Deterrence

[ramdas]

Ramana garu,

It is clear from our nuc. doctrine that MCD is a dynamic concept: as the adversaries (not just the derivative one) increase their forces, our requirements increase. In fact, NFU is a convenient justification for building a robust deterrent.

The only doubt is whether the current "secular liberal" dominated dispensation has slowed or halted the process of updating our MCD to keep pace with requirements (possibly by revising downwards our estimate of requirements).

[ShauryaT]

Read this from 1991!
The Nuclear Dimension: Manvendra Singh

A discussion with K Subrahmanyam, Gen. Sundarji, Jaswant Singh, Praful Bidwai, and others.

Rummaging through Indian Express’ archives has unearthed an interesting discussion in India in January 1991, on the merits and demerits of going nuclear and costs associated with such a decision. Interestingly, the discourse in India at the time was motivated by accounts of Pakistan already possessing a nuclear stockpile; not the other way around, as some commentators would like the world to believe. Clearly, AQ Khan’s admission to Kuldip Nayar in at the height of the Brasstacks crisis played a critical role in shaping Indian perceptions of the regional security environment, post 1987.

The seminar, entitled “Nuclear Pakistan and Indian Response,” was sponsored by IDSA and included commentary from K Subrahmanyam, Gen. Sundarji, Jaswant Singh, Gen. Vohra and Praful Bidwai. Excerpts from Manvendra Singh’s op-ed follow:

Mr. Praful Bidwai expressed doubts as to whether Pakistan was in fact capable of producing nuclear weapons. He called it a bogey used by many in Delhi, for the sole purpose of justifying India going nuclear. David Albright’s article in the June (1987) issue of “Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists” was heavily quoted by him for the technical aspects of his arguments.

Albright’s article was full of uncertainties, as Mr. RR Subramaniam pointed out in his vociferous rebuttals of Mr. Bidwai, whose claim that Pakistan’s nuclear policy was a response to the 1974 Pokhran test was historically incorrect. And in fact none of the other participants pointed out to him that ZA Bhutto’s famous (we will eat grass but make a bomb) speech was made in January, 1972 in Multan.

Gen. Sundarji, with his quick-draw tongue, was at his articulately hawkish best. A specialist in “Deterrence theories,” Gen. Sundarji made a very pertinent point when he stated that simple deterrence, without political engagement leads to overkill, as it did for the Soviet Union. This was in response to the argument that desire for nuclear weapons in the belief of acting as deterrents can never be satiated, as stockpiles go on rising. While unequivocally calling for India to go nuclear, he was of the view that diplomatic dialogue has to be encouraged if an overkill situation is to be avoided.

Mr. K Subrahmanyam, the doyen amongst defense specialists, was characteristically blunt and sharp in his analysis. Debunking the argument put forward that an active nuclear policy is grossly expensive, Mr. Subrahmanyam convincingly backed his thesis that in terms of the value of returns for investments, a nuclear weapons programme is the most effective. The total amount, he clarified, spent on our nuclear weapons programme is minuscule compared to the overall defence outlay. Lamenting on the absence of direction and purpose in our nuclear policy, he grimly reminded the participants about the period post-1962, when India went, prostrate before Britain and the United States, desperate for a nuclear umbrella vis-a-vis China, backing Gen. Sundarji’s statement that “weakness is not a virtue.”

Mr. Jaswant Singh, the only active participant from the ranks of politicians (Mr. IK Gujral was largely an observer), created a bit of a ripple amongst the participants when he declared that India had lost the strategic initiative to Pakistan. He declined to elaborate, saying that it was vital for all to ponder over it. In all probability, his thesis revolved around the fact that primarily out of our inaction, the internal and external range of India’s maneuverability has shrunk to levels incompatible to India’s status and role in the world. This is the sum total loss arising out of an absence of clear long-term policy formulation and implementation.

And taking this setback into account, he said, makes it all the more necessary to have permanent bodies like the National Security Council Secretariat. Active during the period of the National Front government in the formation of the NSC, Mr. Singh stated convincingly that it was imperative for India to have such a specialized decision-making body, given the circumstances that it finds itself in. The shortage of active politicians participating in seminars of such importance is a phenomenon for all Indians to seriously think about.

The decision to go nuclear, or not, rests entirely on the political leadership of India, and which is to a large extent, totally unacquainted with this and related subjects. In Pakistan,however, it is the military brass that is in control of defence policy-making. A military in power, directly or indirectly, will always enlarge its arsenal to keep the internal balance of power, psychologically or otherwise, in its favour. It is therefore natural, no matter how much static exists between Washington and Islamabad, that Gen. [Aslam] Baig will go ahead with increasing and improving Pakistan’s nuclear capability.

In the unlikely event of Pakistani civil leadership initiating moves towards a nuclear treaty with India, Gen. Baig could very easily torpedo the whole process with some populist gimmickry. A nuclear capability will be an enormous psychological boost for Pakistan’s aims in Afghanistan, Punjab and Kashmir

[JE Menon]

Has anyone heard what Prafool is up to lately?

[Sanku]

Has anyone heard what Prafool is up to lately?

Opposing Jaitapur

[JE Menon]

Tx...

[ramana]

Summary of Lok Sabha debate on the NFU issue:

Pioneer Editorial page;

Rethink No First Use
March 18, 2011 4:25:51 AM

Update foreign policy, says Jaswant Singh

By asserting that there will be no change in India’s nuclear strategy, Union Minister of Foreign Affairs, SM Krishna, may have hoped to express the nation’s commitment to “universal, non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament” — which is all very fine — but in reality, he has only wasted a well-timed, much-needed opportunity to revisit our decade-old No First Use policy. A pledge to refrain from using nuclear weapons until we are first hit with the same, it has been the cornerstone of our nuclear policy since the nuclear tests of 1998. But that was 13 years ago and much has changed since then. The Twin Towers have been bombed out of the New York skyline, Al Qaeda has more clout than the CIA, China has just become bigger and better and Pakistan no longer even pretends to be a functioning state, let alone a democratic one. In others words, the world of 2011 is very different from that of 1998 and we simply cannot afford to cling to what might just have become outdated policy — indeed, this was exactly the point made by former Minister of External Affairs and senior BJP leader, Jaswant Singh on Tuesday at a Lok Sabha debate when he noted that the policy is “greatly in need of revision” and warned that the present Government “cannot continue to sit in yesterday’s policy”. He cited India’s multidimensional security concerns as an important reason why the Government must take a hard look at the policy. More specifically, Mr Singh pointed towards Pakistan’s fast growing nuclear arsenal. He noted that Pakistan — a nearly-defunct state which is overrun by terrorists — has about 100 to 110 nuclear warheads, exactly double that of India’s nuclear capacity. This is a matter of grave concern for India and it is imperative that the Government at least begin to deliberate on the matter.

During the debate, Mr Singh also delineated related security issues as well, expressing concern that the nation’s foreign policy was being finalised in Washington, DC as the recent Wikileaks cables have revealed. He also noted that flawed foreign policy initiatives have led to disastrous consequences in Tibet (where we accepted China’s domination), in Sri Lanka (LTTE camps still run in India) and in Nepal (where the Maoists are coming to power and we have done nothing to contain their influence). With respect to Pakistan, Mr Singh rightly pointed out that it was unclear if our bilateral ties were governed by “spirit of the Shimla Agreement, the spirit of Sharm-el Sheikh or more recently the Thimphu spirit.” He also warned of India’s dangerous indifference to the Chinese threat and advised that the country should intervene with caution in its larger neighbourhood in West Asia. Mr Shashi Tharoor who responded to Mr Singh, argued that China maybe aggressive but is also a billion dollar trade partner while in Pakistan’s case, dialogue was must. As for the Gulf countries, Mr Tharoor agreed that we had significant energy, financial and human interest in the region.

So its the economy issue trumps everything? or is case of US decides and INC implements. Tharoor could have responded better.

Did Jaswant Singh say don't dialog with TSP? No. Just adjust the NFU if needed. So talking at a tangent is not enough. As for trade with PRC so is security that enables the trade is also important.

My feelingis that NDA is making the case for a new security paradigm on the basis of changes in the ground and the signal will be lost again just as in 1998.

INC is clinging to NFU like it did to non alignment.

Someone tell Tharoor that NSA Menon already changed the doctrine in his speech at the NDC in October 2010 in front of the Prseident and Cheils of Staff. i.e. the supreme commander and his military council.

[ShauryaT]

It is painful for these two national parties not to see eye to eye on critical issues of national interests.

But, look at these numbers from JS - he is on the record and not challenged.

Revisit no-first-use policy

He wanted the no-first-use policy on nuclear weapons revised, citing changes in the global scenario. Security concerns were multidimensional, and policies of the 20th century would not work, he said, and stressed the need for immediate revision of the nuclear policy. “Please hold broader consultations. Time will not wait for us.” He wanted the government to take the Opposition into confidence while revising the nuclear policy.

Mr. Singh said while India had only 50-60 warheads, Pakistan had 100-110 warheads and their location was not known even to the U.S.

On India-Pakistan relations, he said it was difficult to know whether the two countries were moving ahead in the “spirit of the Shimla Agreement, the spirit of Sharm-el Sheikh or more recently the Thimphu spirit.”

Jaswant: Is Indian policy drafted in Washington?

[ramana]

What if the Pakis have changed their model for nuke deployment? Maybe in Mushy time it was centralized and hence they could make do with lower numbers. Maybe now for various reasons(TSP political situation, Kiyani's internal equations with other army commanders, US in Afghanistan with special forces, Col Start fears etc., etc.) they have distributed the nukes with the corps(e) commanders and thus need as many times that early number.

Gagan, we can affirm or discard this thesis by looking at location of the corps commanders and location of the assets and launch vehicles and air strike assets in the cc area of command?

If above is true they have opted for wide dispersal of their assets and the old proximate security BS from US is just that.

[saadhak]

Has anyone heard what Prafool is up to lately?

As expected, the Japan problem gives him another opportunity to do what earns him his bread 'n butter.
http://www.rediff.com/news/slide-show/s ... 110317.htm

[ShauryaT]

If above is true they have opted for wide dispersal of their assets and the old proximate security BS from US is just that.

Ramana ji: My readings suggest somewhere between 8-12 sites and some war heads are mobile capable. If our government is not spending resources to track this, it would be criminal. Also, all this new estimate is an approximation of their HEU and WgPu capacities and not necessarily number of war heads.

[shyamd]

What if India's usage of N weapons can have greater damage to the enemy with minimal usage of N weapons? 3 gorges dams?

[brihaspati]

What if there has been a deliberate go-slow on the n-weapons front? Perhaps an internal quid pro quo for other stuff and promises?

[RajeshA]

I don't know if this has been discussed earlier. Apologies if already discusses.

Published on Jan 20, 2009
By Presh Talwalkar
4 tips for winning in a game of chicken: Mind Your Decisions Blog

The game of chicken is often told through a story about reckless teenagers. In the classic game, two teenagers are driving towards each other on a crash course. The point of the game is to overcome fear and stay on course. The driver that gets scared and swerves away is the loser. The driver that stays on course is the winner and gets the admiration of onlookers. The problem, of course, is that if both stay on course, then both will crash and die.

The game of chicken is so dangerous that it would be nice if we could just avoid it. But an unfortunate reality is the same incentives describe many other situations–schoolyard fights, drinking contests, and negative campaigns to name a few. In a competitive world, one has to learn how to play the game of chicken.

Read on!

[svinayak]

What if the Pakis have changed their model for nuke deployment? Maybe in Mushy time it was centralized and hence they could make do with lower numbers. Maybe now for various reasons(TSP political situation, Kiyani's internal equations with other army commanders, US in Afghanistan with special forces, Col Start fears etc., etc.) they have distributed the nukes with the corps(e) commanders and thus need as many times that early number.

Gagan, we can affirm or discard this thesis by looking at location of the corps commanders and location of the assets and launch vehicles and air strike assets in the cc area of command?

If above is true they have opted for wide dispersal of their assets and the old proximate security BS from US is just that.

Since they got PAL system from uncle in the last 10 years they can now reliably make this kind of deployment.
But uncle also may know where these locations are. They may also have encouraged PA to disperse

So the entire framework will be a joint Uncle PA and PRC system with alert system.

[ramana]

Source

Finally a clear progression of what led to POKI.

From NVS:

.......

Only interests may remain permanent. Friends of today may turn foes tomorrow, and enemies partners. During the Bangladesh War, Henry Kissinger was egging the Chinese to open a second front against India. And not satisfied with abusing Indira Gandhi, Richard Nixon ordered a carrier nuclear taskforce threateningly into the Bay of Bengal.

That threat provoked a fear of regime-change and India went nuclear in 1974. .........

[ramana]

X-post....


Op-Ed in Reuters;

REUTERS COLUMN
Southern Asia's nuclear myths revisited post bin Laden

Friday, May 13 , 2011

By C. Uday Bhaskar


Thirteen years ago to the day, on May 13, 1998 India conducted its second nuclear test -- the first series having been conducted on May 11 that year.

Finally, after 24 years of ambivalence, India opted to become a state with nuclear weapons -- an SNW. Global opprobrium followed in intense measure and New Delhi with Atal Bihari Vajpayee at the helm as the Prime Minister was ostracised. The U.S. led by President Bill Clinton gravely warned India that it had dug itself into a huge hole by going 'nuclear' -- for Pakistan would soon follow suit and that South Asia would become the most dangerous place in the world.

However, contrary to the popular and assiduously nurtured view, held then -- and now -- India was only catching up with Pakistan and redressing the nuclear asymmetry between the two that had grown in Rawalpindi’s favour since May 1990.

Pakistan's army had acquired credible SNW status on May 26, 1990 and this development has been documented in rigorous detail by two respected U.S. authors, Thomas Reed of Lawrence Livermore Laboratory and Danny Stillman of Las Vegas Laboratory in their book "Nuclear Express" published in January 2009.

The authors corroborated the view held among some nuclear experts that China had tested a weapon design for Pakistan on May 26, 1990 and that this was part of a complex and deliberately tangled nuclear proliferation lattice among Cold War rivals that had its genesis in the U.S. nuclear enormity of August 1945.

Thus two myths have to be revisited. South Asia had become nuclear well before May 1998 and China, the first Asian nuclear weapon power (1964) had created a ‘southern’ Asian nuclear grid that enabled Pakistan and led to the A.Q. Khan nuclear Wal-mart.

Secondly, since 1990, Rawalpindi -- the GHQ of the Pak Army had become the sole custodian of Pakistan’s nuclear weapon capability -- and was introducing a very dangerous 'out-of-the-box' strategy that leavened nuclear weapons with terrorism.

In May 1990, the Pakistan army embarked upon a high-stakes gamble against India that utilised its covert nuclear weapon capability as a firewall to step up terrorism and low intensity conflict in the Kashmir valley.

In retrospect, it may be averred that this was the period when the Pak Army introduced the concept of NWET -- or nuclear weapon enabled terror -- which was far removed from the pristine concept of the 'core' mission of the nuclear weapon that was predicated on the rectitude of the 'responsible' state that had deified nuclear deterrence as the one and only mission of the abominable nuke.

Pakistan had audaciously rewritten the nuclear rule book and was successfully pursuing a revisionist agenda which involved the redrawing of borders and wresting contested territory a la Kashmir. NWET was the means and while May 1990 was aborted for reasons that still remain opaque -- this strategy was adopted again in May 1999 in the Kargil War with General Musharraf directing the charade for the Pak GHQ.

For the U.S. and the world at large, the spectre of terrorism became a reality only after September 11, 2011 and Osama bin Laden (OBL) its more recognisable face and symbol. The worst case scenario was the exigency of the non-state entity acquiring nuclear weapons through a deviant state and using the same to advance a terrorist agenda.

Iraq became the target in 2003 and even at the time, more objective voices within the U.S. and elsewhere pointed out that like OBL in Abbottabad - the NWET elephant in the drawing room was the Pak army - but there were no takers. The true believers {NPA!}drew their certitude about matters nuclear in southern Asia from a different narrative and marched to a different drum.

The 'treasure trove' of data and information retrieved from OBL's mansion in Abbottabad may contain some definitive clues about how determined and close the al Qaeda was to the nuclear weapon or material and the degree to which the Pakistani state was complicit.

The 10th anniversary of the twin tower collapse in September 2011 was laden with multi-textured import for OBL -- pun unintended -- and NWET the most attractive and effective option.

OBL has been interred to a watery grave but the malignancy of NWET is a reality that has to be dealt with adroitly. The Pak army has created a virtual reality of cultivated paranoia, where it is the eternal victim of external perfidy, and Galahad-like valour as savior of the state and the Islamic faith -- a domain that it inhabits in menacing isolation.

Rawalpindi has to be weaned away from the nuclear weapon capability that it acquired in May -- covertly in 1990 and overtly in 1998 and the corrosive strategy it has chosen.

And this can be done only if the many nuclear myths and related narratives apropos southern Asia are revisited with honesty and humility.


(C. Uday Bhaskar is Director of the New Delhi-based National Maritime Foundation. The views expressed in the column are his own. )

Excellent strike by CUB! Worthy of his guruji!

[SSridhar]

Ramana, thanks for posting. That was an excellent article as usual, by Cmdr. Chitrapu Uday Bhaskar.

The NWET will not raise undue concern to the Americans/NATO unless Pakistan acquires missiles of suitable range. It seems it is not China's intention to sell such missiles to Pakistan, at least at this stage.

[pgbhat]

IDSA COMMENT
Pakistan’s ‘First Use’ in Perspective ---- Ali Ahmed

Pakistan can be expected to reinforce its deterrent through an information campaign, surrounding a low threshold projection. This compensates for any weakness or lack of credibility relating to its deterrent, since the deterrent also covers the conventional level. Its projection of irrationality is in keeping with the ‘rationality of irrationality’ thesis - a part of nuclear deterrence theory. The idea is to keep India guessing and hopefully deterred.

To attribute a first use doctrine to Pakistan is to admit that India’s nuclear weapons do not deter adequately. This may not be true since Pakistan too is subject to the psychological effects of deterrence. Deterrence is heightened since first use implies a break in the nuclear taboo. There would also be no guarantee of success and the only certainty would be of costs - known and known unknowns as well as unimagined and unimaginable.

The upshot of this discussion is: firstly that first use is useful only for projection. Secondly, strategic sense favours an operational nuclear doctrine that tends towards NFU. Equally, strategic sense, from Pakistan’s point of view, is in keeping this secret. It can therefore be inferred, that the greater the projection the less likely the intention.

This is one assumption India will not challenge by departing from military prudence. Its recent distancing from Cold Start is not so much on account of the efficacy of Pakistani deterrence, but its own grand strategic economic imperative. Sensibly, even as India wishes to match step with Pakistan, it has no intention of accompanying Pakistan on its way downhill.

[ramana]

CUB also says its the Pak nukes that enable their terrorism under the umbrella.

Wrt to India they threaten to use nukes.

Wrt to US the threaten to give them to the jihadis.

Seeing the non response when facing US power, India draw the lesson that they need more nukes rather than minimum . I would say its important to have more weapons(low yield and low range) to assure them of certain destruction and still maintain credible minimum deterrent wrt to the normal nuke powers.

[shiv]

IDSA COMMENT
Pakistan’s ‘First Use’ in Perspective ---- Ali Ahmed

After 2-3 re readings, I would judge this as an excellent article and is further confirmation that people withing "strategy making" circles do think out complex issues and all their ramifications. Lovely - it makes me so much comfortable with any similar thoughts I may have.

It seems that Pakistan is seeking to play a game of nuclear escalation from "small hits" to bigger hits to massive retaliation.

Pakistan is, in other words "inviting India" to play a game that allows Pakistan to escalate in steps. Pakistan will not say what will cause it to use nukes but is saying "At any point we may use small nukes, and then bigger nukes - or we may use the biggest threats right away. We are not telling you. Come join the game"

India would do well not to join the game but stick to its resolve to nuke Pakistan out of existence the minute Pakistan uses a single nuke. The alternative - that is to escalate slowly and allow Pakistan the chance of using all its nukes is too stupid to contemplate. The Indian response will be to nuke Pakistan out of existence even if Pakistan nukes a single Indian armored column simply because Pakistan, by using the first nuke is saying "We have started the game, we want you to play it by our rules". India will not play by Pakistan;s rules but nuke it out of existence.

But this still leaves India at one disadvantage - and that is it allows Pakistan to conduct terrorist attacks and Kargil like intrusions with he threat of nuclear retaliation if India escalates conventional war. The structure of Pakistan's strategy is as follows

1. We will nuke you if you attack us.
2. We will attack you and taunt you to attack us back, which you cannot do because we will nuke you first.

Pakistan is playing a game of Russian roulette -. Actually this game is called "swerve". Swerve is a game in which two people are approaching each other in a car at high speed and are bound to collide disastrously hurting both parties. The one who swerves first is the "loser" because the other has his way. Pakistan seeks to conduct operations against India and stop India from attacking Pakistan (by making India swerve)

This game can only go so far. If India is pushed hard enough it will not swerve and nuke the Paki-shits out of existence. That is why we need to prepare fro nuclear war. That is why I started that thread, where I will cross post this message.

[shiv]

Cross post and piskology time.

I like the way some Americans have begun to think..however, notice how some of them assume India is being kept on a leash or something. That if the Americans step back India will go after the Paki's. They've assumed Indians are aggressive folk.

OK folks - please pardon me - but I believe that many us Indians have a degree of cognitive dissonance where we try and indignantly try and come to terms with two conflicting ideas.

Indians believe that we are a meek nation with meek leaders. The overall thrust of opinion on BRF and the nedia is that of weak leadership without resolve. To our eyes this is blatantly clear and to us the idea that we are aggressive is so astounding that it is taken almost as an insult when someone purports to say that we are not meek.

Clearly the attitude quoted by Harbans suggests that India is not meek and would be aggerssive. But leave aside America. The Pakistanis believe that the Hindu (Indian) cannot be trusted, He is a person who embodies deceit in the form of "Haath mein churi, mooh mein Ram Ram" (Knife in hand, Pretence of piety on one's lips" and is ready to kill by treachery.

Despite the fact that Indians see other Indians as meek - not everyone sees us that way. We are stuck between the contradiction of "Wea are not aggressive and we are aggressive

Deterrence has a psychological dimension to it and it is important to exploit that psychological dimension. Why throw it away. If other think we are aggressive so be it. Enjoy the feeling and nurture it.

"The (Hindu) Indian is a madman. His gods eat people alive. The Hindu (Indian) will be irrational when it comes to hitting Pakistan. He does not regret the killings of 1947 and does not regret the killing of Kashmiris,. He is mad enough to nuke the world."

[harbans]

^ Pretty good Shiv Ji, however if you don't mind would like to put one question for you: Do you think Paki's really believe India is aggressive or is it for media and aam abdul consumption? IMHO there are no easy answers to this really. But a perspective either way is fine.

[shiv]

^ Pretty good Shiv Ji, however if you don't mind would like to put one question for you: Do you think Paki's really believe India is aggressive or is it for media and aam abdul consumption? IMHO there are no easy answers to this really. But a perspective either way is fine.

On balance - most articles I have read on this subject suggest that there is actually a belief that India is aggressive - but pretending to be meek. It is after all a deceitful Hindu attitude to be that way. The belief is that the Hindu will respect strength but will use every opportunity to use treachery and deceit.

Naturally, That is how the Hindu mind works no?

[Prem]

Cross post and piskology time.
"The (Hindu) Indian is a madman. His gods eat people alive. The Hindu (Indian) will be irrational when it comes to hitting Pakistan. He does not regret the killings of 1947 and does not regret the killing of Kashmiris,. He is mad enough to nuke the world."[/i]

Pischologically, Yindians are best prepared people to adopt and spread Klingon/ Singhon values for the good of global stability.

[SSridhar]

Wrt to US the threaten to give them to the jihadis.

And proliferate to rogue nations (line NoKo or Libya) or other Islamist nations like Iran or KSA. They threaten themselves by threatening to provoke India into a war with State & Non-State actors and talking casually of nuclear response thereby hoping to get world's attention like a cry baby. I won't be surprised if Pakistan attacks India (a la Saddam sending scuds into Israel during Desert Storm) if the US mounts another Op Geronimo. It is essential that India remains on very high alert now.

Seeing the non response when facing US power, India draw the lesson that they need more nukes rather than minimum . I would say its important to have more weapons(low yield and low range) to assure them of certain destruction and still maintain credible minimum deterrent wrt to the normal nuke powers.

Absolutely. We have to work out a number for nukes and missiles for a simultaneous two-front nuclear war.

[SSridhar]

India will not play by Pakistan;s rules . . .

I hope Pakistan has internalized this after 1965 when it did not expect a coward India to cross the IB and after India's restraint under blatant provocation for war through terrorism or even the way the IAF was used during Kargil. But, Pakistan may be again making a mistake. as IDSA's Ali Ahmed says in the Comment posted above,

The gain from executing first use is in attempting to escape paying a price that India may set out to exact by catalysing the international community’s intervention.

the above may be Pakistan's grossly mistaken assessment. Pakistan may be prompted into thinking along these lines because it may be emboldened by China's 'all-weather friendship' or India's presumed vulnerability to international pressure (like after the Parliament attack). However, IMO, that would be a grave mistake by Pakistan because an NBC attack is unlike anything else. But, we should be prepared for anything from an obsessive Pakistan which is increasingly reckless and irrational.

[ramana]

And most likely US might stand aside while their pet monster is brought to justice by India just as Cardinal Richelieu stood aside as Three Musketeers dispatched Milady!

[ramdas]

But Ramanaji,

Do we have enough nukes + delivery systems to make sure TSP will never develop the escalation dominance they are seeking ?

Probably if we bring the RGPu stocks into play...we can have a vastly larger number of weapons..

[somnath]

But Ramanaji,

Do we have enough nukes + delivery systems to make sure TSP will never develop the escalation dominance they are seeking ?

Probably if we bring the RGPu stocks into play...we can have a vastly larger number of weapons..

Even without that, Ramdas-ji, even without the RGPu stocks...Remember Pak presents a far "poorer" target environment than India (or China)..So at least vis a vis Pak, the escalatory ladder is probably in place with our WGPu stocks alone..And a bit more...

The other joker in the pack, of course, is the recent declaraiotn by Shiv Menon that India' NFU is only for non-weapon countries...It is interesting simply because there was no "clarification" that came thereafter...People who do this for a day job wont ignore/miss something like this...

[ramana]

Ramdas, What do you think all those chotus and Brahmos accuracy are all about.

Deterrent is a figment if its not usable. So far TSP thinks big bums will casue big fallout and due to prevailing winds (West to East due to Fennel's law of diffusion) will contaminate India onlee.

By having low yield India is assuring that the fallout stays in TSP. By its seeking accuracy, they are assuring its the TSP/A leadership assets that will also at risk.

[VikramS]

IMHO, right now, India needs to make sure that her nuclear deterrence is in great shape.
If the need be India needs to test the mega nukes. The global (i.e. Western attitude) right now is more sympathetic given the TSP-China nexus, post OBL. The issues which were discussed in the TSP-US-China thread are coming to roost. The lines are being drawn as we speak.

It should be absolutely clear to China that any use of nukes by the TSP against India will result in a response on any one who funded them which includes China. If the West does decide to de-frock the TSP, then the TSP will be tempted to lob a few. PRC has to know that the cost of that is unacceptable.

From the PRC POV, even if TSP is split up, they will be able to find much less expensive client states for their goals. A defrocked Pakjab will reduce her rates even more.

[harbans]

On balance - most articles I have read on this subject suggest that there is actually a belief that India is aggressive - but pretending to be meek. It is after all a deceitful Hindu attitude to be that way. The belief is that the Hindu will respect strength but will use every opportunity to use treachery and deceit.

Naturally, That is how the Hindu mind works no?

I was thinking about this and the answers are still not clear. Indeed the aam Abdul has been made to believe in this. But it's not just for Hindu's. The Koran openly says the same for Jews and Christians and infidels. The less pious amongst them who may not buy that are termed 'hypocrites'. So the conditioning is there to believe that from madrassa to everywhere in Islamic societies. So it's OK to kill and maim in Mumbai, Varanasi, NYC, London, Thailand, Phillipines. As long as a place is Dar ul harb it is valid to go about this business. But in the process some justification has to be given apart from the religious/ doctrinal sanction. So when the infidels strike back after 10 attacks on them, that becomes a justification and these become cumulative examples of victimhood.

That is possibly the reason they know deep inside India will not use nukes first for example. Does MMS look like a type of person willing to commit genocide. Use or sanction to use nukes even in the aftermath of a nuclear attack requires the ability and mental make up to commit genocide.

Pakis think India not playing 'swerve' with them makes them cowards or weak. This is a serious flaw in their thinking. In poker for example, a good player is one who is not swayed and folds even a very strong hand. It's a sign of greater control. Thats the player that makes money and not the player who plays swerve and bluff. Paki's believe in Hindu deceit, perfidy for sure, but they are also convinced that we are cowardly. It's normal nature that one thinks other people think like us. Same way Paki's think that we too think like them. And they'll make up any amount of stories to try and fit things that way. CTs and a sense of victimhood are the only way to fill that gap in logical fallacy.

So while internalizing our aggresiveness, deceit etc as based on CT and victim hood stories/ examples, they also feel macho that we don't play swerve with them and consider themselves more macho or us more cowardly at the same time. The root of this behaviour of course lies in the doctrine.

I have in some conversations with Paki's in my Company directly engaged them on the doctrine of Dar ul Harb and Dar ul Islam. When they know i know, the behavior is very different. I have done it very soberly and in a straight forward way and it works. Had the pleasure of sacking quite a few due to behaviorial /professional reasons and anyways post 2611 ALL Paki's have been kicked out from my company.

[ramdas]

Ramanaji,

Technology for the chotus is there....Are there adequate numbers ? That is the question. The 80-100 claimed by NPAs is far from sufficient.

Plus, to have escalation dominance against TSP and deterrence against PRC, we need some confirmed medium yield TNs that can be produced in large numbers...

The numbers...are we rapidly building up an adequate number ? This is the question that worries me.

[ramana]

IAF against creating CDS ‘in present format’

.....
The IAF chief, Air Chief Marshal P.V. Naik, told a seminar on national security reforms that he disfavoured the creation of a CDS ‘in the present format’ as it would create obstructions in the existing security apparatus.

‘I would like to emphasise and reiterate that the IAF is all for the formation of CDS, but we are against appointment of CDS in the present format. The appointment in this format will only create another obstruction to the system,’ Naik said here at the seminar organised by the Centre for Land Warfare and Studies (CLAWS).

The Kargil Review Committee headed by the late security analyst, K. Subramanyam, was set up in the backdrop of the India-Pakistan war in the Kargil sector of Jammu and Kashmir. It had proposed a CDS to enable jointness among the army, navy and air force and to act as a single-point adviser to the government on security, a gap found during the 1999 operations.

Though the proposal is more than a decade old, Defence Minister A.K. Antony has on several occasions told parliament that consensus among political parties on the CDS was lacking.

Political consensus apart, there was no unanimity among the three services on the CDS.

Naik said the IAF was not ready to accept the appointment a four-star or five-star serving officer as the CDS, saying the he would not have the wherewithal to execute his duties.

Favouring the continuance of the existing structure of command with each service individually communicating with the defence ministry, the IAF chief said: ‘Our existing system, without a CDS, has worked well in last 40-50 years. We fought four wars in 1947, 1969, 1971 and Kargil without any major glitches.’

Contesting the suggestion that the CDS could be the most important reform in the defence sphere, Naik said: ‘Lots of people think that by withholding the appointment of CDS, the government has actually weakened the pace and quality of military reforms.’

Referring to the CDS format of other countries, he said the model varies from country to country.

‘In United States, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff controls the operations; in Australia, the CDS and the defence secretary are parallel and report to their equivalent of the defence minister. Which model do we want to adopt,’ he asked.

Naik dubbed the CDS concept a ‘foreign’ idea and called for ‘strengthening the Chiefs of Staff Committee’ as the first step in the security reforms. ‘Setting up new structures will not make the system more efficient or effective,’ he said.

Stressing the need for a national security doctrine and a White Paper on defence, Naik pitched for a regular dialogue between the political and military leadership of the country, saying it was essential for India, which faced a large number of military and non-military threats.

{So he is aware of the issues yet doesn't want to solve them. Throwing out foreign solutions is OK. But what is his solution? Can't be the same as last 40-50 years. There was chaos during May 1999 that is why the KRC recommended single point of advice. Not three points of advice. The IAF chief wanted more time. The Army Dy Chief wanted to wait for his boss to come back form Poland. The IN moved the fleet to battle stations.}


‘At present there is no political interface. One very good step that has been taken is that the three service chiefs have been participating in the meetings of the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS). It is a good step in my opinion. A lot of our inputs have been taken and acted upon by the government,’ he added.

{This is token move to get around the lack of CDS. The real reason is he is not confident that a CDS will be form IAF. Both IN and IAF have shown they have great leaders who can step into that role.}

[somnath]

Ramdas, What do you think all those chotus and Brahmos accuracy are all about.

Deterrent is a figment if its not usable. So far TSP thinks big bums will casue big fallout and due to prevailing winds (West to East due to Fennel's law of diffusion) will contaminate India onlee.

By having low yield India is assuring that the fallout stays in TSP. By its seeking accuracy, they are assuring its the TSP/A leadership assets that will also at risk.

Dont think Brahmos is designated for a nuclear role...The payload is too small to be useful in that sense, and the missile is too short-legged....Tactical nukes, per all available literature, are not part of India's deterrence posture..The stated doctrine of NFU (howsoever nebulous) calls for massive second strikes..The second strike itself formulates the basis of our deterrence - the adversary should know that we will inflict unacceptable damage in response to a first strike...

Given the conventional balance, it doesnt suit India to have a gradual escalatory "nuclear ladder"...We would rather have conventioanl strategic space below the nuke threshold...The assumption is, once Pak uses nukes (even tactical nukes on an army formation), we respond massively on strategic targets (major cities, industrial centres etc) before international political action moves in to stop the fighting...

IAF against creating CDS ‘in present format’

This is extremely unfortunate...Inservice rivalries are stymying the basic building blocks of a 21st century defence structure...A simple question to ask the IAF chief would be - is there any country in the civilised world today that does not have a version of the unified command?

[ramana]

X-Post...

India takes stock of arsenal in Nuclear Command Authority meet

India on Monday took stock of its nuclear arsenal and delivery systems like long-range ballistic missiles, fighter-bombers and warships towards its quest to have an operational nuclear triad -- the capability to fire nukes from land, sea and air -- in the near future.

Sources said the top-level meet held by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was "not just a general security review'' but in fact a full-fledged Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) conference to assess the steps being taken to consolidate and strengthen India's "minimum but credible nuclear deterrence".
:
The status of two crucial but delayed "strategic programmes", the 5,000-km-range Agni-V missile and indigenous nuclear submarine INS Arihant, is said to have figured in the discussion apart from "overarching strategic issues".

While the three-stage Agni-V is to be tested later this year, INS Arihant is also slated to go for "harbour and sea trials" once its miniature 83 MW pressurized light-water reactor gains "full criticality". The defence establishment is eager to induct INS Arihant, armed with 12 nuclear-tipped missiles, by next year because it will constitute the most effective and difficult-to-detect leg of the nuclear triad.

Interesting that it was a NCA meeting but billed as a security conference. And it had progress reports on delayed programs.

[svinayak]

India takes stock of arsenal in Nuclear Command Authority meet


Interesting that it was a NCA meeting but billed as a security conference. And it had progress reports on delayed programs.

It is the message that India is alert.

[SaiK]

This sabre-rattling comes in the backdrop of Pakistan furiously building up its nuclear arsenal, which already stands at an estimated 70 to 90 warheads compared to India's 60 to 80.

sounds like ddm deterrence techniques


also note on the NCA deterrence value:

India is under civilian control..

[somnath]

sounds like ddm deterrence techniques

Well, that is the new construct being parlayed by the NPA community...

[ramana]

X-Post...

Bade,
Also if TSP and PRC alliance is formalized and a joint attack is carried out then NFU goes out of the window.

From deterring nuke use (by way of second strike) war prevention has to be next goal of India nuke posture. This way all of them realize war is not an option.