The IN and the USN have a huge difference in terms of what it expects from aircraft carriers and how it will have to maneuver within its near abroad and AOR and beyond in the future. So what the IN is seeking to do from its carriers is best understood through the lens of what the IN expects from its carriers rather than what the USN is doing or plans to do in the future. So it shouldn't be the case that " If we can't sail into the SCS like the USN may be then we don't need an AC". The IN is the SME here. It no doubt has vast abilities to do the sort of academic and wargaming required to formulate doctrine and develop concepts of operations for different contingencies so unless you (I don't) have insight into that process, it is going to be difficult to evaluate, with a degree of accuracy, whether what the IN wants is feasible (technically) and advantageous in terms of meeting the maritime sea control, defense, and force projection needs of the nation over the next 3-4 decades. You simply can't apply the formula that since China is preparing to defeat the USN then that is the standard that all of INs measures must be held by.Cain Marko wrote:We are discussing this in the context of the IN - there is little doubt that PLAN have more than enough infra and assets to manage a lone Indian CBG (65k ton or not) in their neighborhood. The article earlier in the thread points to the fact that Chinese capability keeps on increasing - whether it is good enough to tackle the might of USN is questionable
Starting with 65K, 45K, 10K is not a good approach. These are "derived" numbers based on capabilities that you seek. Both qualitative and quantitative capability. You don't start off with a number, but end up with one. So instead of looking at displacement and working backwards to see whether it is in the IN's interest to ask for Carrier X or Y, it is better to invest time in understanding what the IN wants the carrier to be capable of doing. Again both quantitatively (air wing composition, diversity etc) and qualitatively (how much do you want to sustain at sea, how do you support the future fleet with the AC, how many underway days must you be capable of supporting ops for etc etc etc). All these factors then work themselves into ship design and you end up at a displacement. So while physically, you may not be able to see any or much difference in a 40K carrier and a 60K ton carrier, the additional size and displacement isn't there just for giggles. So best to see what's leading the requirements towards an increase in size, displacement and capability. Is there an operational need. Has this need been vetted with a rigorous assessment scrub and some wargaming or is it just in there for fun. What is that additional capability buying you? Survivability? More performance/lethality/firepower? More ability to sustain certian missions for longer and farther out?. These all all the metrics that you start with and the IN no doubt would be having those internal analysis as it ended to a set of decisions for IAC-1 (why was it not 20K ton?) and for any future carriers.Cain Marko wrote: One just questions its usefulness for the IN - if the main purpose is sea control, managing the IOR and TSP, and flag waving - what is the need for a 65k CV?
You see this approach applied in prior generation of aircraft carriers and even the current crop. The French wanted the persistence and qualitative flexibility of the US CVN's and the CdG does provide them that, minus the scale and quantitative capability. The Brits wanted/valued the ability to house and sustain a large air-wing for duration and were willing to shed the requirement for speed, persistence (conventional) and air-wing diversity. They ended up with a larger carrier (to sustain up to 3 dozen 5GFA for some duration given magazine and other needs) but traded away the ability to get things like E-2, and larger aircraft onboard. So its a matter of capability which influences vessel design and air-wing compsition which all ultimately influences displacement.