Agni-V ICBM: New capabilities, technologies, strategies

[member_23229]

@SaiK

You have to understand 5 other methods (..Soil movement, radiation, etc) were used to check and they all matched up consistently.

Each method is used by a separate group.

One group didnt know the results of the other group.

Only DRDO's instruments DIDNOT work.

Foreign seismic measurements cannot be authoritative on yield measurements on a test done so far away. It has NEVER been proven.

Foreign powers will LOWBALL India's deterrence to make India look vulnerable.

So..controlled test with design yield achieved is good enough. Controlled yield during test to limit damage to nearby villages.

Guys, this is simple..watch again Dr. Anil - Karan Thapar video...you will find all the answers...

Lets get rid of this "OK...I want a big crater OR full yield seismic data OR mushroom cloud to have faith in INDIA TN deterrence" type attitude..

[chackojoseph]

Ganapathi Deva,

Even then, we are blind at simulations at higher yield as this was a very small blast. We don't know the behavior at higher tonnage.

[Amber G.]

Kanson's claims dont stand up to scrutiny, I'm afraid.

Ok, let's scrutinize your claims. Santanam episode was fairly examined in other threads; we don't know this episode is part of grand strategy. So lets leave Santanam episode for a while.

One & only fact that you cited for your assertion that other than BARC guys like DRDO do involved in designing of Nuclear weapon is from nuclearweaponarchive.org and rest you provided are all your assertion and imagination. Let's first talk of that one & only fact.
<snip>

.

kansonji - I would like to thank you for taking time and very articulately putting on your data points and rational. This is the kind of post which keeps my interest in BRF.

From a scientists and rationalists point of view, I wanted to add some of my perspective after have read diligently 100's (literally) pages of this debate in BRF, I may post that in separate post.

Meanwhile I do have a request to Ramana, and ask him to please answer what I have asked before.
Please refer to:
this post

I would also like to know exactly what he means by when he recently said:

Its only Indian scientists who talk of scaling a non-linear phenomenon and adding vials or test tubes of gas.

What exactly (that is in what context you are referring) this 'non-linear' phenomena? What is the basis of saying
'only Indian scientists who talk...? " and what exactly is this test tube of gas?

Thanks in advance.

[Amber G.]

I am reproducing the post referred above for convenience:
>>>>
BTW, Ramana et al - you never answered/responded to these .. (asked many years ago)

1.wrt to your formula R=K*Y^(1/n) for cavity/crater wrt to Pokharn II
<clicky>

2. Name of one expert in each category, (since it was claimed that there are tons of them) who could be selected.
See here:<clicky>

3. Last but not the least, from here ..

>>>
But to be truthful I have some questions let us see if you (generic “you” - greatful if any one can shine some light. If nothing else, the discussion would be “technical” So here are some points, which had been talked about in last 100’s of pages but I think never resolved... Thanks in advance to anyone who answers etc..

1 What exactly are ‘hydrodynamic .. fiber optic’ sensors… How/why they are ‘better’ than Coax? (Seems like lot of statements like light travel faster in fiber did not make much sense to me.)

2. What are ‘sacrificial neutron sensors’ which can get ‘full spectrum’ of neutrons. (particularly would like to know how one measure spectrum (vs intensity/flux) in time span of a micro-second? - What kind of detectors is one talking about?

3. What are ‘sacrificial xray sensors” (whose data is supposed to settle the debate between fusion vs fission part of S1). I mean how (even in theory) one can determine the origin of X-ray photon as it applies to S1 event.

Thanks in advance.

>>>>

I ask these, because even after 100's of pages of previous discussion
NOT a single evidence has been given which proves that AK lied and bomb was a fizzle. (Can some one give the *strongest* irrefutable proof of the fizzle? with link- I would like to know that. )

[SaiK]

Ganapathi deva, if you want to correct other posters attitude, then you have to present your case than start commanding. Please present answers to questions. If you think my questions are BS, then prove that is so. I would be glad to correct my understanding and accept your case.

[Supratik]

Those who are wondering about whether A-V is ICBM or IRBM my hypothesis is that India may not go for a ICBM because Khan is the only target for an ICBM and it doesn't make sense to have land based ICBMs against Khan. The best chance of survival for second strike against Khan is a nuke sub with 5000-8000 km SLBMs which can be a A-V variant. So don't be surprised if a full-scale ICBM is not tested.

[ramana]

http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 4#p1277904

I think the thread is going far away from the title.
Please stick to A5 only.

Folks this thread is getting off topic. No one can convince the others of their position.

The fundamental premise is the TNW tested in POKII underperformed.
Does it matter to deterrence?

No.

AmberG, Kanson, and a few others have their views.
The rest have their views.
Its not gonna change except more reiteration of the old positions.
Further one has to consider institutional cultures and pressures that make them take their stance.
So I suggest putting a stop to this at least in this thread.

Amit, Thanks for heeding my request.

[abhischekcc]

Can Agni V's range be increased by lowering the warhead weight, or smaller number of warheads (in case it is MIRV)?

If yes, should it be safe to assume that Agni V is capable of targeting mainland America? Or am I missing something here?

[Amber G.]

AmberG, Kanson, and a few others have their views.
...

Ramana, your request to keep this thread focus on A5 is fair.

However, with all due respect, my query was to your statement put in this thread:
Namely:

Its only Indian scientists who talk of scaling a non-linear phenomenon and adding vials or test tubes of gas.

It is unhelpful to selectively use my name in somewhat dishonest manner. After all I did not even share "my position or view", I just commented that I liked some excellent posts by Kansanji in this thread and asked you for clarification of the comment you made in this thread...Virtually all my comments were nothing more than technical information on other posts on the thread.

In any case, I will be very helpful if you can answer in appropriate thread the very valid clarification I asked you in my previous posts.

Thanks in advance.

Yes, I did ask an old question which you have not replied, and it did seem, at least to me, relevant to topic, others, including you , have touched upon. In any case, I believe you should answer those question here (or in other thread) as they are, very sensible and critical. As you know, those question are simply clarification of the points raised by other esteemed contributors in the forum, including you.

Last of me on this thread, unless some one address me.

[SaiK]

I see a new capability with A5 base-lined [if scalable and modular concepts are envisaged in the missile architecture and design]. It could begin a new dual role for universities and r&d labs to launch vehicles by using a call services (just like desi call-taxis) to launch their babies to deep space.

BARC could call on a service to launch from their backyard to send an experimental yield verification and validation unit that is dispatched to the other side of the darkness, and beyond, with probes and relays. [may not make sense since there is nothing to vibrate in space]

ISRO could launch emergency kits to ISS, on call service, where dock-able containers are packaged and sent. This is another avenue to join the ISS mission, specifically for unmanned requirements.

Private institution could call on services to launch their own satellites from tata and birla backyards - of course within verifiable ways to secure national interests.

mini satellites are very important for varied interests and experiments.

DRDO should send a deep space probe as one of the next test.. we would like to see how far end of the solar system the probe can reach and still communicating. This would also establish the V&V of deep space missions. Indirectly helping us launch detections capabilities for NFU.

[ramana]

AmberG, Thanks. By now you must have understood I don't want to answer your questions for my own reasons. You and any others are welcome to think what you might.
ramana

[darshhan]

the kind of vision I see for the ASBM+MARV attack is something best seen here:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lr5wpM59pqM

decepticons enter earth's atmosphere in a direct flight from deep space and make a plunge for their leader at the bottom of the sea.
the CVBG does not stand a chance....its like a hail of hypersonic stones going through a sheet of glass.

If only DRDO recruited Michael Bay.

[Singha]

cool stuff though. the decepticons didnt have to sink the carrier patrolling over the undersea boneyard , but they homed in on the carrier just to prove a point and tell everyone the big bad dogs had arrived for the fight

[member_20317]

1.1 ton to 600 km.

I think a reverse decepticon is even more attractive. 2-3 Tessy launches and some maneuvers later the payloads join up to give you a working sat in place of the one the Chicoms shoot down. All in matter of hours.

Better still just deliver some fuel to the existing ones to enable change of orbits.

[Klaus]

Recalling Bharat Karnad's talk in NJ this past November, he had a point to make about the Agalega islands being leased to India.

Perhaps these islands could be our version of Kwajalein for future tests of Tessy and maybe even A6.

[SaiK]

that is a very good idea ravi_g, hidden behind that is a massive $$ projects.

thinking about extending sats life! moving orbits is itself an awesome idea.. considering existing sats design, design a pusher satellite that would dock or engage on, and push the sat out to a different oribit.

sounds like a5 tessy is a bedrock for space based automation and robotics projects.

[yantra]

+1 ravi_g. Stretchingit a bit further - can we make satellites change orbits (very slightly, based on an algorithm fed by the ground station) periodically- making it take an un-predictable (for the enemy) path?

That would require very smart ASAT weapons to chase it down..

[Kanson]

Amber G. ji I must say thank you for your kind supportive words. Just when I feel slightly irritated as logic is extended, chopped, modified, added and pruned as per convenience, your words appear soothing. Thanks once again. Not only that, to all who like to put reasoning without bias, it is a pleasure reading your replies.

[Kanson]

My 2 naya-paisa & apologies for the OT: I get the impression that Kanson's point is this "Since we are ready to believe A-5 test is a success based on DRDO's words, we should similarly believe Pok-2 TN was a sizzle & we have proven TNs, based on BARC's words".

Kanson: correct me if I am wrong because I dont want to burn a strawman.

Yes Prem Kumar, that's the point I reiterated.

Kanson is right in terms of "who" can ultimately make the assertion (though there are some nuances in the Pok-2 case). But here is where the above analogy falls apart - even if we assume that the TN was a sizzle:

No I don't think so and i can explain. I can give some short explanations hoping you to do the remaining search.

a) DRDO is not saying that A-V is ready to be deployed. Its going to take 2 more tests before deployment, as per the recommendations of some gentleman's committee (I forget his name). Post Pok-2, if we claim we have deployed TNs, there is skepticism about the reliability of the device because 1 test is too little

Pls go through Ak interview to Karan Thapar, where he try to explain how those few tests ( that is 5 tests) is equivalent to testing several times. Further you can get this bit more explained in Saag.org papers as well as in other sites. Or, I don't know it is still hosted, but some IISc wala added some explanation. You can scourge the net; all these data are at your finger tips.

b) DRDO is not claiming that A-V is a 10000 KM ICBM. If they did that, there will be skepticism because they havent tested A-V to that range. But after Pok-2, if AK or anyone else claims that the deployed TN bums have a yield of 250KT, there is once again justifiable skepticism.

Tessy Thomas mentioned before first (which was not successful) test, Agni 4 contains extra fuel or more fuel to do the maneuver needed to beat ABM. Second, there is a news item which mentioned Agni 4 indeed can go more than the distance tested in the second successful test. In case of Agni V, you check various statements and you can come to your own interpretation. And if try to see what other missile powers were doing, lately, Russians did similar things; to prove to Americans, their missiles do have higher range and can beat their ABM which Americans are planning to install close to Russian borders. So the list goes on.

Also, everyone is aware that the decision to test only 40KT and 3 bums at the same time was made by the scientists because they were under extreme pressure to collect as much data within as few tests as possible. Hats off to them for what they accomplished under the circumstances. However, here is where our political leadership failed us spectacularly. Their only job was to absorb the international pressure, show some balls and tell the world that we will conduct a series of open ended tests till we are satisfied. That's what leaders are supposed to do - provide air-cover. Instead they demonstrated that they have "half a ball". And they thought they could finesse their way out of the sanctions regime - instead of just saying "up yours". Result - we have a miserable deterrence and endless questions.

See, in POK2 they demonstrated Sub-KT testing capabilities. And then AK on some channel mentioned about sub-Critical testing facilities with BARC. In Aerospace equivalence, these equals to having supersonic wind tunnels for full scale model. It means you can literally put LCA TD1/NP1 in a wind tunnel and virtually can see how it is going to behave. And there are many things.

[SaiK]

Adhering to breaper requests, it may be wise to GDF these discussions.

[member_23229]

As usual, even after providing clear explanations here by many, people refuse to see the light about India's TN deterrence.
Thanks Kanson for your explanation.

[PratikDas]

No parting shots, Ganapathi. Let that line of discussion end with this:

http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 4#p1277904

I think the thread is going far away from the title.
Please stick to A5 only.

Folks this thread is getting off topic. No one can convince the others of their position.

The fundamental premise is the TNW tested in POKII underperformed.
Does it matter to deterrence?

No.

AmberG, Kanson, and a few others have their views.
The rest have their views.
Its not gonna change except more reiteration of the old positions.
Further one has to consider institutional cultures and pressures that make them take their stance.
So I suggest putting a stop to this at least in this thread.

Amit, Thanks for heeding my request.

[Amber G.]

A quick needed reply to something addressed to me.

AmberG, Thanks. By now you must have understood I don't want to answer your questions for my own reasons. You and any others are welcome to think what you might.
ramana

Ramana, honestly, if I indeed understood you didn't want to answer what clearly were technical clarification from your earlier posts, why would I continue asking? We are all busy people so why should we spend time deciphering riddles? I must say in all of my BRF participation, this (" I don't want to answer your questions for my own reasons") was the most unusual, if not the strangest explanation I have ever seen. May be, if you change your mind, you may like to clarify those points at some appropriate thread, because I do think I asked the valid clarification which can only help everyone to get ,more clarity.

Regards.

Again, last one from me on this thread, unless some one address me.

[SaiK]

Amber, if I read ramana correct, he said he did not want to answer that in this thread. He may be waiting for you to open a GDF thread. I may be wrong.

[Karan M]

Ok, let's scrutinize your claims. Santanam episode was fairly examined in other threads; we don't know this episode is part of grand strategy. So lets leave Santanam episode for a while.

Actually, why don't you specify what the grounds for your claims were? Its pretty interesting to see you wish to avoid the entire
point of my post which was that Santhanam, with BARCs knowledge and agreement, had control of the testing and as such would
have been well aware of what to expect and not and does not agree with the test results...and was also backed by other BARC guys..

...instead you wish to avoid this, and focus on the hypothetical tangential in my post, which I mentioned as such. What grand strategy and why should we avoid this?

One & only fact that you cited for your assertion that other than BARC guys like DRDO do involved in designing of
Nuclear weapon is from nuclearweaponarchive.org and rest you provided are all your assertion and imagination. Let's first
talk of that one & only fact.

So Kanson, you talk of talking to experts and what not, but you seem to be totally unaware that the entire portion in that link is from Weapons of Peace...hmmm, interesting..

Next, a problem with understanding .. at your end apparently...because you miss the point that what I mentioned was a logical
hypothetical based on known data...and given current Indian MIC capabilities, which you seem to be unaware of..and even so, that hypothetical (whether DRDO was involved in making the bomb etc) was tangential to my main point, that KS was the test in charge and hence knew what to expect, measure and how to do so..something backed by even ex AEC folks...you miss this point and get out some argumentative spiel about "assertion and imagination".

This is not DRDO versus BARC, Kanson & it doesn't fall into that simplistic template either. Its about criticism of the manner in which doubts were addressed. Here you had Kalam (ex DRDO) asked by the GOI to solve the debate and support BARC and you had Homi Sethna counter him and say this:

http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes ... omi-sethna

"Homi Sethna, a former top atomic boss..."I fully support Santhanam and I stand by his statement that India needs more nuke tests to be conducted ," Sethna, the guiding force behind India's first nuclear test in 1974, said."

http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes ... -santhanam

There is a "strong reason to believe that the thermonuclear device had not fully burnt and, therefore, further testing was called for," Iyengar, a former Atomic Energy Commission Chairman, said in a statement yesterday.

..Iyengar ex AEC himself says this about the role of KS:

Santhanam was one of the four leaders associated with Pokhran-II and must certainly have known many of the details, particularly with regard to the seismic measurements, Iyengar said.

...this is what makes the issue serious to any observer. Its quite obvious that KS is not a crank, or a rogue voice but merely expressing the views held by several senior folks across the spectrum, including AEC etc.

Then there are the other guys like BK - no great shakes technically or even on policy, but does repeat stuff mentioned by contacts, he was exNSAB after all..again saying TNW fizzled..

In this quote, Ramanna, Srinivasan K. Subba Rao, Ramamurthy, P.K. Iyengar are BARC people. The quote explains in developing Conventional explosives(known as lens) for Nuclear package under guidance and supervision of BARC scientists. I don't know how anyone can say, this gives the impression that, "They would have been involved in many design level details and possibly even manufacturing"I hope you agree, involving in some work, and having authority on that work is different. Many construction workers do involve in construction a building/bridge but the person who knows and have complete knowledge and understanding of that work is Chief Engineer, right? 'many design level details' - Again this statement is your assertion. What is that 'many' you want to say and where is the proof?

Sorry but do you even think this merits a serious response? Because what you did here was make a complete mockery out of basic engineering principles.

The link clearly mentions that the TBRL team (referred to in usual journalistic shorthand by only its directors name) was tasked by NagC then DRDO head (After whom the missile was named BTW) to develop the explosive lenses. Clearly on the basis of the fact that they had the expertise to do so, and that it maintained secrecy...and you compare them to under informed construction workers! Brilliant!

And what an ..analogy. A Chief Engineer and bridges...lets see, my close relative, with whom I grew up was a chief engineer, and he informs me that apart from him, the Superintending Engineer, the Executive Engineer, the private contractors all had access to design data and often knew significant portions better than he..because it was their job to do so!

And so, the TBRL team gets allotted the task of the conventional explosive lenses, for which part it would have been their job to find out how to get the task done with current technology, work with BARC team to see what could be done, with both team modifying their expectations, and design work portions accordingly...and in turn the TBRL head does 500 test shots and then delivers the final piece...and this is not manufacturing? What is it then?

Again, your assertion/imagination.

So, a hypothetical based on prior events, and current fields of specialization (e.g. who exactly works on conventional explosives in India) is mentioned, and the reasoning explained and you come out with this...brilliant...so no evidence provided that BARC can do the entire job on its own including the conventional explosives part (which could have been one way to do it) or point out that BARC was tasked with doing the entire piece by GOI (which could be another way to do it...). ..nope, just a handwave & thats a counter...

This takes the cake. You think, this is similar to the movie scripts, 'C'mon, I need to know everything what is inside before I transport your maal', huh? You mentioned, 'down to the last detail', Pls don't take it otherwise, but that claim is outlandish. People who involve in such projects often use the word 'compartmentalization'. If you are in doubt, you can check with experts, who actually made their hands dirty in those projects, next time.

Actually, whats outlandish and comparable to movie scripts (the bad ones apparently) are your laboured attempts at sarcasm with juvenile smilies...since you don't seem to want to be civil, I can also proceed on the same way...lets not get there, shall we.

Lets see what I wrote:

So, even considering the DRDO guys did not contribute to the design itself (very unlikely based on prior events), they would have definite need to know the specifics of the bomb design to learn about what it could tolerate in terms of forces, pressures, design fuzing for it, switches etc. Apart from knowing the physical specifics of the packages down to the last detail so as to accurately model it for their delivery - via Agnis etc. Every pound of weight, etc will count.

So what did I mean? Its pretty much there in black and white. It means that if these guys who make the missile need to make sure its payload reaches its target and intended altitude etc - and need to make the missile also suitably rugged or design specific so that it doesn't damage the payload...they will need to know the exact dimensions of the payload and as much as possible...and what it can and cannot withstand..

And you bring in compartmentalization and mention "experts who actually made their hands dirty in these projects, next time"...hmmm... if you are arguing about something as clear cut as what I wrote, you really need to take your own advice..and talk to all those guys, far more than I or anyone else here..

Lets see, in simple terms again - DRDO needs to make a missile, the high level guys will work with project leads at BARC and figure out whats possible, get specifics about what the payloads can or cannot withstand, and then specific subteams in both organizations will work on their specific tasks without being aware of the bigger picture. That is compartmentalization. That does not mean the seniors on either side don't know what's going on.

Even today, DAE and DRDO work together closely on many projects, including many strategic ones, beyond this nuke business...so please don't give me this motherhood and apple pie "gyaan" about compartmentalization, experts who made their hands dirty etc...

Heck, lets look back at history. Raja Ramanna – a man who gave DRDO impetus, was a BARC man..
http://drdo.gov.in/drdo/pub/nl/nov2004/welcomenov04.htm

Incidentally, Ramana supported the Pokhran-2 tests and was positive about the results...which should tell anyone here about how deep the divide amongst the eminent scientists runs about what was a success and what was not and second, I couldnt give a dang about giving points to counter or not...all I am bothered about is the fact that there is no consensus and the system couldn't handle this..

But the briefing is done by DRDO, right ? And not anyother guys, right? Whoever may be the audience who want to know about the missile, only people who were asked to talk about these missiles are DRDO guys. That's the point i'm also raising.

Your point is mistaken I am afraid, because you are cherry-picking what I wrote about the entire process...the point is India's missile program has multiple stakeholders involved, and one agency - i.e. DRDO is not the only auditor of whether its products are complete. This is actually a plus, though the process could be improved further (a single directorate of weapons design, at least for the larger national programs like the LCA etc).

Point is the development process is an iterative, involved process with the user having significant transparency and insight into the entire cycle! Plus its not a given that DRDO alone will necessarily conduct the briefing - there will be examples where even the user representatives who have been part of the development process can be part and parcel of the briefing. I am not going to go dig out my notes on the Prithvi - but there were several Army guys who were part of the process, and later user training as well..

Yourself has give me points to counter. I don't know you can import Nuclear bum and so there is no need to 'convince a customer' for the reasons you say.

No, I haven't given you any points to counter...I was very specific about what I wrote. What's happened is yet again, you have gone and misunderstood something...and then gone off on point scoring.

Heres what I wrote:

These are all hard lessons learnt in order to convince a customer of the validity of each system, when imports are often available and used to benchmark local systems. DRDO also brings in ISRO members to audit technical aspects of their programs. The A-3 failure IIRC had an ex ISRO chair auditing.

I said imports are often available. Not always. Always would have meant all local programs had import alternatives available. But I didn't and they don't. Imports are available for tactical missiles. That's where DRDO has learnt a hard lesson to involve the user and make sure it gets enough buy in. I mention Agni in the last sentence and also mention ISRO. Its obvious that these both refer to strategic programs and events regarding strategic missiles, where imports are not available.

True, once canisterized, these army people, going to fire the missile in times of need. So they need to 'train' by firing missile etc. Nuclear or conventional bum is part of that missile. By firing the missile they also train invariantly firing those bums. Have you anywhere heard of 'Field Workshop' for nuclear bums currently in practise? What is the need to know the insides of nulcear bums separately. If you have a problem and need to service them, there is separate agency to handle that.

Er, who exactly is going to talk about "field workshop" for nuclear bombs (or bums as you wish to refer to them). This entire discussion, speculation etc will lead to stuff about how these are stored, who owns what, timing, processes etc and all that has no business being speculated on an open board unless we are talking of what other countries do.

All said and done, if we see what was done for other payloads, the users will be involved in development of these systems with their inputs at the level that either match their policy/force requirements and second, deployability - which feeds into training. SOPs will be then drawn up, with specific portions available to the operators at need to know basis.

So yes, there will be people from the users who'll know about nuclear bums - more so than the vast majority of people anyway, and they may even grow to become experts in the field over time, if further specialization occurs one day with SFC growing more important. They won't need to know as much as the developers but they can act as auditors over a period of time.

If it can be viewed in another angle, this is taking one's word against another person word. For the discussion, How you know that Santanam's claims are not motivated? If people want not to believe AK's words, what is there to believe in Santanam's claim. Just becoz Santanam is head for test preparations? If so who is Anil Kakodkar then?

Right, so a guy who raises doubts, must be motivated. We shouldn't see whether he was right or not, or whether the institutional capability exists to handle those doubts within the framework of the system..VKS raises issues about IA ammo...gets attacked.. KS says tests had an issue...gets attacked...people who raise concerns are not always right and may not always be accurate either, but to dismiss them out of hand is also wrong.

So.. KS is given the job of being the test evaluator and he does that job diligently and does not buy into what the other guys say.

This is actually a plus and exactly what the role is meant to be. Sort of like how CEMILAC acts independent to ADA, HAL etc despite being under DRDO, MOD but acting like an independent (and diligent) auditor. And this makes him “bad”.

The issue is not of how bad KS was to raise this, or how AK has to be lying if he does not agree (why? he has another point of view and may actually believe what he says about test results) but of the systemic flaw that did not evaluate this issue beyond just having both guys "agreeing to disagree" and then leaving the auditor in the position that he felt that he had to raise the issue publicly. Its a systemic flaw.

Now, for all this business of taking one person’s word against that of another…well guess what, happens all the time, in product development, especially complex design and development challenges, especially those in which multiple agencies work and cooperate..

Such issues often arise, its to KS's credit that he broke omerta and said his piece. We'd seriously be in trouble if everyone kept silent even when they did not agree with the other side..however, this is a breakdown of the system...in the ideal world, he should not have had to do this...he would have been satisfied that his concerns were addressed ...or better still, both sides would have had an agreement of what to do, if the TNW test failed..it seems this was not done.

The bigger picture here is there needed to be some sort of structural framework by which the entire issue could be analyzed and all stakeholder's satisfied without bruising organizational egos or harming individual careers. This business of person versus person just misses the point totally. I couldn't care less if the TNW failed and AK made a widget that did not work. His legacy is already secure in getting us to this point. Similarly, I couldn't care less, if KS was wrong, and he was shown to be so. The problem is there was not a system in place that could reconcile the test "view" with the developer view.

That is the challenge here…instead whats happening is people are fixating on personas…KS, AK etc will go a decade from now, the point is the system remains and must be fixed…theres nothing to say that if tests are held again, everything will be fine, what will we done if the TNW MK2 fails, even if TNW MK1 had worked? We need a game plan in place..

Why you want to know? I'm asking what is the need to know? Even if BARC do have, why we are expecting BARC to reveal those details? These org work in Strategic realm, just as Supreme Court ordered media, by that extension ordinary juntas, not to delve, reveal and discuss Army/troop movements, there is no need for BARC to reveal anything. And it is also our ignorance to expect BARC to reveal what it does or explain to us in all possible ways to convince us on the work they do and make sure that is believable/acceptable to aam junta like us.

Yeah, what is the need to know problems have occurred, what is the need to debate anything, in which case lets not discuss at all, right?

Heh, everyone here are busy commenting on everything from missiles to other topics, and you are suddenly concerned about a public, non specific debate, using only pure open source information about possible alternatives to tests?

If you think the TNW is a glorious success, sure that’s ok. There are others who are not so sure including ex AEC folks and its clear theres no consensus per se.

All I am concerned about is whether there are ways in which the issue can be resolved, with minimal impact to India and Indian interests. Considering we are not decision makers, we can just hope those who are, are doing what needs be done.

[NRao]

Karan ji,

Can we please take that discussion to Deterrence thread?

All these points were discussed in 2008-9ish. There are 41 pages worth of discussion out there on this very topic.

Thanks.

[Karan M]

So much information yet guys go on about "allegations"...

Lets take a look at how multiple agencies worked together. Thanks to these internet chaps, I dont even have to find my WOP copy.

BTW, this is from 1974 - 1989, note how the agencies worked together and how specific people continued to work on the program, moving across labs. So the first weapon - tested in 1974 - and developed further, had a TBRL developed implosion system (the lenses) and later on, the ballistic casing- which also would include the fuzing etc for a gravity bomb. Good luck on developing all that without knowing a lot about the bomb itself - from its physical parameters etc, to the control circuits which need to be tapped to activate it, to the bomb itself which may continue to see different agencies work together.

http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/India/IndiaPause.html

Even without approving the testing the new lightweight fission bomb, Gandhi authorized India's first attempt to weaponize a nuclear weapon - that is, package it so that it could be delivered by the military in wartime, and develop the necessary support systems so that it would be integrated into military operations. It is not enough to have a nuclear explosive device, or even to install it in a bomb casing with suitable fuzing and safety systems. Aircraft have to modified to carry it, and techniques for everything from delivery, to routine maintenance, to security must be developed. In late 1982 Arunachalam began a project to develop these capabilities. Dr. Nagapattinam Sambasiva Venkatesan, who had previously directed the laboratory which developed the bomb's high explosive implosion system, had now moved to the Armament Research and Development Establishment (ARDE) in Pune and was given the task of developing the ballistic case for the bomb. Arunachalam also contacted Air Marshal Chandrakant Gole, the deputy chief of air staff, to arrange for the adaptation and testing of a Jaguar combat aircraft for the role of nuclear bomb delivery. Unfortunately the Indian Air Force was not informed about the project (the purpose for which the test Jaguar had been allocated was not disclosed) although they had little trouble in guessing. The modified aircraft thus remained entirely outside the regular military system [Chengappa 2000, pp. 284-285].

Going forward, DRDO continued its association with development of the payload into a completely weaponized package. They would have obviously needed fairly good details of its efficacy (used to provide pilot escape inputs and delivery profiles) plus what it could, could not stand as well.

No formal action was taken on this report, but it appears to have inspired Rajiv Gandhi to take additional preparedness measures. In 1986 Gandhi instructed Arunachalam to develop a properly engineered aircraft delivery system, with suitable control and security measures and improved reliability to replace the stopgap system developed two years earlier. Arunachalam recruited K. Santhanam as technology adviser on the project. The development effort of the improved bomb system was code named "New Armament Breaking Ammunition and Projectile", or NABAP, and was headed by Muthuswamy Balakrishnan at the Terminal Ballistics Research Laboratory (TBRL) in Chadigarh. Venkatesan, Director of ARDE, was given the task of developing a superior aerodynamic case for the weapon and associated carriage and release mechanisms and to manufacture a certain number of units. This time the Air Force was involved in the development activities from the beginning, with Deputy Chief of Air Staff Surinder Kumar Mehra heading the Air Force team participating in the project. Problems with the existing bomb design and integration plan quickly surfaced. The bombs developed by the DRDO and ARDE turned out to weigh too much for the Jaguar and had ground clearance of only two inches. By late 1986 the Air Force rejected the Jaguar as unsuitable, and efforts switched to integrating the bomb with the recently acquired Mirage 2000 [Chengappa 2000, p. 327]. Considerable integration difficulties continued to be encountered and final qualification of deployed delivery system was not complete until May 1994 [Chengappa 2000; p. 382]. Dr. Badri-Maharaj, author of The Armageddon Factor, has stated that a rudimentary delivery system was in place from 1986-88, presumably referring to the developmental Mirage 2000 delivery system [Indian Express, 18 June 2000]. This effort provided India with it first genuinely usable nuclear weapons capability. By the end of the 80s the Indian Air Force, now equipped with nuclear capable Mig-27 as well, began routinely practicing loft bombing techniques for nuclear bomb delivery.

So Santhanam's presence in the Pokhran tests as a leader was not a coincidence.

Point is despite security measures/compartmentalization etc and all that stuff, there would have been decent number of people who knew a fair bit about the process. The service people probably - hopefully - went onto SFC or its earlier analog. The DRDO/DAE people clearly continued to be associated with the program.

The guys who were key to policy reccomendations during RG;s time were VS Arunachalam and R Chidambaram. The entire team handed over its work to PVNR in 1991.

Then we have:

On 19 February 1994 Agni took its third test flight at the Indian missile test range at Balasore, this time successfully with its range extended to 1200 km. The third flight marked the end of the first phase of Agni development program. The program went into a period of dormancy while the new Agni II began development, a longer range version that replaced the liquid fuel upper stage with a solid fuel version to make an all solid fuel missile

India became a nuclear weapon state in reality in May 1994, though most observers thought that this milestone had been passed years before. It was then that India completed its development of a fully combat ready system for delivering nuclear weapons by successfully conducting acceptance tests. The ARDE developed bomb case, and the TBRL developed implosion system were mated with a modified Mirage 2000 and successfully test dropped at Balasore. The bomb, complete except for its plutonium core, was fuzed for an airburst and released over the ocean. If it been required due to national crisis, no doubt the system could have been pushed into service at an earlier date as a stop gap, but in May the fully mature reliable and safe system entered service. India now had an arsenal of at least a couple of dozen operational nuclear bombs.

In 1996:

The nuclear establishment (BARC and the DRDO) also spent the rest of 1996 in mating the existing fission weapon to the Prithvi and Agni missile delivery systems and preparing the necessary command, control and security measures for the warhead (arming codes, security inter-locks, and an authentication and authorization system for use by the Prime Minister) [Chengappa 2000; p. 418]. On 1 April 1996, Anil Kakodkar became the new Director of BARC.

In the tests in 1998 - again note, many key systems coming from the DRDO side, and they would have had to work out a lot of overall issues with the BARC/DAE physics guys...it sure would not be easy..for either...this also explains why seniors from both sides et al downplayed the institution versus institution angle, both are very heavily involved in the program and hence need to keep that rapport going.

http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/India/IndiaShakti.html

The Shakti Test Devices
Identifier

Description
Shakti I Two stage thermonuclear device with fusion boosted primary, intended for missile warhead;
test design yield 45 kt, with a 200 kt deployed yield
Shakti II Lightweight pure fission tactical bomb/missile warhead, 12 kt design yield
Shakti III Fission experimental device, reportedly made with reactor-grade plutonium.
Probably a fusion boosted design without the fusion fuel, 0.3 kt design yield
Shakti IV 0.5 kt experimental device
Shakti V 0.2 kt experimental device
Shakti VI Not fired; another low yield experimental device?

According to Chengappa the plutonium for the devices weighed 3 to 8 kg, depending of the device, and were colored gray due to the coating applied to contain the radioactivity (and no doubt to prevent oxidation of the plutonium). The explosives surrounding the cores was colored a dull orange.

Three laboratories of the DRDO were involved in designing, testing and producing components like advanced detonators, the implosion systems, high-voltage trigger systems. They were also responsible for weaponization -- systems engineering, aerodynamics, safety interlocks and flight trials.

Its pretty clear this "joint-project" will continue for the foreseable future and is helped by certain "quirks" of the two combines in that they have significant manufacturing ability as well, and don't have to outsource critical assemblies - a plus for secrecy and also accountability.

But again, lets go back to the evidence..says enough.. that a serious observer could discern the Indian MIC and how it works. Should be enough at this point..

Today, TBRL continues its key role:
http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes ... le-warhead

A DRDO lab in the city, Terminal Ballistics Research Laboratory (TBRL) has developed the detonator which can trigger the explosive in a nuclear warhead and account for the successful take off of Agni-V -- a 5,000km range nuclear missile. This was announced by Avinash Chander, the scientist who has developed the missile which will be launched next month. Agni has already created ripples in South Asia with its long range capability.

"The missile has a wide range and with this our defence strategies will become enhanced. It is not to scare countries like China, but to become capable of self-defence. The TBRL has a major role in the development and testing of Agni-V. The detonator, which will trigger explosion in the warhead of the missile, has been tested in Chandigarh," said Chander.

[Karan M]

Karan ji,

Can we please take that discussion to [url=http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... Deterrence[/url] thread?

All these points were discussed in 2008-9ish. There are 41 pages worth of discussion out there on this very topic.

Thanks.

Thanks, was not aware of that thread. Is there a way to print all 41 pages into one file and read it, without manually copy pasting?

[NRao]

Thanks, was not aware of that thread. Is there a way to print all 41 pages into one file and read it, without manually copy pasting?

There was a way to do that, but the last time I tried it - trying to print that very thread it did not work. That feature was removed, much to my chagrin. But perhaps one of the Admins can be a better resource.

OK. Try the "print view" on the top of this page - you need to be logged in.

Best of luck.

As an aside, it is really not worth discussing that topic.

The REAL question is - as you will realize reading that thread - does India have "deterrence". Check my post a page or so ago.

I was in touch with an Ex-prez of BARC/etc - via email - and when I posed the same question he withdrew his support of S. I do not know if it was my question that impacted his thinking, but certainly there was - at that time - a correlation. Could be circumstantial.

Man, I hope I do not have to dust off my Excel spreadsheet.

[negi]

^ ArmenT made a software to archive threads; it's a pity we do not have forum private messaging turned so now you have to hope that Armen reads this page.

[NRao]

Karan ji,

I have "up"ed the deterrence thread for you.

[ramana]

SakshiTV Interview of Dr Saraswat:

Very clear and good questions unlike UndiTV:

[youtube]29di6fyF6Mc#![/youtube]


He clearly says three roles for A5
- MIRV
- Satellite launcher for micro sats for post nuke world if the main sats are knocked out*
- ASAT

Sunderji once asked is it enough to conduct a weapon test or do we prepare to fight a nuke war.

I think the question is being answered by DRDO as the latter.

A5 is maneuvering re-entry. Payload requires no more than 40 deg C.

Watch 10-14 mins

* I don't think PRC can knock out only Indian sats

[SaiK]

wonder what would be the strength of the reinforced carobon composite for RV ? I am thinking we could use that for the hot sections of kaveri engine... or perhaps even blades., instead of SC ones.

[suryag]

Every sentence worth a read

Quality our concern' - Interview with Avinash Chander

[ramana]

Every sentence worth a read

Quality our concern' - Interview with Avinash Chander

DEFENCE

‘Quality our concern'


T.S. SUBRAMANIAN


Interview with Avinash Chander, Chief Controller, Missiles and Strategic Systems, DRDO.





MOHAMMED YOUSUF

Avinash Chander: “ We are looking at certain game-changing processes, at longer-range capability…. We want to anticipate the future.”

AVINASH CHANDER has a rare distinction. He is the architect of five of India's strategic missiles – Agni-I, Agni-II, Agni-III, Agni-IV and now the long-range Agni-V. The missiles of the Agni family were developed by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) of which Chander is now the Chief Controller (Missiles and Strategic Systems).

As Programme Director, Agni-V, he played a key role in the launch of the long-range ballistic missile on April 19 from Wheeler Island, off the Odisha coast. The launch propelled India into a select club of countries (such as the United States, Russia, France and China) that have the capability to build missiles that can travel more than 5,500 kilometres.

Chander joined the DRDO in 1972 after graduating in Electrical Engineering from Indian Institute of Technology, Delhi. He obtained his M.S. in Spatial Information Technology from Jawaharlal Nehru Technological University, Hyderabad. He has made specific contributions to the Agni programme – its management, mission design, guidance, navigation, simulation and terminal guidance.
Excerpts from an interview he gave Frontline in Hyderabad on April 21:

India's successful test-firing of Agni-V has generated much interest internationally.

Many countries are talking about it. The fact that they are talking about it and are concerned about it shows the impact it has made and how it is fitting into their policies. That is why I called it a game-changer.

China has reacted in a big way. It says that Agni-V actually has a range of 8,000 km and that India has underplayed it.

Is it true?

No comments.

{This is good policy neither confirm or deny classified information.}

What made your team confident that Agni-V will succeed in its maiden launch?

Over the years, our missile designs have been robust except in the case of Agni-III, where the first flight was a failure because there was a lacuna in the design itself. In no other flight did we have a real design failure. Yes, there was again some design lacuna in Agni-IV. But the failure of its first flight was for quality-related reasons.

A component failed.

Agni-IV's failure was for quality reasons, but it was not the primary cause. We are now pretty confident of our design strength. We had already tested in Agni-IV the major technologies – such as the composite motors, their conical shape, etc. – that went into Agni-V. But Agni-V had much bigger motors. We had a lot of confidence that our process was well-understood and the missiles' behaviour was well-defined.

We were testing the new navigation system – the ring-laser gyro system – for the first time and we were constantly upgrading and improving it. By the time we went to Agni-V, we had made 20 systems and tested them on ground in various conditions. A lot of data were generated on their performance. Wherever there was a weakness, it was addressed. We had built-in redundancies to take care of unforeseen emergencies. So we were pretty confident that we would have a total mission success.

Our on-board computers went through hundreds of runs in various modes. We tested them in various types of conditions – way beyond the actual missile capability – to ensure that neither the system nor the software would fail.


DRDO/HO/AFP

THE LONG-RANGE AGNI-V missile takes off from a mobile launcher on Wheeler Island, off the coast of Odisha, on April 19. The missile has a 5,000-km range and can target "all potential threat areas".

We now have a system of configuration control and configuration management and an elaborate review mechanism at various stages so that design problems do not slip through. Even with all that, there were occasions when gaps occurred, but in the end we had a rigorous flight review mechanism. This is a practice we borrowed from the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO). When Mr A.P.J. Abdul Kalam came [to the DRDO from ISRO], he made the Agni programme very rigorous. Multiple teams had to go through every item, re-verification was done, and if there was any problem it was rectified on the spot. That was how we were confident that we had captured all the problems for Agni-V.

Our primary concern was quality. Unfortunately, quality continues to be our concern. If you take a missile of this type, there are hundreds of thousands of connections – components being soldered on the integrated circuit systems. Most of them are made manually in our country. The processes are still not automatic. If any one of these joints fails, the mission fails.

There are hundreds of people across the country who have done these components. Although we have instituted a strong quality mechanism in various industries working for us, and we have our own quality control supervisors working there, there is nothing like 100 per cent inspection assurance. That was our primary concern. Ultimately, the product is as good as the weakest element in that chain.

I shall cite a simple case. We purchase components from our vendors. When we were mounting one such component in a package, our inspectors found that it was different from what we had envisaged. It was a fake component.

Fake?

Totally fake. It was not from the source we wanted. It was not of the same quality. It did not match the shape of the component we had ordered. But it had the same batch number. So that is the level to which you should make sure that you do not have any problem. We are steadily trying to improve. Today, we have a better quality control system.

We have created a Strategic Services Quality Assurance Group, dedicated to the Agni class of systems. But at the industrial level, it has to be much, much better. That was the only concern we had [when we launched Agni-V].

You can simulate vibration, shock and acceleration one at a time. You cannot simulate all of them together. But when a missile is in flight, all of them happen together. That is the most critical environment.

Besides, there are so many components that are operating for the first time. About 75 per cent of the failures happen owing to a collection of failures. About 15 per cent of failures occur owing to single-shot systems – some weakness somewhere in a system, such as the rocket motors' separation system, which is not testable. The Americans have also failed in some of the anti-ballistic missile trials because the missile's separation system did not work. They are single-shot systems. [The failure in the U.S. happened] not in the missile which was used as an interceptor but in the missile that was used as a target. Hardly 5 per cent of the failures occur because of design lacuna. We put in a lot of hard work for two years.

{What about the remaining 5%? Also very good summary of aerospace systems. Wonder what the ISRO stats are? Failure analysis and corrective action is a very big activity nowadays. I differ slightly. Even if the 75% are QA related it is in the end design related as the designer did not make it producible. And bogus parts is a big problem in high reliability industries due to the empahsis on commerical off the shelf (COTS) products for cost reasons. And in case of India additionally due to technology denial regimes.}

How did you achieve this quantum jump in range – from Agni-III's 3,000 km to Agni-V's 5,000 km?

We went through various steps. One was that we had to make the upper stages lighter. That was the first and most critical factor. We decided to make both the second and third upper stages of composites. That gave us a major benefit in terms of weight. In Agni-III, both the first and second stages were metallic.

Having made the composite stages, we found that they were coming out better than the metallic stages, strength-wise and property-wise. So we could operate at a higher pressure. So you do not have losses due to gravity, and the losses are reduced. We then went through a total philosophy change. Up to Agni-III, we ignite the upper stage first, then separate the lower stage so that there is no problem of separation.

We decided to leave behind that culture of space vehicles. We now put big retro motors, which create a thrust of four tonnes each – totally 16 tonnes of thrust – just to separate the stages so that no dead weight is passed on to the upper stage.

Correspondingly, we decided to make the mission stronger so that there are no interfaces and the separation is clean. We studied and created extensive models to simulate them on the ground in all types of disturbed conditions in wind tunnels. With all that, we could remove the inter-stages altogether. The weight we had reduced by making the upper stages of composites was fed back into the third upper stage. The weight did not increase overall, but the total energy increased considerably. To reach the 3,000-km range, you need a velocity of five kilometres per second. To reach the 5,000-km range, the velocity has to be more than six kilometres a second.

That was our approach to the repackaging of our vehicle. We made major modifications in the upper stage. V.G. Sekaran, Director, Advanced Systems Laboratory [ASL], DRDO, played a primary role in showing us how to repackage the payload structures so that the weight comes down by 1,000 kg. {Wow!!! So thats the difference in the RV weight 1.1 tonne for A5 vs 1.5 tonne for A3]

How did the payload structures lose weight?

The payload structures had become much lighter; the weight was almost 60 per cent less than what it was earlier. It was a very elaborate exercise. We went to all the stages to see how to lose weight, how to repackage, how to reduce length, what technologies are needed for these, what was the modelling needed, and so on. That was how we could pack practically the same weight – from Agni-III, 48 tonnes in weight and 17 metres in length, to Agni-V, 50 tonnes in weight and 17.5 metres in length, but from a range of 3,000 km to more than 5,000 km. We wanted to make sure that all these capabilities were first proven in Agni-IV. We removed the open inter-stage. We had a closed inter-stage. We had composite motors. We had a compact payload. Of course, there is a vast difference between Agni-IV and Agni-V payloads. But the basic system was the same. But Agni-V had much more visibility and we wanted to make sure that all the elements of Agni-V were good. Agni-IV as a system did its job.

What are your future plans for Agni-V?

There are three stages of missile development. The first is design. As far as Agni-V is concerned, we have crossed that phase.


MOHAMMED YOUSUF

THE VEHICLE-MOUNTED CANISTER that was used for the medium-range Shourya missile, at the DRDO's Research Centre Imarat in Hyderabad. The canister-launch capability of Agni-V will be tested soon.

The next stage is proving the canister-launch capability. We have done the canister-launch for smaller missiles.

Like Shourya.

We have done for BrahMos also. The ASL is the laboratory which developed the canisters for both BrahMos and Agni-V. The gas generators that propel the missiles out of the canisters are made in the ASL. These technologies are available. They are being upscaled.

For instance, if I need five or ten tonnes of thrust there [for BrahMos or Shourya], I need 300 tonnes of thrust here because the mass is so much higher. That is upscaling. We know how to do it. So we will be doing missile ejection tests [from a canister]. We have set up a facility for that at Shamirpet, Hyderabad. We will take our canister to that facility, put a dummy missile inside with a small full-scale booster, and eject it. That small motor will push the missile out and you can recover it. It may be damaged. We have to do three or four tests in that condition to establish all the parameters of launch. What is the kind of vibration and shock that are caused? What is the time that the missile takes to come out of the canister? How much heat is transferred to the canister? And how much energy is lost? All these have been modelled. We have to validate these models by experiments. No other way is possible. That is the first priority.

These experiments will start in May/June. The launchers are already getting ready in the industry – the road-mobile, canister-launch system.

Private industry is making the road-mobile launcher with the launch platform.

They are making the launcher to our design. All our products are Indian. The road-mobile launcher will be delivered in May. The canister is ready. The integrated test will start in June. We are aiming for the missile launch by the end of this year. Or maybe by the beginning of next year, because we have to do a number of tests and evaluate them. If everything goes well, yes, by the end of this year.

A road-mobile, canisterised launch in final, user configuration will take place next year.

The full, final version in all aspects will be tested in the early part of next year. We want to complete all trials by the end of next year.

How many trials will you do?

We need two or three trials from the canister. If two perform very well, we may take a decision to go ahead. Then the production will start. From the production chain, the user will pick some missiles and launch them to validate the production process and then the induction will start. Totally, we will have six more tests before Agni-V is inducted [into the Army].


{So statistically six plus 1(development) successful flights will give >95% confidence level}

Tests by the user?

Tests by the user will be along with our team. That serves a dual purpose – to train the user in operating the system and to validate the production process.

So there will be six tests, including the user trials.

Yes. It is not user trial. It is called pre-induction trial. The user is part of all our trials. Right from the first test, the user is involved – what we are getting, what the performance of the missile is, etc. Every test is a user trial in that sense. Canister trials will happen from June onwards. By December, the canisterised flight will take place.

V.K. Saraswat, Scientific Adviser to the Defence Minister, said recently that the DRDO would not cap the Agni programme. So, will we go in for a missile beyond 5,000 km even though we don't need one?

Dr Saraswat very clearly said there was nothing like a static threat perception. Threat is a dynamic scenario. If tomorrow India's trade requirements go beyond distant regions and it feels threatened by somebody, its requirements will change. The DRDO does not wait for the threat to become a reality before it starts the development. That is why it is a perception. We have to develop capabilities to meet futuristic threats. That is why there is nothing like capping a programme.

A programme, by definition, is for a limited duration. After we deliver Agni-V, that programme is over. We will work parallely…. MIRV [Multiple Independent Re-entry Vehicle] is definitely a technology we want to develop and we are going to develop it. We will be creating that capability. Similarly, we will be creating manoeuvring warheads, another capability that is a must. It will give you the ability to target places with high precision, with nuclear or conventional warheads.

So the role of a missile changes, the threat perceptions change, the dynamic geopolitical situation changes. So there is nothing like capping or not capping a programme. You never cap technology. New programmes evolve as the need arises, but technology development will be a continuous process.

In fact, the future will require intelligent warheads because the capabilities increase for intercepting ballistic or cruise missiles…. Everybody is developing defences against these weapons. It may take time. But it will happen. So we have to upgrade our weapons. We have to go three steps further – two steps to catch up and one to overtake. In warfare, unless you are better than the best, you cannot win the war.

{We are looking at the future DRDO chief here. He has the vision thing.}

Our next step will be to build intelligent warheads which will have the capability to assess the risks and take active or passive action or counter-measures. They will be the warheads of tomorrow, and work has to start now. It may take five or ten years. There is tremendous work that needs to be done to develop state-of-the-art weapons with multiple capabilities.

China has said that India has a long way to go to match its capability.

I cannot comment [on it] because I do not know the Chinese capability. But we know that technology-wise, we have the capability and the knowledge for converting technological capability to build further on it.

V.V. KRISHNAN

ARCHITECTS OF THE Agni-V mission, (from left) Avinash Chander; V.G. Sekaran, Director, Advanced Systems Laboratory, Hyderabad; and V.K. Saraswat, DRDO chief and Scientific Adviser to the Defence Minister, against the backdrop of the missile, two days before its launch.

Agni-V has been developed in three years. MIRV may come in two and a half years from now. We want to make that process faster and faster. We have instituted fantastic measures to make it happen – how to make industries respond faster, how to make design-culture faster, how to make in-house quality products, and so on. So we are attacking the problem at various levels. Agni-V is one example of that process happening. We were able to do it in less than three years after the project was sanctioned. No other weapon has been developed in three years.

There is a perception that Agni-V need not be road-mobile because it is a strategic weapon, which will never be used. It is more a deterrent.

India is a peace-loving nation. It has never taken an offensive action except when it was threatened. In such a situation, you have to make sure that whatever be your deterrence measures, you are well protected. In today's world, with the way the precision and yield of weapons are going up, it is very difficult to store missiles in static sites. Fifty years ago, we kept the missiles in hardened silos. At that time, the missiles used to land with a CEP [circular error probability] of a few kilometres. Today, they have a CEP of 100 metres. With 100 metres, the kind of defences that you will want is so massive that it will be impractical to have them.

So what is the way out? It is that you should be mobile. When a target is static, it is most vulnerable. A moving target has better chances of survival.

A road-mobile missile has many avenues to go. In a city like New Delhi, where hundreds of thousands of vehicles are moving, it is not easy to keep track.

When does the Army want a canisterised Agni-V from now?

A canister gives you the best advantages. You can stop on the roadside on the highway, launch from there and go away. You can stop the traffic for five minutes on either side, launch and go away. Your ability to move, your options to launch and your operational flexibility increase manifold. You have a reduced reaction time. Everything is already prepared. Just make the missile vertical in three minutes, and the launching takes another few minutes. So you stop, launch and go off. That does not give the enemy a chance even if he detects you. He does not know from where you are going to launch. Only when you have made the missile vertical for launch will he realise that you are going to launch it. The boost-phase destruction that people are talking of, that is, the missile getting destroyed before it takes off, will not be possible if you have a short reaction time as in a canisterised launch unless you have a space-based radar weapons system. Today, it is non-existent and is not likely to be developed in the next couple of decades at least.

You say that Agni-V can reach the farthest corners where you want to exert your influence…

I need not stress the strategic significance of Agni-V. You can see from the responses of others what the strategic significance of this mission is.

As far as we are concerned, its primary significance is that you have strategic depth. With Agni-V, you can target all potential threat areas. You can go close to the border areas or thousands of kilometres away from enemy countermeasures and launch this missile. That is the most important strategic significance.

The fact that it can reach large parts of the globe has its own impact – of your acceptance, and more importantly, your arrival as a missile power. We were at the receiving end of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Irrespective of these technology denial regimes, we can do what we need to do. If we can do 5,000 km with all these regimes, we can do anything. We have to set ourselves a goal and we can achieve it. That is for strategic missiles. We are looking at tactical missiles also. We are looking at certain game-changing processes, at longer-range capability, much better kill capabilities than we had thought of earlier. We want to anticipate the future.

We want to be prepared. In those preparations too, we want to make the user a partner because these will be systems which will neither be made nor be available anywhere else. That is the class we are graduating to. This confidence has come from Agni-V and other systems.

Very very good interview. It gives lot of design details.
The use of ahead firing sep motors for separation is interesting. Reduces dead space and structure and thus weight. However it is good for long range trajectories, as they operate/function only when the right thrust has been achieved by the primary motor. Short range targest need to be tackled with other vehicles. Also won't it eat into the motor space thus reducing propellent loading?

Also this dense packaging shows A5 can be the launching point for a sea based vehicle.

[sanjaykumar]

The last two paragraphs are to be read carefully, the scramjet is not pie in the sky.

[SaiK]

trying to picturize ahead firing stage separators to reduce dead weight.. reducing dead space is easier than to visualize after firing aspect of the inter-stage motor. .. so, there must be some expunge of the casing between the stages, to vent.

[ramana]

See the world is changing and one doesn't know what the future will bring in regards to detection and neutralization. Hence their emphasis on keeping abreast of new developments. Right now Arihant seems right choice but who knows what will sats and new type of sensors with super computers for dataprocessing will mean in say 50 years?

Saik, Ahead firing thrusters dont mean there is no interstage. How else will they stages connect. It only means positive separation. But if you do a layout it will eat into your motor envelope. So its trade what do you value most? Looks like they want to minimize length.

Need to listen to VKS in Sakshi TV and read Chander's interview and sift throught them.

[SaiK]

We decided to leave behind that culture of space vehicles. We now put big retro motors, which create a thrust of four tonnes each – totally 16 tonnes of thrust – just to separate the stages so that no dead weight is passed on to the upper stage.

aaah! first I was thinking the retro was on the continuing stage.. my bad.

it would be on the spent stage, so that it can retard faster. gotcha!

but, if my gotcah is correct, then I have more questions.

[ramana]

Go ahead.

BTW ahead firing thrusters mean there is no vulnerable hardware aft of the nozzle on the departing vehicle. Then where are the TVCs located? Or are they wrapped in thermal blankets?