Re: Understanding New China after 19th Congress
Posted: 25 Oct 2021 11:25
Jiang has lots of supporters. Most of the tech giants etc.
Consortium of Indian Defence Websites
https://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/
Chinese version of gestapo and the entire police force is also under his influence.ramana wrote:Jiang has lots of supporters. Most of the tech giants etc.
Source to the original piece - http://chinascope.org/archives/27093Leadership: Central Security Bureau’s Leadership Change
Recently, Xi Jinping appointed Zhou Hongxu (周洪许) as the Director of the Central Security Bureau (中央警卫局). Coming from the position of Deputy Chief of Staff of the Northern Theater Army, Zhou is the first Central Security Bureau’s head appointed from outside instead of being promoted from within.
Cheng Xiaonong, an expert on China issues, wrote a lengthy article to explain the importance of the Central Security Bureau to the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP’s) top leader and how appointment of the bureau’s director works.
The Central Security Bureau is best known for its role in the political coup in 1976 after Mao Zedong died. At that time, Marshall Ye Jianying, Prime Minister Hua Guofeng, and Security Chief Wang Dongxing joined forces and ordered the guards of the Central Security Bureau to arrest the “Gang of Four,” including Mao’s wife Jiang Qing. This coupe ended the disastrous Cultural Revolution in China, and thus was praised as a heroic action.
Cheng explained the inside operation of the CCP system. There is only one ultimate TOP LEADER of the CCP system, who may or may not hold the highest official title. For example, then paramount leader Deng Xiaoping let his subordinates Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang hold the highest CCP’s position – General Secretary of the CCP.
The TOP LEADER secures his power via effectively monitoring/controlling other officials.
He uses three key units of the CCP General Office (中央办公厅) to carry out the control: the Confidential Bureau (机要局), the Health Services Bureau (保健局), and the Central Security Bureau (警卫局).
The Confidential Bureau serves confidential documents and manages the confidential phone systems. Ministers and officials above the ministerial level, have a four-digit-number confidential phone, which is called the “red phone” due to its red case. There is also a “39” phone system, since those phones have their numbers start with “39” and then five digits afterward. The “39” phones are installed at Zhongnanhai, the Great Hall of the People, the Diaoyutai Hotel, and the Yuquanshan Guest House. The Confidential Bureau monitors both the red phones and the 39 phones.
The Health Service Bureau provides personal health care to the few top CCP officials, including health checkups, daily medication, and treatment plans in case of illness. This bureau directly reports to the TOP LEADER and many times only the TOP LEADER knows the real health problem of the other officials. For example, Mao Zedong knew that his Prime Minister Zhou Enlai had cancer but didn’t tell Zhou; Mao also decided not to conduct a cancer treatment operation for Zhou.
The Central Security Bureau is responsible for the safety of the TOP LEADER. The unit also assigns personal security guards to other high-ranking officials.
Though staff members from these three units are assigned to serve individual officials, they report back to their own bureau, so their true loyalty stays within the bureau but not with the official they are serving. They are the eyes and ears of the TOP LEADER to monitor other officials’ actions.
Therefore, the head of the Central Security Bureau is very important to the TOP LEADER. When a new top leader takes power from the incumbent, he will naturally want to replace the director, but he may wait for a few years before doing it. One reason is that if he does it immediately, it shows he does not trust the incumbent leader and creates tension. The other reason is that he may need time to find someone that he can truly trust.
From 1978 to 1994, Deng Xiaoping used Yang Dezhong (杨德中) as the Director of the Central Security Bureau. Deng also took the three key units out of the CCP General Office and put them under the Central Military Commission, which he directly controlled. There are three top leadership titles in China, Deng had the title of Chairman of Central Military Commission and gave the other two, CCP General Secretary and President of China, to others.
Jiang Zemin inherited all the powers after Deng passed away. Jiang held all three big titles and moved the three units back under the CCP General Office. From 1994 to 2007Jiang installed his loyalist You Xigui (由喜贵) as the head of Central Security Bureau.
The next leader, Hu Jintao, took the top office in 2002, though Jiang still had the real power. It took Hu five years, that is, not until 2007, was he able to replace Jiang’s man You Xigui by his own person Cao Qing (曹清).
When Xi Jinping took over in 2012, Xi kept Cao to show his respect and trust to Hu. After more than two years, Xi was ready to replace Cao. He disclosed the information to the New York Times and the BBC that the Central Security Bureau used his “air force one” to smuggle ivory from Africa, and then used that excuse to move Cao out. Xi promoted Wang Shaojun (王少军) to the Director position from 2015 to 2019.
In 2018, Xi appointed Chen Denglv (陈登铝) as the Deputy Director and Political Commissar of the Central Security Bureau. Chen was an outsider appointee, coming from the position of the Political Commissar of the 91st Division of the 31st Group Army in Zhangzhou, Fujian Province. Xi worked in Fujian from 1985 to 2002 and the 31st Group Army is considered Xi’s loyalist army. Chen ran the Central Security Bureau from his Deputy Director position after Director Wang left. The director position was vacant from 2019 until the recent appointment of Zhou Hongxu.
Xi’s appointing outsiders as both the Director and Deputy Director of the Central Security Bureau had two risks: One, the bureau’s internal officials might see little hope for promotion. Two, the bureau’s current staff might worry whether Xi would get more outsiders to replace them. These do not help Xi to control the Central Security Bureau so that he can monitor other officials.
Despite these risks, Xi still chose outsiders rather than an internal promotion. This indicates that the officials of the Central Security Bureau might have been involved in CCP in-fighting, that CCP in-fighting is active, and that Xi is worried about the Central Security Bureau’s loyalty to him.
Source: Epoch Times, July 17, 2021
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/21/7/17/n13095911.htm
Thanks AshishA, excellent information.AshishA wrote:A bit about the organization that protects Xi jinping . . .
Source:- https://m.theepochtimes.com/reporting-z ... 93118.htmlReporting Zhou Yongkang's arrest: Primer on Power Struggle in Beijing
The publication of the news that former domestic security tsar Zhou Yongkang is under shuanggui, the abusive system of detention and interrogation the Party uses on its own officials, marks the latest stage in a long-running power struggle at the highest levels of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
Right at the moment when U.S. Vice President Joe Biden visited with Chinese leader Xi Jinping on Dec. 4, several Chinese news websites based outside China that have in the past seemed to work hand-in-glove with the political designs of former CCP leader Jiang Zemin and his faction released news of Zhou’s detention. His wife is said to be under house arrest, and his younger son, Zhou Bin, has been interrogated.
The publication of these articles indicates that Jiang Zemin and his loyalists have abandoned Zhou Yongkang, their former strongman, in favor of their own survival.
They also used the media reports to attack their political foes, former premier Wen Jiabao and Ling Jihua, former CCP leader Hu Jintao’s former personal secretary whose son died in a suspicious Ferrari crash last year. The media reports stated that Wen and Ling would be Xi Jinping’s next anti-corruption targets.
Wen Jiabao and Ling Jihua are considered bitter enemies by the Jiang faction because the two have toppled senior officials loyal to Jiang Zemin, causing serious damage to their power structure and disrupting a coup plotted by the Jiang faction against Xi Jinping.
Bo Xilai
Disgraced former Politburo member and Party secretary of Chongqing Bo Xilai was a protégé of both Zhou Yongkang and Jiang Zemin. Bo was groomed by them to replace Zhou Yongkang in the Politburo Standing Committee after Zhou’s retirement at the 18th Party Congress last year. They also had designs for Bo to become the future head of the CCP.
But all of that fell through when Bo’s right-hand man Wang Lijun sought refuge from Bo in the U.S. Consulate in Chengdu in February of 2012. Wang allegedly disclosed very damaging secrets, including information about an attempted coup plot to remove Xi Jinping.
After this incident, former Premier Wen Jiabao in a press conference following the close of the National People’s Congress on March 14, 2012 said, “The results that we have achieved may be lost. A historical tragedy like the Cultural Revolution may occur again.
Bo Xilai had sought in Chongqing to revive a passion for Maoism, and a common criticism of him was that there were hints of the Cultural Revolution in his policies in Chongqing. In fact, Wen’s reference to the Cultural Revolution was a veiled attack on Bo Xilai, as became clear a little later in the three-hour meeting.
In response to a question, Wen said, “The present Chongqing municipal Party committee and the municipal government must reflect seriously and learn from the Wang Lijun incident.” Then, Wen immediately referred to the CCP Central Committee meeting in 1978 that repudiated the Cultural Revolution had put China on a path of modernization and reform. Wen linked the lessons to be learned from the Wang Lijun affair—a disgrace that implicated Bo Xilai in particular—to the repudiation of the Cultural Revolution.
The next day, March 15, Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao, and Xi Jinping jointly dismissed Bo Xilai from his Chongqing Party position.
In 2007, Bo Xilai’s promotion to deputy prime minister during the 17th Party Congress had been blocked due to Wen Jiabao’s and Vice Premier Wu Yi’s strong opposition. Wen allegedly felt that Bo was not a suitable candidate because of the multiple international torture lawsuits that had been filed against him by Falun Gong practitioners. Bo, who was China’s commerce minister at the time, was subsequently demoted to the post of Communist Party chief in Chongqing in 2007.
Bo Xilai’s ouster in March of last year seriously disrupted Jiang Zemin’s plans who had counted on Bo to continue his Falun Gong persecution policies and cover-up for Jiang’s crimes.
According to individuals familiar with the matter, the Jiang faction originally planned during the 18th Party Congress to have Bo Xilai appointed to the Politburo Standing Committee and as the Secretary of the Political and Legal Affairs Committee (PLAC)—the Party organ that controls the police, Armed Police, intelligence services, courts, lawyers, procuratorate, prisons, and labor camps. They would then seize power by using their control over the Armed Police to arrest Xi Jinping after two years of preparation.
Ferrari Crash
Before the 17th Party Congress, Ling Jihua helped Hu Jintao to remove Shanghai Party chief Chen Liangyu, Jiang Zemin’s chosen successor as the CCP’s general secretary, severely disrupting Jiang’s faction. The faction was left with no choice but to find another successor, and finally settled on Bo Xilai, who devotedly followed Jiang Zemin in the persecution of Falun Gong.
In 2011, Ling Jihua led the Central Disciplinary Committee to investigate Wang Lijun, resulting in Wang Lijun and Bo Xilai becoming enemies. Once again, Ling had thwarted the Jiang faction’s plans for keeping power.
Three days after Bo Xilai was removed from the post of Chongqing Party Secretary, Ling Jihua’s son, Ling Gu, was killed in a Ferrari crash that was publicized worldwide and questioned by many owing to the cover-up of details.
Hong Kong’s Frontline magazine (Qian Shao) recently said in a report that Ling Gu’s crash was very strange, definitely not a normal car accident, but a political assassination. The report cited high-level sources in Beijing as saying the Ferrari accident was in fact a political murder of Ling Jihua’s son. According to the magazine, Zhou Yongkang and Zeng Qinghong (also a former member of the Politburo Standing Committee and close ally of Jiang Zemin) meant to send a message to the top-level leadership to release Bo Xilai.
Billionaire’s Forced Confession
Epoch Times, earlier this year, reported an exclusive about Wuhan billionaire Xu Chongyang, who had been jailed in 2011 and tortured during Bo Xilai’s “Striking the Black” campaign in Chongqing. Xu was forced by the Beijing Municipal Committee of the PLAC and Hubei Provincial PLAC to make confessions.
Under repeated torture, Xu confessed to three things:
1. that he had accepted secret orders from Hu Jintao’s “most trusted political fixer” Ling Jihua;
2. that he is a Falun Gong practitioner;
3. that he was also receiving directives from the U.S. intelligence services.
Bo Xilai’s purpose was to turn Xu’s case into an ironclad case for targeting Ling Jihua, Falun Gong, and the U.S. government.
Xu Chongyang told the Epoch Times that his case was part of the Jiang faction’s plot against Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao, and Ling Jihua.
Failed Coup Attempt
The day after the fatal car crash of Ling Jihua’s son, gunshots were heard in Beijing during the night of March 19, 2012. Rumors swirled that Zhou Yongkang was attempting a coup utilizing the armed police in the capital.
Netizens spread the story over the Internet the next day using comic characters. The headline read: “Teletubby at war with chief Kang,” referring to Wen Jiabao and Zhou Yongkang. It said chief Kang had lost the war due to having lost his senior general, “Tomato” (a reference to Bo Xilai), prior to the war and ended up being taken down.
The Epoch Times then learned that, as soon as Zhou Yongkang’s March 19 coup failed, he had lost his power in Beijing. He could only mark time until he retired at the 18th Congress in November, 2012. The then-Minister of Public Security, Meng Jianzhu, took over Zhou’s post.
Since he was stripped of his power, Zhou Yongkang’s public appearances have merely served the illusion of harmony, which the regime employs to maintain power.
Standoff Between Wen and Zhou
While the fierce battle raged inside the Beijing leadership compound of Zhongnanhai in April 2012 over Bo Xilai, the renowned blind human rights lawyer Chen Guangcheng successfully broke away from surveillance by the PLAC in Linyi, Shandong Province, and found refuge at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing.
Chen published a video asking Wen Jiabao to thoroughly investigate the PLAC’s illegal persecution of him. This caused a sensational diplomatic incident, putting the PLAC and Zhou Yongkang in the spotlight once again.
Sources with access to senior-level leaders in Beijing told Epoch Times at the time that the reason Chen Guangcheng was able to successfully escape was not merely luck or coincidence, it also included “secret help.”
At the night of May 6, 2012, a number of celebrities spread the word on Weibo and Twitter that, “something major is going to happen in Beijing! Wen Jiabao may resign.” This caused quite a stir among the public and domestic media.
In its exclusive report the Epoch Times later revealed that Wen Jiabao confronted Zhou Yongkang in a meeting of the Political Bureau held around the time of the Chen Guangcheng incident, and asked for an investigation of Zhou. Zhou then countered by asking for an investigation of Wen and his wife, quoting negative overseas hearsay about Wen. Zhou was supported by Zeng Qinghong.
In a rare statement Wen Jiabao responded, “If my family or I are found to have committed corruption, I will resign immediately!”
But Zhou and Zeng did not persist in their request because the rumors about Wen’s wealth had been made up by a Baidu CEO as part of Zhou’s and Bo’s media war and their plan to seize power.
Zhou Yongkang and Bo Xilai forced Google out of China a few years ago and turned Baidu into a monopoly, so as to control Baidu Search and use it as a tool to discredit Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao, and Xi Jinping.
Vindicating Victims of Persecution
What made the Jiang faction most afraid, and hate Wen Jiabao so much, is that Wen mentioned many times during his term in office the need to formally vindicate the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre and the Falun Gong persecution, and also criticized the forced organ harvesting taking place in China.
After the Wang Lijun incident, Wen Jiabao was the most decisive among the high level CCP officials to jail Bo Xilai. Wen once said, “The first six to seven years, and even before, [we] could see the terrible result that persecuting Falun Gong would bring to China. Our investigation revealed that Jiang Zemin used astonishing amounts of the nation’s wealth to persecute an unarmed civil organization. It’s very absurd, even today, the central leadership has not faced or resolved this issue.”
Another source claimed that Wen Jiabao said during an internal meeting at Zhongnanhai: “Without anesthesia, live harvesting of human organs, then selling them for money, is this something a person can do? This kind of thing has happened for many years, we are about to retire, it is still not resolved … Now this Wang Lijun incident that has appeared, the entire world knows. Using the punishment of Bo Xilai to resolve the Falun Gong issue should be very straight forward …”
On March 14, 2012, Wen Jiabao mentioned several times during a press conferences that even if he were to die, he wants to, “be responsible to the people, be responsible to the nation … to gain understanding and forgiveness from the people.” It is precisely because of the regime’s live organ harvesting from Falun Gong practitioners that Wen Jiabao felt guilty that he, the premier, could not stop it.
Before the start of the 18th Party Congress, the Jiang faction’s slandering of Wen Jiabao reached a peak. The Jiang faction, represented by Zhou Yongkang, used secret agents from the national security system to leak fake corruption documents about Wen Jiabao’s wealth to western media. The purpose was to challenge Hu, Wen, and Xi to a fight for power during the 18th Party Congress. The New York Times published this material in an article on its front page on Oct. 26, 2012.
Later, Voice of America based in Beijing verified that all English and foreign language media received a very thick report that included economic investment activities of Wen Jiabao’s family, including certification by some audit agencies.
Abandoning Zhou Yongkang
With Bo Xilai in prison, serving a life sentence for crimes of corruption, and Zhou Yongkang under investigation, Jiang Zemin’s power and influence have become minimal. But abandoning Zhou may now seem to Jiang his only hope for saving himself.
Jiang has also had many law suits filed against him by Falun Gong practitioners in many countries. Pressure world-wide is growing to demand accountability from the Chinese regime for the crimes of forced organ harvesting from Falun Gong practitioners.
Jiang rose to power in 1989 after pushing for the crackdown in Tiananmen Square that resulted in the June 4 student massacre. Jiang replaced Zhao Ziyang as the Communist Party chief and was leader of the People’s Republic of China from 1993 to 2003, as well as chairman of the Central Military Commission from 1989 to 2005.
Jiang launched the persecution of the spiritual practice of Falun Gong in July 1999, despite objections from high-ranking party members. Although Jiang was replaced as head of the CCP by Hu Jintao in 2004, he retained significant power behind the scenes as head of a faction within the CCP.
Jiang put the persecution of Falun Gong under the direct charge of the PLAC, and arranged for the first PLAC director Luo Gan to become a member of the ruling Politburo Standing Committee.
On Luo’s retirement in 2007, Jiang saw to it that Zhou Yongkang held the twin positions of director of the PLAC and member of the Politburo Standing Committee. Zhou Yongkang was Jiang Zemin’s nephew-in-law and entered into the Politburo completely with the help of Jiang.
Source:- https://sinoinsider.com/2018/01/prosecu ... -analysis/Prosecution of Fang Fenghui Confirms Our Coup Analysis
January 9, 2018
IN-DEPTH, MILITARY
◎ In light of Fang’s investigation being made official on Jan. 9, we have made our full report available.
On Sept. 17, 2017, we analyzed that Fang Fenghui and Zhang Yang may be involved in a failed coup against the Xi Jinping leadership.
In light of Fang’s investigation being made official on Jan. 9, we have made our full report available below.
Major Political and Military Shakeup Hints at Failed Coup Attempt Against Xi Jinping
By Don Tse
I – Introduction
In the second half of 2017, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping purged two of officials widely considered to have bright futures in the CCP—Politburo member Sun Zhengcai and Central Military Commission (CMC) Chief of the Joint Staff Fang Fenghui.
Two days after Sun was officially placed under investigation on July 24, Xi summoned hundreds of senior of officials to Beijing for an emergency meeting. Then on July 31, Xi held an unprecedented military parade where he was greeted as Chairman, a designation only Mao Zedong carried in the past.
Xi followed up with removing Fang on Aug. 26. Over several weeks in September, Xi proceeded to replace ve departments heads in the CMC, China’s top military body. The ease with which Xi carried out these major replacements suggests that he faced no opposition from rival political factions or Party elders, two in influential groups whose opinions Xi usually cannot ignore under the CCP’s current system of collective leadership.
These extraordinary developments inside the CCP have gone under the radar as independent, unconnected series of events, simply explained away as Xi amassing control for the sake of power. In our estimation, these developments are likely the result of Xi stopping a coup attempt by the Jiang Zemin political faction.
II – The 2017 coup: Key indicators
1. Sun Zhengcai’s arrest
On July 24, 2017, state media announced that Sun Zhengcai, Politburo member and Party secretary of Chongqing, was under investigation for corruption. Sources inside the CCP, however, told Reuters that he had been removed for political indiscretions.This is a much harsher crime than corruption and a much more likely charge given that corruption isn’t reason enough to remove a seating Politburo member during a Party Congress year.
Sun’s abrupt downfall shocked many observers because he was widely regarded as a candidate to succeed Xi Jinping.
Sun’s career biography marked him friendly to the Jiang faction. While serving in the Beijing municipal government in the early 2000s, Sun was the top aide (mishu) to Jiang faction elites Jia Qinglin (former Politburo Standing Committee member; retired) and Liu Qi (former Beijing mayor, President of the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympics; retired). Sun later headed Jilin Province and Chongqing city, two regions where the Jiang faction carry influence.
1.1. A Secret Emergency Meeting in Beijing
Two days after Sun Zhengcai’s arrest and a week before the annual Beidaihe retreat (a vacation and informal dealmaking session for top CCP officials), Xi Jinping summoned roughly 300 senior officials to Beijing for an emergency discussion seminar and keynote address.
The July 26 to July 27 seminar was striking in several ways:
• Discussion seminars of this sort are usually held in the Central Party School in Beijing. Instead, the venue was Jingxi Hotel, a high-security venue ran by the military, implying that absolute secrecy was a factor.
• In attendance were virtually all national and sub-national level officials, as well as all leading provincial-level officials.
• State broadcaster footage of the seminar showed row upon row of officials seated before empty desks, which suggests that notetaking was forbidden. The last time the CCP held a meeting that forbade the taking of notes was in September 1971 when cadres were briefed about the defection and plane crash of Party vice chairman Lin Biao.
• The day after the meetings on July 28, Beijing municipal Party secretary Cai Qi and Guangdong chief Hu Chunhua held meetings to convey key takeaways of the seminar to local officials. Both mentioned that “political security” was an issue.
Days later, Taiwanese newspaper Up Media reported that during the seminar Xi declared that his leadership would “spare no expense” to:
1. Protect embattled high-ranking officials.
2. Clear out antagonistic forces within the CCP.
3. Deal with outside pressure before and after the 19th Party Congress.
4. Suppress internal CCP instability.
Points 1 and 3 are very likely a reference to fugitive Chinese tycoon Guo Wengui’s efforts to discredit anti-corruption chief Wang Qishan and his oblique endorsement of Sun as the next CCP leader.
In summary, Xi may have used the Sun Zhengcai investigation to lay down his authority over the CCP during the emergency meeting.
1.2. “Chairman” Xi reviews a military parade
On July 30, just three days after the secret Beijing meeting, Xi Jinping held a grand military parade at the Zhurihe training base in Inner Mongolia to mark the 90th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).
There are four unusual points about this parade:
First of its kind
The Zhurihe parade was the first to be held on the eve of the founding of the PLA and in a military base. Such a grand parade would normally be held in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square.
Combat-ready
Instead of donning formal military dress and marching in goose step to a live military band, the Zhurihe parade
troops wore camouflage fatigues and jogged into formation to recorded music. Xi also wore camouflage instead of the customary Zhongshan suit Chinese leaders wear at parades.
“Chairman Xi”
Parade troops greeted Xi with “Hello, Chairman” instead of the usual “Hello, Commander.” Chairman has, up until now, only been used for Mao Zedong. And in July, state-run newspaper Xinhua referred to Xi as “supreme commander,” another term that was only used with Mao.
No Party elders
Politburo Standing Committee and CMC members joined Xi in the review stand at the Zhurihe parade, but not a single Party elder was present. In contrast, Party elders were invited to the 70th and 80th PLA founding anniversary celebrations.
In sum, Xi Jinping appears to be using the Zhurihe parade to show the Jiang faction and other dissenting voices in the CCP that he is the Party Chairman now, has full authority over the military, and doesn’t need retired Party elders to approve and supervise his administration.
2. Fang Fenghui’s removal
In the lead up to the 19th Congress, Fang Fenghui appeared to be checking all the right boxes for promotion from CMC Chief of the Joint Staff to CMC Vice-Chairman, the highest office for military personnel. He was also a trusted confidant of former CCP General Secretary Hu Jintao (Hu and Xi are allies in eliminating the Jiang faction from the CCP).
Fang also participated in several high-profile diplomatic meetings this year:
In April, Fang was part of Xi’s entourage for the first face-to-face meeting between Xi Jinping and President Trump in Florida.
On Aug. 15, Fang signed a new Sino-US military agreement with his U.S. counterpart Joseph Dunford.
On Aug. 21, Fang met with General Surapong Suwan-ath, Chief of Defense Forces of the Royal Thai Armed Forces, in Beijing.
Fang’s diplomatic meetings indicated that he had some measure of Xi’s trust, and was likely marked for promotion at the 19th People’s Congress.
But on Aug. 26, Fang was abruptly removed from office without explanation and replaced by PLA Ground Force commander Li Zuocheng. Fang and political commissar Zhang Yang were also left off the list of 19th Congress delegates.
Several media outlets have reported that Fang and Zhang are being investigated. Depending on the source, Fang is reportedly either being probed for corruption or for stirring up a border conflict with India, which led to a standoff between Chinese and Indian troops from mid-June to Aug. 28. The latter charge, if accurate, is serious enough to warrant Xi removing Fang.
After Fang’s removal, Xi replaced the post of another five CMC members in September, an irregular development in speed and scale. Under usual circumstances, Xi would need to engage in horse trading with various CCP factions and Party elders to get the officials or generals he wants in top offices. For Xi to remove Fang and the others so rapidly suggests that Xi faced little or no opposition, a situation which indicates that Xi is either now immensely powerful or has found a very compelling reason—such as the discovery of a regime-destabilizing coup attempt against his leadership—to get all senior CCP cadres’ support for his personnel changes.
SinoInsider believes that Fang Fenghui had very likely sought to oppose Xi Jinping, but it is still unclear what role he played. Fang could be acting on his own volition in opposing Xi, or Fang could be working in tandem with Sun Zhengcai. Why Fang would want to oppose Xi despite appearing to be in Xi’s favor is unclear.
III – Coup precedent in 2012
1. The Wang Lijun incident
The political faction of former CCP General Secretary Jiang Zemin had plans to remove Xi Jinping in a coup, but the plot was exposed by Chongqing vice mayor and Jiang faction member Wang Lijun.
In early 2012, Wang attempted to defect to the US through the US consulate in Chengdu. He revealed to diplomatic officials in the Obama administration that Jiang faction elites, Politburo member Bo Xilai and security czar Zhou Yongkang, were planning an “usurpation” of incoming Chinese leader Xi Jinping, according to the Washington Free Beacon.
Three years later, Xi alluded to a coup attempt in several public speeches where he accused Bo, Zhou, former military vice chairs Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong, and other Jiang associates of having “carried out political conspiracies to wreck and split the Party.” Bo Xilai and the other conspirators were all arrested and sentenced to life in prison.
An interesting tidbit of Sun Zhengcai and Bo Xilai is that both were Politburo members and Sun had succeeded Bo as Chongqing Secretary after his downfall. Both were also widely regarded by China observers as potential candidates for the CCP leadership.
2. Why Jiang wants to remove Xi
For nearly two decades (1997-2012), Jiang Zemin and his loyalists dominated CCP politics and military. They expanded their influence through governmental and military ranks by rewarding corruption and persecution. For instance, officials could climb the CCP ranks by purchasing higher office, falsifying economic figures to reflect a higher GDP figure in the area they were administering, or by showing willingness to directly persecute Tibetans, Uyghurs, house Christians, and practitioners of Falun Gong, a Chinese spiritual discipline. Many Chinese officials became supporters or members of Jiang’s faction because they benefited from Jiang’s policies.
Almost like a gang initiation, officials who bloodied their hands through persecution became trusted members of the Jiang faction because the guilty won’t bring the guilty to justice with everyone being complicit. Meanwhile, officials like Xi Jinping who take an unclear stance on the persecution of Falun Gong, Jiang’s pet project, were viewed with suspicion and cast as potential threats to the Jiang faction.
All CCP leaders before Xi have directed bloody suppressions, and therefore hope to appoint successors who have also been involved in murderous crackdowns as an insurance against prosecution. Jiang is no exception, and was intent on having a Jiang faction member succeed Hu Jintao in 2012 so that the brutal persecution of Falun Gong which he started in 1999 can be maintained. For instance, the official Jiang wanted as CCP chief was former Politburo member and Chongqing chief Bo Xilai. Bo oversaw mass arrests of Falun Gong practitioners in Chongqing and when he was governor of Liaoning Province. According to American investigative journalist Ethan Gutmann, when Bo was governor, Liaoning Province was an epicenter of the CCP’s forced organ harvesting of still-living practitioners.
If Bo became head of the CCP, Jiang can feel safe that his bloody legacy would be in place until he enters the grave. However, contrary to his plans, Xi Jinping was picked for the top CCP office in 2012, and Jiang had guarantees that Xi will continue the persecution of Falun Gong. Instead, there was a possibility that Xi may even stop the persecution and prosecute Jiang. Jiang couldn’t take the risk and thus attempted a coup to prevent Xi from coming in.
3. After the 2012 coup attempt
In the past five years, the Jiang faction has continually sought to undermine Xi’s leadership, most notably by engineering the 2015 Shanghai stock crash and aiding North Korea’s nuclear program. The Jiang faction goal is to distract Xi with social, economic, and geopolitical turmoil to buy time for themselves. These distractions also serve to undermine Xi’s leadership as they manifest as problems under his watch. But thus far, their efforts have only resulted in more arrests of key members.
Xi launched an anti-corruption campaign shortly after taking office. Then in 2015, he started to push heavy military reform. To date, over 1.21 million officials, or 78 percent of the total officialdom, have been purged. Over 200 of these officials held high office, and the majority of the purged officials in the government or the military have been members or supporters of the Jiang faction.
Xi also appears to be doing what Jiang Zemin and his cronies fear most—quietly shifting the CCP’s stance on the persecution of Falun Gong. Shortly after taking office, Xi ordered the closure of the labor camp system, the main incarceration center for hundreds of thousands of Falun Gong practitioners. In late 2016, Xi’s anti-corruption agency openly criticized the “610 Office,” the Gestapo-like organization that was created specifically to oversee the persecution of Falun Gong. And since the start of 2017, local courts, procuratorates, and police stations have released over 50 practitioners who were under arrest, citing insufficient evidence, something unheard of since the brutal persecution began in 1999.
With Xi sitting in China’s highest office, the tables have turned against the once all-powerful Jiang faction. If Xi can consolidate enough power over the Communist Party at the 19th Party Congress on Oct. 18, he could eradicate the remaining members of the Jiang faction. This places the Jiang faction in a losing predicament.
Conclusion
Based on recent turn of events and the 2012 precedence, SinoInsider believes that Jiang Zemin’s faction had plotted a coup against Xi Jinping to prevent further weakening to their base before the 19th Congress. The 2017 coup attempt also suggests that the Jiang faction did not abandon their 2012 coup blueprint, but instead found new candidates to play the roles of Bo Xilai and Zhou Yongkang. In considering this perspective, Sun Zhengcai may be regarded as “Bo Xilai 2.0.”
The latest coup, however, appeared to have been discovered and foiled by Xi, leading to the purge of Politburo member Sun Zhengcai and Chief of the Joint Staff Fang Fenghui. Following Sun’s expulsion, Xi likely debriefed leading officials about the plot in an emergency meeting. Xi then appears to have seized the opportunity to unify the CCP against Jiang faction elements to undertake sweeping changes in the military without pushback. Now all 31 provincial and regional CCP leaders have declared their allegiance to Xi in essays submitted to the People’s Daily.
There is now a very good chance Xi Jinping will get the personnel changes he wants at the 19th Party Congress, which opens on Oct. 18. As the date closes in, so does the chance for the Jiang faction to take back lost power.
source:- https://sinoinsider.com/2018/02/why-xi- ... limit/#001Why Xi Jinping Removed China’s Presidential Term Limit
February 27, 2018
◎ We believe that the answer to why Xi removed term limits for the Chinese presidency can be found in an analysis of CCP factional struggle.
By Don Tse and Larry Ong
Chinese state media published a list of constitutional changes deliberated by the Chinese Communist Party’s 19th Central Committee on Feb. 25. Among the amendments include the removal of term limits for China’s president and vice president.[1]
News that China’s Xi Jinping could potentially be president for life sparked an international uproar. Observers described the move as a “power grab,” a return to “one-man rule,” and the end of reforms in China. Xi was likened to Russia’s Vladimir Putin and Chairman Mao Zedong. Financial analysts noted that Xi’s lifelong tenure could mean more stable markets but increased systemic risks owing to the nature of dictatorship. Some China experts, however, sensed that something was not “normal” in the Chinese regime.
We believe that the answer to why Xi removed term limits for the Chinese presidency can be found in an analysis of CCP factional struggle (neidou). Since taking office in 2012, Xi has been engaging in a life-and-death contest with Jiang Zemin’s influential political faction. For self-preservation, Xi rolled out several political reforms that helped him consolidate power and marginalize the Jiang faction. One of the latest reforms is the scrapping of presidential limits, a move that further strengthens his authority and paves the way for the implementation of even more significant political reforms.
At this juncture, a clarification of what we mean by political reform is in order. To international observers, political reform in the context of illiberal states is typically understood as a move towards liberalization and democracy. In the Chinese regime, however, political reform refers to less drastic measures like restructuring bureaucracy, rebalancing power among the various Party organs and state apparatuses or even between the Party and state hierarchies, or the creation of new administrative bodies. Our mention of Xi’s political reforms refers to the latter definition.
We also challenge the notion that Xi is aiming to be the second Mao by examining Xi’s unusual focus on the presidency and his constitutional turn from a historical perspective. In fact, we believe that it is inaccurate to compare Xi to any Party or world leaders from past and present after an examination of his reforms and policies.
The Jiang faction has resorted to a myriad of measures to undermine the Xi administration, the most severe of which are coups.
Factional deathmatch
We explored the Xi-Jiang factional struggle and Xi’s reforms at some length (but not exhaustively) in previous essays. A brief recap is required here to contextualize the CCP’s recent constitutional changes. (Those familiar with the CCP neidou can skip this section.)
Xi Jinping came to office in a hugely disadvantageous position. The Jiang faction had dominated the political landscape for nearly two decades, and controlled important CCP organs like the domestic security and legal apparatus. The Jiang faction also controlled the financial sector. While Xi is a Party princeling (his father was a founding revolutionary alongside Mao Zedong), he wasn’t aligned with any influential Party factions, nor did he seek to establish one of his own. Xi’s lack of supporters is evident from his personnel picks for senior positions at the provincial level and above. Presently, less than a quarter of provincial Party secretaries are Xi’s former colleagues, schoolmates, or aides. Indeed, Xi now appears to be heading in the direction of “one-man rule” partly because he lacks a faction and sprawling political networks to control the Party through informal means. But in 2012, Xi had very little political clout.
The Jiang faction wishes to dispose of Xi for several reasons. First, Xi was a compromise candidate between Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, and Jiang always meant to replace Xi at a later date with officials who are friendly with his faction and support his policies. More crucially, Xi was a political risk liability for Jiang because Xi’s stance on the persecution of the Falun Gong spiritual community, Jiang’s pet project, was unclear at best. A study of CCP leadership succession shows that Party leaders with bloodied hands (all except Xi) prefer successors whose hands are also soiled. Finally, Xi’s reforms and policies over the past five-plus years have worked to squeeze the Jiang faction to the brink.
The Jiang faction has resorted to a myriad of measures to undermine the Xi administration, the most severe of which are coups. Coups usually end badly (including loss of life) for the ousted party in authoritarian regimes like the CCP, hence our characterization of the Xi-Jiang factional fighting as a life-and-death struggle. Thus far, the Jiang faction has plotted at least two political coups (2012 and 2017) and one financial coup (2015). The Xi administration has responded with purges and even open signaling of the Jiang faction’s coup efforts. In a 2015 speech, Xi accused Jiang faction members Bo Xilai, Zhou Yongkang, and others of plotting “political conspiracies to wreck and split the Party.” During a 19th Party Congress meeting in October 2017, top securities regulator Liu Shiyu blamed the officials Xi mentioned earlier and fallen Politburo member Sun Zhengcai of plotting to “usurp the Party leadership.” Liu’s remarks on usurpation (cuan dang duo quan) were echoed by CCP General Office director Ding Xuexiang during a Jan. 26 work meeting. Ding also revealed that virtually all of the officials who were purged after Xi took office were guilty of “political crimes” and other political problems.
To swing the factional struggle in his favor, Xi introduced several reforms to turn the regime away from Jiang’s model and consolidate power. A crucial part of Xi’s power consolidation in the CCP involves his collecting symbolic titles like “core” Party leadership (2016) and having his political theory (“Xi Jinping Thought”) enshrined in the Party charter (2017) and state constitution (2018). Xi was able to take on those tokens of power only after weakening the Jiang faction and bolstering his authority in the regime. The anti-corruption campaign targeted mainly Jiang faction members and supporters, and sought to reverse the culture of corruption that flourished during Jiang’s era of dominance (1997 to 2012). Xi’s military reforms served to modernize the People’s Liberation Army, break up entrenched Jiang networks in the People’s Liberation Army, and bring the Party’s “gun” under his control. Meanwhile, Xi has been promoting constitutionalism and the rule of law, and is making efforts to correct historical cases of judicial injustice and malfeasance. Xi’s constitutional turn is anathema to Jiang Zemin and his faction, who engaged in corruption, kleptocracy, and persecution. In fact, Jiang even strengthened the Party’s control over the judiciary and law enforcement apparatus by granting disproportionate power and a massive budget to the Political and Legal Affairs Commission (PLAC). Since taking office, Xi has greatly reduced the power and reach of the PLAC while elevating the judiciary, state institutions, and the constitution.
During a financial apparatus meeting at the 19th Party Congress, China Securities Regulatory Commission chairman Liu Shiyu criticized several purged elite officials and noted that they had “plotted to usurp the Party leadership,” according to Hong Kong media.
Getting in line
Xi Jinping didn’t enjoy much success in implementing some of his reforms during his first five years in office because he was still in the process of consolidating power. As mentioned above, the Jiang faction was opposed to the Xi administration and resisted its policies. For instance, Chinese premier Li Keqiang reportedly pounded his desk in frustration when his plans for the Shanghai Free-Trade Zone were repeatedly scuppered or altered by Jiang faction elements in Shanghai. Li later boycotted the free-trade zone opening ceremony. Meanwhile, other officials disgruntled by the anti-corruption campaign and unsure of whether Xi or the Jiang faction were ahead in the factional struggle appeared to sit on their hands until the neidou results became clearer. The problem of official inaction and procrastination (bu zuo wei) eventually became so severe that anti-corruption officials started addressing the issue in their inspection reports of government departments and work units in the latter half of Xi’s first term. The anti-corruption agency even accused purged Chongqing chief Sun Zhengcai of being “lazy and indolent” as one of his many crimes, the first time procrastination became an official charge. With so many officials, including high-ranking ones, loafing about because they are uncertain about the state of the Xi-Jiang factional struggle, it is little wonder that Xi’s attempts at reform saw mixed results.
In theory, Xi should have few problems in advancing reforms after the 19th Party Congress. For instance, the addition of “Xi Jinping Thought” to the Party charter places Xi at least on the same level as Deng Xiaoping in the pantheon of CCP leaders. Many of Xi’s trusted officials were installed in key Party posts, and Xi appears to be a “General Secretary Plus” in a Politburo Standing Committee that is stacked with his allies and supporters (six to one). Observers believe that Xi may even be the strongest Party leader in decades.
By the logic of CCP factional struggle, however, Xi’s present political dominance has not yet found solid footing. Power is a long game in authoritarian regimes, and Xi’s opponents and the officialdom at large would likely regard him as merely having the advantage for the next five years, or until he has to give up the presidency under the old limits. Thus, many officials will continue to monitor the progress of the Xi-Jiang struggle and procrastinate in implementing policies from Beijing. Also, while Xi clearly didn’t pick a successor at the 19th Congress, Party elders may eventually find excuses to force Xi to designate the next CCP General Secretary (and not necessarily a candidate of his choosing) before his term is up. In other words, Xi may have more fully consolidated power in the Party, but the power struggle is still a factor because the Jiang faction still lingers and Xi’s authority is constrained by his remaining time in office.
Removing the presidential term limits is Xi’s answer to the political problems mentioned above. By opening the possibility that he could be China’s president indefinitely, Xi is also indicating that he could likewise serve as General Secretary and Central Military Commission chairman for life. If Xi intends to rule for three or more terms, he has good reason to rebuff Party elders who may not be inclined to witness a repeat of Mao and Deng’s designated successor problems. Meanwhile, the bulk of Chinese officials would be more inclined to get in line with Xi’s reforms when his rule is no longer bound by time constraints. After all, unending Xi rule means a perpetual anti-corruption campaign (plus the new anti-organized crime drive) and a higher probability of the Jiang faction being eliminated. To protect their self-interests over the long term, officials would gradually throw their weight behind Xi.
Xi’s solution to his reform problem, however, comes with challenges. In examining the Feb. 25 announcement of the constitutional changes and other developments, we believe that Xi met with fierce resistance inside the Party when he tried to drop the presidential limits.
The Second Plenum of the 19th Central Committee was held from Jan. 18 to Jan. 19, and all constitutional amendments discussed during the plenary session should have been finalized on the last day of the plenary session. The Central Committee then submitted the list of amendments to the National People’s Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC) on Jan. 26, and the NPCSC should have deliberated the list during a key meeting on Jan. 29 to Jan. 30. Going by precedent, state media should have announced the constitutional changes around the period of the NPCSC meeting near the end of January. Instead, state media published the amendments nearly a month later. Furthermore, the amendments were published with only days to spare before the Third Plenum (Feb. 26 to Feb. 28), a conclave where important political and economic reforms are scheduled to be discussed. The time gap between announcements is very unusual, and indicates that Xi needed time to convince the 204-member Central Committee to digest and consent to the changes that he sought.
Two prominent arrest cases just before the Feb. 25 announcement also suggest that Xi Jinping is thinking about resistance from the Party at large to his dropping the presidential limits. On Feb. 23, Chinese regulators announced the takeover of Anbang Group and the prosecution of its chairman Wu Xiaohui. The following day, the Chinese authorities announced that Yang Jing, secretary general of China’s State Council, was removed from his posts, demoted from a deputy state-level official to a ministerial-level official, and handed a year-long Party probation. The official notice of Yang’s punishment noted that he had “confessed to his wrongdoing and expressed remorse.” We believe that Xi is sending a message that officials who surrender and fall in line with his administration like Yang Jing will be treated with leniency, while troublemakers like Wu Xiaohui will be punished regardless of their political status (being the grandson-in-law of Deng Xiaoping, Wu is considered a Party princeling). Put in another context, officials who resist Xi’s “indefinite” reign will be severely punished, while those who support him may be let off lightly if they are investigated for corruption.
The timing of Liu He’s United States trip also makes sense in light of the Feb. 25 announcement. Liu, a trusted ally of Xi, was scheduled to be in Washington D.C from Feb. 27 to March 3 to hold trade talks with Trump administration officials. While Liu technically has reason to participate in economic talks with the U.S. since he is the director of the Party’s Leading Group for Financial and Economic Affairs and Sino-U.S. trade tensions appear to be rising, there is little reason for Xi to dispatch him to D.C. at this time. Liu, a Politburo member, will miss the important Third Plenum because of his U.S. trip. Protocol-wise, Liu has not been officially appointed to a state job yet (he is tipped to be a State Council Vice Premier), and it is unclear in what capacity he will be negotiating with American officials. More suspiciously, the Sino-U.S. trade situation doesn’t appear to be so dire that a Politburo member with no state appointment needs to skip a plenary session and confer with officials from the Trump administration for five days. A plausible explanation for Liu He’s trip is that Xi feels the need to update the Trump administration on the implications of the presidential term limit change and what it entails for Sino-U.S. relations going forward.
‘Constitutional idiot and anti-Party element’
In commenting on the removal of presidential term limits, many international observers expressed fear that Xi Jinping is on the path to becoming the next Mao Zedong. From a historical perspective, however, we believe that Xi is in fact heading in the opposite direction from Mao.
Xi has placed much emphasis on constitutionalism since taking office. A month after taking office in November 2012, Xi talked of a “constitutional dream” (“xian fa meng”) in his third-ever speech as General Secretary. “The constitution’s foundation rests in the people’s heartfelt endorsement, and the constitution’s power rests in the people’s sincere faith in it,” he said in the speech. In July 2015, the Chinese legislature passed a decision that required all civil servants in China to pledge allegiance to the constitution when taking office. The first pledges of allegiance, which contain no reference to the CCP, were recited in January 2016. And in his marathon 19th Congress speech, Xi said: “No organization or individual has the power to overstep the constitution or the law; and no one is allowed in any way to override the law with his or her own orders, place his or her authority above the law, violate the law for personal gain, or abuse the law.” The latest changes to the presidential term limit make it constitutional for Xi to stay on indefinitely as head of state.
Mao would not have approved of Xi’s constitutional turn. The Great Helmsman believed that the Party should dominate everything and that constitutionalism was fool’s play. “Only idiots and anti-Party elements seek to distance themselves from the Party’s leadership and implement constitutionalism,” Mao reportedly said at a 1954 discussion forum on the state constitution.[2] In March 1957, he ordered schools to cancel lectures on the constitution and instead hold political lessons. In 1970, Mao repeatedly instructed officials working on constitutional amendments not to draft provisions for a presidency and that he had no desire in the position. Indeed, as Party Chairman and unquestioned dictator, Mao would have seen no need to abide by a set of rules governing the state when the Party and his word were law unto themselves.
Xi Jinping has accumulated immense power in the Party. For him to take the next step along the path of dictatorship and fully restore the primacy of the Party in China, Xi needs only to preserve the Party’s leading position and ignore the state hierarchy. He does not need to promote constitutionalism and strengthen state institutions.
Who is Xi Jinping?
If Xi isn’t on the way to becoming the next Mao, then how will he turn out with unlimited hold on power? Will he abandon political reforms and constitutionalism when his struggle with the Jiang faction is settled?
We believe that it is presently very tricky to anticipate where Xi is going with his reforms. To draw an analogy, criminal groups tend to abide by their own rules and behave in an anti-social fashion. For instance, if a gang boss wishes to partake in a Good Samaritan act, like helping an elderly granny cross a crowded street, his underlings might end up illegally stopping traffic and shoving aside passers-by to help their boss accomplish his task. Some observers have used the label “gangster regime” on the former Soviet Union, North Korea, and the CCP. And if Xi presides over a “gangster regime,” then his reforms and policies will be executed by Party cadres per crude CCP logic. This is why Xi’s push to alleviate poverty in China has seen the 2017 case of county officials in Guangxi over-reporting its poverty statistics (98 percent of the 3,000 “poor” were in fact not below the poverty line) to claim more financial support from the central authorities. Indeed, mainland Chinese media has observed that the CCP appears to be stuck in a “Tacitus Trap,” or a situation where the people presume that the government is dishonest regardless of what it does.
Deciphering the direction of political reform is also particularly challenging in authoritarian regimes because reforms that appear to strengthen a dictatorship could also end up paving the way for democracy. Take the case of Taiwanese dictator Chiang Ching-kuo. After succeeding his father Chiang Kai-shek, the younger Chiang proceeded to consolidate power by sidelining his political enemies in the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang), imposing martial law, and clamping down on the press. At the apex of his power, however, Chiang lifted press and political party restrictions, ended martial law, and transitioned Taiwan to a democracy.
Taiwan, however, is not mainland China, and it would be foolhardy to equate Xi Jinping with Chiang Ching-kuo. Yet it would be just as reckless to liken Xi to Mao Zedong, Vladimir Putin, or other autocrats. Xi Jinping is Xi Jinping, and only he knows best the direction he is taking China. As for whether Xi’s rule is good or ill for the world, a clue can be found in President Donald Trump’s assessment of him after their April 2017 meeting, and Trump’s different treatment of Xi and China.
Conclusion
In sum, Xi Jinping removed presidential term limits because he needs to push through political reform. And Xi needs to be successful in his reforms to avoid ending up the loser in the Xi-Jiang factional struggle, a consequential political battle with dire implications for Xi and China. Contrary to what international observers believe, Xi’s position isn’t entirely stable, and he continues to face grave dangers and risks from factional rivals and the Party system itself. Finally, equating Xi with Mao or other past and present autocrats is erroneous given the reforms and policies Xi has pursued.
Notes
[1] Deng Xiaoping instituted the term limits in 1982, ostensibly to ensure the rotation of the top leadership positions and prevent a Mao-like dictator from emerging. The term limit safeguards, however, didn’t apply to him, a “retired emperor” (taishang huang) with power for life. As Central Military Commission chairman, Deng oversaw the appointment of five CCP General Secretaries and the removal of two. Later as a regular Party cadre, Deng successfully championed further economic reform in 1992. Clearly, constitutional limits were meant for lesser cadres.
[2] There has been some debate in recent years about whether Mao actually said those words, but at least two prominent individuals believe the statement to be correctly attributed. Xin Ziling, a retired defense official formerly at the PLA’s National Defense University, wrote in a treatise in a Chinese language periodical that Mao was known to belittle the constitution and that the statement was very characteristic of him. He Qinglian, a renowned Chinese economist, recalled reading the statement in a political pamphlet that was circulated during the Cultural Revolution.
source- https://sinoinsider.com/2018/03/fu-zhen ... apparatus/Fu Zhenghua, Factional Struggle, and Scrubbing the Security and Law Apparatus
March 22, 2018
◎ We believe that Fu Zhenghua’s promotion doesn’t guarantee his safety.
The Two Sessions personnel reshuffle saw some shock moves, including the appointment of Yang Xiaodu as National Supervision Commission director, Yi Gang as central bank chief, and Yang Jiechi not being named to any state job.
The promotion of Fu Zhenghua, the former public security vice minister, to Ministry of Justice head is another move that puzzled observers. When he was in law enforcement, Fu oversaw several cases of gross human rights abuse. He also once headed the “610 Office,” which coordinates the persecution of the Falun Gong spiritual community.
In September 2017, rights activists petitioned the U.S. government to take action against Fu Zhenghua and BPSB deputy head Tao Jing using the Global Magnitsky Act.
Chinese dissidents and human rights workers are very concerned that the Fu’s appointment as justice minister will result in a regression in the use of the legal system to defend against rights abuses.
We believe that there is reason to be worried about rights abuses under Fu Zhenghua given the authoritarian nature of the Chinese regime. However, it appears that institutional safeguards have been put in place to check the Ministry of Justice against excesses. Also, Fu is currently on the knife’s edge given the state of the factional struggle (neidou) in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
Fu Zhenghua: A brief factional background
Fu Zhenghua served in the Beijing Municipal Public Security Bureau (BPSB) for several years, and eventually headed the bureau from 2010 to 2013. The Jiang Zemin faction has long swayed the BPSB, and Fu can be regarded as a typical Jiang factional official.
Fu, however, appears to have switched sides in the CCP factional struggle before the 18th Party Congress. According to news reports in Chinese language publications, Fu the “turncoat” proved his loyalty to Hu Jintao by helping him thwart an armed police coup in Beijing in March 2012 led by then-Central Political and Legal Affairs secretary Zhou Yongkang. Zhou launched the coup four days after fellow Jiang faction member and Chongqing chief Bo Xilai was purged. The coup was first acknowledged by the Xi Jinping leadership in 2016 when a book of Xi’s speeches criticized Bo, Zhou, and others of attempting to “wreck and split the Party.” More recently, securities regulator Liu Shiyu and CCP General Office director Ding Xuexiang condemned high-ranking officials of having sought to “usurp the Party leadership.” (For more on the coups, see here, here, and here.)
Fu Zhenghua seemed to have been rewarded for “defecting” from Xi’s factional rivals. In August 2013, he was promoted to vice minister of the Ministry of Public Security. He later led the investigation of Zhou Yongkang and other Jiang faction officials. In May 2016, Fu was promoted again to executive vice minister.
But Xi never appeared to trust “turncoat” Fu completely, and Fu never seemed to have fully distanced himself from the Jiang faction. CCP factional struggle is a convoluted and consequential affair. The actions taken by individuals entangled in the struggle can sometimes appear counterintuitive, but could actually be Machiavellian measures aimed at serving larger factional goals. Fu Zhenghua’s case is a model example of factional politics in play.
Going by Xi Jinping’s statements about the “Lei Yang Incident” in May 2016, it appeared that he was planning to use the case to rectify the public security apparatus.[1] However, Xi seemed to have reconsidered the plan after two strange incidents that year. First, about ten thousand military veterans suddenly assembled outside the military headquarters in Beijing to petition the government about unpaid benefits.[2] Second, 4,000 BPSB officers threatened to resign over the arrest of their fellows who were involved in the “Lei Yang Incident.” Fu Zhenghua is said to be behind the attempted mass resignation. Both strange incidents demonstrated to Xi that the BPSB plays a crucial role in “stability maintenance” work and cannot be casually admonished or overhauled.
In January 2017, fugitive Chinese tycoon Guo Wengui started accusing Fu Zhenghua of corruption, abusing power, and “doing as he pleases” on Twitter and Youtube videos. Subsequently, Fu attended the Two Sessions meeting heavily escorted by a security detail. Going by the schedule on the Ministry of Public Security website, he also participated in an unusually low number of public security activities between 2016 to 2017.
Fu Zhenghua’s position looked very shaky going into the 2018 Two Sessions. His being named as justice minister, however, suggests that Xi still has uses for Fu’s ruthless handling of old allies.
Cleaning up the security and legal affairs apparatus
Over the past two years, Xi Jinping has made slow progress in cleaning up the domestic security and legal affairs apparatus, including the justice ministry. The recent Party and state institutional reforms and Fu Zhenghua’s appointment as justice minister seem to be aimed at hastening the cleansing progress.
A brief timeline follows:
Dec. 2016: Lu Enguang, head of the justice ministry’s political affairs department and Party committee member, was investigated.
Feb. 2017: Wu Aiying, justice minister, was removed from her post. Zhang Jun, then deputy head of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, replaced Wu.
Oct. 2017: Wu Aiying was officially expelled from the Party at the 7th Plenum of the 18th Central Committee.
At the 19th Congress, public security chief and Jiang faction member Guo Shengkun became the new Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission secretary. Zhao Kezhi, Xi’s ally and Hebei chief, succeeded Guo as public security minister.
Jan. 24, 2018: The 19th Central Committee and the State Council jointly launched an anti-organized crime campaign. We believe that this campaign is aimed at rectifying the domestic security and legal apparatus. (Link)
Jan. 30, 2018: Wang Xiaohong, the deputy mayor of Beijing and fourth-rank public security vice minister, left his Beijing post, a move which foreshadows a future job change. Earlier at the 19th Congress, Wang, an official whom Xi trusts, was catapulted into the Central Committee despite his non-elite (shuangfei) status.
March 21, 2018: According to the plan for Party and state institutional reforms, the administrative office of the new Advancing Law-based Governance Leading Group will be situated in the Ministry of Justice.
As part of state institutional reform, the Legislative Affairs Office is dissolved and its functions integrated into the justice ministry.
The justice ministry is now responsible for drafting legal and administrative law regulations; legislative coordination and reviewing records; interpreting and coordinating the implementation of administrative law; guiding administrative law reconsideration responses; promoting legal propaganda; managing the prisons, drug rehabilitation and community correction; certifying lawyers and supervising judicial arbitration appraisals; and undertaking national judicial assistance.
March 22, 2018: Former public security vice minister Huang Ming was named Party secretary of the emergency management ministry. Wang Yupu, the former State Administration of Work Safety director, was appointed Minister of Emergency Management and the ministry’s deputy Party secretary.
Many birds, one stone
Taking the macro view, Xi Jinping’s appointment of Fu Zhenghua and other recent personnel moves appear to be aimed at eliminating the remaining Jiang faction elements in the domestic security and legal apparatus:
1. The departure of Fu Zhenghua and Huang Ming (Jiang faction members) from the public security ministry shifts control over domestic security from the Jiang faction to the Xi camp.
For instance, with Fu and Huang gone, fourth-rank public security vice minister Wang Xiaohong would likely take over as executive vice minister. And four out of nine officials now in the public security ministry leadership are from the Xi camp: Zhao Kezhi (minister), Wang Xiaohong (vice minister), Meng Qingfeng (vice minister), and Deng Weiping (CCDI chief stationed in the public security ministry).
2. Going by the functions of the post-reform Ministry of Justice, Fu Zhenghua’s authority has been greatly weakened. Also, he is only the justice ministry’s deputy Party secretary; Yuan Shuhong, the former deputy director of the Legislative Affairs Office, is Party secretary. By the “Party leads everything” power structure, Yuan is Fu’s “supervisor.”
3. Fu’s movements will be further checked with the Advancing Law-based Governance Leading Group administrative office being located in the Ministry of Justice. Because the Leading Group will be headed by either Xi Jinping or Xi ally Li Zhanshu, Fu will find a pair of very high-ranking eyes watching over what he does as justice minister.
4. As public security vice minister, Fu has proven to be merciless in rounding up his old allies in the Jiang faction. We believe that Xi may seek to turn Fu loose against the dark characters running China’s prisons.
The justice ministry oversees the prisons, which are infamous sites of torture, abuse, and other human rights violations. During Xi’s first term, however, the purge of prison officials was nothing to shout about. To demonstrate his loyalty to Xi and preserve his career, Fu could carry out a rigorous sweep of the prisons and the justice apparatus.
5. Fu Zhenghua’s promotion is a strike against Guo Wengui, the Chinese tycoon who is hiding out in the U.S.
Guo seems to be a chess piece in the factional struggle between Xi Jinping and the Jiang faction. Before the 19th Congress, he sought to attack the Xi administration through criticizing Fu Zhenghua and “exposing” top Xi ally Wang Qishan. Guo’s move against Wang appeared to be aimed at forcing Xi to drop the idea of retaining Wang in a senior leadership position. However, Wang has since become vice president (and could potentially stay on in power indefinitely) and Fu is justice minister. If anything, Guo’s “exposés” have lost value.
CCP factional struggles are complicated affairs. Without an understanding of factional relations, it would be very difficult to detect CCP disinformation and misinformation. (See “A Warning About Guo Wengui” and “Decoding China’s ‘Secret Document’ on North Korea”)
6. We believe that Fu Zhenghua’s promotion doesn’t guarantee his safety. In fact, he is at high risk of being investigated, and could very well be purged the moment he shows signs of disloyalty in his new position.
7. The Ministry of Justice manages Chinese lawyers. There is a very good chance that the situation for human rights lawyers could deteriorate with Fu in charge as he strives to curb signs of disloyalty to “Party core” Xi, i.e., rights lawyers openly criticizing Xi’s rule.
Notes:
[1] Lei Yang, a Chinese environmentalist, was arrested by five Beijing police in a case of “mistaken identity,” and was later to have died in police custody of unnatural causes. Lei’s death sparked a huge public uproar, and Xi Jinping seemed to speak up on behalf of him and against his treatment by the police in public speeches. The English edition of People’s Daily even ran a commentary piece calling on police officers to listen to Xi and not to “exploit powers in the name of law enforcement.” The official statements indicated that Xi was intent on using Lei Yang’s case to clean up the domestic security apparatus.
[2] The BPSB almost certainly had a hand in allowing the military veterans’ protest to happen; a gathering of ten thousand people cannot easily escape the scrutiny of security officials. In other words, the Beijing security officials were sending a message to Xi: Without us protecting Beijing, the CCP leadership is endangered.
Source:- https://sinoinsider.com/2021/10/ccp-fac ... ce-cadres/CCP Factional Struggle Intensifies With Purge of Ex-610 Office Cadres
October 13, 2021
◎ The downfall of Sun Lijun and Fu Zhenghua appears to be connected to Xi’s effort at marginalizing and securing a decisive victory against the Jiang faction.
The Chinese Communist Party anti-corruption commission announced the purge of two former public security vice ministers as the fourth quarter of 2021 commenced. Sun Lijun was expelled from the Party and all government posts on Sept. 30. On Oct. 2, Fu Zhenghua was officially investigated for “serious violations of Party discipline and the law.”
There was an intrigue to Fu and Sun’s downfall. Observers believe Sun Lijun was removed for being disloyal to the Xi Jinping leadership as he was accused of “having improper discussions of Party Central’s major policies,” “complying publicly but defying privately,” and “engaging in cliques and factions in the Party.” There was also speculation that Sun was sidelined for leaking sensitive information about the CCP’s COVID-19 handling. The announcement of Sun’s expulsion noted that he had “deserted his post on the frontline of fighting the COVID-19 epidemic” and “privately possessed confidential materials without authorization.”
Explaining the purge of Fu Zhenghua was more complicated. Observers note that Fu was hugely unpopular everywhere and had many enemies in the Party. However, Fu had also helped Xi Jinping take down former security czar and Politburo Standing Committee member Zhou Yongkang, suggesting that he was in Xi’s good books. And until the investigation into Fu was announced in October, his promotion to justice minister in 2018 and transfer to the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference in 2020 seemed to affirm the view that Fu was headed for a safe retirement.
SinoInsider, however, anticipated the eventual purge of Fu Zhenghua in March 2018, at the time of his being appointed justice minister. We also noted that he “still faces significant levels of political risk” when his move to the CPPCC in May 2020 seemed to indicate his good standing. We accurately forecasted Fu’s downfall due to our assessment of the underlying dynamic of factional politics in the Xi era.
Negative political legacies
Xi Jinping has been locked in factional struggle against a powerful faction named after former Party boss Jiang Zemin since 2012, an aftermath of the Wang Lijun incident. While the past nine years have seen Xi consolidate power to a high degree and purge many Jiang faction officials through the anti-corruption campaign, the latter still “remains a force behind the scenes” today, according to a February Wall Street Journal report.
In factional intrigues, the CCP elite have historically attacked their rivals for their “negative legacies”—policies that were undertaken for some political advantage, yet resulted in great disaster or loss of life. For instance, Mao Zedong grew increasingly marginalized in the Party with then-PRC president Liu Shaoqi blaming him for the vast famine brought about by the “Great Leap Forward.”
Targeting the negative political legacy of Party leaders, however, is a highly risky affair with serious consequences. Those who attempt and fail may pay dearly. For challenging Mao’s legacy, Liu Shaoqi was later brutally tortured and killed. Meanwhile, the winners receive a political boost and emerge more dominant, as in the case of Deng Xiaoping attacking Hua Guofeng’s “Two Whatevers” (a vestige of the traumatic Maoist era) and eventually ousting the latter from power.
Both the Xi camp and the Jiang faction have been targeting each other’s political legacies since Xi Jinping took office. For the Jiang faction, that means calling attention to the Xinjiang persecution campaign and escalating tensions in Hong Kong to the point where the Xi leadership has to consider a Tiananmen-like resolution or other draconian measures to end the “chaos.” For Xi Jinping, attacking the Jiang faction’s political legacy involves cracking down on corruption and threatening intra-Party accountability over the Falun Gong persecution while sidelining the organization overseeing the campaign.
Xi-Jiang struggle
The downfall of Sun Lijun and Fu Zhenghua appears to be connected to Xi’s effort at marginalizing and securing a decisive victory against the Jiang faction.
First, the careers of Sun and Fu mark them as Jiang faction members. Both climbed the ranks of the political and legal affairs apparatus during Jiang’s era of dominance from 1997 to 2012. Both were also trusted enough by the Jiang faction to be allowed to helm its anti-Falun Gong campaign. In 2015, Fu was head of the supra-authority “610 Office” and Sun was his deputy. Jiang allies held sway over the political and legal affairs apparatus in Xi’s first term, and Xi’s ongoing campaign to “rectify” the apparatus suggests that it is not yet cleared of Jiang faction influence.
Second, the timing of the formal probe into Fu and Sun’s expulsion indicates that both cases are linked. In Xi’s anti-corruption campaign, investigators often target deputies, aides, and subordinates of high-ranking officials to build a case against them before moving in on the “big tiger.” Fu Zhenghua’s investigation being announced days after his former 610 Office subordinate Sun Lijun was expelled fits the Xi anti-corruption campaign’s mode of operation.
That Sun was also formally accused of resisting investigation is also very telling. It is reasonable to deduce that the anti-corruption authorities only concluded the investigation phase of his case after he finally ratted out his superiors, cronies, and allies. The authorities then very likely used what they gathered from Sun to formally investigate Fu Zhenghua and plan probes into even more senior officials.
Third, the connection between Fu and Sun’s cases and the charge against the latter of “engaging in cliques and factions” indicate that factionalism is the main reason for their ouster.
Finally, the larger context of Fu and Sun’s downfall suggests strong efforts by Xi to attack the Jiang faction’s political legacy. In the second week of September, state media announced that the second segment of the national political and legal affairs education and rectification campaign targeting political and legal affairs officials in provincial-level administrations and higher would commence; Xi has long sought to rein in and take full control over the Jiang faction-swayed political and legal affairs apparatus. Meanwhile, Fu is one of at least 10 former 610 Office leading cadres in city, provincial, and central administrations that have been purged in 2021, according to our tally of investigation announcements in mainland media reports.[1]
Previously, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection strongly rebuked the 610 Office for lacking “political sensitivity” in a 2016 corruption assessment report. The 610 Office and its leading group were subsequently disbanded and its functions split between the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission and the Ministry of Public Security as part of state and institutional reforms announced in 2018.
Showdown
Taking out Fu Zhenghua and Sun Lijun, key 610 Office cadres, and “rectifying” the political and legal affairs apparatus aside, the Xi leadership has issued several notable signals this year that indicate a desire to bring the Xi-Jiang struggle to an end in Xi Jinping’s favor. These include:
A crackdown on tech, finance, and entertainment, the last strongholds of the Jiang faction in the CCP regime;
Xi’s commemoration of the Battle of Xiangjiang, which emphasizes the need for Party members to follow his leadership to survive existential crisis;
References in Qiushi and other Party media (see here, here, and here) to “another Party Central” (另立黨中央), as well as the upholding of “Party splitters” Zhang Guotao and Wang Ming as negative examples that CCP members should not learn from;
Frequent calls to eliminate the “lingering poisonous influence” of Jiang faction members Zhou Yongkang, Meng Hongwei, Sun Lijun, and others in the political and legal affairs apparatus;
A Sept. 16 Qiushi op-ed by the People’s Liberation Army Academy of Military Science’s Institute of Military Political Work that called on the military to be absolutely loyal to Xi and the Party, and condemned Zhang Guotao, Wang Ming, Lin Biao and his “armed coup,” the “Gang of Four,” as well as Jiang faction members Guo Boxiong, Xu Caihou, Fang Fenghui, and Zhang Yang.
A Sept. 25 Central Commission for Discipline Inspection lead article called attention to the phenomenon of interest groups “surrounding and capturing” leading cadres, and warned that if allowed to continue, “it will inevitably shake the foundations of Party rule.” The article also mentioned “lawbreaking financial groups and Baoshang Bank,” with the latter institution being linked to Jiang faction bagman and Tomorrow Group founder Xiao Jianhua.
There are also informal signals that Xi is keen on decisively resolving the factional struggle in his favor:
Duowei, a Beijing-based overseas Chinese language media outlet with a record of leaking information pertaining to the Xi-Jiang struggle, claimed in a Sept. 1 report that the Sixth Plenum of the 19th Central Committee will send a “major political signal” with the emergence of a “third major ‘historical resolution’” [歷史決議]. Because both Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping took the opportunity to obliquely declare victory over their factional rivals in their respective “historical resolutions,” Duowei’s information implied that Xi can be expected to do likewise in his “historical resolution.”
On Sept. 14, “Shang Xian Lao Hou” (“商賢老侯”), a self-media column on the mainland portal NetEase, published an internal “morning meeting circular” received by various anti-corruption, public security, and Jiangsu provincial authorities exposing the “judicial mafia” in Jiangsu Province headed by Luo Wenjin, a former captain of the criminal police corps of the Jiangsu Provincial Public Security Bureau. The article noted that Luo had “illegal dealings” with former Chongqing vice mayor and police chief Deng Huilin and former China Huarong Asset Management chairman Lai Xiaomin, and indicated that Luo’s superior, the former Jiangsu Political and Legal Affairs Commission secretary Wang Like, was also involved in corrupt activity. The article added that Luo and Deng had “improper discussions of Party Central’s major policies,” “insulted key national leaders,” and even planned trouble during a visit by a “national leader” to a commemorative event in Nanjing, but were prevented from carrying out their “sinister activity” by Ministry of State Security personnel. The “Shang Xian Lao Hou” article was subsequently scrubbed from the internet.
Xi Jinping’s bid for a norm-breaking third term at the 20th Party Congress in 2022 is almost certainly the driving factor behind his stepping up of efforts this year to take out factional rivals and eliminate their remaining influence in the regime. With domestic problems compounding for Communist China (Evergrande, debt crisis, rapidly deteriorating economy, demographic crisis, natural disasters, coronavirus pandemic, etc.) and seriously threatening regime security, Xi’s only option is to double down on control, deny his factional rivals any opportunities to strike back, and purge those who persist in resisting him.
Active or retired Jiang faction cadres in the central government, including the Politburo and its Standing Committee, could be brought down if the Xi leadership continues to work its way up the food chain. Supreme People’s Court president Zhou Qiang, Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission secretary Guo Shengkun, and former CPLAC secretary Meng Jianzhu are at risk of being purged. Jiang faction number two Zeng Qinghong and even the faction figurehead Jiang Zemin are at risk of being taken down should Xi Jinping take his anti-corruption campaign to its logical conclusion.
The Jiang faction and the “anti-Xi coalition,” however, will not “go gentle into that good night.” They can be expected to push back against the Xi leadership from their remaining strongholds in the financial sector and the political and legal affairs apparatus.
Businesses, investors, and governments must account for political and Black Swan risks in China as the Xi-Jiang struggle moves to a showdown.
Notes
[1]
Che Jianjun, former director of the Anhui provincial 610 Office (investigated in February 2021);
Peng Bo, former deputy director of the Central 610 Office (investigated in March 2021; CCDI states his 610 Office position);
Zhang Lincai, former director of the 610 Office of Wuqing District, Tianjin City (investigated in April 2021; mainland media lists his 610 Office position);
Du Rongliang, former director of the 610 Office of Wuxi City, Jiangsu Province (investigated in April 2021; CCDI states his 610 Office position);
Liu Xinyun, former deputy director of the 610 Office of Zibo City, Shandong Province (investigated in April 2021; CCDI states his 610 Office position);
Ma Yuchan, former director of the Hebei provincial 610 Office (investigated in July 2021; CCDI states his 610 Office position);
Wang Wenhai, former director of the Henan provincial 610 Office (investigated in July 2021; CCDI states his 610 Office position);
Hui Congbing, former deputy director of the Shandong provincial 610 Office (investigated in August 2021; CCDI states his 610 Office position);
Fu Zhenghua, former director of the Central 610 Office (investigated in October 2021; mainland media lists his 610 Office position);
Xing Lin, former director of the Sichuan provincial 610 Office Strategic Research Division and head of the Sichuan 610 Office’s Foreign Affairs Division (investigated in October 2021; CCDI states his 610 Office position).
In historical terms, CCP is reaching a dead-end like the Qing dynasty and numerous Chinese dynasties which are said to have lost the Mandate of Heaven or jana samudayai or peoples acceptance.So what does all of the above mean for India? It means we have a madman on our eastern border and there are high chances that either Xi will try to pick a fight with India to secure his position (if he wins) but it's very risky so I am not sure if Xi will attempt it. But I feel that to embarrass Xi, PLA generals or units loyal to Jiang faction fight try to cause an incident to force Xi's hand and if it's not decisive victory for Xi, even a stalemate means Xi has lost the power struggle as the party and public perception will be against him.
This climax of decades of infighting will either make or break CCP.
Tbh I feel the countdown to CCP's demise might have already started. I feel India needs to be on high alert for the next 2 years.
Earlier this year, two veteran analysts of Chinese politics, Richard McGregor and Jude Blanchette (2021), published a comprehensive report, laying out four possible scenarios for the next leadership succession in China’s new era. In two of these scenarios, Xi Jinping is out of the picture as the result of either a coup or ‘unexpected death or incapacitation’. In the other two, he stays in power either by extending his tenure as the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to a third term or by retiring from that office but continuing to rule behind the scenes.
Below I outline a third path Xi could take to stay in power: reactivating the office of the Chairman of the Party Central Committee (hereinafter Party Chairman) at the twentieth CCP Congress in 2022. .........
The suggestion that there is a third road for Xi, apart from either continuing or disappearing after the 20th Congress of the CPC, does not appear convincing to me at this point of time. This might happen later, my be at the 21st Congress or beyond. By the 21st congress he would be only 75. XJP wants his pet projects to be completed in his life time and all by himself. He has even compressed the timeline for some goals. He cannot be sure, even if he assumed the overriding position of Chairmanship, that things would turn out exactly the way he wanted. That’s why he has accumulated all powers. Remember that there was a hitch in him getting to be the Head of the CMC just before assuming power and he disappeared for two weeks to force the issue? He is the Chairman of almost all the 'Leading Small Groups', the supra-State Council groups, which actually run the country. Besides, he has not yet identified a successor to groom at this point. He might evaluate the situation by 2024 and identify the successor in time for the the 21st Congress, if at all.
Absolutely Gautam ji. No wonder people call him Xitler.g.sarkar wrote:Sridharji,
This sounds very much like Hitler . . .
Many of the things I wrote have come to pass.The Challenge of China
D. Ramana
The end of Cold War and followed by the collapse of Soviet Union have transformed the Geo-politics globally. Consequently, ideological confrontation has been reduced to a competition between states. While the prospect of nuclear confrontation in Europe has significantly diminished, there remains the problem of reforming of Asian socialism, limited as it may be to China, Vietnam and North Korea. Recent initiatives by the United States to draw North Korea into the world community are encouraging and should be continued. However the moves seem to be driven by need for reducing instability in the Pacific Rim due to continuation of intransigence of the North Koreans. The impact of North Korean behavior in other regions due to propensity to proliferate WMD technology should be taken into account. They have been a source of missile proliferation to rogue states in the Middle East and South Asia (Pakistan). The profile of these transfers notwithstanding, North Korea was and remains a surrogate of People’s Republic of China, and it the latter that requires a closer examination.
The Chinese Challenge
In order to understand the challenge that China represents, one needs to understand the challenge that the Soviet Union, another totalitarian state, once posed. The superpower label used to describe the Soviet Union was misleading, in that Soviet Union was chiefly an ideologically driven military and political power. Despite its prodigious output during World War II and after, the Soviet Union was by no means an economic power. Its inability to successfully transition from a war economy to a peacetime consumer economy ultimately proved to be its undoing. The West, led by United States, formulated the ‘Containment’ policy in order to contain the spread of Soviet power with its system of alliances. However one has to realize that the Soviet Union had already reached its limits of its power soon after end of WWII. Its expansion in Eastern Europe was due to the quest for buffer territory from Germany and later Western Europe. Its forays out of its ‘near abroad’ were limited and reciprocal. The Afghan war stretched its resources and sapped its morale. The economic collapse that followed the intervention led to its implosion and collapse as the ‘other superpower’.
China in contrast is both a rising economic and political power. Its military though modernizing is limited to strategic weapons and does not have any real capability to influence any major event in the near term. Unlike Soviet Union, which was implementing a Western ideology, China's political thought is rooted in nationalism. It has been beating back invaders for over 3000 years. Few nations can boast of its continuity in history and a track record of survival. It has absorbed many invasions and has survived each of them. Its interlude with Communism should be seen in that light as another invasion – an invasion of ideas.
China’s evolution today represents the vision of two individuals- Mao Ze Dung and Deng Xiao Peng. The Mao’s contributions are many, but key among them is his role as nation builder. In particular, he unified China under communist rule, obtained nuclear weapons, and consolidated China’s place in the world. It took the Soviet Union seventy years to realize the folly of its economic policies. China, on the other hand, realized this in about thirty years and Deng launched the four modernizations to transform it. Significant among them is the absence of any devolution of political power. In fact soon after the modernization program was launched, the regime suffered a jolt in the form of political dissent form of the Democracy Movement and led to the Tienanmen Square massacres. This event shook the very core of the regime and hardened its attitudes towards political dissent. The West hopes that by constructive engagement it can bring about gradual changes to the Chinese polity. The hope is that the government will transition from totalitarianism to authoritarianism to eventually democracy. The adoption of pragmatic policies by Deng Xiao Peng, and end of Cold War show that it is making the transition to authoritarian state. In all possibility this could be the most that will happen. Engagement with the West is bringing about tremendous pressure for political change from the newly rich. However, the regime in Beijing wants to keep all political freedoms in control while it leapfrogs from ox-carts to a modern economy without giving up anything on the political side. It fears democratization could derail the process of modernization and undermine the authority of the Communist Party. Consequently, economic liberalization has not been accompanied by political liberalization.
The challenge of Taiwan to the Chinese political system
Taiwan’s democratic transformation throws up a major ideological challenge to the mainland’s political system. Many mainlanders would question the authoritarian nature of their state if the Taiwan experiment succeeds. The mainland is tackling the challenge in two ways- by treating Taiwan as a renegade province it questions the legitimacy of that political system which could undermine it- this is accompanied by keeping up the military pressure and numerous threats. The second way is that of proposing ‘one country two systems’ type of government. Both these paths appear to be aimed at buying time while it grows stronger. As can be seen the fight is internal and will get resolved with the march of time. However it is in the interest of the world community that Taiwan exists as an example of contrast to the people of China.
China and the World
China is a member of many of the power bodies of the world. Its pretense at being a responsible international player is not matched by its actions on the ground. Despite being a member of the UN Security Council its participation in peacekeeping missions are few and that too in non-combatant roles. Despite being a member of many international treaties it has proliferated weapons of mass destruction in its own strategic interest and has thus spread suffering.
In order to understand its policy of proliferation, one must understand that this constituted practicing war by other means. Realizing that direct war can be costly, China has found the asymmetric weapon of proliferation to tie down its challengers- declared and potential. Its nurturing the North Korean regime to tie down South Korea and principally Japan has backfired. The latter is drawn more closely into security arrangements with the US than during the Cold War. And possibly that could be a goal of the Chinese- a Japan tied up in a relationship with the US is better than an autonomous Japan. And North Korean belligerent moves have prompted the neighbors into participating in US theater missile defenses, which in turn degrade China’s posture. Its proliferation to Pakistan has prompted India to unveil its nuclear capability and it is a matter of time for the Indian posture to build up sufficiently to dissuade China. It is contributing to the instability in the Middle East by proliferation and hopes to weaken the US based alliances in the region. One has to see how this turns out in the future.
Taking a long view of China’s history, the nearby regions have suffered whenever China had a weak center. From the time of the Mongol invasions to the colonial era, there has been negative fallout in the region whenever China had weak regimes. However strong centers have also resulted in a spillover of hegemonistic tendencies prompting a former Thai minister to say, "The best thing China can do is stay together and stay at home!" What is desirable is a benign Son of Heaven in Beijing for peace and prosperity in Asia and now in a globalized world. However till that happens, one has to be on guard.
Threat to India and responses
The post Cold War was hoped to give rise to multiple poles. China sees for itself a bipolar role globally and a unipolar role regionally. It is in this aspect that its moves to check India’s rise to power should be seen. Most Indian observers state that the loss of Tibet as a buffer has brought about problems in the Indo- Sino relationship. However it is not understood that the occupation of Tibet was an essential element of the Chinese worldview for gaining domination in Asia. It is the desire to dominate and play a zero sum game that drives the dissonance in the relationship and than mere border disputes. Here again it has taken advantage of the confusion among the Indian elite in recognizing the challenge it presents to them. Here is an instance of Sun Tzu’s precepts in practice to confuse the challenger in order to achieve strategic surprise.
Ever since Sumdrong Chu, China seems to have decided that direct confrontation is not a feasible option and has propped up Pakistan as a surrogate. The proliferation of delivery systems started in late 1988 along with the declarations of peace. It is notable that these transfers took place after the Cold War was waning and appears to be part of a long-term strategy to tie up India locally. The hoped for response did not materialize as India took steps to protect its strategic autonomy.
The potential areas where China could cause direct problems for India are mainly two – proliferation of WMD to Pakistan and support for insurgencies in the North- East region. It can cause indirect problems through dragging its feet on the unsettled border and veto India’s membership in world councils. Proliferation of weapons and delivery systems to Pakistan increases instability and causes resources diverted to defense related systems. The umbilical can only be cut by forceful posture with Agni-III deployment and a visible the C3I system put in place. The nuclear tests in the late nineties and the deployment of the deterrent will contribute in mitigating the effects of the proliferation. Active dialog and steps have to be taken to raise the costs to the proliferators to dissuade them. Pursuing peace efforts in Kashmir with the local militants will go a long way to diffuse the situation and remove the rationale for Pakistan to offer ‘moral ‘ support to the militancy.
The trouble in North East and an unsettled border lead to increase or sustained military/paramilitary expenditure, which reduces economic growth. These could be accompanied by encouraging intransigence in neighbors- Myanmar etc. Here again a mixture of economic and political measures should tackle the internal troubles. Integrating the North East into the mainstream of the Indian economy is an urgent and required step and should be pursued regardless. As regards the neighbors, expansion of BMIST, and a new regional economic integration are needed to ensure ASEAN type of system. This should go a long way in discouraging the propensity to support such behavior in neighbors.
Conclusion
Its threat is mainly an indirect one through proliferation to Pakistan and support of insurgencies in the North East. It could also harass India by prolonging the border settlement and oppose entry into world bodies. The response has to be increased economic growth and regional integration to reduce propensity for conflict accompanied by a watchful eye on defense related systems. As China eventually resolves for itself the role that it wants to play in the world, India has to be on its guard. China’s attempts to constrain India are doomed to fail for India has historically never taken a back seat to China. The realization should be that it is not that China directly threatens India but rather it reduces and diminishes India’s power.
g.sarkar wrote:https://www.thestatesman.com/opinion/in ... 22556.html
India must exploit Chinese fears
For China, India remains a major threat, against which it is compelled to concentrate large forces.
Harsha Kakar | New Delhi | November 2, 2021
India last week conducted its first night-user firing of the newly introduced AGNI V ICBM. The missile range extends to the northern part of China. It forms a crucial part of India’s minimum deterrence policy. Earlier, China had questioned India’s missile trials by stating, “As for whether India can develop ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, the UNSCR 1172 already has clear stipulations.”
This UNSC resolution was issued post nuclear tests by both India and Pakistan. It mentions that the two nations must not develop nuclear-capable ballistic missiles. India ignored Chinese comments. Simultaneously, China has passed its new border laws which make the PLA responsible for border regions. China has constructed border villages, where it forcibly moved Tibetans from their traditional grazing grounds, handing over those lands to Han Chinese to exploit for minerals.
The new land laws make it mandatory for Tibetans living in these border villages to support military activities. These laws are mainly applicable against Bhutan and India, the two nations China has not settled its borders with. It is aware that its border dispute with Bhutan can only be settled with Indian concurrence. Though nothing changes between India and China with the passing of the new laws, the intention appears to be to project continuation of the dispute. {i]{Good general is not thinking broadly. The village settlements create civilian areas that need to be conquered in a clash. This way the villages are hostages to deter clashes.}[/i]
The Indian foreign ministry reacted and stated, “It may be noted that India and China have still not resolved the boundary question…In this regard, China’s unilateral decision to bring about a legislation which can have implication on our existing bilateral agreements on border management as well as on the boundary question is of concern to us.”
Chinese foreign ministry officials dismissed Indian objections. Tensions between India and China continue along the northern and eastern borders. Talks with China have stalled. Additional forces would remain in place through harsh winters for the second consecutive year. In the past twenty months, China has replaced 20 battalions in Ladakh and has had large medical casualties due to weather conditions; however due to its own stubbornness, it is compelled to remain in situ for future winters.
As per the Indian army’s Eastern Army Commander, Lt Gen Manoj Pande, Chinese exercises in the region have increased, as also has its troop density. Development of infrastructure continues by both sides. China is aware that India is no pushover. The recent incident in Tawang where Chinese troops were temporarily detained has hurt Chinese ego. It employed every social media forum to deny the incident and stalled the last round of talks to convey its displeasure.
When India announced it would impart lessons on Tibetology to its soldiers deployed along the LAC, the Chinese mouthpiece, the Global Times, stated that the Indian intention appears to be to deploy these troops in disputed regions. Indian deployment of K9 Vajra and M 777 155 mm guns in Eastern Ladakh was commented upon by the Chinese spokesperson as “China opposes any arms race in the disputed border areas for the purpose of competition over control.”
In retaliation, China deployed 100 long-range PCL-181 light, truck mounted howitzers. In the Eastern theatre India has deployed Pinaka and Smerch multiple barrel rocket systems in response to China deploying its rocket regiments. Troop levels maintained by both sides are at near parity, thus making operations difficult. India has sent the message that it will not be cowed down by Chinese pressures.
......
Gautam
If China's reading of India is even half as accurate as it needs to be, it will realise that it has no real direct moves to make anywhere on the border. Last year's Ladhak confrontation leading to Galwan was its best shot at agressing India and capturing Leh. Its far from certain they would have succeeded, but it was the best shot they had. After Glawan, PLA is obliged to maintain a large force in Ladhak to defend against India's response, and that has made a move on Aurnachal nearly impossible. Because if hostilities start in Arunachal, it would give India an opportunity and reason to attack G219 and cut off the umbilical cord for Chinese towns and troops in Ladhak. India can then launch a counter offensive in Ladakh and destroy Hotan base, capture territory, take PoWs and be in a strong bargaining position to trade them off against any potential gains China may make in Arunachal.ramana wrote:So having weapons is not the issue but the delivery vehicles is the crux of the problem.
The bolded statements indicate there is parity along LAC.
So where and how would PLA make a move?
Very prescient!! This is the reality today.ramana wrote:The post Cold War was hoped to give rise to multiple poles. China sees for itself a bipolar role globally and a unipolar role regionally. It is in this aspect that its moves to check India’s rise to power should be seen. Most Indian observers state that the loss of Tibet as a buffer has brought about problems in the Indo- Sino relationship. However it is not understood that the occupation of Tibet was an essential element of the Chinese worldview for gaining domination in Asia. It is the desire to dominate and play a zero sum game that drives the dissonance in the relationship and than mere border disputes. Here again it has taken advantage of the confusion among the Indian elite in recognizing the challenge it presents to them. Here is an instance of Sun Tzu’s precepts in practice to confuse the challenger in order to achieve strategic surprise.
You are being modest here. 20 years ago the wider analyst community did not foresee that China would so rapidly develop the economic and military capability to make a coercive pitch for a unipolar Asia and a bipolar world. It required a keen reading of the Chinese psyche.ramana wrote:Nothing prescient about.
Just having a clear mind like Tagore advised, "Where the mind is without fear..."
We need to build on it. No retro kudos!
How do you reconcile your assertion that China's threat is an indirect one with your concern regarding the PLA wanting to make a move?ramana wrote:So having weapons is not the issue but the delivery vehicles is the crux of the problem.
The bolded statements indicate there is parity along LAC.
So where and how would PLA make a move?
I wrote that 20 years ago. Since then much water has flown down the Brahmaputra.DavidD wrote:How do you reconcile your assertion that China's threat is an indirect one with your concern regarding the PLA wanting to make a move?ramana wrote:So having weapons is not the issue but the delivery vehicles is the crux of the problem.
The bolded statements indicate there is parity along LAC.
So where and how would PLA make a move?
https://twitter.com/ELuttwak/status/145 ... XhNaA&s=19In India last month I observed the depths of Chinese strategic incapacity in antagonizing a country whose trajectory is bound to overtake the PRC's vast progress achieved during its now fading high-speed growth phase. Modi strove hard to educate Xi Jinping in 1 on 1s, to no avail
If I'm reading you correctly, you're stating that China's motives have not changed, but the situation on the ground has changed, therefore China's tactics will change as well, right?ramana wrote:I wrote that 20 years ago. Since then much water has flown down the Brahmaputra.DavidD wrote:
How do you reconcile your assertion that China's threat is an indirect one with your concern regarding the PLA wanting to make a move?
Things change but people don't.
PLA at that time had Pakistan tie up India. No longer so has to make a move.