Bharat Rakshak

The difference from the so-called trade-based or organic/evolutionary/gentle-persuasion strategies of weaning away and my line is that - I have already concluded that weaning away is only possible under delegitimization and destruction of the theological institutional networks that sustain and reproduce jihad in various forms flexibly.

For Pakistan, as I have repeated many times before, therefore, my projection was destruction of all the powers, structures and therefore the state - which protect and backup the mullahcracy and the institutional mechanisms.

Without soverignty neither the choice nor the protection of choice can be ensured. I would also like to destroy the very structure on which mullahcracy stands in alliance with feudalism and the army - by promising land redistribution and implementing it too.

I am sure you have heard of the term , "if you break it - you own it".

This weaning away can be done only by a superior countervailing force, with the backing of a modern state apparatus and allies, who are interested and are willing to put assets on the line to delegitimize and destroy the sunni theologic institutional networks. Where are these opposing social, theological, political and military forces? It is fine to lay these principles down in isolation and many folks have been through the whole cycle of Islamism and what they mean - I think very few would disagree with your views on Islamism alone on this board,. But these principles need some semblance of reality to come to fruition. The realities on the ground are so far off from the ideals you present that it is baffling for small minds, like mine, to comprehend the journey and the path you envision.

I am sure you have heard of the term , "if you break it - you own it". It is not like we can afford to do what dumb Americans can afford to such as come in bomb and kill a few 100,000 people and then go back home after a a decade and ask, who is next? Even if we somehow muster the power to break TSP, we will then have the responsibility of owning it. Before we acquire something new, we first have to ensure that we are able to manage, what we currently own. In most peoples view, the Indian republic itself is still a work in progress and has not come out in flying colors and hence trying to own up to new responsibilities at this time or in the foreseeable near future (20-50 years), would be premature.

True, without absolute control, you may not be able to guarantee certain outcomes and have to be able to manage outcomes to certain acceptable degrees, from the outside. Land redistribution is a laudable goal but no magic panacea in a country with a burgeoning population and increasing urbanization, who's issues are not non-similar to the issues we have. It is not land that a new generation looks forward to as its source of wealth, it is industry, education and jobs.

So, at question here is not not the ideals you set but the path you may undertake to achieve the same. I asked about UCC as a question to make the point that if the Indian polity cannot muster the courage, due to the muslim population veto, to enforce a uniform view of its own laws (even if faulty, IMO) , on its own population then pray how will it muster the wherewithal to consume entire geo-political constructs. Your answer was, once TSP is destroyed, things like the UCC will follow quickly. IMO, that is like putting the cart before the horse and did not answer my question. The Indian state is not strong enough yet, to undertake a venture such as the consummation of TSP. The need of the hour is to strengthen this state and more so the social structures of the nation.

Methods or the path are obvious. It is very legitimate to start off with, and will evolve depending on how the colonial-inherited-rashtra-led by vacuum ideologues serving apparatus of personal power - react in coercion or not. [b]Starting off with cultural unification with the clear consciousness of transformation of the rashtra towards expansion[/b] and necessity of coercion on hostile forces, and a rejection of values represented by Islamists and similarly aligned or sympathetic forces.

If I may ask some naive questions here: could you explain why this is the case for us? It is not obvious to me why we cannot help 'break' Pakistan, then walk away and let the pieces descend into civil war.

There is agreement in the above view. There is a political slide going on for about 1000+ years and it will take time to first consolidate, unify and then expand. IMO, we are at a pre-consolidation stage, where the first battle is to fight to change the slogan "unity in diversity" to "diversity in unity". There is a world of a difference in the meanings of the two slogans. The first puts its emphasis in diversity and not our cultural unity. The latter has its emphasis in this cultural unity, while accepting its diverse strands. In India at this time, the battle for a change in this mind set has not even begun in earnest. Indeed, I fear that the trajectory is towards a deracinated view of ourselves and one extrapolation of the current trajectory may again land up this nation as a colonized nation or a claw of some other crab.

The big question is how and when to get out of the Islamic forceful conversion.

Ramana It may be deeper than that. The conversion comes with the compulsion that questioning one's own beliefs or opposing them leads to pain. It's like attitudes put in childhood about fearing dogs or snakes. The fear is deep and primaeval. There is very real fear of questioning one's own beliefs because that questioning is associated with all sorts of pain and suffering. So the focus is never on the discomfort of changing what's inside, but only on saying that what is outside - that is the others, the kafirs are wrong and if they changed (converted) all would be well.

It is a very very robust model and not amenable to easy solutions.

Ramana It may be deeper than that. The conversion comes with the compulsion that questioning one's own beliefs or opposing them leads to pain. It's like attitudes put in childhood about fearing dogs or snakes. The fear is deep and primaeval. There is very real fear of questioning one's own beliefs because that questioning is associated with all sorts of pain and suffering. So the focus is never on the discomfort of changing what's inside, but only on saying that what is outside - that is the others, the kafirs are wrong and if they changed (converted) all would be well.

It is a very very robust model and not amenable to easy solutions.

I am sure you have heard of the term , "if you break it - you own it".

Ramana It may be deeper than that. The conversion comes with the compulsion that questioning one's own beliefs or opposing them leads to pain. It's like attitudes put in childhood about fearing dogs or snakes. The fear is deep and primaeval. There is very real fear of questioning one's own beliefs because that questioning is associated with all sorts of pain and suffering. So the focus is never on the discomfort of changing what's inside, but only on saying that what is outside - that is the others, the kafirs are wrong and if they changed (converted) all would be well.

It is a very very robust model and not amenable to easy solutions.

During British times quite a few went to England and changed over to Christianity. No fatwa/watwa in those days for they couldn't deal with UK!
So its a case of bending before greater power.

How many times have we seen Indian and Pakistani leaders meet, say nice things, pledge their efforts to peace, and witness little change on the ground? There is cricket diplomacy initiated by Gen. Zia-ul-Haq in the mid-1980s when he invited himself to an India-Pakistan Test match in Jaipur and during the lunch period had a chat with Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. Last year Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani watched the World Cup India-Pakistan semi-finals in Chandigarh and had an hour with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. Now President Asif Ali Zardari and son Bilawal conducted “dargah diplomacy” — a pilgrimage to Ajmer Sharif with a lunch break in Delhi with the Indian Prime Minister. Despite all the good intentions, these informal meetings have produced little and the Delhi detour on April 8 by the Zardaris will go down as another instance of cosmetic diplomacy that looked good, achieved little.

The supposedly new wrinkle of allowing bilateral trade and economic cooperation to take off even as the more contentious issues, such as Kashmir, are dealt with at a more deliberate pace in negotiations by diplomats trained to work at snail speed, is not new. This is the path India and China have taken, and Delhi has been trying to push Islamabad towards it for over a decade, finally with some success. It is fortuitous that Beijing, worried about the ring-fencing of China by many Asian states in cooperation with the United States, is eager to distance Delhi from Washington by incentivising non-involvement in such a containment scheme. And for this purpose is encouraging Islamabad to establish an economic nexus with India. Whatever the motivations, Pakistan has decided to confer the Most Favoured Nation status on India, a privilege Delhi had accorded Pakistan in 1996, which the latter did not have the wit to exploit. The question is if Kashmir — a core issue for Pakistan — is sought to be set aside, is Delhi’s main concern — Pakistan-based terrorist gangs operating without any official hindrance — also to receive the same treatment?

A sometime press adviser to the Prime Minister, Sanjaya Baru, has written about how Dr Singh got many things right in terms of symbolism and friendly gestures in his attempts to rev up the rapprochement process with Gen. Pervez Musharraf-led Pakistan during 2004-07. But he stopped short of revealing just why Dr Singh, on the cusp of ushering in enduring peace in the subcontinent on the basis of a Kashmir accord he had negotiated with Gen. Musharraf in 2006, got cold feet, refused to sign the deal and squandered a great opportunity that may never come again. Gen. Musharraf was desperate for that agreement, as it would have strengthened his hold on the Pakistani state, bolstered his political standing at home, kept at bay those asking him to surrender his position as Pakistan’s Army chief and impressed the Pakistani people with his achievement of getting India, for the first time, to concede an albeit slight role to Pakistan in overseeing the affairs of Jammu and Kashmir. Gen. Musharraf was satisfied because he craved some such role, however hollow.

A unique mix of tactical finesse, strategic blindness and political opportunism, Gen. Musharraf, as head of state, Army Chief and virtual dictator of the country, would have committed Pakistan to a treaty the Pakistani military could not have easily wriggled out of.

Dealing with a one-point source of power is always easier. But as a Musharraf-type of phenomenon is unlikely to recur in Pakistan any time soon, India will be compelled to deal with an elected government in Islamabad, which will always act with the inevitable veto by the Pakistan Army in mind. In the event, the dispute will continue to simmer, and occasionally come to a boil.

The Indian government’s concern with Pakistan’s “internal political dynamic” and the desire to settle outstanding disputes only with an elected government in Islamabad is, as I have repeatedly argued over the last 20-odd years, the cross this country has had to bear at a progressively higher strategic cost. Whether Pakistan is a democracy or not is the Pakistani people’s business. But the sooner Delhi gives up the idea that a democratically-elected government in Islamabad is somehow better, more amenable, from the point of view of shutting down terrorist activity than a military regime, the better it will be in terms of acknowledging the basic reality in Pakistan, and adjusting to it. An unpacified neighbour who has discovered the joys of brandishing the terrorist stick against India, moreover, is like a child playing with fire — fascinated by its heat and light rather than thinking about how it could burn down his own home. Retaliation against Pakistan in response to terrorist acts, according to national security adviser (NSA) Shivshankar Menon, is unnecessary because, as he stated at an event sometime back, “Why kill a man who is committing suicide?”

The trouble is there’s no certainty that Pakistan, an ostensibly failed state, will actually implode as a very large part of the Indian establishment believes will happen, for purely self-serving reasons. It helps the Indian government stay with status quo-ist policies that everybody’s got used to. In any case, whatever the nature of the dispensation in Islamabad, India will have to think up some imaginative ways to get the Pakistan Army off its terrorism hobby horse. All that the official and unofficial Indian squawking and bellyaching about Hafeez Saeed does is raise the nuisance value of the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba for the Pakistani generals. This is elementary stuff but it is something the Indian government, led by the ministries of external affairs and defence, finds hard to wrap its head around. So Delhi keeps missing opportunities and Indian diplomats and the military brass keep huffing and puffing about the threat ostensibly posed by Pakistan. But, to turn the NSA’s logic around, how is a man bent on suicide a danger to you?
The writer is a professor at the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi

are Morani, advani and mirchandani also sindhi-baloch?

PML-N Quaid Mian Mohammad Nawaz Sharif is the only leader of a national party, who has been categorical about how the PML-N considers division of Sindh equivalent to treason and how Pakistan's territorial integrity is linked to Sindh's borders not being tampered withOf late, we have all noticed that the signage for a separate province for Mohajirs is fast spreading in Sindh's big cities. We condemn such a movement and those forces who are actively assisting such a tehreek. Breaking Sindh in pieces would lead to bloodshed because every son and daughter of the soil would resist such a move peacefully. However, knowing the terrorist and fascists supporting such a movement, it is clear that our peaceful resistance would make us sitting targets for their firepower.There can be no distinction between any of them based on how new their entry has been in Sindh. Those who entered Sindh pre-Raja Dahir, post-Mohammad bin Qasim and post-1947 cannot be divided into bands of new and old Sindhis. It’s unheard of in the world to have separate provinces for immigrants, since by their very definition immigrants migrate to make their new homeland their home and not to carve it out into a separate home.

Those who entered Sindh pre-Raja Dahir, post-Mohammad bin Qasim and post-1947 cannot be divided into bands of new and old Sindhis.

It’s unheard of in the world to have separate provinces for immigrants, since by their very definition immigrants migrate to make their new homeland their home and not to carve it out into a separate home.

As the economy of Pakistan goes downhill, people are going to come to the view that they do not get jobs because other ethnic groups corner all the sarkari jobs, as they have political power, they having their own province. The cries for a separate province for Mohajirs would only increase. When the state starts taking violent steps against the agitating masses, one would see a full-scale movement for independence even from the Mohajirs.

Interesting time line:

NAWABSHAH: Gunmen on Friday shot dead seven passengers on a Swabi-bound bus on National Highway and wounded three others, police said.Around 50 passengers were on board when the bus came under attack at Rinn Shakh, near Qazi Ahmed Taluka of Nawabshah district.Deputy Superintendent of Police Sardar Khan Chandio said the Sindhu Desh Liberation Army had claimed responsibility for the attack. Pamphlets of the outfit claiming responsibility for the killings in revenge for Jeay Sindh Muttahida Mahaz (JSMM) leader Muzaffar Bhutto’s killing were found at the site of the attack.One body was shifted to the People’s Medical College Hospital in Nawabshah district, while the remaining six were moved to the Taluka Hospital Qazi Ahmed.The second driver of the bus, Lal Khan, told reporters that a passenger had boarded the bus from Sakrand. He had asked the driver to pull over at Rinn Shakh where his brother was waiting to get on the bus. “When the bus stopped, four armed men boarded the bus and opened fire, and later fled on two motorbikes,” Khan said.
Five people died on the spot, while two passed away at hospital. The deceased were identified as Haji Abdul Ghaffar Pathan (driver), Shahzad Hassan and Muhammad Makrab from Attock, Sameeullah Khan from Mianwali, Gulreb Khan from Swabi, Abdul Majeed and Arsalan Majeed from Taxila. One deceased could not be identified, while Qair, Tahir Ali and Ameer Ali were among the injured.According to witnesses, the attackers had been raising slogans that they had taken revenge for an attack on the Awami Tehreek rally in Karachi. Other witnesses said the assailants had said the attack was revenge for the murder of JSMM leader Muzaffar Bhutto, whose body was found from Hyderabad after 15 months of his disappearance.However, the bus cleaner, Nadeem Khan, said the attackers did not discriminate on if the victims were Sindhis or non-Sindhis. “They didn’t ask about anyone’s ethnicity. They climbed up and opened fire and fled while raising slogans.”Hyderabad Police Deputy Inspector General (DIG) Sanaullah Abbassi, who reached the site of the attack, told reporters that at least 25 bullet shells were seen around the bus. “The attackers fired inside and from outside the bus,” he said. The DIG said police could not say whether automatic weapons were used in the incident.The passengers who escaped the attack were shifted to a safe place, which the police authorities declined to reveal.A senior police officer said the incident could be an act of terrorism or sectarian violence. He further said police had launched a search operation to apprehend the killers.Meanwhile, President Asif Ali Zardari took notice of the incident and directed the authorities concerned

grenzsituation (border situation)

I think Afghanistan will be the biggest test to Indian National security and thanks for pointing out demographics here which is extremely important. If we are going to win in Afghanistan it requires Pashtun participation, not just minorities. Hence why our aid program's are focused on Pashtun areas.

I think India needs get in in Afghanistan with more ambition, ambition of development type. The fundamental question is to which region would the Pushtuns feel more attracted to - Northwards or Southwards. And I speak for all Pushtuns - in Afghanistan but also in Pakistan. If the Pushtuns see their destiny Northwards, then Pakistan can wave their unity goodbye. Then Pushtuns including in Pakistan would lean towards a unity with their Northern brothers to partake in the opportunities from the North. If however the pastures down south appear more bright to the Pushtuns then Pakistan can hope to keep their flock together.


Same way, if India enters Afghanistan and sets up a network of world-class highways linking Afghanistan to Central Asian Republics and Iran and at the same time ensures that Karachi dies off as a city and port, then Afghanistan would start leaning elsewhere encouraging the Pushtuns in Pakistan as well to look elsewhere.

We need to make Pakjab and Karachi poor first, so that Pushtuns can look elsewhere for their future.