Lessons Learned from Russia-Ukraine Battles

[ramana]

On this one-year anniversary of the Russo-Ukraine Battle, what lessons are there for India?

[Avid]

On this one-year anniversary of the Russo-Ukraine Battle, what lessons are there for India?

Conflicts in this day and age will be "short and intense" war is a myth. While that is still most likely -- a country needs to have a solid plan for a long sustained war. Why? A conflict with PRC is more likely to shape like that than be only short-and-intense.

While this is most likely a Russian source -- it does talk about Russia's doctrine of "Total War" and the perspective of sustainment of such action.

With sustainment, it is not just an issue of surge capacities; but also a matter of equipment selection. Clearly, when discussing in context of India -- this implies we must take constrained resources in mind while being prepared for both types of wars. That is easier said than done.

To my fellow rakshaks -- I urge you to read the essay and accept what might be relevant to our context. Over the years, following the discussion here -- we have often talked about decision makers falling for glitz and glamor of complex equipment. This essay brings out many of those.

https://simplicius76.substack.com/p/in- ... -total-war

[sudeepj]

On this one-year anniversary of the Russo-Ukraine Battle, what lessons are there for India?

1. The age of the 'big arrow' offensive and war of movement/Bewegungskrieg/blitzkrieg is probably over now that the enemy has numerous eyes in the sky.
2. Conflict will be waged subliminally using the rhetoric of 'open societies' till suddenly, one day it explodes into a shooting war. Infiltration into civic infrastructure and sovereignty over info domain is crucial.

[Yagnasri]

On this one-year anniversary of the Russo-Ukraine Battle, what lessons are there for India?

Prepare for wartime production levels.
Prepare for 0.5 front more intensely.
Prepare to use all methods, including targeting individuals, without hesitation.
Economy to be insulated from world events.
Information warfare.

[sanjayc]

Prepare to use all methods, including targeting individuals, without hesitation.

This is very effective. Bumping off key individuals of the enemy is a low-cost option to cause big damage to the entire structure confronting you. Seen in Nepal, Maoists and Pakistan.

[Deans]

On this one-year anniversary of the Russo-Ukraine Battle, what lessons are there for India?

1. We have to be atmanirbhar in defense production. Getting something made in India which is good enough (meets basic requirements) is better
than the best imported product. Same with foreign investment - don't over rely on it.

2. Defence production capacity has to be min 3X of what we can produce. If a Ordnance factory produces from 1 production line running 1 shift, it
should have 2 lines installed capable of operating 2 shifts, with trained workers available at short notice (no unions)

3. We lag (in my opinion) in Drones, AI, cyber security. That has to be boosted on a war footing. Also critical gaps in SAMs, AWACS, Submarines,
Artillery (barrels and ammo as much as guns) and longer range missiles.

4. Infantry is our strength. Russia is not able to take territory, because they use artillery as a substitute for infantry.

5. We can't fight a war on our own, we need allies, who can give us intel, critical spares, or force multiplier weapons we don't have.
(Israel, Japan, Taiwan, France, Vietnam ?).

6. Some critical infrastructure has to have a degree for foreign ownership to de-risk them. e.g. Oil companies partly owned by Saudi/ UAE
(but not a controlling stake). Unfriendly countries (China) have to be completely out of critical infra.

[chetak]

On this one-year anniversary of the Russo-Ukraine Battle, what lessons are there for India?

just one boffors gun position on the border can fire off several million $ worth of ammo in a single night

[NRao]

On this one-year anniversary of the Russo-Ukraine Battle, what lessons are there for India?

* India MUST be able to operate in the "dark" - no GPS, no or rudimentary communications, and absolutely no "network". Absolutely forget about (the dumb and silly idea called the) "cloud"
* India must be able to ID/distinguish between humans and robots and prepare to attack the humans and deal with the robots

* Set aside the Geneva Conventions most of the times - which is "as appropriate"

* Do not bargain any advantages gained for "peace" (there is nothing called "peace". "Peace" is only the absence of "war" -"war" being the true nature of man)

[ramana]

On this one-year anniversary of the Russo-Ukraine Battle, what lessons are there for India?

I am not calling it a war as it's a lot of skirmishes in a battle.

[pravula]

Artillery is king. Includes rockets
Cheaper drones - at scale
Airpower for CAS - not feasible
Manpower/Training also needs surge capacity

[ramana]

Folks am going to capture the Lessons learned in another thread so it is not lost. Thanks.

Let us explore this in another thread.
Am going to ask questions and use Socratic Method!

[Kanoji]

Set up an Information research organization that disseminates relevant information in various media/social media outlets to set/control the narrative. Ensure that this organization has enough budget and operational freedom to do its job. Something along the lines of ISPR.

[Atmavik]

1. "Fire and Maneuver" has been replaced by "Surveillance and Precision"
2. Logistics is still lifeline of war
3. cannot just prepare for a Lightning campaign wars can drag on . need industrial capacity to keep producing Ammo and spares

[sudeepj]

There is some nuance lost in the question itself. If you have the disadvantages suffered by Ukraine, you will draw different lessons. If you are in a Russia like situation, you will draw different lessons.

In general, some more observations:
1. Cheap/Disposable surveillance and attack drones is the new high ground.
2. If your factories can be hit, its good to have some factories abroad or in neutral countries that are out of the reach of the enemy.
3. COTs should be designed into mil hardware, mil specific production does not scale.
4. Dual use industries make sense. An OF producing pressure cookers makes sense, if the capacity can be converted into making mines or shells in short order. A factory producing rail wheels can also make tank wheels. etc. Such sourcing and production should be encouraged.
5. War plans must include industrial policy.
6. "Big arrow" offensives very hard to pull off against a reasonably equipped and unattritted enemy because of the 'eyes in the sky' will forewarn.
7. Longer range and mass still counts.
8. If war comes, we will have to fight with whatever we have. Postponing acquisitions while forces wait for unobtainium is suicide. Better to have batched acquisitions on a continuous basis.
9. Your entire population can form a civil air observer core! Ukraine developed a phone app, that allowed people to report cruise missile heading just by pointing their phone in the direction that the missile went!
10. A full war can be extremely destructive and unpredictable affair. Should avoid if one can. 'Friends' will try to manipulate you to attack their enemies.

[ramana]

Will start asking questions from here onwards.
1.0 What was the efficacy of Armed drones?
1.a Kamikaze or Suicide drones
1.b Armed UAVs

Will ask next question after replies are exhauated.

[V_Raman]

My 2 items

• India needs to 100% in house capability for ammo production across the board. Including gun powder, fuzes, etc.
  India needs 100% in house capacity for missile production including chips and electronics. We should get older gen fabs asap that can service auto industry and dual purpose for defense. Get away from the old Intel processors and go with an Indian design that can be made with auto industry level fabs. Size does not matter. Production capacity matters. As we saw - we dont need cell phones in a war!

[Pratyush]

Will start asking questions from here onwards.
1.0 What was the efficacy of Armed drones?
1.a Kamikaze or Suicide drones
1.b Armed UAVs

Will ask next question after replies are exhauated.

1.0 During the initial phase of the operations, the armed drones were effective locally. Once the Russians started to jam communications and the IADS operators were trained under fire. Drones lost effectiveness to an extent, that, the Ukrainians actively discouraged the Americans from supply of Reapers to Ukraine.

Over the last few months, I have not seen any evidence of large armed drone operation over the battlefield.

On the flip side they have used something to strike an air base in Russia. I personally believe it to be a modified Tu drone from the USSR days.

The objective lesson for me is as follows.

- Armed UAVs are effective in non contested environments.

-Where the enemy has the ability to disrupt data links and jam
communication with the drones. They lose effectiveness quickly.

- they are susceptible to low end air defences.

Looking into the future.

Armed UAV in order to retain effectiveness for the future will need to develop following capabilities.

1) geo fenced autonomous target engagement capacity against enemy radio emitters and jammers. Using anti radiation weapons. The drone will have to be relatively large in size.

2) low observable airframe.

3) AI based targeting capacity for hunter killer roles against field formations.

1.A will respond later.

1.B see response to point 1.0

[NRao]

By the time i posted last, i thought someone would have mentioned "sensors".

* Miniaturization of sensors.

* Conformal sensors

* Self-healing sensors

* Accompanying software - this is a topic by itself

* Open architecture - this too is a topic by itself. Plug-n-play, vendor agnostic, version agnostic

__________________

Sensors are a dime a dozen. Anyone can built test articles and before going public debug them, etc. Great for "AI" projects.

[Anoop]

No lessons to be learned on protecting civil population centers? To ensure displaced population handling?

[ramana]

Anoop, I am trying to channel the discussion.
We will park your point for later.

[ramana]

https://simplicius76.substack.com/p/in- ... -total-war

I think experts are not looking at how the objectives decide the conduct of war.

The US way of war is to capture the center of gravity and end the war.
This might work with democratic states.
With an ideological/authoritarian state, you need to destroy its capability to wage war.
In fact, US Civil War also shows this concept.

The North could have captured Richmond and ended the war in a year at most.
But they dragged it for 4 years and destroyed the South.
In Gulf War, US captured Baghdad and forced a regime change. However, ended up getting a long resistance and eventually had to leave.
Same in Afghanistan. The capture of Kabul and installing Karzai were easy.
But eventually had to leave Kabul and the Taliban came back.

So why did India succeed in East Pakistan by capturing Dacca?
Well, the Pak Army of 93000 was really an occupying force and the capture of Dacca led to their removal.


The same tactic won't work with a dash to Indus.
It will be a brutal war of destruction with Pakistan.

[Cyrano]

We must note that the use of fairly cheap small unarmed drones with a live camera in roles such as
A. sentry or reconnaissance,
B. provide precise coordinates guidance to artillery on enemy assets for accurate firing
from long range rockets, artillery guns, machine guns or armed drones is also being extensively used, both for offensive and defensive purposes, thus reducing risks to combatants and therefore reducing casualties.

It seems to be working well for both sides.

[NRao]

Will start asking questions from here onwards.
1.0 What was the efficacy of Armed drones?
1.a Kamikaze or Suicide drones
1.b Armed UAVs

Will ask next question after replies are exhauated.

UAV usage in the Ukraine war is not representative (as compared to others who have an integrated doctrine).

My understanding is that the Russians did not have a plan to use them, and the Ukrainians used them - IMO - for PR or evening TV broadcasts.

___________________

Aside:

* Each Service (special ops, army, navy, AF) has its own need for UAVs. There is a lot to unpack on this topic and the likes of China, who leads, have made huge strides - as far as techs are concerned, not saying they are well integrated

[V_Raman]

https://simplicius76.substack.com/p/in- ... -total-war

I think experts are not looking at how the objectives decide the conduct of war.

The US way of war is to capture the center of gravity and end the war.
This might work with democratic states.
With an ideological/authoritarian state, you need to destroy its capability to wage war.
In fact, US Civil War also shows this concept.

The North could have captured Richmond and ended the war in a year at most.
But they dragged it for 4 years and destroyed the South.
In Gulf War, US captured Baghdad and forced a regime change. However, ended up getting a long resistance and eventually had to leave.
Same in Afghanistan. The capture of Kabul and installing Karzai were easy.
But eventually had to leave Kabul and the Taliban came back.

So why did India succeed in East Pakistan by capturing Dacca?
Well, the Pak Army of 93000 was really an occupying force and the capture of Dacca led to their removal.


The same tactic won't work with a dash to Indus.
It will be a brutal war of destruction with Pakistan.

This is great insight - perhaps the gap between our Army and DRDO in designing systems. I might be totally wrong to draw this conclusion - but this is perhaps why Arjun is resisted so much and why ATAGS might also face the same issue.

[ks_sachin]

This is great insight - perhaps the gap between our Army and DRDO in designing systems. I might be totally wrong to draw this conclusion - but this is perhaps why Arjun is resisted so much and why ATAGS might also face the same issue.

How so?

[Shameek]

An area to focus on will be the protection of military assets, factories etc. even away from the conflict zone. There has been news of fringe groups and others damaging assets deep inside Russia and Belarus. Some of our assets are in highly populated areas where civilian infrastructure has intruded very close.

[ramana]

V_Raman,
If you look at Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan's early campaigns, they were wars of maneuver and quickly won victory by capturing capitals.

Then it became long wars. IOW blitz krieg period was over as Allies chose to destroy the ideological Nazis and Imperial Japan.
Italians didn't matter.

So it's matter of which war are we fighting?

[SwamyG]

If there is an Indo-Pak war, India needs to convince Russia, America and China to not intervene. It means India needs to convince them that destruction of Pakistan is beneficial to them. If America or China intervenes, it will be a long drawn war.

[Deans]

If there is an Indo-Pak war, India needs to convince Russia, America and China to not intervene. It means India needs to convince them that destruction of Pakistan is beneficial to them. If American or China intervenes, it will be a long drawn war.

The destruction of Pak = Destruction of Pakistan's economic potential. We have to identify where Pak is most vulnerable. For e.g. Ukraine's installed power capacity is double of actual pre war consumption. In Pak, there are power shortages, so they are a lot more vulnerable to strikes on their power grid and plants.
Destruction of Pak army in a battle of attrition, should not be the goal, as it will result in heavy losses for us too- though a consequence of the war would be that Pak loses its offensive potential and ceases to be a threat.

For China our defenses should give the perception that we are not the best option for Chinese expansionism - Taiwan may be a more attractive target, or grabbing parts of the South China sea. Ukraine gave the impression in Feb 22 that they will roll over quickly. After that NATO had the impression that Russia will run out of ammo etc and sanctions will collapse their economy. Both assumption, in my view, led to the strong strategic decisions.

[SwamyG]

There are three phases:
1) Preparing the World that Pakistan is obsolete
2) Military defeat of Pakistan
3) Post-victory managment of the people, territory and material assets.

[ramana]

One lesson learned by Russia is reorganization of their assault battalions.

https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/statu ... caIgQ&s=19

To understand this change look at the 1970s Soviet Assault Batallion organization.
It brings heavy firepower right into battalion command.

Another way of saying is the combat brigades are getting smaller.
The challenge is urban and forest areas.

[ks_sachin]

One lesson learned by Russia is reorganization of their assault battalions.

https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/statu ... caIgQ&s=19

To understand this change look at the 1970s Soviet Assault Batallion organization.
It brings heavy firepower right into battalion command.

Another way of saying is the combat brigades are getting smaller.
The challenge is urban and forest areas.

Suprise! Suprise!

[Jay]

For us the lesson is if want to fight Pakis or China then we need to make our armed forces understand that no amount of buying foreign stuff and ignoring domestic military industry will make us win the war. When Pakistan can fight asymmetrically by throwing a few hundred drones, responding to every drone incursion with a gold plated rafale will not yield results and will make sure that out strength is irrelevant. There was a huge gulf between the aspirations of Putin his inner circle and what Russia's armed forces were actually capable of and we need to make sure this gulf does not exist in our context. In a war with Pakis, US might be neutral but China would not and will provide the Pakis with the entirety of its surveillance capabilities. Time and time again when we get into a skirmish, we set off to Europe/Israel with a blank check and will buy enough goods that will only last for that battle and no more. This mindset needs to be overcome and we need to embark on a serious stockpiling of ammo and wares.

Tactically, we need integration of UAV's and Anti UAV capabilities passed down to the smallest units. Across the board increase in the firepower, and EW capabilities. Availability of high caliber artillery within a reach of a call. Support and Supply units need to be assigned the same importance as assault/combat units. Streamline flow of communication from up and down the chain and reinforce decision making capabilities to the units closer to battle. Practice, Practice, and more Practice.

[ks_sachin]

V_Raman,
If you look at Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan's early campaigns, they were wars of maneuver and quickly won victory by capturing capitals.

Then it became long wars. IOW blitz krieg period was over as Allies chose to destroy the ideological Nazis and Imperial Japan.
Italians didn't matter.

So it's matter of which war are we fighting?

Ramana sir blitzkrieg is one aspect of manoeuvre warfare in my humble opinion.

It did not become long wars out of a choice by the allies. Geography wrt to Japan and the fact that an extremely competent German army waited for them across the channel plus the fact that they had to cross the channel meant that a dash to Berlin was going to be difficult. But if you look at the various operations/battles speed to Berlin was definitely something of importance.

[NRao]

One lesson learned by Russia is reorganization of their assault battalions.

If at all I would call it "adaptation", which led to "reorganization". It is to be expected, nothing surprising. The Ukrainian military must reorganize to defeat Russia August 30, 2022, from none other than the Atlantic Council!!! So, what else is new?

__________________________

Meanwhile, I have no idea how much to trust the person tweeting:

Unlike BTG, assault detachments doesn’t seem to have a logistics or MLRS units in their structure.

So, how are these units supported?

[ks_sachin]

NRao,

Reorg / Adapt call it whatever you want.

The weakness of the BTG and especially the manpower component and its mode of operation was known. So my initial feeling has been vindicated.

I had a look at the structure again and I seem to think that they have fixed the fundamental problem with the BTG which was the availability of manpower. Although I am surprised at some of the operational tactics that have been specified in the manual as per the twitter poster. I am not sure how reliable this info is...

[NRao]

KSS,

That a weakness was detected and addressed is the greatness of the Russians - which I called "adaptation".

Reorgs are a dime a dozen. The Army’s transformation begins with these new units April 11, 2022. US Army reorgs because they feel like. What problem do they solve, I bet they themselves do not know.

Hats off to your "initial feeling".

[Pratyush]

Gunners shot discussion on the topic of Russo-Ukrainian war.

[ks_sachin]

That the weakness existed because the recent Russian army was not designed to fight the war it has ended up fighting. This is the first time after WW2 are they fighting a proper war!!

[V_Raman]

ks_sachin ji and ramana ji - our army is not at like USA or NATO. We likely need to fight a war of attrition with Pak or with China - equations change with a 14000 stockpile of BrahMost of course - especially with Pak.

Our Army might still be operating under similar Russian philosophy and want equipment that takes low manpower to run and is multi-purpose - similar to russian gear. Hence the speculation that Army might be resisting machines like Arjun which require a crew of 4 and has higher degree of automation than the T90.