone, Chhattisgarh has only five helicopters, none of which is specially equipped to provide mobile trauma care.

Officials also told TheHindu that these helicopters are routinely shared with neighbouring States in case of emergencies.

There are also no dedicated military hospitals. Injured troops are flown either to the Maharani Hospital in Jagdalpur or the National Mineral Development Corporation hospital in Dantewada.

After the latest attack, one helicopter flew multiple sorties to evacuate the injured to Jagdalpur. “We called for the second,” said the official, “But I don't think it made it on time.”

[D Roy]

so much for chopper back-up, gunships, UAVs with SAR, UAVs for commlinks ....

all I can see is a HAL Dhruv ferrying one casualty at a time.

come on GOI , have a heart, buy the CRPF a few dedicated Mi-17s .....

if the BSF can have some, so can the CRPF

[Shameek]

A signfiicant portion of the blame will certainly rest on the CRPF leadership. If they didnt have the training and doctrine, they should have refused to be deployed. If they had the training then they will shoulder the blame for using incorrect tactics / ignoring intel / showing overconfidnece / underestimating the enemy.

Jagan saar. Add to this the deployment of these men without an adequate medical infrastructure being set up. That report above that said there was just one helo ferrying the wounded is very painful to digest. The second one apparently did not reach on time. We as a nation have been constantly involved in COIN operations. Then who takes the blame for this complete lack of preparation?

[ASPuar]

X-post


ASP sahab, this was what I was talking about.

Despite having about 20 battalions of Central paramilitary forces and an additional 6,000 State policemen (exact troop figures are confidential), in the Bastar Zone alone, Chhattisgarh has only five helicopters, none of which is specially equipped to provide mobile trauma care.

Officials also told TheHindu that these helicopters are routinely shared with neighbouring States in case of emergencies. There are also no dedicated military hospitals. Injured troops are flown either to the Maharani Hospital in Jagdalpur or the National Mineral Development Corporation hospital in Dantewada.

After the latest attack, one helicopter flew multiple sorties to evacuate the injured to Jagdalpur. “We called for the second,” said the official, “But I don't think it made it on time.”

This report is not written by someone familiar with either how ops are conducted, or how medical support is provided. Perhaps he was given the report from the side of the state police, in which case some of the things he says are true, but the things he has said are not true for the Central Police Orgs.

In the first place, the IAF is already providing logistical backup to the CPOs for operation green hunt, so the state governments choppers are irrelevant.

As to medicals, there is never a dedicated hospital right where you want it, which is why there is a concept of battalion medical officers, field dressing stations, field ambulance, etc, which are all available in the CPOs. Secondly, the CRPF/CISF/BSF/SSB/ITBP/Assam Rifles all have dedicated CPO Composite Hospitals and Base Hospitals to care for their personnel (which are usable by all CPOs), to which they can be evacuated.

There is, in fact, a fully equipped CRPF composite hospital in Bilaspur, Chattisgarh, which is not very far from where this incident occurred.

Casevac is a problem in the Indian (and other) armed forces, but the DGAFMS has detailed plans on its conduct, as do the ADG medical in the BSF and IT

[ASPuar]

Troopers ignored warfare manual in Maoist den

Irrational strategy, flawed operations', say experts

The S O B are blaming the victims.

Dont get me wrong, but I dont think thats what it is.

They are pointing out that use of mainline roads, and driving through forested area is known to be prohibited in the Maoist zone, and it is because of the ignoring of these rules that this disaster was allowed to happen. It is not blaming the victims, but a necessary analysis of the fatal misjudgment on the part of some (maybe one) person, that caused such mayhem. You will note that Gill points out that there is no thought put into the fatigue that being so thinly spread over such vast tracts, is causing these troops.

If even one casualty could have been avoided by following the established procedure, then it should have been done.

The following article by Mr. KPS Gill suggests that he doesnt think that the ops are being conducted properly:

http://www.tribuneindia.com/2010/20100407/main2.htm

I had mentioned much earlier, that this Green Hunt seems to be more bombast on the side of the home minister, than action on the ground. Mr. Gill has literally torn a hole in the credibility of the HM's actions on the Naxal situation, actions which have caused loss of life. The Maoists are not people you can scare into submission by brandishing a few bandouks. When you fight them, you either mean business, send troops in with a clear mandate to finish the job, and with the backup to do it, or you pay the price for your weakness.

[mmasand]

ASP saar,they have the infra(hospitals) but there is a serious lack of paramedics on the field.Little or no supplies are carried,remember the BPJ's are 14kg each add to that the weight of ammo.None of the helos have stabilising equipment on board.The window for a an injured personnel is the time it takes to get to a hospital during which he/she must be administered first aid by a first responder,failing which there will be loss of blood and lead to a casualty.

Regardless someone pointed out the lack of comm sets.I am assuming the ratio would be 1:5 or even more,and I seriously wonder if they were carrying satnav/GPS to pinpoint their location to reinforcements/casevac.

We all know that politicians have the impression that the world can be achieved if we have the manpower, which is not true.The acquisitions and support measures must be prepared by technical experts and not secretaries and bureaucrats as it has been for the last umpteen years.We can't expect civilians to know what best for the forces.

Even in the past we have had home ministries in various states question/inquire about tenders and acquisition requests on the basis of 'financial scrutiny'.India's policing agencies still exist in the 'fourth world'.

[Gagan]

Doesn't Nishant have a SAR payload?

[Sid]

Troopers ignored warfare manual in Maoist den

Irrational strategy, flawed operations', say experts

The S O B are blaming the victims.

I am totally with ramana on this. All central police forces are used as cannon fodder by our nation. They should not be seen as expendable force but state assets.

Inadequate equipment, bad infrastructure and what not and you send them to each and every nook N corner of country to fight such savages.

Also there is no political will to crush such a movement. Such "chalta hai" attitude has cost lives of so many people. Every 4 months you will hear 10 or 30 jawans killed in ambushes but we Indians are now kind of okay with such casualty numbers. Its only now after so many deaths that every one is listening.

So sad. RIP CRPF guys.

[ASPuar]

ASP saar,they have the infra(hospitals) but there is a serious lack of paramedics on the field.Little or no supplies are carried,remember the BPJ's are 14kg each add to that the weight of ammo.None of the helos have stabilising equipment on board.The window for a an injured personnel is the time it takes to get to a hospital during which he/she must be administered first aid by a first responder,failing which there will be loss of blood and lead to a casualty.

Im not sure what you mean there are no paramedics on the ground? How dyou know?