Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch

Jamal K. Malik · Post by **Jamal K. Malik** » 24 Jun 2009 16:20

India invited to international meet on Afghan-Pak in Italy

http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/Pol ... 695542.cms

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 25 Jun 2009 00:14

Comments from Nightwatch, 22 june 2009

Afghanistan: Thanks to a poorly researched and ludicrous Wall Street Journal item – repeated by FOX and every other shallow US entertainment news network -- the whole world has been informed that Afghan Taliban Leader Mullah Omar appears to be asserting more direct control over operations and fighters in Afghanistan. This “profound” insight came from U.S. officials and insurgents in Afghanistan. Wow!

Since January, these sources said, Omar has issued orders through his direct lieutenants for suicide bombings and assassinations in southern and eastern Afghanistan, and has been replacing field commanders and “shadow governors” in the provinces, in preparation for a surge of U.S. troops. Defense officials say the Shura also has been depositing weapons of caches throughout eastern and southern Afghanistan, recruiting more fighters and appointing new local commanders in the region.

Comment: NW has studied and watched Omar since his emergence as leader before 1996. His emergence is itself close to miraculous. He has never been a tactician who issues attack orders and never much of a strategist. He is a visionary, high on drugs and his own Islamic fantasies.

The very idea of his involvement in specific target selection is laughable to old hands. He has never asserted direct authority over fighting groups. Thus the idea of his assertion of tactical command would be without precedent, were it not so risible. He is an incompetent military commander.

Moreover, the notion of Omar’s assertion of military authority is not consistent with his management style, or with the practices of Afghan Shuras. Omar’s involvement in tactics would be great news for the Coalition, were the report remotely credible. In the NW experience more hands-on involvement by Omar would ensure a Coalition success! Tacticians and operational commanders far more competent than Omar are directing the fight!

If the news leaks measure the quality of US intelligence analysis, NW urges the command to find new analysts, including some who actually read history, understand it, and perform critical analysis. For example, issuing orders through lieutenants is how the visionary Omar crosses the barrier between his dream state and the reality of his combat directors, DUH.

The comment that the Shura is issuing orders on logistics contradicts the main premise of the item. The Shura is the device Omar uses to operationalize his visions. The Journal article is contradictory nonsense. A competent critique of its misinformation would take more time and room than NW allots.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 25 Jun 2009 00:16

And on 23 June 2009

Pakistan: McClatchy’s expert and special correspondent on Pakistan, Saeed Shah, has written an excellent article on a significant setback to the Islamabad government’s program to counter the Pakistani Taliban. Qari Zainuddin a Mahsud tribe leader, who challenged Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud for leadership of the Mahsuds, was shot by one of his own bodyguards. Authorities suspect the killer was an infiltration agent working for Baitullah.

On several occasions this month, tribal lashkars -- loosely organized armed tribal militiamen -- expelled from their villages militants and terrorists associated with the Pakistan Taliban Movement. Government tribal political agents working with Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) probably provided significant support to encourage and empower the lashkar leaders and tribal elders. The government’s failure to provide security to Zainuddin will threaten to sap the courage from other potential tribal leaders who might act as counterweights to the Pakistani Taliban.

Shah’s article makes an important point that Zainuddin’s break with Baitullah was over the direction of the fighting. Zainuddin said he thought fighting Muslims was wrong. Thus he opposed Baitullah’s policy of fighting in Pakistan against Pakistani government agents and security personnel. Zainuddin thought the fight should be focused exclusively against the US and NATO forces in Afghanistan to force them to depart.

The episode spotlights the fragility of attempting to use tribes against each other, especially without enhancing the personal protection of the pro-government guys. It also exposes the divergence of interests between Pakistan and Afghanistan and its Allies. Some security initiatives that benefit Pakistan’s security actually worsen the threat to Afghanistan.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 29 Jun 2009 20:08

A new twist.

Afghan Leader Says Guards Working for U.S. Killed Police Chief

President Hamid Karzai accused Afghan guards working for U.S. coalition forces of killing a provincial police chief and at least four other security officers during a gunbattle outside a government office Monday.

In a harshly worded statement, Karzai demanded that coalition forces hand over the guards involved. But the governor of Kandahar later said 41 private security guards connected to the incident had been disarmed and arrested by Afghan authorities.

The U.S. military said it was not involved in the shooting, calling it an ''Afghan-on-Afghan incident.'' However, Karzai's statement suggested that the guards sought refuge in a U.S. coalition base after the killings, and he ''demanded that coalition forces prevent such incidents, which weaken the government.''

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 30 Jun 2009 22:20

CIA chief to persuade Pak to allow India a greater role in AfPak

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 30 Jun 2009 22:22

The mid-summer ferment

Jamal K. Malik · Post by **Jamal K. Malik** » 02 Jul 2009 00:35

US to consult India on goals in Pak, Afghan: Obama aide
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Worl ... 723312.cms

Amber G. · Post by **Amber G.** » 02 Jul 2009 09:04

Marines Deploy on Major Mission -Thousands Fan Out in Afghanistan's South in Crucial Test for Revised U.S. Strategy

Afghanistan, July 2 -- Thousands of U.S. Marines descended upon the volatile Helmand River valley in helicopters and armored convoys early Thursday, mounting an operation that represents the first large-scale test of the U.S. military's new counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan.<snip>

Jamal K. Malik · Post by **Jamal K. Malik** » 02 Jul 2009 19:57

Major military operation underway in Afghanistan
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Worl ... 727100.cms

Thousands of US Marines and hundreds of Afghan troops moved into Taliban-infested villages with armor and helicopters early Thursday in
the first major operation under President Barack Obama's revamped strategy to stabilize Afghanistan.

krithivas · Post by **krithivas** » 02 Jul 2009 20:16

This is murky - Uncle Sam first wanted to bracket India into Af-Pak, and quickly realized that it was insanely senseless (to bracket a global power with failed states). Now he wants to convince a failed sate Pakistan (#10) to permit India to play a greater role?

This new positioning makes it as though "India is wanting to be there ....."?

NRao wrote:CIA chief to persuade Pak to allow India a greater role in AfPak

Jamal K. Malik · Post by **Jamal K. Malik** » 02 Jul 2009 20:46

Pakistan's Taliban chief Fazlullah may be dead
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Worl ... 729326.cms

shyamd · Post by **shyamd** » 03 Jul 2009 22:27

IOL: Afghan insurgents have adapted their strategy to that of NATO and are superior when it comes to initiating combat,” claims a French army intelligence officer, who wished to remain unnamed. According to the officer, the Taliban will continue to prefer attacking coalition forces in small groups headed by “a double command,” in other words by a military chief and ideological officer. The aim is to immobilize the coalition by constantly harassing it, forcing troops to remain within the confines of forward operational bases and thus leaving them cut off from the population.

Heavily armed but slow to react and poorly informed, coalition units risk being forced to observe a careful modus Vivendi around their bases, venturing beyond the confines only to flush out insurgents for air strikes and U.S. special forces.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 03 Jul 2009 22:29

shyamd,

Discussions/observations outside this thread please.

thx

Arun_S · Post by **Arun_S** » 04 Jul 2009 00:41

Russia Opens Route for U.S. to Fly Arms to Afghanistan

By PETER BAKER
July 4, 2009
MOSCOW — The Russian government has agreed to allow American troops and weapons bound for Afghanistan to fly over Russian territory, providing an important new corridor for the United States military as it escalates efforts to win the eight-year-old war, officials from both sides said Friday.

The agreement, to be formally announced when President Obama visits here on Monday and Tuesday, represents one of the most concrete achievements of the effort to rebuild a relationship severely strained by last year’s war between Russia and Georgia. The new transit route will give American forces more alternatives as they encounter increasing trouble elsewhere.

.... .. .Until now, Russia has allowed only restricted use of its territory for the Afghan war, permitting shipments of nonlethal supplies by train. Under the new agreement, American officials said, military planes carrying lethal equipment as well as troops will be allowed to make thousands of flights a year through Russian airspace.

... .. . The agreement on Afghanistan was a high priority for Mr. Obama, who has ordered an additional 21,000 American troops to join the fight against the Taliban and Al Qaeda there. Supply routes through Pakistan have become complicated by that country’s increasing volatility, while Uzbekistan evicted American troops from a base a few years ago and Kyrgyzstan threatened recently to do the same. American negotiators recently persuaded Kyrgyzstan to change its mind by increasing payments for the base there.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 06 Jul 2009 01:46

Why Obama's Afghan War is Different

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 06 Jul 2009 17:56

Taliban launch 'operation' against Marines

"In response to Operation Khanjar (dagger) by the invading forces, we have launched Operation Foladi Jal (Iron Net)," Ahmadi (Taliban) said.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 08 Jul 2009 22:56

U.S. commander: More Afghan troops needed in Taliban push

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 08 Jul 2009 22:58

Drones 'kill dozens' in Pakistan

In the first attack, suspected US drones attacked a Taliban forest camp in South Waziristan, near the Afghan border, killing at least 10 militants.

Hours later, officials said about 40 militants died when five missiles hit a vehicle convoy in the same region.

shravan · Post by **shravan** » 09 Jul 2009 10:47

Former Gitmo Inmate Leading Fight Against U.S. in Helmand

A former Guantanamo Bay inmate is leading the fight against U.S. Marines in the Helmand province of Afghanistan, a senior U.S. defense official confirmed to FOX News on Tuesday.

Zakir was released from Afghan custody around 2008, according to the New York Post. He re-established connections with high-level Taliban leaders in Afghanistan and Pakistan after his second release.

Taliban chief Mullah Omar appointed Zakir in mid-2008 as senior military commander, according to the newspaper.

Zakir quickly became a charismatic leader, helping establish an "accountability commission" to track spending and monitor activities of Taliban leaders in the districts where they held power and were running a shadow government, according to the Post.

Explaining why Zakir was released from Gitmo, the defense official said, "We were under incredible pressure from the world to release detainees at Gitmo. You just don't know what people are going to do.

shravan · Post by **shravan** » 14 Jul 2009 00:15

India under pressure in Obama's AfPak strategy

Stage set for a new round of regional diplomacy when US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visits later this month.

The death of six Indians working on a USAID-funded road project between Khost and Paktia provinces in southern Afghanistan last week and confirmation from Pakistan that it is concerned over India’s “over-ingress” in Afghanistan is setting the stage for a new round of regional diplomacy when US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton comes visiting later this month.

Clinton is traveling to Delhi and Bangkok, to attend a meeting of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (Asean), and is so far not scheduled to go to Islamabad, but it is clear that alongside a review of the bilateral relationship — including the latest differences on nuclear enrichment and reprocessing — Pakistan’s unhappiness over India’s growing presence in Afghanistan will be on the table.

With elections in Afghanistan slated for August 20, the US is already believed to have told India to keep a “low profile” until the poll process is concluded, Indian officials said on condition of anonymity, but clearly Pakistan wants more.

In an interview with CNN over the weekend, Pakistan military spokesperson Maj Gen Athar Abbas said: “What we see as a concern is an over-involvement of Indians in Afghanistan…If you see an over-ingress of the Indians into these areas, like their government, their ministries, their army. The fear is, tomorrow what happens if these Americans move out and they’re replaced by Indians as military trainers? That becomes a serious concern.”

Abbas said Pakistan had told the US-led coalition in Afghanistan about its India-related concerns and stressed that “they (the coalition) have to have a line because if it goes beyond them, beyond the line, then of course the situation would take an ugly turn.”

Indian officials, citing information from US counter-terrorism officials, believe the bomb attack on the Indian embassy in Kabul last July was masterminded by the Sirajuddin Haqqani faction of the Taliban, in connivance with Pakistan’s intelligence agency, the ISI.

But western diplomats in Kabul, while appreciating India’s reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan amounting to $1.2 billion, pointed out that New Delhi should also soon take steps to allay Islamabad’s concerns on its own bilateral track.

“The US kept India out of its AfPak strategy in deference to New Delhi’s demands that Kashmir be kept out of the regional hyphenation, but the truth is that India needs to be more understanding about the pressures Pakistan is facing internally,” the diplomat said.

According to Radha Kumar, strategic analyst and professor at Jamia Millia University, the “logical outcome of the AfPak strategy is peace with India,” and could take the form of action on Mumbai terrorists still free inside Pakistan (like Zaki-ur Rehman Lakhvi), the break-up of groups like the Lashkar-e-Toiba, autonomy within Kashmir and a settlement with Pakistan on the disputed state, Kumar said.

But as Pakistan began to crack down on its own Taliban, India needed to watch out for the spillover effect, in terms of infiltration or terrorist attacks. “The more unstable Pakistan is, the greater will be the spillover into India,” she said.

While the first signs of a new dialogue seem to have begun between India and Pakistan, which will likely be taken forward on the margins of the NAM meeting at Sharm-el Sheikh in Egypt, India continues to press the US to press Pakistan to take action against India-directed terrorism.

It seems that the US establishment is divided over Pakistan’s role in destabilising India’s presence in Afghanistan. While some US officials believe that lower-level and retired operatives of the ISI still have connections with the Afghan Taliban, Newsweek, in its September 2008 issue, quoted US officials anonymous as saying Sirajuddin Haqqani had become the ISI’s “darling”.

Meanwhile, several Afghans are asking whether Pakistan will also act against the Afghan Taliban seeking refuge in the Pakistani city of Quetta, just as it was doing against militants like Baitullah Mehsud in South Waziristan.“The US is still turning a blind eye to Pakistan’s selective targeting of militants,” an Afghan official said. But the western diplomats said the US did not want to push Pakistan too hard. “The Pakistan army’s targeting of Baitullah Mehsud and his ilk are a first step. There is already a lot of anti-American anger within civil society in Pakistan. The Americans have to move carefully,” the diplomats said.

Kumar confirmed that. “Pakistan seems to have reached a kind of tipping point, where it seems impossible for it to take on the India-related Lashkar, its own militants like Baitullah Mehsud as well as the Afghan Taliban, all at the same time,” she said.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 16 Jul 2009 00:52

Nightwatch Jul 14, 2009

Pakistan-bin Laden: Usama bin Laden’s 3 June audio message denouncing President Obama contained about 26 minutes of denunciations against Pakistani authorities. The anti-Pakistan statements received little attention anywhere. However, on 11 and 12 July an Urdu translation of that portion of the tape was posted to the Internet, according to MSN India.

Bin Laden called President Zardari and the Pakistan Army allies of Satan and urged that Zardari and Chief of Army Staff General Kayani be targeted. One report also mentions Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani. Bin Laden warned, “if Pakistan gets weak India would divide it into parts and Pakistani nuclear assets may be neutralized then.”

He said “Asif Zardari and Ashfaq Kayani have continued to distract the army from its main tasks, which are protecting Islam, and protecting its followers, and its territories. Instead, they prompted it to fight Islam and those who demand the implementation of it and they order it to kill and fight the Pashtun and Baloch tribes. Meanwhile, most of the Pakistani people reject this unjust war. Zardari has done so in response to those who pay him in the White House not only 10%, rather they pay doubles than that.”

(Note: Zardari used to be called “Mr. 10%” which referred to his practice of requiring ten percent as his fee in making investment deals, using Benazir Bhutto’s -- his wife -- connections as Prime Minister)

One of the most fractious debates in the Afghan and Pakistan branches of the Taliban movement has concerned where to concentrate the fight. Afghanistan’s Mullah Omar has insisted the Americans and other outsiders must be removed from Afghanistan and Pakistan left alone. Baitullah Mehsud has tended to focus his resources on attacks within Pakistan. In that target set, he has had support from Ayman Zawahiri who denounced Musharraf during his tenure, and now from bin Laden who has denounced Zardari and General Kayani.

Today seems to be the first day that Pakistani news services picked up on the parts of the 3 June tape that mention Pakistan. The Pakistani parts of the message appear to be bin Laden’s acceptance of the new US strategy in which Afghanistan and Pakistan are lumped together as a single problem. That implies an assessment that if the pro-US leadership of Pakistan is murdered, the Taliban will achieve a significant victory benefiting its interests in both countries.

shravan · Post by **shravan** » 16 Jul 2009 19:48

Indian Army chief to visit US next week

shravan · Post by **shravan** » 16 Jul 2009 23:52

U.S. Threatens Afghans Over Kidnapped GI

At least two Afghan villages have been blanketed with leaflets warning that if an American soldier kidnapped by the Taliban two weeks ago isn't freed, "you will be targeted."

Villagers near the border of two volatile provinces, Ghazni and Paktika, tell CBS News' Sami Yousafzai that aircraft dropped the leaflets during the past several days.

Military spokeswoman Capt. Elizabeth Mathias confirmed that the leaflets were produced at Bagram Air Base, the primary U.S. installation in Afghanistan, and distributed in the region. She told CBS News correspondent Mandy Clark, however, that they were distributed by hand, not aircraft.

The papers show on one side an image of a soldier with his head bowed so that his face is not visible (above). A message in the local Pashtun language over the image says, "If you do not free the American soldier, then…"

On the other side, an image shows Western troops breaking into a house. The rest of the message is printed across the photo: "…you will be targeted".

According to the military, the translation of the last word in the sentence is "hunted," not targeted, but CBS News' independent translators say the word also means "targeted".
-------

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 17 Jul 2009 00:07

Isn't this called "collective punishment" and was charged as a war crime at Nurmberg when the Nazis destroyed a village near Heydrich's assasination place?

Baljeet · Post by **Baljeet** » 17 Jul 2009 02:09

Ramanji
Those were different times. In those times evil had a face, a military, who fought with grace, dignity and valor. These are Paki Talibunnies the defender of peaceful religion where there is no grace, dignity or valor. Ignorance is their virtue, medival barbarism their weapon, establishing their caliphat their dream cause. They want to subjugate the freedom of humanity in the shackles of peaceful religion.

So I actually have no problem if US Marines annihilate village after village to send Khuda key bandey to meet their 72. More the merrier.

Virupaksha · Post by **Virupaksha** » 17 Jul 2009 03:50

Baljeet wrote:Ramanji
Those were different times. In those times evil had a face, a military, who fought with grace, dignity and valor. These are Paki Talibunnies the defender of peaceful religion where there is no grace, dignity or valor. Ignorance is their virtue, medival barbarism their weapon, establishing their caliphat their dream cause. They want to subjugate the freedom of humanity in the shackles of peaceful religion.

So I actually have no problem if US Marines annihilate village after village to send Khuda key bandey to meet their 72. More the merrier.

Na, Na, Na. The problem is not with that. The problem is the straight face with which they turn towards and start giving us lectures on human rights and blah blah blah.

VinodTK · Post by **VinodTK** » 17 Jul 2009 04:07

China stalls on the AfPak road

Raman · Post by **Raman** » 17 Jul 2009 04:25

ramana wrote:Isn't this called "collective punishment" and was charged as a war crime at Nurmberg when the Nazis destroyed a village near Heydrich's assasination place?

You probably already know this, but "collective responsibility" is legal in FATA by the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR). The Pakis routinely destroy whole villages if they don't couldn't pin-point a single badmashee.

Virupaksha · Post by **Virupaksha** » 17 Jul 2009 05:31

Raman wrote:
ramana wrote:Isn't this called "collective punishment" and was charged as a war crime at Nurmberg when the Nazis destroyed a village near Heydrich's assasination place?
You probably already know this, but "collective responsibility" is legal in FATA by the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR). The Pakis routinely destroy whole villages if they don't couldn't pin-point a single badmashee.

Is Paki = america, fata = afghan? The point is the americans are no better than pakis in this human rights issue.

Baljeet · Post by **Baljeet** » 17 Jul 2009 08:48

ravi_ku wrote:
Baljeet wrote:Ramanji
Those were different times. In those times evil had a face, a military, who fought with grace, dignity and valor. These are Paki Talibunnies the defender of peaceful religion where there is no grace, dignity or valor. Ignorance is their virtue, medival barbarism their weapon, establishing their caliphat their dream cause. They want to subjugate the freedom of humanity in the shackles of peaceful religion.

So I actually have no problem if US Marines annihilate village after village to send Khuda key bandey to meet their 72. More the merrier.
Na, Na, Na. The problem is not with that. The problem is the straight face with which they turn towards and start giving us lectures on human rights and blah blah blah.

Ravi
Its not just they give us lecture, bigger problem is we give them the opportunity to give us lecture. Here is what I mean, instead of giving them an opportunity and maintaining the so called "Indian Diplomatic Decorum" we said, hey we kill these A** Holes because they were killing innocent people. If you are so high and mighty about human rights how come more than half the black population is in prison, why don't you close GITMO, why did your people shoot innocent civilians in Iraq and yet you let all the culprits go free under the guise of lack of evidence. why do you have fence with mexican border and not with canadian border. Discriminating against mexicans is a human rights issue.

shravan · Post by **shravan** » 17 Jul 2009 09:12

Taliban Warn: We'll Kill Kidnapped U.S. Soldier If Search Operations Don't Stop

The Taliban have warned that it will kill a kidnapped U.S. soldier if foreign troops continue targeting civilians in the name of search operations in Ghazni and Paktika provinces, Afghanistan.

The U.S. soldier was seized along with his two Afghan National Army (ANA) counterparts by Taliban insurgents in Yousafkhel district of the southeastern Paktika province on July 1.

---
America will destroy those villages --- Ghengis khan

shravan · Post by **shravan** » 19 Jul 2009 00:53

2 die in U.S. fighter jet F-15 Eagle crash in Afghanistan

a U.S. plane crashed in Ghazni's Nawur district before dawn

--

shravan · Post by **shravan** » 20 Jul 2009 23:50

Army Chief in US, defence cooperation, Af-Pak to top agenda

Washington: A range of strategic issues, including America's Af-Pak policy, the regional security situation and Indo-US defence cooperation will top the agenda of Indian Army Chief General Deepak Kapoor who arrived here on Monday on a week-long visit to the United States.

During his first trip to the US as army chief, Gen Kapoor is expected to hold discussions with senior US military and civilian defence hierarchy.

Among the top Pentagon officials he will meet are Chairman of the Joint Chiefs the Staff Admiral Mike Mullen, his counterpart in the US Army Gen George W Casey and Defence Secretary Robert Gates.

The two sides are expected to deliberate on contemporary strategic issues, including US Af-Pak policy and regional security situation. The discussions will also delve on the Indo-US defence cooperation, including joint training and exercises, exchanges and military equipment cooperation.
.
.
The visit comes at a time when Indo-US bilateral relations are on an upswing and there is a consensus from both sides to take the strategic partnership to a higher level for synergised efforts to combat global terrorism and to bring peace and stability in the region, Indian officials said.

The Indian Army chief's tour coincides with US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's five-day visit to India.

----
America Must be buying this guy Right ?

Time to leave India and settle in Pakistan...

shravan · Post by **shravan** » 21 Jul 2009 17:15

Report: Pakistan Objects to Expanded U.S. Military Operations in Afghanistan

A report Tuesday said Pakistan was objecting to the expanded role of the U.S. military in Afghanistan.

President Barack Obama has ordered additional forces to Afghanistan, in an effort to quell a resurgent Taliban and to bring better stability to the southwest Asian Islamic nation in a move reminescent of a strategy that helped dramatically reduce violence in Iraq.

By year's end, the U.S. will have 68,000 troops in Afghanistan - far fewer than were in Iraq, but roughly double the number of forces it had.

Pakistan's objections come as a surprise, given that al Qaeda and Taliban fighters have and expanded presence in its remote western mountainous regions.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 24 Jul 2009 20:37

Nightwatch, 23 July 2009

Afghanistan: Comment. Several news services reported the US command in Kabul has stopped releasing information on Taliban casualties. Such practice always and in every war is an indicator of strategic failure, no matter how the Command dresses up the explanation.

Enemy casualty data are never precise, of course; no Reader expects that. But even orders of magnitude nuance, balance and check Allied and Taliban boasts of victory, even when losses are inflated. Failure to provide the data always raises the question, “What are you hiding?”

If the Allies have anything to hide relative to casualties, it is that the open source data from June and July show that the casualty ratios portend an inevitable Taliban reoccupation of Kabul, through a war of attrition. The Coalition Nations cannot long sustain the losses the Taliban are now inflicting.

The President’s description of certain behavior as stupid applies. Winning generals are not afraid of releasing casualty figures, even obviously inflated claims, as in Sri Lanka, Kashmir and Swat Valley. Tortured logic about the refocus on protecting villages contains no metrics that even the villagers understand or value.

Swat, Sri Lanka and Kashmir are the only recent examples of successful counterinsurgencies in South Asia. None applied US doctrine. All achieved their stated objectives.

NightWatch will continue to report monthly compilations of casualty information reported in open sources, as it is able.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 01 Aug 2009 01:24

Book Review:TO LIVE OR TO PERISH FOREVER: TWO TUMULTUOUS YEARS IN PAKISTAN

TO UNRAVEL A COMPLICATED QUESTION

TO LIVE OR TO PERISH FOREVER: TWO TUMULTUOUS YEARS IN PAKISTAN By Nicholas Schmidle, Random House, Rs 299

“But what’s the problem with that place?” The question was put to Nicholas Schmidle on telephone by his grandfather, who, like so many of his fellow Americans, must have become aware of Pakistan ’s existence post-9/11. Schmidle was in Pakistan then on an Institute of Current World Affairs fellowship that required him to report and write on what he saw, and could have taken the question head-on. But he must have hung up soon. A long-distance telephone conversation wouldn’t give him enough time to explain Pakistan’s complex realities. In fact, even after having written 261 pages in small print, Schmidle cannot be entirely sure if he has provided “any answers” to what is wrong with Pakistan .

The best way to go about this book, however, is to stop looking for answers and take in Schmidle as he comes — without any compulsion to provide a linear narrative and without the sombreness that usually marks all discussions on Pakistan and its killing fields. Schmidle even manages to give a face to each extremist in that swarm of bearded men in shalwar-kameez. The infamous Abdul Rashid Ghazi, who led the Red Mosque insurrection in 2007, is said to have looked like Jerry Garcia, and Maulana Fazlullah of Swat, who has never been photographed, is a short man with large gaps between his teeth and a “goofy smile”.

The reason why most of the chapters in this book — many of them self-sufficient articles — work so well is because Schmidle layers his narrative. The unexpected breaks — to recount meetings with tribal and political leaders, his experience of street clashes or tribal rituals, to recollect student politics or rehash history — give no chance for monotony to set in. The dramatic two years — 2006-08 — which included a regime change, in any case, wouldn’t let that happen.

Liberal Pakistan versus the Taliban is only one of the many conflicts that the nation has survived. Pakistan’s current preoccupation, however, also overshadows other irreparable sectarian and ethnic divides that make it almost impossible for Pakistan to hold together as a nation — the Shia-Sunni conflict, the Pashtun-Mohajir or the Punjabi-Sindhi divide, or the recalcitrance of Baluchistan to cohere with the nation. Schmidle goes deep into each of these fissures to show how conflicting identities and histories have complicated Pakistan’s political journey since its birth. The more Pakistan’s State-building efforts have tried to smother identities, the more intractable each problem has become.

Take Baluchistan, which seems to be currently worrying India more than Pakistan. Its incorporation into Pakistan happened more by accident than by design. Over the decades, the Pakistan government has intensified the feeling of alienation by its neglect of the region, its ill-devised financial system and its ham-handed policy of dealing with insurgency. The same myopia has deepened other divides. In a society as polarized as Pakistan’s, Schmidle says that any political problem gets transformed into an ethnic one.

Schmidle also shows that these problems are never simple. For example, the Pashtun Awami National Party may have given up on its dream of an independent Pashtunistan, but its politics is grounded in the belief that “Talibanization” is a “neocolonial” attempt of the Punjabi elite (read the Pakistan army) to rule the Pashtun lands through religious proxy. And, yet, it did agree to a “deal” with the pro-Taliban Sufi Mohammad. Has the ANP given in to the Punjabi design then? In 2009, Schmidle himself might be groping for an answer to that question.

Schmidle invests a lot of time, energy and patience in unravelling the mystery behind the inexorable Talibanization of Pakistan. This takes him repeatedly to the smooth-talking Abdul Rashid Ghazi in the Red Mosque, deep into Waziristan, to the mountain abode of the Taliban in the North West Frontier Province, to witness their summary justice. To begin to do all this, Schmidle had to do a lot of homework. He started off by reading about the country, learning Urdu, and then donning the shalwar-kameez and travelling by public transport to far-off places or riding on local journalists’ bikes and hatchbacks to slums, madrasas and Taliban territory. Schmidle never forgets the dangers of being an American, although his hosts, sometimes the feared Taliban, often do. As Maulana Fazlullah’s military commander, Sirajuddin, put it nonchalantly, “You are our guest.”

In his wanderings deep into Pakistan, Schmidle finds a tribal society in flux — centuries-old tradition of governance was being replaced by the violent “sharia-rule” of the Taliban, which, nevertheless, answered the people’s need for prompt justice and order. The brash, impatient, new entrants into the game of religious and political one-upmanship were pushing out the previous generation of conservative leaders like Maulana Fazlur Rehman of the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam. There was no time left for the democratic games that Rehman once played under the umbrella of the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal.

One man in a real hurry to seize the moment was Abdul Rashid Ghazi, the imam of the Red Mosque and Schmidle’s friend, who gave him the key to enter the radical heartland. Schmidle suspects that Ghazi became a victim of the cult he had himself created but he cannot help blaming the Pakistan government/army for forcing Ghazi’s hand. Schmidle’s grief for Ghazi is genuine, and in grieving the “death of a friend”, he manages to give a human face to extremists like Ghazi and to his own tribe — the mediapersons scavenging on Pakistan ’s disorder to make a name and career.

Despite Schmidle’s interest in the Taliban, he does not explore Pakistan’s intelligence agencies’ links with them, although he constantly hints at them. After Daniel Pearl, that is probably now too dangerous a subject. Schmidle’s discretion, however, does not prevent him from being hounded by the intelligence agencies. He is forced to leave the country end of 2007, and again, more dramatically, after a hot chase in August 2008. Schmidle’s nail-biting account of the chase in 2008, broken only briefly by his visit to the annual urs for Lal Shahbaz Qalandar, helps the book transcend political commentary and become almost a thriller. But even without this ‘epilogue’, the book would have remained an enjoyable read.

CHIROSREE BASU

Yash · Post by **Yash** » 01 Aug 2009 03:16

Defence Link (PDF file): Progress towards security & stability in Afghanistan:

India reference is only in the context of food supplies (what of the umpteen consulates that apparently are doing a lot more than "issuing visas"?):

The food security situation in 2009 is likely to be better than it was in 2008. The strength of the World Food Program (WFP) food pipeline (full through November 2009) and the arrival of 250,000 metric tons (MT) of wheat donated by India will strengthen the strategic grains reserve and improve the country’s ability to address emergency needs and control wheat prices.

The reference to building roads has no India mention - it's likely a deliberate omission to keep the hounds quiet.

While roads are the current priority for improving transportation infrastructure in Afghanistan, there has been progress in rail and air travel. The Iranians have nearly completed a 60 km railway line from the border at Islam Qala to Herat. As part of their investment in the Aynak copper-mining venture, the Chinese are scheduled to build a 700 km rail link from Sher Kahn Bander to Torkham.

shravan · Post by **shravan** » 01 Aug 2009 14:16

U.S. may ask for more troops for Afghan war

WASHINGTON -- U.S. Army General Stanley McChrystal may soon ask the Obama administration for extra forces for the Afghanistan war.
.
.
In interviews with Reuters and public comments, prominent analysts advising him say he will need more boots on the ground even after force levels reach 68,000 U.S. troops - on top of more than 30,000 from allied nations - later this year.
.
.
Stephen Biddle, a military analyst at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington, said a "sizable reinforcement of the U.S. troop count" was necessary.

Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington suggested the United States would have to add several more brigade combat teams - units of between 3,000 and 5,000 troops.

"We, the United States, are going to have to provide the resources if we want to win," Mr. Cordesman said.

"This means very substantial budget increases. It means more brigade combat troops and it means financing both the civilian effort needed in the field and a near doubling of Afghan national security forces."
.
.
U.S. may ask for more troops for Afghan war

John Snow · Post by **John Snow** » 01 Aug 2009 23:18

Please read.

Float Like a Butterfly, Sting Like a Bee
The Taliban Rope-a-Dope
By FRANKLIN SPINNEY

Istanbul.

On July 7, the Times [UK] carried a remarkable report describing the trials and tribulations of the Welsh Guards, who are now engaged in the ongoing offensive against the Taliban in Helmand Province, Afghanistan. It described in riveting detail how accumulating mental and physical stress are grinding down the bodies and minds of what are clearly highly-motivated, well-trained, and competently-led troops. My aim is to elaborate on the Times report by examining its information from a different perspective. My hope is that this will provide a better appreciation of the Taliban's game.

With the exception of the last sentence in the penultimate paragraph (i.e., "The Taliban fight not to win but to outlast"), which is silly, the Times provides a graphic description of the pressures on the individual British soldiers, and it is an excellent window into the effects of the Taliban's military art. The information suggests the Taliban's strategic aim is to wear down their adversaries by keeping them under continual strain and by working on their psychology, or as the late American strategist John Boyd would say, by getting inside, slowing down, and disorienting their adversary's Observation - Orientation - Decision - Action (OODA) loops. Moreover, the Taliban's operational art seems particularly focused on the mental and moral levels of conflict. Outlasting, by running away to fight another day whenever faced with superior forces, is a central part of any winning strategy directed toward achieving this aim. (Interested readers can find a brief introduction to OODA loops in the last section of my remembrance of Boyd in the Proceedings of the Naval Institute, Genghis John. And for an example of an implicit application at the mental and moral levels of conflict, see my essay in CounterPunch, How Obama Won).

The Times report also contains information describing NATO's operational art. It suggests that NATO's operational focus is aimed at occupying or cutting lines of communication (LOCs) by occupying checkpoints or outposts. This operational level aim reflects NATO's belief that control of checkpoints along the LOCs will make it possible to control movement of the Taliban, and thereby make it easier to protect the Afghan population from the Taliban. By definition, if successful, this outcome would slow down and physically disconnect the Taliban's OODA loops from the political environment, thus establishing the blanket of military security needed for achieving the strategic aim of winning the hearts and minds of the people through political action. But we will see that this is more an exercise in self-referencing than in strategy.

The differences between the Taliban's art of war and NATO's art of war raise the question of who has and will maintain the initiative, or in the context of Boyd's strategic theory, whose OODA loops are really being slowed down, disoriented, and made more predictable in what is an emerging war over the Afghan LOCs?

The Times report does not address this question, but it contains some very suggestive information in this regard.

The Taliban live off the land and have weapons/supply caches throughout Helmand province and Afghanistan. They can and indeed have been ordered by their leader in Helmand, Mullah Naim Barach, to concentrate and disperse at will. The Taliban can do this easily, because they can blend seamlessly into the local culture, should they choose to do so.

The deployed NATO units, on the other hand, are highly-visible alien conventional military forces. Moreover, the NATO foreigners are deployed in easily discerned, static positions: checkpoints, outposts, and base camps. The geographic distribution of the NATO forces in a large number of small outposts makes them vulnerable to a welter of float-like-a-butterfly, sting-like-a-bee attacks and ambushes, made at times and places of the Taliban's choosing. The Times report makes it clear that Taliban attacks are aimed at isolating and stressing individual checkpoints and, perhaps, also at triggering a flow of reinforcements to these checkpoints, which could then be ambushed by the Taliban along the long, vulnerable LOCs.

Not mentioned in the Times report is a closely-related, important asymmetry: Conventional NATO forces can not live off the land and are entirely dependent on a massive thru-put of food, fuel, water, ammunition, and spare parts. In this regard, the report does describe a land resupply route along the canal. It says that British forces are forced to move at a snail's pace, because of the uncertain menace posed Taliban's ever-present mine threat.

Cheap mines and simple booby traps, which the Pentagon euphemistically labels as IEDs, or improvised explosive devices, as if they represented something new and unexpected, have long proven themselves to be one of the most effective ways to slow down, distract, and disrupt the OODA loops of an attacking adversary. That is because they directly attack the attacker's mind and slow down or paralyze his decision cycle. Any soldier who has experienced the overwhelming sense of freezing fear created by the mental effect of finding himself ensnared in a minefield during a firefight knows how the known presence of mines can wreck even the best OODA loop.

With this background in mind, let us now place these observations and thoughts in a somewhat different context.

Every conflict, be it conventional or unconventional, embodies an amalgam of physical, mental, and moral effects. The great battlefield commanders have long recognized that strengths and weaknesses in moral and mental effects can be far more influential in shaping outcomes than physical effects. Napoleon, for example, pithily encapsulated this view by saying "the moral is to the material as three to one." Viewed through a moral and mental lens, the Times report contains information that is strongly suggestive of an asymmetry in the opposing strategies that reflects long standing differences the eastern and western approaches to making war.

Without explicitly saying so, the Times report makes it clear that the Taliban's strategic target is the mind of their adversary. Its operational schwerpunkt (i.e., main military effort to which all other efforts are subordinated) is also directly aimed at the mind of their adversaries, both in the field or in London and Washington. It is also pretty clear, that the Taliban's operational schwerpunckt is to use an omnipresent physical menace (manifesting itself through a welter of large and small attacks, and when faced with opposition, running away to fight another day, as well as mine warfare, terror, etc.) is to undermine mental and moral stability of their adversaries. This focus on the mind is a way of war that is entirely consistent with the thinking expressed in the first book ever written on the art war by the Chinese philosopher Sun Tzu, as well as their modern incarnation in the guerrilla theories of Mao Zedong.

Like the Taliban, the strategic aim of the British operation is also directed toward the mental and moral levels of conflict -- namely winning the hearts and minds of the Afghan people. But in sharp contrast to that of the Taliban, the operational-level schwerpunkt of the NATO forces is entirely physical. It is aimed directly at controlling checkpoints and lines of communication.

The theory behind NATO's operational schwerpunckt -- and remember, it is only a theory -- is that through this physical control, NATO forces (i.e., alien outsiders) will provide the means to win at the mental and moral levels of conflict. Borrowing terminology from Mao and applying it to the culture of Afghanistan, NATO forces would do this by physically isolating the Taliban fish from a sea of a people supporting them -- people who, in this case, have been conditioned by 30 years of violent civil war in what is perhaps the most xenophobic culture in the world. Once the Taliban are isolated, the NATO military forces would then be able to play the mental and moral game of winning the hearts and minds of the people by providing greater protection, economic aid, and the construction of economic and democratic political infrastructures.

This new strategy, named Clear, Hold, Build by the Americans, is actually the resurrection of a famous old colonialist strategy evolved by Hubert Lyautey (1854-1934) who eventually became a Marshall in the French army and ended his days as a virulent fascist. Lyautey's theory, named Tache d'huile, a buzz word to connote the idea of spreading oil spots, posited that counterinsurgent forces should aim to secure an ever expanding geographic zone of security, like a spreading oil spot, and then use that security to win over the colonized people (presumably, so the French colonialists could continue to exploit the people and their resources). Each new area secured would provide a basis for further spreading, and so on, clearing and holding ever larger regions. Tache d'huile was tried by the French in Morocco, Vietnam and Algeria and by the Americans in Vietnam with the notorious Strategic Hamlets program. Although it worked sometimes in the short term, the long term results speak for themselves. (Some contemporary counterinsurgency specialists like to point to the case of Malaya as a successful counter-example of clearing and holding, but one must remember that the guerilla fighters in this case were ethnic Chinese who were hated by the ethnic Malayans.)

The problem is that to succeed in the moral and mental game in Afghanistan, NATO's tache d'huile strategy must establish a blanket physical security so pervasive that highly visible alien aid providers and reformers spread thinly throughout a traumatized, xenophobic, clan-based population will not be picked off one by one by the Taliban, warlords, criminal gangs, or any others who feel threatened by their presence.

But there is more. Not only is the operational focus of the NATO forces physical, it is clearly reflective of and consistent with the interdiction theories of modern western conventional war, particularly those of Baron Antoine-Henri Jomini, a very influential 19th century French theoretician who tried to systematize Napoleon's art of war. These theories reflect the incontestable fact that western combatant forces are heavily dependent on lines of communication (LOCs) for flows of supplies and reinforcements, and therefore, are highly vulnerable to physical disruption of LOCs. NATO's heavy dependency raises the ominous question of whether the fallacy of mirror imaging -- i.e., assuming the Taliban is vulnerable to something NATO is vulnerable to -- is again creating the same mistake it did for the Americans in Vietnam.

History has shown repeatedly that conventionally-inspired military action (especially interdiction operations aimed at choking off the supplies and reinforcements and destroying the so-called safe havens of the adversary) aimed at achieving an unconventional end (winning hearts and minds of the people in a guerilla war) can easily degenerate into a mindless, fire-power centric war driven by conventional military thinking.

The Soviets, for example, tried to win the hearts and minds of the Afghan people, but lost sight of their goal and eventually became ensnared in a struggle for control of Afghan LOCs. This degenerated into a firepower intensive bloodbath in which the Soviets inflicted horrendous damage; but, in the end, they had to leave Afghanistan with their tail between their legs. Readers interested in the Soviet experience should click here for a stunning lessons-learned analysis of how nation building Soviet-style failed in Afghanistan. The same kind of degeneration into a mindless applications of firepower happened to US forces in Vietnam. In both cases, all the noble sounding rhetoric about winning hearts and minds of the locals was drowned and forgotten in a sea of mindless body counts and wanton destruction.

As in Vietnam, the tempting response to the welter of Taliban attacks on NATO's LOCs, checkpoints, and outposts in this war will be to increase NATO's dependence on high speed reinforcements. But, as the Times report shows, the Brits are learning to their dismay that guerrilla surprise attacks and mine laying activities force ground reinforcements to move at a snail's pace. The natural response by NATO will be toward a greater reliance on rapid-response reinforcements moved via air to threatened areas by helicopters and Marine V-22s, together with an increase in supporting firepower of air and artillery.

Such an evolution on a large scale would mean that costs to fight the most recent Afghan war will escalate ever more rapidly. Operating these aircraft in high mountain ranges or in the dusty high desert plateaus entails a host of very expensive logistics and operational problems. Moreover, by concentrating the troop reinforcement packages in vulnerable helos and V-22s, NATO will run the risk of far greater troop casualties, when the Taliban learn how to shoot down these reinforcing aircraft as they approach their landing zones, as they surely will. Counter insurgency strategists would do well to remember that the United States lost over 5,000 helicopters in Vietnam, mostly to small arms and machine gun fire as they approached hot landing zones. The Soviets relied more on ground reinforcements (which resulted in a large number of very bloody ambushes), but their helos also got plastered in Afghanistan. NATO strategists would also do well to remember how the "strategists" in both of these earlier wars insensibly became obsessed with bombing lines of communication. In the end, frustration, coupled with the insensible seduction of firepower and conventional dogma, led to attrition and destruction becoming ends in themselves, memorably encapsulated by the American officer who told a reporter, "we had to destroy the village to save it," and thereby pushed the hearts and minds of the people into the welcoming arms of the insurgents.

No one knows if this kind of ruin is to be our future, but the Times report suggests many of the fatally flawed building blocks are now falling into place.

One unrelated final point: The Times report contains some very interesting information that should be of specific interest to those American officers who have a Haig-like affinity for the comfort of rear echelon command posts. Of the five battle deaths suffered by the Welsh Guards, the Times says three were commanding officers: one a platoon commander, another a company commander, and last, the regimental commander. The British officers at the pointy end of the spear seem to be setting high moral examples by sharing the risks and burdens of the grunts they are leading. It also would not be surprising if the Taliban are targeting commanding officers, but this high percentage of total losses (admittedly 60% of a tiny specific sample makes it impossible to extrapolate) makes one wonder if they are also receiving the requisite intelligence information to do so.

Franklin “Chuck” Spinney is a former military analyst for the Pentagon. He currently lives on a sailboat in the Mediterranean and can be reached at chuck_spinney@mac.com

John Snow · Post by **John Snow** » 01 Aug 2009 23:42

Read this and notice how they want to negotiate with Taliban (of Afghanistan).

***
http://www.ihavenet.com/Flipping-the-Ta ... istan.html
Flipping the Taliban:
How to Win in Afghanistan by Fotini Christia and Michael Semple

After seven years of the Bush administration's neglect and mismanagement of Afghanistan, President Barack Obama was prompt in ordering the deployment of 21,000 more U.S. troops.

Yet although sending more troops is necessary to tip the balance of power against the insurgents, the move will have a lasting impact only if it is accompanied by a political "surge," a committed effort to persuade large groups of Taliban fighters to put down their arms and give up the fight.

The idea that large groups of armed men bent on killing Americans and other Westerners can be persuaded to change sides may seem fanciful at first. But it is not -- at least not in Afghanistan.

After continuing uninterrupted for more than 30 years, war in Afghanistan has developed its own peculiar rules, style, and logic. One of these rules is to side with the winner. Afghan commanders are not cogs in a military machine but the guardians of specific interests -- the interests of the fighters pledged to them and of the tribal, religious, or political groups from which these men are recruited. In a war that drags on, changing camps to the winning side means living and holding on to power, as well as saving one's family and one's village. Changing sides, realigning, flipping--whatever one wants to call it -- is the Afghan way of war.

So far, Afghan leaders and their U.S. backers have made only halfhearted, ill-funded, and largely futile efforts to exploit the willingness of Taliban commanders to switch sides. Reconciliation with the Taliban has never been a sufficiently high priority for the Karzai government or Washington for either to put in place a coherent strategy encouraging defections from among the movement. But a focused campaign to win the cooperation of significant elements within the Taliban can succeed.

One important step is for the Afghan government to tailor its approach to the needs of the fighters. A well-organized reconciliation program would have to offer substitutes for all the benefits that membership in an insurgent network brings: comradeship, security, a livelihood, and respectability. Another important element of a reconciliation strategy will be to recognize the needs of each group, zeroing in on their particular characteristics: their tribal links, their traditions, the special conditions under which they function.

Any initiative to approach these groups should be spearheaded by interlocutors who have both credibility inside the Afghan establishment in Kabul and ties to insurgent networks. The trick will be to engage a critical mass of local commanders simultaneously. This vision of reconciliation concerns itself not so much with getting foot soldiers to lay down their arms as with building alliances with commanders and their troops.

The core rationale for the current NATO mission in Afghanistan is to ensure that the Afghan authorities can prevent the Taliban's al Qaeda allies from exploiting Afghanistan as a base for terrorist operations. If they want to extricate themselves from the insurgency and become part of Afghanistan's new deal, Taliban commanders will have to demonstrate that they have broken with al Qaeda. As a tradeoff and to create an incentive for the insurgents to cooperate, the U.S. government and its allies should gradually hand over responsibility for the country's security to the Afghan national forces. Commanders and fighters should be formally associated with or absorbed into the police or the army, for example, which would allow the foreign troops to slip into the background.

And like it or not, the leaders, commanders, recruiters, financiers, and families of those running the Afghan insurgency are predominantly based in Pakistan. Thus, a process of reconciliation based on accommodation with key networks of commanders within the insurgency -- rather than with the whole of the Taliban leadership or the movement's foot soldiers -- would have to start in Pakistan, where these networks are most accessible. Now that U.S.-Afghan-Pakistani relations are being recalibrated, Washington is on the lookout for ideas about how Pakistan could do more to support progress in Afghanistan. Pakistan's backing of a low-profile political dialogue, even one that yielded only an agreement not to disrupt the process, would open up a whole new field of possibilities.

The Obama administration and its Afghan counterparts will have to get many things right in order to salvage Afghanistan.

Reconciliation with Afghan insurgents is one important component of any new successful strategy. President Karzai has pledged his personal support for reconciliation, but given his diminished personal standing and the mounting uncertainty about the future of his leadership, significant progress is unlikely unless he changes his policies or a new president is elected with the authority to cut credible deals. And given that corruption, arbitrary detentions, and factionalized local governance have helped drive so many people to join the armed resistance, progress is only likely where such predatory behavior can be reined in.

Finally, only if the United States' military surge can demonstrably stem the insurgents' influence in Pashtun areas will militants there start to believe that they might be able to stay alive if they realign with the government. But time is short, and effective engagement with the Taliban could mean the difference between a protracted, unwinnable conflict and a pragmatic solution acceptable to both Washington and its Afghan allies.

Fotini Christia is Assistant Professor of Political Science at MIT. Michael Semple is a regional specialist focusing on Afghanistan and Pakistan, with extensive experience dialoguing with the Taliban.

Copyright 2009 Council on Foreign Relations, publisher of Foreign Affairs. All rights reserved. Distributed by Tribune Media Services.