Indian Army Discussion

Ajay K · Post by **Ajay K** » 23 Mar 2009 15:17

VinodTK
Post subject: Re: Indian Army Discussion

Major, 4 jawans killed
Major, 4 jawans killed

How did these rats get past the border fencing? Are there tunnels in place?
BSF should have permanent posts(Manned or unmanned) along critical sections of the Puk border.

RayC · Post by **RayC** » 23 Mar 2009 17:36

Ajay K wrote:
VinodTK
Post subject: Re: Indian Army Discussion

Major, 4 jawans killed
Major, 4 jawans killed

How did these rats get past the border fencing? Are there tunnels in place?
BSF should have permanent posts(Manned or unmanned) along critical sections of the Puk border.

The Indian Kashmir barrier is a 550 km (330 mile) separation barrier along the 740 km (460 mi) 1972 Line of Control (or ceasefire line). The fence, constructed by India, is well inside territory on the Indian-controlled side. Its stated purpose is to exclude arms smuggling and infiltration by Pakistani-based separatist militants.

The barrier itself consists of double-row of fencing and concertina wire eight to twelve feet (2.4-3.7 m) in height, and is electrified and connected to a network of motion sensors, thermal imaging devices and alarms in stretches where power supply is available. The small stretch of land between the rows of fencing is mined.

The terrain is not a straight or plains, but mountains with deep valleys and gallies etc. Therefore, it is not feasible to guard every inch of land.

There are permanent posts all along the border, some even specifically to check infiltration and which have no co- relation to the operational deployment!

satya · Post by **satya** » 23 Mar 2009 19:30

Why are we thinking tht fencing not working ? On contrary this report also suggest tht this group of terrorists were detected ( by whtever means be it fencing/techno stuff/intell) near LoC ,doesn't it tell something about fencing & other sensors working ?

sum · Post by **sum** » 23 Mar 2009 19:37

Absolutely...

IMHO, it is due to the fencing and sensor deployment that most of the herds of pigs are intercepted right near the border in forests and all the encounters have shifted from cities/villages to these remote areas which reduces civilian causalities also...

Of course, it would be better if we are able to reduce Army causalities also which seem to be on the rise (kill ratio which was heavily skewed in favour of the security forces seems to be reducing which means better trained pigs are coming across)

sunilUpa · Post by **sunilUpa** » 23 Mar 2009 20:56

Major Mohit Sharma cremated with full military honours

Ghaziabad, Mar 23 (ANI): Army Major Mohit Sharma, who lost his life while fighting terrorists in Kupwara, was cremated here with full military honours on Monday.

Sharma was killed along with three other soldiers on Sunday in an encounter with the terrorists.

Major Sharmas body was taken to Ghaziabad, where hundreds of his relatives, friends and other admirers paid their last tribute.

RIP Brother.

But then as per 'esteemed' BRite (Naval thread), these are the guys who are like a fish out of water once they are out of army, may be it is better that they die in the army, No?

Ajay K · Post by **Ajay K** » 23 Mar 2009 23:05

More than just the fencing, regular patrols - BSF are not able to net them. Suppose these rats infiltration is fore warned which are the units that would engage them first? RR or regular patrols from closest army base?

satya · Post by **satya** » 24 Mar 2009 01:07

We are seeing a shift in terrorist modus operandi ,earlier before Mumbai attack it use to be hit & run & most of time , average terrorist use to have offload 1 magzine with one in reserve in general direction of security forces & make a run out of scene if lucky he use to get away but security forces too changed their tactics & it lead to a big increase in terrorists going vertically up much sooner . Now its limited/small numbers & highly trained terrorists plus heavily armed who are told to make a stand since now its all about perception as the main issue who is winning & losing in media . People remember that in Mumbai 10 terrorists kept fighting for more than 50+ hrs & this is the perception terrorists want to keep . Attacks & encounters with terrorists will be more fierce & time consuming , IA is doing well to limit these encounters near LoC & not let them enter media spot light cities like Srinagar . But rest assured , IA too will change its tactics to face these highly trained & motivated terrorists .Beauty of IA's training at least is the input that are received & constantly used in updated training for soldiers & officers alike .

About BSF , less said the better , they are part of the problem not solution on both east & west border .

Surya · Post by **Surya** » 24 Mar 2009 05:21

About BSF , less said the better , they are part of the problem not solution on both east & west border .

Thats cruel.

For years till Op Rakshak began - it was the poor sods of the BSF who kept the tri color flying in the Valley with a smaller support base than the army. The initial intel network was laid by BSF's G branch

So give them credit.

Raja Bose · Post by **Raja Bose** » 24 Mar 2009 06:42

The role of the G branch in the valley is the stuff intel legends are made of. BSF is not some pandu force so please show them some respect.

Paul · Post by **Paul** » 24 Mar 2009 07:18

The year long duel between BSF IG Ajai Raj Sharma (initially Delhi police chief) and Ghazi Baba is no different than the feud between Gabbar Singh and Sanjeev Kumar. This happened in 2001 - 2003 period.

Ghazi Baba was instrumental in planning and executing the attack on the red fort when Ajai Raj Sharma was in charge of Delhi Police. A year or so later Sharma had his revenge when under his command of BSF, Ghazi Baba was gunned downed in Srinagar. It was written on in the Pioneer.

Learn to read and research before you comment.

sum · Post by **sum** » 24 Mar 2009 09:34

Raja Bose wrote:The role of the G branch in the valley is the stuff intel legends are made of. BSF is not some pandu force so please show them some respect.

You took the words out of my mouth, Bose sir....

The G-Branch was the single largest factor for complete decimation of the once feared Al-Badr group of pigs....

JaiS · Post by **JaiS** » 24 Mar 2009 09:54

Indian Army to scale most difficult peak Mount Dhaulagiri

ChandraS · Post by **ChandraS** » 24 Mar 2009 11:42

Details of the BSF operation to neutralize Ghazi baba - http://bsf.nic.in/archi/arch01.pdf

Details of CI ops in J&K by one of our ex-mods L N Subramanian - http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/ISSUE3-2/lns.html

Some excerpts of BSF's role

So IG Patel started from scratch. The BSF's intelligence wing, the 'G' branch, would generate information based on interrogation and worked on a strategy of letting the minor figures go in order to trap the important figures. Along with it the BSF signal's intercept capability was improved. Putting the 2 together the G branch identified precise locations of militants. Special teams would then move around in jeeps without the benefit of larger units to cordon off. They would sneak in to the hostile neighborhoods, grab the suspects and dash out. This dangerous game started paying off as more and more precise info started coming in. In addition the BSF boosted its signal intercept capability. The BSF also started equipping with Carl Gustaf 84 mm RCLs and automatic grenade launchers although the numbers are still spread thin

Give those chaps their due, Satya. You may have some genuine concern about their effectiveness but they tried and succeeded in keeping the tricolour flying in J&K during the worst of the times.

sum · Post by **sum** » 24 Mar 2009 14:28

This slightly dated article of 2005 seems to give the impression that CRPF is the weak link and it rates the BSF highly:

Farewell, Srinagar: The BSF Withdraws
Guest Writer: Praveen Swami
Chief of Bureau in New Delhi and Deputy Editor, Frontline

New Delhi’s decision to withdraw the BSF from counter-terrorism duties in Srinagar, and replace it with formations of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), is of considerable symbolic significance. BSF troops were sent to Srinagar in 1990 after the State police force and the CRPF failed to contain growing violence. Although the Force took time to adapt to its new task, and attracted not a few complaints of excessive force, it soon won a formidable reputation. Since 1990, the BSF has been responsible for the elimination of 2,653 terrorists, among them the architect of the 2001 attack on Parliament in New Delhi, Shahbaz Khan. It also succeeded in securing some 9,375 arrests, including the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) ‘chief’ Maulana Masood Azhar, who was subsequently released from prison as part of a prisoners-for-hostages swap that took place when an Indian Airlines jet was hijacked in 1999. Almost 700 BSF personnel died in the course of its fifteen-year commitment in Srinagar

Coming days after Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s meeting with the All-Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) leadership, in which the secessionist formation had called for the phased reduction of Indian counter-terrorism formations, the decision to withdraw the BSF from Srinagar appears to be aimed at consolidating the ongoing dialogue process. New Delhi had decided to hand over urban counter-terrorist operations to the CRPF in 2003, on the basis of the recommendations of a Group of Ministers who reviewed India’s security posture in the wake of the Kargil war. Some numbers of BSF troops were subsequently withdrawn from urban areas of Srinagar north of the Jhelum River. However, the withdrawal plan bogged down last year amidst concerns about CRPF’s ability to deal with the challenge before it. Two weeks ago, however, the BSF received orders to withdraw from Srinagar – the timing of which suggests that New Delhi wished to have a post-talks gift in hand for the All Parties Hurriyat Conference.

While most Srinagar residents are likely to react to news of the BSF withdrawal with some happiness, further evidence that the process of normalisation is gathering momentum, no great imagination is needed to see that India’s decision to withdraw the BSF from Srinagar involves considerable risks.

For one, CRPF units posted to areas in the city north of the Jhelum River a year ago have secured no great success. Bar the recoveries of some small amounts of weapons and ammunition, the CRPF has not succeeded in conducting a single independent offensive operation. Nor, on occasion, have its personnel displayed great competence: not a little criticism was generated by the CRPF’s failure to defend Srinagar’s Tourist Reception Centre against a fidayeen (suicide squad) attack in April 2005, on the eve of the departure of the first bus from Srinagar to Muzaffarabad. While the criticism might be unfair, for every counter-terrorism Force in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) has had its share of dismal performances, it does point to the challenges ahead.

Principal among these are the recoveries of well over a thousand kilograms of chemicals used in manufacturing explosives from recent raids in southern and central Kashmir. In the main, these caches have consisted of commercially-available substances, like potassium permanganate and aluminium nitrate, rather than the Research Department Explosive (RDX), the traditional explosive of choice for terrorist groups in J&K. Used in several recent car bomb attacks – terrorists have, notably, learned to evade anti-sabotage road patrols by driving along with military convoys and then parking bomb-laden vehicles a short distance ahead of them – the new explosives caches suggest that the infrastructure exists for a major escalation of violence. The new materials suggest that Pakistan’s covert services have instructed jihadi groups to take measures to vest that country’s denials of involvement in terrorist activity in J&K with some plausibility.

If a large-scale bombing campaign does get underway this winter or next spring, the CRPF will be relatively ill-prepared to play an offensive role in targeting its perpetrators. Unlike the BSF’s somewhat obscurely named intelligence wing, the ‘G-Branch’, the CRPF does not as yet have a large network of assets within terrorist groups. For reasons that will be obvious to intelligence professionals, the G-Branch’s assets have been more than a little reluctant to work for new and inexperienced masters. Moreover, the CRPF’s independent signals intelligence capabilities, unlike those of the ‘G-Branch’, are rudimentary; its staff, unlike that of the BSF, has not acquired an intimate knowledge of the wireless operators of jihadi groups. Finally, the CRPF’s medium-weapons and explosives capabilities are frugal, as is appropriate for a police organisation. While such resources are rarely used in counter-terrorism work in Srinagar, they have on occasion been essential to success.

To all of these concerns there are, of course, credible counter-arguments. Much signals-intelligence work in Srinagar now relies not on the interception of traditional wireless traffic but of mobile phone communication, a task which is in the domain of India’s domestic covert service, the Intelligence Bureau. Given this fact – and the existence of Indian Army’s sophisticated signals intelligence apparatus – the loss of the G-Branch’s technical assets could be argued not to be of great significance. Second, the J&K Police, which will be the principal director of counter-terrorism operations, has demonstrated considerable competence in both offensive counter-terrorism operations over recent years. Its counter-terrorism officials have long worked with the G-Branch and, in many cases, have jointly handled its assets. As such, the handover may be smoother than might be expected in other circumstances.

India’s apparent willingness to experiment with its counter-terrorism formations has been in no small part enabled by the significant scale-back in the activities of the Hizb ul-Mujahideen (HM), and can be read as an effort to test the seriousness of Pakistan’s commitment to continuing its de-escalation of its not-so-covert war in J&K.

The largest terrorist group in J&K – and the one of greatest political significance, since its cadres for the most part hail from the State and have linkages with local political formations, both mainstream and secessionist – the HM has carried out few strikes of importance since 2002. Its posture has led politicians to call for efforts to bring about a ceasefire with the group, although it has rejected such overtures. India had ordered its Forces not to initiate offensive combat operations in the wake of the Kargil war, after some elements in the HM initiated a dialogue process with New Delhi. While that enterprise collapsed, amidst an escalation of violence Indian military commanders have made clear they have no wish to see repeated, some politicians believe it ought to be resuscitated.

Could something of the kind be brought about, at least in the mid-term? Since the May, 2004 elimination of Abdul Rashid Pir, the HM has not had an overall ‘commander’ for operations in J&K. Pir, a trusted confidante of the organisation’s Muzaffarabad-based ‘supreme commander’, Mohammad Yusuf Shah aka Syed Salahuddin, had been attempting to build a new support base for the organisation among mainstream political groups, like the ruling Peoples Democratic Party, following its desertion by its long standing patron, the J&K Jamaat-e-Islami. His loss was a considerable blow to the HM, coming less than five months after the killing of his predecessor, Ghulam Rasool Dar, just over a year after the elimination of the previous commander for operations, Ghulam Rasool Khan. Through the last several months, the HM also lost a number of powerful provincial commanders, notably Arif Khan, Shabbir Bhaduri, and, this March, Ashiq Butt.

For reasons that are unclear, the HM never despatched Amir Khan, Pir’s intended successor, to J&K. The alias Ghazi Misbahuddin, which the organisation now uses to refer to its ‘operational commander’, is in fact used by a several separate functionaries. Indian intelligence analysts, for the most part, believe the HM’s failure to despatch a ‘commander’ reflects organisational weakness. Another explanation is, however, possible: the HM may have learned its lessons, and sees no reason to have a single-point leader who can be targeted with ease. As things stand, the tasks of command have now been handed over to relatively low-profile second-rung leaders like Ibrahim Dar, a long-standing military aide to Shah, who has returned to J&K from Pakistan in recent months, and an individual code-named Salim Hashmi, believed to be a South Kashmir resident with over a decade of field experience with the HM.

If this second explanation is correct – and it should be underlined that it is at best speculative – there is the possibility that the HM’s relative quiescence in recent months is not only the consequence of its mainly-ethnic Kashmiri cadre’s wait-and-watch attitude on the peace process.

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s September 11, 2005, declaration that he can "do business" with General Pervez Musharraf points us in the direction of an important component of the détente process in South Asia. There is, however, another component: getting security issues right within J&K itself.

If the somewhat quixotic conduct of Chief Minister Mufti Mohammad Sayeed’s Government on security issues is a guide, there is at least some reason for concern. Consider, for example, its use of the Public Safety Act, a legislation that enables the preventive detention of terrorism suspects. In recent weeks, Chief Minister Sayeed’s government used the PSA to detain Asiya Andrabi, the head of an ultra-right Islamist women’s group known as the Dukhtaran-e-Millat (DeM). Andrabi’s offence was to have carried on a raucous campaign against restaurants in which men and women committed the crime of sitting together, as well as the sale of liquor. While Andrabi’s conduct during the protests was without dispute disgraceful, her activities posed no great threat to the state. Her arrest seems to have been carried out to embarrass the Hurriyat Conference, which had claimed New Delhi’s willingness to review the detention of PSA prisoners as a major gain from its talks with Prime Minister Singh.

On the other hand, Chief Minister Sayeed has shown a conspicuous unwillingness to act against those who do pose a demonstrable threat to both citizens and the state. In 2003, the Jammu and Kashmir Police detained Nasir Ahmad Jan, a Government-employed engineer, on charges of having aided terrorists who attacked a telephone exchange in Srinagar’s Indira Nagar neighbourhood, killing an Army officer, two CRPF troopers and an employee of the telephone company in the process. Jan’s arrest was based on the statements of Janzeb Kashmiri, a member of the two-person fidayeen squad who is now in jail in Jammu. Two years on, the Sayeed Government has refused to issue PSA warrants enabling Jan’s arrest – as indeed, it has done in hundreds of terrorism-related cases across Kashmir. Since Andrabi’s arrest makes it clear the Sayeed government has no principled objection to the PSA, its conduct is mystifying.

Such conduct is symptomatic of a larger malaise. Officials complain that covert funds sent by New Delhi for use in counter-terror operations have not reached cutting-edge formations: intelligence operations conducted by both the BSF and J&K Police have suffered from the hoarding of these funds by State officials for the last ten months. Service regulations within the police service have also been flouted, with a crippling impact on officer morale. Where vacancies existed for 37 officers to be promoted to the rank of Superintendent of Police, for example, 59 were granted the job – the last on the list, in order of seniority, being a member of the personal security staff of the Chief Minister. All of this is, of course, part of business-as-usual in J&K. Such state-level messing with the apparatus of counter-terrorism, however, makes it that much more likely that the worst-case possibilities opened up by the BSF withdrawal will be realised – something that ought to merit, at the very least, a discreet nudge from New Delhi.

Mandeep · Post by **Mandeep** » 24 Mar 2009 14:56

The BSF played an important role in occupying positions on the ground and establishing the authority of the Indian State in Srinagar city. This was in places that were hitherto no-go areas for the police and the Indian security forces.

We've established that the BSF played an important role in countering insurgency and terrorism in J&K. Now can we get back to the topic of the thread please ?

Sanku · Post by **Sanku** » 24 Mar 2009 16:19

sunilUpa wrote:
Major Mohit Sharma cremated with full military honours
.

RIP Brother.

But then as per 'esteemed' BRite (Naval thread), these are the guys who are like a fish out of water once they are out of army, may be it is better that they die in the army, No?

His brother is my colleague. I knew him a little. An A class officer -- one of those about whom was said "chief material", he was always advised to go "slow" because he had an habit of making it a point to be the first every where he went, esp in combat.

May mother India grace us with more such sons.

sunilUpa · Post by **sunilUpa** » 24 Mar 2009 16:44

24 Dead In Kashmir Fighting - Indian Army

An army statement said eight soldiers and 16 rebels have died in the fighting in Kupwara district close to the Line of Control that divides the Indian and Pakistani-controlled parts of the Himalayan region.

sum · Post by **sum** » 24 Mar 2009 19:37

Wow...seems to have been a massive firefight indeed.

Full marks to our border detection system and intel for predicting the path of the huge group though the loss of so many men is very unfortunate!!!

Im sure that lots of mayhem has been averted due to this action.

shyamd · Post by **shyamd** » 24 Mar 2009 19:41

X Post

shyamd wrote:RIP

Kashmiri relatives of Indian Army soldier Shabir Ahmed Malik mourn during his funeral procession in Dab, some 35 kilometers (22 miles) Northeast of Srinagar, India, Tuesday, March 24, 2009. Malik was killed in an ongoing battle which has claimed seven other army soldiers and sixteen suspected rebels, Lt Col. J.S. Brar of the Indian Army said.
(AP Photo/Dar Yasin)

An Indian army soldier stands guard during the funeral of Shabir Ahmad Malik, a Kashmiri Muslim soldier from the Indian army, in Dab, 35km (21 miles) north of Srinagar March 24, 2009. At least 19 people have been killed after four days of gun fighting between Indian soldiers and Muslim militants in disputed Kashmir near the Pakistan border, the army said on Monday. Four soldiers including Malik and five militants were killed on Monday alone, the army said, the highest number of people killed in a single firefight between Muslim militants and Indian troops in the Himalayan region in the past year. REUTERS/Fayaz Kabli
(INDIAN-ADMINISTERED KASHMIR CONFLICT POLITICS MILITARY)

People gather for the funeral of Shabir Ahmad Malik, a Kashmiri Muslim soldier from the Indian army, in Dab, 35km (21 miles) north of Srinagar March 24, 2009. At least 19 people have been killed after four days of gun fighting between Indian soldiers and Muslim militants in disputed Kashmir near the Pakistan border, the army said on Monday. Four soldiers including Malik and five militants were killed on Monday alone, the army said, the highest number of people killed in a single firefight between Muslim militants and Indian troops in the Himalayan region in the past year. REUTERS/Fayaz Kabli
(INDIAN-ADMINISTERED KASHMIR CONFLICT POLITICS MILITARY)

sum · Post by **sum** » 24 Mar 2009 20:00

Something tells me that a couple of guys shown in the pic also from the SF....

Must be the attitude they seem to ooze even in the pic...

svinayak · Post by **svinayak** » 24 Mar 2009 21:07

See the rank and unit of the Shaheed soldier

sunilUpa · Post by **sunilUpa** » 24 Mar 2009 21:08

Kupwara gunbattle ends, 17 militants killed

Srinagar, Mar 24 (PTI) Six more militants were killed today taking the death toll in the fierce gunbattle between militants and security forces in Jammu and Kashmir's Kupwara district to 25 as the five-day-long stand-off ended this evening.
Seventeen militants and eight Army personnel, including a Major, were killed in the encounter which began on March 20 on higher reaches of the Shamsabari range in Harfada forest, a defence spokesman said.

Four soldiers and five militants were killed yesterday while an ultra died a day before. On Saturday, four troops, including Major Mohit Sharma, and two insurgents, were killed.

On the first day, three militants were mowed down by the security forces. AMS

suryag · Post by **suryag** » 24 Mar 2009 22:06

Sad to see eight of our brave men dead. Had a query with regards to the pay commission. The Sixth pay commission provides for performance based incentive. Does this incentive apply to our armed/paramilitary forces too ? If so what would be the parameters to grade performance when deployed and when in the unit. If it doesnt why has the government barred the armed forces from having this incentive.

suryag · Post by **suryag** » 24 Mar 2009 22:10

sum wrote:Unlike the BSF’s somewhat obscurely named intelligence wing, the ‘G-Branch’,

How are intelligence assets transferred from one unit to the other.

kobe · Post by **kobe** » 24 Mar 2009 22:16

when terrorists are trained by pakistan army
when terrorists are given cover by pakistan army during border crossing
when terrorists arrive in india heavily armed and motivated to commit suicide in order to kill indian soldiers and civilians

then

pakistani goverment should be held accountable for murder

this is not much different from mumbai attacks,
unfortunately in kashmir it is a weekly affair

indian politicians do not see it that way because they are blind, deaf, and dumb

satya · Post by **satya** » 25 Mar 2009 00:50

WRT my comments about BSF , i apologize for bringing up this issue for neither i can't put in facts in open or in pvt so it was a mistake in first place maybe years down the line should it ever becomes a major national issue we will all hear about it hopefully till then matter is close ( all those media posts about G branch & its success & other successes in J&K ) , no further comments from me in this regard .

putnanja · Post by **putnanja** » 25 Mar 2009 02:15

Plan to lease aircraft to move soldiers going on leave

The Home Ministry has at long last acceded to a long-pending request from the Army. It will approach the Union Cabinet with a proposal for leasing aircraft from domestic airlines to transport soldiers going on leave from their postings in inaccessible areas. Currently, these soldiers have to spend as many as eight days in transit.
...

Surya · Post by **Surya** » 25 Mar 2009 02:32

Why not use IAF transports which are moving around sometimes with spare capacity.

At least it could get the soldiers to a main center.

Sid · Post by **Sid** » 25 Mar 2009 03:28

Surya wrote:Why not use IAF transports which are moving around sometimes with spare capacity.

At least it could get the soldiers to a main center.

IAF courier flights are used, but they are not enough and usually fly jam packed.

also u have to book it too early in advance.

Surya · Post by **Surya** » 25 Mar 2009 03:40

SId

When did you see that for transporting jawans going for vacation?

I saw one 3 years ago returning pretty much empty from KKD to a northern base.

Sid · Post by **Sid** » 25 Mar 2009 04:31

Surya wrote:SId

When did you see that for transporting jawans going for vacation?

I saw one 3 years ago returning pretty much empty from KKD to a northern base.

well jawans do travel through courier service. usually when courier arrive from north-east (i.e. Nagaland), as transit time is max form that area (around 2 to 4 days). but their allocation is minimal. seats are allocated based on rank and availability of alternate transport mode.

also IAF gives preference to their own personal (Rank based) when allocating seats. That's also one reason why Army wants their own courier service.

sunilUpa · Post by **sunilUpa** » 25 Mar 2009 06:18

xinhua photo gallery on funeral of Shahid Shabir Ahmad Malik

Just take a look at the headline! The Chinese have significantly boosted the coverage of India on Xinhua, lot's of news reports related to Indian armed forces and Kashmir are appearing on Xinhua for the past month or so.

JaiS · Post by **JaiS** » 25 Mar 2009 07:58

A soldier and an entrepreneur

sum · Post by **sum** » 25 Mar 2009 09:03

Acharya wrote:See the rank and unit of the Shaheed soldier

Acharya-saar,
Yes..i did see the caption of 1 Para(SF) and hence, the observation that couple of others standing near the coffin also look like dyed-in-the-wool SF!!!

RayC · Post by **RayC** » 25 Mar 2009 09:07

sunilUpa wrote:xinhua photo gallery on funeral of Shahid Shabir Ahmad Malik

Just take a look at the headline! The Chinese have significantly boosted the coverage of India on Xinhua, lot's of news reports related to Indian armed forces and Kashmir are appearing on Xinhua for the past month or so.

Since news does not percolate that easily from the remote areas of China, as Xingjian, it could be that there has been some unrest amongst the Uighurs (who are Muslims) and so this type of news that subtly suggest that even 'separatists' (as many incorrectly believe and propagate) are changing tack in India. It possibly is to shore Chinese morale as also to act as a reminder to the Uighurs.

Worth checking what is going on in Xingjian.

Mandeep · Post by **Mandeep** » 25 Mar 2009 12:48

I've been advocating for years that soldiers coming home on leave or rejoining their units from the North-East and J&K be transported either through regular IAF flights or chartered commercial flights. Saves so much time and money besides being a great morale booster. I must remind everyone that steps to maintain morale and the elan of soldiers are necessary in times like the present. In the future we are going to find it increasingly difficult to recruit Jawans unless we improve facilities and amenities. This is in the context of better economic prospects and better career avenues being opened up for the target market for soldiers.

Mandeep · Post by **Mandeep** » 25 Mar 2009 12:53

Regarding the debate over the awarding of highest gallantry decorations in what we perceive as undeserving cases I did little research. The BSF has some 206 awardees of the President's Police Medal for Gallantry. Now this is the highest award for gallantry for police and para-military forces. The police has been projecting the medal as their equivalent of the Ashoka or Param Vir Chakras. The inferences one can draw from this very large number of awardees are obvious.

Anshul · Post by **Anshul** » 25 Mar 2009 14:43

kobe wrote:
JaiS wrote:SAF, Indian army exercise..........
don't ask me for source or link,

it should be known that singapore military is "thouroghly" infiltrated by the chinese, i have met the chinese ex-military electronics engineers working in singapore research institute and they have clearly boasted about it after having a good dose of high quality rice wine.

the mainland chinese "engineers" were working here

that particular group was working on "image processing" algorithms and were in the process of deciding which FPGA to use, and were picking my brains for pointers on chips and algorithms to meet an "urgent' deadline.

so the singaporeans coming to india for "joint" military excersice will surely teach the chinese about doctrines, tactics, equipment, etc

remember, singapore is even paying for such military excersices.

Singapore is multi ethnic with ethinicity highly skewed in favour of ethnic chinese.Then come the malays,indonesians etc.

All businesses have significant chinese investment.This sphere of influence also extends to policy making,defence and educational institutions.I have stayed in Indonesia and Singapore and a majority of my class mates where of chinese origin followed closely by filipinos and sindhis.

This is a real concern....and maybe the reason MOD does not favour Singaporean hardware for the forces.The performance parameters may have been compromised.Really love the way PRC leverages ethinicity for strategic objectives.

RayC · Post by **RayC** » 25 Mar 2009 16:41

From the Post to the Railhead, there can be a number of transit camps.

These transit camps are not only decided by the distance from the railhead, but also the transport available to ferry the soldiers and officers to the railhead. Not only the returning transport (those that carried the supplied to the Forward Depots), but also buses (including State Transport buses) specifically meant for transients . However, these are not adequate given the number of troops proceeding on leave with their luggage and in addition, catering for those returning from leave. It maybe also remembered that transport has to be used to stock stores to the Forward Depots from the Railhead and this is a high priority task.

Therefore, the turnaround time for the soldier who is proceeding on leave from a Post can be 15 to 20 days to the Railhead. Add to this the person's leave of two months, and also add another 15 to 20 days to be back at the Post.

If they have to be acclimatised add those days of each stage of acclimatisation since they will not be 'operational' till acclimatised.

The number of troops not 'operational' at anyone time should not be more than 25%. However, one has to add the ones on Casual Leave, Temporary Duties and Courses.

Now, longer the time a soldier is away from the unit and 'non operational' for the reason mentioned i.e. not constructively engaged in unit and operational duties, the others cannot go on leave. It also affects the morale and the unit operational readiness that is desirable.

IAF transport aircraft was and is used for ferrying troops proceeding or returning from leave. This movement by air, cuts down on the transit time and reaches the person to the transit camp in the hinterland from where his leave commences. For example Delhi instead of Jammu or the Railheads in the NE.

During the tenure of George Fernandez, IA flights were chartered for ferrying troops proceeding and returning from leave. And since the carrying capacity of the IA aircraft was more, a large volume of traffic could be cleared and the non operational time of a soldier reduced. It maybe mentioned that IAF carry not only personnel proceeding or returning from leave, but also essential operational cargo and thus the manpower carrying capacity is reduced.

Overall when calculated ferrying troops by IA charter apparently is cheaper to the State, and also enhances operational efficiency, wherein not only fuel used by surface transport is not utilised for ferrying troops, but also a greater number of vehicles can be diverted to the primary task of stocking of stores from the Railhead to the Forward Depots and so on.

RayC · Post by **RayC** » 25 Mar 2009 16:44

Mandeep wrote:Regarding the debate over the awarding of highest gallantry decorations in what we perceive as undeserving cases I did little research. The BSF has some 206 awardees of the President's Police Medal for Gallantry. Now this is the highest award for gallantry for police and para-military forces. The police has been projecting the medal as their equivalent of the Ashoka or Param Vir Chakras. The inferences one can draw from this very large number of awardees are obvious.

Mandeep,

I think Handing over medals which have significance and value in terms of gallantry as if they were rations, be it of any Force, only dilutes the importance of such medals. One becomes one of the many and not any special person who has done a special task that behoves his being awarded the medal!