Indian Nuclear Weapons FAQ

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 21 Jun 2000 22:19

Every time there is some "news" about the Indian nuclear weapons program there seems to be "surprise", "fear", "doubt", "jubilation" and other emotional responses from forum members and a lot of threads seem to end up as being exercises in "stroking" where fears are comforted and assuaged or anger vented time and time again. I think it is high time that we make up an FAQ on the Indian nuclear weapons program - and perhaps even extend the B-R home page to include this information.Long ago I had been entrusted with the task of trying to collate such information with a view to putting it up on B-R, but much less information was available then. I present below an FAQ based on information I have in my head with (almost) NO references being given at this point in time. All the information is based on what I have read on B-R and some other sources. The idea is to establish a "baseline" of sorts - from which discussions can be taken further. Members may please add information and make corrections as necessary. Any errors are mine.1) Does India have any nuclear weapons Yes2) How many? Estimates have varied from a few dozen to over 200, but the most recent informed assessment came from Dr.Sanjay Badri-Maharaj posted elsewhere on this forum. A figure of 40+ weapons has been quoted, and this number seems reasonable given the estimates of weapons grade Pu production. The number can be much higher if one uses reactor grade Plutonium and gas-boosted fission the number goes into hundreds, but 40-50 would be a "safe" assumption at this point in time. Obviously the number estimates could vary a great deal as the issue is fraught with intrigue and diplomatic fallout.3) What types of weapons are these? An existing 15 kT fission warhead was tested in Pokhran - and until further information becomes available, this may have to be taken as the "standard"4) Does that mean India has no thermonuclear weapons? There are no reports that indicate that India has any deliverable thermonuclear weapons as of now. This situation may change over an unspecifiable time period as weaponization proceeds. Statements have been made that such weapons do exist by various people - but there is little evidence to make a dogmatic statement about it. In other words: they may exist. OTOH they might not.5) Didn't India test a thermonuclear weapon at Pokhran in 1998? India tested a thermonuclear explosive device. There is no evidence to indicate that it was a weapon or a weaponised device.6) Wasn't that thermonuclear test a failure? No. Evidence indicates that the fusion explosion ocurred, but may have been of lesser efficiency than planned. Fusion explosions can be scaled to give varying yields. The effect of a lower than predicted yield may be described as follows in very crude terms. If a planned 100 kT thermonuclear bomb is dropped on a city the size of Bombay, but it yields 75 kT only, one may end up with only 3 million deaths as opposed to an anticipated 5 million. It would be difficult to pin down the standards that could be used to describe this as a success or failure.7) Aren't thermonuclear warheads essential for any nuclear deterrent? Not necessarily. But thermonuclear warheads do give more bang for the buck, and are useful in reducing warhead weights and saving on fissile material. Every existing nuclear weapon power has worked towards developing a sizable thermonuclear warhead stockpile.8) What is weaponization? Isn't the very existence of a bomb enough? Weaponization means the intergration of a bomb with a delivery technique and ensuring that the bomb mechanism withstands the journey from launch point to target without exploding prematurely, and ensuring that the bomb does explode after reaching a predetermined point over the target. It would also involve safety locks to prevent misuse.9) How would Indian nuclear weapons be delivered? As of now this would be done either by an aircraft as a free fall bomb, or by a Prithvi or Agni missile.10) Would the bombs work? Yes. Tests seem to have been conducted on all the mechanisms involved in arming, delivering and trigerring nuclear bombs - short of including the fissile material and setting off an actual nuclear explosion.11) Have a sufficient number of tests been done with missiles as delivery vehicles? The Prithvi has been tested 17 times. The Agni 3 times. The final stage of the Agni is the same as the Prithvi - which as indicated has been thoroughly tested.12) What is the range of the missiles in the Indian inventory? The longest stated range of the Prithvi is 250 Km with a 500 Kg payload, and the longest stated of the Agni is 2500 Km. with a 1000 Kg payload. One estimate of warhead weight in the Indian context has been <250 Kg. if this is correct - one could expect longer ranges with this lighter payload.13) What aircraft could be used for delivery? The Mirage 2000. 14) How many missiles does India have for nuclear delivery? It has been stated that the Army will receive 75 Prithvis and the Air Force 25. The missiles are in production - and there is a storage depot in Jullunder. Some Agnis seem to have been deployed. Nothing is known about numbers and status of the Agni.15) Are the nuclear warheads stored in the missiles? No, They are stored separately - for "mating" if necessary. India's policy is not to maintain a "hair trigger alert" such as that maintained by the US/USSR during the cold war - with its associated risk of accidental nuclear war.16) Where are the warheads stored? Difficult question. The fissile material was apparently stored at BARC but it is now spread out in other places.17) Does India have a submarine based nuclear delivery method? As of now, No.[This message has been edited by Calvin (edited 21-06-2000).]

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 21 Jun 2000 22:22

By sheer coincidence - I just found this email from Dr. Sanjay Badri-Maharaj in my Inbox:I know you've seen Dr. Chidambaram's comments regarding the fact that 'only one' of the devices tested at Pokharan in May 1998 was a weapon.This might not be much use now, but I think it is useful that BR have an idea of what this really means. I'm sure that you've all gone through this ad nauseam, but this is a summary.We all know that the 1974 test was supposed to be of a 12-15kT device.However, it appears that the device tested then weighed in at a staggering 1000kg. If converted into a weapon - with arming mechanisms and safety locks - then anything directly based on the 1974 device would have weighed in at probably 1200-1400kg.In 1982-83, when there were allegedly plans for a series of Indian nuclear tests, BARC scientists prepared a fission design with a weight of 170-200kg and a yield of 12-15kT.This was achieved by sustained efforts by BARC and DRDO to produce more reliable neutron initiators, improving the yield-to-weight ratio and enhancing the simultaneity of the high explosive charges. It is also not impossible that the original beryllium/ polonium neutron initiators were replaced with deuterium-tritium neutron initiators to provide a longer shelf-life and smaller size.These improvements would have reduced the weight of the Indian fission gravity bombs. Furthermore the subsystems for this device could be tested separately, obviating the need for a full-scale nuclear test of the design. It appears that weapons developed from this design were probably flight trialled in 1994. It can also be assumed that the Prithvi warhead designs tested between 1996-97 were based on this fission weapon.1998 provided an opportunity to verify the reliability of the design - hence the testing of a 15kT fission weapon.It should also be stated that this design can be 'stretched' to produce larger fission weapons - up to 50kT or slightly higher.Dr. Chidambaram indicates that the others were 'weaponizable designs'. This does not mean that more tests are needed to turn the devices tested into weapons.The three sub-kiloton devices were designed to explore a number of possibilities: (i) The creation of sub-kiloton tactical nuclear weapons (ii) Testing of the weapons' design potential of reactor-grade plutonium with gas-boosted primaries (iii) Creating a database for future weapons computer simulationsThus, the devices are 'weaponisable' with some modifications, but they were intended to satisfy a number of requirements.The thermonuclear test was a design test as opposed to a weapons test.One of the most important elements of this test was the verification of the efficacy of the 'boosted-fission' primary stage.India had been ready to test a 'boosted-fission' system in the 1980s and BARC was confident of its ability to deploy a weapon - 150-200kT in yield - based on this design. In fact, Dr. Chidambaram's statement soon after the 1998 tests that India could deploy a 200kT nuclear weapon apparently refered to a 'boosted-fission' warhead for the Agni-2.The thermonuclear design tested at Pokharan in 1998 - if allowed to operate at full design yield - would probably have had a yield of some 160kT. However, according to Dr. Frank Baranby - a nuclear physicist formerly with SIPRI - an operational weapon based directly on the thermonuclear design tested in May 1998, would have been a variable yield system producing yields of 5, 50 and 500kT.Dr. Chidambaram's statement that the fusion part worked perfectly is confusing as some calculations indicate that instead of 45kT, the design actually generated a yield of 23-37kT. This could be due, at least in part, by tampering with the design to reduce its yield to 45kT.In short, the May 1998 tests indicated that India has the ability to produce fission and 'boosted-fission' weapons without difficulty. The tests also indicated that India could produce weapons from reactor grade plutonium and sub-kiloton nuclear weapons if necessary. Furthermore, sufficient data was generated to provide for at least some computer simulation and sub-critical testing of fission and 'boosted-fission' designs.However, though a viable thermonuclear capbility exists, it is clear that there is some uncertainity regarding the yield produced. If the discrepancy is due to some design tampering to 'artificially' reduce the yield, then there should be no problem in developing weapons from the basic thermonuclear design of any yield without further testing. If, on the other hand, there is a problem with the actual design of the fusion stage, then India's thermonuclear weapons capability can be verified only through another test.

rama · Post by **rama** » 21 Jun 2000 23:54

Hi Shiv, Good idea to put this FAQ together. Couple of suggestions: 1) Minor- either/or: Aircraft that *could* be used for delivery - Mirage2000, Jaguar and Mig-27 (there have been reports over the years of the latter two types being considered and/or put through some kind of evaluation) Aircraft that will most likely be used for delivery - Mirage2000. 2) As mentioned in SBM's note: Was the thermonuclear test a failure? Not as far as developing a 200kT weapon is concerned. A fusion test consists of a fission primary that triggers off a second fusion reaction. BARC & DRDO claim that two distinct stages of explosion were noted with a yield close to the 45kT design. Even among sceptics who challenge the yield, it is clear that there was tritium boosting of the yield. So the only question relating to the thermonuclear test is wether it was a fusion device or just a boosted fission device. Indian scientists have claimed that besides the standard 15kT fission device, India plans to have a 200kT device - this can be achieved with only a boosted fission device and there is no question that India demonstrated the capability for atleast such a device. (I think it is important to point out that there is a step in between 15kt fission devices and multi-megaton devices, and that India's next device could be a yield in between).Also helpful would be a question like: Q: Why is there such a large discrepancy in various reports on the size of India's stockpile?A: One of the variables that contributes to the wide range of estimates is the fissile material from the 8 reactors in India's nuclear power program. Only 2 research reactors at BARC produce weapon grade Pu directly, and the low end of India's estimates come from accounting for the output of those reactors only. However, India operates a class of power reactors known as pressurised heavy water reactors which produces both reactor grade plutonium and tritium enriched heavy water. The reactor grade plutonium can either directly be made into heavier weapons or can be further purified into reactor grade plutonium and both options are available to India. Heavier weapons can be deployed on aircraft. Also India operates two plutonium purification plants that could potentially purify reactor grade plutonium.The heavy water output from these reactors is also potentially important since it is enriched in tritium which is the primary component of fusion or boosted fission weapons. BARC has developed a cheap and unique catalytic extraction process that gives India relatively large amounts of tritium cheaply, as opposed to conventional techniques that rely on expensive accelerators to bombard other elements with nuclear particles to produce the tritium isotope. This latter process is inherently a low volume process.

Arun_S · Post by **Arun_S** » 22 Jun 2000 00:02

If someone can shed light on 2 key questions that I have: 1. Is the standard fission bomb of ~15Kt weighing 170-200Kg, pure fission weapon or is boosted ? If it is boosted then what yield is expected of it ? {My understanding is that the boosted weapon would have same (or very similar) design & weight}2. What is the approx weight of the 150-200Kt boosted fission system that BARC developed in 1980's ? My understanding is that Agni has been designed and tested for this 1000Kg Boosted-Fission weapon of ~200Kt yield.Will appriciate any insight. Cheers -Arun

Sunil · Post by **Sunil** » 22 Jun 2000 00:08

Shiv,cool, i totally like what you have up there. BTW there are some questions about the CTBT and the indian context of the CTBT as well perhaps someone with a more complete understanding of these issues could answer questions like. 1) Why does india not support the cause of nuclear disarmament by signing the CTBT? 2) What nuclear treaties has india signed?3) What is a greater threat to india, Pakistan or China?

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 22 Jun 2000 01:30

A report in Hindu about a US facility that monitors tests worldwide. Pay attention to the experts remarks about the Indian tests! <A HREF="http://www.the-hindu.com/holnus/03212003.htm" TARGET=_blank>http://www.the-hindu.com/holnus/03212003.htm</A> ----------- Shiv good job! Now for a web page on all this. I also would add that due to second strike doctrine separating the payload from delivery increases the cost to an agressor as he has to ensure both are taken out. One could argue its enough to locate launchers only but that is half the job.

Calvin · Post by **Calvin** » 22 Jun 2000 04:02

Shiv:I would like to quibble with your math. It is highly unlikely that a 100kT device will kill 5 million people in Bombay. The number of dead is probably closer to a million.Also since the affected area scales with the 2/3 power (radius scales with 1/3), a 25% reduction in yield translates into a 15% reduction in affected area (or deaths).It might be best to leave out the estimated number of dead (in the question concerned). have a separate question detailing the possibility of destruction, and have a hypothetical case, based on MVRamanna's article in FAS estimating the number of dead per 20kT device in a city like Bombay.

P Smith · Post by **P Smith** » 22 Jun 2000 06:58

Dunno if this is part of the FAQ; some links to comments, interviews and articles on some technical aspects of POK-2 : <A HREF="http://www.fas.org/news/india/1998/05/980500-conf.htm" TARGET=_blank>http://www.fas.org/news/india/1998/05/9 ... onf.htm</A> - Press conference of RC, Kalam et al. on May 17, 1998. <A HREF="http://www.fas.org/news/india/1998/05/prmay1798.htm" TARGET=_blank>http://www.fas.org/news/india/1998/05/prmay1798.htm</A> - Joint statement by DAE and DRDO on May 17, 1998. <A HREF="http://tejas.serc.iisc.ernet.in/~currsc ... cles23.htm" TARGET=_blank>http://tejas.serc.iisc.ernet.in/~currsc ... s23.htm</A> - Analysis of regional Lg and Rayleigh waves of the May 11 explosions; paper by Roy, Nair et al (from BARC) in Current Science, Dec.25, 1999. <A HREF="http://www.barc.ernet.in/barc/letter/july99.html" TARGET=_blank>http://www.barc.ernet.in/barc/letter/july99.html</A> - Radiochemical analysis of the May 11 explosion(s) - BARC newsletter, July 1999. <A HREF="http://www.the-hindu.com/fline/fl1625/16250810.htm" TARGET=_blank>http://www.the-hindu.com/fline/fl1625/16250810.htm</A> - On the sub-kiloton tests - Frontline, Nov.27-Dec.10, 1999. <A HREF="http://www.barc.ernet.in/barc/letter/sep99.html" TARGET=_blank>http://www.barc.ernet.in/barc/letter/sep99.html</A> - On the sub-kiloton tests - BARC newsletter Sep. 1999. <A HREF="http://www.barc.ernet.in/barc.explosion.html" TARGET=_blank>http://www.barc.ernet.in/barc.explosion.html</A> - Link to three articles on reported yield and seismographic signatures - BARC. <A HREF="http://www.timesofindia.com/170200/17edit4.htm" TARGET=_blank>http://www.timesofindia.com/170200/17edit4.htm</A> - P.K.Iyengar's article in the ToI, Feb.17, 2000. <A HREF="http://www.the-hindu.com/fline/fl1601/16010840.htm" TARGET=_blank>http://www.the-hindu.com/fline/fl1601/16010840.htm</A> - Interview with R. Chidambaram - Frontline, Jan 2-15, 1999. <A HREF="http://www.the-hindu.com/fline/fl1511/15110130.htm" TARGET=_blank>http://www.the-hindu.com/fline/fl1511/15110130.htm</A> - Early technical details in Frontline, May 23-June 5, 1998. <A HREF="http://tejas.serc.iisc.ernet.in/~currsc ... cles20.htm" TARGET=_blank>http://tejas.serc.iisc.ernet.in/~currsc ... s20.htm</A> - Spectral characteristics of Pokhran & Chagai explosions - Current Science, April 25, 1999. <A HREF="http://www.geo.arizona.edu/geophysics/f ... index.html" TARGET=_blank>http://www.geo.arizona.edu/geophysics/f ... ex.html</A> - Preprint of a paper published in the Seismological Research Letters, Sep. 1998, on the possible yield of May 11 explosion(s).

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 22 Jun 2000 07:35

Point taken Calvin - I was trying to make a point myself - with wrong figures.Would anyone care to put up brief answers to Sunil Sainis' questions:1) Why does india not support the cause of nuclear disarmament by signing the CTBT? 2) What nuclear treaties has india signed?3) What is a greater threat to india, Pakistan or China?

Muppalla · Post by **Muppalla** » 22 Jun 2000 08:50

Can we add the following to the FAQ ? 1) Does India have Neutron Bomb ? 2) Does India have proven Neutron Bomb technology ?Somtime back, I remember Ramana analyzing that India doesn't need to test Neutron bomb.

Calvin · Post by **Calvin** » 22 Jun 2000 09:15

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:<HR> 1) Why does india not support the cause of nuclear disarmament by signing the CTBT? 2) What nuclear treaties has india signed?3) What is a greater threat to india, Pakistan or China? <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>1. India's believes that as long as there are nuclear weapons in the world, India would require these weapons for her security. India, equally, believes that her long term interests include a nuclear weapon free world, and the elimination of all nuclear weapons within a fixed time-frame. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is a non-proliferation tool that is not linked to nuclear disarmament. Consequently, accession to the treaty will mean foregoing strategic options, perpetuating an inequitable global order, and surrendering national sovereignty. The sanctions in place against India since 1974 flow from the Non Proliferation Treaty, and consequently there are little gains to be had in this regard. In the balance, India has concluded that it will have to give up too much, to obtain too little. 2. India is a signatory to the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (1963). India is not a signatory to the Non Proliferation Treaty or the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. India is part of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) and negotiations for a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT), and Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS).3. Both China and Pakistan pose civilizational threats to India. China shares a much larger border with India, than does Pakistan. By virtue of its economic and geographic size, it is inevitable that India and China view each other as rivals in Asia. In this context, China is likely to remain the pre-eminent long-term threat to India. Pakistan, however, will be the primary short-term threat that India faces. This threat will primarily be in the form of low-intensity conflict and proxy war. <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:<HR> Can we add the following to the FAQ ? 1) Does India have Neutron Bomb ? 2) Does India have proven Neutron Bomb technology ? <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>1&2. Indian scientists have asserted that they have proven enhanced radiation devices. The Indian draft nuclear doctrine does not have a role for nuclear war-fighting. The enhanced-radiation weapon is primarily a tactical nuclear weapon and is unlikely to form a part of the Indian arsenal. India has however indicated that pursuit of this sort of technology (which may only have use in tactical situations) constitutes a strategic need, and we must expect that research and development in this area is ongoing.Will we have a list of required reading, as part of the FAQ? If so, the below is a primer on Indian policy on Nuclear Disarmament by the inimitable Arundhati Ghose. <A HREF="http://209.207.236.112/news/india/1997/ctbtghose.htm" TARGET=_blank>http://209.207.236.112/news/india/1997/ctbtghose.htm</A> [This message has been edited by Calvin (edited 21-06-2000).]

Arun_S · Post by **Arun_S** » 22 Jun 2000 12:12

>>3) What types of weapons are these? An existing 15 kT fission warhead was tested in Pokhran - and until further information becomes available, this may have to be taken as the "standard" This needs correction:Though the weapon was tested in "Pure Fission" configuration (yielding @15Kt), the weapon would certainly be be rated for military purpose in boosted-fission configuration with atleast 30-45Kt yield.Shakti series also proved 15Kt boosted-fission weapon. They had such high confidence that it was used as primary for the Shakti-1 Fusion test.So the correct answer to the question is : 15 Kt pure Fission weapon 30-45 Kt boosted fission weapon 15 Kt boosted fission weapon Cheers -Arun S

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 22 Jun 2000 21:10

I quote here from Dr. Badri-Maharaj's earlier message that was posted on another thread"The Agni-2 - again sending back a lot of telemetric data - was tested to around 2100km. Actual range is some 3000km with a 1000kg payload - intended for the 200kT boosted-fission warhead that has been prepared for the Agni."[This message has been edited by shiv (edited 22-06-2000).]

Div · Post by **Div** » 22 Jun 2000 22:05

About the Mirage 2000's range:The "Encyclopedia of World Aircraft" states a general Mirage 2000 range with aux fuel tanks of 3335km(2,073m).An older reference, "The Complete Encyclopedia of modern weapons..." has a seperate section on the Mirage 2000N and states the range as being 1850km with 2 aux fuel tanks. The description of the flight profile is treetop hight at around 600knots. I don't know though as to how accurate this is.The two recent AFM editions with Mirage coverage don't mention much about the range either. Except that the Mirage 2000C/RDIs doing CAP in Kosovo required 3 IFRs for 6-7 hour sorties. They mentioned the Mirage 2000 has having a "relatively short range".

rama · Post by **rama** » 22 Jun 2000 23:09

Question - What is a practical upper limit on the yield of a boosted fission device? I am under the impression that something like 10X boosting is feasible but from some of the posts above, I am getting the impression that this may not be the case...

Arun_S · Post by **Arun_S** » 22 Jun 2000 23:54

Mirage-2K range for lo-lo-lo profile would be much lower then typical lo-lo-lo cruise because with a nuclear payload (for best mission assurance) the plane could be flying much faster then the typical cruise speed (read fuel efficient) for the altitude. Thus burning more fuel and lower range.

Arun_S · Post by **Arun_S** » 23 Jun 2000 00:08

>>Question - What is a practical upper limit on the yield of a boosted fission device? I am under the impression that something like 10X boosting is feasible but from some of the posts above, I am getting the impression that this may not be the case...What you say is correct. But my 2-3 x estimate is conservative and assumes no-change (or minor changes) in the standard 15Kt weapon design, geometry & weight. On the other hand if the 15Kt weapon tested from inventory was originally designed as boosted-fission (which is very likely) then it would be rated around 100Kt yield. Cheers.......

Raman · Post by **Raman** » 23 Jun 2000 05:02

Greetings,Although I've been browsing this forum for several months, this is my first post.

I have a question related to the missile ranges supplied for Agni. For IRBMs and ICBMs, does the direction of launch affect the range of the missile due to the earth's rotation?++Rajesh

Calvin · Post by **Calvin** » 23 Jun 2000 05:11

Shiv: Some more minor points. <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:<HR> The number can be much higher if one uses reactor grade Plutonium and gas-boosted fission the number goes into hundreds, but 40-50 would be a "safe" assumption at this point in time. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>I don't know if "gas" boosted really means anything, so lets go with "boosted-fission." <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:<HR> 3) What types of weapons are these? An existing 15 kT fission warhead was tested in Pokhran - and until further information becomes available, this may have to be taken as the "standard" <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>It is believed that the three types of weapons likely to be deployed are a pure-fission Pu devices, boosted fission Pu devices, and thermonuclear devices based on a fission or a boosted fission primary. <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:<HR> 4) Does that mean India has no thermonuclear weapons? There are no reports that indicate that India has any deliverable thermonuclear weapons as of now. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>I think many can take issue with this. The comments from Chidambaram et al are fairly convincing. I think we should either not address this question, or leave the possibility open ("it is highly likely that...") <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:<HR> 9) How would Indian nuclear weapons be delivered? As of now this would be done either by an aircraft as a free fall bomb, or by a Prithvi or Agni missile. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>Are we unnecessarily assuming that PGM may not be mated to these weapons? <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:<HR> Nothing is known about numbers and status of the Agni. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>This is somewhat questionable, given Chengappa's revelations and SBM's corroborations of these.

Sunil · Post by **Sunil** » 23 Jun 2000 05:14

> does the direction of launch affect the range of the missile due to the earth's rotation?yes, there should be coriolis effects at the very least which should affect the range.. i dont know the magnitude... some of the guys had simulated stuff about the agni.. perhaps they could enlighten us about this.. I suspect the corriolis effects are small.. i mean it goes as W(earth)XV(projectile) so those are pretty small quantities there so it shouldn't really be very large but there will be an effect. BTW is it possible to put this FAQ in the monitor or is that too tapori a thing to do? [This message has been edited by sunil sainis (edited 22-06-2000).]

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 23 Jun 2000 07:20

Thanks for the feedback Calvin. The necessary modifications can be made in due course - many of the FAQ answers were off the cuff statements tilted towards conservatism - being non-commital where controversial statements or opposing arguments have been made.Another question:Does India have ICBMs as delivery vehicles? There are no confirmed reports to indicate that India has any deployed ICBMs. However many reports surface from time to time stating that India is working on an ICBM project.Regarding the mission profile of a nuclear attacking aircraft I would have though that it would probably be a lo-hi-lo - for it cannot be low over the target.

Bibhas · Post by **Bibhas** » 23 Jun 2000 09:06

<HTML> <BODY> Rajesh Said:"I have a question related to the missile ranges supplied for Agni. For IRBMs and ICBMs, does the direction of launch affect the range of the missile due to the earth's rotation?"Sunil said:"yes, there should be coriolis effects at the very least which should affect the range.. i dont know the magnitude... some of the guys had simulated stuff about the agni.. perhaps they could enlighten us about this.. "For the rest of us who is still wondering what the hell is corriolis effect, here is a simple explanation, I thought it will be useful though may be out of the topic. <HR> Corriolis Effect: named after French mathematician. If the Earth didn't rotate, convection would produce only northsouth circulation patterns in each hemisphere. But the Earth does rotate at a rate of 73.8 m/s at the equator. We don't sense this rotation directly; we only notice that the sun rises and sets during one day. The Earth's rotation exerts a centrifugal force on the atmosphere and ocean circulation. In the northern hemisphere (facing the equator), it makes objects tend to move to the right (west). In the southern hemisphere (facing the equator), it tends to make objects move to the left (west again). The magnitude of the Corriolis force depends on the rotation rate and is at a maximum at the poles. I do not know how to insert a figure. but the above article I got from <a target=new window href=http://www.geo.umn.edu/courses/1001_per ... .html>This site</a> </BODY> </HTML>

Arun_S · Post by **Arun_S** » 23 Jun 2000 11:31

I do not want to hijack the thread but I guess the question was directed to me.Yes the missile range is dependent on direction of launch, manily because the rotational speed of earth crust at equator is 463 meters/sec towards east. The range of missile is significantly affected by reduced "G" during its flight due to centrifugal force and to some extent due to reduced gravity. Thus the velocity gain (hence reduced "G") due to this effect is dependent on both the launch pad location (further way from equiator it is lesser is the velocity component due to rotation) as well as the direction of launch. (Eastward firing is maximum, west is minimum).Following are the result for a rocket similar to Agni with 1000Kg weapon payload (+ 500Kg Re-entry Vehicle), using my updated Rocket Ballistic Simulator: { when I first poster this message, I was tired and the configuration that I typed into Rocket Simulator was a little different than Agni. The results are however correct for a hypothtical rocket}Thus 1000Kg weapon (1500Kg netpayload) fired east from 22 Latitude, range is 2,253Km. When fired west range is 2,006 Km. Notice the effect on Net-G when it reaches peak. The effect is more pronounced for a 200Kg weapon (700Kg payload) yeilding range of 4,177Km vs 3,505Km when fired westerly.This is not exactly Agni-II configuration. Don't be confused by 5 stages in the rocket. I have split the first stage into 3 virtual stages.Webmasters feel free to move this discussionon a seperate thread. Thanks -Arun S ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Payload = 1,500.0 Kg, Number of Stages = 5, Simulation Time Granularaty = 0.200 Second Launch Direction = 90 degrees-North, Launch Latitude = 22 degreesSegment-Name ISP(Vac) ISP(SL) Stage-Mass Fuel-Fract Burn-Time Thrust-Direction Stage1 Boost 264.0, 237.0, 03,333.0, 0.85, 016.0 Sec 45.0 Degree Stage1 Mid 264.0, 237.0, 03,333.0, 0.85, 017.0 Sec 45.0 Degree Stage 1 Tail 264.0, 237.0, 03,333.0, 0.85, 017.0 Sec 45.0 Degree Interstage1 000.0, 000.0, 00,300.0, 0.85, 004.0 Sec 45.0 Degree Stage2 262.0, 262.0, 04,000.0, 0.85, 021.0 Sec 45.0 Degree Time-Secs,Time-Min:Sec, Range, Altitude, Velocity, Net-G Stage1 Boost BURNOUT,16.19999, 0:16, 2,612.99 meter, 1,317.89 meter, 367.04 m/sec, 9.70 Stage1 Mid BURNOUT,33.20005, 0:33, 11,751.85 meter, 6,366.82 meter, 886.48 m/sec, 9.55 Stage 1 Tail BURNOUT,50.20012, 0:50, 30,057.53 meter, 17,855.55 meter, 1,712.18 m/sec, 9.20 Interstage1 BURNOUT,54.20013, 0:54, 35,748.98 meter, 21,561.22 meter, 1,692.13 m/sec, 9.19 Stage2 BURNOUT,75.39999, 1:15, 81,490.69 meter, 54,575.59 meter, 3,984.34 m/sec, 7.64 ON-PEAK 427.2077, 7:7, 1,133,238.14 meter, 474,346.46 meter, 3,145.93 m/sec, 6.62 BOOM 800.8304, 13:21, 2,253,277.59 meter, -81.14 meter, 4,087.90 m/sec, 7.79 --------------------------------------------------------------------- Payload = 1,500.0 Kg, Number of Stages = 5, Simulation Time Granularaty = 0.200 Second Launch Direction = 270 degrees-North, Launch Latitude = 22 degreesSegment-Name ISP(Vac) ISP(SL) Stage-Mass Fuel-Fract Burn-Time Thrust-Direction Stage1 Boost 264.0, 237.0, 03,333.0, 0.85, 016.0 Sec 45.0 Degree Stage1 Mid 264.0, 237.0, 03,333.0, 0.85, 017.0 Sec 45.0 Degree Stage 1 Tail 264.0, 237.0, 03,333.0, 0.85, 017.0 Sec 45.0 Degree Interstage1 000.0, 000.0, 00,300.0, 0.85, 004.0 Sec 45.0 Degree Stage2 262.0, 262.0, 04,000.0, 0.85, 021.0 Sec 45.0 Degree Time-Secs,Time-Min:Sec, Range, Altitude, Velocity, Net-G Stage1 Boost BURNOUT,16.19999, 0:16, 2,612.98 meter, 1,314.18 meter, 366.72 m/sec, 9.79 Stage1 Mid BURNOUT,33.20005, 0:33, 11,751.42 meter, 6,332.84 meter, 884.83 m/sec, 9.76 Stage 1 Tail BURNOUT,50.20012, 0:50, 30,055.26 meter, 17,728.35 meter, 1,707.50 m/sec, 9.59 Interstage1 BURNOUT,54.20013, 0:54, 35,746.12 meter, 21,397.94 meter, 1,686.76 m/sec, 9.57 Stage2 BURNOUT,75.39999, 1:15, 81,487.66 meter, 54,092.49 meter, 3,970.97 m/sec, 8.48 ON-PEAK 384.4051, 6:24, 1,010,199.66 meter, 420,888.39 meter, 3,145.93 m/sec, 7.53 BOOM 715.0252, 11:55, 2,006,631.75 meter, -497.43 meter, 4,085.96 m/sec, 8.64 --------------------------------------------------------------------- Payload = 700.0 Kg, Number of Stages = 5, Simulation Time Granularaty = 0.200 Second Launch Direction = 90 degrees-North, Launch Latitude = 22 degreesSegment-Name ISP(Vac) ISP(SL) Stage-Mass Fuel-Fract Burn-Time Thrust-Direction Stage1 Boost 264.0, 237.0, 03,333.0, 0.85, 016.0 Sec 45.0 Degree Stage1 Mid 264.0, 237.0, 03,333.0, 0.85, 017.0 Sec 45.0 Degree Stage 1 Tail 264.0, 237.0, 03,333.0, 0.85, 017.0 Sec 45.0 Degree Interstage1 000.0, 000.0, 00,300.0, 0.85, 004.0 Sec 45.0 Degree Stage2 262.0, 262.0, 04,000.0, 0.85, 021.0 Sec 45.0 Degree Time-Secs,Time-Min:Sec, Range, Altitude, Velocity, Net-G Stage1 Boost BURNOUT,16.19999, 0:16, 2,763.43 meter, 1,468.53 meter, 393.51 m/sec, 9.69 Stage1 Mid BURNOUT,33.20005, 0:33, 12,516.07 meter, 7,134.28 meter, 963.34 m/sec, 9.53 Stage 1 Tail BURNOUT,50.20012, 0:50, 32,371.35 meter, 20,190.28 meter, 1,902.66 m/sec, 9.12 Interstage1 BURNOUT,54.20013, 0:54, 38,605.37 meter, 24,447.89 meter, 1,882.15 m/sec, 9.10 Stage2 BURNOUT,75.39999, 1:15, 91,152.25 meter, 64,436.28 meter, 4,976.86 m/sec, 6.76 ON-PEAK 648.0211, 10:48, 2,096,025.31 meter, 921,429.04 meter, 3,848.47 m/sec, 4.97 BOOM 1240.591, 20:41, 4,177,584.81 meter, -111.30 meter, 5,063.97 m/sec, 6.92 --------------------------------------------------------------------- Payload = 700.0 Kg, Number of Stages = 5, Simulation Time Granularaty = 0.200 Second Launch Direction = 270 degrees-North, Launch Latitude = 22 degreesSegment-Name ISP(Vac) ISP(SL) Stage-Mass Fuel-Fract Burn-Time Thrust-Direction Stage1 Boost 264.0, 237.0, 03,333.0, 0.85, 016.0 Sec 45.0 Degree Stage1 Mid 264.0, 237.0, 03,333.0, 0.85, 017.0 Sec 45.0 Degree Stage 1 Tail 264.0, 237.0, 03,333.0, 0.85, 017.0 Sec 45.0 Degree Interstage1 000.0, 000.0, 00,300.0, 0.85, 004.0 Sec 45.0 Degree Stage2 262.0, 262.0, 04,000.0, 0.85, 021.0 Sec 45.0 Degree Time-Secs,Time-Min:Sec, Range, Altitude, Velocity, Net-G Stage1 Boost BURNOUT,16.19999, 0:16, 2,763.41 meter, 1,464.61 meter, 393.16 m/sec, 9.79 Stage1 Mid BURNOUT,33.20005, 0:33, 12,515.61 meter, 7,098.20 meter, 961.52 m/sec, 9.75 Stage 1 Tail BURNOUT,50.20012, 0:50, 32,369.03 meter, 20,054.44 meter, 1,897.50 m/sec, 9.53 Interstage1 BURNOUT,54.20013, 0:54, 38,602.50 meter, 24,273.20 meter, 1,876.17 m/sec, 9.52 Stage2 BURNOUT,75.39999, 1:15, 91,150.31 meter, 63,911.83 meter, 4,961.53 m/sec, 7.79 ON-PEAK 545.2148, 9:5, 1,759,909.65 meter, 770,674.43 meter, 3,848.55 m/sec, 6.16 BOOM 1035.041, 17:15, 3,505,319.24 meter, -147.86 meter, 5,061.22 m/sec, 7.96 --------------------------------------------------------------------- [This message has been edited by Arun_S (edited 23-06-2000).][This message has been edited by Arun_S (edited 23-06-2000).]

rahulm · Post by **rahulm** » 23 Jun 2000 14:30

Aruns_S: Superb as usual.How hard/easy and and in what time frame could DRDO enchance Agni-II or develop Agni-III given existing Indian tech. capabilities to deliver a 1500Kg payload 1500K=1000kg+500Kg) to a 5500 Kms distance. I ask because you seem to know a lot about missile tech.Rahul

Tim · Post by **Tim** » 23 Jun 2000 21:40

For what it's worth, CIA estimates of the Agni-2 range are up to 2,500 km.Tim

Arun_S · Post by **Arun_S** » 25 Jun 2000 09:18

When the BR server crashed few weeks ago, we seem to have lost part of our Archive on "Missile Discussion" in which Agni-III configuration with 36 Ton first stage was discussed. Since then I have updated my Ballistic Simulator to take into account the direction of launch. So let me quicky provide information about AGni-II and AGni-III on a seperate discussion thread titled " MIssile Discussion" <A HREF="http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/ubb/Forum ... 00183.html" TARGET=_blank>http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/ubb/Forum ... 83.html</A> Cheers -Arun S

shiva · Post by **shiva** » 25 Jun 2000 09:33

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:<HR>Originally posted by Tim: For what it's worth, CIA estimates of the Agni-2 range are up to 2,500 km.Tim<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>What kind of warhead weight is assumed for this estimate ?

Calvin · Post by **Calvin** » 28 Jun 2000 20:22

Are there any other "questions" that frequently need to be answered?

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 29 Jun 2000 07:37

Q. What is the command and control structure for nuclear weapons? Whose finger is on button and what is the top-down hierarchy of control (e.g. PM gets wiped out in 1st strike)This information becomes useless if it is known to the public. Nothing is known other than references to reports in which it has been stated that a designated army officer will receive written instructions about a retaliation, and more recently, a book reference to a secure "briefcase" that is said to follow the PM around. Q. Can a poor country like India properly safeguard nuclear weapons to prevent accidental/malicious launches etc.? If yes, can it still maintain any kind of readiness?Yes and Yes.

VivekT · Post by **VivekT** » 29 Jun 2000 10:57

I think we'd have to rethink the lo-level capability of the Mirage 2000's in the IAF. They are basically Mirage 2000C's optimised for the fighter role rather than the low-level strike role performed by the French Mirage 2000N. without the terrain following radar of the -N the pilot would be forced to fly at a higher altitude, this would increase range slightly but would bring about increased risks of detection and interception by the PAF.

Raj Malhotra · Post by **Raj Malhotra** » 30 Jun 2000 00:39

FriendsMost of the discussion on POK-II is just speculation so I will add some of my own in order to discuss the POK-II in more positive light. The tests are widely accepted to be 5 consisting of one pure fission weapon of 15kt another thermonuclear device of 45 kt and three of sub kt variety. Now let us consider them one by one:-1. The pure fission test of 15 kt device is now widely accepted to be a successful test of a weapon design.2. The first of the three subkt is stated to be of a plutonium based device. If true then this device can not only be used to make tactical weapons but also demonstrates India’s capability to make advanced complex designs for miniature nuclear weapons. Further coupled with 15kt device will allow the scientists to determine whether their mathematical models continue to hold when weapons are scaled up.3. The second of the three subkt is stated to be of a reactor grade boosted plutonium-based device. If true then this device would dramatically enhance the plutonium available to make weapons while simultaneously proving the ability to boost yield and to make reactor grade plutonium weapons more reliable. Weapon grade plutonium can be extracted from reactor grade plutonium by up gradation and reprocessing. But reactor grade plutonium will also be required for Indian fast breeder reactors. Also weapons using reactor grade plutonium are heavier & unreliable therefore the requirement for a test may have been primarily academic, to build reliable mathematical models and in order to provide database for future in case India does not test further. In any case in the changing world scenario always better to have an ace up the sleeve.4. The third of the three subkt device is speculated to be of Uranium device. If true then it would demonstrate the capability to enrich uranium upto 90% as also further proof of weapon development progress. Further this will allow the scientists to determine whether their mathematical models continue to hold when weapons are made of different material. India has taken the plutonium route to weapon development. Though difficult to make and handle plutonium is supposed to be a better base for lighter and more efficient weapon design. In any case enriched uranium will be required for Indian nuclear submarine & Indian capacity to produce enriched uranium is limited. Therefore the requirement for a uranium test was perhaps primarily academic, to build reliable mathematical models and in order to provide database for future in case India does not test further.5. The most important test was of thermonuclear device. This test as per a lot of analysts was a disappointment because the yield was 45kt (off) or 25-35kt (depending on which analyst you believe). The primary reason for this conclusion is the P-5 tested Mt range thermonuclear devices. I think this analysis may have a lacunae because it ignores two important facts. Firstly USA did actually conduct tests of very small Kt size three step devices which resulted in Mt range weapons in Hardtack-1-Juniper. Secondly the analysts think that a 15kt pure fission device was used as a primary which obviously would have given a yield of 15-150-1500kt (1665 Kt) in a three step efficient thermonuclear device. This ignores the fact that except for 15kt device that was tested for proving the weapon stockpile all other designs were not weapons but weaponizable designs to provide mathematical data which will allow scaling up.6. My hypothesis is that the thermonuclear device used a sub kiloten fission primary example of 0.5kt boosted to 4kt and leading to thermonuclear secondary fusion yield of 40kt totaling 44.5kt or round about. This reasoning will fit in perfectly with the official position that the device was a success as also that other tests used a sub kt devices. Further making a light and efficient three step device shows a extremely advanced capabilities. Such a device can easily be upgraded to weapon size. Even a yield of 20-30kt from a 0.5 kt primary would indicate a extremely good design.7. Further it is reported that C stated that India could field a 200kt weapon which is speculated to a boosted 15 kt fission primary giving a yield of 150-200kt (which would be boosted fission and low grade fusion burn.) Interestingly this is also speculated to be also the sixth device, which was not tested because as per C the test of the thermonuclear device was so successful that a (separate) test (of fission boosting alone?) of sixth was not necessary. If we accept the reasoning of doomsdayers then it would imply that the thermonuclear test failed then the sixth device ought to have been tested and not other way around.8. Now to end I think that the thermonuclear device worked perfectly and (as K stated ?)will allow us to develop 500kt range weapons easily (with perhaps weights of less than 250 kg or lighter) which will interestingly be of the same yield as warheads reported to be mounted on Topol. Further the configuration suggested by Arun_S in Missile Discussion for Agni III (Surya) weighing Stage 1 –36 tons Stage 2-10 tons will be very near to Topol weight Configuration.[ As per the data released by FAS 6 kt / kg was considered a practical design limit by USA in its Hardtack series of tests in Mt range tests. So taking in account inefficiencies of subMt range , rugged & reliable design and weight taken by safety shield, arming, safing, fuzing, firing mechanisms & powersource etc a weight of 250kg is speculated]

svinayak · Post by **svinayak** » 01 Jul 2000 10:45

Folks more questions on the Nuclear policyWhither nuclear policy? By V. R. Raghavan <A HREF="http://www.the-hindu.com/stories/05012523.htm" TARGET=_blank>http://www.the-hindu.com/stories/05012523.htm</A>

Calvin · Post by **Calvin** » 05 Jul 2000 20:19

Should we have any information on Civil Defence and the (lack of?) infrastructure to deal with a nuclear war?

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 05 Jul 2000 20:54

Calvin - that is a good idea - and as you know I'm working on something. I need to obtain certain regional data on India - and this includes some census material.A general overview is easy to make - but it would merely be a mirror of readily available open source info.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 05 Jul 2000 20:59

On second thoughts - I think we must put up some links/separate info on survival.

Faizi · Post by **Faizi** » 06 Jul 2000 09:10

I have some questions: 1. even with a command and control structure in place, is it possible for the main centres in india (parliament, secretariat, bombay etc) to be protected by a preemptive set of measures in case of a nuclear attack? 2. If this is not possible (I think it is not because the warning time is ~5 mins) then we are looking at a complete wipeout of the top levels of government and administration, so who takes charge? (Even the top military and judicial officials might be killed in such an attack.) ?

Calvin · Post by **Calvin** » 06 Jul 2000 09:19

Faizi: You raise some good questions. However many of these have been discussed previously. Please refer to the archives for an exhaustive discussion of C&C. There are also articles at IDSA that address this. In fact, the last issue of the BRM reviewed one such article. Please read the available sources first and then ask your questions. Otherwise, we will be answerng the same questions over and over again. A good starting place is the Bharat Rakshak Monitor (http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR) and the IDSA website (http://www.idsa-india.org) under their Strategic Analysis link.Here is the review that addresses some of your questions. Col. Gurmeet Kanwal is an artillery officer who is on deputation to IDSA currently. <A HREF="http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/I ... nandv.html" TARGET=_blank>http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/I ... dv.html</A> Gurmeet Kanwal. "Command and Control of Nuclear Weapons in India". Strategic Affairs. Vol XXIII No 10, January 2000.Command and Control (C&C) is a critical issue in the formulation of a credible nuclear posture. C&C to the ability to sanction nuclear operations by authorized decision-makers. It also refers to the checks and balances in place that prevent theft, unauthorized use or accidental use. Threats to C&C include the inability to take decisions and issue commands. This may be due to a "decapitating attack" on major command centers or a failure of communications. The link between a credible nuclear posture and C&C relates to the ability "to realize in practice the threats implicit in weapons and strategy."The authors analyze the various factors that affect a viable and fail-safe C&C apparatus. The review the situation in other Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) and attempt to draw conclusions for India. They note that nuclear forces are under the firm command of political leaders in all NWS except Pakistan. Other aspects of C&C involve a chain of succession that is known to exist, even if the successors are not publicly known. Robust command infrastructure includes hardened or mobile command centers that are designed to withstand or evade nuclear detonations and withstand electro-magnetic pulses (EMP). Communication networks must be dense and provide redundancy. Negative control over nuclear forces pertaining to their misuse is generally addressed through a variety of means including electronic locks or codes and the multiple-person rules. Clearly, the greater the level of C&C, the lower the state of readiness necessary. In the Indian context, the authors argue for the involvement of the military in nuclear decision making. They also argue for a reorganization of the Indian armed forces as well as the creation of a Strategic Force to be the fifth force of the Union. This reorganization has faced considerable resistance from the bureaucracy and the armed forces. The political will to push through these changes does not seem to exist now. The authors argue for the creation of a survivable command center. There is no indication that there is any such fixed or mobile command center at present. The creation of a chain of command and succession is also recommended. The essential aspects of this are the actual control over the weapons, the line of succession, the devolution of command, and the pre-delegation of authority. The last does not have to be made public as long as it exists. There have been suggestions that such a line of succession has been in existence for some time now. However, inferences of its constituents have been sketchy. In the Indian context, the key actors are the political, military and scientific masters. The authors do not discuss the role of the scientific actors in C&C, although it would seem plausible that they have a role given India’s history with chemical weapons. The C&C cost of realizing the credibility of a nuclear posture is considerable compared to the actual cost of developing the technology and building the weapons. The bottom line is that without command and control there is no credibility. <A HREF="http://www.idsa-india.org/an-jan00-5.html" TARGET=_blank>http://www.idsa-india.org/an-jan00-5.html</A> [This message has been edited by Calvin (edited 05-07-2000).]

Sunil · Post by **Sunil** » 06 Jul 2000 09:31

Calvin,> Should we have any information on Civil Defence and the (lack of?) infrastructure to deal with a nuclear war?ouch.. It is an Indian Nuclear Weapons FAQ so i am not sure that it belongs in there. The whole concept of deterrence rests on the premise that nuclear war will not be fought.

Faizi · Post by **Faizi** » 06 Jul 2000 10:54

Calvin, thanks and sorry for raising old questions.

Calvin · Post by **Calvin** » 06 Jul 2000 18:45

Faizi: Your critical comments on C&C would be much appreciated and we start a new thread on it, if you wish.