Analyzing Realistic Outcomes of America's Af-Pak Adventure
Posted: 09 Nov 2010 11:41
We had explored this question in a poll shortly after the London Conference on Afghanistan, where SM Krishna was relegated to back-bencher status and India's viewpoint largely ignored.
I think it's time to look at it again, with perhaps slightly fewer and more stark choices.
Essentially, there are three broad possibilities for the future of the US mission in AfPak.
1) The US can exit Afghanistan as the Obama administration is currently hoping to, by following its present policy of buying off the TSPA and cutting some sort of deal whereby TSPA will get to secure its primacy over post-withdrawal Afghanistan. On the face of it this seems like a bad thing for India; once Afghanistan is back in pro-Paki Taliban hands, India's gains in Afghanistan over the last decade will be more or less erased, and India's nation-building presence in Afghanistan (at least the Pakhtun areas) essentially terminated.
However, this is not as simple as it seems. If the Americans withdraw most of their ground forces from Afghanistan, their need to continue placating TSPA with aid is likely to decrease (though TSPA might continue to milk the Americans to some extent even afterward, in exchange for guaranteeing that no terrorism against Western interests is allowed to emanate from an Afghanistan under Pakistani control.)
But the bigger question is... CAN TSPA/ISI credibly offer such a guarantee to the US, that a post-withdrawal Afghanistan constructed according to a Pakistan-favoured dispensation will never become a source of terrorism against the West? Given the fact that so many jihadi tanzeems seem to be following their own agenda irrespective of Islamabad's wishes, can the TSPA guarantee that whatever faction of Taliban comes to power in Kabul following the "face saving" American withdrawal, will not once again lend itself to Jihad against Western interests? Will the Taliban, resurgent in Kabul, continue to take orders from the TSPA who once betrayed it?
In fact, may it not be in TSPA's interest that another 9/11 is launched from a post-withdrawal Afghanistan and the US is forced to come back, re-opening the money flow to Pakistan?
Also, will the US respond in the same way to another 9/11 as it did to the original one... trying to solve the problem by once again co-opting and buying off the TSPA? Or will they do something else?
2) The US can be forced to exit in a 1975/Saigon-style debacle, if the US economy continues to falter and increasing pressure at home forces the GOTUS to pullout even before the Pentagon considers Afghanistan to be "ready".
In this case there will be even greater chaos in post-withdrawal Afghanistan than in scenario (1). Probably it will lead to a de-facto partition of the Pakhtun south and the Tajik/Uzbek north once again.
(Side note: despite what Blackwill and some others have been prescribing, I don't believe that the Obama administration would ever conduct such a partition themselves... they don't have the political will to do it, and they don't have the stomach or finances to back a post-partition client "Northern Afghanistan" with the economic and military strength to survive. The only way a partition could happen, IMO, is if the US leaves the country in chaos and other powers like Russia or Iran fill the vacuum to bolster Northern Afghanistan.)
Conventional wisdom has it that a Saigon-style humiliating withdrawal of the Americans from Afghanistan will be a great "propaganda victory" to the "Islamists", who will now be able to boast of utterly defeating both the superpowers. However, will this be as bad an outcome for India as it will be for Pakistan?
Pakistan might continue to milk the Americans for aid even in scenario (1), but in scenario (2) it is unlikely that the Americans, having been deprived of a face-saving withdrawal, will continue to give the TSPA any aid at all. Distrust between Washington and Islamabad will plunge to a new low, as the Americans will not even have lip-service guarantee from the TSPA of preventing future terrorism against Western interests from Afghanistan. The US will be relying entirely on their internal security, and their own intelligence assets left behind, to fend off future 9/11s. Any extent of cooperation between the CIA and the ISI on this issue, such as it was, will come to a complete stop.
Meanwhile, the partitioned Afghanistan will become a Damocles' Sword hanging over Pakistan... particularly the Pakhtun south which will almost certainly harbour irredentist ambitions for a united Pakhunistan.
Pakistan's only option in this situation will be to launch an all-or-nothing jihad against India, likely over J&K, and hope that as many of the Islamist groups in AfPak as possible rally to their banner. Pakistan will try to take advantage of the new triumphalism among the jihadis, in the wake of humiliating US withdrawal, to engage them in such a jihad.
It will be a dangerous time for India, but if the cards are played right, could it also be the best opportunity to rid ourselves of Pakistan once and for all?
3) The US can remain engaged in Afghanistan militarily, at the same (or greater) force levels as they currently deploy, for the foreseeable future. Many gurus on BRF think this is essentially what will happen.
What this means is that the money-and-arms flow to Pakistan from Washington will continue in full swing. Many have speculated that this is, in fact, the outcome that the Pakis want most; because (a) they continue to receive generous aid and (b) US military presence will be close at hand to protect, if necessary, the TSPA/ISI state from being overrun by its own Frankensteins Monsters.
The downside for Pakistan here is two-fold. One, they do not have an absolutely free hand to continue terrorism against India. India has some small leverage over the US, especially post-Parakram, to restrain the extent to which Pakistan can launch terrorist attacks in India, even in J&K. It may not be anywhere near as much leverage as we jingoes would like (witness the Headley saga, and also the constant carping from sections of GOTUS that India should make concessions on Kashmir/scale down our presence in Afghanistan/renounce Cold-Start etc.) But whatever it is, it is there. After Parakram, Paki terrorism against India (even in J&K) has never been ratcheted up to pre-2002 levels. This may hold good only as long as the US is militarily engaged in AfPak.
The second disadvantage for Pakistan if the US remains indefinitely engaged in Afghanistan, is the constant propagation of stresses in the relationship between the jihadi tanzeems and their TSPA/ISI mentors. Already we are seeing a slew of IED mubaraks on Fridays and other such fun stuff. The longer the TSPA/ISI continue to keep up appearances of collaborating with the US, the longer they continue to allow drone strikes and other ops on Paki soil by US/NATO forces, the more the hostility between non-sarkari jihadi tanzeems (eg. TTP) and the TSPA/ISI will escalate.
At some point these stresses may become untenable, no matter how much aid is being poured into TSPA/ISI by the Americans to keep them afloat.
Another point to note here: in scenario (2), it is relatively easy for TSPA/ISI to take advantage of Afghan chaos and jihadi triumphalism, and unite all the various jihadi factions into a grand jihad against India. However, in the present scenario (3) of US remaining indefinitely engaged in AfPak... such a unification becomes more difficult to implement, and relies more on the perpetration of atrocities like 26/11 to provoke India into a military action that could unite all Jihadi tanzeems under the TSPA/ISI banner.
With the US military presence and intel presence in the neighbourhood, India currently has the option (however much we jingoes might hate it) of not responding to a Pakistani terrorist attack. In this way, India can (theoretically) pressure the US to make more concessions to Indian interests in exchange for India not retaliating against Pakistan... i.e., not messing up the Americans' AfPak game plan. Additionally, India would not be drawn into a conflict that would adversely impact her economic growth. Meanwhile the TSPA/ISI is denied the safety valve that an Indian attack would represent, and must continue to face an ever-increasing buildup of internal stressors in their relationship with the jihadi tanzeems.
This would not apply in scenarios (1) or (2)... having already withdrawn from AfPak, the Americans would have little interest in preventing India from retaliating against a Pakistani terrorist attack, with all the attendant consequences. So in some small way, India's range of options is wider because of the continuing American military engagement in Afghanistan. If the Americans leave Afghanistan, the GOI's current policy option (avoid conflict with Pakistan and concentrate on economic growth) will no longer be available. Whether we think that the GOI's current policy option is a good one or a bad one, is a matter for discussion. The current strategic security establishment (from K Subrahmanyam and Shivshankar Menon on down) apparently think it is a good one.
All said and done, it seems a very complex issue, with all the three outcomes having their positive and negative consequences as far as India is concerned. I would like to use this thread to explore whether the marginal benefits outweigh the marginal disadvantages of any of these three outcomes... and also, how India could follow pro-active policies to widen the margins in each instance.
I think it's time to look at it again, with perhaps slightly fewer and more stark choices.
Essentially, there are three broad possibilities for the future of the US mission in AfPak.
1) The US can exit Afghanistan as the Obama administration is currently hoping to, by following its present policy of buying off the TSPA and cutting some sort of deal whereby TSPA will get to secure its primacy over post-withdrawal Afghanistan. On the face of it this seems like a bad thing for India; once Afghanistan is back in pro-Paki Taliban hands, India's gains in Afghanistan over the last decade will be more or less erased, and India's nation-building presence in Afghanistan (at least the Pakhtun areas) essentially terminated.
However, this is not as simple as it seems. If the Americans withdraw most of their ground forces from Afghanistan, their need to continue placating TSPA with aid is likely to decrease (though TSPA might continue to milk the Americans to some extent even afterward, in exchange for guaranteeing that no terrorism against Western interests is allowed to emanate from an Afghanistan under Pakistani control.)
But the bigger question is... CAN TSPA/ISI credibly offer such a guarantee to the US, that a post-withdrawal Afghanistan constructed according to a Pakistan-favoured dispensation will never become a source of terrorism against the West? Given the fact that so many jihadi tanzeems seem to be following their own agenda irrespective of Islamabad's wishes, can the TSPA guarantee that whatever faction of Taliban comes to power in Kabul following the "face saving" American withdrawal, will not once again lend itself to Jihad against Western interests? Will the Taliban, resurgent in Kabul, continue to take orders from the TSPA who once betrayed it?
In fact, may it not be in TSPA's interest that another 9/11 is launched from a post-withdrawal Afghanistan and the US is forced to come back, re-opening the money flow to Pakistan?
Also, will the US respond in the same way to another 9/11 as it did to the original one... trying to solve the problem by once again co-opting and buying off the TSPA? Or will they do something else?
2) The US can be forced to exit in a 1975/Saigon-style debacle, if the US economy continues to falter and increasing pressure at home forces the GOTUS to pullout even before the Pentagon considers Afghanistan to be "ready".
In this case there will be even greater chaos in post-withdrawal Afghanistan than in scenario (1). Probably it will lead to a de-facto partition of the Pakhtun south and the Tajik/Uzbek north once again.
(Side note: despite what Blackwill and some others have been prescribing, I don't believe that the Obama administration would ever conduct such a partition themselves... they don't have the political will to do it, and they don't have the stomach or finances to back a post-partition client "Northern Afghanistan" with the economic and military strength to survive. The only way a partition could happen, IMO, is if the US leaves the country in chaos and other powers like Russia or Iran fill the vacuum to bolster Northern Afghanistan.)
Conventional wisdom has it that a Saigon-style humiliating withdrawal of the Americans from Afghanistan will be a great "propaganda victory" to the "Islamists", who will now be able to boast of utterly defeating both the superpowers. However, will this be as bad an outcome for India as it will be for Pakistan?
Pakistan might continue to milk the Americans for aid even in scenario (1), but in scenario (2) it is unlikely that the Americans, having been deprived of a face-saving withdrawal, will continue to give the TSPA any aid at all. Distrust between Washington and Islamabad will plunge to a new low, as the Americans will not even have lip-service guarantee from the TSPA of preventing future terrorism against Western interests from Afghanistan. The US will be relying entirely on their internal security, and their own intelligence assets left behind, to fend off future 9/11s. Any extent of cooperation between the CIA and the ISI on this issue, such as it was, will come to a complete stop.
Meanwhile, the partitioned Afghanistan will become a Damocles' Sword hanging over Pakistan... particularly the Pakhtun south which will almost certainly harbour irredentist ambitions for a united Pakhunistan.
Pakistan's only option in this situation will be to launch an all-or-nothing jihad against India, likely over J&K, and hope that as many of the Islamist groups in AfPak as possible rally to their banner. Pakistan will try to take advantage of the new triumphalism among the jihadis, in the wake of humiliating US withdrawal, to engage them in such a jihad.
It will be a dangerous time for India, but if the cards are played right, could it also be the best opportunity to rid ourselves of Pakistan once and for all?
3) The US can remain engaged in Afghanistan militarily, at the same (or greater) force levels as they currently deploy, for the foreseeable future. Many gurus on BRF think this is essentially what will happen.
What this means is that the money-and-arms flow to Pakistan from Washington will continue in full swing. Many have speculated that this is, in fact, the outcome that the Pakis want most; because (a) they continue to receive generous aid and (b) US military presence will be close at hand to protect, if necessary, the TSPA/ISI state from being overrun by its own Frankensteins Monsters.
The downside for Pakistan here is two-fold. One, they do not have an absolutely free hand to continue terrorism against India. India has some small leverage over the US, especially post-Parakram, to restrain the extent to which Pakistan can launch terrorist attacks in India, even in J&K. It may not be anywhere near as much leverage as we jingoes would like (witness the Headley saga, and also the constant carping from sections of GOTUS that India should make concessions on Kashmir/scale down our presence in Afghanistan/renounce Cold-Start etc.) But whatever it is, it is there. After Parakram, Paki terrorism against India (even in J&K) has never been ratcheted up to pre-2002 levels. This may hold good only as long as the US is militarily engaged in AfPak.
The second disadvantage for Pakistan if the US remains indefinitely engaged in Afghanistan, is the constant propagation of stresses in the relationship between the jihadi tanzeems and their TSPA/ISI mentors. Already we are seeing a slew of IED mubaraks on Fridays and other such fun stuff. The longer the TSPA/ISI continue to keep up appearances of collaborating with the US, the longer they continue to allow drone strikes and other ops on Paki soil by US/NATO forces, the more the hostility between non-sarkari jihadi tanzeems (eg. TTP) and the TSPA/ISI will escalate.
At some point these stresses may become untenable, no matter how much aid is being poured into TSPA/ISI by the Americans to keep them afloat.
Another point to note here: in scenario (2), it is relatively easy for TSPA/ISI to take advantage of Afghan chaos and jihadi triumphalism, and unite all the various jihadi factions into a grand jihad against India. However, in the present scenario (3) of US remaining indefinitely engaged in AfPak... such a unification becomes more difficult to implement, and relies more on the perpetration of atrocities like 26/11 to provoke India into a military action that could unite all Jihadi tanzeems under the TSPA/ISI banner.
With the US military presence and intel presence in the neighbourhood, India currently has the option (however much we jingoes might hate it) of not responding to a Pakistani terrorist attack. In this way, India can (theoretically) pressure the US to make more concessions to Indian interests in exchange for India not retaliating against Pakistan... i.e., not messing up the Americans' AfPak game plan. Additionally, India would not be drawn into a conflict that would adversely impact her economic growth. Meanwhile the TSPA/ISI is denied the safety valve that an Indian attack would represent, and must continue to face an ever-increasing buildup of internal stressors in their relationship with the jihadi tanzeems.
This would not apply in scenarios (1) or (2)... having already withdrawn from AfPak, the Americans would have little interest in preventing India from retaliating against a Pakistani terrorist attack, with all the attendant consequences. So in some small way, India's range of options is wider because of the continuing American military engagement in Afghanistan. If the Americans leave Afghanistan, the GOI's current policy option (avoid conflict with Pakistan and concentrate on economic growth) will no longer be available. Whether we think that the GOI's current policy option is a good one or a bad one, is a matter for discussion. The current strategic security establishment (from K Subrahmanyam and Shivshankar Menon on down) apparently think it is a good one.
All said and done, it seems a very complex issue, with all the three outcomes having their positive and negative consequences as far as India is concerned. I would like to use this thread to explore whether the marginal benefits outweigh the marginal disadvantages of any of these three outcomes... and also, how India could follow pro-active policies to widen the margins in each instance.