China Military Watch - Jan 11, 2011

[Austin]

India and USA to protect Vietnam from China
Sergey Balmasov

Vietnam is not alone in a festering territorial dispute with China. In the near future Indian warships will arrive into the South China Sea. This is a group of destroyers CMD (controlled missile defense).

But there is more to it: at the end of June there were reports from New Delhi that the Indian Navy intends to settle in the South China Sea for a long time. The Indian side is expected to establish a permanent military presence there.

According to the official government version of India, this will help the Navy of India to play a more prominent role in South-East Asia where strategic shipping lines are located.

By doing this, India, as one of the major competitors of China in the region, intends to prevent the far-reaching plans of China to expand its sphere of influence. It is no secret that China intends to establish full control over all the islands in the South China Sea.

At the moment, it controls the Paracel Islands seized in 1974 from South Vietnam, as well as a smaller part of the Spratly archipelago. The severity of the dispute is explained not only by the importance of shipping lanes from the Pacific into the Indian Ocean, but also the wealth of biological resources of the South China Sea and, most importantly, large deposits of hydrocarbons on the shelf.

In particular, the Vietnamese side provides the entry for the Indian warships and naval bases in Nhatraneg and Halong Bay. In addition, India offers aid to Vietnam to increase its naval power by building ships and training of Vietnamese sailors.

Hanoi is not able to withstand the Chinese pressure at sea. This is clearly demonstrated by the events of 1988 when the Chinese were able to capture the Spratly archipelago and win a landslide victory in the clash with Vietnamese Navy.

Since then, the gap between the Chinese and the Vietnamese Navy has increased many times not in favor of the latter. Several years ago, Vietnam's leadership took steps to reduce it. In particular, they purchased six diesel submarines from Russia. Nevertheless, their presence could not stop the Chinese who have much more powerful navy.

In the last six months, they have been actively demonstrating their muscles not only to the Vietnamese but also Filipinos who are also claiming a part of the Spratly archipelago. The severity of the territorial dispute has reached such a high level that Manila recently asked Washington to interfere, and tried to develop a united front with Vietnam to cope with the "China threat."

However, the Chinese Navy is decisively superior to the battle fleets of Vietnam and the Philippines combined, and in the event of military conflict the chances of Manila and Hanoi at sea are minimal.

Recently, the likelihood of this scenario has markedly increased. In late May, the tension between China - Vietnam and China - the Philippines has increased dramatically. The parties sent additional Navy forces to the problem areas. Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung on June 14 issued a decree in this regard on conscription of sailors in the event of further escalation of the conflict with China.

The latter, based on the balance of power, is clearly not afraid and shows determination and full control over the Spratly archipelago. An additional impetus is given by high world prices on hydrocarbons, on the one hand, and the lack of progress in Chinese-Russian negotiations on gas prices, on the other.

However, the establishment of China's full control over the islands of the South China Sea has created enormous problems for the countries of South and Southeast Asia. Even in Indonesia, not to mention Malaysia and the Philippines, there are growing fears that China might use the Spratly as a springboard to leap into the South Seas countries.

As for India, there is another reason why the growing Chinese expansion in the region has caused such a strong opposition. Recently its opponent Pakistan decided to give the Chinese a naval base on its shores. In case of further strengthening of China in the South China Sea, India is risking to be extremely disadvantaged in terms of strategic position.

However, speaking of the commotion caused by the Chinese activity, we should not forget about "the singer behind the scenes." The United States plays a significant role in building the anti-Chinese alliance with India.

Since December of 2007 the influential American officials, including the chief of the CIA, have been paying regular visits to Vietnam. In the face of rising threats from the Chinese, the parties are demonstrating their intent to forget past grievances. This once again emphasizes that despite the anticipated military demonstrations in India the U.S. warships will arrive to the Vietnamese coast in the near future.

They will not limit themselves with "courtesy calls" and will conduct trainings with the Vietnamese Navy. Of course, it has already provoked a nervous reaction in China that urged the U.S. to "not interfere in the territorial disputes in the South China Sea." Yet, this outcry is unlikely to scare the Americans who will be increasing their activity in the region as China's activities are enhancing. Otherwise they will lose the strategically important in terms of geopolitics territory to the Chinese.

[shiv]

How an anti ship missile can be defensive .......

By sinking hostile enemy ships close to one's shore

[VinodTK]

China's pearls unstrung - for now

:
Ever since the introduction of the string of pearls theory in 2004 by Booz Allen, it has been controversial and debatable. According to a 2011 Congressional Research Office report, China might be building, or may want to eventually build, a series of naval and other military bases in the Indian Ocean to support Chinese naval operations along the Sea Lane of Communications (SLOCs) linking China to Persian Gulf oil sources.

On the other hand, China is building commercial port facilities in the Indian Ocean and has not yet established any naval bases there, instead pursuing what US officials call a "places not bases" strategy. In The Military Balance 2011 by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a retired Chinese naval officer suggested that the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN, or PLA Navy) could set up China's first permanent overseas base in an unspecified location in the Middle East. The Chinese Ministry of National Defense subsequently distanced itself from these comments, stating that it has no plans for an overseas naval base.

Although it remains to be seen whether the string of pearls is real, the perceived pearls and provocative discourse from a hawkish Chinese navy unsettle the region. Indians, for instance, fear that China is surrounding their country with ports. Even though these deep sea ports are ostensibly for trade, China "could call them in for military or strategic purposes if oil becomes scarce."
:

[jimmy_moh]

How an anti ship missile can be defensive .......

By sinking hostile enemy ships close to one's shore

But sir.. that missile has the range of 2700 km...... in that distance enemy ships will be resting on their bases

[bmallick]

But sir.. that missile has the range of 2700 km...... in that distance enemy ships will be resting on their bases

Look at it this way. US Carrier entering South China Sea would be 1000 km from the Chinese coast. Now with this missile, PLAN can target the carrier from more than 1000 km inland, far away from where USN can try, find and destroy it. Thus the entire Chinese mainland can be a point from where this missile can be launched. Hence great deterrence.

[Shrinivasan]

Look at it this way. US Carrier entering South China Sea would be 1000 km from the Chinese coast. Now with this missile, PLAN can target the carrier from more than 1000 km inland, far away from where USN can try, find and destroy it. Thus the entire Chinese mainland can be a point from where this missile can be launched. Hence great deterrence.

Good point, the best defense is to have a strong offense tool, hence it is called Deterrence. A missile launcher hidden deep inside the hinterland is almost impossible to find and destroy unless you have phenomenal humint inside the adversary country.

[Philip]

A take on why China desires to dominate the Indo-China Sea (sometimes called the S.China Sea).

http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com ... china-sea/

Possessing a credible sea-based nuclear deterrent is a priority for China's military strategy. China’s single Type 092, or Xia-class, nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine, equipped with short-range JL-1 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), has never conducted a deterrent patrol from the Bohai Sea since its introduction in the 1980s. However, China is on the verge of acquiring credible second-strike capabilities with the anticipated introduction of JL-2 SLBMs (with an estimated range of 8,000 kilometres) coupled with DF-31 and DF-31A road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). In addition, China plans to introduce up to five Type 094, or Jin-class, SSBNs outfitted with the JL-2 missiles, while constructing an underwater submarine base on Hainan Island in the South China Sea.
It’s clear, then, that China is making every effort to keep the South China Sea off limits, just as the Soviet Union did in the Sea of Okhotsk during the Cold War. Back then, the Soviet Union turned to SSBNs as insurance against US capabilities to destroy land-based ICBMs. The need to secure its insurance force from attacks, and the need for effective command and control, meant that Soviet SSBNs had to be deployed close to home, with longer-range missiles to be used to strike the continental United States. In addition to the Barents Sea, Moscow prioritized making the Sea of Okhotsk a safe haven for SSBNs by improving the physical defences of the Kuril Islands and reinforcing the Pacific Fleet based at Vladivostok. The Soviet Pacific Fleet deployed 100 submarines, combined with 140 surface warships, including a Kiev-class light aircraft carrier, to defend its insurance force in the Sea of Okhotsk.

However,the article is erroneous when discussing India's desire to operate in the Indo-China Sea-supposedly for our ATV/SSBNs to operate from.Eventually,our SSBNs are expected to carry a 5000km range ballistic missiule with MIRVs,which will be able to operate from regions of the IOR.SEnding Indian SSBNs into the Indo-China Sea would make them vulnerable to Chinese subs and other naval forces,instead,Indian SSGNs like the Akula/Chakra and future SSGNs of indigenous design will certainly operate in the Indo-China Sea especially to track PLAN SSBNs with a view to destroying them in any crisis.It is here that Indo-Vietnamese cooperation is absolutely vital and the naval relationship should be further accelerated.Vietnam is to acquire 6 Kilos from Russia and IN training would be invaluable.For the IN to have access to Vietnamese base/naval facilities,esp. for our subs-both N-subs (if reqd.) and conventional AIP subs,would be a significant step in establishing a "forward defence" line in the Indo-China Sea ,with the well known choke points of the IOR the second line.

[Gerard]

Latest amphibious warship launched in Shanghai

The Jinggangshan dock landing ship, which is the largest warship in the Chinese Navy, was officially launched in Shanghai, Monday's Jiangxi Daily reported. ... With a displacement of 19,000 tons, the amphibious warship is 210 meters long and 28 meters wide and can carry helicopters, armored fighting vehicles, boats and landing craft as well as nearly 1,000 soldiers, Jiangxi Daily said.

[shiv]

By sinking hostile enemy ships close to one's shore

But sir.. that missile has the range of 2700 km...... in that distance enemy ships will be resting on their bases

Too true.

But words like "defensive" and "offensive" are clearly nonsense. You defence is the other guys offence. The US used such words while arming Pakistan and China is using those words on the US.

[NRao]

By sinking hostile enemy ships close to one's shore

But sir.. that missile has the range of 2700 km...... in that distance enemy ships will be resting on their bases

Hmmmmmm.................

The missile has that range, but the threat perception is not at that range - yet.

The US is developing a missile to counter the Chinese missile and that may increase the range of a threat perception. But that is in the future.

[akula]

Guru's, found this today.


The Jiaolong's range theoretically gives China access to nearly all of the world's deep-sea areas.
The craft is designed to reach a maximum depth of 7,000m and in a dive in the South China Sea last year it made China only the fifth country to go deeper than the 3,500m mark

http://www.straitstimes.com/BreakingNew ... 93370.html

Is India in this list?

[Austin]

With 3 people on board its a DSRV type submarine good for rescuing submarines in deep water and to explore minerals at the ocean bed.

[tsarkar]

http://www.warisboring.com/2010/05/13/j ... ter-china/

Disruptive technologies work both ways

Rather than build ships to counter ships, sink them faster than they build them.

Anyways, this is what BrahMos A could have been...

[Philip]

China's "two-pronged military strategy".Fine article from the Diplomat.
http://the-diplomat.com/2011/07/22/chin ... me-rise/2/

The PRC spends a huge 33% of it budget on the PLAN,with a view to dominating the Pacific and IOR in the future.Apart from the two new 18/19000t amphibious vessels launched by China in the above post,China has embarked upon building carbon copies of the newly refurbished Varyag ,including two N-powered carriers to have 5 major carriers by 2020! These will be ar larger than India's Gorshkov and IAC class which are merely medium sized flat-tops.Apart from the 5 carriers,the PLAN will also possess 80-100 new nuclear and conventional subs,many with AIP.This is the greatest danger to India as we could have upto 20 PLAN subs along with another 12 Paki sub operating in concert against the IN from 2020 onwards.By then,the IN might have about only 12-16 subs operational thanks to our neglect and delay in placing orders.

Xcpt:

But China’s maritime capabilities are set to extend beyond access denial, into power projection. The systems that have gained most international attention are China’s planned aircraft carriers and its new fifth-generation fighter bomber. Anytime now, the PLA Navy will commence sea trials for its first carrier, the ex-Ukrainian Varyag, which has been renamed Shi Lang. The former Soviet ship is larger than European carriers, but one-third smaller than US Nimitz class carriers. Moreover, China has publicly confirmed it has a second, larger, conventionally powered carrier under domestic construction that will likely be launched in 2015. China has planned or is constructing a third conventionally-powered carrier and two nuclear-powered carriers are on the drawing board, with a planned completion date of 2020.

Equally important as the warships, are the aircraft China plans to deploy on its flat tops. The main fighter-bomber in the PLA Navy carrier air wing will be the J-15 Flying Shark, which under current configuration is comparable in size and capability to the US Navy’s retired F-14 Tomcat. The jet will have limited range given its weight taking off from the ski deck-configured Shi Lang, however, it’s believed that advances in Chinese aeronautics and avionics, as well as a catapult launch system on forthcoming carriers, could put the J-15 in the same performance class as the USN F-18 Super Hornet in the future. China may also have developed a carrier-based airborne warning and control systems (AWACS) aircraft, which would be a major development. An Internet-sourced photograph that appeared in mid-May, meanwhile, shows a corner of a model of what is clearly a small AWACS aircraft inspired by the E-2 Hawkeye and the unrealized Soviet Yak-44 designs.

To put China’s carrier programme in perspective, with the retirement of the USS Enterprise this summer, the United States will have only ten carriers to meet worldwide commitments; China will likely have five carriers devoted to the Asia-Pacific region alone.

[Austin]

China's New AAM - SOC

[abhishek_sharma]

China’s Perspective on Nuclear Deterrence
Sr Col Yao Yunzhu, People’s Liberation Army of China
Air & Space Power Journal, Spring 2010

My topic is about China’s perspective on deterrence, but before I deal with the topic, I must point out that for a long time in the Cold War, China strongly opposed the concept of nuclear deterrence, which, as so frequently used by the US government, had carried with it such derogatory connotations as “nuclear blackmail,” “nuclear coercion,” “nuclear containment,” and “nuclear threat.” And China, as the country most frequently threatened by nuclear attack,was understandably reluctant to use such a term.[1] Not until the late 1980s or early 1990s, when China’s drive toward defense modernization inspired academic debate, did deterrence gain acceptance as a key concept in strategic studies and lose its pejorative sense. However, even though the term remained taboo for some time, the logic of deterrence has always played a major role in Chinese nuclear thinking. To facilitate understanding, I explain China’s nuclear policy, making use of US deterrence terminology, and compare China’s deterrence thinking with that of the United States.

China’s No-First-Use Policy Indicates That It Applies Pure Deterrence and Deterrence by Punishment

The most important element of China’s nuclear policy is renunciation of the first-use option. By adopting a no-first-use policy, China has to base its deterrence on retaliation, not on denial. Therefore it must develop retaliatory second-strike capabilities instead of nuclear war-fighting capabilities and doctrines. Studying the nuclear thinking of earlier Chinese leaders like Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, we find that neither man considered nuclear weapons usable on the battlefield in the same way as conventional means. Moreover, neither believed that nuclear wars could ever be fought and won in a measured and controlled way. Such thinking differs from that of American nuclear strategists who have explored many possible forms of nuclear conflict and have formulated complex, complete theories of nuclear war fighting, including limited war, theater nuclear operations, and escalation control.

The Self-Defensive Nature of China’s Nuclear Policy Means That It Carries Out Central Deterrence but Not Extended Deterrence

China preserves nuclear capabilities only to deter nuclear-weapon states from launching nuclear attacks against its homeland. China neither provides a “nuclear umbrella” to, nor accepts one from, any other country. Its opposition to the policy of extended nuclear deterrence—the practice of nuclear-weapon states’ providing nuclear umbrellas to their non-nuclear-weapon allies—attests to the self-defensive nature of that policy. China has clearly indicated that it will neither deploy nuclear weapons on foreign territory nor allow foreign nuclear weapons into China. By comparison, the United States has incorporated extended deterrence as a key component into its nuclear strategy and alliance policy, both during the Cold War and even today. I disagree with the notion that extended deterrence helps nonproliferation by relieving allies of the need to develop their indigenous nuclear arsenals, thus reducing the number of nuclear states. In my view, extended deterrence is first and foremost a defense commitment used to strengthen an alliance, with nonproliferation a by-product of this commitment rather than a predesigned major mission. Very few of America’s allies face threats today that can be dealt with only by US extended nuclear deterrence; rather, US conventional military means can easily satisfy their defense requirements. Additionally, extended deterrence promotes proliferation by motivating declared or potential enemies of the United States and its allies to possess nuclear weapons as asymmetric means to offset US conventional superiority. If we are serious about creating conditions for a nuclear-free world, as President Obama has suggested, the policy of extended nuclear deterrence should be among the first to change.

China’s Nuclear Policy Seeks Deterrence at the Grand Strategic and Strategic Levels, Not at the Operational and Tactical Levels

Chinese leaders mainly consider nuclear weapons a political instrument for employment at the level of grand strategy, not as a winning tool for military operations. The concept of “what wins, deters” does not guide China’s nuclear thinking. China has not stratified nuclear operations into strategic, operational, or tactical levels. China perceives a nuclear strike against its territory—whether with high- or low-yield warheads, causing either great or small losses—as the attack that invokes its counterattack. The American practice, by comparison, incorporates nuclear war fighting into strategic, campaign, and tactical operations. For example, theater operational plans (OPLAN) like US Pacific Command’s OPLAN 5077 (the OPLAN for military conflict in the Taiwan Strait) have annexes on nuclear operations.

China’s Nuclear Arsenal at the Minimum Level Can Be Interpreted to Some Extent as the Minimum-Deterrence Posture


At this point, let me alter the meaning of the concept of nuclear deterrence somewhat by giving it some Chinese characteristics. Chinese minimum deterrence means that the role played by nuclear weapons in national security should be minimized. China would use nuclear weapons only against nuclear attack and only for second-strike purposes. Accordingly, the arsenal must be kept at the minimum level needed. In China’s official documents, “lean” and “effective” are the two adjectives used to describe the nuclear arsenal. To keep the arsenal lean, China has to exercise restraint in developing nuclear weapons; to keep the arsenal effective, China has to modernize it to ensure credibility after a first nuclear strike. Furthermore, Chinese strategists regard the concept of minimum deterrence as a relative one, defined not only by quantitative criteria but also by the survivability of nuclear weapon systems and the credibility of counterattack. Some researchers in the United States have concluded that, based on its modernization effort, China is shifting from a minimum- to a limited-deterrence posture, whereby China could use nuclear weapons to deter both conventional and nuclear wars—and even to exercise escalation control in the event of a conventional confrontation. However, we must remember that the basic logic of China’s nuclear thinking conceives of nuclear weapons as a deterring, not a winning, instrument against other such weapons.

China Depends More on Uncertainty for Its Deterrence Than Any Other Nuclear-Weapon State

By introducing the matter of uncertainty, I try to preempt any questions on China’s opaqueness regarding the structure and size of its nuclear force. For a state adopting a no-first-use policy and intending not to waste too much money on unusable weapons, dependence on opaqueness to bring about greater deterrent value is a wise choice. One can achieve deterrence through the certainty of prospective costs outweighing prospective gains, as well as through the uncertainty in cost/gain calculations. Deterrence works not only to reverse the enemy’s original intention, but also to prevent him from forming such an intention for lack of information. Comparing China with the United States, one sees that the former places more emphasis on taking advantage of uncertainty in implementing deterrence, while the latter realizes more deterrence value by a show of force.

Lastly, China’s Nuclear Policy Has Remained Constant

Here, I want to make the point that China’s perspective on nuclear deterrence has not changed very much since the start of the twenty-first century. The 1960s and 1970s had been the most crises-ridden years for China. Since then, China’s security environment has improved steadily. However, several new factors complicate China’s nuclear calculations. First, it has more nuclear neighbors than before. Second, the Taiwan Strait has become a potential flash point that might drag two nuclear states into military conflict. And third, the deployment of US ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems threatens the credibility of China’s deterrence and the strategic stability between the United States and China. In spite of these new developments, we can see no substantial change in China’s declared nuclear policy and no deviation from the basic deterrence logic in which it believes. Several reasons may account for this lack of change. First, the multilateral-deterrent relationship that China forms with all nuclear-weapon states can readily accommodate new nuclear neighbors. Second, deterrence applied at the strategic level, if credible, can deter nuclear use against China in peace and even in conventional conflict. Third, the BMD system may result in a reassessment of force structure and size, but not in the abandonment of a policy that has best served China’s national interest for nearly half a century.

✯ ✯ ✯ ✯ ✯

In conclusion, China will continue to apply deterrence at the grand strategic level, to base its pure and central deterrence on a retaliatory second-strike capability, to depend more on uncertainty for better deterrence effect, and to modernize its nuclear arsenal by keeping it more survivable, penetrating, and secure. ✪

Note

1. China has been repeatedly threatened with nuclear attacks and might be nearer to such an attack than any other country in the world. During the Korean War, General MacArthur urged the Truman administration to drop atom bombs on China. During the French-Vietnamese War, President Truman and British prime minister Churchill consulted on several occasions, agreeing that the Allies would support US use of atom bombs on China in case the Chinese intervened on the side of Vietnamese troops. The Eisenhower administration threatened to use nuclear weapons against key areas in China (including Beijing) if it launched another offensive in 1953 during the Korean War. The Taiwan Strait crisis of 1958 once again saw China threatened by US nuclear weapons. Top Soviet military leaders considered launching a preemptive strike against China with a “limited number of nuclear weapons” during the Sino-Soviet border clash in 1969. See “A Chronology of Nuclear Threats,” Science for Democratic Action 6, no. 4 / 7, no. 1 (October 1998), http://www.ieer.org/ensec/no-6/threats.html (accessed 24 September 2009).

[Ashutosh Malik]

Ravi Rikhye in http://www.orbat.com on the DF-21 and related stuff below:

The Chinese DF-21 anti-carrier missile: Borrrrring Lot of people getting excited about the Chinese anti-carrier missile, see for example, http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/ ... ns&next=10

The topic is so boring we can hardly keep our eyes open. So we're going to summarize our answer.

(a) You have to find the carrier to hit it. Are you sure you'll find it? Are you really sure? Really, really sure? Yes? Forget about it. You'll never find the carrier.

(b) Your missile depends on electronics links of many kinds. The carrier will use EMP to destroy your links. Oh, you have EMP too, including on the DF-21. How adorable. US will destroy your EMP links, you will get nowhere trying to destroy US links.

(c) DF-21 is hypersonic. Can't be intercepted. How cute. How wrong.

(d) US aircraft will have to fly hundreds and hundreds of kilometers to get at Chinese targets. Their payload will be minimal. Really, now, Chinese High Command: do you think this is back in the 1960s when US would have sent six carriers to eliminate Soviet naval bases accessing the Atlantic? Beijing, have you noticed US carrier doctrine has changed? Now the carriers don't approach till the defenses are taken down. Ever heard of cruise missiles?

This whole debate is so irrelevant Hello, Beijing. Any of you notice that US doctrine specifically reserves to itself the right of a first nuclear strike? US has never defined a threshold, and even if it has, we'd throw away that piece of paper because its a misdirect. What are you going to do if US attacks your naval bases with nukes after you launch an anti-carrier strike? Escalate to counter-city strikes against the US? You think the US doesn't know the cost of even one ICBM getting through? Do you honestly think an N-strike against your naval bases will not be accompanied by an all-out counterforce strike?

But you say: US doctrine talks of gradual escalation with pauses for evaluation before going on - or not - to the next level. Really? Where does it say that? You now haul out a hundred documents to make your point. Our suggestion: please use those documents for toilet paper. That's all they're good for. Do you honestly believe the US has laid out its true N-fighting doctrine in a series of papers released to the public? Listen, good buddies, good friends. Every bit of those public N-fighting doctrines are complete misdirects. If you don't know that, its not our place to educate you.

But, you say, we'll bomb Taiwan and South Korea and Japan, so we'll be raising the stakes very high for the US without threatening the US. Now, now, no need to get upset, but if you think the US gives one little darn about these allies, you are sadly mistaken. US will use your local area N-strike as an excuse to wipe you off the face of the planet.

The point is, you don't get it There is an Indian cute-baby word, choochee. It means little and cute. Beijing, you think you're hechkuva big threat. No, no, and no. You are a choochee threat. The Red Ruskis were a real threat. Did that stop American carriers from exercising in the Norwegian Sea and their submarines from operating off Arctic Russia. No. What do you think would have happened if the Red Ruskies had made a grab for - say - Greenland? You don't know? At last something we can agree, because neither do we. And that's the whole point, isn't it. Since the Russians didn't know what the US would do, it didn't seize Greenland.

The entire Chinese High Command publically blows wind. That's what the East Wind is. They blow wind to assuage their ego and to justify their control of ordinary Chinese. But may we remind the Chinese people of something? Words aside, your leadership is so cautious that even during the 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pakistan Wars and the 1986-87 crisis where PLA sent eight divisions and several independent regiments to reinforce your front opposite Northeast India because Beijing was worried India was about to attack, Beijing did not make even one offensive move against India. Why? Because your High Command is realistic, and it knows opening fire creates situations where no one is in control any more and everything blows up.

Doubt us? Reread your histories of World War I and World War II. Reread the history of the Korean War, where the US made the mistake of thinking it had the situation under control when it crossed the 38th Parallel. Or rather, made the mistake of thinking it didn't need to go all out if it wanted to win.

Just remember: US may be decadent, US may be degenerate, US may be falling to pieces economically. There is a single race of natural born killers on this planet, one race that loves killing and does it better than anyone. Yes, its the US. You don't have to take our advice. Go ahead, push the US. Just don't blame us for what comes later.

Now pardon us. This is a boring discussion at pre-school level. We're going off to take a nap.

(Thanks to reader Luxembourg with initiating a private dialog on the DF-21.)

----------------

Best regards.

[DavidD]

You sound very, very sure that the Chinese won't be able to find, target, and hit U.S. carriers, I wouldn't be so sure one way or another. The DF-21D isn't meant to be a "carrier-killer" as many have dubbed it to be, it's just one more weapon that the USN has to account for.

[NRao]

Let us forget about "other", that is within Chinese means at this point in time.

WRT US, I doubt.

China is WAY behind in all respects WRT to the US. More than anything else in R&D. To even keep pace with the US China will HAVE to resort to stealing technologies.

India needs to be concerned. US? Nope.

The US needs to take care of her economy, more than anything else.

Hate to post this (due to the death of so many people), but China needs to first come up with proper mechanisms to prevent train accidents. This particular technology has been a challenge to all nations that want to rely on train as a primary means of transportation. It is complex, so, solve something like that first, then we can talk of finding ships in the vast ocean and links, etc.

[Ashutosh Malik]

You sound very, very sure ..............

Not me. Ravi Rikhye.

Best regards.

[abhishek_sharma]

China's ASAT test motivations and implications
Phillip C. Saunders, Charles D. Lutes
Joint Forces Quarterly, July 2007

China's ASAT Programs

China launched a direct-ascent ASAT weapon on January 11, 2007, which struck a Chinese FY-1 weather satellite in low Earth orbit (LEO). The ASAT's kinetic kill vehicle (KKV) was likely boosted by a two-stage launcher based on a DF-21 medium-range ballistic missile, which may be mounted on a mobile transporter-erector-launcher. China reportedly conducted several previous tests of the system; it is unclear if the same configuration was used for all the tests. (1) The successful test demonstrates a Chinese capability to destroy a number of U.S. satellites in LEO used for reconnaissance, remote sensing, surveillance, electronic surveillance, and meteorology, as well as some civilian communications satellites with military applications. (2) These satellites and the International Space Station are also at increased, although not significant, risk from the debris cloud created by the recent ASAT test.

The direct-ascent ASAT appears to be part of a larger Chinese ASAT program that includes ground-based lasers and jamming of satellite signals. People's Republic of China (PRC) analysts, scientists, and strategists have written extensively about ASAT weapons and potential means of countering U.S. military uses of space. (3) The revelation by the director of the National Reconnaissance Office that Chinese lasers have "painted" U.S. satellites indicates a capability to disrupt imaging satellites by dazzling or blinding them. (4) Jamming can disrupt U.S. military communications and global positioning system (GPS) navigation and targeting signals. The exact performance characteristics of Chinese systems are unknown, but a range of ASAT capabilities would provide flexible options to temporarily or permanently deny U.S. space capabilities. The Chinese direct-ascent ASAT program appears to be in the research and development phase, and the intent or timing of operational deployment remains unknown.

Motivations

Most analysts believed that China felt the need to test its direct-ascent ASAT in order to develop the system and confirm that it worked properly. A space expert argued that ASATs are like ballistic missile defense: "At a certain point you need to test or the program won't improve to the next level." The group agreed that the timing of the test is not significant; the important message is the fact that China is pursuing ASAT weapons and has demonstrated a certain capability. One China expert suggested that the key messages are that the United States could not expect to dominate space alone and that intervention on behalf of Taiwan would be increasingly risky and costly. Others suggested PRC motives might include warning Taiwan against seeking independence and highlighting Chinese capabilities with respect to Japan and India, both of which operate satellites.

Most of the group felt that ASAT weapons are one of a series of asymmetric capabilities that China is developing to exploit potential U.S. military vulnerabilities. Chinese strategic analysts are well aware of increasing U.S. military dependence on space; ASAT weapons can exploit this vulnerability and reduce American ability to operate in the Western Pacific. One space expert argued that ASAT weapons are a logical and relatively inexpensive response to U.S. military dominance, which rests heavily on space capabilities. Others noted that China's military modernization, which emphasizes "informationalization," would rely increasingly on space in the future, reducing the asymmetric impact of ASAT capabilities.

If deployed, Chinese antisatellite weapons would pose immediate threats to a range of U.S. military capabilities that rely on space assets and would have significant consequences for a Taiwan contingency. The United States has a range of options for countering Chinese ASAT capabilities and limiting their impact, but there is no simple or cost-free solution.

Capabilities at Risk

The direct-ascent ASAT system China tested could threaten satellites in LEO. These include U.S. military satellites used for reconnaissance, remote sensing, surveillance, electronic surveillance, and meteorology, as well as a number of civilian communications satellites with military applications. Satellites in medium Earth orbit and geostationary orbit are not vulnerable to the direct-ascent ASAT system boosted by the two-stage DF-21 launcher. Although China has demonstrated the ability to launch satellites into geostationary orbits using larger rockets, the techniques required to reach higher orbits would significantly alter the dynamics for an effective hit-to-kill KKV, making the current ASAT design unusable for such purposes. However, laser-based ASAT weapons could potentially target U.S. reconnaissance satellites. One space expert viewed lasers as a more important threat than the direct-ascent system, while another noted that all efforts to develop high-powered lasers had been plagued with technical problems, and deployment of such capabilities was probably decades away. Jammers that degrade GPS signals or interfere with satellite communications are another means of disrupting U.S. space assets, but it is difficult to assess Chinese capabilities in this area. Experts noted that China's doctrine for employing space weapons and ability to link systems operationally were unclear.

Strategic Implications

A deployed Chinese ASAT capability would complicate the strategic military relationship between Washington and Beijing. Although U.S. early warning and nuclear command and control communications satellites would not be vulnerable to the current direct-ascent ASAT, they could be targeted for denial by other means. Actions that cast doubt on the U.S. ability to effectively use its nuclear force would set up a destabilizing strategic dynamic. A China expert noted that U.S. attacks on ground-based ASAT systems or components might inadvertently affect China's nuclear command and control system. A PRC perception that the United States might be attacking its nuclear command and control would be very destabilizing. A space expert also suggested that one motive for developing ASAT weapons is concern that U.S. space-based ballistic missile defenses might eventually negate China's nuclear deterrent. In this sense, ASAT weapons could be regarded as defensive in that they could prevent China from becoming vulnerable to a potential U.S. nuclear attack.

The possibility of a U.S.-China space weapons race was discussed. A strategist noted that Beijing probably exaggerates current U.S. space capabilities and overstates the likelihood that Washington will develop and deploy an extensive space weapons arsenal. Statements by U.S. advocates of space control or space weaponization coupled with U.S. reluctance to accept constraints on future space options encourage this misperception. One China expert noted that Beijing is probably sincere in proclaiming that it has no intention of engaging in an arms race. However, China is also unwilling to lock itself in a position of permanent vulnerability to the United States.

[abhishek_sharma]

^ Continuing from the article posted above:

Countering ASAT Weapons

Most felt that China is unlikely to be able to permanently disable most U.S. space assets in the near- or midterm. However, it may soon be able to use ASAT weapons to gain advantages in a Taiwan contingency. The group discussed a range of technical and operational means that might help counter potential Chinese ASAT capabilities:

* Launch direct attacks against Chinese ASAT systems: Attacking ground-based ASAT systems or components prior to launch or use might be effective against known high-powered lasers but would have only limited utility against possible mobile ASAT systems that would likely be dispersed, hard to find, and located deep in China's interior. China experts noted that attacks inside Chinese territory would significantly escalate any conflict.

* Use space-based weapons to attack Chinese ASAT systems or space assets: Some participants believed space-based weapons could help protect U.S. satellites by attacking some types of Chinese ASAT weapons. Others disagreed and suggested that space-based weapons could create even greater insecurity. These systems would take years to develop and deploy and could cause the United States to embark on a costly path both economically and politically. Some space experts suggested that China might hope to divert U.S. military modernization down this path.

* Replenish damaged satellites rapidly: The ability to launch replacement satellites quickly could limit the military advantage from ASAT attacks. This is likely to be expensive and might be negated by increased Chinese deployment of less-expensive ASAT weapons.

* Make satellites harder to find and hit: Smaller satellites that incorporate stealth technology, employ countermeasures, or have the ability to maneuver would be harder for China to target and attack.

* Employ constellations of small satellites: Dispersing capabilities among a number of small satellites would reduce the vulnerability to the loss of any single satellite and complicate efforts to target U.S. space capabilities. It would also increase the robustness of the system by creating redundancies. This would require a shift in design philosophy and might not be applicable to all military space capabilities.

* Make greater use of nonspace tactical reconnaissance systems: Aircraft and unmanned aircraft systems could substitute for some space-based assets and would potentially be harder to target. However, they may not be able to loiter in critical or contested airspace, rendering them ineffective.

* Use foreign satellites to increase the political costs of attacks: Some space experts suggested the United States could make greater use of Russian, European, or commercial communications or imagery satellites to take advantage of Chinese reluctance to attack commercial or foreign space assets. Others questioned the willingness of countries to take sides in a conflict, given their increasing economic stake in relations with China.

U.S. officials should also consider some broader military and policy options:

* Learn to fight without satellites: The modern American way of war depends heavily on space capabilities. Learning to fight without them would take a concerted effort to develop and exercise alternate contingency plans and field redundant capabilities. Some China experts noted that this would return the U.S. Navy to a 1970s style of fighting with carrier battlegroups and strike aircraft. A military expert noted that the United States needs to rethink the assumption that precision strike, intelligence/surveillance/reconnaissance, and bombers would always translate into military superiority, especially with a contested space environment.

* Consider diplomatic solutions: Diplomatic approaches, including arms control, offer the potential to deal directly with the strategic issues posed by ASAT weapons. These approaches might range from formal treaties on preventing an arms race in space or banning ASAT weapons to informal understandings about proper military uses of space. Most participants felt that negotiating and verifying a formal ban on ASAT weapons would be extremely difficult. Some believed that other arms control approaches might be more practical and still have considerable value.

* Adopt an international code of conduct on space behavior: Establishing a code of conduct or rules of the road would reinforce international norms about the right of countries to use space for peaceful purposes. (12) This could limit China's ability to conduct future ASAT tests and to develop more effective systems. Both arms control and code of conduct approaches would impose limits on U.S. freedom of action in space. In addition, a ban against actions that produce space debris would not address strategic issues associated with ASAT weapons or prevent the development of capabilities that could deny or disrupt satellite services. However, the space debris issue could be helpful in mobilizing commercial interests to actively oppose ASAT weapons or actions that interfere with the operations of satellites.

* Establish international partnerships to support peaceful uses of space: The Proliferation Security Initiative offers an example of partnerships among like-minded nations to counter malevolent international behavior. A Space Security Initiative could be developed to discipline actors that seek to limit international uses of space. The goal would be to enlist government and nongovernment users in efforts to prevent and penalize actions that might threaten the operation of satellites, including issues such as ASAT weapons, space debris, nuclear accidents in space, jamming of satellite communications, or intrusions into satellite broadcasts. The partnership could offer benefits such as shared surveillance of space debris and also serve as a vehicle for sanctions against countries or entities that violate a space code of conduct, whether they are signatories or not. All space-faring nations, including China, could become members of the partnership by agreeing to the code and enforcing its norms.

[svinayak]

Suspicions between the People's Republic and its neighbours bedevil its boundaries to the east, south and west. Added to www.audiovideo.economist.com in February 2010

[shukla]

The China challenge: a strategic vision for US-India relations

[venku_Raj]

PLAAF Su-27 went after U.S U-2, Taiwan scrambled F-16s in response

[Austin]

In good old days when Chinese AD was nothing but junk , US used to fly SR-71 and similar recco aircraft over Chinese main land in order to gather intel , some of the drones have even crashed but during those days the PLAAF could do very little and just watch it go by.

[nits]

7,000m & below: China sub set for record dive

Chinese scientists aim to complete the world's deepest dive in a manned submersible in 2012 by going to 7,000 metres (22,966 ft) beneath the sea after a successful test dive in the Pacific Ocean, state news agency Xinhua reported on Tuesday . The Jiaolong - named after a mythical Chinese sea dragon - reached 5,057 metres (16,591 ft) in a dive in international waters in the Pacific in the early hours of Tuesday, Xinhua said.

"Such a depth means the Jiaolong is capable of reaching over 70% of the seabeds in the world," it quoted head of the diving operation Wang Fei as saying. "It will pave way for a recordbreaking 7,000-metre test dive in 2012," Wang added.

Guys - Any idea what is ths capability we possess in this area...

[Austin]

US to continue spy flights after jets 'pursued' by China over Taiwan

Washington on Tuesday insisted it would continue spy flights over the Taiwan Strait after Chinese jets reportedly chased a US reconnaissance plane into Taiwanese airspace.

Taiwan's defence ministry said it sent two F-16 fighters to intercept the Chinese Sukhoi-27 jets near the central line across the 113-mile wide Strait in late June, the first such incursion for 12 years.

The ministry said that the two Chinese jets quickly turned around. A spokesman added that he believed the incident was "an accident" and that Taiwan had been "in full control" of the situation.

China has long objected to US reconnaissance of its coastline, especially since a US spy plane and a People's Liberation Army jet collided in 2001 near Hainan island, killing the Chinese pilot. The crew of the US plane was detained for 11 days in a major diplomatic row.

Adm Mike Mullen, the top US military official, said: "We won't be deterred from flying in international airspace. The Chinese would see us move out of there. We're not going to do that, from my perspective. These reconnaissance flights are important."

But in an article for the New York Times chairman of the joint chiefs of staff stressed that the Pentagon wants to build bridges with Beijing.

Following his visit to China and his counterpart Gen Chen Bingde earlier this month, Adm Mullen said the US was considering an exchange of more junior defence officials.

"General Chen and I are considering more frequent discussions, more exercises, more personnel exchanges," he wrote.

"We both believe that the younger generation of military officers is ready for closer contact, and that upon their shoulders rests the best hope for deeper, more meaningful trust."

The relationship between China and the US should be based on "candid and forthright" talks rather than suspicion, he added.

He said that the time had come in the US to end reflexive suspicion of China, but admonished Beijing for cutting off ties whenever it didn't like "something we do".

"That can't be the model anymore. Nor can we, for our part, swing between engagement and overreaction," he wrote.

Though there are simmering fears in the region about China's increased military might, relations between China and Taiwan have eased lately as Taiwan's President Ma Ying-jeou has abandoned his predecessor's pro-independence stance and boosted ties with the world's fastest-growing major economy.

China still claims sovereignty over Taiwan, which the Kuomintang claimed sovereignty over in 1949 after losing control of the mainland during the communist revolution.

Though Washington has dropped official recognition of Taiwan, the US is still obliged by law to defend the country against Chinese aggression.

In January last year President Barack Obama authorised the sale of $6.4 billion (£3.9bn) in arms, including missile systems and helicopters to Taipei, prompting Beijing to suspend military contacts for a year.

The US administration is close to a final decision on whether or not to sell 66 new F-16 fighter jets to Taiwan by Oct 1.

[Singha]

the deep sea vehicle is likely going into places like the marianas trench and others to see if anything valuable is down there...for the next round of territorial claims.

russians are doing same thing in artic...leading to much takleef in norway, denmark(greenland),iceland and canada..apart from UK - which is always in takleef.

[Kanson]

You sound very, very sure that the Chinese won't be able to find, target, and hit U.S. carriers, I wouldn't be so sure one way or another. The DF-21D isn't meant to be a "carrier-killer" as many have dubbed it to be, it's just one more weapon that the USN has to account for.

True. Kind of deterrent weapon albeit conventional. If USN really loose a carrier, then all hell break loose. Under the current status quo PLAN wont make that mistake. It is just a kind of reassurance to their own military to over come the kind of shock they experienced during Taiwan crisis.

[Austin]

China warns US over spy planes

China has warned the United States that it will "seriously harm" the relationship between the two countries if it continues to fly its spy planes close to the Chinese coast.

The warning comes after it was reported this week that two Chinese Sukhoi-27 fighters had chased a US U-2 reconnaissance jet and had briefly strayed into Taiwanese airspace.

Taiwan confirmed it had dispatched two F-16 fighters to intercept the Chinese jets, which quickly backtracked.

"We demand that the United States respects China's sovereignty and security interests and takes concrete measures to boost a healthy and stable development of military relations," said a spokesman for the Chinese Defence ministry to the Global Times, a state-run newspaper.

The defence ministry called on the US to halt the flights, calling them a "major obstacle" to good relations and saying that they had "severely harmed" mutual trust.

The US seems unlikely to bow to the demands. Admiral Mike Mullen, the chairman of the US joint chiefs of staff, insisted in the wake of the latest incident that the US would continue to fly operations in international airspace. The Chinese would see us move out of there," he said. "We're not going to do that, from my perspective. These reconnaissance flights are important." China has long objected to the US monitoring of its coastline, especially after a US spy plane and People's Liberation Army jet collided in 2001 near Hainan island, killing a Chinese pilot. In a major diplomatic row, the crew of the US plane was detained for 11 days.

Military ties between the US and China have been rocky and continue to be strained by US arms sales to Taiwan. A decision on whether to sell the island 66 new F-16 jets is due by the beginning of October.

The US has said it wants greater military transparency from China over its military modernisation, and has warned about China's growing missile and cyber capabilities.

[Austin]

China Defends Carrier, But Neighbors Worry

[Pratyush]

China Defends Carrier, But Neighbors Worry

From the article posted above.

China’s humiliations at the hands of Western powers in the past centuries “left the Chinese people with the deep pain of having seas they could not defend, helplessly eating the bitter fruit of being beaten for being backward,” said a front-page editorial in the paper.

The sense of victim hood is amazing. Along with the need to prove that they have progressed.

[DavidD]

J-10B with WS-10X?

[Philip]

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/m/dalian/2 ... 009518.htm

Carrier set for maiden voyage
By Hu Yinan and Li Xiaokun ( China Daily )
2011-07-28

"Being extremely capital intensive, building an aircraft carrier task force requires both long-term heavy investments and also access to advanced technologies," wrote Swaran Singh, a research fellow for the India-based Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses.

Geng, the Defense Ministry spokesman, said on Wednesday that the Varyag project embodies the capability of China's defense technology and will promote the modernization of the PLA.

The ship will be equipped with indigenous Chinese engines, ship-borne aircraft, radar and other hardware, said Cao Weidong, a researcher with the PLA Navy's Academic Research Institute.

The carrier might carry the J-15 fighter, the JT-9 naval trainer and the Z-8 helicopter, according to postings on websites including Xinhuanet, and People's Daily and China Central Television's forums.

Its first task

Aircraft carriers present large, vulnerable targets for an adversary, said Li Qinggong, deputy secretary of the China Council for National Security Policy Studies.

That was one of the forefront issues raised by people who supported development of new types of submarines, which are much more flexible in combat. Whether it makes sense for China to develop an aircraft carrier at all was the subject of a long-running debate.

The carrier project was postponed once and again, and it took years before it was approved.

"To modernize our national defense and build a perfect weaponry and equipment system, we cannot but consider the development of aircraft carriers," Liu Huaqing, vice-chairman of the country's Central Military Commission between 1989-97, wrote in his 2004 memoir.

Liu, credited as "the father of Chinese aircraft carriers", died in January.

Debates over their utility and roles "are just a tip of the iceberg in the mounting tasks facing aircraft carriers. . . . That's why we attach huge importance to the first carrier's role as a platform for scientific research and staff training," Li said.

One of the reasons it has taken authorities so long to refit the Varyag and confirm its status with the media, he said, is Beijing's hope that major powers and China's neighbors can, over time, understand the country's need to protect its maritime interests without making anyone nervous.

The reconstruction of the aircraft carrier is a long-term project and will have a long way to go before the warship can become operational, spokesman Geng said.

"Both overestimation and underestimation of China's future aircraft carrier have been wrong," he said.

[DavidD]

Another pic of the J-10B(prototype 1035, never shown before as we'd only seen pictures of 1031, 1032, and 1034) with the WS-10X engine:

http://i.imgur.com/XSZvw.jpg

[S_Prasad]

Another pic of the J-10B(prototype 1035, never shown before as we'd only seen pictures of 1031, 1032, and 1034) with the WS-10X engine:

http://i.imgur.com/XSZvw.jpg

Why does it reminds me of a crow!!

[Austin]

Another pic of the J-10B(prototype 1035, never shown before as we'd only seen pictures of 1031, 1032, and 1034) with the WS-10X engine:

http://i.imgur.com/XSZvw.jpg

How do you identify it WS-10X , just becuase the nozzle looks different or is it possible it would be some advanced variant of AL-31 engine with a different nozzle ?

Interesting those B model have redesigned intake with DSI and IRST . Does it have any additional HP ? Are they working on any PESA or AESA for the B model J-10 ?

[S_Prasad]

http://www.youtube.com/user/Luptonga#p/ ... 1pu3YePg3M

Video which shows that 13000 chinese soldiers were flown into india to train and equip them against the Japs

[Jamal K. Malik]

China wants more aircraft carriers to compete with India