Indian Navy News & Discussion - 22 April 2015

[Prem Kumar]

thats even more worrisome if brahmos were cheaper. we need a torpedo tube launch version of brahmos yesterday.

Is IN/DRDO lukewarm on subsonic AShM because they feel its era is over? Otherwise, with Nirbhay (high subsonic cruise) & Brahmos (seeker, sea skimmer) they have the requisite technology to build a desi, stealthy Harpoon!

[Philip]

The Pip design looks awfully crude. Previously,old warships like frigates were used for training purposes with much of the armament and sensors removed. The 3 G class FFGS could serve the same purpose as they are retired as Leanders did earlier. Of course accommodation would be much less.

[Philip]

China swiftly spreading its sea legs into the Meditt for the first time!
The Indian Pres. should've also be at the May Victory Parade in Moscow.Who is going?

http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/04/ ... 30[b]China, Russia to hold first joint Mediterranean naval drills in May[/b]

Chinese and Russian naval vessels participate in the Joint Sea-2014 naval drill outside Shanghai on the East China Sea, in this file photo taken on May 24, 2014.

Reuters/China Daily
(Reuters) - China will hold joint naval drills with Russia in mid-May in the Mediterranean Sea, the first time the two countries will hold military exercises together in that part of the world, the Chinese Defence Ministry said on Thursday.

China and Russia have held naval drills in Pacific waters since 2012. The May maneuvers come as the United States ramps up military cooperation with its allies in Asia in response to China's increasingly assertive pursuit of maritime territorial claims.

A total of nine ships from the two countries will participate, including vessels China now has on anti-piracy patrols in waters off Somalia, Chinese Defence Ministry spokesman Geng Yansheng told a monthly news briefing.

"The aim is to deepen both countries' friendly and practical cooperation, and increase our navies' ability to jointly deal with maritime security threats," Geng said.

"What needs saying is that these exercises are not aimed at any third party and have nothing to do with the regional situation."

Geng gave no specific date for the drills, which will be focused on navigation safety, at-sea replenishment, escort missions and live fire exercises.

Since Western powers imposed economic sanctions on Russia last year over the violence in Ukraine, Moscow has accelerated attempts to build ties with Asia, Africa and South America, as well as warming relations with its former Soviet-era allies. [ID:nL8N0XP3ED]

China and Russia are both permanent members of the U.N. Security Council and have close diplomatic, economic and military ties, with China traditionally relying on Russia for its most advanced equipment.

President Xi Jinping is expected to visit Moscow next month to attend a parade celebrating the end of World War Two.

China has been increasingly flexing its military muscles since Xi assumed the presidency in 2013, jangling nerves around the region and globally, though Beijing insists it is a force for peace and threatens nobody.

China's navy has become a focus of Xi's efforts to better project the country's power, especially in the disputed South China Sea.

U.S. President Barack Obama accused China on Tuesday of "flexing its muscles" to advance its territorial claims at sea.[ID:nL1N0XP111]

China says about 90 percent of the 3.5 million sq km (1.35 million sq mile) South China Sea is its sovereign territory. The Philippines, Taiwan, Malaysia, Brunei and Vietnam also claim large parts.

[Austin]

Indian Navy Aviation History - Official Film ( via livefist )

[Philip]

Tx Austin,that was a really nice vclip.The NLCA taking off from the ski-jump was a thrill.Can't wait to see it take off from a carrier.Can't remember whether this report was posted,about the IN wanting 50 UAVs,operating from ships of 50m size upwards and from land. It will enhance the IN's air surveillance capability immensely.

http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-in ... es-2065597
Indian Navy to acquire 50 drones for intelligence purposes
Monday, 2 March 2015

Though a little dated,a good summation of the IN's sub-surface challenges.

http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the ... 1598[quote]
May-June 2015 Issue out now!
The Indian Navy Has a Big Problem: The Subsurface Dilemma
While India's navy is certainly attracting lots of attention in the press, it faces a major challenge that might not be easily solvable.

Iskander Rehman
November 4, 2014

The United States’ strategic reorientation towards the Indo-Pacific has been accompanied by a heightened interest in matters maritime. In contrast to the primary theaters of the Cold War, the region’s strategic and economic geography is strongly defined by its wide oceans, narrow choke points and contested waterways. As a result, the naval profiles of Asia’s two great rising powers, India and China, have attracted a hitherto unprecedented level of attention.

Meanwhile, the very nature of maritime competition appears to be undergoing a radical transformation. The proliferation of precision-guided weaponry has resulted in the erection of increasingly formidable land-based reconnaissance-strike complexes, structured around dense constellations of anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) complexes. The growing ability of coastal states to both locate and prosecute mobile targets offshore has raised questions over the survivability of expensive, high-signature surface vessels, and maritime competition is increasingly being driven underwater. While much commentary has been made on the drivers and motivations behind China’s growing submarine fleet, the Indian Navy’s perception of the undersea domain has only infrequently been discussed. How do security managers in New Delhi view issues such as undersea warfare or the future of subsurface competition in the Indian Ocean? What are the Indian Navy’s priorities in terms of subsurface force structure and anti-submarine warfare (ASW)? How close is it to realizing its stated objectives? And what kind of acquisitions could best help the Indian Navy shield its fleet and maritime environs from unwelcome submarine activity?




Since its inception, the Indian Navy has been a carrier-centric force with a service culture heavily geared toward blue-water operations, surface warfare and sea control. India’s 2009 Maritime Doctrine clearly reflects these organizational proclivities, stipulating that “[s]ea control is the central concept around which the [Indian Navy] is structured, and aircraft carriers are decidedly the most substantial contributors to it.” With rare exceptions, Indian Navy chiefs have been surface warfare officers or naval aviators.

Nevertheless, Indian naval planners have long had a strong appreciation of the risks posed by marauding enemy submarines and the advantages to be derived from using subsurface assets for forward-deployed sea denial and choke point–control. The sinking of an Indian frigate, the INS Khukri, by a Pakistani Daphne-class submarine in the war of 1971, features amongst the Indian Navy’s darkest hours, and security managers in Delhi have traditionally harbored a somewhat proprietorial attitude toward the Indian Ocean, fretting over underwater encroachments. Whereas during the Cold War, Indian strategists pointed to the mushrooming of U.S. submarine pens in Diego Garcia, nowadays concerns revolve more around China’s growing presence in the Indian Ocean.

India’s Dwindling Conventional Submarine Force:

Since 1999, the Indian Navy has repeatedly stated that it would require at least twenty-four conventional submarines in order to both prevail in a high-intensity conflict with Pakistan and deter extra-regional powers. This force structure has been sanctioned by India’s Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS), and was reportedly reiterated in the most recent version of the Indian Navy’s classified Maritime Capability Perspective Plan.

Unfortunately, after a series of accidents and cascading delays, the Indian Navy’s submarine flotilla has shrunk down to only eleven operational boats—seven Russian Kilo-class submarines and four German HDW submarines. No new diesel-electric submarine has been commissioned for the past fifteen years, and many of the existing boats are over a quarter-century old. In October 2005, the Indian Navy signed a landmark deal for six French Scorpene-class boats. All submarines were to be built in India, at Mazagon Dock Limited (MDL) in Mumbai, under a technology-transfer agreement. For a variety of reasons ranging from reported teething problems in the absorption of new technologies, to abstruse and never-ending pricing negotiations, the schedule for delivery has been repeatedly pushed back. Indeed, whereas the Scorpenes were initially projected to join the fleet between 2012 and 2017, it now only looks as though they will be battle-ready by 2022. Project 75I, a follow-on program for six next-generation SSKs equipped with air-independent propulsion (AIP) and land-attack capabilities, was only just cleared by India’s Defense Acquisition Council, after years of increasingly desperate appeals by India’s naval officers to fast-track the process. Initially, the plan was to import two boats once a foreign vendor had been selected, then license-build the remaining four, but it now looks as though the Indian Navy has opted to construct all six boats in India with foreign assistance. It will probably take a few years to select the vendor, then another eight to ten years to build the submarines in question, rendering the prospect of them joining the fleet before 2030 extremely unlikely.

India’s Naval Nuclear Ambitions:

In parallel to its conventional submarine fleet, India has been investing in nuclear-powered platforms. In 2012, the Indian Navy commissioned the INS Chakra, an Akula-class nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN), which it acquired from Russia on a ten-year lease. When it was commissioned, it was described as a potential force multiplier for India’s rapidly decaying submarine fleet, and as opening the door in the future for blue-water submarine operations. Whereas India’s diesel-electric submarine fleet is primarily located along its western coast, the INS Chakra has been stationed along its eastern seaboard—and is clearly positioned to address the Chinese threat. There have been persistent rumors of plans to lease a second Akula, although nothing has yet been officially confirmed.

The most significant development with respect to India’s submarine force occurred in 2009, when India launched its first indigenously developed SSBN, the INS Arihant. The Arihant’s reactor went critical in August 2013, and it is expected to formally join the fleet some time in 2015. At present, it is slated to be fitted with up to twelve 750-km range Sagarika K-15 SLBMs, which is considered by many Indian commentators to be “grossly inadequate." Due to these range limitations and the short refueling cycle of the boat’s nuclear reactor, it is unlikely that the Arihant will deploy on deterrent patrols any time soon, and should thus be viewed—for the time being, at least—as something of a test platform and technology demonstrator, rather than as a viable, rugged component of India’s deterrence structure. This may change in the future, however, as India continues to develop longer-range SLBMs, such as the K-4, which has an advertised range of 3,500 km, or the K-5, which is still in the design phase and projected to have a range of 5,000 km.

New Delhi is cognizant of the fact that in order to enjoy an effective sea-based deterrent, particularly vis-a-vis China, whose strategic centers are located along its eastern seaboard, it will need to develop larger SSBNs with greater missile-carriage capacity and more powerful reactors. The development of a sea-based deterrent constitutes a colossal new undertaking for the Indian Navy, whether in terms of technological development, supporting infrastructure or even in terms of nuclear doctrine and command and control arrangements. Under the aegis of Project Varsha, a large new SSBN base is being built in Rambilli, 50 km southwest of the eastern port of Visakhapatnam, and an Extremely Low Frequency (ELF) communications station was recently erected next to India’s Very Low Frequency (VLF) station in Tamil Nadu. India aims to eventually acquire a SSBN fleet of four to five indigenously produced vessels, all of which will most likely be based along its eastern seaboard. This is primarily due to the fact that the Bay of Bengal is deemed a great degree more suitable for nuclear submarine operations—and perhaps in the future for SSBN bastion development—than the shallow and congested waters of the Arabian Sea.

India’s Perception of the Undersea Domain:

India’s concerns with regard to the undersea domain are twofold. The first, more immediate concern is Pakistan, which currently operates five SSKs, three Agosta-90B submarines and two more antiquated Agosta-70 boats, along with three Cosmos-class midget submarines. Unlike India’s conventional submarines, Pakistan’s Agosta-90Bs are equipped with AIP, and senior Pakistani defense officials have intimated that Islamabad could soon conclude a long-discussed deal to procure six additional SSKs from China. Pakistani naval planners have traditionally focused on offensive sea denial and coastal interdiction. Indeed, as one former Pakistani chief of naval staff noted, “Submarines have all along been [Pakistan’s] main strength and at the heart of our naval strategy of offensive sea denial.”

For the Indian Navy, acquiring and preserving the ability to successfully establish localized sea control within cluttered and bathymetrically challenging waters is of critical importance. If India can no longer credibly threaten Pakistan’s sea lines of communication or operate within strike range of Pakistan’s major ports, it will lose its capacity to translate its naval superiority into effective coercive power. New Delhi would find itself deprived of one of its few viable options to impose costs on Pakistan, and India’s ability to dissuade Pakistani acts of subconventional provocation would find itself further reduced. An addition of another six submarines to Pakistan’s inventory could severely impede India’s ability to exert sea control along Pakistan’s Makran Coast. India’s surface fleet might experience difficulty in locating and prosecuting Pakistani diesel-electric and midget submarines, particularly if they chose to “bottom” and evade sonar detection by settling on a shallow seafloor, switching off their engines, and closing their seawater inlets. Even the hypothetical presence of such platforms deployed along Pakistan’s coastline could create a “subsurface threat-in-being” for the Indian Navy and discourage it from deploying some of its more valuable assets.

In the future, the Indian Navy might consider developing a more distributed undersea battle network, composed of smart mines, midget submarines, sensors and UUVs (unmanned underwater vehicles), in addition to larger submarines, in order to help reconnoiter, and, if necessary, sanitize contested undersea environments. UUVs, in particular, are likely to fulfill an increasingly wide spectrum of tasks, ranging from mine warfare (MIW), to underwater intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance (ISR), and ASW. There have been reports that India intends to acquire up to six 150-ton midget submarines for its special ops MARCOS unit, as well as up to ten indigenously developed UUVs for littoral surveillance purposes. These are steps in the right direction.

India’s more long-term concern is related to Chinese submarine deployments in the Indian Ocean. Since December 2008, China has regularly rotated naval task forces in the Indian Ocean, ostensibly for anti-piracy missions. Indian observers, however, have expressed concern over the second-order effects of such deployments, noting that they have allowed Chinese naval intelligence units to better survey the Indian Ocean’s underwater topography and record bathymetric conditions. Similarly, Beijing also signed a contract allowing it to explore polymetallic sulphide ore deposits over a 10,000 square-kilometer swath of the Southwest Indian Ocean’s seabed. This has been perceived by India’s Directorate of Naval Intelligence as an excuse for the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to map the region’s notoriously challenging undersea terrain, with future submarine operations in mind. In 2013, the Indian press leaked the findings of a classified Indian Defense Ministry report, which allegedly reported that Chinese nuclear submarines were “making frequent forays into the Indian Ocean.” These assertions have been partially confirmed by Lt. General Michael Flynn, the Director of the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, who declared in February 2014 that China had “recently deployed for the first time a nuclear-powered attack submarine to the Indian Ocean.”

More recently, a Song-class SSK berthed in the Sri Lankan port of Colombo before heading out for escort missions in the Gulf of Aden. In the past, Indian naval officers had repeatedly asserted that the forward deployment of Chinese submarines—and particularly of Chinese SSNs—in the Indian Ocean would be cause for grave concern. Now that Beijing’s subsurface penetration of the Indian Ocean has been confirmed, it will be interesting to see how the Indian Navy chooses to respond to what, no doubt, constitutes an unwelcome new strategic reality.

The Importance of the P-8I:

India’s acquisition of eight Boeing P-8I (Poseidon) Neptune Aircraft—with an option for four more—constitutes perhaps one of the most encouraging developments, as it will significantly enhance the Indian Navy’s ability to conduct long-range maritime reconnaissance and ASW. The Poseidon’s Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) will also allow the Indian Navy to more easily detect diesel-electric submarines’ periscopes—a critical factor when addressing the Pakistani submarine threat. Presently based at Rajali, in Tamil Nadu, India’s P-8Is will eventually be deployed to India’s Eastern Naval Command. With a mission radius of 600 nautical miles for six hours on station and up to 1,200 nautical miles for four hours on station, India’s P-8Is will allow the Indian Navy to greatly enhance its maritime and littoral surveillance capabilities over the Bay of Bengal, as well as its ability for maritime interdiction and ASW.

There are concerns, however, over the security of the P-8I’s communications, as well as over its lack of electronic warfare self-protection abilities. Indeed, due to India’s continued refusal to sign the Communications Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA) and the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geospatial Cooperation (BECA), the P-8I was delivered without secure and encrypted communications, and satellite navigational aids. As a result, India’s P-8Is are slated to be equipped with an indigenously developed communications system, the Data Link-II system, whose reliability and effectiveness have been openly questioned by some Indian naval officers.

The Damaging Effects of Bureaucratic Dysfunction:

India’s growing challenges in the undersea domain are exacerbated by certain glaring capability gaps in its surface fleet’s ability to conduct deep-water ASW (anti-submarine warfare). As of now, India’s major surface combatants are only equipped with hull-mounted sonars. While observers have commented on the efficacy of these indigenously developed sonars in the higher thermoclines of the Indian Ocean, the Indian Navy urgently requires new types of sonar in order to effectively address the growing threat posed by both nuclear and diesel-electric submarines. Active variable depth sonars (VDS) will be required to better monitor the movements of quiet diesel-electric submarines, while passive towed arrays will be needed to effectively detect the noise emitted by nuclear power plant machinery. Going forward, the best approach for the Indian Navy might be to pursue a VDS so as to address the diesel threat, and a multifunction towed array in order to both listen for the returns from the active VDS, and the noise continuously radiated by lurking nuclear submarines.[1] In short, acquiring a multifunction towed array would allow Indian surface ship commanders the operational flexibility to choose to remain silent and simply listen for the sounds of enemy submarines, or to “ping” active to bounce sound off the hulls of any subsurface intruders.

These hardware deficiencies can be attributed, as often in India, to the dysfunctional state of the nation’s higher defense management. Even though the Indian Navy has been trying to import advanced towed arrays for its ships since the 1990s, the Indian Ministry of Defense has, until recently, repeatedly blocked these attempts in favor of mostly fruitless indigenous efforts, such as the Nagan. There are indications that this bureaucratic obstructionism may soon dissipate, but it will take some time before India’s frigates and destroyers are equipped with more advanced sonar systems. Concerns over the vulnerability of India’s surface ships to subsurface attack have been compounded by the fact that the Indian Navy now suffers from an acute shortage in ASW helicopters. Indeed, it currently has only eleven aging Kamov-28 and seventeen Sea King helicopters to help screen a fleet of over 130 boats. Once again, the Indian Navy’s requests to move ahead with a contract for longer-range, and better equipped, helicopters have been met with an unsavory mixture of bureaucratic incompetence and political diffidence.

Earlier this year, India’s naval chief, Admiral DK Joshi, resigned after a series of dramatic accidents, two of which took place aboard SSKs and—in both cases—led to a tragic loss of life. In the course of a recent and much discussed interview, the embittered admiral deplored the difficulties he had experienced in obtaining timely repairs and refits of his vessels and drew attention to what he perceived as forming the true cause of India’s continued military dysfunction:


“The root cause is this dysfunctional and inefficient business model that we have (…) While professional competence, accountability and responsibility is with the service, this is not the case with authority. (…) For example, when it comes to changing submarine batteries, which are available indigenously, or commencing refits and repairs of ships, aircraft, submarines in Indian yards, the service (navy) does not have that empowerment. (….) Where there is authority, there is no accountability. And where there is responsibility, there is no authority.”

Until these larger structural and institutional issues are addressed, it would appear that—notwithstanding India’s beleaguered naval officers’ best efforts—the nation’s subsurface challenges are likely to grow, rather than diminish.

Iskander Rehman is a Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA).

Note: This article is adapted from a presentation the author made at the event “Warfare Beneath the Waves: The Undersea Domain in Asia,” held at the American Enterprise Institute on October 20th 2014.

[1] The author is grateful to his colleague Commander (Retd.) Bryan Clark for this point
[/quote]

PS:The sealing of the deal of Pak's 6+ AIP SSKs from China and the IN's planned 6 SSNs in the future ,plus the future P-76 design to be totally indigenous,are the latest major developments since this article was written.

[Aditya G]

^ The prediction of P-75Is coming into the submarine by 2030 seemed way off initially, but is infact quite reasonable - and discomforting. IMHO the irrespective of the progress on this or the follow on P-76, we should continue building more Scorpenes with an order of at least 6 more. Perhaps with some MKIzed components.

The author also re-affirms the understanding that IN truly requires both conventional and nuclear subs. The latter have to be SSN, SSGN and SSBN - or perhaps a balance of at least 2 capabilities in each boat, like we see in Arihant.

Though the state of affairs may seem alarming, the picture is improving with Kalvari and Sindhukriti float outs. At worst, fewer subs means diminished offensive sea denial capability.

The lack of ASW capability is something IMHO which needs to be addressed soon. As lack of it creates a situation where our powerful surface fleet has to be on the defensive. The option clause for P-8I should be exercised immediately.

[Philip]

Scorpenes are v.expensive,even our non-AIP ones and unlikely to be chosen for the 75I req. We may build a few more to keep MDL and the numbers happy.A second line in a pvt. yard is on the cards,L&T have the most experience with their ATV hull manufacture. The speedy acceptance of the SSN design is even more urgent than the 75I/76 req. This programme will run in parallel to whatever conventional/AIP subs that are being built and if we fast track the programme,we could have the first boat launched by 2020. At least 2 N-subs and 2 conventional subs must be under construction at any given time at Vizag,MDL and a pvt. yard.The N-subs at Vizag.

[Aditya G]

From MDLs perspective, irrespective of the actual P-75I winner, they are going to get the contract. I am suggesting that they continue the Scorpene line till the new sub comes online. Expensive or not, the Navy is committed, and it makes sense to continue building the same.

[Philip]

Then what was the whole point of a P-75I requirement? A previous report quoted an IN off. who said that the delay was so long that by the time the last Scorpene was built,the design would be obsolete to new subs being built. It is obvious that the IN wants something better than the Scorpene,which will in effect be the replacements for the U-209s when pensioned off. Both U-boats and Scorpenes cannot carry BMos or evn Klub,just Exocets.Just two U-209s are worth major upgrades say some sources.

[Cain Marko]

^The lack of ASW capability is something IMHO which needs to be addressed soon. As lack of it creates a situation where our powerful surface fleet has to be on the defensive. The option clause for P-8I should be exercised immediately.

yes, this is a core need but there seems to be no noise from any quarter in the press about any such possibilities.

I believe the first priority is to get the surface combatants adequate ASW capabilities via the helo acquisitions.

Priority 2 is probably the MRMP bird - not much noise here either

Not much word on the Novella upgrades on the IL-38s and the Bears. Perhaps this is a good sign.

[Philip]

I think that the Mays and Bears will be upgraded to the extent that they have useful life in the airframes left and serve as extra assets to the P-8Is and are equipped with LR ASMs like BMos and Nirbhay.Having plumped for 8 P-8I,another quick order of 4+ would be in the IN's interests.As for the MMRP,one would prefer a few more Il-38s instead,Russia has many in mothballs. Much of the eqpt. in side could be similar to that on the P-8Is,as these birds perform the "low and slow" tasks better and would have far better range and loiter time. Extra P-8Is and IL-38s would obviate the need for another type.

I'm not sure whether an armed/maritime/ASW version of the Fairchild Do-328 hasn't been looked at since we operate so many of the 228s whose wing is similar.We could build the same here (wings already being built for the 228s) as they have good potential too for transport and civilian versions. The US operate a number of them for special ops.

Wik

Related development
Dornier Do 228
Fairchild Dornier 328JET
Aircraft of comparable role, configuration and era
Antonov An-24/Xian Y-7
ATR 42
de Havilland Canada DHC-8
Embraer EMB 120 Brasilia
Saab 340
Xian MA60
CASA CN-235

However,the LTA hasn't as of yet been awarded,with the Tata's proposal hanging fire.About 50+ aircraft are expeted to be built If an LTA built in India is selected,that type could also serve as an MMRP aircraft in a maritime version as it would also bring down costs with more of the type built making spares,MRO cheaper too..

[Aditya G]

Then what was the whole point of a P-75I requirement? A previous report quoted an IN off. who said that the delay was so long that by the time the last Scorpene was built,the design would be obsolete to new subs being built. It is obvious that the IN wants something better than the Scorpene,which will in effect be the replacements for the U-209s when pensioned off. Both U-boats and Scorpenes cannot carry BMos or evn Klub,just Exocets.Just two U-209s are worth major upgrades say some sources.

Philip, do you seriously believe that the Scorpenes are outdated? Even if we consider a 10-15 year delay, the total life of boats is 30 years+ minimum. There are some concerns on the AIP system but the same is installed on PN Agostas - which is considered a successful design.

VLS seems to be the only concrete capability difference over Scorpenes. But is it so important for our SSKs? Can't we leave land attack work to our SSGN/SSN/SSBNs? We can target Pakistan from air, sea and land anyways. Tube launched excoets are a reasonable choice, probably better than harpoons we are installing aboard the U-209s.

[Vivek K]

Scorpene not from mother Russia! Obsolete onleee!

[member_22539]

^+1 Indeed

[Karan M]

The lack of ASW capability is something IMHO which needs to be addressed soon. As lack of it creates a situation where our powerful surface fleet has to be on the defensive. The option clause for P-8I should be exercised immediately.

With Atlas Elektronic towed arrays on order & the DRDO ALTAS in trials, the situation isn't as bad as it was.
The priority is & should be the MRH before the P-8Is follow on order.

[member_24684]

.

My promo video for INS Vishal, nuclear powered aircraft carrier .!!

[uddu]

The AMCA will also serve on the carrier. AMCA is going to be the primary aircraft that will be flying from the carrier. Also certain numbers of LCH etc will be accommodated.

[Philip]

That was a quote (Scorpene obsolescence) from a senior IN offr. For the record,just look at how many other navies have been operating Scorpenes long before us,including Malaysia?

The next carrier,IAC-2 will arrive long before the AMCA.Even if it takes 10 years to arrive,that is at least 5 years before the AMCA will if the programme is to begin only after LCA MK-2 is completed. Why I've been saying that we should leapfrog LCA MK-2,which will involve a lot of redesign,making it virtually a new aircraft ,but with inferior capabilities in comparison with both the Rafale and AMCA,and build more Mk-1A/B/Cs whatever .The IAF will increasingly want more capable aircraft than the "lightweight" LCA,which is arriving at least a decade late and underperforming. The Bison an interim solution was developed to meet the shortfall/delay and will soldier on well into the 2020s.

If started immediately,the AMCA programme will save a lot of money that would've been spent on developing the Mk-2 and would also make use of the limited human resources available,designers,engineers,etc.,and save substantial time as well; hopefully the series production arriving around 2025+.Since the NLCA is progressing better than the LCA,but again requires a more powerful engine says the IN,we may have limited numbers of it aboard the IAC-1.

Report on the decision that all future warships,subs,etc. will be locally built ,pvt. yards chipping in if DPSUs are overloaded. Import content about "50%".
http://www.defensenews.com/story/defens ... /26631375/

India To Limit Ship Buys to Domestic Yards
By Vivek Raghuvanshi May 2, 2015

Xcpts:

The Navy has potential orders worth more than US $50 billion over the next 10 years for ship and submarine builds, said a Defence Ministry source.

However, the $12 billion purchase of six conventional submarines with air independent propulsion, for which a request for proposals is being prepared, will still allow foreign participation in the design phase, although the subs will be built only by domestic shipyards, the MoD source added.

As state-owned shipyards have their hands full, private sector yards, which have the facilities but fewer orders, are likely to be the biggest beneficiaries under the new directive, analysts said.

"Private shipyards have not been given adequate opportunity to prove their mettle. There is no doubt that they are more modern and perhaps more efficient and given an opportunity will perhaps outperform the state-owned shipyards. It is too early to judge them as the state-owned shipyards have a five-decade lead in shipbuilding," said Anil Jai Singh, retired Indian Navy commodore.

In February, the government cleared a proposal to build seven stealth frigates and six nuclear attack submarines worth $16 billion to be designed and built in India. In addition, the Navy will build 16 anti-submarine warfare craft worth $2.5 billion and 12 mine countermeasures vessels (MCMVs) for $5 billion; all of these orders will be placed with domestic yards, the Navy official said.

"No Navy in the world equips its warships with exclusively indigenously developed weapon systems. This is because technology in weapon systems is rapidly changing. So there is need for the Indian Navy to also depend on certain imported systems," he said. "But the Indian Navy can integrate these imported systems because we have our own design capability. If the Indian Air Force or state-owned military aircraft manufacturer Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. had the type of capability which the Indian Navy has developed over the past 50 years, then the need to purchase a Rafale fighter from France would have been a different story."[/quote]

[member_28840]

^^ I beg to differ with that last statement. While i appreciate and commend the efforts by the Navy to push for indigenous shipbuilding, we are still importing far too many critical systems. Powerplant, transmission ,sensors, weapon systems , stealth composites and much more.

While i am not the biggest fan of HAL or DPSUs in general, how is this any different than say, the LCA? The design and airframe are ours, but we are importing the sensors, power plant and ...

We really need something to shake up the whole rotten edifice and bring back innovation instead of screw driver work.

[NRao]

"Cost" is the main factor.

"Cost" of not knowing and therefore importing. And.

"Cost" of getting what can be produced within a nation cheaper from other sources.

Finally, the "cost" of research. Even if you produce the latest and greatest today, it will not mean that you can produce the latest and greatest of tomorrow.



The navy has to find a fine balance between all this and politics (which is a "cost" by itself).

India has the potential, but has a very long way to go and will have fight very hard to get where she wants to be.

[vishvak]

Finally, very welcome news, stated here many times. Though, must take precautions that Make In India does not turn into -not make in Russia but can make somewhere else- kind of flawed arguments and goalposts changing arguments, finally appended by "Amrikan F-35-Z has sports car and submarine version also".

[brar_w]

[Kakkaji]

Interesting details, hence posting in full:

Pitch to build subs in Bengal

Buoyed by a Rs 20,000-crore order from the Centre to build three stealth frigates called the P17A, defence public sector Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers (GRSE) has said in the blueprint that it will build a yard in the resort town of Raichak, set on a bend in the river 50km south of Calcutta.

A workshop, a dry dock, an assembly and fitting-out jetty, and a "slipway" in Raichak will launch the submarines into the Hooghly's waters before they sail out to sea.

The part of Raichak where the yard has been planned has a draft, or depth, estimated at eight to 10 metres, which will allow the boats to be built, the GRSE chairman and managing director, Rear Admiral (retired) A.K. Verma, told The Telegraph. The boats will be built under the navy's Rs 60,000-crore Project 75 India (P75i).

The Hooghly is largely non-navigable for vessels requiring great depths because of silt as well as berms on the riverbed that often emerge at low tide.

In February this year, GRSE presented the blueprint to an eight-member committee headed by the navy's Controller of Warship Production and Acquisitions, Vice-Admiral Ashok Subhedar. The Subhedar committee had been tasked to recommend which Indian shipyard(s) should be considered for the P75i programme.

The P75i is India's biggest military acquisitions programme, estimated to cost Rs 60,000 crore. Last October, the government decreed that all six submarines in the project should be built in India.

The selected Indian yard(s) would be expected to tie up with one of six global submarine majors: DCNS of France, Rubin Amur (Russia), Navantia (Spain), Thyssenkrupp or HDW (Germany), Kockums (Sweden), and Soryu (Kawasaki, Japan). The Subhedar committee is yet to submit its recommendations.

GRSE was initially ruled out because the Hooghly is not known to allow a draft of more than four to five metres at best.

But GRSE convinced the government to take a serious look at its capabilities after delivering two major warships - the anti-submarine warfare (ASW) stealth corvette INS Kamorta and the Barracuda offshore patrol vessel, India's first warship export (to Mauritius) - in time last year. It also disclosed its plans for Raichak.

A Telegraph team that was given a guided tour of GRSE's restricted-access facilities saw two more ASW corvettes of the P28 Kamorta class being readied for deliveries to the navy at the fitting-out jetty and the main yard, and an amphibious ship, which can beach with troops and armoured vehicles, at a dry dock that slopes into the Hooghly.

Towering above the yards was a Goliath crane, recently built as part of a Rs 600-crore modernisation programme.

"With the technology available today, any yard that can build a warship can build a submarine," GRSE chief Verma said.

"We have just got a Rs 20,000-crore contract for three P17A (stealth frigate) ships that will go on for ten years, and we are transiting from a medium-level shipyard to a major builder capable of meeting international standards - witness our export."

For the submarine-building programme, GRSE is in competition with Mazagon Docks (Mumbai), Goa Shipyard, Hindustan Shipyard (all under the defence ministry), Cochin Shipyard (under the shipping ministry), Pipavav and Larsen & Toubro (both in the private sector).

Only Mazagon Docks and L&T have some experience with submarine-building. French firm DCNS is building six Scorpene submarines at Mazagon Docks; L&T has supplied the hulls for India's Arihant-class nuclear submarines.

In Raichak, the defence shipyard has acquired 100 acres. It is also in talks with the Odisha government to acquire land at Dhamra in Bhadrak district. Verma says the modular design of shipbuilding will allow submarines to be built block by block and integrated in Raichak.

For the Kamorta class, which requires the fitment of underwater sonar (submarine-detection equipment), the yard takes the ship to Visakhapatnam.

A warship-overseeing team from the navy monitors each stage of the shipbuilding process. Its offices are by jetties on the east bank of the Hooghly, concealed by high walls and the dirt and grime and heavy trucks that trundle through the Calcutta suburb's broken roads.

In Raichak, GRSE has planned a workshop for the manufacture of blocks up to 200 tonnes each that would be lowered to the jetties for assembly. The assembled boat would then be taken to a slipway to be launched into the water.

The Calcutta-based defence firm --- which built India's first warship, the INS Ajay, in 1961 --- is also looking at a Rs 2,000-crore order for "midget submarines" (also called "human torpedoes" or "chariots") that the Centre is trying as an experiment in Visakhapatnam. This is part of a 45-year-old navy programme that was recently revived.

[Aditya G]

GRSE probably has the worst quality of warship production - judging by external finishing.

Navy had to tow incomplete hulls of the Kora class to GSL to complete them due to labour issues at the former,

[uddu]

That's long back. Nowadays they are building the Corvettes and all almost within the timeframe. So lot of improvement has happened. Next will be the building of the frigates. Submarines and all may take time. Even MDL which used to build subs and large destroyers are grappling with Scorpene. So it will take time for GRSE to build subs, in the mean time let them build what they can build like ASW Corvettes, patrol vessels and the upcoming P17A's in large numbers.

[Philip]

L&T have a massive brand new shipyard at Kattupalli near Madras,which is lying idle for want of orders.L&T have far more experience in sub building than any of the other pvt. yards like Pip as well as GRSE,which has its order book full with P-28s and P-17As to follow.

The Kattupalli Shipyard cum Captive Port Complex is a large shipyard project at Kattupalli village near Ennore of Chennai being built by L&T Shipbuilding Ltd. It is being set up jointly by TIDCO and Larsen & Toubro (L&T) in two phases.

In terms of cargo generation, the terminal is located close to the majority of Container Freight stations in Chennai. The Kattupalli development also includes a shipyard being developed by L&T, a private sector–backed development.

It is planning to compete with Japanese and Korean shipyards in building "specialised ships," such as large-size warships, car carriers, submarines, naval offshore patrol vessels, fast patrol vessels and corvettes. After Colombo and Singapore, Kattupalli will be the third major international destination for ship repairs in the region.[2]

The shipyard-cum-minor port complex was officially inaugurated on 30 January 2013.[3]

Wik:

Interestingly,the 16 ASW patrol craft mentioned being built at a cost of approx. $150M",and the minewarafre vessels will also be built in India but not know as of now where.GSL would be a prime candidate for the same and the 16 ASW craft order could be split between a DPSU yard and pvt yard. It would be very interesting to see what bang for the buck one would get in the design for $150M apiece.

In the early '90s,we paid approx. $30M each to licence build the Tarantula class missile corvette,whose hull,machinery,etc. are the same as the Pauk/Abhay class ASW corvettes which these new ASW vessels are to replace."A version of these ships for coastal anti submarine warfare and patrol was developed as the Pauk class corvette or Project 1241.2." Going by that figure,double or even triple it,we would be able to get a larger 750-1000t ASW corvette for around $150M. These vessels would be then able to MBUs,TTs,TAS,30mm/57mm DPs,MANPADs and perhaps even an open heli-deck like the Khukri/Koras.

[Singha]

returned from goa. there is no sign of a single Mig29K there.
3 x IL38, 1 x Kamov, 2 x Kiran were parked on the ramp but no Mig29K.

with Vikky berthed in karwar, and karwar not having a naval air station yet, and we having a lot of Mig29k, the mystery is where have they all gone?

[Philip]

Aboard the carrier and the rest sent to Vizag I imagine at INS Dega,where a MIG-29K sqd. was established.No idea if the full lot have been delivered as well The IN is strengthening its naval air stations all around the coast/island territories as can be seen from the map in the excellent video-clip of its aviation wing.

[deejay]

^^^ Sqns often undertake long detachments for exercises / firing practice etc.

[Philip]

A take on Indo-US naval carrier design/dev. cooperation. One point to be made from the start is the cost of a N-powered EMALS carrier of 65,000t. It is going to be very,very,expensive.Does the GOI/IN have the money for such an expensive carrier with other "mouths to feed" in the IN alone?
Secondly,what aircraft? NLCA while a welcome arrival,will be simply too small and less capable than other med-large sized twin-engined multi-role fighters.They may serve better aboard the Vik-A and IAC-1. The realistic options are an advanced TVC version of the 29K,closer to or above MIG-35 specs ,a naval version of the FGFA which some reports say is also being considered by the RuN for their future carriers,a new naval variant of the Flanker which could be based upon the SU-35,Naval Rafales and the F-35B/C.

Personally,if affordable,I would like the F-35B to be aboard our amphib vessels,if designed with a view to providing a healthy air capability for fleet defence and support of amphib ops. It will be the only STOVL aircraft in service anywhere.The manner in which the USMC is still operating and valuing its Harriers is remarkable for that type of aircraft,perfectly suited to those ops. Since this carrier will arrive at the very least in the period between 2025 and 2030,a whole decade of naval aircraft development is going to take place.UCAVs will also be in contention after UCLASS is successfully inducted.

To my mind,the best course for the IN is to design the 3-4 amphib vessels of size of IAC-1 with similar aviation capabilities and take a serious look at the multi-role stealthy F-35B operating from a ski-jump,just as RN F-35Bs will be doing from the QE class carrier. If the F-35Bs are found to be too expensive to acquire (first option though),the same aircraft on IAC-1,MIG-29Ks and NLCAs can do the business.Ro-ro ships can easily be acquired for augmenting the transport of AVs,eqpt.etc. in a dual civil/mil purpose,taken up for duty in a crisis for amphib ops. There is an article in a US mag whether a well-deck is at all needed for all of its amphibs,though fast LCs will always be required.With the ability to operate current naval aircraft,the IN's amphibs will provide a very robust air/amphib capability,possessing substantial integral strike support for landing forces.The amphib vessels could also be used in a swing role for intensive ASW ops as our greatest threat is going to come from enemy subs.Just change the air complement/configuration of the aircraft/helos to suit the mission. The similarities in design,etc.,would make it more affordable,easier and faster to construct with a v.large part of the eqpt. being the same. This would then give the IN a carrier/flat top fleet of around 5-6 vessels,not just 2-3 and affordable.

The design of a larger series of carrier could then be worked out and work begun when we can afford them. Just one N-carrier is not enough,we will need more in the future,2030 and beyond. Investing so much into an EMALS/N-powered carrier makes it necessary that a stealth 5th-gen fighter is aboard. Can we start developing a naval AMCA right from the start of the AMCA programme? This perhaps could be the ideal solution if it can arrive on time,if we leapfrog LCA Mk-2 and move straight on to AMCA development.

The sub warfare element of the IN is the one that is going to demand the max funds in the coming decade,as this is the weakest arm of the IN and should be given top priority,over and above the IAC-2. Pak's planned acquisition of 8AIP subs with N-tipped cruise missiles,giving it a strat deterrent at sea,is going to be a huge challenge for the IN to counter,leave alone the Chinese sub ambitions with its planned sub base at Gwadar. Until our 6-8 SSNs are under construction apart from the SSBNs,IAC-2 should be kept for the future."INS India" is unsinkable and supersonic LRMP aircraft like Backfires,etc., will be excellent platforms to deal with surface threats.

Fundamental to the Q posed below is the IN's grand strategy and maritime doctrine for the next few decades,where force projection by carriers and sea denial by subs have their own pros and cons. the vulnerability of carriers to subs is only growing with subs getting quieter and armed with more sophisticated weaponry,not to mention China's anti-carrier BMs,specifically meant to knock out US carriers.The USN however possesses a balanced fleet of carriers and N-subs,both SSBNs and N-attack subs,carrying large numbers of cruise missiles,anti-ship/sub and land attack. the IN however at the moment is unbalanced when it comes to its sub inventory.

http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/us-india ... good-idea/

US-India Collaboration on Aircraft Carriers: A Good Idea?
Ashley Tellis claims the United States should help India develop its next-generation carriers. He’s right.

By Ankit Panda
April 24, 2015

Yesterday, my colleague Franz-Stefan Gady covered the main takeaways from a new Carnegie Endowment for International Peace report, authored by Ashley Tellis, that calls for, among other things, broader cooperation between the United States and India on developing the latter’s naval capabilities. Specifically, Tellis focuses on carrier aviation and recommends that the United States ensure that India fields a more robust carrier capability than China. India has a Vikrant-class carrier in the works: the 65,000 ton nuclear-powered INS Vishal will launch in the next decade. Tellis’ report has drawn attention for good reason, and I’d like to herein address two points that stood out to me.

First, Tellis astutely notes that while the United States and India are strategically converging—certainly in the first 11 months of Narendra Modi and the Bharatiya Janata Party’s time in power—what both sides really need is a bilateral strategic event on the scale of the 2005 123 agreement on civil nuclear cooperation. That agreement stands as a watershed moment in bilateral relations between the world’s oldest democracy and its largest. It came a few years after that United States had alienated and sanctioned India for its nuclear tests in the late-1990s. The civil nuclear agreement was a feather in the Bush administration’s cap on foreign policy and showed the India and the United States could work together for mutual benefit.

Today, though both countries cooperate and agree on a variety of security and defense issues (see examples here and here), there is no real looming possibility for a cooperative endeavor on the scale of the civil nuclear cooperation deal. Tellis claims—and I’d agree—that U.S. technical assistance for India’s indigenous aircraft carrier, while not comparable in scale to the nuclear agreement, are a great way to encourage a convergence between the core national security interests of both countries. Tellis situates the strategic logic of this endeavor in terms of the broader conversations that are taking place in both Washington and New Delhi about China’s naval modernization and forays into the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).

Second, while the report’s two core recommendations for the United States on offensive carrier technology are straightforward, they are not both equally convincing. The recommendations, on improving the ability of India’s next-generation carriers to “fight,” are to allow India access to General Atomics’ electromagnetic aircraft launch system (EMALS, the advantages of which I discussed in some detail earlier this month), and offer India access to “various advanced aviation systems” (read: E-2C/D Hawkeye and F-35C Lightning joint strike fighters). The first proposal—EMALS—is both realistic and feasible while the second is less so. EMALS would ensure that India’s Vikrant-class carriers would have superiorly capable air wings to anything China currently fields on its sole carrier, the sidegraded Russian Admiral Kuznetsov-class carrier, the Liaoning.

In short, an EMALS-equipped INS Vishal (and ostensibly INS Vikrant) would entail a switch to the more complex but versatile catapult-assisted (CATOBAR) launch systems. Currently, India, Russia, and China operate carriers using the less advanced short take-off (STOBAR) launch system. With an EMALS-equipped CATOBAR launch system (pardon the alphabet soup), India’s naval strike fighters would encounter less strain on their airframes and be able to conduct sorties faster. This means that even while China’s current J-15 fighters may be better equipped than India’s currently employed MiG-29K Fulcrum fighters, India would have a leg up when it came to deploying its carrier air wings.

Of course, the MiG-29K Fulcrum won’t be India’s go-to strike fighter (one hopes) when the Vishal heads out to sea. The question of what fighter would adorn the Vishal‘s flattop remains open. Tellis proposes Lockheed Martin’s F-35C Lightning. While it’s an interesting thought, it’s hard to imagine India opting for the F-35C (it would seem Flashpoint‘s Robert Farley agrees with me on this point, based on his post from earlier today discussing the future of India’s carrier aviation). Part of the reason is that India is too far along with Russia on their plans to jointly develop a multi-role fifth generation fighter aircraft based off the Sukhoi T-50 PAK FA. (New Delhi is also testing naval prototypes of its Tejas light combat aircraft, but the focus remains on STOBAR launch systems.)

While joint production and development plans have hit a few roadblocks, New Delhi is almost certainly not interested in looking away at this point. To be sure, that could change in the future and the F-35C may become a compelling option. For example, disagreements over the extent of India’s involvement in the FGFA could drive New Delhi away. Additionally, Tellis notes that the T-50 has no naval variant; the FGFA variant might not either, initially. India’s recent decision to acquire 36 Dassault Rafale fighters from France could be the big wrench in the works here for any Indian plans to explore an F-35C acquisition. While the Rafale is less capable than the F-35C as a stealth fighter, it would fight the bill for India’s next-generation carrier air wings.

As an ancillary note, the F-35 could have had a very different fate with India had things gone differently in the early stages of bidding for India’s now-dead medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA) tender. In 2008, Lockheed Martin pitched a F-16 variant (F-16IN) for consideration under the MMRCA, with the added bonus that India would be eligible for the F-35 Lightning in the future (Tellis himself explored the reasons the U.S. pitch failed in 2011). The F-16 wasn’t appealing for a variety of reasons: Pakistan operated the fighter and its capabilities were insufficiently differentiated from the Mirage 2000s the Indian Air Force already possessed. Additionally, Indian carrier development was less of a priority at the time the MMRCA was conceived. Today, Indian priorities have changed with the times and New Delhi sees a greater role for naval aviation in its bid to exert strategic primacy over the IOR.

Leaving the nuts and bolts of cooperation on India’s carriers aside, one hopes that Tellis’ recommendations will be heard loudly and clearly in both New Delhi and Washington. As the India and the United States continue to build their relationship on a solid foundation of shared interests, both strategic and economic, they will find it easier to pursue their common goal of preserving the status quo in the Indian Ocean through sustained cooperation on defense and security matters. Washington should do its part in buttressing New Delhi’s ability to exercise naval supremacy in the IOR. Making sure India has the right tools for the job (i.e., cutting edge aircraft carriers) is a straightforward and visible way to do so.

[brar_w]

A take on Indo-US naval carrier design/dev. cooperation. One point to be made from the start is the cost of a N-powered EMALS carrier of 65,000t. It is going to be very,very,expensive.Does the GOI/IN have the money for such an expensive carrier with other "mouths to feed" in the IN alone?
Secondly,what aircraft? NLCA while a welcome arrival,will be simply too small and less capable than other med-large sized twin-engined multi-role fighters.They may serve better aboard the Vik-A and IAC-1. The realistic options are an advanced TVC version of the 29K,closer to or above MIG-35 specs ,a naval version of the FGFA which some reports say is also being considered by the RuN for their future carriers,a new naval variant of the Flanker which could be based upon the SU-35,Naval Rafales and the F-35B/C.

Cost is constantly a tradeoff with capability and expect the IN to run those numbers when they do come to a design decision. Do you want to pay 50% more to get better capability etc or do you want to simply add another carrier. Their are capability, and LCC implications to both and this is what they have to model. Its quite a detailed and lengthly process but expect them to run those numbers and do an AOA keeping in mind the Chinese Navy, how its projected to develop over the next 50 years. Carriers last a mighty long time in service, and in my opinion if they have a very large room of growth inherent in their designs they can provide much better value for money over their life. The cost to design, and procure the carrier is only one small share of what you will have to pay for that carrier and its air-wing over its entire service life (specially if its nuclear powered) which is usually expected to be in excess of half a century. Just image a 2020 carrier where you saved a hypothetical $ 1 Billion because you made design changes that saved cost but also cut future growth capacity. Do you think a 2060 Naval chief is going to think of that as a wise investment??? Strategic Bombers and Aircraft Carriers need to last a heck of a long time and have capability growth planned to keep them relevant over that entire time. While a UK can go in for a cheaper solution given the umbrella under which it fights in..Having the Chinese navy pushing deeper into its neighborhood in the next 50 years may just be the reason the IN needs to start planning for that capability NOW.

Personally,if affordable,I would like the F-35B to be aboard our amphib vessels,if designed with a view to providing a healthy air capability for fleet defence and support of amphib ops. It will be the only STOVL aircraft in service anywhere.The manner in which the USMC is still operating and valuing its Harriers is remarkable for that type of aircraft,perfectly suited to those ops. Since this carrier will arrive at the very least in the period between 2025 and 2030,a whole decade of naval aircraft development is going to take place.UCAVs will also be in contention after UCLASS is successfully inducted.

F-35B is only worth it if you do not intend on having CAT's, or just having flattop ambhibs..It compromises on payload and range in support of STOVL performance. If you do not require that compromise you (STOVL performance) you do not have to live with the reduced range and payload (2 x 1000 pound bombs + 2 x Aim-120 vs 2x 2000 lb bombs + 2 x Aim-120 for the A and C).

In the end it hardly matters which aircraft you choose since Naval aircraft don't last that long...You'll have a completely different air-wing by the time the carrier retires off so you can build it over time. You missed one very important player - AMCA-N


EDIT: Saw the AMCA portion..Its the absolute right way to go..You need to have the AMCA-N planned from the start to replace the Mig-29K's as they retire.

[NRao]

A take on Indo-US naval carrier design/dev. cooperation. One point to be made from the start is the cost of a N-powered EMALS carrier of 65,000t. It is going to be very,very,expensive.Does the GOI/IN have the money for such an expensive carrier with other "mouths to feed" in the IN alone?

I would think it would be expensive.

However, the Indian need to project further out should - IMHO - compensate for the "cost".

The "cost" itself will also be influenced by the US offer to help.

BTW, the news is that some IN top brass, within the past few weeks, visited the USS Carl Vinson, anchored off of Kochi. Where a US Adm gave a presentation.

[Philip]

Tx.One is looking holistically at the IN's needs short,med and long term. In the short term,we already have two carriers,a new replacement for the Viraat/Hermes before 2020 and a plan to build 4 amphibs.If we tweak the amphib design,we will have at least 3 more air-capable flat tops in the medium term,IAC std or equiv.,adequate for our short-med term needs, operating the existing naval carrier aircraft (29Ks and NLCA) as well as the F-35B if affordable and offered. A sqd. of supersonic maritime Backfires (a few sqds available but need upgrading.Russia is also studying a plan to resume manufacturing Blackjacks. We won't be offered the Pak-DA and should develop our own stealth bomber) would be able to sanitise the IOR along with the remaining Tu-142s in service in the anti-shipping/carrier role. They could also carry a part of our strat arsenal if and when reqd.From 2025 onwards,we will require a couple of larger N-powered carriers,at least 65,000t.Construction for the first should start sometime after 2020,after all amphib vessels have been launched/commissioned.

The sub fleet however is in crisis.The Kilos ,even upgraded ones are around 20-30 years old.The U-209s are in the same state of affairs,also of '80s vintage with reports saying that only two are worth major upgrades...to fire sub-launched Harpoons,something that Paki subs have been able to do for two decades! The Scorpenes are just arriving,the first to be commissioned only next year. Like the Hawk trainers,we will be perhaps the last nation to operate Scorpenes from the looks of it. Malaysia got its first Scorpene in 2009 (!),where there were diving problems experienced with the first one.India will thus get its first Scorpene 7 years later than Malayasia and as the first for Chile was commissioned in 2005,10 years ago,our first will arrive 11 years later!

The only capable subs are the approx. 6 upgraded Klub-capable Kilos and the Chakra,Akula-2 on lease.With 2 more upgraded U-boats,this makes 9,of which the only new sub is the Chakra! 6 "new" Scorpenes (of which only 2 will have AIP) will arrive hopefully within the next 5 years,still leaving a yawning gap as around 3 Kilos and 2 U-boats will have to be pensioned off by 2020. Unless a few more Akulas,not just the second one under consideration,are acquired,the IN's sub fleet will be under severe strain,as the PN acquires its new Chinese AIP subs,the first to arrive anytime within the next 3-4 years. The IN should've taken up the offer of a swift transfer of 2 Amur class subs, and built another 6 in India as Kilo replacements. Given the speed of Russian sub construction-looking at the Viet Kilo orders,we could've acquire/built at home at least4-6 boats in a pvt. yard. The P-75I programme will now meander along the usual maze of evaluation and red tape in the MOD before a suitable design is selected,and even if the decision is made in 2016/17,the first will only arrive 2020 onwards if built in India.By then,the PN would've acquired all their 6-8 new Chinese AIP SSKs,plus 4 AIP Agosta 90Bs ,will have a conventional sub inventory (other than the SSBNs and a few Akulas ),almost equal to that of India!

We have to catch up both in numbers and capability.Why in the last report that only locally built ships and subs would be ordered in the future,N-subs were left out. A parallel line for India built SSNs should start asap (design yet to be arrived at),at least by early 2017 the latest,and the number of Akulas on lease/bought outright extended to at least 4.These N-subs will be our chief counter to the PLAN's fleet of both conventional AIP and N-subs which will only increase their operations in the IOR with each year.

[NRao]

I have no clue about the ships/techs. But, what I do know is that the IN better have plans to dominate in the IOR (Gulf of Oman, Gulf of Aden, Cape of Good Hope, Ozland, to Malacca Straits) and then have a very good presence in SCS and in the very near future beyond - all the way to Vladivostok.

India needs to challenge and win within IOR and challenge along the Chinese coast.

For that I would expect (no expert) that India needs a larger aircraft carrier with formidable assets on board. The ones IN has or is planning are insufficient IMHO. At the very least a cat is necessary. At the other extreme I would think would be a nuclear powered, EMAL anchored (4 of them), with a complement of at least 75 assets. Two such ships. And other accompanying assets. Based on the current funds, "Expensive" would be an understatement.

[Singha]

imo the south and east china seas poses its own peculiar challenges being only 100m in depth.
cheen is trying to ringfence it with occupied islands and coral reefs.
going in there would put everything in range of the PLAAF and PLANAF.

the USN strategy of keeping surface and sub assets east of the philipines and indonesia, to monitor the channels between the islands starting from japan down to malacca from deep water sounds more workable.

the range of cruise missiles means even weapons fired from there will reach the cheen coast.

LO air platforms would no doubt move deeper in to take shots at targets farther inland.

[arshyam]

A simple pooch: considering IN's evaluating new techs like EMALS and nuke propulsion for the next carrier (and failing which, at least a steam cat), and may need tie ups/ToT with the US, it looks like this carrier will materialize only after 2025 (probably too optimistic?). Then we have the usual US inspired shenanigans like end use, etc. but that's a separate conv.

My question is, why not ask CSL to start working on a INS Vikrant follow on in the meantime? Their hull plant is probably free now, and since the plans and dimensions of this follow-on will be the same as the Vikrant, the work can proceed quickly and we can see the new carrier rolling out by 2022 at the latest (2015 start work, 4 years to launch, 3 years to commission, going by the Vikrant's timeline). It may even be faster this time around since we don't have delays on warship steel like the Vikant faced.

Such a plan will realize the long held dream of operating 3 carriers - 2 in operations 1 in refit - soon after retirement of the very-long-in-the-tooth Viraat. The best part is, 2 of these carriers will be home designed and built, so better suited to our conditions. Another advantage is the STOBAR config we have operationalised in the Vikramaditya will be carried over through the Vikrant, which means less time to operationalise the new carrier. The air wing can be the LCA-Navy with a few MiG-29Ks which are STOBAR compliant and operational anyway, so less time on getting them on board too.

A word on the ships to accompany this carrier. The carrier needs a task force of destroyers, frigates, suppliers, etc. I understand that. But we need to build them for the Vishal anyway. Since the Vishal is a decade away, some of the ships we are continuing to build (P-15A, P-15B, P-17A, etc.) will be available by the 2022 timeframe, so they can deploy together. As the Vishal comes online, a P-15C (?) or the next follow on classes will need to be built as a) the IN is expanding anyway and b) will need to replace the Rajput class destroyers by then. So the point is, this new carrier will not steal any resources allotted for Vishal, rather use them optimally upon commissioning.

Another reason for considering this would be China's plans. The Liaoning is only a training ship, but based on what they learn, we can rest assured they will turn out a few carriers in quick succession and will soon be deploying to SCS and the IOR, at least to show their flag. At that time, instead of dhoti shibbering, which our media will definitely do , if we have our 3-carrier force, we could deploy a task force to the SCS (?) and ECS for 'exercises' with Vietnam, Phillipines, Korea and Japan, Australia, etc., and still have enough firepower left on the homefront. That would sort of counter any moves by the PLAN.

This is not to say stop work on the n-powered+EMALS Vishal. In the long term, IN wants to have larger carriers with more specialised air assets, and they are evolving their strategy around that. They can continue working on that to eventually get to a 5 carrier force (3 in ops, 2 in refit) that can dominate the IOR and beyond as needed.

What do folks think?

[NRao]

imo the south and east china seas poses its own peculiar challenges being only 100m in depth.
cheen is trying to ringfence it with occupied islands and coral reefs.
going in there would put everything in range of the PLAAF and PLANAF.

the USN strategy of keeping surface and sub assets east of the philipines and indonesia, to monitor the channels between the islands starting from japan down to malacca from deep water sounds more workable.

the range of cruise missiles means even weapons fired from there will reach the cheen coast.

LO air platforms would no doubt move deeper in to take shots at targets farther inland.

The issue is a commercial related one, not a military related one.

Can commercial ships - from any nation - be able to use the SCS or are they going to be subject to claims of Chinese territorial waters.

The "projection" - for IN - is in terms of ensuring Indian commerce from not being harassed (in any shape of form) (by the Chinese specifically) in and around China and specifically in the contested SCS.

So, it is first of all a deterrence.

Second of all, push comes to shove, then and only then will the IN be needed to push her weight around there.

My point is that the current (planned included) IN aircraft carriers accomplish nothing WRT the above.

[NRao]

why not ask CSL to start working on a INS Vikrant follow on in the meantime

IMHO, reading in-between the lines, I feel that discussion has already started.

[member_29004]

A very senior naval officer recently told me, " I wish the Indian public and Indian media got out of this Russian love, Russians have such an enviable position in Indian psyche that they get away with anything, and they really do. All the deals with Russians have kickbacks, every single one of them, and all of them marked atleast 300% of their real price, worse none of them work as advertised" especially in spares and maintenance. I cant believe people like Philip or MKB, because of their blind hatred for a certain people are ready to sell India this way

[sooraj]

Naval Air Arm Power Projection

[youtube]/watch?v=ZU2Fi4tnL9k&feature=player_embedded[/youtube]