Indian Army Discussion

RayC · Post by **RayC** » 15 May 2009 07:32

Ramana,

Thanks.

I will read it in detail.

I did a document search for Kargil. Nothing came. Which page?

RayC · Post by **RayC** » 15 May 2009 07:45

maybe i missed something, but woudln't their cantts come under heavy air assault early on?

The air effort in the initial days is to ensure Offensive Counter Air Operations. Offensive counter air ops are aimed at destroying, disrupting or limiting the enemy air power as close to its source as practicable. Enemy air power implies not only his ac but also his ground based weapon systems which can hinder our achievement of air superiority, radars and communications and intelligence network.

To prosecute successful offensive counter air ops, the following roles may have to be employed :-
(a) Airfields attacks.
(b) Suppression of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD).
(c) Fighter sweep/offensive sweep.
(d) Escort.

Heavy air assault in combat means does not deter movement.

Movement by night, movement in driblets to the Assembly Area and so on, movement on many axes etc are ways to divide the air assets that can be applied.

Prem Kumar · Post by **Prem Kumar** » 15 May 2009 08:37

RayC wrote:While it is disconcerting that one loses one's men in an operation and after op post mortem throws up how it could have been avoided, yet one takes it in one's stride, learns the lessons and gets more focussed and determined.

In terrain like the Shamshabari and Gurez, which is very difficult, losses of life is possible. One of the reasons why the terrorists were better placed was that they had Gujjar guides who know the terrain like the back of their palms and know where to hide and where to expose. They have lived their whole lives in these mountains herding the flock. They have their dhoks on top and so are well conversant with the terrain. The IA units, on the other hand, are there for three years at most. It is not enough to know every nook and cranny of the terrain. Yet, at the same time, no SF person will let go of an opportunity to go for the jugular. Therefore, that is one of the reasons why the losses appear unacceptable.

As far as avalanches go, it does not differentiate friend and foe!

Sawant, in journalistic enthusiasm compares the terrain with Kargil. He was on NH1A and so he would not know the glaciated areas of Kargil. I wonder if he could last if he went to Bimbat or 5109! On foot, that is!

I have seen these sectors mentioned on foot!

RayC Sir,

A question based on some of the details that have emerged. Before air-dropping the paras, is aircraft or UAV based recce of the area done? Alternately, does the commander in charge of the Ops have the authority to request spot specific satellite imagery?

Reason I ask is that - after the first dawn encounter, we must have known that the terrorists must be holed up in a max 50 Sq Km area.

Of course, all this is just armchair analysis on my part & I am sure the IA will learn, adapt and move on. But still I am curious as to the level of operational intelligence gathering that happens.

RayC · Post by **RayC** » 15 May 2009 11:15

I am not aware of this specific instance and so I cannot comment.

When troop are carried by helicopter, they either slither down or are heli-landed for precision landing of troops, more so in the mountainous terrain.

Ideally, recce should be done through any means available including ground patrols. However, the issues involved is the speed in which the op is to be mounted from the time info has been received. If it is to be immediate, then there is no time to find out through sophisticated means since we are still not in the Network Centric realm.

Further, any recce will give away surprise, which a paramount factor in these ops.

In this context, be it an immediate op or a detailed and worked through op, the very approach of helicopter is a dead give-away.

Therefore, risks have to be taken.

Luck is a great factor in any ops and it can never be factored in!

I learn that there is constant surveillance of the LC through a variety of means and the new spy in the sky satellite will be a force multiplier. The only problem is the processing time of satellite photos from the time of request and the time it reaches the user!

To the person who is to take on the terrorists, general info is uselful i.e. they are in gen area A, but it is the specifics that ensures the kill and that info is very difficult to get, unless there is an encounter ensuring and the terrorists have been 'fixed' i.e. confined to a specific area i.e. houses/ village.

sum · Post by **sum** » 16 May 2009 10:51

OT but:

The UPA has come to power again meaning that all dreams of IA acquiring desperately needed 155 mm artillery are firmly out of the window...

Yogesh · Post by **Yogesh** » 16 May 2009 11:00

sum wrote:OT but:

The UPA has come to power again meaning that all dreams of IA acquiring desperately needed 155 mm artillery are firmly out of the window...

Well lets wait and watch

rkhanna · Post by **rkhanna** » 16 May 2009 15:36

OT but:

The UPA has come to power again meaning that all dreams of IA acquiring desperately needed 155 mm artillery are firmly out of the window...

IMO it will be completely opposite in Defence purchases specially considering the Left is no longer in Govt.. Lastly do keep in mind that the People of India need food more than 155mm artillery

They voted overwhelmingly for Congress. The end.

AmitR · Post by **AmitR** » 16 May 2009 16:27

rkhanna wrote: IMO it will be completely opposite in Defence purchases specially considering the Left is no longer in Govt.. Lastly do keep in mind that the People of India need food more than 155mm artillery They voted overwhelmingly for Congress. The end.

That is a tired argument isn't it and then after every terrorist attack we bemoan the lack of defence this and intel that. For a change how about those corrupt babus and politicos getting some stick because of whom millions are hungry.

sum · Post by **sum** » 16 May 2009 21:57

IMO it will be completely opposite in Defence purchases specially considering the Left is no longer in Govt

Sir, it may be the case for other supplies but when it comes to Bofors/BAe, all logic goes out of the window.

To top it, we have already banned the next best, Denel...

Jagan · Post by **Jagan** » 18 May 2009 06:51

While trying to compile various army formations listings I came across an interesting listing for "335 MSL BRIGADE" which I assume stands for "335 MISSILE BRIGADE". Anyone heard about it before? Turns out there is a 334 MSL BRIGADE as well.

sunilUpa · Post by **sunilUpa** » 18 May 2009 07:16

^^^AFAIK 334 has Agni I, 335 has Agni II. Brigadier Sunil Govind Ghokale from 335 received Vishisht Seva Medal in 2008.

AFAIK the following are the missile 'groups' or brigades of IA
222, 333, 334, 335, 444, 555. No 666, yet.

Jagan · Post by **Jagan** » 18 May 2009 07:21

sunilUpa wrote:^^^AFAIK 334 has Agni I, 335 has Agni II. Brigadier Sunil Govind Ghokale from 335 received Vishisht Seva Medal in 2008.

AFAIK the following are the missile 'groups' or brigades of IA
222, 333, 334, 335, 444, 555. No 666, yet.

thats the thing sunil, we have been hearing about "Groups" but never brigades. So if the official title is "Brigade" why are we referring to them as groups? or was there a change of designation sometime in between?

sunilUpa · Post by **sunilUpa** » 18 May 2009 07:50

Jagan wrote:
sunilUpa wrote:^^^AFAIK 334 has Agni I, 335 has Agni II. Brigadier Sunil Govind Ghokale from 335 received Vishisht Seva Medal in 2008.

AFAIK the following are the missile 'groups' or brigades of IA
222, 333, 334, 335, 444, 555. No 666, yet.
thats the thing sunil, we have been hearing about "Groups" but never brigades. So if the official title is "Brigade" why are we referring to them as groups? or was there a change of designation sometime in between?

I am not sure there was a change from 'group' to Brigade. It was only in press we read 'missile group', while in most of the official communications we see 'msl bde'.

eg 1 14607120 NK KAMAL SINGH, 334 MSL BDE
eg 2 IC-27288 BRIG SUNIL GOVIND GOKHALE, ARTY, HQ 335 MSL BDE
eg 3 10. 335 Msl Bde, Secbad

JMT, I will try to dig older reports.

errr. what is 3351 MSL REGT?

Gaurav_S · Post by **Gaurav_S** » 18 May 2009 09:27

861? 862? BrahMos.

putnanja · Post by **putnanja** » 23 May 2009 02:45

Protest withdrawn, Indian peacekeepers on way to Congo

...
More than six months after the Congolese government wrote to the UN asking it not to send any new troops from India, the first batch of Indian soldiers are set to leave for the peacekeeping mission on May 27. Sources said the matter was resolved after Congo withdrew its protest and apologised to the Indian government. While India is not yet considering additional deployments, the troops are being sent to replace peacekeepers who have been serving in the country.
...
...
Officials had then said that India was fed up with consistent and often ‘irrational’ complaints against its peacekeepers in the country. The complaints, officials said, often came through foreign social service organisations operating in the country.

In March, the Army gave a clean chit to around 100 soldiers who were indicted by an internal UN investigation for child abuse and sexual exploitation while posted at a peacekeeping mission in Congo. The Army’s inquiry into the matter did not find ‘even a single shred of evidence’ against its soldiers.
...

sum · Post by **sum** » 23 May 2009 19:07

Nice story(real??) similar to the "Kashsoldier/Lethal weapon" series:

To Kill a Priest

Chapter 1: The sophistication of uncomplicated thinking

Day & Date: 0700 hrs, 11 November, 1997.
Location: Kala Pathhar (COMMAND BUNKER)
Poonch Sector, Jammu & Kashmir (Operation Rakshak)
Post: Kopra Ridge (Main), Line of Control, 9, 500 ft a.s.l.

It was a misty and cold morning, not that Kashmir had offered me anything else, and I snuggled deeper inside my sleeping bag. I had, just a few minutes back, given an all OK report to Major RK Anuj, the Adjutant of 17 Kumaon. I had told him that all was well. Well, not exactly. The adjutant and I had our little joke going. I would say, “All quiet on the western front” and he would grunt. This morning he insisted on talking and was rather chirpy. Brigade Headquarters was full of paper tigers. The Brigade Commander was biased. Being a Gurkha officer, the GR units never got ROP duty. DSSC should be shut down; it was producing Rommels and Guderians with great powers of hallucination etc etc. I had heard this all before and mumbled a reply in agreement. It never does well to put off your adjutant. The last time had seen me on a 7 day LRP over the Pir Panjal mountain ranges, and a re-play did not seem like a great idea. Suddenly, acute matters of national security demanded his attention; the BM wanted 7 boys for working duty and the Adjutant ran to comply.

Sleep was like a drug and I was drifting back to la-la land. I was back to the ideal world......the canteen was a cafeteria, the hostel was "residence" and even the mere function of asking someone to pass the chapattis was an cool "zap the chaps" or if you were a seventies degenerate, "roll the discs". Aah.....the pleasant burdens of Stephania. Suddenly, a loud rap on the bunker door jolted me back to reality. “Ram, Ram sahib”, Subedar Bhim Singh’s voice rang out and I cursed my luck. This was the last thing I wanted early in the morning. To have such a psycho as a platoon commander was in itself a huge problem. I had to literally beg the commanding officer not to sign Bhim Singh’s AFMSF-10, not once but twice. Bhim was nature’s bad boy. He was an “unfit JCO”. He was in the infantry, thought like a Para Commando and executed like a nurse. Once an NCO “ran amok” in C Company. The NCO was drunk and he chased Bhim Singh all over the unit lines with a khukri, before he was caught, put in QG and charge sheeted. Good friend Bhim returned the favor 2 years later, emulating the act to the T. If there was something called JLQs’ (JCO like qualities), they had certainly given Bhim the go by. 17 Kumaon knew for a fact that in such a sensitive area, only Bhim stood between the CO and a Higher Command nomination. Bhim had the CO a very worried man.

I asked him to sit on a camp stool, while Ramesh Chandra, my faithful sahayak of two years, tried to light up the bukhari. He soon got a good fire going and proceeded to pour a cup of tea for both of us.

“Sahib, we have lost 3 jawans in the last 2 months and the morale of the troops is not good”, he said. For the uninitiated, a Kumaoni will never come straight to the point. Whatever it is, it has to sound like a good story.

“Yes, Bhim Sahib. I know that. What are you trying to say?” I asked.

“Sahib, there is a pattern to this whole thing”, he said.

Jesus, I thought. There he goes again. He will be gone in minutes, leaving me to nurse a migraine for the whole day.

He continued, “All three men were killed between 0300-0400 hrs. All three belonged to the last patrol of the night. All three were surprised by infiltrating militants.”

I sat up uneasily. Bhim Singh was right. How had I missed this? But, couldn’t it just be co-incidence? What was the proof of a pattern? Not wanting to disturb his flow, I nodded gravely to him. Now he had my full attention.

“Someone is helping them from inside”, he delivered his punch line.

“What? Do you mean one of our men………. ” I said.

“No, no Sahib. How can you even think that one of our boys could do something like this? We have given this great army two PVCs and three Chiefs………….” he started. I knew where this monologue was heading. Not wanting another dose of paltan ki izzat……..I waved for him to continue.

“I have information that it is none other than Haji Abdullah, the maulvi. He has often requested our 0300 hrs patrol to help him get to the pir baba ki mazar to put a 200 watt bulb. That is the signal to the Pakistani post that all is clear and they should begin infiltration”, he finished.

5 km into Indian territory from the Line of Control is a black out zone at night. No one is allowed to switch on lights inside their homes and if they do, they have to cover the windows with black cloth or paper so that nothing is visible from outside. This is just to make the enemy Arty OP work harder for his salary. What Bhim was trying to say was that the CO had given permission to the 78 year-old Maulvi on religious grounds, to light a bulb at the Pir baba site. This was the only bulb which was allowed to be lit in the whole area of 5 km. The maulvi, once a week, feigning illness or bad memory, would actually request our jawans to guide/ escort him to the Pir Baba. Then the maulvi would put the bulb in the socket. In the pitch dark valley, the bulb would shine like a torch. It was the signal to the Pak post that the last Indian patrol of the night had left. Since the patrols only patrolled the gaps between the ambush sites, it was a cakewalk for the militants.

It was certainly a plausible theory. Yes, our boys had died only on the nights the maulvi had requested for our help in putting the bulb on the mazar. But much of this was conjecture. Who would buy such a fantastic argument? But then, this was Kashmir. The normal rules of engagement (and logic) certainly did not apply.

“How did you come across all this? How could you figure out?” I asked Bhim.

Bhim smiled at me, showing a single row of badly stained and rotting teeth and said, “Ranjan told me”.

Ranjan was our company masalchi (cook’s helper). An avid reader of cheap Bengali pulp fiction, he knew about the vital statistics of film heroines as thoroughly as he knew which Lt. Gen. would become Army Commander. Ranjan was a man in the know of things.

Bhim’s logic had me stumped. How could I go to the CO with this story? And the CO had only last snowfall given the maulvi Rs.10, 000/- from the unit intelligence fund, to repair the masjid wall which had fallen due to heavy snow. The CO had obviously planned it as a brilliant “hearts and minds” campaign.

I dismissed Bhim and set thinking. What were the loopholes in Bhim’s logic? The facts certainly seemed to jell. But without the CO's sanction, what could I do? What should I do? I was itching to get the person who had killed my men. Was I over-reacting? A million thoughts passed through my head. My mind was in turmoil and I felt lost. Ranjan would talk. My men would know that I was given the information and failed to act; infantrymen always thought in black and white. You were either “Dost” or “Dushman”. You were to be either embraced or killed. And, my men would not judge the maulvi worthy of embracing.

What stopped me from contemplating any action was the credibility Bhim had in the unit. He was a shifty eyed, 5’4 ft guy with kohl lined eyes. He was an alcoholic. He had a few black ink entries against his name. When he spoke in anger, he frothed at the mouth and his eyes spun in their sockets. He was right out of a comic book. And, he was a Services boxer. I guess even his own mother hated him.

Lt. Thomas, my company 2-i-C was a youngster with 4 months of service. He literally lived with the men. I had seen him translating “Platoon Leader” for the men, though his regimental spirit took a nosedive when he was requested by the CHM to translate a Playboy story. Could I trust Thomas? No, I decided. He was much too young for paltan politics. One call from the Adjutant would have him on his knees.

When I took my decision, my own calm surprised me. It was as if the fact was always at the back of my mind, unable to come forth. I could not cross check the facts with a third party. I could not go to my CO. I could not have another death in the company. My mind was made up. Mentally, I had already passed orders for the execution of Haji Abdullah.

I started preparing for the kill.

Please read the rest at the site itself. Not posted full to avoid Adminullah hellfires...

manjgu · Post by **manjgu** » 23 May 2009 20:46

Sum.. i know the officer who has written this

)) worked in our company !! at GGN office. the story is credible...

RayC · Post by **RayC** » 23 May 2009 22:46

Sum,

It is a very plausible story.

I am not surprised!

Thank you for putting it on the forum.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 23 May 2009 23:07

ramana wrote:RayC, Please take a look at this USWAR college monograph on Strategic Shock vs Strategic Surprise and comment on Kargil from this point of view. Thanks, ramana

A 50 page pdf on Known Unknowns from US War College.

And pass it on to any who might be interested.

RayC, What I ment was to look at whole Kargil Op from the point of view of strategic surprise or strategic shock, though I think Mushy got both from the Indian Army

, whereas it was iniitally tactical surprise for IA.

Baljeet · Post by **Baljeet** » 24 May 2009 00:01

RayC wrote:Sum,

It is a very plausible story.

I am not surprised!

Thank you for putting it on the forum.

RayC
The thing I don't understand is why was CO's name was not in higher command list. Is their a clue in that sentence?

Raja Bose · Post by **Raja Bose** » 24 May 2009 06:29

Good find sum...made for some very interesting reading.

RayC · Post by **RayC** » 24 May 2009 07:09

Baljeet wrote:
RayC wrote:Sum,

It is a very plausible story.

I am not surprised!

Thank you for putting it on the forum.
RayC
The thing I don't understand is why was CO's name was not in higher command list. Is their a clue in that sentence?

HC is based on ACRs (Annual Confidential Reports), Course Result, Awards, etc and of course vacancies.

Therefore, not all make it to HC.

RayC · Post by **RayC** » 24 May 2009 07:38

RayC, What I ment was to look at whole Kargil Op from the point of view of strategic surprise or strategic shock, though I think Mushy got both from the Indian Army , whereas it was iniitally tactical surprise for IA.

That Pakistan would do this operation was indeed a surprise and also a shock.

One could call it Strategic Surprise and even Strategic Shock since such an operation is not within the tenets of how an operation is undertaken. It violated some of the Principles of War.

One can always go and sit behind the enemy lines, that is no problem. However, one has to have supplies, medevac, replenishment of ammunition, weapons, batteries et al so that one can sustain the operation.

In Kargil, no routes to these posts made by the Pakistani infiltrators were opened and they did not even try to open one. Therefore, that was really odd and hardly the way a military operation is planned and sustained. How long could they have stayed if food, water (at these heights there is no water) was not supplied to replenish the quantity utilised? If they engaged the IA, then they would run low on ammunition and finally would be out of ammunition. If they had casualties and they did not have medevac, then the man would die and it would demoralise the others. Therefore, an operation that does open up routes of maintenance and which is not sustainable cannot be termed as a planned and executed military operation.

The fact that they did such an operation is a Surprise in all ways. However, in the final analysis, they themselves were Surprised.

If you read the diaries of the Officer who was killed, you would find that it was an operation that was executed on the ground by young chaps who were charged up with religion. Religion alone cannot sustain an operation!

These type of operations appear 'brilliant' in Sand Model Discussions (SMD) and one finds many such SMDs and after which all go for a break up party. The unfortunate part is that while these appear 'brilliant' tactically, they are in actuality not thought through in detail, especially the unattractive part of an operation and the real problematic area of any operation i.e. logistics.

wig · Post by **wig** » 24 May 2009 08:18

ray c sir,
it is obvious that the kargil operations by the pa was violative of the 'principles of war'. even a blog by a retired Air Commodore of PAF, one; Tufail, Kaiser (a link from one of the BR forums) says that much. having said that i still fail to appreciate why the pa started the issue. was the entire command structure of the pa ideologically compromised or was one of the pa's trustworthy friends in the international arena carrying out some gameplan to test indian responses. or am i reading too much into the issue. somehow i don't believe that the pa command structure is so naive.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 24 May 2009 12:57

wig wrote: i don't believe that the pa command structure is so naive.

Gen Malik was the Indian Army chief during Kargil. He has an article on BR and he quotes how Gen Javid Nasir of Pakistan assessed the Indian army and India in general before Kargil Nasir's article is also available online

http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/I ... malik.html

In February 1999, Lieutenant General Javed Nasir, former head of the ISI, then Chief Intelligence Advisor to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, a well-known Islamic hawk, wrote a highly publicised article “Calling the Indian Army Chief’s Bluff”. The crux of that article was that the Indian Army was incapable of undertaking any conventional operation. This was not only a gross underestimation of a possible adversary but also a poor assessment and misperception. Some other assumptions and misperceptions which led to the Pakistani offensive operation in Kargil were:
Nuclear umbrella allows “offensive action” without risk.
International community would intervene or stop the war at an early stage.
The coalition government in India, weak and indecisive, will either over-react or under-react.
India is militarily weak and unprepared.
Indian frustration will lead to escalation, putting the onus of escalation on India.
Military operation under the garb of “Mujahideen” would focus attention on Kashmir and Pakistan would be able to claim this as a victory.
There are several such assumptions and misperceptions about the military, including nuclear capabilities, on both sides of the border even now. One of the problems is near opaqueness of matters military in both countries, which leads to considerable speculation and misreporting in the media.

Here is the original article by Javid Nasir.
http://www.defencejournal.com/feb-mar99/chief-bluff.htm
Gen Javid Nasir

RayC · Post by **RayC** » 24 May 2009 13:09

ray c sir,
it is obvious that the kargil operations by the pa was violative of the 'principles of war'. even a blog by a retired Air Commodore of PAF, one; Tufail, Kaiser (a link from one of the BR forums) says that much. having said that i still fail to appreciate why the pa started the issue. was the entire command structure of the pa ideologically compromised or was one of the pa's trustworthy friends in the international arena carrying out some gameplan to test indian responses. or am i reading too much into the issue. somehow i don't believe that the pa command structure is so naive.

I am afraid such a foolish operation cannot be fathomed. It, however, is 'brilliant' on the Sand Model. Logistics, as "brilliant" tacticians are wont to do, be the Pakistani or world over, was missed out and so they came to grief!!

I am also confused as to how the Pakistanis could be that stupid, but then Musharraf is not known to have much sense! Imagine how ignobly he had to demit office!!

Maybe the fact that he lost a strategic height i.e. the Quaid Post (named Bana after our capture) when he was the Brigade Commander fuelled his wrath and wanted to be clever than half!!

Notice that Santa Claus Shiv has posted and his thoughts. If such fools exist, then we are on pig's back!!

Gaur · Post by **Gaur** » 24 May 2009 14:01

RayC Sir,
There was some discussion relating to forward observation officers of artillery in newbie thread. The discussion was about OP(observation point) officers having to operate close to or sometimes even in enemy controlled area in small teams. This raised the question of whether there is some special training provided to arty officers for such ops. Can you shed some light on this?
Also can you tell us about the strength and structure of the teams undertaking such ops?

wig · Post by **wig** » 24 May 2009 18:52

shiv,
thanks for the two articles.
ray c,
thanks for the exposition.

RayC · Post by **RayC** » 24 May 2009 20:02

Parijat Gaur wrote:RayC Sir,
There was some discussion relating to forward observation officers of artillery in newbie thread. The discussion was about OP(observation point) officers having to operate close to or sometimes even in enemy controlled area in small teams. This raised the question of whether there is some special training provided to arty officers for such ops. Can you shed some light on this?
Also can you tell us about the strength and structure of the teams undertaking such ops?

Those who control artillery fire, when in defence are known as OP (Observation Post) Officers and in an attack are called FOO (Forward Observation Officer). They are as close to the enemy as the forward troops are in defence and move along with the attacking troops in an attack.

Such officers can also go behind enemy lines to direct artillery fire onto the enemy and are called Commando OPs (though this in not an official term).

These normally consists of an officer, a radio operator, a driver and a lineman. They establish their own line to the gun end (where the guns are) so that there is instant communication without having to go through an exchange.

sum · Post by **sum** » 24 May 2009 21:38

RayC wrote:Sum,
It is a very plausible story.
I am not surprised!
Thank you for putting it on the forum.

All jingoes,
Are there more such stories(first person type authentic IA) floating on the net? Any links/actual story would be appreciated...

Have been hooked onto such stuff since coming across the Lethal Weapon blogs...

Walker · Post by **Walker** » 24 May 2009 22:48

Could someone please post the address of the Lethal Weapon blog? thx in advance.

Arunkumar · Post by **Arunkumar** » 24 May 2009 22:59

^^
http://kashmirdiary.rediffiland.com/scr ... y_view.php

Gaur · Post by **Gaur** » 25 May 2009 00:24

RayC Sir,
Thanks for the information. But operating behind the enemy lines seems to be an extraordinarily dangerous and difficult job. Is there any specialized course which arty officers undergo to prepare for such ops (such as junior leader course at Belgaum undertaken by all infantry officers)?

RayC · Post by **RayC** » 25 May 2009 07:55

Parijat Gaur wrote:RayC Sir,
Thanks for the information. But operating behind the enemy lines seems to be an extraordinarily dangerous and difficult job. Is there any specialized course which arty officers undergo to prepare for such ops (such as junior leader course at Belgaum undertaken by all infantry officers)?

Actually one needs no special training to operate behind enemy lines. One does not have to operate for an endless period of time. They operate just for the duration of that operation and then fall back.

Let us say there is an attack on an objective. The Arty FOO would just infiltrate and go on take up a vantage position behind that objective or to the flank to direct the fire.

Before any attack, extensive patrolling is done to get the maximum details of the enemy position and the routes. In one such patrol that would also have the Arty personnel, they would also recce the area from where they are to direct the fire.

Once the objective is captured, the Arty team would marry up on the objective.

aditp · Post by **aditp** » 25 May 2009 09:13

Yogesh wrote:
sum wrote:OT but:

The UPA has come to power again meaning that all dreams of IA acquiring desperately needed 155 mm artillery are firmly out of the window...
Well lets wait and watch

Lets say, the recent exhoneration of Mr. Quattrochi, makes us ready to deal with Bofors AB once again.

Baljeet · Post by **Baljeet** » 26 May 2009 01:06

bhai log
Here are few videos I found of Longewala tank battle, Chamb, poonch, akhnoor sector and shakargarh. This is a real footage with war time camerman and gun camera.

The valor of Dependir Singh Ahlawat, Arun Kehterpal brings tears to my eyes. This is what Indian rugged man of villages are made of.

[youtube]r4ImboEeYrk&feature=related[/youtube]

[youtube]I2EtAltIBqQ&feature=related[/youtube]

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 26 May 2009 05:57

Baljeet wrote:bhai log
Here are few videos I found of Longewala tank battle, Chamb, poonch, akhnoor sector and shakargarh. This is a real footage with war time camerman and gun camera.

Both videos uploaded by me on my channel

Baljeet · Post by **Baljeet** » 26 May 2009 08:50

Rupesh · Post by **Rupesh** » 26 May 2009 21:27

'India is to send another 40,000 troops to the India-China border.'

India ups vigil on China border

Nitin Gokhale, Tuesday May 26, 2009, New Delhi

It now seems clear that India is slowly but surely being surrounded by China with the growing influence that the Chinese have in each of India's neighbours -- Pakistan, Nepal, Burma and now even Sri Lanka.

Clearly concerned about being encircled NDTV has exclusive information that India is to send another 40,000 troops to the India-China border.

After downplaying the China threat for years, the government is now decided to raise additional fighting formations to meet any eventuality and to improve the infrastructure in the areas bordering China.

India increases troops

Two new divisions (40,000 troops)
Artillery brigade, 9 airstrips
Military's assessment: China is India's greatest threat
India wants to match China's forces
Cost: Rs 5,000 crores
India is increasing the number of troops on the border with China in Arunachal Pradesh. NDTV has learnt that two mountain divisions, that is, 40,000 troops will be recruited over the next two years.

It's a huge step that New Delhi has taken and reflects the military's view that China is India's greatest threat.

Deploying more troops is being seen as an assertion by India that Arunachal Pradesh is not a part of China as Beijing claims.

So, why has this been done?

India wants to match China's forces. Sources say there's an urgency to match China's massive military presence across the border estimated at 3 lakh troops. After this, in Arunachal alone India will have about 1 lakh soldiers. This plan implementation will cost the government Rs 5,000 crore.

This was also among the main stories on NDTV 9.00 PM news.