India Border Watch: Security and Operations
Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations
https://twitter.com/Nrg8000/status/1264039847431254016 ..apparently its a reverse doklam...
Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations
How is it a reverse Doklam?
Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations
The reverse Doka La narrative comes from the fact that the Chinese are now stopping our infrastructure building activity, especially in the Galwan Valley. But, this analogy is incorrect for several reasons. Primarily, there is no third country involved. It is not a trijunction. The Darbuk-Shyok-DBO road has been in existence for sometime and it has only been realigned & rebuilt by 2019. There is no disputed area involved. The Chinese want to use this as an excuse to intrude, stay put & do the usual salami slicing.
Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations
No, it is one degree worse than Doklam. In Doklam China attempted building a road in uncharted, "disputed" land and India confronted China. So the standoff was in "disputed" Bhutan land.manjgu wrote:https://twitter.com/Nrg8000/status/1264039847431254016 ..apparently its a reverse doklam...
At the Galwan river according to the twitter thread, India was building a road "within" it's acknowledged territory, in fact behind the last Indian Army encampment so as to better service that encampment. Beyond this encampment there is disputed "no mans land" up to the first Chinese encampment. And neither India nor China built encampments in this "disputed" area via mutual agreement. Soldiers from both sides patrolled the area. What China has now done is set up encampments in the disputed area directly in front of the last Indian Army encampment. Effectively they have "taken over" the disputed area. And the reason for this is that India is building a road to better service it's encampment.
Has the same thing happened at the Pangong Tso Lake? The disputed area was between Finger 2 controlled by India and Finger 8 controlled by China where both sides patrolled. Has China set up permanent encampments either at Finger 2 or 3 or 4 thereby taking over that disputed area? And preventing the Indian Army from patrolling beyond Finger 2?
In this kind of a situation the Indian Army should establish a camp in some other area and "take over" an area equivalent to what China has taken over at the Galwan river and Pangong Tso Lake.
What China is effectively saying is that they have a veto over infrastructure development in land that is well within India as accepted by both India and China. That is the height of arrogance.
Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations
The lesson Chinese took from Doklam was India will use back channels to resolve a dispute, rather than making noise. Chinis FO was sending out daily threats during Doklam, while we were quite.
So the Chinis think, if they "capture" an area using Salami tactics, India will negotiate over it.
Now what if India continues negotiation, but make a hala gula about being a "victim of a democratic state being invaded by a authoritarian regime". Bring out the inner Pakness in us and whine about Chinese invasion?
GoI just need to "inform" there are 5000 PLA troops beyond LAC. Our nutcase English media will go to town with this and do the rest.
So the Chinis think, if they "capture" an area using Salami tactics, India will negotiate over it.
Now what if India continues negotiation, but make a hala gula about being a "victim of a democratic state being invaded by a authoritarian regime". Bring out the inner Pakness in us and whine about Chinese invasion?
GoI just need to "inform" there are 5000 PLA troops beyond LAC. Our nutcase English media will go to town with this and do the rest.
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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations
Let's wait before Rona dhona... Complete info is not out yet..
Ndtv also reporting that Indian soldiers were detained
Ndtv also reporting that Indian soldiers were detained
Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations
I doubt they care about the subtleties. As far as the chinks are concerned they'll claim quid pro quo. You tried to make us stop a road, we'll try to make you stop one. If it is just rhetoric like at Doklam then it can be resolved the same way.SSridhar wrote:The reverse Doka La narrative comes from the fact that the Chinese are now stopping our infrastructure building activity, especially in the Galwan Valley. But, this analogy is incorrect for several reasons. Primarily, there is no third country involved. It is not a trijunction. The Darbuk-Shyok-DBO road has been in existence for sometime and it has only been realigned & rebuilt by 2019. There is no disputed area involved. The Chinese want to use this as an excuse to intrude, stay put & do the usual salami slicing.
If there are 5000 of them "kilometers" inside our side of the LAC then it is a whole different ballgame. Let's the press know and prepare for war to remove them. If they are there and refuse to move then there has to be war.
Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations
Seems Chinese don't like Indians building roads.
Chinese moves in Laddakh could be seen as their predictable answer to Lipulekh road that has been built up. Now Chinese have to guard over another entry point for Indians. Hopefully we build all possible routes to Chinese border and let them sweat about it.
A possible answer to Laddakh could be doing some hanky panky in Nepal. As it is Nepal under present Communist Govt is colony of Chinese. But this is coming at deep alienation of the Madhesis, who have deep family and cultural roots in Bihar, UP. Time for Hanky Panky in Nepal. It shall serve multiple purposes - keep anti India powers in Nepal in check, give Chinese a feel for how their machinations can be thwarted, get leverage in Laddakh as Chinese may be seeing Nepal as their strategic asset.
Either ways, this shall be perfect time to get Aksai Chin back from China, as the global opinion is furiously against Chinese as the moment.
Chinese moves in Laddakh could be seen as their predictable answer to Lipulekh road that has been built up. Now Chinese have to guard over another entry point for Indians. Hopefully we build all possible routes to Chinese border and let them sweat about it.
A possible answer to Laddakh could be doing some hanky panky in Nepal. As it is Nepal under present Communist Govt is colony of Chinese. But this is coming at deep alienation of the Madhesis, who have deep family and cultural roots in Bihar, UP. Time for Hanky Panky in Nepal. It shall serve multiple purposes - keep anti India powers in Nepal in check, give Chinese a feel for how their machinations can be thwarted, get leverage in Laddakh as Chinese may be seeing Nepal as their strategic asset.
Either ways, this shall be perfect time to get Aksai Chin back from China, as the global opinion is furiously against Chinese as the moment.
Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations
I was told Chinis were greater planners. The started digging in April at the Ngari airport. Must be those damn blast proof shelter, which they keep on forgetting while getting in a fight with us
https://twitter.com/detresfa_/status/12 ... 4986494981
Until they build those shelters, we won't see much fight
https://twitter.com/detresfa_/status/12 ... 4986494981
Until they build those shelters, we won't see much fight
Last edited by nam on 24 May 2020 02:15, edited 1 time in total.
Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations
^^ All that talk is fine but first step would be to recognise Tibet as an independent nation.
Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations
It's now the headline news in TOIIet and that's good for us. The Chinese don't like our media blowing things up and sensationalizing. Random Twitter accounts, OSIT sources will all join the bandwagon and soon this will be global news.
That is hardly what the Chinese need right now and I for one hope the media really does overdo it. Plays into our hands on this case and besides, we really need to start controlling the global narrative on confrontations
That is hardly what the Chinese need right now and I for one hope the media really does overdo it. Plays into our hands on this case and besides, we really need to start controlling the global narrative on confrontations
Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations
Evil Commies, invaded a democratic nation
https://twitter.com/alexplitsas/status/ ... 7784166402UPDATE: China has invaded a part of India along its disputed border. 5,000 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) soldiers have crossed into the area, dug in, and are building fortifications
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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations
Let's wait and watch first, his sources are Ajay Shukla and TOI.nam wrote:Evil Commies, invaded a democratic nation
Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations
Why to be so defensive? It is exactly how we want. I am eagerly waiting for CNN or similar such jokers to pick it up. Hope they add masala and say 10,00 troops invaded.dinesh_kimar wrote:Let's wait and watch first, his sources are Ajay Shukla and TOI.nam wrote:Evil Commies, invaded a democratic nation
Shuklaji has served his purpose.
Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations
* The Chinese have pitched close to a hundred tents at four points on the Galwan River between Patrolling Point 14 (PP 14) and Gogra
* There is a serious stand off in the finger 4 area on the north shore of Pangur Tso
Some historical and geographic perspective to these two locations of standoff and how they relate to each other:
First, about Gogra. Before the 1962 war broke out, the Chinese had similarly started intruding down Galwan valley with patrols and tents. These patrols were supported by a base close to the headwaters of Galwan River, in a place called Samzungling. To cut off the patrols from Samzungling, the Indian Army established a series of posts in upper Galwan Lungpa. To do so, the Indian soldiers did not go up Galwan Lungpa - they reached there via Shamal Lungpa, which runs north-south from close to Galwan headwaters and terminates in the Chang Chenmo river valley very close to Gogra. Gogra can be googled and if you zoom in, you will see the famous police memorial dedicated to the men of ITBP led by DSP Karam Singh who engaged in the first shooting incident with the Chinese in October of 1959.
Gogra is a vital strategic location for India in the Chang Chenmo River valley. A short distance to the northwest of Gogra is Shamal Lungpa. To the east of Gogra is Kongka La, where the encounter between ITBF and PLA happened in 1959. This was not by chance - Shamal Lungpa was popular with the ITBF (under IB) in the 1950's as a back door entry for long range patrols into the Aksai Chin plateau. IB (ITBF) patrols from this area were the ones that got the first solid evidence for India that the Chinese had built the Aksai Chin road. The Gogra/Hot Springs area therefore became a location for some of the first ITBF forward posts; these were later taken over by the Army after 1959 and the Army continued to use the area for the same tactical purposes including launching the army parties that cut off the Chinese in Galwan Lungpa. So Gogra and Kongka La are currently the easternmost foothold of India in the Chang Chenmo river valley. (Chang Chemo enters Indian controlled territory at Kongka La, and originates near Lanak La which is on the Ardagh-Johnson Line considered by India as the boundary with Tibet.)
The entry for India into the Chang Chenmo river valley is Marsimik La. One descends northeastwards from Marsimik La to enter the valley. Pangur Tso is to the south of the spurs that originate from the ridge to the south of Marsimik La. What this should indicate is just how vital Chang Chenmo valley is, as the fulcrum of Indian military presence in that entire contested area.
The 100 tents in the line from lower Galwan lungpa to Gogra block Indian patrols or temporary positions (a la 1962) that can threaten or cut off the Chinese incursion point in Galwan valley. But there is also a larger pattern and geographic linkage that emerges if the the two areas of current stand off are viewed as being connected.
There is a major reason why the fingers region sees the most frequent stand offs, including the current serious standoff near Finger 4. To see why, the location where the Finger 4 spur ends on the north bank should be recognized by its historical name: Sirijap. Sirijap on the north bank and Yu La on the south bank of Pangur Tso were the two gate guardians to the Chusul area and Indian Indus valley before 1962, and significantly the Chinese have not relinquished claim on Sirijap even after they withdrew from several other areas including lower Galwan Lungpa. Just north of Pangur, the LC cuts through Ane La which permits inland access all the way to Fort Khurnak on Finger 8, where Pangur Tso has its narrowest and most easily defensible point. Notably, the valley that leads northwards (i.e the same one accessible via Ane La) from Fort Khurnak is easily motorable right up to... Kongka La! In fact, if you follow a rivulet joining Chang Chenmo from the south, close to Kongka La, you will see an excellent quality road built by the Chinese that goes for a considerable distance down that valley (but remains unbuilt after a point probably because India would react very strongly if that construction is taken all the way to Ft Khurnak).
This is going to be a long summer. They are not going to budge, and the Indian Army will not back down either.
* There is a serious stand off in the finger 4 area on the north shore of Pangur Tso
Some historical and geographic perspective to these two locations of standoff and how they relate to each other:
First, about Gogra. Before the 1962 war broke out, the Chinese had similarly started intruding down Galwan valley with patrols and tents. These patrols were supported by a base close to the headwaters of Galwan River, in a place called Samzungling. To cut off the patrols from Samzungling, the Indian Army established a series of posts in upper Galwan Lungpa. To do so, the Indian soldiers did not go up Galwan Lungpa - they reached there via Shamal Lungpa, which runs north-south from close to Galwan headwaters and terminates in the Chang Chenmo river valley very close to Gogra. Gogra can be googled and if you zoom in, you will see the famous police memorial dedicated to the men of ITBP led by DSP Karam Singh who engaged in the first shooting incident with the Chinese in October of 1959.
Gogra is a vital strategic location for India in the Chang Chenmo River valley. A short distance to the northwest of Gogra is Shamal Lungpa. To the east of Gogra is Kongka La, where the encounter between ITBF and PLA happened in 1959. This was not by chance - Shamal Lungpa was popular with the ITBF (under IB) in the 1950's as a back door entry for long range patrols into the Aksai Chin plateau. IB (ITBF) patrols from this area were the ones that got the first solid evidence for India that the Chinese had built the Aksai Chin road. The Gogra/Hot Springs area therefore became a location for some of the first ITBF forward posts; these were later taken over by the Army after 1959 and the Army continued to use the area for the same tactical purposes including launching the army parties that cut off the Chinese in Galwan Lungpa. So Gogra and Kongka La are currently the easternmost foothold of India in the Chang Chenmo river valley. (Chang Chemo enters Indian controlled territory at Kongka La, and originates near Lanak La which is on the Ardagh-Johnson Line considered by India as the boundary with Tibet.)
The entry for India into the Chang Chenmo river valley is Marsimik La. One descends northeastwards from Marsimik La to enter the valley. Pangur Tso is to the south of the spurs that originate from the ridge to the south of Marsimik La. What this should indicate is just how vital Chang Chenmo valley is, as the fulcrum of Indian military presence in that entire contested area.
The 100 tents in the line from lower Galwan lungpa to Gogra block Indian patrols or temporary positions (a la 1962) that can threaten or cut off the Chinese incursion point in Galwan valley. But there is also a larger pattern and geographic linkage that emerges if the the two areas of current stand off are viewed as being connected.
There is a major reason why the fingers region sees the most frequent stand offs, including the current serious standoff near Finger 4. To see why, the location where the Finger 4 spur ends on the north bank should be recognized by its historical name: Sirijap. Sirijap on the north bank and Yu La on the south bank of Pangur Tso were the two gate guardians to the Chusul area and Indian Indus valley before 1962, and significantly the Chinese have not relinquished claim on Sirijap even after they withdrew from several other areas including lower Galwan Lungpa. Just north of Pangur, the LC cuts through Ane La which permits inland access all the way to Fort Khurnak on Finger 8, where Pangur Tso has its narrowest and most easily defensible point. Notably, the valley that leads northwards (i.e the same one accessible via Ane La) from Fort Khurnak is easily motorable right up to... Kongka La! In fact, if you follow a rivulet joining Chang Chenmo from the south, close to Kongka La, you will see an excellent quality road built by the Chinese that goes for a considerable distance down that valley (but remains unbuilt after a point probably because India would react very strongly if that construction is taken all the way to Ft Khurnak).
This is going to be a long summer. They are not going to budge, and the Indian Army will not back down either.
Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations
Thanks for the great details, YI Patel.
Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations
With Cheen under seige by Trump and the West, there can be no better time to settle this once and for all.
Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations
Those saying that India can easily overcome the Chinese in Ladakh and go all the way upto Lhasa, are overlooking some crucial aspects.
Both Indian Army and the PLA are not the same as in 1962. We are not going to be fighting the same war.
Indian soldiers will have higher motivation and are battle hardened and battle tested, however, the Chinese have some crucial advantages over us.
1). The Chinese have reasonably good surveillance technology and along with its satellites has fairly good idea about Indian positions.
2). The Chinese have a big advantage over us in drone technology. They have a variety of armed and unarmed drones. We have all seen the effectiveness of Turkish drones in Syria and Libya recently. To counter the same we do not have a large number of relatively cheap drones of our own, neither do we have good short range air defence systems. The upgrade of crucial gun based AD systems is still on going and there are issues with the ammo. Man portable SAMs are obsolete as we still rely on the Igla-1M. Best we can muster is the Tunguska. The follow on of the same, the Pantsir, was shred to pieces by the Turkish drones. The QRSAM is not yet ready. The best option would be the Spyder systems, which we would be forced to move from the western border. Either that or send in our airforce jets to take on the Chinese drones. A highly inefficient solution, which would also cost us a lot. If the armed drones start taking a toll, it would force us to use our jets to counter the same. The worst would be that it would not be possible for us to easily make out if the drones in the air are armed ones or cheap unarmed ones. In some cases the Spyder or air to air missiles used against the drones, might end up being more expensive than the drones themselves. Our Rustam-II is still in development and the arms to be carried by it are also not ready.
3). The Chinese also have a big advantage in armed helicopters. We do not have the same on our side. The Mi-35s cannot be used at that altitude. The LCH hasn't entered production, the Rudra still doesn't have its primary weapon system and the Apache's are still being inducted and may not be available or only in very limited numbers. Against this, the Chinese can send in a large number of armed/attack helicopters. Once again, our low level AD options against these are limited. We would be forced to use our IAF jets, like how we scrambled a Su-30MKI, to counter a Chinese heli intruding into our airspace.
4). Tube artillery. The picture remains the same. The Sharang and Dhanush are still not available in numbers. The B-777 are still being inducted and may be available in limited numbers. Other possible options like the Bharat Forge Bharat-52 and ATAGS are not available. Only the 250-300 original bofors guns and the 180 odd Soltam upgraded M46 guns, would be are only options for large guns. Many of these would have to be withdrawn from the western front and the Pakis would make full use of the opportunity. They would pound us on the LoC and try and push in as many of their jihadis as possible. Already many from the afghan front might be becoming available for them, and this would cause another nightmare for us in the future.
5). Systems like the NAG missile have still not been inducted. The NAMICA mounted NAG would have been really useful, even the weather would allow the system to pickup any Chinese armoured vehicles or even bunkers etc., from its full range of 4Kms or even beyond. Alas, we don't have the system.
6). The FICV doesn't even remain on paper anymore and the upgrade of the BMP-2s is still pending. We have the T-72s and T-90 tanks deployed both in North Sikkim and Ladakh. However, the upgrade of the T-72 is pending. Upgrade of the engine to the T-90s 1000 HP engine would really help in this region. We have all seen the video of T-90 tanks slowly lumbering up the slopes in Ladakh. A higher powered engine would be required to effectively use the T-72s in the region.
In all of the above areas the Chinese have an advantage over us and though I still believe that the Indian Army would give them a bloody nose if the balloon goes up, the price to be paid maybe high.
Both Indian Army and the PLA are not the same as in 1962. We are not going to be fighting the same war.
Indian soldiers will have higher motivation and are battle hardened and battle tested, however, the Chinese have some crucial advantages over us.
1). The Chinese have reasonably good surveillance technology and along with its satellites has fairly good idea about Indian positions.
2). The Chinese have a big advantage over us in drone technology. They have a variety of armed and unarmed drones. We have all seen the effectiveness of Turkish drones in Syria and Libya recently. To counter the same we do not have a large number of relatively cheap drones of our own, neither do we have good short range air defence systems. The upgrade of crucial gun based AD systems is still on going and there are issues with the ammo. Man portable SAMs are obsolete as we still rely on the Igla-1M. Best we can muster is the Tunguska. The follow on of the same, the Pantsir, was shred to pieces by the Turkish drones. The QRSAM is not yet ready. The best option would be the Spyder systems, which we would be forced to move from the western border. Either that or send in our airforce jets to take on the Chinese drones. A highly inefficient solution, which would also cost us a lot. If the armed drones start taking a toll, it would force us to use our jets to counter the same. The worst would be that it would not be possible for us to easily make out if the drones in the air are armed ones or cheap unarmed ones. In some cases the Spyder or air to air missiles used against the drones, might end up being more expensive than the drones themselves. Our Rustam-II is still in development and the arms to be carried by it are also not ready.
3). The Chinese also have a big advantage in armed helicopters. We do not have the same on our side. The Mi-35s cannot be used at that altitude. The LCH hasn't entered production, the Rudra still doesn't have its primary weapon system and the Apache's are still being inducted and may not be available or only in very limited numbers. Against this, the Chinese can send in a large number of armed/attack helicopters. Once again, our low level AD options against these are limited. We would be forced to use our IAF jets, like how we scrambled a Su-30MKI, to counter a Chinese heli intruding into our airspace.
4). Tube artillery. The picture remains the same. The Sharang and Dhanush are still not available in numbers. The B-777 are still being inducted and may be available in limited numbers. Other possible options like the Bharat Forge Bharat-52 and ATAGS are not available. Only the 250-300 original bofors guns and the 180 odd Soltam upgraded M46 guns, would be are only options for large guns. Many of these would have to be withdrawn from the western front and the Pakis would make full use of the opportunity. They would pound us on the LoC and try and push in as many of their jihadis as possible. Already many from the afghan front might be becoming available for them, and this would cause another nightmare for us in the future.
5). Systems like the NAG missile have still not been inducted. The NAMICA mounted NAG would have been really useful, even the weather would allow the system to pickup any Chinese armoured vehicles or even bunkers etc., from its full range of 4Kms or even beyond. Alas, we don't have the system.
6). The FICV doesn't even remain on paper anymore and the upgrade of the BMP-2s is still pending. We have the T-72s and T-90 tanks deployed both in North Sikkim and Ladakh. However, the upgrade of the T-72 is pending. Upgrade of the engine to the T-90s 1000 HP engine would really help in this region. We have all seen the video of T-90 tanks slowly lumbering up the slopes in Ladakh. A higher powered engine would be required to effectively use the T-72s in the region.
In all of the above areas the Chinese have an advantage over us and though I still believe that the Indian Army would give them a bloody nose if the balloon goes up, the price to be paid maybe high.
Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations
The Chinese are willy nilly walking into a trap the western powers are making. It is damn stupid of them to open another front while things are heating up with uncle in the Pacific as well as S "china" sea
Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations
After trying to read between the lines and cut through a lot of noise in news reports, this is what seems to be the issue in the Galwan area. My understanding is that we are building a permanent north-south road along the Shyok river which is some kilometers within our side of the LAC, and the Chinese are having a problem with that. The pathway is already in use by us to access DBO and SSN, but does not have a permanent pavement in some parts. The Galwan river is one of the many that empties into the Shyok from the East, and the Chinese are sitting pretty in a nice bend of the Galwan river 5km away from the Shyok/road construction site. They don't seem to have ingressed much, basically on the LAC, probably in by about 500m but that would be the natural place to pitch camp.
I think we will continue road construction while telling them to bugger off. Their camp is basically a sitting duck as I am sure we have snipers and artillery on the rock faces along Galwan.
What this has to do with Pangong finger areas, and north Sikkim I don't know. Pangong finger roads seem to be pretty pucca on the northern side; on the south we are at a slight advantage; however it must be kept in mind that they have very good supply lines from both the north and south of Aksai Chin area whereas we are dependent entirely on the southern route.
I think we will continue road construction while telling them to bugger off. Their camp is basically a sitting duck as I am sure we have snipers and artillery on the rock faces along Galwan.
What this has to do with Pangong finger areas, and north Sikkim I don't know. Pangong finger roads seem to be pretty pucca on the northern side; on the south we are at a slight advantage; however it must be kept in mind that they have very good supply lines from both the north and south of Aksai Chin area whereas we are dependent entirely on the southern route.
Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations
On the lake, there are areas of patrol, called fingers. We used to patrol till Finger 8. The Chinese used to patrol till Finger 3. The patrol path is very narrow in some areas, so somethings both the patrol come "amna samna". The drill is for the both the patrol to turn.yensoy wrote: What this has to do with Pangong finger areas, and north Sikkim I don't know. Pangong finger roads seem to be pretty pucca on the northern side; on the south we are at a slight advantage; however it must be kept in mind that they have very good supply lines from both the north and south of Aksai Chin area whereas we are dependent entirely on the southern route.
However the Chinis have been aggressive in their claim. Instead of both going back , they want only we go back. Now they have come up till Finger 3-4 and sat down.
This is blocking our patrol till Finger 8, so also sat down in front of them. Hence the standoff.
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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations
The Chinese have pitched close to a hundred tents at four points on the Galwan River between Patrolling Point 14 (PP 14) and Gogra.
Can they sustain it in winter?
Can they sustain it in winter?
Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations
Whatever it is we must also start inching into thier territory, probe weakpoints . Now the Army has denied that the Chinese had detained any Indian Soilders. Now I have noticed a certain amount of hype from pro Paki elements. Just like during Doklam Paki media was claiming Chinese rocket artillery killed 159 Indian soldiers. So let us not lose focus on the LOC. Clearly our Western neighbor and it's allies are are for some reason asking our northern neighbor to come to thier rescue. Something must be hurting very badly.
Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations
We are really good satellite coverage. Agree we have fewer drones and bit outdated, we don’t know how good are cheni one? If they are field cheap unarmed drones so we can also domody wrote:1). The Chinese have reasonably good surveillance technology and along with its satellites has fairly good idea about Indian positions.
Let’s not compare Syria and India, we have much better radar coverage and fully functional professional Air Force. They might run thin but drones will not have a field day and no match for manned fighters. Having said that more the sorties, chances of technical break down and errors increase so there will be lose of man n material that’s the nature of war.2). The Chinese have a big advantage over us in drone technology. They have a variety of armed and unarmed drones. We have all seen the effectiveness of Turkish drones in Syria and Libya recently. To counter the same we do not have a large number of relatively cheap drones of our own, neither do we have good short range air defence systems. The upgrade of crucial gun based AD systems is still on going and there are issues with the ammo. Man portable SAMs are obsolete as we still rely on the Igla-1M. Best we can muster is the Tunguska. The follow on of the same, the Pantsir, was shred to pieces by the Turkish drones. The QRSAM is not yet ready. The best option would be the Spyder systems, which we would be forced to move from the western border. Either that or send in our airforce jets to take on the Chinese drones. A highly inefficient solution, which would also cost us a lot. If the armed drones start taking a toll, it would force us to use our jets to counter the same. The worst would be that it would not be possible for us to easily make out if the drones in the air are armed ones or cheap unarmed ones. In some cases the Spyder or air to air missiles used against the drones, might end up being more expensive than the drones themselves. Our Rustam-II is still in development and the arms to be carried by it are also not ready.
Reason for sending Su-Mki was not to shot down the helicopters but give a warning. In war situation, we will go for kill using every available option. IAF and MoD are to blame for missing LCHs, self inflicted pain.3). The Chinese also have a big advantage in armed helicopters. We do not have the same on our side. The Mi-35s cannot be used at that altitude. The LCH hasn't entered production, the Rudra still doesn't have its primary weapon system and the Apache's are still being inducted and may not be available or only in very limited numbers. Against this, the Chinese can send in a large number of armed/attack helicopters. Once again, our low level AD options against these are limited. We would be forced to use our IAF jets, like how we scrambled a Su-30MKI, to counter a Chinese heli intruding into our airspace.
True but again not fully true, we have desi bofos inducted n available in limited number. most of Vajras out of 100 are inducted. Like you mentioned, we have also inducted ULH in limited numbers. Every month, we add more systems.4). Tube artillery. The picture remains the same. The Sharang and Dhanush are still not available in numbers. The B-777 are still being inducted and may be available in limited numbers. Other possible options like the Bharat Forge Bharat-52 and ATAGS are not available. Only the 250-300 original bofors guns and the 180 odd Soltam upgraded M46 guns, would be are only options for large guns. Many of these would have to be withdrawn from the western front and the Pakis would make full use of the opportunity. They would pound us on the LoC and try and push in as many of their jihadis as possible. Already many from the afghan front might be becoming available for them, and this would cause another nightmare for us in the future.
You are right another self inflicted pain by IA and MoD, we are feeling the pain but there are expensive alternatives but less capable. We have enough stock for now.5). Systems like the NAG missile have still not been inducted. The NAMICA mounted NAG would have been really useful, even the weather would allow the system to pickup any Chinese armoured vehicles or even bunkers etc., from its full range of 4Kms or even beyond. Alas, we don't have the system.
MoD to blame for not ordering Namica and LCH. IAF and IA will have to sweat harder and spend blood because of wrong procurement priorities.6). The FICV doesn't even remain on paper anymore and the upgrade of the BMP-2s is still pending. We have the T-72s and T-90 tanks deployed both in North Sikkim and Ladakh. However, the upgrade of the T-72 is pending. Upgrade of the engine to the T-90s 1000 HP engine would really help in this region. We have all seen the video of T-90 tanks slowly lumbering up the slopes in Ladakh. A higher powered engine would be required to effectively use the T-72s in the region.
Last edited by RKumar on 24 May 2020 16:43, edited 1 time in total.
Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations
It looks like its on our side of the LAC. Too small sized a post for it to matter either way, which is one reason I don't believe the snake oil salesman Ajai Shukla. No way PLA can sustain 5000 men in that altitude (the Chinese rear areas are at a higher altitude than ours), without considerable back-end logistics. The nearest PLA div HQ is at Hotan - 800 km on a single road, before reaching our positions near Daulat Beg Oldi. Our division HQs are at Leh, Dras and Yol. Leh and Yol are also Corps HQs.Aditya_V wrote:Can anyone tell what is this Chinese post there for google coordinates 32.972821, 79.218743 , there does not seem to be any Indian post near it
Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations
Deans sir did not read your book. A factual low down (not big than few pages) on relative strength and position is welcomed (if you are current and know things).
One view (not picking on but giving example like chola) is that there are but few brigade in all of Tibet) and the other is that perhaps Chinese have as much man as us and more material. Shiv’s you tube is also educational. Where is our MSc come in?
One view (not picking on but giving example like chola) is that there are but few brigade in all of Tibet) and the other is that perhaps Chinese have as much man as us and more material. Shiv’s you tube is also educational. Where is our MSc come in?
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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations
TWITTER
@drapr007 :
@drapr007 :
https://twitter.com/drapr007/status/126 ... 84033?s=19Total 114 tents of PLA is there in Galwan Valley & aproxx 500-600 troopers r camping there while 1000-1200 troopers r in nearby area & they can reach there within 3 hours. We have also reinforced required numbers of troopers. Pending construction work will start soon. #JaiHind
Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations
India needs time to take on China. I believe by May 2024 (by which time political changes in India may matter less), we will have fundamental changes in our strength relative to China. Given that this year (upto Mar 2021) is mostly written off for both countries, trying to deal with Covid and (in India) fixing the economy, fallout of CAA etc. We would see the following changes over the 3 years 2021-24, assuming we don't get into a premature military confrontation with China, but deal with them as we did at Doklam.
1. India's trade deficit with China will steadily reduce. This will partly be due to India making a sincere effort to attract manufacturing and partly the
result of us (and the world) acknowledging their vulnerability to Chinese imports and doing something about it.
2. India's GDP will grow more than China's over the next 3 years, increasing our strength relative to China. Conversely Pakistan's GDP growth would continue to be less than India's and will be overtaken by Bangladesh on a per capita basis. China's OBOR will unravel more - creating an economic problem and also more enemies - if they insist on countries paying up their loans. Already Pak has started realising they have been shafted.
3. Kashmir is pretty much a done deal after article 370's abrogation. Insurgency related deaths have continued their downward trend.
4. Greater tendency by the world community to support us both against China (for e.g. a loose coalition for intel gathering and basing between the navies of the US, Japan, Australia, Taiwan, Vietnam and the Philippines and less tolerant of supporting Pak (e.g. less willingness or ability of IMF to bail them out again). China will have a limited ability to use Pak against us and will also have to use which adversary to take on.
1. India's trade deficit with China will steadily reduce. This will partly be due to India making a sincere effort to attract manufacturing and partly the
result of us (and the world) acknowledging their vulnerability to Chinese imports and doing something about it.
2. India's GDP will grow more than China's over the next 3 years, increasing our strength relative to China. Conversely Pakistan's GDP growth would continue to be less than India's and will be overtaken by Bangladesh on a per capita basis. China's OBOR will unravel more - creating an economic problem and also more enemies - if they insist on countries paying up their loans. Already Pak has started realising they have been shafted.
3. Kashmir is pretty much a done deal after article 370's abrogation. Insurgency related deaths have continued their downward trend.
4. Greater tendency by the world community to support us both against China (for e.g. a loose coalition for intel gathering and basing between the navies of the US, Japan, Australia, Taiwan, Vietnam and the Philippines and less tolerant of supporting Pak (e.g. less willingness or ability of IMF to bail them out again). China will have a limited ability to use Pak against us and will also have to use which adversary to take on.
Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations
Eastern side of Indus near Demchok is in adverse (Chinese) possession, has always been so. That post is a Chinese one and looks quite unimportant.Deans wrote:It looks like its on our side of the LAC. Too small sized a post for it to matter either wayAditya_V wrote:Can anyone tell what is this Chinese post there for google coordinates 32.972821, 79.218743 , there does not seem to be any Indian post near it
Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations
How much of the current standoff is due to the pressure China is under at WHO and our upcoming chairmanship of the same? Are they trying to tell us, in their usual ham-handed way, not to open investigations against them for being the source of the Wuhan virus?
Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations
This link is an old one, but shows accurately, where Chinese units in the Western theatre are deployed.fanne wrote:Deans sir did not read your book. A factual low down (not big than few pages) on relative strength and position is welcomed (if you are current and know things).
One view (not picking on but giving example like chola) is that there are but few brigade in all of Tibet) and the other is that perhaps Chinese have as much man as us and more material. Shiv’s you tube is also educational. Where is our MSc come in?
https://jamestown.org/program/snapshot- ... r-command/
Currently China has the 76th and 77th group armies in the Western Theatre (Tibet). One in North west Tibet/ Xiajiang (North of Hotan) and one army in Eastern tibet (mostly east of Arunachal). They are at the edge of the Tibet plateau because of the much higher altitudes of Tibet (5000 meters).
Each group army has 6 combined arms brigades, with supporting artillery, helicopters, engineers etc. They are roughly the equivalent of an IA corps with 3 divisions. In addition to the 76th and 77th armies, the PLA has 3 brigades on the Tibet Plateau.
There is no infrastructure close to the LAC that can support even a single PLA division on the LAC.
Against this we have the following:
XIV corps - Leh (1 division each in Leh and Dras and an armored brigade)
IX Corps - Yol - can deploy a division for Himachal
1 reserve division (Bareilly) for Uttaranchal
XXXIII corps - Siliguri - 3 divisions for Sikkim and West Bhutan
IV corps - Tezpur - 3 divisions for West Arunachal
III corps - Dimapur (3 divisions for counter insurgency and for Walong - East Arunachal
We also have a Ranchi based division in reserve.
This excludes the MSC which is XVII corps in Pangarh (in my opinion not required - would be better to strengthen the firepower of existing formations)
Clearly therefore, the 76th and 77th armies cannot take on the IA on the LAC. However, since the PLA has 13 group armies, the 76th and 77th
can potentially be reinforced by the 81st, 82nd and 83rd armies from their Central theatre which is intended to be used as a reserve in any conflict.
There are also light infantry/ motorised divisions used for internal security in Xinjiang. My sense is that in a conflict, some of these will be used to provide additional infantry for the PLA, since their combined arms brigades have shed infantry in favor of mechanised forces (of limited use in the mountaIns). This would give the PLA rough parity with IA in terms of forces that can be deployed along the LAC - in theory.
I have said, `in theory' because rail capacity (and road capacity from the rail head) is insufficient to deploy the equivalent of 6 group armies - all their food and drinking water for e.g. has to be transported from hundreds of km away.
The PLAAF has 288 modern fighter aircraft in the Western Theatre command. However, the total no of bases in Tibet, within range of the LAC can realistically accommodate only half this number. Aircraft have huge payload penalties operating from airfields in Tibet. That makes the Chinese helicopter superiority largely irrelevant.
Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations
That is a good analysis from deans. Also both the roads and railways to get these chinese armies into tibet are very vulnerable to disruption by Indian missile strikes and IAF fighters and can be cut off. China is not in a good position in tibet if we have to fight them one to one. But the real problem is they have a rottweiler called pukistan on our western borders.If that problem did not exist India of today can screw china real good in tibet.
Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations
Suresh S wrote:That is a good analysis from deans. Also both the roads and railways to get these chinese armies into tibet are very vulnerable to disruption by Indian missile strikes and IAF fighters and can be cut off. China is not in a good position in tibet if we have to fight them one to one. But the real problem is they have a rottweiler called pukistan on our western borders.If that problem did not exist India of today can screw china real good in tibet.
I don't see how Pakiland changes the equation on our situation in Cheen. Our Western Command is the biggest and most powerful in the IA. It will more than hold its own against Pakistan and especially if it fought with the advantage of defending.
And there are other commands to bring into play against Pakiland like the Central and Southern.
There will be no need to pull troops from the chini borders at all. The advantages we own at the beginning of a conflict with Cheen will remain there no matter what troubles the Pakis make.
Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations
Just to add my extra 2 pisa here,Deans wrote:India needs time to take on China. I believe by May 2024 (by which time political changes in India may matter less), we will have fundamental changes in our strength relative to China. Given that this year (upto Mar 2021) is mostly written off for both countries, trying to deal with Covid and (in India) fixing the economy, fallout of CAA etc. We would see the following changes over the 3 years 2021-24, assuming we don't get into a premature military confrontation with China, but deal with them as we did at Doklam.
1. India's trade deficit with China will steadily reduce. This will partly be due to India making a sincere effort to attract manufacturing and partly the
result of us (and the world) acknowledging their vulnerability to Chinese imports and doing something about it.
2. India's GDP will grow more than China's over the next 3 years, increasing our strength relative to China. Conversely Pakistan's GDP growth would continue to be less than India's and will be overtaken by Bangladesh on a per capita basis. China's OBOR will unravel more - creating an economic problem and also more enemies - if they insist on countries paying up their loans. Already Pak has started realising they have been shafted.
3. Kashmir is pretty much a done deal after article 370's abrogation. Insurgency related deaths have continued their downward trend.
4. Greater tendency by the world community to support us both against China (for e.g. a loose coalition for intel gathering and basing between the navies of the US, Japan, Australia, Taiwan, Vietnam and the Philippines and less tolerant of supporting Pak (e.g. less willingness or ability of IMF to bail them out again). China will have a limited ability to use Pak against us and will also have to use which adversary to take on.
Material wise by 2024 we will get
1. S400 (upto 4 regiments)
2. Rafles
nothing new to write at BRF but still, Sl. no 1 has a huge deterrence value for both Western & Northern border neighbours.
Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations
I am not disagreeing with u. If I was in charge I will take the risk and go for it. I also agree that in the present circumstances it is possible even without USA direct entry to take back aksai chin and other defensible positions on india china border.But a better strategy is to remove the paki problem first with a preemptive strike before the chinese army can mobilize. But unfortunately India as a country is too defensive by nature and will not do it.
Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations
The advantage China has with Tibet is that, Tibet is a buffer state. Even if we end this occupation of China, militarily, their propaganda is going to be that we have been aggressive. Even if we occupy Lhasa, they can nuke Lhasa, because it's not going to be a loss to Han core.
We can't nuke Shanghai or Beijing if they nuke Lhasa, because they consider Lhasa as their own (though it's 3000 km away from the nearest Han core of China)
We can't nuke Shanghai or Beijing if they nuke Lhasa, because they consider Lhasa as their own (though it's 3000 km away from the nearest Han core of China)
Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations
No doubt China is upto dirty tricks but this detaining of troops etc is by pro Paki crowd is to try and take the focus of them. While we need to keep upgrading capabilities on the China border we must also keep the pressure on the Pakis.
Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations
What are the Chinese so worked up about roads towards LAC?
Because access is the most key aspect.
The LAC is 3000 KM+, a mountains frontier like none other in the world. This makes it manning against a instruction almost impossible for anyone.
The Chinese know this. Hence they build good road to make it easier to reach any risk area, asap to counter any ingress by us. This means they don't have to man the entire LAC. A very expensive proposition. The lack of roads on our side has helped the Chinese, because it limits the places we can ingress. So when they do a standoff, we are limited to where we do a counter ingress.
Having lateral and feeder roads, nullifies this advantage. Now we can ingress ANYWHERE.
This result in the Chinese having to man the entire LAC. This threat is not going to go away even if the LAC is settled. They cannot watch India upping it's infra and their hands tied because the LAC is settled.
I am now thinking the Chinese will not settle the LAC until we publicly agree NOT to build access roads.
Because access is the most key aspect.
The LAC is 3000 KM+, a mountains frontier like none other in the world. This makes it manning against a instruction almost impossible for anyone.
The Chinese know this. Hence they build good road to make it easier to reach any risk area, asap to counter any ingress by us. This means they don't have to man the entire LAC. A very expensive proposition. The lack of roads on our side has helped the Chinese, because it limits the places we can ingress. So when they do a standoff, we are limited to where we do a counter ingress.
Having lateral and feeder roads, nullifies this advantage. Now we can ingress ANYWHERE.
This result in the Chinese having to man the entire LAC. This threat is not going to go away even if the LAC is settled. They cannot watch India upping it's infra and their hands tied because the LAC is settled.
I am now thinking the Chinese will not settle the LAC until we publicly agree NOT to build access roads.
Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations
From a former governortheir propaganda is going to be that we have been aggressive..
a comment w.r.t. Nepal's stand
Something to ponder on handling of foreign policy in past.
Last edited by vishvak on 24 May 2020 22:47, edited 1 time in total.