The ongoing India-China standoff yet again points to Intelligence lapses amid reports that the Chinese got winter warfare training from Canadian forces
Rebel News, a Canadian far right news network, has obtained 34 pages of documents called ‘China Files’ establishing that Canada has been training the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in cold-weather warfare at its military institution in Kingston, bases in Ontario and at the Canadian Forces College, Toronto. Further, it sent to China flag-rank Canadian officers to teach PLA officers tactics and techniques in high-altitude fighting. Nearly 200 Canadian soldiers participated in the October 2019 World Military Games at Wuhan and Canadian sailors and naval ships celebrated the PLA Navy’s 70th Raising Day at Qindhao. Defence and security relations between the countries were particularly active during 2018-19 despite the Chinese taking two Canadian civilians hostage. It seems that the Canadian Government under Premier Justin Trudeau was keen to maintain warm relations and not to displease the Chinese overlooking objections raised by the Trump Administration over unintended consequences of transfer of knowledge and information to the Chinese though Canada’s Five Eyes partners were not perturbed.
The news network obtained redacted documents, some classified secret and for Canadian eyes only, 19 months after it sought them on a Freedom of Information request but as the documents were not properly redacted, they were legible. When there was resistance to implementing the exchange programmes — the Chief of Defence Staff put on hold one joint section-level exercise in winter warfare in Canada — orders were given that no training was to be suspended without consulting the Chief of Privy Council. These documents, made public last week, clearly tell India that the Chinese had been preparing for high-altitude warfare since 2018-19 — especially in the winter of 2019 — and have received training, expertise and equipment from Canadian Defence Forces during bilateral military exchanges in China and Canada. The Trudeau Government’s record of sensitivity towards India’s security concerns has at best been lax, given that its Defence Minister and Leader of the Opposition are both Khalistani sympathisers.
These revelations fit in neatly with the US-China Economic, Security Review Commission report of December 1 which describes the eight-month-long India-China standoff along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) as the most severe border
crisis in decades and accuses China of planning the Galwan clash with the blessings of Defence Minister Gen Weng Fei. Two weeks before the clash, Global Times warned that India would suffer a devastating blow if it got involved in the US-China rivalry. The report notes that while the “Chinese Government might deem its Ladakh venture to acquire territory a success, it failed to dissuade India from building infrastructure or aligning with the US, where results have been counterproductive”. The Indian Government, though, has denied both loss of any territory or alignment with the US. Although no clinching evidence was presented in the report, tell-tale signs were there that China was working to a premeditated grand design of forcibly altering the LAC in Ladakh for which preparations had started in mid-2019, ifnot earlier, as the ‘China Files’ indicate. These predate the Mahabalipuram/Chennai summit and are akin to Prime Minister AB Vajpayee’s historic Lahore visit coinciding with Gen Musharraf’s planning of Kargil.
Lies and deceit are ingrained in the Chinese Communist Party and PLA’s psyche. Foreign Minister S Jaishankar has said that the Chinese have given India five differing explanations for deploying large forces along the LAC. In its latest response to Jaishankar speaking at a virtual session with Sydney-based Lowy Institute where he blamed China for the standoff and breakdown in relations, Beijing Foreign Office repeated its standard response: “The merits of the situation are very clear. India is totally responsible for the situation.” The standoff has hit an impasse with no prospect of any thaw this winter; the Chinese and Indian tanks are just 20 metres apart near Kailash range. The Chinese cancelled the joint release of a stamp on the 70th anniversary of bilateral relations. The date for the ninth military dialogue has not been communicated by Beijing and while channels of communication remain in suspended animation, both sides are talking at each other.
Russia, which enjoys the best of relations with both India and China, has entered the fray not in helping to break the logjam but adding fuel to the fire by accusing the
West of “anti-China games”. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov set the cat among the pigeons by saying that the western powers were promoting Indo-Pacific Strategy and Quadrilateral Security Dialogue to engage India in anti-China games and also trying to undermine Russia’s partnership with India. His remarks were directed at the US which has been threatening India with sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) for the purchase of $5.4 billion S400 air defence system from Russia. This is a direct challenge to India’s strategic autonomy and one of the sticking points in the India-US Defence Partnership on which the Trump Administration remained discreetly silent.
Although India is still sitting on the fence in deference to China, it has indicated to Beijing both in words and deeds the options available to it for crossing the Rubicon. US Democratic lawmaker Mark Warner, speaking last week at the Hindustan Times Leadership Summit, said: “India should join a ‘Coalition of the Willing’ with the US and other democracies to confront China’s model of State-sponsored authoritarian capitalism.” Just as Trudeau wants to be nice to China, India does not wish to offend Beijing as it cannot independently deter Chinese coercion on the Himalayan frontiers due to conspicuous power asymmetry.
Jaishankar’s continuing reliance on diplomacy stems from ground reality and realpolitik. When asked by a journalist about India’s reaction to Chinese intrusions being diplomatic rather than a pushback, he rebutted that “there has been an enormous military response in our force deployment”, deflecting the initial omissions of any counteractions following delayed detection of intrusions. The Government is making a virtue of necessity in its counter-deployment. In the same interview, he said the standoff could go the Sumdorong Chu way (1986) which took nine years to resolve. But then while the geopolitical context and limited scale of deployment were vastly different, India was tactically in a commanding position having surrounded the PLA intrusion at Wangdung which was beyond the Indian limit of patrolling. Still Wangdung was an Intelligence lapse!
The Intelligence and operational failures on the LAC this year are compounded by the Rebel News revelations of the Chinese getting winter warfare training from the Canadian armed forces in 2018-19. In a similar situation in 1984, India got a tip-off that Pakistan was buying snow clothing in Europe and pre-emptively occupied Siachen. The last GOC Ladakh Sub-Area, Maj Gen Yash Mor who was there at the time of intrusions, lamented this week about “our repeated failures to read Intelligence”.
China Military Watch - Sept' 2016
Re: China Military Watch - Sept' 2016
Repeated failures
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Re: China Military Watch - Sept' 2016
Great watch
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Re: China Military Watch - Sept' 2016
Russian and Chinese bombers fly joint patrol over Pacific-abc News(so a pinch of Tata salt)
https://abcnews.go.com/International/wi ... c-74859039
https://abcnews.go.com/International/wi ... c-74859039
The Russian Defense Ministry said in a statement that the joint mission was intended to “develop and deepen the comprehensive Russia-China partnership, further increase the level of cooperation between the two militaries, expand their ability for joint action and strengthen strategic stability.”
It follows Russian President Vladimir Putin's statement in October that the idea of a future Russia-China military alliance can’t be ruled out
Putin also noted in October that Russia has been sharing highly sensitive military technologies with China that helped significantly bolster its defense capability.
Re: China Military Watch - Sept' 2016
https://twitter.com/CovertShores/status ... 24900?s=20 ---> Russia Aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov and the Chinese Navy’s new carrier Shandong.
https://twitter.com/Firezstarter1/statu ... 84352?s=20 ---> When the Chinese copy, they copy everything.
![Image](https://pbs.twimg.com/media/Ep3WiGHWMAAKlM5?format=jpg&name=large)
![Image](https://pbs.twimg.com/media/Ep3WiBfXYAUs3nK?format=jpg&name=large)
https://twitter.com/Firezstarter1/statu ... 84352?s=20 ---> When the Chinese copy, they copy everything.
Re: China Military Watch - Sept' 2016
^^^ They messed up on the color though.
Re: China Military Watch - Sept' 2016
The Chinese are infallible
They make no mistakes.
![Smile :)](./images/smilies/smile.gif)
Re: China Military Watch - Sept' 2016
^^^ So it seems the Shandong carrier is at the chini resort island of Hainan. A type 075 LHD was spotted down there too. Something's up ...
https://mobile.twitter.com/RupprechtDei ... 8334218240
https://mobile.twitter.com/RupprechtDei ... 8334218240
@Rupprecht_A
@RupprechtDeino
The PLAN "Shandong" arrived at Hainan ...
@Rupprecht_A
@RupprechtDeino
Upps Face with open mouth... can anyone see a PLN Type 075 LHD?
![]()
Re: China Military Watch - Sept' 2016
How accurate is this?
Chinese military command structure.
Re: China Military Watch - Sept' 2016
Remember the surprise winter counter attack by the Nazis in 1944,the Ardennes offensive which came to be known as the " Battle of the Bulge." We are somewhat in a similar situ,a stalemate on the LAC but with at least 50K + PLA troops at various locations from Ladakh to Ar.Pradesh.
What must be taken v.seriously as a possible precursor to a surprise Chin offensive is the appointment of a new Chin
Gen. Zhang Xudong as CO of its western theatre, replacing Gen.Zhao Zhongqi.
While this may look like a rap on the knuckles for Gen.Zhao,he has done his bit while at the helm, incrementally moving the LAC over time, and apparently gaining some iniative at Pangong Tso,Galwan notwithstanding, the arrival of Xudong indicates a
shift in gear of the PLA to prepare for an offensive, which may come as a rude surpriseto us ,a winter attack a la the Nazis.
What is embolding the fuhrer XI is the current situ in the country, Delhi surrounded by lakhs of farmers, and elections in a few crucial non-BJP states where the party's bigwigs are on the campaign trail. We have yet to plug gaps in the critical reqs. of the forces to fight a long campaign whereas the Chins have oodles of ammo and eqpt.,plus the fellow traveller Pak, adding whatever nuisance value it can to divide our military resources.
The govt. should immediately embark upon critical acquisitions as if war has already broken out.I'm afraid the FM Jaishankar is being led on a diplomatic Beijing duck chase by the Chins yet again. Diplomacy will produce bugger all,ziltch,.Only military measures will save the day. Is our leadership aware of the same?
What must be taken v.seriously as a possible precursor to a surprise Chin offensive is the appointment of a new Chin
Gen. Zhang Xudong as CO of its western theatre, replacing Gen.Zhao Zhongqi.
While this may look like a rap on the knuckles for Gen.Zhao,he has done his bit while at the helm, incrementally moving the LAC over time, and apparently gaining some iniative at Pangong Tso,Galwan notwithstanding, the arrival of Xudong indicates a
shift in gear of the PLA to prepare for an offensive, which may come as a rude surpriseto us ,a winter attack a la the Nazis.
What is embolding the fuhrer XI is the current situ in the country, Delhi surrounded by lakhs of farmers, and elections in a few crucial non-BJP states where the party's bigwigs are on the campaign trail. We have yet to plug gaps in the critical reqs. of the forces to fight a long campaign whereas the Chins have oodles of ammo and eqpt.,plus the fellow traveller Pak, adding whatever nuisance value it can to divide our military resources.
The govt. should immediately embark upon critical acquisitions as if war has already broken out.I'm afraid the FM Jaishankar is being led on a diplomatic Beijing duck chase by the Chins yet again. Diplomacy will produce bugger all,ziltch,.Only military measures will save the day. Is our leadership aware of the same?
Re: China Military Watch - Sept' 2016
Chengdu J-20 Overhyped or Reality – A Comprehensive Story
https://airpowerasia.com/2020/08/15/che ... ive-story/
https://airpowerasia.com/2020/08/15/che ... ive-story/
Re: China Military Watch - Sept' 2016
1) I believe the PLAN will lose heavily in any kinetics in the IOR; first it means fighting the USN's 7th and then 6th Fleets and then against the IN and IAF with overwhelming local superiority; based on their record, war will not happen if it were left to them; india though can make it a kinetic by starting one but knowing us, that too will never come to pass,Rakesh wrote: But one can make an educated guess and state that the Chinese are not close to what the US Navy has. Would you agree with that assessment?
...
But since I claimed that the Chinese will have mastered the systems that the US Navy also has, in 10 years, where would that leave the Indian Navy in 2031? What will happen to the Indian Navy when a PLAN CATOBAR-equipped CBG (or multiple CBGs) enter the Indian Ocean. In 10 years, we will have no CATOBAR-equipped CBG. How does the Indian Navy expect to counter it? Or will the Indian Navy lose?
2) if they come during peace time and they will, the IN will lose (prestige, jurisdiction over remote blue water commons and allegiance of IOR states) until we get a CATOBAR.
That is why I think the IN is pushing so hard for this CATOBAR. They know that competition between major powers happens during peacetime 99.96%.
But Admiral saar, you asked that I make an educated guess on spite of the Damocles Sword. So I will! Mind you none of this is predicated on matching the US. Just something "usuable" on a CATOBAR.
1) there is a CATOBAR being built in Shanghai, the timeline is they will probably finish up with the build in 2021 and fit out in 2022. Maybe trials in 2023. Commisioning in 2024. This is based on the Type 002 so things can be extended by a half dozen years for full operations who knows? But it's something we will see in this decade,
https://mobile.twitter.com/HenriKenhman ... 3825045506
2) the KJ-600 has flown that is all we know.
https://mobile.twitter.com/Cyberspec1/s ... 2847854594
This thing had been in the works for years, the first Y-7 demonstrator was first seen around 2011 if not earlier:
https://mobile.twitter.com/BENTON001/st ... 3342396416
It could fail miserably despite the decade of work already done or like the J-15 they could just plug away at it year after year until it works well enough (see below):
So timeline is anywhere from an extra 5 to 10 years. But who knows?
3) the J-15 has been flying since 2012 and they have been built in repeated batches (latest is 3rd batch, bort number 61):
https://mobile.twitter.com/RupprechtDei ... 9016186881
and they are building new variants like an EW variant:
https://mobile.twitter.com/RupprechtDei ... 7780741120
This thing had a horrible beginning but it hadn't stopped the chini navy from using it and building more. With the CATOBAR, some of its limitations go away. 5 to 10 years
4. Helos: it is not just the Z-9 vs the Romeo, sir:
The Z-9 is mainly for SAR -- they are already running AEW, SAR and Utility Z-8/18s:
![Image](https://i.ibb.co/hCFbDGk/62-D532-E2-417-A-4-B11-B6-D4-BCCD9-A3-A2345.jpg)
The Z-20 coming with AEW and ASW spotted so far:
![Image](https://i.ibb.co/D1QVSx6/239-BD714-945-E-45-C0-B3-D4-FA0-F54-B6-F460.jpg)
![Image](https://i.ibb.co/q0TsDRX/933-A9274-56-B3-4-EC2-84-E0-43-BC7507284-C.png)
So I would say 5 to 10 years here as well.
Guesstimate is 10 years for them to have a viable CATOBAR which doesn't mean they will match the US.
Re: China Military Watch - Sept' 2016
@ Admiral
Latest on their carrier AEW.
https://mobile.twitter.com/RupprechtDei ... 9379919873
Latest on their carrier AEW.
https://mobile.twitter.com/RupprechtDei ... 9379919873
@Rupprecht_A
@RupprechtDeino
And another major news Face with open mouth... the first clear images - ok, at least parts of it - of the XAC KJ-600 carrierborne AEW.
And the most important piece is this...
@Rupprecht_A
@RupprechtDeino
Replying to
@RupprechtDeino
A first rough comparison to a USN E-2C ...
![]()
Last edited by chola on 01 Jan 2021 17:30, edited 2 times in total.
Re: China Military Watch - Sept' 2016
@Admiral
EMALS related. They've been testing catapults both EM and steam for years with a J-15T cat-capable variant.
![Image](https://i.ibb.co/S3hTsb4/89927-CA4-92-C3-4053-B751-F32-DD57-BFB44.webp)
![Image](https://i.ibb.co/y4G769S/0-B43-F7-A8-083-B-4-F99-85-EE-9-E81-AD1970-F5.webp)
![Image](https://i.ibb.co/vY0PhLr/A1-C50363-AD6-F-4-A68-BA94-0796-BD911016.webp)
None of this stuff suddenly appeared yesterday. The CATOBAR with the EM catapult, fixed-wing AEW, cat-capable J-15T and naval helos had been followed by watchers for a very long time. Because of this, don't think it would take them very long to have things at least running after the CATOBAR's launch. Maybe a decade for everything together into something viable -- again won't match the US.
EMALS related. They've been testing catapults both EM and steam for years with a J-15T cat-capable variant.
https://mobile.twitter.com/Cengiz_Karab ... 8229552128dafeng cao
@dafengcao
Xingcheng J-15T EMALS test.
![]()
cengiz karabulut
@Cengiz_Karablut
Huangdicun Naval Airbase, China
High resolution image : https
![Image](https://i.ibb.co/S3hTsb4/89927-CA4-92-C3-4053-B751-F32-DD57-BFB44.webp)
![Image](https://i.ibb.co/y4G769S/0-B43-F7-A8-083-B-4-F99-85-EE-9-E81-AD1970-F5.webp)
![Image](https://i.ibb.co/vY0PhLr/A1-C50363-AD6-F-4-A68-BA94-0796-BD911016.webp)
None of this stuff suddenly appeared yesterday. The CATOBAR with the EM catapult, fixed-wing AEW, cat-capable J-15T and naval helos had been followed by watchers for a very long time. Because of this, don't think it would take them very long to have things at least running after the CATOBAR's launch. Maybe a decade for everything together into something viable -- again won't match the US.
Re: China Military Watch - Sept' 2016
China monitoring IOR by uncrewed underwater vehicles (UUV) sea wing gliders
https://www.india.com/news/world/amid-l ... t-4301661/
https://www.india.com/news/world/amid-l ... t-4301661/
Re: China Military Watch - Sept' 2016
https://thediplomat.com/2020/12/hints-o ... the-2020s/
Hints of Chinese Naval Procurement Plans in the 2020s
All military forces have a desired force requirement and a desired “critical mass” to aspire toward. What does the 14th five-year plan tell us about China’s?
By Rick Joe, December 25, 2020
This year has seen multiple major navies in the world establish their future long term procurement strategies, ranging from the U.S. Navy’s 500-ship plan for its fleet by the year 2045, to the U.K.’s plans for the Royal Navy post-2030, and the Indian Navy’s recent reinforcement for its aspirations for a third aircraft carrier. Indeed, ambitions for expansion appear to be in the cards worldwide for many major navies, both for the near future, and in the longer term beyond 2030 as well, despite the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Thus it is somewhat appropriate that in recent weeks rumors emerged surrounding some of the naval procurement goals set as part of China’s recently concluded Fifth Plenum in late October surrounding the 14th Five-Year Plan (to be abbreviated hereafter as 14-FYP), that produces goals and strategy for the entire nation across the next five years from 2021 to 2025. This article will review the details of those rumors (as well as omitted information), in context of some recent predictions written by myself on the subject of future PLA Navy (PLAN) procurement.
An Impending Slowdown?
However, before reviewing the recent 14-FYP naval rumors, it is appropriate to address some recent research and articles revolving around the same topic of future PLAN procurement. One article published by the U.S. Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute in November, thoroughly researched and produced by Capt. Chris Carlson (retired) of the U.S. Navy, examines what the trajectory of future PLAN procurement might look like from a perspective of operational, maintenance and overhaul costs in context of the overall Chinese economic, political, and industrial context going into the future. (This author also acknowledges and is flattered to have a past article referenced as an illustrative barometer in the paper. To address one of Carlson’s questions – 056 corvettes and older 051 and 052 family destroyers are included in that force makeup, but are included as “other ships to note” rather than the list of major battle force vessels that were chosen for being modern and blue water capable.)
Carlson rightly states that future force projection requires more than merely surveying shipyard capacity and drawing a straight line. Human labor demands, as well as future operational and maintenance demands, and accurate assessment of its costs could all serve as useful metrics for gauging production capacity. The projected growing costs of labor and the “slowing Chinese economy,” and cost of maintenance are hypothesized to suggest that the previously suggested future fleet of 2030 might be out of reach and unattainable. The article and its predictions have subsequently been referenced by some other defense journalists as well, suggesting an imminent slowdown in Chinese naval procurement going forwards.
However, it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine anything near accurate assessments of such statistics. Even for something as simple as procurement cost, an estimate for the cost of an 054A was put at $280 million. But a naval insider had in the past stated an 054A costs about 1.5 billion yuan instead, just under $230 million at current exchange rates. (Additionally, 052D was placed at 3.5 billion yuan, and 055 placed at 6 billion yuan – interestingly the latter is about an equivalent proportion of Chinese GDP as a Burke-class destroyer is to the U.S. GDP).
This is not to suggest that assessing industrial and economic trajectories and limitations are unimportant, but it does mean assessments of those input factors need to be accurate and appropriately weighed, especially in context of other assumptions including a nation’s willingness and resolve to commit resources and labor for procurement as well. For a military and industry that is as opaque as China’s, the role of unofficial credible rumors and official statements of intent (such as the goal to build a “world class military” which includes the navy), remain a vital part of gauging the threshold of ambition. Demonstrations of past procurement capacity and existing/new production capacity also remain vital in determining potential for the near future, including assessing the navy’s track record for appropriately upgrading and maintaining ships as a proxy for their respect of maintenance and operational costs.
.....
Gautam
Hints of Chinese Naval Procurement Plans in the 2020s
All military forces have a desired force requirement and a desired “critical mass” to aspire toward. What does the 14th five-year plan tell us about China’s?
By Rick Joe, December 25, 2020
This year has seen multiple major navies in the world establish their future long term procurement strategies, ranging from the U.S. Navy’s 500-ship plan for its fleet by the year 2045, to the U.K.’s plans for the Royal Navy post-2030, and the Indian Navy’s recent reinforcement for its aspirations for a third aircraft carrier. Indeed, ambitions for expansion appear to be in the cards worldwide for many major navies, both for the near future, and in the longer term beyond 2030 as well, despite the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Thus it is somewhat appropriate that in recent weeks rumors emerged surrounding some of the naval procurement goals set as part of China’s recently concluded Fifth Plenum in late October surrounding the 14th Five-Year Plan (to be abbreviated hereafter as 14-FYP), that produces goals and strategy for the entire nation across the next five years from 2021 to 2025. This article will review the details of those rumors (as well as omitted information), in context of some recent predictions written by myself on the subject of future PLA Navy (PLAN) procurement.
An Impending Slowdown?
However, before reviewing the recent 14-FYP naval rumors, it is appropriate to address some recent research and articles revolving around the same topic of future PLAN procurement. One article published by the U.S. Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute in November, thoroughly researched and produced by Capt. Chris Carlson (retired) of the U.S. Navy, examines what the trajectory of future PLAN procurement might look like from a perspective of operational, maintenance and overhaul costs in context of the overall Chinese economic, political, and industrial context going into the future. (This author also acknowledges and is flattered to have a past article referenced as an illustrative barometer in the paper. To address one of Carlson’s questions – 056 corvettes and older 051 and 052 family destroyers are included in that force makeup, but are included as “other ships to note” rather than the list of major battle force vessels that were chosen for being modern and blue water capable.)
Carlson rightly states that future force projection requires more than merely surveying shipyard capacity and drawing a straight line. Human labor demands, as well as future operational and maintenance demands, and accurate assessment of its costs could all serve as useful metrics for gauging production capacity. The projected growing costs of labor and the “slowing Chinese economy,” and cost of maintenance are hypothesized to suggest that the previously suggested future fleet of 2030 might be out of reach and unattainable. The article and its predictions have subsequently been referenced by some other defense journalists as well, suggesting an imminent slowdown in Chinese naval procurement going forwards.
However, it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine anything near accurate assessments of such statistics. Even for something as simple as procurement cost, an estimate for the cost of an 054A was put at $280 million. But a naval insider had in the past stated an 054A costs about 1.5 billion yuan instead, just under $230 million at current exchange rates. (Additionally, 052D was placed at 3.5 billion yuan, and 055 placed at 6 billion yuan – interestingly the latter is about an equivalent proportion of Chinese GDP as a Burke-class destroyer is to the U.S. GDP).
This is not to suggest that assessing industrial and economic trajectories and limitations are unimportant, but it does mean assessments of those input factors need to be accurate and appropriately weighed, especially in context of other assumptions including a nation’s willingness and resolve to commit resources and labor for procurement as well. For a military and industry that is as opaque as China’s, the role of unofficial credible rumors and official statements of intent (such as the goal to build a “world class military” which includes the navy), remain a vital part of gauging the threshold of ambition. Demonstrations of past procurement capacity and existing/new production capacity also remain vital in determining potential for the near future, including assessing the navy’s track record for appropriately upgrading and maintaining ships as a proxy for their respect of maintenance and operational costs.
.....
Gautam
Re: China Military Watch - Sept' 2016
The only reason the US did not build a conventionally powered EMA LS is that they dont operate conventionally powered aircraft carrier., the EMALS seems doable with other sources., there were some reports of DRDO testing some variant of this on land.chola wrote:@Admiral
EMALS related. They've been testing catapults both EM and steam for years with a J-15T cat-capable variant.
dafeng cao
@dafengcao
Xingcheng J-15T EMALS test
https://mobile.twitter.com/Cengiz_Karab ... 8229552128
None of this stuff suddenly appeared yesterday. The CATOBAR with the EM catapult, fixed-wing AEW, cat-capable J-15T and naval helos had been followed by watchers for a very long time. Because of this, don't think it would take them very long to have things at least running after the CATOBAR's launch. Maybe a decade for everything together into something viable -- again won't match the US.
Re: China Military Watch - Sept' 2016
Unless the Chinese have a technological lead over the US, or have been investing far more money or far longer in this area, getting EMALS fully fleshed out and developed then fielded with high operational availability is going to be a very very long road. For reference, the first non-production representative EMALS was installed at the shore based test site in the US in 2009 or thereabouts and it will be a good 13-14 years post that before the first carrier equipped with an EMALS unit actually goes on a long duration operational deployment. And they weren't really also trying to invent new aircraft types alongside this (the F-35 being one exception but it won't be qualified for the CVN-78 until a couple of years into the ships deployment). The E-2, and most other aircraft that would be flying and integrating with EMALS were themselves pretty mature.
The technology gestation period itself was decades in the case of the US. Even before they put a prototype system on land and launched the first aircraft in 2010. So instead of chasing tweets and grainy pictures on Chinese social media, and using that dubious information for wild guesses, one is probably going to be better off in looking at what the Chinese have published on these systems as far as academic publications are concerned and what one can make out from them in terms of how they've structured their development and test campaigns for these cutting edge technologies. 99.9% of the so called Chinese experts are nothing more than internet warriors who sift through Chinese social media for pictures and get excited even when the markings on one aircraft are off by 1-degree because that must mean something. It then bounces around their echo chamber and gets picked up and recycled. And then someone throws a wild guess based on other guesstimates (and just compound the errors in estimating) and we end up with "they must be X years away".
The technology gestation period itself was decades in the case of the US. Even before they put a prototype system on land and launched the first aircraft in 2010. So instead of chasing tweets and grainy pictures on Chinese social media, and using that dubious information for wild guesses, one is probably going to be better off in looking at what the Chinese have published on these systems as far as academic publications are concerned and what one can make out from them in terms of how they've structured their development and test campaigns for these cutting edge technologies. 99.9% of the so called Chinese experts are nothing more than internet warriors who sift through Chinese social media for pictures and get excited even when the markings on one aircraft are off by 1-degree because that must mean something. It then bounces around their echo chamber and gets picked up and recycled. And then someone throws a wild guess based on other guesstimates (and just compound the errors in estimating) and we end up with "they must be X years away".
Re: China Military Watch - Sept' 2016
Chengdu J-20 Overhyped or Reality – A Comprehensive Story
https://airpowerasia.com/2020/08/15/che ... ive-story/
https://airpowerasia.com/2020/08/15/che ... ive-story/
Re: China Military Watch - Sept' 2016
The only ones who take the bolded part of the tweet below is a few on BRF and other like-minded strategic thinkers in the US, who want India to get into a formal alliance with America.
https://twitter.com/TheWolfpackIN/statu ... 01729?s=20 ---> Another month of winter has passed, yet not a single PLA section along LAC has got even a day's worth of food via drone delivery despite CCP media propaganda harping about them. As IAF Chief said yesterday, don't take China's capability claims at face value.
https://twitter.com/TheWolfpackIN/statu ... 01729?s=20 ---> Another month of winter has passed, yet not a single PLA section along LAC has got even a day's worth of food via drone delivery despite CCP media propaganda harping about them. As IAF Chief said yesterday, don't take China's capability claims at face value.
Re: China Military Watch - Sept' 2016
https://twitter.com/AirPowerAsia/status ... 41440?s=20 ---> China's C-919 Airliner. This is what they call home grown.
![Image](https://pbs.twimg.com/media/EqsP9-DVkAA3AqO?format=jpg&name=large)
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Re: China Military Watch - Sept' 2016
Seriously...???Rakesh wrote:...
While I tend to believe that PLA would do something like this, why will they advertize it so openly...???
Re: China Military Watch - Sept' 2016
This nonsense passes for logic in the PLA, because this is a military that has never actually fought a war in recent memory. This is the enemy that we are supposed to dhoti shiver about.
Although this is assuming that the tweet is actually true. But this is possible with the lizard.
Although this is assuming that the tweet is actually true. But this is possible with the lizard.
Re: China Military Watch - Sept' 2016
Why should the PLAN lose against the IN? If they have a CATOBAR, they should have zero losses and the IN should be the exact opposite. How will they lose anything, with the invincibility of their CATOBAR protecting them. Do explain.chola wrote:1) I believe the PLAN will lose heavily in any kinetics in the IOR; first it means fighting the USN's 7th and then 6th Fleets and then against the IN and IAF with overwhelming local superiority; based on their record, war will not happen if it were left to them; india though can make it a kinetic by starting one but knowing us, that too will never come to pass,
How do you suggest the IN enforces the peace in the absence of the IN CATOBAR? Or are we guaranteed to lose said prestige, jurisdiction over remote blue water commons and allegiance of IOR states? And whenever that CATOBAR arrives, how will the IN then magically enforce that peace? By that point, by dhoti-shivering estimates, they may have 4 - 5 CATOBAR aircraft carriers. How will one of our CATOBAR aircraft carriers go against the might of their many CATOBAR aircraft carriers. CATOBARs are invincible after all.chola wrote:2) if they come during peace time and they will, the IN will lose (prestige, jurisdiction over remote blue water commons and allegiance of IOR states) until we get a CATOBAR. That is why I think the IN is pushing so hard for this CATOBAR. They know that competition between major powers happens during peacetime 99.96%.
Since you made the statement, define usable. Like number of fixed wing and rotary aircraft sorties, validation of their EMALS system, reliability of the vessel's machinery onboard, etc. Do not give me vague statements or pictures. Show me actual data.chola wrote:But Admiral saar, you asked that I make an educated guess on spite of the Damocles Sword. So I will! Mind you none of this is predicated on matching the US. Just something "usuable" on a CATOBAR.
I know you are not going to find a single piece of verifiable data, so do not even bother. But in the absence of such, please define your term ---> something usable. I am interested to know how you came up with this term.
I think you are stretching the time frame. It should be as follows;chola wrote:1) there is a CATOBAR being built in Shanghai, the timeline is they will probably finish up with the build in 2021 and fit out in 2022. Maybe trials in 2023. Commissioning in 2024. This is based on the Type 002 so things can be extended by a half dozen years for full operations who knows? But it's something we will see in this decade,
https://mobile.twitter.com/HenriKenhman ... 3825045506
* Build completion by tomorrow
* Fitting Out by the end of the next day
* Trials the day after and commissioning on Sunday.
How else Saar are you going to make us dhoti shiver?
Before you post such gems in the future, please look up the length of time that EMALS development took for General Atomics. How does that tie in with your time frame above? From STOBAR, they are jumping straight to EMALS. They have never operated a catapult system prior to this. And based on the time frame above, that system will be functional by 2024?
![Laughing :lol:](./images/smilies/icon_lol.gif)
Am I to assume that this aircraft will give their CATOBAR invincibility from aerial attack? Because that is what the E-2D does - when tied in to a host of other systems - for the USN Carrier Battle Groups. Northrop Grumman has built over 300 E-2 variants over the course of 60 years. They have perfected those systems down to a fine art. The manufacturer knows what the aircraft is capable of and is battle proven. Also sold to many nations around the world. The E-2D is the benchmark. What reliable figures can you provide that the KJ-600 will be able to match this performance and reliability?chola wrote:2) the KJ-600 has flown that is all we know.
https://mobile.twitter.com/Cyberspec1/s ... 2847854594
In the absence of an effective AEW&C aircraft, a carrier battle group is susceptible to attack. But since this is the PLAN we are talking about, I am sure that it is better than even the E-2D. Their R&D department rivals even that of the US.
When do you expect "....until it works well enough..." to occur?chola wrote:This thing had been in the works for years, the first Y-7 demonstrator was first seen around 2011 if not earlier:
https://mobile.twitter.com/BENTON001/st ... 3342396416
It could fail miserably despite the decade of work already done or like the J-15 they could just plug away at it year after year until it works well enough (see below):
So timeline is anywhere from an extra 5 to 10 years. But who knows?
How did you come to the conclusion that it will take an extra 5 to 10 years? Why not by tomorrow? Because when you say "who knows?" anything is possible correct?
Apart from posting pictures from China military watchers, I am still waiting on reliable data (i.e. sortie rate, MTBF of their turbofans, etc) from you. Please provide that. Not serial numbers and batch numbers.chola wrote:3) the J-15 has been flying since 2012 and they have been built in repeated batches (latest is 3rd batch, bort number 61):
https://mobile.twitter.com/RupprechtDei ... 9016186881
So in 5 to 10 years, the J-15D will be on par with the F-18 Growler? Do you have any data to back that up?chola wrote:and they are building new variants like an EW variant:
https://mobile.twitter.com/RupprechtDei ... 7780741120
This thing had a horrible beginning but it hadn't stopped the chini navy from using it and building more. With the CATOBAR, some of its limitations go away. 5 to 10 years.
Would this helicopter be able to detect any of the Project 75I vessels in contention right now? Or how about the Kalvari Class boats currently in service? If your answer is yes, can you provide any information that proves your point?chola wrote:4. Helos: it is not just the Z-9 vs the Romeo, sir:
The Z-9 is mainly for SAR -- they are already running AEW, SAR and Utility Z-8/18s:
The Z-20 coming with AEW and ASW spotted so far:
So I would say 5 to 10 years here as well.
Who will they be on par with then, if not with the US? It cannot be India, because we will not have a CATOBAR in 5 to 10 years.chola wrote:Guesstimate is 10 years for them to have a viable CATOBAR which doesn't mean they will match the US.
With the Navy of Afghanistan perhaps? (Hint: Afghanistan is a land-locked country).
Re: China Military Watch - Sept' 2016
If it does not match the US - your own claim - then who will it match up against?chola wrote:@Admiral
EMALS related. They've been testing catapults both EM and steam for years with a J-15T cat-capable variant.
None of this stuff suddenly appeared yesterday. The CATOBAR with the EM catapult, fixed-wing AEW, cat-capable J-15T and naval helos had been followed by watchers for a very long time. Because of this, don't think it would take them very long to have things at least running after the CATOBAR's launch. Maybe a decade for everything together into something viable -- again won't match the US.
What is "something viable"? How do you "define" or "quantify" something viable?
Re: China Military Watch - Sept' 2016
But Saar, they do and thus the rest of your post is speculation onlee. Please do not post such logic in here. Allow the fantasy to continue.brar_w wrote:Unless the Chinese have a technological lead over the US...
Re: China Military Watch - Sept' 2016
Rest of world definitions of terms and chin-pak are differentRakesh wrote: What is "something viable"? How do you "define" or "quantify" something viable?
For example:
- Deterrent patrol means “a heated barge tied to the quay for 35 years” but the rest world must shiver at the cheeni muscular nucular triad for 35 years
- fifth gen tech: as per ACM Dhanoa, they are fighter designs that act as as radar reflectors for their more stealthy luneberg lenses.
- EMALS, matter of time before they fix the issue of the fighters ripping out the catapult shoe for some reason. But we must assume they will fling a fully fueled and loaded Y20 COD by next week
All of these things they have been tested for years. Must mean they are as good as khan’s visibly working products.
Re: China Military Watch - Sept' 2016
Saar, I only posted an guesstimate because you asked me to. And I used what I had to the best of my knowledge (which is not much, I agree) and those are mainly the tweets from German and French watchers. If that created dhoti shivering then I shouldn't have posted them. Pardon me.Rakesh wrote:by dhoti-shivering estimates, they may have 4 - 5 CATOBAR aircraft carriers.
...
* Build completion by tomorrow
* Fitting Out by the end of the next day
* Trials the day after and commissioning on Sunday.
How else Saar are you going to make us dhoti shiver?
You are right! I can find no evidence whatsoever that says the Z-9, Z-8, Z-18 or Z-20 can specifically detect the P75I or Kalvari.Would this helicopter be able to detect any of the Project 75I vessels in contention right now? Or how about the Kalvari Class boats currently in service?
With that I'll take leave of this discussion and this thread. I realize my posts here are inadequately researched and do nothing but lead to dhoti shaking -- and I don't want to contribute to any kind of quaking under the lungi unless it is pleasurable
![Smile :)](./images/smilies/smile.gif)
Re: China Military Watch - Sept' 2016
China’s new defence law: A potential Sure threat to global peace.
China is bringing in the new National Defence Law (NDL-2020) to replace the NDL of 1997. The new law is aimed at further consolidation of power in the hands of President Xi. Under the NDL-2020, ‘Xi Jinping’s thought on Military Affairs’ has been included as the foundation for national defence. With this move, Xi would not only be commanding the army through direct orders but also through his ideology as a guiding force, and thus the division between philosophy of CPC and the Army have been sidelined.
Another major objective of the NDL-2020 is to ensure loyalty of military personnel towards the Communist Party of China (CCP). The NDL-2020 chalks out the responsibilities of all party/state/military organizations and individuals on the matters of national defence, and makes them obligatory and legally binding. It mandates all members of the armed forces to abide by the directions of the party even if they are not members of the Party.
The centrality of Xi Jinping, who already holds the posts of Communist Party of China’s (CPC) General Secretary and Chairman of Central Military Commission, besides being the President of People's Republic of China, would be further fortified through the new law. While decisions on declaration of state of war would be taken by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, the power of declaring a state of war rests with the President of the People's Republic of China.
The law makes the definition and scope of national interest more inclusive by expanding it to cover space, electromagnetic spectrum, cyberspace and country's developmental interest, besides the traditional areas of land, air and sea. The aim seemingly is to ensure intervention of Xi-controlled army in the civil, commerce and technical area as well. This would also enable Xi’s administration to easily frame charges of treason and subversion on those who do not fall in line with the CPC’s ideologies or instructions.
The broadened scope of armed forces would thereby be the justification for creation of new forces of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) such as PLA Rocket Force, PLA Strategic Support Force and PLA Joint Logistic Support Force. The goal primarily is to increase China's military strength.
The NDL-2020 establishes a military welfare guarantee system that would be coordinated with development of the national economy. It further emphasizes upon guaranteeing the status of military personnel by incorporating the clause “make military personnel a profession respected by the whole of society”. The military welfare guarantee system makes the military profession more lucrative resulting in better intake of more qualified personnel at the entry level. At the same time, the guaranteed stature of military personnel is meant for forcibly making its citizens to accept the supremacy of armed forces.
Moreover, the law provides for the establishment of a “coordination mechanism” between the State Council and the CCP’s Central Military Commission to discuss important defence matters. This infuses Xi Jinping's favoured concept of ‘military-civil fusion/integration’ in the country's defence law as well as further consolidating his centrality as he would be entitled to directly/indirectly take all the important military decisions.
Experts believe, “ The new NDL specifies that Chinese armed forces could be engaged as per the Chinese laws to protect Chinese citizens, organizations, institutions and facilities abroad. The concept was roped in earlier through the Military Strategy paper released in 2015 and is being fortified under the new NDL. This would be used to justify overseas unilateral military actions undertaken by China. Moreover, it also indicates that China is likely to be more aggressive in its overseas actions on the pretext of national defence and security of its entities abroad, undermining the international laws even when it is participating in international organizations.”
Such unilateral military actions overseas have cost China a pan-global confrontation. The same was even asserted by Chinese Defence Minister Wei Fenghe in his statement that “the changes incorporated in the NDL were ‘urgently needed’ in view of the heightened state of ‘strategic rivalry around the world.”
China's NDL-2020 reinforces primacy of CCP in all dimensions of national defence and security. This new law is in line with China's intermediary military reforms brought in by Xi's administration in the past and enforces PLA’s centrality to the CCP and thereby Xi Jinping himself. It aims to empower Chinese military for a wider domestic and global role.
This presents an almost certain potential threat to global peace as the world might witness intensified military offensives by Chinese armed forces in foreign countries in the coming times.
China is bringing in the new National Defence Law (NDL-2020) to replace the NDL of 1997. The new law is aimed at further consolidation of power in the hands of President Xi. Under the NDL-2020, ‘Xi Jinping’s thought on Military Affairs’ has been included as the foundation for national defence. With this move, Xi would not only be commanding the army through direct orders but also through his ideology as a guiding force, and thus the division between philosophy of CPC and the Army have been sidelined.
Another major objective of the NDL-2020 is to ensure loyalty of military personnel towards the Communist Party of China (CCP). The NDL-2020 chalks out the responsibilities of all party/state/military organizations and individuals on the matters of national defence, and makes them obligatory and legally binding. It mandates all members of the armed forces to abide by the directions of the party even if they are not members of the Party.
The centrality of Xi Jinping, who already holds the posts of Communist Party of China’s (CPC) General Secretary and Chairman of Central Military Commission, besides being the President of People's Republic of China, would be further fortified through the new law. While decisions on declaration of state of war would be taken by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, the power of declaring a state of war rests with the President of the People's Republic of China.
The law makes the definition and scope of national interest more inclusive by expanding it to cover space, electromagnetic spectrum, cyberspace and country's developmental interest, besides the traditional areas of land, air and sea. The aim seemingly is to ensure intervention of Xi-controlled army in the civil, commerce and technical area as well. This would also enable Xi’s administration to easily frame charges of treason and subversion on those who do not fall in line with the CPC’s ideologies or instructions.
The broadened scope of armed forces would thereby be the justification for creation of new forces of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) such as PLA Rocket Force, PLA Strategic Support Force and PLA Joint Logistic Support Force. The goal primarily is to increase China's military strength.
The NDL-2020 establishes a military welfare guarantee system that would be coordinated with development of the national economy. It further emphasizes upon guaranteeing the status of military personnel by incorporating the clause “make military personnel a profession respected by the whole of society”. The military welfare guarantee system makes the military profession more lucrative resulting in better intake of more qualified personnel at the entry level. At the same time, the guaranteed stature of military personnel is meant for forcibly making its citizens to accept the supremacy of armed forces.
Moreover, the law provides for the establishment of a “coordination mechanism” between the State Council and the CCP’s Central Military Commission to discuss important defence matters. This infuses Xi Jinping's favoured concept of ‘military-civil fusion/integration’ in the country's defence law as well as further consolidating his centrality as he would be entitled to directly/indirectly take all the important military decisions.
Experts believe, “ The new NDL specifies that Chinese armed forces could be engaged as per the Chinese laws to protect Chinese citizens, organizations, institutions and facilities abroad. The concept was roped in earlier through the Military Strategy paper released in 2015 and is being fortified under the new NDL. This would be used to justify overseas unilateral military actions undertaken by China. Moreover, it also indicates that China is likely to be more aggressive in its overseas actions on the pretext of national defence and security of its entities abroad, undermining the international laws even when it is participating in international organizations.”
Such unilateral military actions overseas have cost China a pan-global confrontation. The same was even asserted by Chinese Defence Minister Wei Fenghe in his statement that “the changes incorporated in the NDL were ‘urgently needed’ in view of the heightened state of ‘strategic rivalry around the world.”
China's NDL-2020 reinforces primacy of CCP in all dimensions of national defence and security. This new law is in line with China's intermediary military reforms brought in by Xi's administration in the past and enforces PLA’s centrality to the CCP and thereby Xi Jinping himself. It aims to empower Chinese military for a wider domestic and global role.
This presents an almost certain potential threat to global peace as the world might witness intensified military offensives by Chinese armed forces in foreign countries in the coming times.
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- BRF Oldie
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Re: China Military Watch - Sept' 2016
I lack the time these days to make meaningful contributions to the discussion on this forum, so I am relegated to lurking from time to time. That said, I felt compelled to jump in here and add my two cents of support to Chola and the absolute wall of denial (from enlightened members, no less) that he has been trying to pierce on this thread while keeping peace.chola wrote:With that I'll take leave of this discussion and this thread. I realize my posts here are inadequately researched and do nothing but lead to dhoti shaking -- and I don't want to contribute to any kind of quaking under the lungi unless it is pleasurable
It was almost too painful to see the level of responses being leveled against Chola, simply for pointing out that the dragon is not to be taken too lightly. But apparently the solution to the questions posed by Chola is to mock him instead.
Chola: let it be. This thread is supposed to be "China Military Watch". But the decision has been made to make this thread a mockery. Just know that your efforts to list out and summarize the open source data on Chinese production and tech has not gone unnoticed. Perhaps a different location exists for this work. Turns out I can't send a private message: could you email me v i v e k underscore a h u j a 1 2 3 at yahoo dot com?
Last edited by vivek_ahuja on 05 Jan 2021 10:57, edited 1 time in total.
Re: China Military Watch - Sept' 2016
There is a difference between a realistic assessment and flights of fantasy, which is what he is doing.
Too date, apart from posting pictures, he has been unable to provide a single shred of evidence on the capabilities of the platforms that the lizard is producing. Their EMALS tech is a prime example of that.
No one is taking the lizard lightly
but the laws of science and R&D are true the world over. China is no exception to that rule.
Too date, apart from posting pictures, he has been unable to provide a single shred of evidence on the capabilities of the platforms that the lizard is producing. Their EMALS tech is a prime example of that.
No one is taking the lizard lightly
![Wink ;)](./images/smilies/icon_wink.gif)
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- BRF Oldie
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Re: China Military Watch - Sept' 2016
Pictures is all we have to go on, on a military watch thread (especially China of all countries). That plus the manufacturing schedule that the Chinese have demonstrated for various projects. The latter we see only because stuff gets made in large numbers and deployed.Rakesh wrote:There is a difference between a realistic assessment and flights of fantasy, which is what he is doing.
Too date, apart from posting pictures, he has been unable to provide a single shred of evidence on the capabilities of the platforms that the lizard is producing. Their EMALS tech is a prime example of that.
No one is taking the lizard lightlybut the laws of science and R&D are true the world over. China is no exception to that rule.
As to the actual analysis, who knows what the real capabilities are? If the US-leaning posters want to state that the Chinese cannot hope to catch up with the USA by copying, stealing and learning on-the-go, then there is nothing to prove them wrong. Same for the other end of the spectrum for people who want to make it sound like the PL-15 is the greatest BVR matching everything AMRAAM+Meteor and more.
Point is, if the requirement is to tell someone like Chola to simply post the pictures, data etc. and leave it without adding his interpretations, then we should encourage that by stating it in the thread rules (like the other pics thread, for example). No discussion. Just post the raw data.
Re: China Military Watch - Sept' 2016
Where is the raw data to post? In the absence of such, one is left with making a number of assumptions based on pictures. And that is what he is doing.
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- BRF Oldie
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Re: China Military Watch - Sept' 2016
Indeed. What raw data exists (and how to separate it from Chinese lies and propaganda)? As discussed, all we know to be relatively true is production numbers, dates, schedules and pictures of actual flying/floating/driving tech. I think you will agree that this is useful data to collate in one thread.Rakesh wrote:Where is the raw data to post? In the absence of such, one is left with making a number of assumptions based on pictures. And that is what he is doing.
So if this thread is to live and not turn into swinging ends of the pendulum in terms of analysis, why not just restructure it to make it like this? Don't you do something similar for the first page of the LCA thread?
Re: China Military Watch - Sept' 2016
Any info on production numbers, dates, schedules & capabilities are released by the ChiCom. Example: PL-15 has a range of 300 km. There is no point in creating a new thread to regurgitate the Chinese propaganda. And then all we are left with is the pictures from which all the fantasy is spun into reality.
As per his own statement, he vows to not post in here. I hope he follows his own advice.
As per his own statement, he vows to not post in here. I hope he follows his own advice.
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- BRF Oldie
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Re: China Military Watch - Sept' 2016
Production numbers. Not performance numbers. The first can be verified open source. The second is mostly propaganda. The number of PL-15 produced is a production number. The Range=300 km is the performance number. We need to know how many such missiles are being produced; Not what the Chicoms claim the range of that weapon to be. Same with production number of Y-20s, H-6s, different ballistic missiles etc.Rakesh wrote:Any info on production numbers, dates, schedules & capabilities are released by the ChiCom. Example: PL-15 has a range of 300 km
Open source sat intelligence verifies most of their naval production schedules and is extremely useful for projecting the rate of production based on available facilities etc. Useful stuff.
Dates show us how long it takes between a Chicom claim and a Chicom deployment of a given tech. Again useful.
ORBAT data on field formations.
Pictures to support the above.
Capabilities can be discarded as propaganda unless from a reputed source. Unless you admins/moderators clean this up in the description of the thread, the thread will always be a mess.
Last edited by vivek_ahuja on 05 Jan 2021 11:35, edited 2 times in total.
Re: China Military Watch - Sept' 2016
How would you determine the production number of the PL-15 BVRAAM? Or the J-20? Or the J-31?
What would be your source of data?
What would be your source of data?
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- BRF Oldie
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Re: China Military Watch - Sept' 2016
Satellite images of production facilities for the larger tech items like the J-20, Y-20, H-6 etc. Same with naval warships. That's how everyone has been maintaining their numbers. That's how we know, for example, how weakly deployed the J-20 is within field units.Rakesh wrote:How would you determine the production number of the PL-15 BVRAAM? Or the J-20? Or the J-31?
What would be your source of data?
BVR missiles are much harder, for obvious reasons. But I didn't make that example in my original comment. So for something like that, the rule is: don't post until verified reliably.