Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

[rkhanna]

it was not very responsible of him to call DSC a rag tag force. If this is how a retired general describes his own ex-servicemen, betrays some attitude problems.

What what if he is calling a spade a spade?

[prahaar]

it was not very responsible of him to call DSC a rag tag force. If this is how a retired general describes his own ex-servicemen, betrays some attitude problems.

What what if he is calling a spade a spade?

He had also claimed in the same time line that throwing DSC at the problem was a bad idea. He was talking without having proper knowledge of the situation. I stand by my opinion that while people are getting killed, calling any soldier rag tag is not honorable conduct.

[deejay]

it was not very responsible of him to call DSC a rag tag force. If this is how a retired general describes his own ex-servicemen, betrays some attitude problems.

What what if he is calling a spade a spade?

No he is not. DSC are good at the job they do. The Gen should think of how they would cook with guns at the ready in the cook house? Or does he want them to stop cooking till the attack was over?

The DSC were there at the base because they are responsible for perimeter security in every base. They are not rag tag. One unarmed DSC took out an armed Jihadi. This was a 58 yr old braveheart. Ex IA. The same IA that the Gen was part of.

The Gen calls Garuds poorly trained. Poorly trained with respect to what - Astronauts? Only those he thinks are well trained become well trained, hain ji?

The Gen wrote this piece with half baked information and his biases are pretty much on show. Those who think that DSC should not have been there, please elaborate where they should have been? DSC know the guard posts and periphery better than anyone else out there - it is where they are on duty.

I seriously do not want to get into Gen Panag and his motives for writing this piece of ? so I will wait for Gen Hasnain's write up if and when it comes.

[Singha]

found on fb:
How Niranjan died :- The soldiers had killed two terrorists in the same spot and as a standard procedure the bodies have to be inspected thoroughly ( even inserting probes in to their chest cavity and stomach) by the NSG explosive disposal squad, which is headed by Niranjan. Normally terrorists hide explosives in their body which is meant for inflicting further damage.
Niranjan approached the first body and cleared that of for handling as it did not have any hidden explosives.
The solders dragged the second body a little towards Niranjan for him to inspect and clear. But the second body had a chest belt based explosives hidden, which gets triggered once the belt is disturbed. Niranjan quickly realized that it had got activated and screamed at the solders to take cover.
He then rolled over to the dead body, lifted the body in air and was trying to throw it away. By then the explosion got triggered and ruptured our national hero's both hands, chest cavity, one side of face and eye.
The reason why he was not wearing protective gear was that,it was a major combing operation by walk, in a vast 1500 acres forest type land. The bomb disposal gears are so heavy with all that protective gears and non flexible. It is impossible for an NSG commando to have put that on in a live operation underway, in a terrain like that.
I saltute the fallen spirit and we all Indians say, you will live through us.... your every drop of blood will continue to flow through us... You, our immortal hero... we salute you !!!

Satish Kasetty I don't want to fault the brave soldier but he made a mistake.
The normal routine procedure used to be, tie a rope and drag the dead for a distance before going and inspecting.
There is a difference in being brave and being courageous

[Yagnasri]

We can be proud that the so call "rag tag" "old and retired" men who are unarmed attacked suddenly still could kill one terrorist armed to teeth. The General shall know that you do not use young and highly trained people for doing perimeter guard duty in a normal military installation. Further apart from their age and related weaknesses there is no reason to believe that they can be insulted in this manner. Had they been attacked when they are armed I am sure they could have given a good account fo themselves.

Apparently the instructions were not to take any risks that may result in loss of life in our side. That was achieved. If we used 30mm or bombed them to hell so issues.

Now we have to see how NM and AD will respond.

[Philip]

Good analysis by well-known analyst Cdr. Uday Bhaskar.
http://www.thequint.com/opinion/2016/01 ... e-syndrome

Pathankot Attack: Intelligence and the Keystone Syndrome
C Uday Bhaskar

[/b][/b]•The Pathankot counter-terror operation has been successful as damage to material assets and human life has been contained.

•Based on information in the public domain, it is clear that Indian security forces could have done better in the intelligence domain.
•The attack on the Pathankot airbase isn’t the first time that intel from local sources has been ignored.
•Gurdaspur SP Salwinder Singh’s abduction and eventual release is decidedly fishy.
•The NIA ought to look into the links between drug cartels and terrorism, especially in Punjab.

Pathankot Operation Successful, but the Attack Exposed Gaps in Security Protocols

The Pathankot terror attack is finally over and the counter-terror operation can be termed a success – to the extent that the primary objective of the perpetrators was denied – namely, damage to material assets in the airbase and a greater loss of human lives.

Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar visited the base on Tuesday (December 5) and provided a spirited rationale for the manner in which the entire operation was conducted. A more detailed investigation by the different agencies involved will shed more light on an operation that is still opaque by way of chronology and tactical detail – but Mr Parrikar admitted that there were some gaps in the local security protocols. Hopefully appropriate lessons will be learnt and policy correctives swiftly applied.

Defence Minister, Manohar Parrikar addresses the media at the Indian air force base in Pathankot, Tuesday, January 5, 2016. (Photo: AP)
India’s Keystone Cops: Intel Must be Put to Better Use

Based on the information now available in the public domain, it is evident that the one area where the Indian security establishment could have done better is in the intelligence (or intel) domain.

The term ‘Keystone cops’ taken from the silent films era refers to a bunch of bungling police officials and their comic characteristic is that slapstick mistakes recur after expending vast energy, time and resources and the visible lack of coordination.

The word Keystone comes to mind when reviewing the intel handling over the Pathankot operation – the big difference being that this had a tragic ending by way of the loss of precious Indian lives. Even while conceding that not all available intelligence inputs can ever be disclosed in the public domain in a counter-terrorism operation – some strands are instructive.

Security beefed-up outside Indian Air Force (IAF) base in Pathankot. (Photo: IANS)

Enough Intel was Available to Justify that Special Forces be Moved into the Area

It is understood that the first alerts were made available to Delhi by a ‘third country’ around Christmas Day – which incidentally was when Prime Minister Narendra Modi made his surprise visit to Lahore. Subsequently, it transpires, the local Punjab police had also picked up some ‘clutter’ to suggest that military bases in Punjab would be targeted by terrorist around New Year’s eve.

The terror attack took place in the early hours of Saturday (January 2) and the intel inputs are further strengthened by information ostensibly provided by a Punjab police SP – Salwinder Singh – who was apparently abducted by the terrorists the previous night – and curiously – released.

This is the broad contour of the intel inputs and one presumes that the quality was deemed credible enough for special forces to be moved into the area.

Army personnel take positions on a rooftop of a building outside the airbase in Pathankot, Saturday, January 2, 2016. (Photo: AP)

Pathankot Isn’t the First Time Early Inputs Were Ignored

The operation then moved into what may be called the 24/7 cycle of TV news channels and it then became a ball-by-ball account till the combing operations had concluded – and the Defence Minister Parrikar was able to visit the airbase.

The ‘gaps’ that have been acknowledged point to the inability of the existing intelligence grid in Punjab to manage such inputs and translate them into what is termed as ‘actionable intel’ inputs. A predictable blame-game has already begun with the local Punjab police claiming that they had done their bit and that it was the next level (the centre?) that had not acted promptly.

While the veracity of these claims need to be objectively reviewed in the weeks ahead – what stands out now is the eerie similarity with what happened during Kargil in May 1999 and the 2008 Mumbai terror attack. In both exigencies, early inputs received from local sources were either ignored or not treated with the rigour that was warranted by the existing national security lattice. Individual ministries and services/departments remained in their silos and turf was protected in an insular manner.

The Taj Mahal hotel in Mumbai November 27, 2008. (Photo: Reuters)
Vajpayee’s Intel Reforms Remain Still-Born

Then Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee constituted a holistic post-Kargil review and intel reforms was a major recommendation. However it remained still-born. The same experience was repeated in Mumbai in 2008 when the first alerts about a potential attack from the maritime domain was ignored. And now Pathankot exudes a familiar pattern – the lack of apex capacity and institutional harmonisation across various security related agencies and ministries.

The most curious element in the Pathankot story is that of SP Salwinder Singh and the manner in which he was ostensibly abducted in his official car. Glaring inconsistencies have been brought into the public domain and his personal profile includes a gender harassment charge.

SP Salwinder Singh faces sexual harassment charges. (Photo: ANI screengrab/Altered by The Quint)

Explore the Drug Cartel/Terror Link

Given the narcotics footprint that has enveloped many parts of Punjab and the manner in which state machinery and certain officials have been compromised, many questions remain to be answered. The most glaring is why a group of ruthless terrorists would first abduct and then release a police official even as they moved towards their designated target area – an airbase. This is the Keystone redux!

The drug-cartel/terror linkage is well established internationally and one presumes that the NIA, which has been brought into the investigative loop, will follow all of these leads determinedly – however politically prickly. The even more intriguing aspect of the Pathankot-intel narrative is that Salwinder Singh was given considerable media space to buttress his story.

The ambiguous centre-state command and control over internal security management could not have been more ‘Keystonish’. Hopefully the Pathankot investigation and policy review will not end in the Kargil-Mumbai cul-de-sac.

Same site ,another opinion.

The Pathankot Attack Was a Disgrace For Us
Lt General HS Panag (Retd.)

An email was sent by Lieutenant General HS Panag (retd), a former Northern Army Commander, to Major General Pradyot K Mallick (retd), formerly of the National Defence College. It was what a former Lt General felt as the Pathankot Terror attack unfolded. It was first published by Mohan Guruswami on his facebook page.

The letter has been edited here for readability.

Dear Pradyot,

You are being mild. It is better to raise a hue and cry while the incident is still in the limelight. In two days, the next party will begin. This operation was a disaster from the word go. Luck and providence saved the air base.

Infiltration can be effected with impunity all around the Shakargarh Bulge. The border Security Force (BSF) always lies.

Pathetic internal coordination. Despite the windfall of SP Salwinder Singh’s carjacking and the use of his mobile, we were not only slow to respond, but also caught with our pants down.

Be that as it may, Doval held a conference on 1 January at 1500 hrs which was also attended by the Chief of Army Staff. The air base was assessed as the target and everyone was warned. A battery of the National Security Guard (NSG) was dispatched to Pathankot air base. A Special Forces team was flown in and put in location at Mamun.

No lead agency or overall Commander was appointed. Unless Doval felt he could control the events. The area in the vicinity of the base was not combed. The public was not informed. It was a failure of the Pathankot police and, possibly, the Indian army, if they were tasked at all. If the General Officer Commanding (GOC) 29 Div was in charge, this would have been done. Preventive security of the air base was not beefed up. Given the size, an Infantry Battalion should have manned the perimeter and patrolled the wall from outside.

Soldiers stand guard near the Indian Air Force (IAF) base at Pathankot in Punjab, India, January 3, 2016. (Photo: Reuters)

The less said about the security of our air bases in general, the better. Four-five platoon (60 men) of rag tag DSC are capable of being static security guards only. There are approximately 20-30 poorly trained Garuds. No electronic sensors of any kind are present along the wall and fence and the outer periphery is not lit up. Civilian houses are right next to the wall. Recall Air Forward Defence Battalions in 1971. One was located at the Pathankot air base but was later merged with normal infantry. Our air bases are sitting ducks. We have been singularly lucky that despite Mehran and Kamra, ISI did not target air bases near the International Border.

Despite the 24 hour warning, 5-8 terrorists scaled the wall and entered the administration area and attacked the DSC Mess where men were unarmed despite the warning. Five men were lost.

The less said about the response of the NSG and the Garuds, the better as well. The initial casualties imposed too much caution. The Indian army moved in and killed two terrorists while two were killed by the NSG. Victory was declared by the evening of the 2 January by everyone including the Prime Minister and the Home Minister. Fundamental precaution of combing the area was not taken. Consequently, it took another 48 hours to get one more terrorist – the operation was still on. A Lt Col of the NSG was lost due to not following Standard Operating Procedure on 3 January. Seven to eight NSG were wounded.

The villain of the piece seems to be Doval, followed by the Indian air force and the Indian army. What was the NSG doing in a purely military installation? The time is not far when we will take orders from the Home Minister, the National Security Advisor or the police

Union Home Minister Rajnath Singh at Rajya Sabha (Photo: ANI)

Once again we have become the laughing stock for the whole world, and given our weaknesses on a platter to the ISI.

The operation should have been under GOC 29 Div. Air base security should have been placed under the Indian army. An Infantry Battalion responsible for preventive security, Special Forces team and Infantry quick reaction teams should have been placed inside the base. On 1 Jan, the area in the vicinity of the base should have been combed. Any one of us familiar with our air bases and their lack of security, and with the hindsight of Mehran and Kamra would have done this.

All this has been put on Twitter by me from day one! It is better to shame ourselves in public to force reforms rather than do nothing!

[Sid]

Retired officers also rejoin IA as part of extended service. I think it's allowed up to 3-4 yrs or certain age after retirement.

Does he looks down on every retired service personal as IA extended rag-tag force?

[manjgu]

a) yagnasri...totally wrong that young people dont do perimeter security. there is a very big ordanance depot near my place and its perimeter is guarded by young active soldiers. as well as the nearby army school. b) DSC is a rag tag force for todays threat... individual acts of bravery notwithstanding. Its not adequately armed , not sure how much training they undergo to keep their shooting skills etc. , physically they are definitely not there being usually in their late 40's. 50's i dont think Panag meant any disrespect..only highlighting the shortcomings. this is more an indictement of higher management of defence matters than DSC. DSC is not totally irrelevant but there will certain aspects to be addressed. c) no clue abt Garuds training.

[Screambowl]

I just hope, this operation was not to divert the attention from security apparatus in Delhi , to disrupt the Republic day celebration in New Delhi! There were reports that the two terrorists escaped to Delhi.
http://www.ibnlive.com/news/india/two-j ... 84733.html

[habal]

have we found out where the terrorists had stored the 40-50 kg of bullets? Surely they had not lugged the same in their trek across the border.

[tsarkar]

@Deejay, agree at that ranges, there will be dispersion even for a stabilized gun. If memory serves right, the Mi-25/35 guns are four barreled 12.7 mm ones. The pods seem to be UPK-23 pods, that I've seen on MiG-27s used by IAF MAO

On vibrations, I felt Kamovs vibrate the most. I wonder whether this was thought of when Ka-226 was selected.

[chetak]

Retired officers also rejoin IA as part of extended service. I think it's allowed up to 3-4 yrs or certain age after retirement.

Does he looks down on every retired service personal as IA extended rag-tag force?

these retired reemployed types, (their numbers very much reduced, these days) are not used in operational roles

[chetak]

@Deejay, agree at that ranges, there will be dispersion even for a stabilized gun. If memory serves right, the Mi-25/35 guns are four barreled 12.7 mm ones. The pods seem to be UPK-23 pods, that I've seen on MiG-27s used by IAF MAO

On vibrations, I felt Kamovs vibrate the most. I wonder whether this was thought of when Ka-226 was selected.

from where ever did you get such an idea??

[abhik]

Do we need something like this on the IB at Punjab and other places next to Pakistan.

One disadvantage with a wall is that it blocks your view of what's going on on the other side, of course it works both ways.

[chetak]

Good analysis by well-known analyst Cdr. Uday Bhaskar.
http://www.thequint.com/opinion/2016/01 ... e-syndrome

Pathankot Attack: Intelligence and the Keystone Syndrome
C Uday Bhaskar

Same site ,another opinion.

The Pathankot Attack Was a Disgrace For Us
Lt General HS Panag (Retd.)

An email was sent by Lieutenant General HS Panag (retd), a former Northern Army Commander, to Major General Pradyot K Mallick (retd), formerly of the National Defence College. It was what a former Lt General felt as the Pathankot Terror attack unfolded. It was first published by Mohan Guruswami on his facebook page.

The letter has been edited here for readability.

Dear Pradyot,

You are being mild. It is better to raise a hue and cry while the incident is still in the limelight. In two days, the next party will begin. This operation was a disaster from the word go. Luck and providence saved the air base.

Infiltration can be effected with impunity all around the Shakargarh Bulge. The border Security Force (BSF) always lies.

Pathetic internal coordination. Despite the windfall of SP Salwinder Singh’s carjacking and the use of his mobile, we were not only slow to respond, but also caught with our pants down.

Be that as it may, Doval held a conference on 1 January at 1500 hrs which was also attended by the Chief of Army Staff. The air base was assessed as the target and everyone was warned. A battery of the National Security Guard (NSG) was dispatched to Pathankot air base. A Special Forces team was flown in and put in location at Mamun.

No lead agency or overall Commander was appointed. Unless Doval felt he could control the events. The area in the vicinity of the base was not combed. The public was not informed. It was a failure of the Pathankot police and, possibly, the Indian army, if they were tasked at all. If the General Officer Commanding (GOC) 29 Div was in charge, this would have been done. Preventive security of the air base was not beefed up. Given the size, an Infantry Battalion should have manned the perimeter and patrolled the wall from outside.

Soldiers stand guard near the Indian Air Force (IAF) base at Pathankot in Punjab, India, January 3, 2016. (Photo: Reuters)

The less said about the security of our air bases in general, the better. Four-five platoon (60 men) of rag tag DSC are capable of being static security guards only. There are approximately 20-30 poorly trained Garuds. No electronic sensors of any kind are present along the wall and fence and the outer periphery is not lit up. Civilian houses are right next to the wall. Recall Air Forward Defence Battalions in 1971. One was located at the Pathankot air base but was later merged with normal infantry. Our air bases are sitting ducks. We have been singularly lucky that despite Mehran and Kamra, ISI did not target air bases near the International Border.

Despite the 24 hour warning, 5-8 terrorists scaled the wall and entered the administration area and attacked the DSC Mess where men were unarmed despite the warning. Five men were lost.

The less said about the response of the NSG and the Garuds, the better as well. The initial casualties imposed too much caution. The Indian army moved in and killed two terrorists while two were killed by the NSG. Victory was declared by the evening of the 2 January by everyone including the Prime Minister and the Home Minister. Fundamental precaution of combing the area was not taken. Consequently, it took another 48 hours to get one more terrorist – the operation was still on. A Lt Col of the NSG was lost due to not following Standard Operating Procedure on 3 January. Seven to eight NSG were wounded.

The villain of the piece seems to be Doval, followed by the Indian air force and the Indian army. What was the NSG doing in a purely military installation? The time is not far when we will take orders from the Home Minister, the National Security Advisor or the police

Union Home Minister Rajnath Singh at Rajya Sabha (Photo: ANI)

Once again we have become the laughing stock for the whole world, and given our weaknesses on a platter to the ISI.

The operation should have been under GOC 29 Div. Air base security should have been placed under the Indian army. An Infantry Battalion responsible for preventive security, Special Forces team and Infantry quick reaction teams should have been placed inside the base. On 1 Jan, the area in the vicinity of the base should have been combed. Any one of us familiar with our air bases and their lack of security, and with the hindsight of Mehran and Kamra would have done this.

All this has been put on Twitter by me from day one! It is better to shame ourselves in public to force reforms rather than do nothing!

absolutely nothing wrong with what General HS Panag has said. He could have been a bit more diplomatic about it but it is difficult to sugar coat the truth which is often bitter.

[Sid]

Retired officers also rejoin IA as part of extended service. I think it's allowed up to 3-4 yrs or certain age after retirement.

Does he looks down on every retired service personal as IA extended rag-tag force?

these retired reemployed types, (their numbers very much reduced, these days) are not used in operational roles

It's up to the retired folks to join IA, lot of them get a gig in civil/corporate sector while others stay put. I am not sure if anyone got any stats to say their numbers are reduced or increased.

My point was, retired or not retired, a soldier is a soldier for life. The way this gent was berating his old brotheren is very disappointing.

[Suresh S]

classic hindustaniat. we from time immorial fighting with each other while the enemy laughs. Army pissed because NSG in charge.someone unhappy because Dovalji gives orders. Rag tag DSC.
For me personally the image that will remain forever is the fearless DSC soldier of our armed forces who embraced certain death who chased and killed one of the pigs. There is no army. air force, NSG, dovalji that will inspire this nation from this incident but the selfless, fearless retired soldier who knowingly sacrificed himself in the highest tradition of Armed forces.
The lt general should think a bit before coming out with unnecessary bile .

[rohitvats]

The rant and raves of Panag about NSA aside, he is bang on target with respect to the command of operation and additional deployment of infantry. If the threat was deemed to be strong enough to warrant placing Infantry platoons to guard the technical area, it makes it equally more important to place infantry cordon around the base.

Having said that, placing the infantry for perimeter defense does not mean there would've been no casualties. A patrol or a picket for sure would've been targeted leading to casualties.

There is one important point though - people are concentrating more on the negatives than positives. May be, somethings could've been done in a better manner. But a lot of things were done in a very good manner. The very fact that an UAV was keeping surveillance and detected the movement is credit worthy. As was placing every one on standby, including troops for technical area and Army AF team for contingency.

[manjgu]

rohitvats... well now we have benefit of hindsight ..to place soldiers all around the perimeter apart from tech area. what was known there was a threat but was it so pin pointed that AFB is indeed the only target? if some other target has been attacked , this placement of soldiers around the perimeter would have become the controversy. i will be very happy if right lessons can be learnt..and napakis are taught a lesson.

[Karan M]

Fundamentally, the issue is there was no joint IA-IAF SOP for protecting an AFB and the Garuds by themselves are not probably sufficient in number for the task. That should be and can be fixed. The rest of the bile against NSA wagehra, shaming this, folks will then claim that is to be expected from the "political Generals" whose kids happen to be in AAP, and folks like Mohan Guruswamy. Further, I suspect the Garuds will have a fair bit to say about "poorly trained" and the NSG, the villain of the piece? Laughable. Unfortunately, this is what ensures that even if there are valuable points in the piece about what could have been done better, the politicization of the analysis downgrades its impact. It would have been far better if Gen. Panag reached out to GOI by the myriad channels he had possible or wrote a professional, factual opinion piece for CLAWS or USI which the Govt could have responded with the end result a policy paper, as an outcome for handling such events at key bases.

Instead, what we have is a set of venomous remarks against those who did what they could including the NSA, NSG etc and even a slam on the Army. Whereas key contributors like the Garuds and DSC from brother service/s, are dismissed with contempt. We saw much the same after Kargil too, wherein senior folks who should have known better traded barbs in public, IA vs IAF, and so forth. Sadly, it seems we still lack a mechanism by which folks are trained to share their opinions for a productive outcome. Add the media & political aspect/bias into it, even worse.

Sid, agree.

[Aditya G]

CT op now on in Gurdaspur:

http://www.hindustantimes.com/india/two ... c0jHO.html

Security personnel including an Israel-trained SWAT team spilled into the fields and byways of Punjab’s Pandher village on Thursday to flush out two suspected militants, with authorities fearing an attack on a key military facility days after a terror siege at the nearby Pathankot airbase.
Senior superintendent of police Gurpreet Singh Toor confirmed that government forces were prepared for an offensive a day after locals reported seeing two men in military fatigues acting suspiciously near the army cantonment in Gurdaspur district. When confronted, the men took cover in a sugarcane field, witnesses said.

“A drone helped locate their exact location and by Thursday afternoon, the army and police teams took position,” a police source said.

Soldiers concealed themselves on rooftops, behind trees and at a brick kiln as armoured vehicles and mortar guns rolled into the village in the afternoon. A helicopter had conducted a surveillance sortie earlier in the day. Pandher village is nearly 20km off the India-Pakistan border and about a stone’s throw from the Tibri military cantonment.
The facility is not far from the Pathankot air force station that saw a four-day long counter-terror operation in which six jihadists and seven security personnel were killed.
All roads leading to Tibri have been cordoned off and a high alert sounded in the area.
“We couldn’t get any sleep last night. Many villagers left to stay the night with their relatives though some returned this morning,” said a local resident who did not wish to be named.

[Denis]

Too much fog!!

Gaurav Savant attributes pig-slaughter to DSC and Army and credits vague resources for the info.

GAURAV C SAWANT ‏@gauravcsawant 19h
6 terrorists killed at Pathankot. 1 by DSC. 3 by army (JAKRIF) & 2 Mech Inf. Good use of ICV & RLs for such Ops: sources. @IndiaToday

While the good Lt. General in the TOIlet link given below gives the credit of nuetralizing to the NSG

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/indi ... 476559.cms

[Aditya G]

...
For me personally the image that will remain forever is the fearless DSC soldier of our armed forces who embraced certain death who chased and killed one of the pigs. There is no army. air force, NSG, dovalji that will inspire this nation from this incident but the selfless, fearless retired soldier who knowingly sacrificed himself in the highest tradition of Armed forces.....

+1

I request Hakimji to comment on the age aspect of DSCs.

Nobody is expecting them to run 20k with 20 kg. But surely men like Subedar Major Fateh Singh - sharp shooter and hony. captain - had the right stuff in him to take on a jehadi.

[UlanBatori]

With six military-trained suicide commandos, if they were able to kill only 7 ppl, 6 of them unarmed cooks, plus burn one truck and one bus, I would say that is a busted operation for the Pakis. I don't see how anyone in the dunia could have prevented such losses, except of course the needless loss of the NSG Lt. Col. Any old bomb attack tossed from a motorcycle into a cafe would have caused more losses. As for how long it took to find and clean out the pests, well.. it was a good idea to take all needed time. Politically, it kept the incident in world news for a week - all loss from that was to Pakistan. The retired jarnails and air marshmallows should consider the wisdom of Churchill:

Sometimes it is better to keep one's mouth shut and let everyone wonder whether one is stupid, than to open it and remove all doubt

[rajanb]

Posting an opinion. Not necessarily in agreement because I am sifting through whatever is available, in these days of twisted news.

One contradiction, which may have a plausible explanation is that all air assets were removed from the AFB. Another saying the AFB was fully operational.

Here it is. The last sentence tells it all

http://www.thequint.com/opinion/2016/01 ... ace-for-us

With full due respect to the retired General, it was not very responsible of him to call DSC a rag tag force. If this is how a retired general describes his own ex-servicemen, betrays some attitude problems.

Valid point Shiv.

And the comments flying around about "rag tag force" and Mohan Parrikar's press conference statement with reference to some of the deaths as being "bad luck" are unfortunate. Why? I hasten to add that everyone has to be respected for their opinions, even if they can be compared to someone hunting for a thimble in a box full of motion sensitive IEDs. But, it is my opinion.

However, being old enough, and closely associated with the Armed Forces in my life time; the depression of what happened in 1962; the glee with which I witnessed Fl. Lt. Alfred Cooke shoot the hell out of a F86 in front of my own eyes and within touching distance of the Paki's shattered corpse; the friends & family I had in the Armed Forces during 1971 included someone associated with the sinking of PNS Ghazi and the brutal attack on Karachi; The brilliance of one of the best strategists in Tank Warfare, Lt. Gen Harbaksh Singh, who laid a trap, and laid to waste the "famous" Patton tanks.

There is a malaise that afflicts our security establishment. Such establishment consists of civilians and I shudder at the thought, maybe, certain seniors in the Armed Forces.

Here is another one for you guys to chew on: http://scroll.in/article/801430/

To me, it is becoming clear, as I peruse and analyse it even more, we had all the makings of smashing an attack with brutal, surgical effectiveness and we bumbled along.

BTW, the 72 hours to Nawaz Sharif is over. Any news yet? Except for his return call, where he will get to the bottom of it. The question I ask is "His bottom, or ours?"

[Sid]

Gen Panag's thoughts that combing OP should have been initiated, and more IA troops should have been moved in to replace DSC...... but could have alerted these rats and they would have hit somewhere else, maybe in main city causing much more damage.

[Philip]

V.happy to see this reported.

Good use of ICV & RLs for such Ops: sources.

In the past the absence of such tactics allowed the jihadis to streatch the encounters ad nauseum and inflict greater casualties.

[Karan M]

Can you point out where there is a credible report of the GOI stating it gave 72 hours to anyone? Not some vague report citing sources etc.

>>To me, it is becoming clear, as I peruse and analyse it even more, we had all the makings of smashing an attack with brutal, surgical effectiveness and we bumbled along.

Benefits of hindsight. Put more troops on the perimeter, chances of casualties increase as well. Otherwise we would not be taking casualties in Kashmir from BATs. Fundamentally, the issue is one of being defensive, and waging the war on ones own territory.

React and the enemy will always have the initiative.

[manjgu]

the following is going to come out from his bottom.... well the evidence provided by India is not actionable enough and we need more evidence...which will hold water in a paki court... (i am waiting for this answer and Modi jis reaction..another dossier war in making..)..

[Karan M]

Its not going to be dossier war (if at all) alone.. in short, if Modi was truly naive/well intentioned, then this is his Kargil moment wherein he realizes either Nawaz can't do anything OR Nawaz/Pak mil do good cop/bad cop.. fundamentally, the issue is whether we are willing to go the Baloch/Sindh way.. fighting a defensive battle within India is useless.

More such attacks occur, more the MSM/AAP/Kang types will make political fodder.. same as was done during Kargil for similar aims . Aim will be to run down Indian morale .. anonymous trolls are already coordinating across social media & most websites posting a coordinated message about "why no war, 56 inch, bla bla bla" etc... if there is a war same group will spin the reverse...

So fighting a defensive war in India is a mugs game for India, aim should be to put pressure on Pak using all other means..even as if we build up for conventional conflict. Question is whether we can develop those resources in time..

[chetak]

{quote="Sid"}Retired officers also rejoin IA as part of extended service. I think it's allowed up to 3-4 yrs or certain age after retirement.

Does he looks down on every retired service personal as IA extended rag-tag force?{/quote}

these retired reemployed types, (their numbers very much reduced, these days) are not used in operational roles

It's up to the retired folks both officers and jawans to join IA, lot of them get a gig in civil/corporate sector while others stay put. I am not sure if anyone got any stats to say their numbers are reduced or increased.

My point was, retired or not retired, a soldier is a soldier for life. The way this gent was berating his old brotheren is very disappointing.

The general has a very good reputation for his army service and he certainly did not mean ANY disrespect to the DSC. No officer will ever denigrate his troops. It's disloyal, goes against the very grain and is against all military ethos.

He meant rag tag in the manner of encompassing a wide variety in terms of training, capability and the ability to multitask and certainly not well standardized/suited/trained for direct contact with armed jehadis hell bent on mayhem. The DSC role and mandate is limited.

It is not completely up to the retired officers to join.

The scrutiny is very very tough and all slackers are weeded out ruthlessly.

very few are finally allowed to continue but for very limited periods only.

The govt, for many years now, has strongly discouraged the hiring of such people as a matter of policy and the voluminous justification and paperwork is really tough to push through.

stats are certainly available but I really doubt if anyone is going to be putting them out in public domain.

[rajanb]

Can you point out where there is a credible report of the GOI stating it gave 72 hours to anyone? Not some vague report citing sources etc.

>>To me, it is becoming clear, as I peruse and analyse it even more, we had all the makings of smashing an attack with brutal, surgical effectiveness and we bumbled along.

Benefits of hindsight. Put more troops on the perimeter, chances of casualties increase as well. Otherwise we would not be taking casualties in Kashmir from BATs. Fundamentally, the issue is one of being defensive, and waging the war on ones own territory.

React and the enemy will always have the initiative.

With due respect, Karan M, go through the newspapers, you will find reference to:
a) 72 Hours ( I only get TOI, Bangalore)
b) Modi's Call
c) Sharifs return call.

[rajanb]

>>> Retired officers also rejoin IA as part of extended service. I think it's allowed up to 3-4 yrs or certain age after retirement.

Does he looks down on every retired service personal as IA extended rag-tag force?{/quote}

these retired reemployed types, (their numbers very much reduced, these days) are not used in operational roles[/quote]

It's up to the retired folks both officers and jawans to join IA, lot of them get a gig in civil/corporate sector while others stay put. I am not sure if anyone got any stats to say their numbers are reduced or increased.

My point was, retired or not retired, a soldier is a soldier for life. The way this gent was berating his old brotheren is very disappointing<<<<


The general has a very good reputation for his army service and he certainly did not mean ANY disrespect to the DSC. No officer will ever denigrate his troops. It's disloyal, goes against the very grain and is against all military ethos.

He meant rag tag in the manner of encompassing a wide variety in terms of training, capability and the ability to multitask and certainly not well standardized/suited/trained for direct contact with armed jehadis hell bent on mayhem. The DSC role and mandate is limited.

It is not completely up to the retired officers to join.

The scrutiny is very very tough and all slackers are weeded out ruthlessly.

very few are finally allowed to continue but for very limited periods only.

The govt, for many years now, has strongly discouraged the hiring of such people as a matter of policy and the voluminous justification and paperwork is really tough to push through.

stats are certainly available but I really doubt
if anyone is going to be putting them out in public domain.[/quote]

Just a quick question for everybody.
How long does it take to put a base on full alert?

[Karan M]

With due respect, Karan M, go through the newspapers, you will find reference to:
a) 72 Hours ( I only get TOI, Bangalore)
b) Modi's Call
c) Sharifs return call.

So in other words, there is no credible reference from GOI itself apart from some random news reports about 72 hours in that paragon of objectivity, the TOI? Anyone can cook up a story to make it salacious and interject 72 hours & what not, and then mix and match some actual common sense events - Modi calling up Sharif & a return call. And of course, the public has to follow it hook, line and sinker, and call Modi & GOI names based on such "media reports". The media game is clear.. drum up eyeballs.. am not playing that one though. Sorry.

Also, 72 hours or 96 hours or 123 hours.. the basics don't change. Conflicts are won by logistics & availability of resources. We know much is in progress to address that. It won't happen in 72 hours. Modi was elected to be common sensical about such things & fix the day to day stuff, which is what he is doing. I for one, would be very surprised if he goes off half cocked even if the media wants as versus following the services professional opinion on what they want & what needs to be done. Same as IG did when she asked Sam.

[chetak]

rohitvats... well now we have benefit of hindsight ..to place soldiers all around the perimeter apart from tech area. what was known there was a threat but was it so pin pointed that AFB is indeed the only target? if some other target has been attacked , this placement of soldiers around the perimeter would have become the controversy. i will be very happy if right lessons can be learnt..and napakis are taught a lesson.

what hindsight??

this scenario has been war gamed enough number of times by the IA. They specialize in search and cordon functions. The perimeter would have automatically been guarded had the GOC been left to his own devices.

there were trained assets locally available for the mere asking but no one asked. no one asked because of the direct involvement of dilli babus and the big honchos of various forces who were gingerly walking around each other not wanting to step on any important toes.

Home ministry, Defence ministry, PMO, NSA, Punjab police, Intelligence all reporting to different bosses.

there was no C&C worth the name.

everyone is scared witless of Doval, everyone simply assumed that the biggest wolf was in charge and so no one spoke up.

sab ka naukri pyaari hai.

[RajeshA]

The Pathankot Attack Was a Disgrace For Us
Lt General HS Panag (Retd.)

Lieutenant General Harcharanjit Singh Panag (retired) (born 4 December 1948) is an Indian political activist associated with the Aam Aadmi Party. He is father of Gul Panag!

'nuff said!

[chetak]

The Pathankot Attack Was a Disgrace For Us
Lt General HS Panag (Retd.)

Lieutenant General Harcharanjit Singh Panag (retired) (born 4 December 1948) is an Indian political activist associated with the Aam Aadmi Party. He is father of Gul Panag!

'nuff said!

please do not reduce it to this level.

[RajeshA]

The Pathankot Attack Was a Disgrace For Us
Lt General HS Panag (Retd.)

Lieutenant General Harcharanjit Singh Panag (retired) (born 4 December 1948) is an Indian political activist associated with the Aam Aadmi Party. He is father of Gul Panag!

'nuff said!

please do not reduce it to this level.

We all need to be careful about propaganda draped in "analysis"!

[rohitvats]

rohitvats... well now we have benefit of hindsight ..to place soldiers all around the perimeter apart from tech area. what was known there was a threat but was it so pin pointed that AFB is indeed the only target? if some other target has been attacked , this placement of soldiers around the perimeter would have become the controversy. i will be very happy if right lessons can be learnt..and napakis are taught a lesson.

Nope. This has nothing to do with benefit of hindsight.

The threat to station was considered strong enough to place two platoons for protection of technical area. Throwing a cordon of infantry battalion around the AFB would've been a simple, and logical extension, of this act.

As for the part about. 'what if other target had been attacked?' - well, rest assured, Pathankot has enough troops to deal with Pakistan Army, leave alone a few terrorists. A battalion deployed for perimeter security would not have made a dent to any security preparation anywhere in Pathankot.

[rohitvats]

Lieutenant General Harcharanjit Singh Panag (retired) (born 4 December 1948) is an Indian political activist associated with the Aam Aadmi Party. He is father of Gul Panag!

'nuff said!

please do not reduce it to this level.

I also agree with RajeshA here.

In so much as I agree with Lt General Panag on some important points, a lot of analysis by likes of him is driven more from perspective of finding fault and somehow discredit the operation. There will always be mistakes made in any kind of operation but the ones made in this case weren't exactly disastrous.

Panag and many others are desperately trying to take the credit away from the government on a successful operation.