CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

The Military Issues & History Forum is a venue to discuss issues relating to the military aspects of the Indian Armed Forces, whether the past, present or future. We request members to kindly stay within the mandate of this forum and keep their exchanges of views, on a civilised level, however vehemently any disagreement may be felt. All feedback regarding forum usage may be sent to the moderators using the Feedback Form or by clicking the Report Post Icon in any objectionable post for proper action. Please note that the views expressed by the Members and Moderators on these discussion boards are that of the individuals only and do not reflect the official policy or view of the Bharat-Rakshak.com Website. Copyright Violation is strictly prohibited and may result in revocation of your posting rights - please read the FAQ for full details. Users must also abide by the Forum Guidelines at all times.
ramana
Forum Moderator
Posts: 49815
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30

Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby ramana » 18 Feb 2018 11:22

Philip, As I said before India has a continental threat which is primarily an Army related. Until Pak is neutralized it's mainly Army primacy.

Current COS on rotation gives the other two a chance.


SaiK
BRF Oldie
Posts: 35641
Joined: 29 Oct 2003 12:31
Location: NowHere

Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby SaiK » 19 Mar 2018 05:56

Image

Nikhil T
BRFite
Posts: 966
Joined: 09 Nov 2008 06:48
Location: RAW HQ, Lodhi Road

Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby Nikhil T » 19 Mar 2018 11:05

^Not sure why this news is gaining so much attention. All it does is gives the ANC C-in-C explicit power over officers from all three services. This was always the case, atleast on paper. The ANC C-in-C is a three star officer who has three one-star officers from each of the three services reporting to him.

Frankly, it's telling that 17 years after the ANC was founded, we have to issue these "breakthrough" directives that should have been there on day one.

Philip
BRF Oldie
Posts: 19334
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30
Location: India

Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby Philip » 19 Mar 2018 15:27

However,the fact that it has been put to paper officially,that any theatre commander can requisition and command assets from the two other services in his theatre,is a big step.I forsee a theatre commander appointed for the NEast,which would be obviously a 3* IA general. Some new designations will have to be given for the other theatres ,especially for the IOR with the enhanced maritime footprint of the IN,even unto the ICS and Pacific!

ramana
Forum Moderator
Posts: 49815
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30

Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby ramana » 24 Apr 2018 22:29

http://bharatshakti.in/indias-national- ... -a-revamp/


Please post full text so it can be analyzed.

Thanks...



India’s National Security Architecture Set For a Revamp

April 24, 2018; By: Nitin A. Gokhale


The formation of Defence Planning Committee (DPC) under the chairmanship of National Security Adviser (NSA) Ajit Doval, reported by the media last week has naturally evoked a mix response among commentators and strategic experts. Some have predictably slammed the move, calling it an attempt to stymie appointment of a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) for the three services; others think the new body is just a stop gap arrangement to bring in better coordination among various arms of the government to revitalise the defence sector. Both opposing viewpoints miss the wood for the trees.

The DPC is much more than a body to just improve defence procurements or revitalise defence diplomacy. Its formation is part of a larger exercise ordered by the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) to review the existing structures that give inputs on vital national security issues and provide advice to the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS), the highest decision-making body that finally approves crucial steps to protect India’s national interests.


To begin with therefore the PMO had asked, the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) about a year ago to review the functioning of the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS) and entrusted it with writing a National Security Strategy. [b]The NSAB recommended revamp of the NSCS some months ago, suggesting creation of new verticals to ensure focused attention to specific subjects. Four of those verticals–​Policy and strategy, Planning and capability development, Defence diplomacy and Defence manufacturing—have been included in the DPC. The other verticals will continue to remain under the NCSC but with more specialisation built into their functioning. So for instance, two separate sections on space and cyber security will take on board on-field practitioners for real-time utilisation of their skills.
[/b]

A draft National Security Strategy document—authored by a member of the NSAB–on the other hand is now ready to be presented for discussion at the highest level. By all indications, it is first likely to be discussed and debated at the NSA and NSAB level before being taken to the CCS and the PMO as early as mid-May. Once approved, a gist of the fresh National Security Strategy is likely to be put out in the public domain. If that happens, it would be a major departure from the past practice when India has fought shy of articulating leave alone putting out a National Security Strategy document in public. Those in the know say at least three versions of a National Security Strategy have been attempted in the past but none of them were either approved or released for public consumption.




Another development that has largely gone unnoticed is the formation of a China-specific, MEA-run and funded think tank. Called the Centre for Contemporary China Studies (CCCS), the new think tank will only study China from an Indian point of view. Manned by serving officers drawn from the MEA, the three armed forces, the Intelligence Bureau, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) and other relevant ministries and departments, CCCS will prepare reports and undertake specific studies on China at the behest of different government departments to provide real-time policy inputs to the decision-makers dealing with China. So far instance, the CCCS can be asked to provide quick inputs by the Commerce Ministry on the impact of US trade sanctions against China and the likely advantage that can accrue to India. Or, recommend a future course of action in India’s (largely positive) relationship with North Korea post the Trump-Kim summit. The CCCS’ governing body is headed by the External Affairs Minister and the NSA is the deputy chairman.


The DPC, as already reported and analysed, has been entrusted with four major responsibilities. Of the four—mentioned in the preceding paragraphs—the section on defence procurements has attracted the most attention in the public discussion so far because of recent revelations that majority of India’s military arsenal is either outdated or is getting there quickly. As a consequence, the DPC is expected to first concentrate on repairing the dysfunctional procurement process and align future acquisitions with the quantum of funds that are likely to be available in the next few years. It is here that the inclusion of Secretary Expenditure from the Ministry of Finance in the DPC is welcome. While the Defence, Foreign and Home Secretaries have always been part of committees and groups entrusted to deal with strategic issues, it is perhaps for the first time in recent years that a finance ministry official has been included in a high-powered committee dealing with issues of national security.

Similarly, the fact the DPC is headed by NSA Ajit Doval is a clear indication that the Prime Minister continues to trust his NSA to evolve a comprehensive roadmap and get it implemented. Since Doval has the Prime Minister’s total trust, he can be expected to get things moving faster than they otherwise would have. The arrangement however also has pitfalls: Mr Doval already has too much on his plate (dealing with Pakistan, China, US and Russia for instance), heading the nuclear command authority and handling the overall security situation. Now to expect him to deliver on these crucial issues looks a challenging task. However, as a trusted man of the Prime Minister, the NSA has the necessary authority lacking in earlier committees that had suggested reforms and roadmaps to bring India’s national security architecture up to speed. Moreover, the committee can derive its strength from the fact that it constitutes serving officers and therefore will not be time or personality specific.
:?: :?: :?:

However, the formation of DPC has perhaps come a year too late. Its effectiveness would be demonstrated only after a couple of financial years have gone by. With general elections exactly a year away, there is very little the DPC can show as achievement before 2019. Would that hamper the functioning of the DPC? Perhaps not given that it is only one part of a larger change is that is being sought to be brought in in the larger national security framework.

Nitin A Gokhale




So DPC will have four vertical blocks in its organization structure. Interesting that two others (space and cyber Security) are still with NSCS.

Wish Nitin had included an org chart.

Aditya G
BRF Oldie
Posts: 3339
Joined: 19 Feb 2002 12:31
Contact:

Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby Aditya G » 25 Apr 2018 12:56

In modi sarkar the NSA is effectively the CDS ...... .

ShauryaT
BRF Oldie
Posts: 5184
Joined: 31 Oct 2005 06:06

Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby ShauryaT » 29 Apr 2018 22:57

Aditya G wrote:In modi sarkar the NSA is effectively the CDS ...... .
First, a junior minister as RM and now an IPS cadre as an ex-officio head of defense! :(

deejay
Forum Moderator
Posts: 3788
Joined: 11 Aug 2016 06:14

Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby deejay » 30 Apr 2018 18:27

ShauryaT wrote:
Aditya G wrote:In modi sarkar the NSA is effectively the CDS ...... .
First, a junior minister as RM and now an IPS cadre as an ex-officio head of defense! :(

No sir, not junior at all. And NSA is not the CDS. People may have their opinions.

pankajs
BRF Oldie
Posts: 10169
Joined: 13 Aug 2009 20:56

Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby pankajs » 02 May 2018 11:13

https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/ne ... s?from=mdr
Joint logistics node set up at Andaman & Nicobar command

NEW DELHI: In a first, a joint logistics node has been set up at the tri-services command in the Andaman & Nicobar Islands, which will provide logistical support to all three defence services. The move aims to improve utilisation of resources, manpower and remove duplication.

There are plans to set up similar nodes at 12 or 13 locations in the western and north-eastern sectors, top defence ministry officials said.

The joint logistics node comprises of three elements – the Joint Logistics Command & Control Centre (JLC&CC), which is the overall command organisation, the Tri-services Detachment at Material Organisation (TRIDAMO), which will meet logistical needs of the armed forces and the Triservices Advanced Detachment (TRISAD), based on mainland and responsible for sending troops and equipment to the nodes.

The defence services was planning for long to create such nodes in areas where two or more services are located to cater to logistical needs, officials said. Andaman & Nicobar Command (ANC) in Port Blair was picked as a pilot project.

ramana
Forum Moderator
Posts: 49815
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30

Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby ramana » 03 May 2018 23:39

My complaint is Indian military is getting Americanitis which is suffering from excessive acromania.

ShauryaT
BRF Oldie
Posts: 5184
Joined: 31 Oct 2005 06:06

Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby ShauryaT » 07 May 2018 03:56

DPC turning out, as expected, to be yet another bureaucratic pimple - Bharat Karnad

It is early days for this entity but not having defense planning within the MoD headed by the RM really undermines an entire institution, where the RM does not matter to the process. The new setup will thrive and flounder based on the occupier of the NSA office and the NSA's proximity and importance to the PM. The NSA not being a constitutional office will necessarily be by and large personality driven. The history of personalities that have occupied this office has a lot to be desired to provide leadership on defense matters.

My only ray of hope is if this setup is a temporary route to a permanent CDS....

One report talked about the DPC chaired by NSA Ajit Doval with the three armed services chiefs — Admiral Satish Lanba, General Bipin Rawat, Air Chief Marshal BS Dhanoa, defence secretary Sanjay Mitra, expenditure secretary Ajay Jha, foreign secretary Vijay Gokhale, and Lt Gen Satish Dua heading the Integrated Services HQrs as member-secretary writing up the minutes, surveying the “geostrategic landscape” and deciding to come up with an äction plan. Another reported that the stress was on the military services alighting on a coordinated plan to avoid developing duplication and triplication of capabilities that would be mindful of the financial constraints and keep in view rapidly advancing technologies and the likely nature of the wars of the future. In this context, the navy was asked not to push for the third indigenous aircraft carrier (that NHQ had hoped would have on board the prohibitively costly electromagnetic aircraft launch system (EMALS) that the US Navy is finding to be unaffordable. All present also apparently agreed that the flab needs to be excised. That’s all that has come out in the public realm.

This is all very good, particularly the non-sanctioning of the EMALS carrier that this analyst has long suggested is a criminal waste of money and operationally will reduce the Indian navy’s footprint in the Indian Ocean, because the bulk of the not so very large naval forces will have to be deployed to protect its prized aircraft carriers — which however many ships are tasked as escorts will be unable to do given that the near future heralds the dawn of hypersonic glide weapons speeding to targets at Mach 7+ , superceding supersonic Brahmos-type missiles that had already rendered aircraft carriers obsolete as I have argued in my writings, and extensively in my last book, ‘Why India is Not a Great Power (Yet)’.

But these are operational aspects of force planning that the DPC, perhaps, will deliberate on, hopefully with an open mind, in the months to come. The basic problem, however, is with the forces that the services HQrs have planned. I have long contended that the Indian armed services, considering their organization and history, are not transformation-minded and, therefore, not transformation-enabled. What they have in mind when talking future war capability is beefing up the force structure in place with modern versions of weapons already in the arsenal. So it is one-for one replacement, which is all that they are catering for as their force planning predicate. This defeats the entire notion of a transformed military based on genuine integration in line function and in terms of support logistics, full-spectrum command, control and communications, and procurement.

Moreover, with robotic, functionally autonomous, weapons now being experimented with in terms of man-machine interface by advanced militaries, and with cyber capabilities integral to the offensive and defensive plans and generally warfighting, what the DPC should ideally do is design a future force guided by these defining metrics. This will necessitate configuring a singular future force with air, land, and naval elements that are slimmed down, and which will require the military’s “tail” to actually be lot bigger in size than “teeth”. This goes against the grain of the flawed understanding of trending military technology in govt and military circles, which is reflected in the illiterate Indian print and electronic media, and in DPC wanting “lean and mean” military forces. (Talk of banalities!)

Such force redesign is impossible without a military organization with a single head of the military — Chief of Defence Staff (CDS). CDS is what the Modi government promised before it was elected in 2014. Four years later the country gets the NSA as CDS (as the previous post in this blog argued) and in Doval, a policeman fixated on Pakistan and smaller and weaker neighbouring states, not a strategist with the mental wherewithal for strategic thinking. All you have to do is listen to the speeches he has delivered to-date (and to be found on youtube.com) to know that not a single original idea has ever been uttered by him on national security issues in the flood of banal statements that he has mouthed over the years. Hard to imagine then that overnight he will become a tremendous intellectual defence resource for the country, and hence even less likely he will be able credibly to give imaginative guidance to the services chiefs and MEA, or instruct the defence and expenditure secretaries to fork out the monies (which task — allocation of funds for military planning being beyond his brief as NSA-cum-DPC head).

What he will end up doing is leave it to the military chiefs to draw up plans. Whence, he can be certain there will be no re-orientation of the armed forces from Pakistan to China, and no restructuring of forces to follow in train, involving the rationalizing of the armoured-mech heavy land forces into a single composite armoured-mech corps with materiel and monies thus freed up diverted to raising and forward deployment of three offensive mountain corps for rapid debouching on to the Tibetan plateau for war. This would mean paying only lip service to the “Wuhan consensus” that Modi and Xi agreed on and which the foreign secretary Gokhale is threatening to implement when the trouble is there was no consensus. Jay Ranade, the Mandarin-speaking former RAW stalwart on China ops, for instance, points out that two very different communiques were issued at the end of the Wuhan Meet. The Indian version mentions “guidelines” issued by the principals to their respective militaries to ensure there’s no Dokla La redux, but the Chinese version, typically, has no such mention. Consequently, while India will put out — as per China friendly MEA’s faulty appreciation of what transpired at Wuhan, Beijing will sit pretty and do nothing other than maintain its agro on the LAC but await the Modi govt, prompted by Gokhale and his ilk to, as usual, do its trademark tail-between-the legs routine!

Meanwhile the defence secretary will again get to play god, and play off the three armed services against each other — because the DPC does not in any way sideline the defence secretary’s role. And the expenditure secretary will report to Finance Minister, Arun Jaitley, about the proceedings, allowing him to sit back do the normal thing when funds are scarce — fund programmes in drips and drabs to guarantee that India’s military can only beat up on small states, if that, and, in the event, that national security is no better off after the DPC than it was before. This is the reason why I had warned that the DPC will amount to nothing more than yet another bureaucratic pimple on the already pock-marked face of the Indian state.


Mukesh.Kumar
BRFite
Posts: 741
Joined: 06 Dec 2009 14:09

Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby Mukesh.Kumar » 05 Jul 2018 13:59

Swarajya on the need for Integration

The Indian Army has been the country’s first and most important weapon against external aggression. Today, threats have evolved, and this calls for a recalibration of approach.


wig
BRFite
Posts: 1503
Joined: 09 Feb 2009 16:58

Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby wig » 14 Jul 2018 11:12

https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-ne ... qSQJJ.html

excertpts
In rare criticism, Navy officer blames IAF for ‘trust deficit’ between forces
There is stiff resistance from the Indian Air Force to theaterisation, or setting up of integrated commands where the assets of all three defence arms would come under the operational control of a three-star officer from any of the three services.

and
The paper, titled ‘The IAF and Theaterisation — Misplaced Apprehensions,’ is a deep dive into the military’s approach towards enhancing so-called jointmanship and its progression tow-ard theaterisation. Jointmanship refers to a degree of co-ordination and integration in terms of both strategy and execution across the three services. Theaterisation refers to placing under a Theatre Commander, specific units of the army, the navy, and the air force.

There is stiff resistance from the IAF to theaterisation, or setting up of integrated commands where the assets of all three defence arms would come under the operational control of a three-star officer from any of the three services, depending on the function assigned to that command.

“By continuing to stress on a ‘do it alone’ command structure, the IAF has only harmed itself. It has resulted in a weakening of trust with the other two services who have attempted to resolve the issue by investing into integral air power,” rear admiral Monty Khanna wrote.

ramana
Forum Moderator
Posts: 49815
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30

Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby ramana » 15 Jul 2018 04:34

We should revist the Kargil War time in the intervening period when Gen Malik was abroad and the COSC was in charge.

Unlike Marshal of Air Force Arjan Singh who supported the IA immediately , there was a big reluctance till much later.

Kakkaji
BRF Oldie
Posts: 3125
Joined: 23 Oct 2002 11:31

Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby Kakkaji » 15 Jul 2018 08:09

I see some merit in IAF's argument that they are the only service among the three services, that can shift its assets to, and fight in, different theatres within a day. So, they say they say the theater command concept will not work for them.

chetak
BRF Oldie
Posts: 16981
Joined: 16 May 2008 12:00

Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby chetak » 15 Jul 2018 08:20

Kakkaji wrote:I see some merit in IAF's argument that they are the only service among the three services, that can shift its assets to, and fight in, different theatres within a day. So, they say they say the theater command concept will not work for them.


with the kinds of BVR weaponry available now, this claim is a pipe dream.

Everything works well in theory.

ManuJ
BR Mainsite Crew
Posts: 263
Joined: 20 Jan 2004 12:31
Location: USA

Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby ManuJ » 16 Jul 2018 01:10

How does the theater command concept preclude shifting of assets around?

RoyG
BRF Oldie
Posts: 5154
Joined: 10 Aug 2009 05:10

Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby RoyG » 16 Jul 2018 03:14

CDS at this stage is unrealistic. BJP doesn't want to deal with another power center if it has to deal with Cong and Judiciary. May wait till after GE. Army would naturally be the dominant service with manpower and industries backing them. Maybe a rotational system like USA would be best.


Return to “Military Issues & History Forum”

Who is online

Users browsing this forum: Karthik S and 27 guests