Siachen News & Discussion
Re: Siachen News & Discussion
The book "The Long Road To Siachen The Question Why" by Kunal Verma ad Rajiv Williams has some great photos of that area.
Re: Siachen News & Discussion
Yes its a nice book
The part about J&K's history is very interesting
The part about J&K's history is very interesting
Re: Siachen News & Discussion
Shepri Kangri in the middle
Ghent Kangri on the left
Re: Siachen News & Discussion
Looking at the Siachen Glacier from the helo which is approx over Bilafond La
Other things visible too
Re: Siachen News & Discussion
In the pic of Bilafond La is K2 visible in the distance?
Re: Siachen News & Discussion
gagan and YIP ...thanks for the pics/maps... i can also die peacefully now... gagan...can u mark the points of interest on ur bana sonam pic... A friend of mine climbed apsarasas kangri... which overlooks the siachen... will chk if he has pics..
Re: Siachen News & Discussion
nooo..K2 will not be visible from Bila .. unless u looking in a certain direction... if u looking towards directly across the pass ( towards pakis //ali bragansa ) then u cant see K2... if u looking north east ..then u can see ( i am saying this based on their positions..i have not been there !!!)
Re: Siachen News & Discussion
need to mark N on the pics for better appreciation..
Re: Siachen News & Discussion
that pic of conway saddle..sia la is most probably taken from Gasherbrum ..( the beautiful mountain)...
Re: Siachen News & Discussion
conway saddle is with pak army IMHO...
Re: Siachen News & Discussion
Thanks for sharing YIP ji and Gagan Sir. Some of those helipads sent chill down the spine when I saw them today. And those mountains...
Re: Siachen News & Discussion
God, what beauty! Looks so deceptively quiet and serene. I have been a sea-level guy all my life but these snow-capped mountains..
Re: Siachen News & Discussion
Deejay jideejay wrote:Thanks for sharing YIP ji and Gagan Sir. Some of those helipads sent chill down the spine when I saw them today. And those mountains...
Please no Sir for me.
Re: Siachen News & Discussion
They were kicked out. There is a post right on the saddle.manjgu wrote:conway saddle is with pak army IMHO...
The pakis are far below
They can't even see the Siachen Glacier, except if they climb a peak far far away, then maybe a little bit.
Qaid Post now Bana post was the last such post where they had a bird's eye view of the glacier. (maybe if they climb the Shepri Kangri)
In the early years, the Indian Army systematically kicked them off the Saltoro range, one place at a time - a lot of blood spilled on that glacier, lots of lives lost
Re: Siachen News & Discussion
Gagan - thanks for labelling the Bana/Sonam post photo. Combining your annotations with news reports about the avalanche at Sonam post and then going back to google earth makes the location of Bana top and Bana Post very clear: here's a hitchhiker's guide to getting to the highest helipad in the world
Start northwards on the Siachen Glacier. Take a left at the Lolofond Glacier fork, towards the NE. You will get to Bilafond La at the crest of the saddle separating Bilafond and Lolofond Glaciers. The mountain feature on your left is the one housing bunkers at the top for Bana Post. What is most interesting is that this is only if you want to take selfies. To actually go up and shake hands, you have to take the first left before you get to Bilafond La. You will enter a club (as in cards) shaped cul-de-sac where you are surrounded on all sides by mansions taller than 6000 meters. As you enter the cul-de-sac, you are facing towards the SE. Enter the leaf of the club to your right, which is actually formed by a C shaped curve of the mountain feature that has Bana Top. Now start climbing that mountain feature - you will enter the C shaped formation that Gagan has annotated above. At the floor of the ridgelines, roughly, is the world's highest helipad. While chatting with the friendly IA natives of Sonam Post, turn around roughly towards SW and look up towards the ridgeline of the mountain feature. And wave. Folks from Bana Post will wave back. However, be careful not to wave too far to the south, where the ridgeline begins to dip downwards into a saddle. That's where residents of Amar Post live, and they are mighty resentful because they are actually the frontline against Paki attacks from the Ali Barangsa Base Camp. Bana and Sonam get all the glamour and glory, while to poor folks at Amar go unsung and unheard of. If you are feeling particularly adventurous or belligerent, ask for directions to the less friendly mansion called Tawiz post, which is facing and roughly to the NW of Chez Bana across Rue Bilafond. Now those folks are not particularly friendly, especially if you look like you are buddies with the residents of Bana, Sonam and Amar. But worry not. All you need to do is to pull out your candle and start talking about Aman ki Aasha. Then you will be okay, although your candle will be frozen.
Gagan, any pointers to where the Tawiz Post is, relative to Bana top? Is it still manned?
Start northwards on the Siachen Glacier. Take a left at the Lolofond Glacier fork, towards the NE. You will get to Bilafond La at the crest of the saddle separating Bilafond and Lolofond Glaciers. The mountain feature on your left is the one housing bunkers at the top for Bana Post. What is most interesting is that this is only if you want to take selfies. To actually go up and shake hands, you have to take the first left before you get to Bilafond La. You will enter a club (as in cards) shaped cul-de-sac where you are surrounded on all sides by mansions taller than 6000 meters. As you enter the cul-de-sac, you are facing towards the SE. Enter the leaf of the club to your right, which is actually formed by a C shaped curve of the mountain feature that has Bana Top. Now start climbing that mountain feature - you will enter the C shaped formation that Gagan has annotated above. At the floor of the ridgelines, roughly, is the world's highest helipad. While chatting with the friendly IA natives of Sonam Post, turn around roughly towards SW and look up towards the ridgeline of the mountain feature. And wave. Folks from Bana Post will wave back. However, be careful not to wave too far to the south, where the ridgeline begins to dip downwards into a saddle. That's where residents of Amar Post live, and they are mighty resentful because they are actually the frontline against Paki attacks from the Ali Barangsa Base Camp. Bana and Sonam get all the glamour and glory, while to poor folks at Amar go unsung and unheard of. If you are feeling particularly adventurous or belligerent, ask for directions to the less friendly mansion called Tawiz post, which is facing and roughly to the NW of Chez Bana across Rue Bilafond. Now those folks are not particularly friendly, especially if you look like you are buddies with the residents of Bana, Sonam and Amar. But worry not. All you need to do is to pull out your candle and start talking about Aman ki Aasha. Then you will be okay, although your candle will be frozen.
Gagan, any pointers to where the Tawiz Post is, relative to Bana top? Is it still manned?
Re: Siachen News & Discussion
Amar post does not go unsung in knowledgeable circles.. It played a pivotal role in the capture of Bana Post..
2nd Lt Balraj Sharma was posted here with a seven man detachment... a MG detachment from this post was crucial in cutting of Quaid Post and making it Bana Post
2nd Lt Balraj Sharma was posted here with a seven man detachment... a MG detachment from this post was crucial in cutting of Quaid Post and making it Bana Post
Re: Siachen News & Discussion
Amar is on the other side of the Bana Perfecture
Similarly located as the Sonam post is, but on the other side of the Bana Top
They had put up a machine gun nest during the assault on the quaid post.
Sonam post played a vital role in stopping Pervez Musharraf’s several attacks on Bilafond La, dead in their tracks
Similarly located as the Sonam post is, but on the other side of the Bana Top
They had put up a machine gun nest during the assault on the quaid post.
Sonam post played a vital role in stopping Pervez Musharraf’s several attacks on Bilafond La, dead in their tracks
Re: Siachen News & Discussion
https://twitter.com/majorgauravarya/sta ... 4899342337 --> With Brigadier Ashok Chaudhary, Vir Chakra. In 1988 in Siachen, he climbed down Pak side to cut ropes fixed on a sheer ice wall, totally exposed to enemy for 10 hours. “यह पागलपन है. (This is madness, Sir).” I said. He smiled “मोहब्बत और पागलपन में बहुत कम फ़र्क़ होता है (There is very little difference between love and madness)."
Re: Siachen News & Discussion
https://twitter.com/neeraj_rajput/statu ... 3879958528 ---> Army bids farewell to gallant officer Lieutenant Colonel Deepak Thapa in Dharmshala yesterday after long fight with cancer. 'Thapa Base' in Siachen Glacier named after him for his actions against Pakistan in 1989. RIP.
Re: Siachen News & Discussion
https://twitter.com/shatrujeet009/statu ... 0464798721 ---> Some more exclusives from the highest battlefield Siachen Lynx Snowmobile in service with Indian Army.
Re: Siachen News & Discussion
The need to remember Kargil.
Even as India’s attention focuses on the ceasefire at the LoC/IB and the suspension of operations in Jammu and Kashmir’s hinterland, social media is abuzz with the remembrance of Kargil of 1999. Various acts of valour form the deserving narrative of honour. However, it is the big picture, the collective one, which is rarely explained or examined in the public mind. An informed idea of what really happened at the lofty heights in mid-1999 will help India’s current generation and many more to appreciate some of the nuances of how Kargil really occurred and how it was handled. Indian military literature on this is limited but currently, opinion in Pakistan is having a field day.
Two recent books have discussed and exposed issues concerning the Kargil episode. Nasim Zehra, a Pakistani journalist, has released her book ‘From Kargil to the Coup’, and there is ‘The Spy Chronicles’, a joint effort by two former Chiefs of India’s and Pakistan’s premier intelligence agencies, which has some discussions relating to the misadventure. Zehra calls it the handiwork of a clique of generals and not of the Pakistani army. She terms it a disaster because it undermined the honest efforts of the Lahore Agreement of February 1999 which attempted to overcome some of the mistrust arising out of the nuclear tests of May 1998. Comments of Pakistani panellists at some of the book’s launch events reveal Pakistan’s continued mindset. One of them stated that Pakistan owed no apologies to India for Kargil because India, too, deceived Pakistan on Siachen and did not follow the Shimla Agreement while occupying it. A consensus opinion was that the planning and execution in isolation was a disaster and made the operation an adventure rather than an aimed and planned effort. In fact, a Pakistani general believed “had there been proper planning and full logistical support, the operation could have delivered the desired results of clogging the support line of India in Kashmir”. Nawaz Sharif also came under criticism for his unplanned rush to Washington and yielding to Bill Clinton’s pressure to vacate the remaining intrusion. Obviously, little regret and even lesser remorse make up Pakistan’s opinion on Kargil.
Asad Durrani, former DG ISI, in the jointly written book, ‘The Spy Chronicles’ expresses his perception that Pervez Musharraf as Pakistan’s DGMO was obsessed with the Kargil plan which was rejected by then PM Benazir Bhutto. The opportunity came when Musharraf was elevated to the position of the Pakistani army chief. How much of this intent and plan was known to his then mentor, Nawaz Sharif, will always remain cloaked in doubt, an issue also inconclusively analysed in Zehra’s book. However, 1998-99 provided the opportunity for the execution of the plan through the winter. Prime Minister Vajpayee’s Lahore Bus Yatra on February 21, 1999, offered scope for enhanced deception.
A brief explanation will clarify many of the issues above. The road from Srinagar to Leh enters the Ladakh sector after crossing the Zojila pass. Along the 100-km distance from Zojila to Kargil, major segments are overlooked by Pakistani posts across the LoC at a short distance. In winter these were vacated every year as were the Indian posts opposite them. Beyond Leh, a road leads into the Nubra Valley across the Ladakh range; the Army’s base camp is housed here for the defence of Siachen glacier. The Indian occupation of the latter in a coup de main operation in May 1984 put Pakistan at a huge strategic and psychological disadvantage. Musharraf, as a younger officer with Pakistan’s Special Forces, was known to have personally led failed assaults to evict the Indian Army from the Saltoro Ridge in 1987. The Kargil plan was a classic employment of manoeuvre which envisaged choking the Zojila-Leh road by an early winter occupation of vacated posts of both Pakistani and Indian armies, preventing the logistics resupply of Ladakh (and thereby Siachen) by interdiction and making the Indian Army’s defence of Ladakh untenable. An alternative supply artery to Leh existed from Pathankot via Manali but it was comparatively fragile and undependable due to heavy snow accumulation and road closure for extended periods. Discovered quite accidentally in May 1999, the Pakistani intrusion at the Dras and Kargil heights did embarrass the Indian Army whose attention was focused on the Kashmir Valley and south of Pir Panjal where militancy was fast spreading. It was as much an intelligence failure as an ‘intellect failure’ as India did not ever assess the nuisance potential of Kargil in a low-intensity war. Without an idea of the extent and depth of penetration, India attempted to locally restore the situation. When that failed, it inducted additional troops with 8 Mountain Division, then deployed in North Kashmir, to take on the mantle of restoration. The restoration operations fought at lofty heights were based upon company and platoon battles against entrenched Pakistani troops with some valorous feats by Indian junior soldiers and officers. Initial support by the Indian Air Force was helpful but difficult to execute. Later medium artillery (Bofors) became the backbone of fire support. Having recaptured a large chunk of the intrusion, India allowed diplomacy to play its role; that saw Sharif’s rush to Washington.
Kargil’s impact on the Valley was indirect as large tracts of North Kashmir were vacated and progressively occupied by our troops from elsewhere. It may never have been Musharraf’s intent, but this situation provided the space for a spurt in terror activities in Kashmir, including the infamous suicide ‘sneak attacks’ (sometimes erroneously called fidayeen). Kashmir witnessed the highest casualties among civilians and soldiers/policemen in 2001 and the tenuous situation on the counter-terror grid remained in place almost till 2003.
A major lesson emerged from Musharraf’s failed exploits – that initiation of operations could be brilliant but without an accompanying termination plan suited to various contingencies, success would invariably be elusive; he underestimated the resilience of the Indian Army and its sense of honour as had many of his predecessors. In her book, Zehra quotes a Pakistani major – “We said a two rakaat prayer of gratitude to Allah,” once Pakistan’s decision to vacate the remaining occupied heights was announced.
Siachen was the actual reason for the Pakistani misadventure at Kargil. When people today question the Indian Army’s continued insistence on remaining deployed at the Siachen glacier, as against mutual withdrawal along with the Pakistan Army, they need to be reminded of two things. First, in military standoffs trusting the adversary is suicidal, just as Kargil’s annual winter vacation exemplified. Second, if Siachen is to be vacated, it will only be one army which will withdraw. Unknown to the Pakistani people and largely to the Indian public, the Siachen is firmly in India’s grip with no Pakistani presence which can even glimpse the glacier.
Even as India’s attention focuses on the ceasefire at the LoC/IB and the suspension of operations in Jammu and Kashmir’s hinterland, social media is abuzz with the remembrance of Kargil of 1999. Various acts of valour form the deserving narrative of honour. However, it is the big picture, the collective one, which is rarely explained or examined in the public mind. An informed idea of what really happened at the lofty heights in mid-1999 will help India’s current generation and many more to appreciate some of the nuances of how Kargil really occurred and how it was handled. Indian military literature on this is limited but currently, opinion in Pakistan is having a field day.
Two recent books have discussed and exposed issues concerning the Kargil episode. Nasim Zehra, a Pakistani journalist, has released her book ‘From Kargil to the Coup’, and there is ‘The Spy Chronicles’, a joint effort by two former Chiefs of India’s and Pakistan’s premier intelligence agencies, which has some discussions relating to the misadventure. Zehra calls it the handiwork of a clique of generals and not of the Pakistani army. She terms it a disaster because it undermined the honest efforts of the Lahore Agreement of February 1999 which attempted to overcome some of the mistrust arising out of the nuclear tests of May 1998. Comments of Pakistani panellists at some of the book’s launch events reveal Pakistan’s continued mindset. One of them stated that Pakistan owed no apologies to India for Kargil because India, too, deceived Pakistan on Siachen and did not follow the Shimla Agreement while occupying it. A consensus opinion was that the planning and execution in isolation was a disaster and made the operation an adventure rather than an aimed and planned effort. In fact, a Pakistani general believed “had there been proper planning and full logistical support, the operation could have delivered the desired results of clogging the support line of India in Kashmir”. Nawaz Sharif also came under criticism for his unplanned rush to Washington and yielding to Bill Clinton’s pressure to vacate the remaining intrusion. Obviously, little regret and even lesser remorse make up Pakistan’s opinion on Kargil.
Asad Durrani, former DG ISI, in the jointly written book, ‘The Spy Chronicles’ expresses his perception that Pervez Musharraf as Pakistan’s DGMO was obsessed with the Kargil plan which was rejected by then PM Benazir Bhutto. The opportunity came when Musharraf was elevated to the position of the Pakistani army chief. How much of this intent and plan was known to his then mentor, Nawaz Sharif, will always remain cloaked in doubt, an issue also inconclusively analysed in Zehra’s book. However, 1998-99 provided the opportunity for the execution of the plan through the winter. Prime Minister Vajpayee’s Lahore Bus Yatra on February 21, 1999, offered scope for enhanced deception.
A brief explanation will clarify many of the issues above. The road from Srinagar to Leh enters the Ladakh sector after crossing the Zojila pass. Along the 100-km distance from Zojila to Kargil, major segments are overlooked by Pakistani posts across the LoC at a short distance. In winter these were vacated every year as were the Indian posts opposite them. Beyond Leh, a road leads into the Nubra Valley across the Ladakh range; the Army’s base camp is housed here for the defence of Siachen glacier. The Indian occupation of the latter in a coup de main operation in May 1984 put Pakistan at a huge strategic and psychological disadvantage. Musharraf, as a younger officer with Pakistan’s Special Forces, was known to have personally led failed assaults to evict the Indian Army from the Saltoro Ridge in 1987. The Kargil plan was a classic employment of manoeuvre which envisaged choking the Zojila-Leh road by an early winter occupation of vacated posts of both Pakistani and Indian armies, preventing the logistics resupply of Ladakh (and thereby Siachen) by interdiction and making the Indian Army’s defence of Ladakh untenable. An alternative supply artery to Leh existed from Pathankot via Manali but it was comparatively fragile and undependable due to heavy snow accumulation and road closure for extended periods. Discovered quite accidentally in May 1999, the Pakistani intrusion at the Dras and Kargil heights did embarrass the Indian Army whose attention was focused on the Kashmir Valley and south of Pir Panjal where militancy was fast spreading. It was as much an intelligence failure as an ‘intellect failure’ as India did not ever assess the nuisance potential of Kargil in a low-intensity war. Without an idea of the extent and depth of penetration, India attempted to locally restore the situation. When that failed, it inducted additional troops with 8 Mountain Division, then deployed in North Kashmir, to take on the mantle of restoration. The restoration operations fought at lofty heights were based upon company and platoon battles against entrenched Pakistani troops with some valorous feats by Indian junior soldiers and officers. Initial support by the Indian Air Force was helpful but difficult to execute. Later medium artillery (Bofors) became the backbone of fire support. Having recaptured a large chunk of the intrusion, India allowed diplomacy to play its role; that saw Sharif’s rush to Washington.
Kargil’s impact on the Valley was indirect as large tracts of North Kashmir were vacated and progressively occupied by our troops from elsewhere. It may never have been Musharraf’s intent, but this situation provided the space for a spurt in terror activities in Kashmir, including the infamous suicide ‘sneak attacks’ (sometimes erroneously called fidayeen). Kashmir witnessed the highest casualties among civilians and soldiers/policemen in 2001 and the tenuous situation on the counter-terror grid remained in place almost till 2003.
A major lesson emerged from Musharraf’s failed exploits – that initiation of operations could be brilliant but without an accompanying termination plan suited to various contingencies, success would invariably be elusive; he underestimated the resilience of the Indian Army and its sense of honour as had many of his predecessors. In her book, Zehra quotes a Pakistani major – “We said a two rakaat prayer of gratitude to Allah,” once Pakistan’s decision to vacate the remaining occupied heights was announced.
Siachen was the actual reason for the Pakistani misadventure at Kargil. When people today question the Indian Army’s continued insistence on remaining deployed at the Siachen glacier, as against mutual withdrawal along with the Pakistan Army, they need to be reminded of two things. First, in military standoffs trusting the adversary is suicidal, just as Kargil’s annual winter vacation exemplified. Second, if Siachen is to be vacated, it will only be one army which will withdraw. Unknown to the Pakistani people and largely to the Indian public, the Siachen is firmly in India’s grip with no Pakistani presence which can even glimpse the glacier.
Re: Siachen News & Discussion
First MiG-23BN fighter landing at Leh
With the escalation of the Siachen operations in 1984, Contingency plans were developed to utilise high performance fighter aircraft from Leh airfield as and when needed. Air Marshal A D Joshi narrates the first landing of the MiG-23BN at Leh airport - The planning and training for this event was no simple matter, as this narration will make it evident.
Classic view of SM290
Ever since flying operations commenced at Leh in Ladakh , it has been the base for transport and helicopter operations only. Fighter operations could not be undertaken due to various limitations on the aircraft , as Leh is situated at a fairly high altitude. Even the British Harrier trials planned in 1973 could not be undertaken due to various problems and confidence levels of the British test pilots.
In April 1984 when Siachen operations commenced, the Army was in need of fighter support if the situation warranted it. The Air Force decided on deploying the Hunter aircraft initially, however because of weapon limitations that the Hunter aircraft could carry, it was decided to utilize the Mig-23 variable wing sweep, supersonic fighter bomber.
On 4th April 1984, No. 221 Squadron AF, was operationally deployed at Pathankot, standing by for operations. The squadron was equipped with the MiG-23 BN fighter bomber aircraft. The MiG-23 BN was capable of reaching the target area from Pathankot itself, with the maximum load. The only factor that needed to be considered was the flying time that it would take to reach the target area.
While at Pathankot extensive valley flying training was undertaken under my guidance, then a Squadron Leader, senior flight commander and offg commanding officer of the unit. Dummy attacks on possible targets in the valley as well as on mountain tops were practiced.
Practice diversion sorties were flown to Leh, so as to get used to the terrain and circuit pattern. The approach to land at Leh was only for Runway – 07. Two types of approaches were possible . One was a direct approach from Khalsi and the other was a standard circuit descending on down wind and base leg like the transport aircraft. The circuit for R/W 07 was behind the mountain range and approach was along the slope of the mountain. The airfield could not be seen on down wind and base leg and became visible just prior to rolling out on finals. The approach all along was just 50 meters above the slope and there was a big hump just after the Indus river and short of the 07 dumbbell, and lot of care had to be taken when doing an overshoot after round off, as the engine response and speed build up was slow.
Since there was a big hill feature at the other end of the runway a turn had to be executed to the right, so as to fly along the Indus in a south easterly direction to build speed and height.
On 15 May 1984 on instructions from HQ WAC, I along with two aircraft ferried back to Halwara. Technicians from the Base Repair Depot (BRD) were to carry out some trials on the turbo starter which started the main engine. A .1mm jet was fitted to the fuel pipe line to reduce the fuel inlet into the turbo starter. The squadron was still not aware as to why this mod was being carried out. After various trials, on 16th May, the aircraft were ferried back to Pathankot.
On 18th May on instructions from WAC, I led a detachment of three aircraft to Awantipur . At Awantipur some more trials were carried out on the turbo starter and finally .6mmjet was fitted. Simultaneously ground crew was moved to Leh.
The SASO WAC Air Mshl Raghavendran visited Awantipur on 22nd May along with AOC J&K AVM Arvind Dalaya . It was then that I was asked to land the MiG-23BN at Leh. I was given to understand that our own test pilots were not too confident about the aircrafts operational utilization from Leh.
On 23 May1984 at 10:00 hrs I was escorted by my no 2 Sqn Ldr Paul and 2 Mig 23 MFs ,as a single fighter aircraft is prohibited from flying over the mountains and my no 2 was to return to Awantipur. My aircraft (SM-245) configuration was clean with only internal fuel. The unit had already calculated the all up weight of the aircraft required for a safe landing at Leh. Based on temperature and pressure the (Touchdown Air Speed) TAS was calculated. The permissible hub speed for the undercarriage of the aircraft was 320 kms for the main wheels and 280kms for the nose wheel. The altitude of Leh being 3256 mtrs , the true airspeed at touchdown was approx 60 kms more than the IAS (Indicated Air Speed) . The tail chute limitations of less than 280kms was another factor that had to be kept in mind. Therefore , it was necessary to keep the aircraft floating for as long as possible ,so as to ensure that the touchdown TAS would be less than 320kms and the nose wheel lowering as well as the tail chute deployment would be less than 280kms.
On reaching overhead Leh , the other three aircraft detached and were orbiting overhead. I carried out practice circuits and over shoots so as to bring the fuel state to a figure as low as possible. When the fuel state reached 550 liters, I decided to land the aircraft as the fuel available did not permit another circuit. If I had failed to land the aircraft, it would result in an ejection due to lack of fuel.
After announcing my intention to land, there were calls of ”best of luck “ from my airborne buddies as well as the ground based personnel ( ATC and Tpt aircraft ). I carried out my descending circuit as precisely as possible, turned onto base leg , and just before roll out made contact with the runway. The approach was made on Radio Altimeter maintaining 50 mtrs all along the slope, adjusting the height speed combination.
I was aware that on crossing the Indus River short of the runway there would be light turbulence, erratic winds, speed fluctuations, as well as a mild sink. There was also a big hump in line with the runway, short of the dumb-bell which gave the feeling that the main wheels would touch it.
The speed on threshold was 280 kms IAS, round off was on the dumbbell. I reduced the throttle gently, allowed the aircraft to float and touched down at a speed of 240 km IAS. Things moved in a flash and at a speed of 220 km IAS, I lowered the nose wheel and deployed the chute. The aircraft rolled till the the end of the runway under control.
R/T NATTER OF “CONGRATULATIONS JOE “came from one and all including the IAC captain . I turned right into the taxy way leading to the blast pen at the end of R/W 07. I jettisoned the tail chute, stopped the aircraft, switched off and then gradually depressurized the cockpit as sudden decompression could cause problems.
Gp Capt S K Behal , the officiating COO for fighter operations was present to receive me. I was taken to the ops room and made to speak to Air Mshl Wollen the AOC-in-C WAC who extended his congratulations and asked a lot of questions.
I then carried out a recce of the runway and gauged that the down slope from dumbbell 25 to 07 was fairly steep, and there was no arrester barrier at the 07 end, therefore aborting take off meant going off the runway hitting the hump and then going over into the Indus river. In case one decided to eject, the minimum height required was 30 meters and speed above 130 kms.
I then carried out start up and taxy trials . The trials completed, the aircraft was made ready for takeoff and return to Awantipur. However bad weather set in and flying was called off for the day .
I was elated at the fact that I had created history . As per rules , an overnight stay meant rest for 48 hrs , however on instructions from WAC the restriction was waived and if I was found fit the next day I was to take off.
On 24 May 84, after a thorough medical examination I planned my take off . Once the three aircraft from Awantipur came over head Leh, I started up the aircraft which posed no problems , Oil pressure had to be adjusted to remain within limits ,I then lined up on R/W 25. Take off was also a little awkward as 300mts up the runway it slopes away and therefore the controls initially have to be eased forward to prevent premature liftoff and on crossing the hump then eased back to lift the nose wheel. This is to be done gently as the gap between the tail fin and runway surface is very little and chances of it touching is runway are bright.
At a speed of 130 km IAS, I raised the nose wheel as I had crossed the hump and unstuck at 290 km IAS short of middle marker. This worked out to a speed of 352 km TAS which was way above the 320 kms restriction on the hub.
The flight to Awantipur was uneventful and on landing was received and congratulated by the SASO and other station personnel.
Three more trial landings and take off’s with various loads were carried out before full flying operations on the Mig 23 BN’s was cleared for other fully ops pilots. This was certainly a red letter day for me personally and the Air Force .
During my tenure as CO of the same unit from April 85 to May 87 the squadron carried regular operations at Leh. I was also tasked to carry out range trials at Toshe Maidan near Srinagar , Dummy dives at camp 6 on the Siachen Glacier . Since it was dangerous to carry out full range work on the glacier, based on my recommendation Kar Tso was opened as a regular range after I had carried out trials of all weapons ( guns ,rockets & bombs ).
I was then given the task of briefing Mig 21 Bis and Mig27 sqns. Besides this, approaches were carried out by me at Thoise, and a number of Photo recee sorties were personally under taken by me and some unit pilots. It has certainly given me great satisfaction for being the first pilot to start operations from Leh as even the Soviets had not operated at such heights and possibly the most experienced fighter pilot to fly in this area.
Air Marshal A D Joshi (10886 F(P))was commissioned in the IAF in June 1967, as part of the 97th Pilot's Course. In his service spanning over 39 years, he commanded No.221 Squadron flying the MiG-23BN, and was the C-in-C for Eastern Air Command and Strategic Forces Command. He is a recipient of the PVSM and VM.
Re: Siachen News & Discussion
Operation Meghdoot - How India Captured Siachen.
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Re: Siachen News & Discussion
Thanks to Rohit Vats Saar for sharing this on Twitter:
https://twitter.com/followmkp/status/11 ... 63968?s=19
And Kancha Saar has an epic thread running on the services rendered by these awesome friends.
On the day of #internationalpetday Meet IndianArmy “DOT”. Dot located L/n Hanumanthappa under 30 feet of snow at 19500 feet height in -55Degree Temp on 3feb,2016.
#PetDay #InternationalPetDay
https://twitter.com/followmkp/status/11 ... 63968?s=19
And Kancha Saar has an epic thread running on the services rendered by these awesome friends.
Re: Siachen News & Discussion
Every soldier in Siachen gets a personal kit worth Rs 1 lakh.
Indian soldiers deployed in the world's highest battlefield Siachen glacier are getting personal kit worth around Rs one lakh for protection against extreme cold conditions there.
Along with the personal kit for protection against winters, every soldier also gets equipment worth around Rs 1.5 lakhs for survival and moving around the Siachen glacier during their deployment there, Army sources told here.
The equipment and the personal kit of the troops were examined and reviewed by Army Chief General Manoj Mukund Naravane during his trip to Siachen in the second week of January.
"The facilities have been provided to the soldiers for personal protection from winters and survival in the extreme cold conditions. Clear instructions have been issued by the Army top brass that if the troops need more facilities, they should be provided that," the sources said.
The most expensive part of the personal kit of soldiers includes the multilayered extreme winter clothing which costs around Rs 28,000 per set along with the special sleeping bag which is worth around Rs 13,000.
The down jacket and the special gloves of troops together cost around Rs 14,000 while the multipurpose shoes cost around Rs 12,500.
Among the equipment being provided to the troops, is also the oxygen cylinder costing Rs 50,000 per piece which is very important at such altitudes as the oxygen levels are very low there.
The Soldiers also get equipment and gadgets for detecting avalanche victims which costs around Rs 8,000. Avalanches are a very frequent occurrence in the glacier which receives very heavy snowfall during the year.
India has been deploying forces at the heights ranging from 17,000 feet to 22,000 feet for more than three decades now at the Siachen glacier which was attempted to be usurped by the Pakistan Army.
The Pakistan Army has ceded a significant chunk of their territory to the Chinese near the Siachen glacier area and Army top brass feels the area is strategically important for keeping enemy designs in check.
Indian soldiers deployed in the world's highest battlefield Siachen glacier are getting personal kit worth around Rs one lakh for protection against extreme cold conditions there.
Along with the personal kit for protection against winters, every soldier also gets equipment worth around Rs 1.5 lakhs for survival and moving around the Siachen glacier during their deployment there, Army sources told here.
The equipment and the personal kit of the troops were examined and reviewed by Army Chief General Manoj Mukund Naravane during his trip to Siachen in the second week of January.
"The facilities have been provided to the soldiers for personal protection from winters and survival in the extreme cold conditions. Clear instructions have been issued by the Army top brass that if the troops need more facilities, they should be provided that," the sources said.
The most expensive part of the personal kit of soldiers includes the multilayered extreme winter clothing which costs around Rs 28,000 per set along with the special sleeping bag which is worth around Rs 13,000.
The down jacket and the special gloves of troops together cost around Rs 14,000 while the multipurpose shoes cost around Rs 12,500.
Among the equipment being provided to the troops, is also the oxygen cylinder costing Rs 50,000 per piece which is very important at such altitudes as the oxygen levels are very low there.
The Soldiers also get equipment and gadgets for detecting avalanche victims which costs around Rs 8,000. Avalanches are a very frequent occurrence in the glacier which receives very heavy snowfall during the year.
India has been deploying forces at the heights ranging from 17,000 feet to 22,000 feet for more than three decades now at the Siachen glacier which was attempted to be usurped by the Pakistan Army.
The Pakistan Army has ceded a significant chunk of their territory to the Chinese near the Siachen glacier area and Army top brass feels the area is strategically important for keeping enemy designs in check.
Re: Siachen News & Discussion
13 April 1984 36 years
36 years of Operation Meghdoot: A tale of Indian army's unmatched bravery, heroism and sacrifice
On April 13, 1984, the Indian Army secured the strategically important Siachen Glacier and continues to guard the highest battlefield in the world braving the most challenging situations.
https://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-3 ... ce-2820861
excerpted
36 years of Operation Meghdoot: A tale of Indian army's unmatched bravery, heroism and sacrifice
On April 13, 1984, the Indian Army secured the strategically important Siachen Glacier and continues to guard the highest battlefield in the world braving the most challenging situations.
https://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-3 ... ce-2820861
excerpted
Siachen sits astride two disputed boundaries with Pakistan and China. It lies in the Karakoram Range in North-West India. Siachen Glacier is 76.4 km long and covers about 10,000 sq km uninhabited terrain.
In 1974, Pakistan started permitting mountaineering expeditions into Siachen Glacier. By the spring of 1983, it was clear that India needed to maintain a close watch on Siachen.
On this day, a Platoon of four Kumaon led by then Captain Sanjay Kulkarni planted the first Indian Flag on Siachen Glacier at Bilafond La which began Operation Meghdoot.
Re: Siachen News & Discussion
Vips wrote:The need to remember Kargil.
Comments of Pakistani panellists at some of the book’s launch events reveal Pakistan’s continued mindset. One of them stated that Pakistan owed no apologies to India for Kargil because India, too, deceived Pakistan on Siachen and did not follow the Shimla Agreement while occupying it. A consensus opinion was that the planning and execution in isolation was a disaster and made the operation an adventure rather than an aimed and planned effort. In fact, a Pakistani general believed “had there been proper planning and full logistical support, the operation could have delivered the desired results of clogging the support line of India in Kashmir”.
the pakis, especially their crore commander's "army", excel at two things
trying to finesse India and failing badly
and
finessing themselves and succeeding rather spectacularly.
one cannot figure out which hurts them more.
Re: Siachen News & Discussion
How about international support of looting and plundering other's territory of j&k UT including occupied in name religion, race, selling territories to China etc...proper planning and full logistical support
Not to mention that pakis don't have a stellar record on democracy or in Balochistan or that India is (due to efforts of Indians) the largest democracy and such details.
Re: Siachen News & Discussion
India occupies the heights of the Saltoro range and the defence of the Siachen glacier region seems secure. However, what is the step forward from here?
How can India take advantage of the position that is has fought so hard to reach, over the last 30 years? The capture of point 5770/Bilal Post now known as Navdeep post or Cheema top, has probably opened up some options for taking further offensive action against the pakis.
However, to what end?
There was even some fear amongst the pakis that India might take advantage of the Gyari landslide/avalanche in 2012 and creep forward.
However, in my opinion that would have been fruitless. Perhaps we can undertake some offensive action in the region and dislodge the pakis from the western slopes of the Saltoro range and also from the glaciers. Capture of render paki presence untenable on their base camp of Bilafod glacier. this would force them to abandon most of their posts in the region.
However we wold not be able to vacate our existing posts, even if we manage to remove the pakis from most of their posts, as a constant vigil would still be required.
Maybe we could go so far as to capture Gyari! However, I say it would be fruitless, because it would not be possible for the Indian army to hold Gyari.
For holding Gyari, we have to neutralise the paki positions at Goma and also the brigade headquarters at Khapalu.
Which brings me to the only solution that I think possible, for the Siachen issue, i.e. capture large parts of Baltistan.
For the Siachen issue, I think there are only three possible solutions.
1). We remain happy maintaining the current status quo and due to better technology in the future cut down the casualties that we suffer even further. However the expenditure that we incur will continue and the hardships that the soldiers face will also continue.
2). Sign some kind of a peace agreement with the pakis to vacate the posts. This can happen only if the pakis agree to demarcate the AGPL and agree to extend the LoC along Saltoro range, till where it meets the Shaksgam valley. This would be the worst option for India, as it would gain little for 30 years of fighting and would be strategic blunder at this stage, given the Chinese designs for the wider region.
3). The best option for India, capture large parts or possibly all of Baltistan. Baltistan consists of 4 districts. If we do go down this route, hopefully we expand the scope a little further and also target Astore which lies north of the Gurez valley and perhaps all the way upto Hunza, right next to the Khunjerab pass. If not so far, at least all of Baltistan would be enough.
The people of Baltistan would probably come around accepting the Indian army and accept being a part of India, just like the population in Kargil and the Baltis in Turtuk have. The mainly Shia Ismailis and Nuristanis do not really like the Sunni pakjabi dominated paki army and we play our cards right, it can actually solve more issues then just Siachen for us.
If any other more knowledgeable people have any other options for solving the Siachen issue to our advantage, please do post.
How can India take advantage of the position that is has fought so hard to reach, over the last 30 years? The capture of point 5770/Bilal Post now known as Navdeep post or Cheema top, has probably opened up some options for taking further offensive action against the pakis.
However, to what end?
There was even some fear amongst the pakis that India might take advantage of the Gyari landslide/avalanche in 2012 and creep forward.
However, in my opinion that would have been fruitless. Perhaps we can undertake some offensive action in the region and dislodge the pakis from the western slopes of the Saltoro range and also from the glaciers. Capture of render paki presence untenable on their base camp of Bilafod glacier. this would force them to abandon most of their posts in the region.
However we wold not be able to vacate our existing posts, even if we manage to remove the pakis from most of their posts, as a constant vigil would still be required.
Maybe we could go so far as to capture Gyari! However, I say it would be fruitless, because it would not be possible for the Indian army to hold Gyari.
For holding Gyari, we have to neutralise the paki positions at Goma and also the brigade headquarters at Khapalu.
Which brings me to the only solution that I think possible, for the Siachen issue, i.e. capture large parts of Baltistan.
For the Siachen issue, I think there are only three possible solutions.
1). We remain happy maintaining the current status quo and due to better technology in the future cut down the casualties that we suffer even further. However the expenditure that we incur will continue and the hardships that the soldiers face will also continue.
2). Sign some kind of a peace agreement with the pakis to vacate the posts. This can happen only if the pakis agree to demarcate the AGPL and agree to extend the LoC along Saltoro range, till where it meets the Shaksgam valley. This would be the worst option for India, as it would gain little for 30 years of fighting and would be strategic blunder at this stage, given the Chinese designs for the wider region.
3). The best option for India, capture large parts or possibly all of Baltistan. Baltistan consists of 4 districts. If we do go down this route, hopefully we expand the scope a little further and also target Astore which lies north of the Gurez valley and perhaps all the way upto Hunza, right next to the Khunjerab pass. If not so far, at least all of Baltistan would be enough.
The people of Baltistan would probably come around accepting the Indian army and accept being a part of India, just like the population in Kargil and the Baltis in Turtuk have. The mainly Shia Ismailis and Nuristanis do not really like the Sunni pakjabi dominated paki army and we play our cards right, it can actually solve more issues then just Siachen for us.
If any other more knowledgeable people have any other options for solving the Siachen issue to our advantage, please do post.
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Re: Siachen News & Discussion
very nice post mody ji..after long seeing some serious thought on this thread...my noob idea is that there would be many threads being worked on the final solution to the papi problem. The problem has ramifications both internal and external....siachen, sir creek, LoC are just the symptoms of the disease..modi has made it clear that yeh khel jahan se shuru hota hai wahi khela jayega...unless pakis/chinese give us an opportunity first this thing would be in works...
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Re: Siachen News & Discussion
In fact, a Pakistani general believed “had there been proper planning and full logistical support, the operation could have delivered the desired results of clogging the support line of India in Kashmir”.
Yes, and ghazwa e Hind will commence immediately upon the successful conclusion of ghazwa e East Pakistan.
Yes, and ghazwa e Hind will commence immediately upon the successful conclusion of ghazwa e East Pakistan.
Re: Siachen News & Discussion
Sir Creek is a different problem. For sir creek, we have been stupid not to have solved it over so many years. Our position is the logical one and the pakis might have even agreed to it. Now, with the international norm for demarcating the continental shelf and special economic zone, would give much bigger gains to India, if our position on Sir Creek is accepted and hence the pakis will never agree to it. The LoC for us generally is a solved issue, except for a few desirable bits of real estate like the Haji Pir pass etc. India in all likelyhood would not mind converting the LoC along PoK into an international border.ArjunPandit wrote:very nice post mody ji..after long seeing some serious thought on this thread...my noob idea is that there would be many threads being worked on the final solution to the papi problem. The problem has ramifications both internal and external....siachen, sir creek, LoC are just the symptoms of the disease..modi has made it clear that yeh khel jahan se shuru hota hai wahi khela jayega...unless pakis/chinese give us an opportunity first this thing would be in works...
Its Gilgit-Baltistan which is actually of much higher significance, due to the China factor. At the time of the 1948 war, the British stabbed us in the back and sided with the pakis, purely for GB area.
Earlier the Siachen issue was limited on to the Siachen area. However, now it is different. In fact for us from the three options that I have mentioned,
option 2 would be the worst option. Worse then maintaining the status quo as it is right now. In fact, we have to thank the paki stupidity and their obsession with H&D for not proposing something like Option-2 and the stupid peaceniks in India agreeing to the same.
Let me elaborate on the last line that I wrote in our post above, i.e. if we do manage to capture Baltistan or large portion of it, it would solve more then just the Siachen issue for us.
1). If we do re-capture Balistan, it would automatically solve the Siachen issue. We would be able to vacate the heights and the glacier and use the Thoise airfield for taking tourists to the area.
2). It would demonstrate very clearly the superiority of the Indian Army over the Paki Army. No matter what the pakis would throw at us, to try and re-capture the areas, IA would be able to hit back with superior numbers, superior technology and superior firepower. This point is important for demoralising the pakis, the aam abduls and also for setting the record straight to the domestic audience in the Kashmir valley. The likes of Farooq Abdullah have openely boasted that "kisike baap mein takat nahi hai ke woh militarily poK and G-B capture kar sake". capturing large chunk of territory is the only thing that will really hit the PA hard. Killing any number of uniformed or non-uniformed jihadis for them, makes no difference, for that matter destroying posts or bunkers.
3).It would bring a chunk of large muslim majority area of erstwhile J&K state, back under our control. As with Kargil and Turtuk, Baltistan would eventually be happier being with India and would accept the IA, if we play our cards right. This would also be a big blow to the separatists in the valley.
4). We would be able to open up the Kargil-Skardu and Srinagar-Skardu roads in the future and domestic and foreign tourism in the area would get a big leg up, especially with the Skardu airport already in existence. If the tourism picks up, the people in the valley would loose a part of the tourism to this region and would be forced to reconsider the militancy option.
5). We would be able to lay claim to the Shaksgam valley and put pressure on China. Would give us one more bargaining chip in our boundary negotiations with the Chinese.
6). Would allow us to keep much better surveillance of the Karakoram Highway and maybe also interdict the same, if we so desire. This would spoil the Chinese plans for the CPEC and they would be forced to negotiate with India. Fearing further creeping advance by the Indian Army, they might even force Pakistan to accept a tri-border junction at the Khunjerab pass, to protect the rest of Gilgit and their sizeable investments in the Area and rest of porkiland.
7). With Baltistan under our control, more of the Nubra, Shyok and Indus rivers would flow through territory controlled by us and we would be able to make use of our share of the waters, as per the Indus water treaty. Currently we are not using anything from these rivers. We would be able to take over the Chinese hydel projects in the area and also build additional small and micro hydel projects for the area.
8]. If we are successful in bringing much needed development to the area, it would also show the difference between being under paki control and being part of India and the stark advantages of the later.
9). The population of Baltistan is largely Shia Ismailis and Nuristanis. We could get the Prince Aga Khan foundation to take up some very visible projects in the area and perhaps also get the prince Aga Khan to visit the area at the opportune time. This would be a big deal to his Ismaili followers.
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Re: Siachen News & Discussion
My pilot had executed a flawless zero-zero landing at 22,000ft in a 30-year old single-engined helicopter on a pad I couldn’t see until we’d hit it. That’s good skills, right there.
https://luckyaviator.wordpress.com/2020 ... areer/amp/
Must read!
Forgot to share the source
https://twitter.com/realkaypius/status/ ... 18881?s=19
Re: Siachen News & Discussion
https://twitter.com/TheSatishDua/status ... 1671616512
33 yrs ago on this day, my Battalion captured QAID POST, now BANA POST, in world's highest attack at 21153 ft at Siachen Glacier. Salute Hony Capt Bana Singh, PVC, Sub Sansar Chand, MVC, all other awardees & heroes!
Proud to belong to this Bravest of Brave Paltan.
Jai Durge!
Salutations to the Brave Sons of India.
33 yrs ago on this day, my Battalion captured QAID POST, now BANA POST, in world's highest attack at 21153 ft at Siachen Glacier. Salute Hony Capt Bana Singh, PVC, Sub Sansar Chand, MVC, all other awardees & heroes!
Proud to belong to this Bravest of Brave Paltan.
Jai Durge!
Salutations to the Brave Sons of India.
Re: Siachen News & Discussion
Superhuman effort in a pitiless environment against an entrenched enemy with height advantage.
Take a bow Sirs !
Take a bow Sirs !
Re: Siachen News & Discussion
I had published a journal article on Siachen a few years back, which ought to fit here quite well.
It's a rather dry academic article, still it might be useful for those interested in Siachen specifically and mountain warfare broadly.
It's open access, there's no paywall and you can share the link freely. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/a ... 9815000347
A PDF download is also available from the page
Securing the heights: The vertical dimension of the Siachen conflict between India and Pakistan in the Eastern Karakoram
Abstract
The Siachen conflict between India and Pakistan is often referred to as the coldest war, or, the endless war atop the roof of the world. The high altitude and extreme climate create a hostile environment that has caused by far the most casualties and imposed tremendous costs on both sides. This environmental setting is usually only cited to underline the absurdity of this more than 30 year old conflict. We, however, argue that rather than being a constraint upon the conflict, the terrain itself is central to the genesis and continuation of the conflict. Further, the vertical dimension is the focus of contestation and the site where mountaineering practices, cartographic imagination and military logic intersect. The inaccessibility imposed by the terrain also implies that far from being a frozen conflict there is a temporal dynamism, as improvements in technology and logistics alter the possibility of maintaining the status quo.
It's a rather dry academic article, still it might be useful for those interested in Siachen specifically and mountain warfare broadly.
It's open access, there's no paywall and you can share the link freely. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/a ... 9815000347
A PDF download is also available from the page
Securing the heights: The vertical dimension of the Siachen conflict between India and Pakistan in the Eastern Karakoram
Abstract
The Siachen conflict between India and Pakistan is often referred to as the coldest war, or, the endless war atop the roof of the world. The high altitude and extreme climate create a hostile environment that has caused by far the most casualties and imposed tremendous costs on both sides. This environmental setting is usually only cited to underline the absurdity of this more than 30 year old conflict. We, however, argue that rather than being a constraint upon the conflict, the terrain itself is central to the genesis and continuation of the conflict. Further, the vertical dimension is the focus of contestation and the site where mountaineering practices, cartographic imagination and military logic intersect. The inaccessibility imposed by the terrain also implies that far from being a frozen conflict there is a temporal dynamism, as improvements in technology and logistics alter the possibility of maintaining the status quo.
Re: Siachen News & Discussion
https://theprint.in/opinion/surviving-o ... ear/49282/
A general recounts the tale of how as a young captain, he and five soldiers manned a post on a peak 20,000 feet above sea level for six gruelling months.
It was early 1986 and almost two years after the Indian Army, supported by the IAF and Army Aviation’s fleet of Mi-8s and Cheetahs, had established dominance over many heights on the Saltoro Range. In a daring but completely unsustainable operation, the Ladakh Scouts of the Indian Army attempted to establish posts over 6100 metres on the lower slopes of the Saltoro Kangri Mastiff that was part of what the Indian army calls the Northern Glacier.
As a young captain and paratrooper, Navkiran Singh Ghei, was posted to the Ladakh Scouts after a stint as an instructor at the National Defence Academy. Ghei went on to command the Indian Army’s only Para Brigade, a division in the northeast in counter-insurgency operations and a corps in Punjab, before signing off his illustrious career as a Lieutenant General, after a three-year stint as the Commandant of the National Defence College, India’s premier institution of strategic learning.
A reticent and ‘feet on the ground’ kind of a general, I was fortunate to get him talking one day on his experience of opening and maintaining a small post at 6135 m (20,250 feet) for over six months with hardly any back-up or logistics support, along with five ‘Nunnus’, as the Ladakh Scouts soldiers were affectionately called.
Having gradually occupied the heights at Bilafondla, Sia la and tasted some success in the Southern and Central Glacier, operational ideas about how to dominate the entire glacier flowed fast and thick from both Northern Command and Army HQs. The importance of establishing more posts in the Northern Glacier was important for the visibility it offered over the entire communication lines that extended towards the Pakistani posts in the Central Glacier and on the Saltoro and Baltoro ridges, particularly from the point of view of providing direction for artillery fire. Consequently, a height was identified that overlooked the Indian posts of Ashok and U Cut (so named because the post itself was located on a ridge that resembled a U Cut) and offered visibility over the Pakistani logistics line that ran up the Bilafond Glacier to support posts like Qaid Post.
As the Siachen imbroglio deepened, the value of the Ladakh Scouts was immense and officers from various regiments were posted there to garner expertise in high altitude operations. At the time, the Ladakh Scouts had its headquarters in Leh, and was divided into two forces of approximately 8-10 companies each. These were known as the Karakoram and Indus Forces after the areas given to them to patrol and operate in.
After a period of acclimatisation at Base Camp and a Forward Logistics Camp, Ghei and his platoon, which included Subedar Sonam as platoon commander, and four hardy Ladakhi troops set out on an arduous climb from 15,000 feet to 20,000 feet, reaching their intended summit at around 8 pm on 26 February 1986. Having pitched their three-man Arctic Tents, they burrowed-in for the night, little realising that they would suffer white out conditions in appalling weather for the next three days.
Ghei recalls that they could not see beyond a couple of feet and had to make do ‘without a pee or a crap for days’. It was a surreal experience for the six men as they huddled in their small tents thinking of how they would survive a week, leave alone for a couple of months as they were tasked to accomplish. Realising that they had bitten off more than they could chew, Ghei radioed for assistance. He sought a larger tent, some supplies and reinforcements.
As the weather cleared, the team established camp for the long haul. It was envisaged that the teams would be rotated every few weeks, but when Ghei’s replacement came a few weeks later, he was all but gone. He barely reached the camp suffering from acute mountain sickness, and had to be evacuated down to the base camp and onwards to the military hospital before he sank further. This meant that Ghei remained on station.
On a clear day, the team had a vantage view of Pakistani supply lines along the Bilafond La glacier and directed artillery shoots on these lines. The rarefied atmosphere posed great challenges for Indian gunners as the lower density meant that the shells encountered lower drag and thus overshot the target by miles as there were no charts for those altitudes. ‘Drop 300m, drop 500m’ were common radio calls that Ghei made to the artillery gun posts to aim much shorter.
They invariably transmitted back to him that the firing picture they were getting pointed at an impact point that was in friendly territory; sometimes even coinciding with his own location. It was a period of uncertainty and virgin territory for India’s gunners, and it was only gradually that ballistics were worked out to ensure acceptable levels of accuracy. One month turned to two, and then almost six. Ghei and his team survived on the post like zombies.
When I asked him how they survived, he said that the Ladakhis were amazing survivors and seeing them gave him the courage to lead from the front. Deprived of sleep, suffering from periodic hallucinations, surviving on milk powder and an odd paratha that the ‘Nunnus’ made him, Ghei lost 10 kg and suffered partial memory loss by the end of his extended six-month vigil on Pt 6135.
When they went down and reported the conditions, the post was abandoned and never manned again. This is a story like the stuff one only reads in the memoirs of mountaineers and their struggle against the odds of nature. The only difference is that it is only one of many that come out of Siachen.