India's Response to Terror
Posted: 31 Mar 2010 00:58
This is what I feel about India's present terror situation:
India’s Response To Terror
The night of 26th November, 2010 sent reverberations throughout the world, and the world sat stunned. A small group of armed terrorists were able to hold Mumbai, India’s financial capital, hostage for nearly three days. India is no stranger to terror, terror groups have been unleashing wave after wave of attack on India since 1993. The only difference this time was that India woke up. The Indian Government, along with her people saw the horrible scale and precision at which the attacks were carried out, as news filtered in from the survivors, the Indian television audience was glued. And the location didn’t help either; the Taj Mahal Palace Hotel, along with the Oberoi Trident are arguably the finest hotels in India, and consequently haunts of the Mumbai élite. Previous attacks were carried out in places frequented by the poor or middle class, but this time around it was the rich and famous that paid the price for India’s ignorance. On the 28th of November, India seethed. The authorities knew that this could not go on. For the United States, it was 9/11 which initiated a security clamp down. For India it was 26/11. This essay will examine India’s new security architecture from a critical point of view in the hope to judge whether India’s latest overhaul can keep her safe.
On the 23rd of December, nearly a month after the attacks in Mumbai, India’s Home Minister P. Chidambaram gave a talk to the Intelligence Bureau outlining India’s new security architecture. Most of India’s politicians had already commented heavily on the Mumbai attacks and several knee-jerk reactions had already taken place, such as BJP’s calls for reinstating POTA12, and the usual accusations aimed at Pakistan. However, what set Chidambaram apart from the previous commentators was that his proposed security architecture took into account both short, and long term objectives while laying out a detailed plan to reinforce the security establishment at all levels of the government (District, State, Centre). Moreover, the Home Minister spoke not only of responding and/or containing a terrorist attack but also went on to stress the importance of India being able to prevent such attacks from happening in the first place.
India’s establishment had already taken a number of steps to strengthen its security pre-26/11, some of which include the setting up of the Model Police Act, the formation of 79 new battalions for the CPMF3 and 38 battalions for the CRPF4. However, in the light of the Mumbai attacks, these were found to be woefully inadequate, and even the famed NSG (National Security Guards) commandos took miserably long to get from their station in New Delhi to Mumbai.
Another great failing of the Indian security establishment was its intelligence. India operates several intelligence services which often overlap in their jurisdiction. In the case of the Mumbai attacks, they proved to be fragmented, disconnected and in complete disarray. After having seen the gaps in India’s security institutions, we can examine Chidambaram’s proposals with a stronger foundation.
One pillar of Chidambaram’s outline was the need for connectivity in our security establishment. He mentions in his speech, “The police stations in this country are, today, virtually unconnected islands.5” He goes on to say that due to the increase in telecommunication, there is a channel of dialogue between the senior police officers, but that is about all, there is no common filing system, and no way for the thousands of police stations to communicate between each other. Having realized the gross inefficiencies in the system the government has sought to launch a scheme known as the ‘Crime and Criminal Tracking Network System’, if this scheme is realized the benefits for the state as well as the citizens is enormous. Not only does this allow for a common database of criminal records, but it also takes away much of the paperwork and turf war that characterizes our bureaucracy, and as a consequence, our institutions of security.
What is interesting about the proposed security architecture is that it reinforces our security authorities at several levels of government; take for example the proposition of the 24/7 control rooms, these are to be control rooms manned by IB (Intelligence Bureau) staff and will be created at district levels. Moreover, the creation of Anti-Terrorist Units at the state level, which have the mandate of “pre-empt terrorist activities and investigate terrorist crimes6”. And at the highest level of government, the centre, there are three ambitious proposals; the first one is the setting up of NatGrid, a compilation of 21 different intelligence databases in order to allow for seamless access of information between agencies. NatGrid will be placed under NCTC, which we will discuss later. The two others are the MAC (Multi-Agency Centre) and the NCTC (National Counter-Terrorism Center), these are perhaps two of the most ambitious yet sorely needed initiatives which we need against terrorism. The MAC which has been operational since January 31st, is meant to better facilitate the co-operation between the numerous intelligence agencies by having representatives from each of the respective intelligence as well as security agencies, the key benefit of this, as Mr. Chidambaram pointed out is, “that no one can say that his/her organization was kept in the dark7”. Secondly, the NCTC, which gets it mandate from the Centre, has a much broader mandate than the MAC. Chidambaram envisions the NCTC to have three main functions; intelligence, investigation and operations, also to be noted is the fact that once the NCTC is operational (deadline has been set for the end of 2010), the MAC will be integrated into the NCTC in order to satisfy one of its roles, ‘intelligence’. The appearance of such an articulate, yet comprehensive plan for the gathering and disseminating of intelligence is certainly a step forward for the country, indeed, many Indians were surprised at the speed and clarity of Chidambaram’s overhauling of the security agencies.
Moreover, parallel to the over-hauling of the intelligence establishment there has also been a leap in defense purchases by state governments following the Mumbai attacks. One of the images which was captured on CCTV during the Mumbai attacks was that of a lone police officer doing battle against a heavily armed terrorist with nothing more than a bolt-action rifle and a chair8! In an effort to reassure Mumbaikars, the security forces held a march last November to mark the first anniversary of the attacks. Only this time, commandos dressed in brand new combat fatigues with shiny new automatic rifles at the ready paraded down Mumbai’s seafront. All of Mumbai’s new toys were on display, since the attacks, the state of Maharashtra has alone spent some $30 Million on new equipment for Mumbai police forces and rapid action teams. These include Rapid Intervention Vehicles, High Speed Patrol boats and bullet proof jackets to name a few. Even other states such as Gujarat, who are vary of infiltrators using their porous coastline, have begun purchasing equipment from the Coast Guard. Obviously, technological acquisitions alone are not enough to counter the threat that India faces, but along with the upheaval of the intelligence and security forces that was mentioned earlier, this increased co-operation amongst the services in addition to better training and equipping our personnel is the most substantiative and far reaching improvement to our country’s security in history. Perhaps this is what India needed all along.
There is no doubt that India and her citizens are safer today than a year ago, however, India and her citizens must be careful not to be led into a false sense of security due to the recent rhetoric concerning our security establishment, the recent bombing of the German Bakery in Pune is a testament to this. India’s track record in the security sphere is nothing short of disappointing. Since independence, India has poured Billions of dollars and countless man-hours into safeguarding its borders and projecting its military muscle abroad, it is unfair to say that our security establishment is inexperienced, in this context ‘unprepared’ would be a more fitting word. As the head of Maharashtra State Police A.N. Roy succinctly put it, “Today, we feel much more confident than we were one year ago… but there is still a long way to go.9” Despite the recent praise that has been giving to Chidambaram’s proposals earlier in this essay, we must take his plans with a pinch of salt, this is not to say that Chidambaram does not harbor the best intentions for India but rather to shed light on the sluggish, vastly inefficient behemoth that is India’s administration.
Take for example the first proposal of interconnectivity between police stations. Anyone who has ever had to visit a police station in India can testify to their hopeless incompetence in terms of equipment and training. Most police stations even in the city of Ahmedabad, which is the economic capital of one of India’s most industrialized states, Gujarat, have only a few telephone lines to communicate to each other and the outside world. While officers usually possess a mobile phone, this is not nearly enough to compile and share information on the scale that is required today. Our Home Minister’s proposal may sound straight forward, but if even a city like Ahmedabad is under equipped, what is to say about the condition of our police infrastructure in India’s smaller cities? Not to mention India’s 600,000 odd villages. What is important here is not to dismiss Chidambaram’s proposal, because it is clearly a step in the right direction, but to understand the huge scale at which these reforms operate in and as a consequence the large period of time it will take to implement them.
Another fallacy which the Pune attacks brought out was the failure of local forces to act; On March 16th, Chidambaram admitted that the attacks were not an ‘intelligence failure’, he mentioned that all establishments in the Koregaon Park area, including the German Bakery were given written advisories by Maharashtra Police10. Despite intelligence from the Centre, the attack was not avoided. This brings us to a crucial subject which is of ‘operations’. As noted before, one of the NCTC’s key roles, apart from intelligence and investigation is operations, however due to India’s administrative structure, States are required to provide for their own security, not the Centre. In many cases, as highlighted by the Pune attacks, local police may be overstretched and/or unable to act timely on intelligence provided by the centre. Therefore, as Chidambaram himself mentions, it is paramount that the NCTC be allowed to conduct ‘operations’ within States independently or in co-operation with local forces, similar to the powers of the Homeland Security in the US. However, owing once again to our structure of governance and party politics, it is not clear how successfully, if at all the Centre will be able to push through with this proposal.
On an ending note, India’s new ambitious proposal for its security administration is clearly a road map to a safer India. Unlike the usual rhetoric which follows a terror attack in India, Chidambaram’s bold steps are a breath of fresh air for India and her people. The setting up of the MAC, along with the NCTC are a testament to the present government’s seriousness towards combatting terror. As seen in the preceding pages, India’s legislators have proven their foresight and commitment to the country, qualities which should not be underestimated. They have contributed to India an enormously comprehensive security architecture which not only takes into account obvious points such as responding to a terror attack, but goes further in its mandate to preventing an attack, and most importantly investigating an attack so as to be better prepared for the future. There are few doubts in my mind about this plan’s effectiveness, since it augments our intelligence and policing capacities, encompasses every major level of government, involves the representation of all our various intelligence agencies and even promotes co-operation and unity amongst the parties involved.
However, if there is one factor which could undermine the effectiveness of the entire plan, it is (ironically) the government itself. Chidambaram’s plan is rife with opportunities for its members to engage in turf wars and blame games, and Chidambaram, having seen this has repeatedly called out to avoid such damaging activities. But many of the proposal’s promises have yet to be fulfilled and it will be a period of time until the full effect of Chidambaram’s overhaul will be seen. But on the other hand, terrorism is one of those rare subjects in which India’s two main parties; The Indian National Congress and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) stand united, with such a large support base in Parliament, I have no doubt that not only will this overhaul be implemented in its fullest, but after conducting a critical examination of the overhaul, I have come to see it as by far the most far-reaching and forward thinking reform in our country since the economic reforms of 1991.
Bibliography:
The Far Eastern Economic Review Website: http://www.feer.com/politics/2008/decem ... terror-law. Accessed on 22/03/2010.
P. Chidambaram, New Delhi, 23rd December, 2008, ‘A New Architecture for India’s Security’.
France 24 Website: http://www.france24.com/en/20091126-sec ... ai-attacks, Accessed on 18/03/2010.
Outlook News Website: http://news.outlookindia.com/item.aspx?676889, Accessed on 22/03/2010.
Kamdar, Mira. Planet India: The Turbulent Rise of the World’s Largest Democracy, Simon & Schuster, Great Britain, 2007.
Sen, Amartya. The Argumentative Indian, Penguin Books, London, 2005.
India’s Response To Terror
The night of 26th November, 2010 sent reverberations throughout the world, and the world sat stunned. A small group of armed terrorists were able to hold Mumbai, India’s financial capital, hostage for nearly three days. India is no stranger to terror, terror groups have been unleashing wave after wave of attack on India since 1993. The only difference this time was that India woke up. The Indian Government, along with her people saw the horrible scale and precision at which the attacks were carried out, as news filtered in from the survivors, the Indian television audience was glued. And the location didn’t help either; the Taj Mahal Palace Hotel, along with the Oberoi Trident are arguably the finest hotels in India, and consequently haunts of the Mumbai élite. Previous attacks were carried out in places frequented by the poor or middle class, but this time around it was the rich and famous that paid the price for India’s ignorance. On the 28th of November, India seethed. The authorities knew that this could not go on. For the United States, it was 9/11 which initiated a security clamp down. For India it was 26/11. This essay will examine India’s new security architecture from a critical point of view in the hope to judge whether India’s latest overhaul can keep her safe.
On the 23rd of December, nearly a month after the attacks in Mumbai, India’s Home Minister P. Chidambaram gave a talk to the Intelligence Bureau outlining India’s new security architecture. Most of India’s politicians had already commented heavily on the Mumbai attacks and several knee-jerk reactions had already taken place, such as BJP’s calls for reinstating POTA12, and the usual accusations aimed at Pakistan. However, what set Chidambaram apart from the previous commentators was that his proposed security architecture took into account both short, and long term objectives while laying out a detailed plan to reinforce the security establishment at all levels of the government (District, State, Centre). Moreover, the Home Minister spoke not only of responding and/or containing a terrorist attack but also went on to stress the importance of India being able to prevent such attacks from happening in the first place.
India’s establishment had already taken a number of steps to strengthen its security pre-26/11, some of which include the setting up of the Model Police Act, the formation of 79 new battalions for the CPMF3 and 38 battalions for the CRPF4. However, in the light of the Mumbai attacks, these were found to be woefully inadequate, and even the famed NSG (National Security Guards) commandos took miserably long to get from their station in New Delhi to Mumbai.
Another great failing of the Indian security establishment was its intelligence. India operates several intelligence services which often overlap in their jurisdiction. In the case of the Mumbai attacks, they proved to be fragmented, disconnected and in complete disarray. After having seen the gaps in India’s security institutions, we can examine Chidambaram’s proposals with a stronger foundation.
One pillar of Chidambaram’s outline was the need for connectivity in our security establishment. He mentions in his speech, “The police stations in this country are, today, virtually unconnected islands.5” He goes on to say that due to the increase in telecommunication, there is a channel of dialogue between the senior police officers, but that is about all, there is no common filing system, and no way for the thousands of police stations to communicate between each other. Having realized the gross inefficiencies in the system the government has sought to launch a scheme known as the ‘Crime and Criminal Tracking Network System’, if this scheme is realized the benefits for the state as well as the citizens is enormous. Not only does this allow for a common database of criminal records, but it also takes away much of the paperwork and turf war that characterizes our bureaucracy, and as a consequence, our institutions of security.
What is interesting about the proposed security architecture is that it reinforces our security authorities at several levels of government; take for example the proposition of the 24/7 control rooms, these are to be control rooms manned by IB (Intelligence Bureau) staff and will be created at district levels. Moreover, the creation of Anti-Terrorist Units at the state level, which have the mandate of “pre-empt terrorist activities and investigate terrorist crimes6”. And at the highest level of government, the centre, there are three ambitious proposals; the first one is the setting up of NatGrid, a compilation of 21 different intelligence databases in order to allow for seamless access of information between agencies. NatGrid will be placed under NCTC, which we will discuss later. The two others are the MAC (Multi-Agency Centre) and the NCTC (National Counter-Terrorism Center), these are perhaps two of the most ambitious yet sorely needed initiatives which we need against terrorism. The MAC which has been operational since January 31st, is meant to better facilitate the co-operation between the numerous intelligence agencies by having representatives from each of the respective intelligence as well as security agencies, the key benefit of this, as Mr. Chidambaram pointed out is, “that no one can say that his/her organization was kept in the dark7”. Secondly, the NCTC, which gets it mandate from the Centre, has a much broader mandate than the MAC. Chidambaram envisions the NCTC to have three main functions; intelligence, investigation and operations, also to be noted is the fact that once the NCTC is operational (deadline has been set for the end of 2010), the MAC will be integrated into the NCTC in order to satisfy one of its roles, ‘intelligence’. The appearance of such an articulate, yet comprehensive plan for the gathering and disseminating of intelligence is certainly a step forward for the country, indeed, many Indians were surprised at the speed and clarity of Chidambaram’s overhauling of the security agencies.
Moreover, parallel to the over-hauling of the intelligence establishment there has also been a leap in defense purchases by state governments following the Mumbai attacks. One of the images which was captured on CCTV during the Mumbai attacks was that of a lone police officer doing battle against a heavily armed terrorist with nothing more than a bolt-action rifle and a chair8! In an effort to reassure Mumbaikars, the security forces held a march last November to mark the first anniversary of the attacks. Only this time, commandos dressed in brand new combat fatigues with shiny new automatic rifles at the ready paraded down Mumbai’s seafront. All of Mumbai’s new toys were on display, since the attacks, the state of Maharashtra has alone spent some $30 Million on new equipment for Mumbai police forces and rapid action teams. These include Rapid Intervention Vehicles, High Speed Patrol boats and bullet proof jackets to name a few. Even other states such as Gujarat, who are vary of infiltrators using their porous coastline, have begun purchasing equipment from the Coast Guard. Obviously, technological acquisitions alone are not enough to counter the threat that India faces, but along with the upheaval of the intelligence and security forces that was mentioned earlier, this increased co-operation amongst the services in addition to better training and equipping our personnel is the most substantiative and far reaching improvement to our country’s security in history. Perhaps this is what India needed all along.
There is no doubt that India and her citizens are safer today than a year ago, however, India and her citizens must be careful not to be led into a false sense of security due to the recent rhetoric concerning our security establishment, the recent bombing of the German Bakery in Pune is a testament to this. India’s track record in the security sphere is nothing short of disappointing. Since independence, India has poured Billions of dollars and countless man-hours into safeguarding its borders and projecting its military muscle abroad, it is unfair to say that our security establishment is inexperienced, in this context ‘unprepared’ would be a more fitting word. As the head of Maharashtra State Police A.N. Roy succinctly put it, “Today, we feel much more confident than we were one year ago… but there is still a long way to go.9” Despite the recent praise that has been giving to Chidambaram’s proposals earlier in this essay, we must take his plans with a pinch of salt, this is not to say that Chidambaram does not harbor the best intentions for India but rather to shed light on the sluggish, vastly inefficient behemoth that is India’s administration.
Take for example the first proposal of interconnectivity between police stations. Anyone who has ever had to visit a police station in India can testify to their hopeless incompetence in terms of equipment and training. Most police stations even in the city of Ahmedabad, which is the economic capital of one of India’s most industrialized states, Gujarat, have only a few telephone lines to communicate to each other and the outside world. While officers usually possess a mobile phone, this is not nearly enough to compile and share information on the scale that is required today. Our Home Minister’s proposal may sound straight forward, but if even a city like Ahmedabad is under equipped, what is to say about the condition of our police infrastructure in India’s smaller cities? Not to mention India’s 600,000 odd villages. What is important here is not to dismiss Chidambaram’s proposal, because it is clearly a step in the right direction, but to understand the huge scale at which these reforms operate in and as a consequence the large period of time it will take to implement them.
Another fallacy which the Pune attacks brought out was the failure of local forces to act; On March 16th, Chidambaram admitted that the attacks were not an ‘intelligence failure’, he mentioned that all establishments in the Koregaon Park area, including the German Bakery were given written advisories by Maharashtra Police10. Despite intelligence from the Centre, the attack was not avoided. This brings us to a crucial subject which is of ‘operations’. As noted before, one of the NCTC’s key roles, apart from intelligence and investigation is operations, however due to India’s administrative structure, States are required to provide for their own security, not the Centre. In many cases, as highlighted by the Pune attacks, local police may be overstretched and/or unable to act timely on intelligence provided by the centre. Therefore, as Chidambaram himself mentions, it is paramount that the NCTC be allowed to conduct ‘operations’ within States independently or in co-operation with local forces, similar to the powers of the Homeland Security in the US. However, owing once again to our structure of governance and party politics, it is not clear how successfully, if at all the Centre will be able to push through with this proposal.
On an ending note, India’s new ambitious proposal for its security administration is clearly a road map to a safer India. Unlike the usual rhetoric which follows a terror attack in India, Chidambaram’s bold steps are a breath of fresh air for India and her people. The setting up of the MAC, along with the NCTC are a testament to the present government’s seriousness towards combatting terror. As seen in the preceding pages, India’s legislators have proven their foresight and commitment to the country, qualities which should not be underestimated. They have contributed to India an enormously comprehensive security architecture which not only takes into account obvious points such as responding to a terror attack, but goes further in its mandate to preventing an attack, and most importantly investigating an attack so as to be better prepared for the future. There are few doubts in my mind about this plan’s effectiveness, since it augments our intelligence and policing capacities, encompasses every major level of government, involves the representation of all our various intelligence agencies and even promotes co-operation and unity amongst the parties involved.
However, if there is one factor which could undermine the effectiveness of the entire plan, it is (ironically) the government itself. Chidambaram’s plan is rife with opportunities for its members to engage in turf wars and blame games, and Chidambaram, having seen this has repeatedly called out to avoid such damaging activities. But many of the proposal’s promises have yet to be fulfilled and it will be a period of time until the full effect of Chidambaram’s overhaul will be seen. But on the other hand, terrorism is one of those rare subjects in which India’s two main parties; The Indian National Congress and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) stand united, with such a large support base in Parliament, I have no doubt that not only will this overhaul be implemented in its fullest, but after conducting a critical examination of the overhaul, I have come to see it as by far the most far-reaching and forward thinking reform in our country since the economic reforms of 1991.
Bibliography:
The Far Eastern Economic Review Website: http://www.feer.com/politics/2008/decem ... terror-law. Accessed on 22/03/2010.
P. Chidambaram, New Delhi, 23rd December, 2008, ‘A New Architecture for India’s Security’.
France 24 Website: http://www.france24.com/en/20091126-sec ... ai-attacks, Accessed on 18/03/2010.
Outlook News Website: http://news.outlookindia.com/item.aspx?676889, Accessed on 22/03/2010.
Kamdar, Mira. Planet India: The Turbulent Rise of the World’s Largest Democracy, Simon & Schuster, Great Britain, 2007.
Sen, Amartya. The Argumentative Indian, Penguin Books, London, 2005.