Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

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Arun_S
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by Arun_S »

amit wrote:
abhiti wrote:No I am saying a very different thing, I am saying China will take notice once we have sufficient capability to destroy some portion of their country. Fizzle vs sizzle makes all the difference as it changes the law of known capabilities.
How would you define sufficient capability? Would that be in terms of number of bombs, tonnage, delivery mechanism (missiles), CEP of missiles, choice of targets, how?

Do note that a 15kt bomb if it hits the Three Gorges dam accurately would probably cause more collateral damage and deaths than a 500 kt bomb burst over Shanghai.

These issues are very complex and people spend their entire lives gaming them. So it is very simplistic to say that China will take notice "after we have sufficient capability" without defining what constitutes "sufficient" in the eyes of Chinese leadership.
Wrong.
Pls check your sources again. Three Gorges dam has been design hardened to withstand 20 kT strike(s). So it needs something much more stronger.

Hydrel experts in India will tell you that to take down Three Gorges dam, on has to consider using combination of tidal wave and direct hit.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by NRao »

ss_roy wrote:I think that we cannot develop a TN warhead without a few more tests... heck, France performed 22 tests to validate it's first TN warhead.

The real question is- will our 'white ass kissing' netas let that happen? On a related note, why do we (as a people) elect spineless morons? and why do our netas think that respect can be achieved through petitioning?

PS- There is only one way to validate an untested weapon design (however sound)- TEST IT.
True on the spineless count.

But, does India really need a TN? IF so, why and how many?
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by enqyoob »

Wonder why they even bother. Dam bursts are highly overrated in their killing potential, unless ppl happen to be picnicking right under when the burst occurs. I would say that 15kT or even two 5Kt fizzles over Shangahi will kill far more ppl than any Dam burst.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by Arun_S »

sivab wrote:http://www.hindu.com/2009/09/21/stories/2009092155800900.htm
Deterrence and explosive yield

K. Subrahmanyam and V.S. Arunachalam
I am totally shocked to see who K. Subrahmanyam has chosen to be his illustrious co-author. A very sad day for India and Subrahmanyam.

Does anyone recall Sankhya Vahini the Trojan Horse?

SANKHYA VAHINI & NATIONAL SECURITY - SAAG
by B.Raman
Dr.Raj Reddy, now an American citizen enjoying the highest security clearance of the Pentagon, graduated in engineering from the Guindy Engineering College (now called the Anna University) of the Madras University in 1958 and then went to Australia where he obtained the Mtech from the University of New South Wales in 1960.

After having worked in Australia for three years as an Applied Science Representative of the IBM Corporation of the US, he went to the US in 1963 to study Computer Science in the Stanford University, obtaining his doctorate in 1966. He worked there as an Assistant Professor for three years.

In 1969, he joined the Carnegie Mellon University (CMU) of Pittsburgh as an Associate Professor of Computer Science and was promoted as a full Professor in 1973 and as a University Professor in 1984. He was named as the Simon University Professor in 1992.

In 1979, the Westinghouse Electric Corporation gave a grant of US $ 5 million to start a Robotics Institute at CMU. The CMU made him the founding Director of the Institute in which post he continued till 1991.

Dr. Reddy's hopes of making Pittsburgh the Robotsburgh of the US were partly belied despite close collaboration with the US Energy Department in respect of robots for nuclear power stations and the National Aeronautic and Space Administration (NASA). The highly (in retrospect) optimistic expectations of demand for robots from industries were not fulfilled. Despite the inadequate commercial results, it continues to work on many US Government projects.

In 1991, he became the Dean of the School of Computer Science of the CMU, of which the Robotics Institute is a part, and continued in that post till last year.

In the late 1980s, Dr. Reddy was reported to have helped Dr.V.S.Arunachalam, Scientific Adviser in the Ministry of Defence of the Government of India who was associated with research and development of a sensitive nature and who was the predecessor of Dr.Abdul Kalam, secure a job in the CMU. Dr. Arunachalam left Government service and joined the CMU to become a Distinguished Service Professor in the Department of Engineering & Public Policy, Materials Science and Engineering of the Robotics Institute.

In February 1997, the US President, Mr.Bill Clinton, appointed Dr. Reddy as a member of the President's Information Technology Advisory Committee (PITAC), which has a one-billion dollar budget to promote multi-agency research and development under the High Performance Computing Act of 1991. The Act requires the President to appoint an Advisory Committee to provide advice and information on high-performance computing and communication to the Office of Science and Technology Policy.

Mr.Bill Joy, founder and chief scientist of the Sun Microsystems, and Mr.Ken Kennedy, Director of the Centre for Research on Parallel Computation of the Rice University, were appointed by Mr.Clinton as the first co-chairs for two years and they were replaced in August last by Dr.Reddy and Mr.Irving Wladawsky-Berger, General Manager, Internet Division of the IBM Corporation.

Before his appointment, Mr.Kennedy had taken the initiative in the formation of the Houston Area Computational Science Consortium (HACSC) to incorporate high performance computing and virtual reality into the next Internet and to increase the bandwidth capabilities so that full-motion video and new applications can be transferred in real time.

After his appointment, Mr.Kennedy said that one of the aims of the PITAC would be the development of the Next Generation Internet (NGI). In a press interview, he explained the difference between Internet II and NGI as follows: "Internet II is a consortium of US universities that have joined together to establish high-speed connections to one another. It has no formal relationship to the NGI, which is a federal research initiative to establish the technology infrastructure that will be needed to bring the current Internet to bandwidths (amount of information that can be transferred in a second) to 100 or even 1000 times what it is today."

He added: "The Internet II consortium may benefit from the NGI's proposed support for a testbed that would interconnect 100 or more research labs, especially those at universities. However, the NGI support would pay only part of the cost of establishing connections that are needed for the testbed; significant costs would fall on the universities themselves. "

Another important task of the PITAC is to advise the President on the defensive as well as offensive aspects of the information infrastructure security. The defensive aspect is about preventing the penetration of the US' information infrastructure by foreign intelligence agencies and hackers. The offensive aspect is about developing a capability for penetrating the information infrastructure of foreign countries.

It is believed that Dr.Reddy's inclusion in the PITAC is partly because of his expertise in this subject, which has received special attention in the research faculties of the CMU's School of Computer Science under his stewardship. In fact, the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) of the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) of the Pentagon functions in the CMU's School of Computer Science, which is the recipient of regular grants from the Pentagon for research and development in this field.

Published reports of October, 1995, had identified Mr.Dain Gary as the head of the DIA's CERT in the CMU. It is not known who presently heads it. Dr.Bruce Berkowitz, Adjunct Professor of Strategic Studies at the CMU, served in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) from 1978 to 1985 and then as an aide in the Senate Staff Committee on Intelligence from 1985 to 1987.

In a written testimony before the Senate Sub-committee on Communications on March 8,2000, Dr.Reddy explained the measures required for strengthening the information infrastructure security in the US. The testimony had thanked a number of members of the PITAC and others for their suggestions on this subject. Dr.Arunachalam was one of them.

Apart from his two hats as an academic and as an advisor on information infrastructure security to the US intelligence community and the Pentagon, Dr. Reddy wears a third hat as a participant in business ventures. He used to be, and probably still is, the Chairman of the Board of the Carnegie Group Inc. and a member of Microsoft's Technical Advisory Board. In 1995, he became a member of the Board of Directors of Industry.Net, a company that was merged in 1996, with the AT&T's New Media Services Unit to form Nets Inc, with Dr.Reddy continuing as a member of its Board of Directors.

He is also the Chairman of SEEC.Inc of which Mr. Ravindra Koka is the CEO and has reportedly a link-up with the Satyam Infoway.

On August 10, 1998, Dr.Reddy and Dr.Arunachalam prepared the first draft of their proposal for a National High Speed Inter-University Data Network for India to be called the Sankhya Vahini, or the River of Knowledge. They explained their objective as follows: "To establish a very high bandwidth all-India national data network and enrich it with educational, healthcare and other knowledge oriented multimedia applications for the technical and economic growth of the nation. Named Sankhya Vahini, this network will be primarily a data network forming the National Backbone, and will initially connect at least 10 metropolitan centres and over 100 universities, institutions of higher learning and research centres. As the speed of the network will be more than 1,000-10,000 times the speed currently available in the country, it will not only be able to meet the research, teaching and learning requirements of educational institutions, but also the high bandwidth data communication needs of other organisations in the commercial, manufacturing and financial sectors….. More than meeting the immediate and fast growing requirements of the country, Sankhya Vahini will also provide the testbed for developing and proving multi-giga bit technologies that will soon become the norm throughout the world in the next decade."

They also said that the network would be set up in phases with the first two phases consisting of the creation of a National Internet Backbone and then a series of Urban Data Networks to be linked to the National Backbone. Their draft also envisaged that this national network be linked to an inter-university high speed data network of the US through the CMU. To start with, they suggested that the Indian Institute of Information Technology of Hyderabad, the Indian Institute of Science of Bangalore and the Indian Institutes of Technology of Chennai and Mumbai become partners of this venture.

Their proposal was approved in principle by the Information Technology Task Force of the Government of India on September 5,1998, and a Memorandum of Understanding was signed in Washington on October 16,1998. The project has since run into controversy on procedural and national security grounds. This paper would restrict itself to some observations having a bearing on the national security aspects only.

The US intelligence community was totally taken by surprise by India's nuclear tests (Pokhran II) of May 1998. An enquiry ordered by the Clinton Administration attributed the failure of the intelligence community to detect the preparations for the tests

to misjudgement of the BJP's determination to have the tests carried out, over-reliance on satellites to detect the preparations, lack of penetration capability in India and successful concealment techniques of Indian scientists.

Intriguingly, within a few weeks of the submission of the enquiry report, this proposal for an US-aided data network in India to be connected with a data network of the CMU surfaced. Since the School of Computer Science of the CMU works in collaboration with the CERT of the DIA of the Pentagon, all its foreign collaboration projects are subject to prior clearance by the Pentagon. This project was apparently cleared without any delay seeing from the rapidity with which the MOU was signed.

After Pokhran I in 1974, Washington has imposed severe restrictions on sensitive technology transfers to India. In the fit of anger after Pokhran II, Washington added to these restrictions, vastly expanded the black list of Indian entities with which co-operation without prior permission was prohibited, refused or cancelled visas to many Indian scientists invited to seminars in the US and issued informal advisories to American scientific institutions freezing interactions with their Indian counterparts,

Since 1974, all projects for sensitive technological collaboration with Indian institutions are subject to security vetting by the US intelligence community followed by a careful examination by an inter-departmental committee, resulting in long and painful delays even in the clearance of legitimate projects of a non-sensitive nature, as one saw from the experience of the Indian Meteorological Department in the 1980s.

When inordinate delays have thus been the norm in all such projects since Pokhran I, the Clinton Administration and its intelligence community do not appear to have created any hurdles or delays in respect of Sankhya Vahini. On the contrary, despite the then prevailing fit of anger over Pokhran II, all clearances in respect of this project seem to have been given in a jiffy between August and October, 1998..

It would be reasonable to infer from this that the US agencies are interested in a quick implementation of this project for their own national security reasons and the only possible reason for this could be their calculation that the US involvement in this network could facilitate their penetration of India's information infrastructure.

The US intelligence community always looks for opportunities for the penetration of the information infrastructure of not only potential adversaries like China, but also allies like the member-countries of the European Union, Australia etc. In 1995, the Australian Navy ordered a temporary suspension of the use of Microsoft software in its establishments following suspicion that the Microsoft was collaborating with the DIA for the penetration of the information infrastructure of the Australian Navy.

The same year, an enquiry ordered by President Jacques Chirac of France into the penetration of the information infrastructure of the French Navy reportedly concluded that the penetration had been done by the Americans. The French authorities alleged that the US intelligence community tried to mislead their investigators by planting false information on them that the penetration was by the Russians.

And, one had seen the recent allegations by the EU countries about the joint Echelon project of the US and British intelligence, not only for telephone tapping, but also for penetrating the information infrastructures of the EU countries.

Against the background of this, the national security implications of the Sankhya Vahini project do not seem to have received the thorough attention they deserved. We may have to pay a heavy price for this one day in the form interference with and distortion of the information infrastructures of our nuclear, missile and other sensitive defence projects by the American experts associated with this project.

For causing such distortions, they don't even have to come to India. They can do so from Pittsburgh by taking advantage of the inter-connectivity between the Indian network and that of the CMU.

(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, and, presently, Director, Institute for Topical Studies, Chennai, E-mail: [email protected]
Dr. V.S. Arunachalam was no ordinary adviser in the above project, he was company's president !

But in today's article he is positioned as V.S. Arunachalam, is now Chairman of CSTEP, a Bangalore-based think-tank, will be useful to checkout his association with US government organization with innocent cover names.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by NRao »

Swine, Avian, Nile - flu and the world goes into a tissy. A 15 Kt on any city would ............................

No need for perception.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by prao »

I'm not the mole says Arunachalam.

Now what did Nixon say? He said "I'm not a crook".
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by ss_roy »

NRao,

Personally, I would say about 1,000 - 200kt warhaeds on a mix of well dispersed Agni-2's and 3's should be enough to deal with China. Personally I do not care if they are TN or BF, but you put more TN warheads per missile. Having said that, a 700 kg (500kt) French MR-41 type warhead on a Agni-3 will be fine, IF we have enough of them.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by Arun_S »

sivab wrote:http://www.hindu.com/2009/09/21/stories ... 800900.htm
Deterrence and explosive yield
K. Subrahmanyam and V.S. Arunachalam
Reading it sounded repetitious to me, having hear this argument few years ago.
His other arguments during the time on what US seeks from India in the Strategic Partnership and Civil Nuclear Deal have been proven wrong.

BTW if one carefully reads this article by KS and VSA, there is an explicit admission that there is no existing or deployed FBF, let alone TN. So, they've opted to continue with the shoddy cover up and say that pure fission is the ultimate. Sheer fraud !
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by Satya_anveshi »

Arun_S wrote:I am totally shocked to see who K. Subrahmanyam has chosen to be his illustrious co-author.
I found it shocking also. I mean there were news reports on TV on this episode. He could be all innocent just as laloo and jaya lalitha but KS choosing him to author a piece in his area of expertise? How many times we have seen KS having co-authors for his articles? All in good company.

One of these days we might even see the absconding former RAW man Ranbir Singh also might co-author something with someone favoring GOI / AEC stand in this hoopla.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by Prasad »

narayanan wrote:Wonder why they even bother. Dam bursts are highly overrated in their killing potential, unless ppl happen to be picnicking right under when the burst occurs. I would say that 15kT or even two 5Kt fizzles over Shangahi will kill far more ppl than any Dam burst.
Perhaps its thought to be an economic or critical-infrastructure kind of target associated with massive loss of H&D in case of successful strike and on par with striking a city? jmt
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by shiv »

narayanan wrote:shiv: 2 questions:

1. Could u pls post succint answer to this: "If I have no nukes at all - then it might be tempting to use nukes (but still not advisable as I have stated in the deterrence thread in the other forum)." Trying to find that post there would take too long. I am curious. Is it the fear that Big Brother will come in and beat up small bully? Would Big Brother want to risk own cities just to Teach Befitting Lesson to bully?
I will merely cross post what I wrote in the other forum

I sometimes feel that deterrence is working in the world (so far) not because of "peer to peer" deterrence (i.e I am afraid of your nukes and you are afraid of mine) but deterrence has worked because of "What will my peer think if I use nukes" i.e Log kya kahenge" deterrence.

Everyone knows nukes are very destructive, and while we may be tempted to nuke someone or the other, nobody really wants to be nuked.

So here I am with my nukes feeling that I am scaring you with them, and in turn I am scared (or maybe not scared) of your nukes or fizzles. But you are not the only one in the neighborhood. There are a few others too with proven working nukes and i don't want them to nuke me either.

Now suppose I get into a war with you and decide that your stupid fizzles don't scare me, I could decide to nuke you and finish you off. But the problem is that all those guys around with proven nukes have so far imagined that I am scared of their nukes. Now when they see that I am not scared of nukes and I am willing to nuke you, they will understand that I may be insane enough to nuke them too.

That will make them more willing to nuke me - because they will be scared of the fact that I am a nuke user - rather than a person who fears nukes. I am such a danger to them that I will have to be nuked early and first in case or war - because I have proved my willingness to use nukes.

The point I am trying to make is that if China nukes India or India nukes China - it signals not just the breakdown of India-China deterrence - but it also signals the breakdown of global deterrence. Any nuclear war between any two parties indicates that both those parties are willing to use nukes. If any party survives with nukes after such a war - it will be seen as a "dangerous party" that will use nukes and will have to be punished and even nuked early on in any future war. That would be a real breakdown of deterrence.
narayanan wrote: 2. What happens to your above calculus if we were discussing two nations where
(i) A has 1000 SMALL (artillery or surface-2-surface or air-2-surface) 2KT-5KT nukes and 200 15KT type fizzles with accurate delivery systems, while B only has 200 1-MT weapons with accurate delivery systems, and no small devices?

(ii) Both A and B have a large inventory each of tactical devices, but there is lopsided imbalance in heavy nukes (A has all puny 15KTs while B has TFTA 1-MT types)?

The last situation describes India-China rather well, assuming that India has weaponized the little things and produced enough numbers. The first one may describe Russia-China. I think in both cases, the tactical weapons are highly likely to be used in a border war, but the big things are irrelevant except that they neutralize each other and render all unusable.
N3 I believe that India has no plans to use tactical nukes and is not developing them.

As far as my knowledge goes "tactical nukes" are small nukes - usually thermonuclear in which there is a fission/boosted fission primary and a fusion secondary. One might argue that India's tests of "subkiloton" devices was aimed at developing tactical nukes. I don't think so. I think those tests were merely to gather data to develop equations of state to refine thermonuclear warheads to get bigger bombs of smaller weight. This is the only thing that can be useful for the future whether or not S1 fizzled.

As per India's nuclear doctrine - India is supposed to retaliate with a devastating attack to cause "unacceptable damage" (I read that as population centers) if any nuke is used against Inda or Indian forces anywhere - either on Indian territory or outside.

So as far as I can see the calculus does not change with the number and type of the other nation's weapons provided the capability exists for a large number of Indian warheads to survive a first strike and launch retaliation.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by shiv »

Arun_S wrote: Dr. V.S. Arunachalam was no ordinary adviser in the above project, he was company's president !

But in today's article he is positioned as V.S. Arunachalam, is now Chairman of CSTEP, a Bangalore-based think-tank, will be useful to checkout his association with US government organization with innocent cover names.
There are worse stories than this about VS Arunachalam. But not about K Subrahmanyam to my knowledge.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by kit »

So no deployed fusion or fission weapons . India s cards are all open now No wonder they are scared of retaliating even against PK and of China less said the better.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by shiv »

K. Subramanyam can be accused of inconsistency now - he last spoke of 80 kt yields and that is now down to 25 kt in agreement with K Santhanam

But the goal post has moved - Santhanam has revised his figure to 15 kt. Maybe someone can race ahead of Santanam and talk of 1800 kg 12 kt bombs? :lol:
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by csharma »

shiv wrote:K. Subramanyam can be accused of inconsistency now - he last spoke of 80 kt yields and that is now down to 25 kt in agreement with K Santhanam

But the goal post has moved - Santhanam has revised his figure to 15 kt. Maybe someone can race ahead of Santanam and talk of 1800 kg 12 kt bombs? :lol:
He might have used 25KT just because Santhanam talked about 25KT bombs in his write up.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by samuel »

We know now, it would appear, that Pokhran-2 was not as successful as claimed. The TN did not work as advertised. As a result, the approach being taken is to suggest that TNs are not necessary to deter; 25 or 15 or 5KT will all do just fine, if necessary, in numbers and, further, who would be crazy enough to start a nuclear war. Further, under NFU, a nuclear strike will be met with some retaliation, whatever feasible, against population centers.

So, would a few 0.5KT - 1 KT bomb by China aimed at wiping a division or perhaps half of it out and employed tactically in war draw a nuclear response? How about 0.1KT - 0.5KT? How about a LACM or a shell out of a cannon like this:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Nuke_Cannon_4.JPG

Or perhaps like a W33 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Mk33.jpg
Incidentally, the W33 was in production in 1957.

Image

Can India justify the killing of 10-20,000 soldiers in battle by killing 100,000+ innocent people of the population indiscriminately in response?
Last edited by samuel on 21 Sep 2009 09:32, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by Arun_S »

Regarding 25 kT pure fission.

Email reply three days ago from K.Santhanam reconfirmed:
The fission bomb of May 98 had an estimated yield of 20 - 25 kT. No boosting.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by Austin »

Arun_S wrote:Regarding 25 kT pure fission.

Email reply three days ago from K.Santhanam reconfirmed:
The fission bomb of May 98 had an estimated yield of 20 - 25 kT. No boosting.
So with LiD to boost , how much conservatively it can scale up to ?
What is the weight of this pure fission device ?

Thanks
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by Kanson »

shiv wrote:K. Subramanyam can be accused of inconsistency now - he last spoke of 80 kt yields and that is now down to 25 kt in agreement with K Santhanam
This is the starting line of that article.
Following the controversy on the success or otherwise of the thermonuclear test of India on 11th May 1998 questions have been raised by some senior ex-service officers and civilian strategists on the credibility of the Indian deterrent posture and the perceived mismatch between a 3,500-km missile and a warhead of two digit explosive yield.
You may guess why he talked abt 25 kt. Did you also notice he also talked abt 150 kt :) Do you also want to guess why he referred to 150 kt while he could have talked abt any number like 60 or 80 or 200 kt ?

Hint : Sometimes back one of my independent sources ( pardon me ) told me 150 kt is a reality.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by SanjibGhosh »

shiv wrote:
Interestingly Sanjib Ghosh "Western experts and seismologists" have recorded only ONE signal from India in 1998

I think they have received three not one .... they could not get the signals of sub kt .....

But my point was that this was reviled by "Mr AQ khan" not by the "Western experts and seismologists" ....

I don't care what "Western experts and seismologists" are saying .... For us it would be shocking if APJ says something like that ......
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by Austin »

People who now understand and accept the fact that TN failed are now resorting to statements like 25 kT is good enough for deterrent , Perfect case of sour grapes

But in this whole debate we lost the focus that one of the device tested S-1 was a TN and from being labelled as modern 98 vintage TN design which was spectacular success ( RC claimed in the DD TV interview ) , this argument is almost being dumped to we do not need TN.

Why is GOI not ready for a peer review involving the detractors ( ex BARC/DAE ) and military who are the ultimate planners and user of the weapons.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by Kanson »

Masaru wrote:
sivab wrote:http://www.hindu.com/2009/09/21/stories ... 800900.htm
Nuclear deterrence is essentially a mind game. A potential aggressor will be deterred if he is persuaded that the nuclear retaliation that will be delivered by the survivable nuclear force of the victim will cause unacceptable damage, totally incommensurate with any strategic, political, economic or any other objective that drives him to go for the first strike. During the Cold War, both sides thus opted for a status-quo and the world was spared a nuclear war.
Theoretically speaking, the same unacceptable damage can be inflicted by increasing the number of delivery vehicles and warheads of lower yield and increasing their survivability. Reliability, robustness and survivability of weapon platforms are important determinants in validating the deterrence a country practices.
The absolute yield is irrelevant, but the relative potency of the arsenal wrt the adversary definitely is. If a an aggressor is unarmed, he can be deterred by a knife. But if the aggressor already has a knife one needs at least a knife and more likely a sword to deter the aggressor. This in no way reduces the potential damage a knife can do, but surely reduces its deterrence ability. How does the absence of any working TN option, coupled with significantly lesser (both in quality and quantity) fission devices and delivery systems, when faced with MT TN weapons provide credible deterrence? For an aspiring 'world power' having access to technology of late 60's like proven TN tech is a given, why there is a debate at all?
The analogy of throwing boulders against each other wont be apt here? Boulders can be small or big. Whatever be the size, ultimately the opponent is crushed to death. Only thing that matters here is the accuracy of throwing.
Last edited by Kanson on 21 Sep 2009 10:10, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by ss_roy »

Arun_S,

I am surprised that you are surprised.. :) Seriously, we have far too many people like them in the upper levels of administration.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by Arun_S »

Austin wrote:
Arun_S wrote:Regarding 25 kT pure fission.

Email reply three days ago from K.Santhanam reconfirmed:
  • /quote] The fission bomb of May 98 had an estimated yield of 20 - 25 kT. No boosting./quote]
So with LiD to boost , how much conservatively it can scale up to ?
What is the weight of this pure fission device ?

Thanks
Austin: Boosting is a significant design change from Fission. Its not just priming it some boost gas. The question is wrong. Fission bomb design will remain fission bomb.

The 17 kT primary of S1 is the only successful test by India. And that was designed for a yield required for TN. At best it can be extrapolated few times over to ~50 kT, but need confirmatory test. To get to 150kT OTOH requires different design features, and being a new design will require few proof shots.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by ramana »

sivab wrote:http://www.hindu.com/2009/09/21/stories ... 800900.htm
Deterrence and explosive yield

K. Subrahmanyam and V.S. Arunachalam


Following the controversy on the success or otherwise of the thermonuclear test of India on 11th May 1998 questions have been raised by some senior ex-service officers and civilian strategists on the credibility of the Indian deterrent posture and the perceived mismatch between a 3,500-km missile and a warhead of two digit explosive yield. It is not the intention here to go into the question of success or otherwise of the thermonuclear test. Heaven knows, so much has been said about that already. Instead, there is a need to understand what we mean by deterrence and we shall also discuss whether Indian nuclear strategic posture is credible in the absence of thermonuclear warheads.

Nuclear deterrence is essentially a mind game. A potential aggressor will be deterred if he is persuaded that the nuclear retaliation that will be delivered by the survivable nuclear force of the victim will cause unacceptable damage, totally incommensurate with any strategic, political, economic or any other objective that drives him to go for the first strike. During the Cold War, the Western assumption was that communist ideological expansionism constituted a threat to the very survival of democratic system. But as George Kennan pointed out, the communists while espousing an offensive ideology were also convinced that history was on their side and were not ready to push it at the risk of a nuclear conflict. Both sides thus opted for a status-quo and the world was spared a nuclear war.

In the sixties the U.S. gave serious thought to the possibility of carrying out a total disarming strike on the Soviet Union when it had more than ten times the superiority in warheads. The U.S. Chiefs of Staff could not, however, assure the President that a few Soviet warheads would not get through to the U.S. and that was enough to deter Washington from pursuing that idea of a disarming strike.

No doubt Robert McNamara as Defence Secretary came up with very fanciful calculations of what percentages of Soviet population and industry should be threatened by assured destruction to become the deterrent. These calculations were based on the Soviet Union suffering 20 million casualties in the Second World War and enormous damage to its industry in the European part of Russia. But that happened incrementally over four years of the war and the Soviet leadership could not have known there would be such losses when the Nazi aggression took place. In real world, the Soviets could not accept the loss of fifteen thousand lives in Afghanistan and pulled out of that country. In a sense the U.S. calculations were a misplaced justification to build an arsenal of several thousand warheads and engage the Soviet Union in an arms race. Having built 30,000 warheads at great costs, both sides are now cutting back on their arsenals and dismantling those weapons, again at great cost.

Robert McNamara in later years of his life changed his views. Writing in Foreign Policy of May/June 2005 he said that he had never seen any U.S. or NATO war plan which concluded that initiating the use of nuclear weapons would yield U.S. or the Alliance any benefit. He added that his statements to this effect had never been refuted by any NATO Defence Minister or senior military leaders. Yet it was impossible for any of them, including the U.S. Presidents, to make such statements publicly because they were totally contrary to established NATO policy

War is politics by other means and the aim of a war is to compel the adversary to accept one’s terms. President Reagan and the Soviet Union’s General Secretary Gorbachev are on record that a nuclear war cannot be won. In a nuclear war, once the missiles are launched, entire countries on both sides become battlefields. It is difficult to control or regulate the firing of the missiles since both sides are under compulsion to use the missiles before they are eliminated by the enemy strike. As soon as the first city is hit, populations of all cities would attempt to empty out into the countryside since there will be panic that their own city will be the next target in the next few minutes. Think of the entire urban population of a country becoming internally displaced persons in a matter of hours. Can there be effective governance in the country?

A thermonuclear weapon of 150 kiloton explosive power or three 25 kiloton warheads delivered in a distributed way on a city will perhaps produce equal magnitudes of casualties and property damage. Can it be argued that only a 150 kiloton weapon will deter another warhead of a similar yield? Deterrence is not about the damage one causes to the adversary. It is about what the aggressive side will consider as unacceptable. It is irrelevant whether the destruction is caused by 150 kt weapons or 25 kt weapons. Obviously, it is not infra-dig for a 3,500-km range missile to carry a 25 kt warhead. Cost-effectiveness calculations have no meaning since the nuclear war itself has no meaning. In a mega-city struck by a couple of 25 kt warheads, apart from the hundreds of thousands of dead, there will be an equal number of people wounded and more people affected by radiation; all of whom will be envying the dead. One of us is revisiting the calculations involved in predicting the extent of destruction inflicted by nuclear weapons. Our preliminary results suggest that even with 25kt fission bombs, the damages are going to be far more and extensive than what Hiroshima and Nagasaki suffered given the higher population densities in the cities of China and South Asia and the urban development of recent years. Therefore, the Indian deterrent posture will not lose its credibility if India is compelled to rely on fission weapons only.

Important determinants

The role of the Indian nuclear weapons is to deter others using nuclear weapons against us. It can perform that role so long as the retaliatory force is perceived as survivable and able to inflict unacceptable damage on the aggressor. That does not depend on the explosive yield of the individual warheads. Theoretically speaking, the same unacceptable damage can be inflicted by increasing the number of delivery vehicles and warheads of lower yield and increasing their survivability. Reliability, robustness and survivability of weapon platforms are important determinants in validating the deterrence a country practices.

In this article we do not propose to sermonise on the need to eliminate nuclear weapons globally. This was articulated by Rajiv Gandhi in the United Nations many years ago, but has not been pursued since then. Along with our deterrence policy, we should once again pursue the mission for the global elimination of nuclear weapons. Our world will be better for that and fission or fusion will then lose their relevance.

(K. Subrahmanyam is a well known strategic analyst and V.S. Arunachalam, a former Scientific Advisor to Defence Minister, is now Chairman of CSTEP, a Bangalore-based think-tank.)
Looks like:

Deterrent ke liye kuch be chalega!

So the core facts are:

US got deterred by SU due to survivability of the latters deterrent
The SU got deterred by US as the thought time was on their side and were really self deterred.
Besides SU wasn't going to accept the casualties that a nuke exchange could inflict on them.

Yet despite all this the US let UK, France develop their deterrents, which are solely against the SU. And they roped in PRC to add to the mess. Its another matter that the SU was also targetting these folks irregardless of their posture. There was no situation where these minor powers would take on the SU on their own.

The crux of the matter is how close India's situation vis a vis PRC-TSP is to US vis a vis SU situation during the Cold War?

I think the KS & VSA article is high on Indian mirroring their ideals on to their challengers and ignores the duality of the PRC-TSP combine. IOW its a tired duo accepting what is being dished to and coming up with any excuse. And it suffers from a failure to comprehend the threat. India is not in a like US situation. And PRC-TSP is not like the SU. The PRC-TSP duo is aggressive and are willing to use any method to achieve their objectives unlike SU which thought the force of history was on its side and why risk it. It is India that has a low threshold of unacceptable damage. And its Indi athat has the limited and low yielding wepaons unlike the US which had high yield and large numbers of weapons. So its inverse problem and the lessons of Cold War are being applied in a incorrect manner.

And looks like they will accept anything from BARC. And that's a telling summation of the situation. great job BARC "Scientists"

A week ago KS was writing about 60kt -80kt weapons etc. And now looks like an absolute floor value was reached with the 25kt value.

Now how do they suppose they can get those numbers to provide the credible deterrence that they suggest with the FMCO looming?

Will the next step be to cut off at current numbers with another platitude?
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by Kanson »

Austin wrote:Why is GOI not ready for a peer review involving the detractors ( ex BARC/DAE ) and military who are the ultimate planners and user of the weapons.
To be frank, isnt already those ex- gave their opinion on the subject ? So what new outcome it can get.

On the contrary, Santhanam claim of 25 kt for S2 is shocking. First it was 25 +or - 2. We thought it was all about TN and i guess it was about S2. May be he should have evidence for this ?
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by Arun_S »

sivab wrote:http://www.hindu.com/2009/09/21/stories ... 800900.htm
Deterrence and explosive yield

K. Subrahmanyam and V.S. Arunachalam


Important determinants

The role of the Indian nuclear weapons is to deter others using nuclear weapons against us. It can perform that role so long as the retaliatory force is perceived as survivable and able to inflict unacceptable damage on the aggressor. That does not depend on the explosive yield of the individual warheads. Theoretically speaking, the same unacceptable damage can be inflicted by increasing the number of delivery vehicles and warheads of lower yield and increasing their survivability. Reliability, robustness and survivability of weapon platforms are important determinants in validating the deterrence a country practices.
Read KSubramanyam's except above, and see how utterly it has been proven wrong in 2002 (Op Parakaram) when Army chief, General S Padmanabhan, delivered following military threat on Indian TV channels:
Pakistan would cease to exist as a nation if Islamabad indulged in any nuclear misadventure
Case closed on the fallacious deterrence argument.

ramana wrote:Looks like:

Deterrent ke liye kuch be chalega!
So aptly stated.
ramana wrote:US got deterred by SU due to survivability of the latters deterrent
The SU got deterred by US as the thought time was on their side and were really self deterred.
Besides SU wasn't going to accept the casualties that a nuke exchange could inflict on them.

Yet despite all this the US let UK, France develop their deterrents, which are solely against the SU. And they roped in PRC to add to the mess. Its another matter that the SU was also targetting these folks irregardless of their posture. There was no situation where these minor powers would take on the SU on their own.

The crux of the matter is how close India's situation vis a vis PRC-TSP is to US vis a vis SU situation during the Cold War?

I think the KS & VSA article is high on Indian mirroring their ideals on to their challengers and ignores the duality of the PRC-TSP combine. IOW its a tired duo accepting what is being dished to and coming up with any excuse. And it suffers from a failure to comprehend the threat. India is not in a like US situation. And PRC-TSP is not like the SU. The PRC-TSP duo is aggressive and are willing to use any method to achieve their objectives unlike SU which thought the force of history was on its side and why risk it. It is India that has a low threshold of unacceptable damage. And its Indi athat has the limited and low yielding wepaons unlike the US which had high yield and large numbers of weapons. So its inverse problem and the lessons of Cold War are being applied in a incorrect manner.

And looks like they will accept anything from BARC. And that's a telling summation of the situation. great job BARC "Scientists"

A week ago KS was writing about 60kt -80kt weapons etc. And now looks like an absolute floor value was reached with the 25kt value.

Now how do they suppose they can get those numbers to provide the credible deterrence that they suggest with the FMCO looming?

Will the next step be to cut off at current numbers with another platitude?
One can see the fallacy in that India has just ~24 Agni-II missiles. Yet at the same time he skirts the quadrupling (or more) of economic cost to field those many more missiles, Submarines and bombs to makeup for "Pure Fission" based bomb of 25 kT yield, by saying no need for economic analysis because nuclear war does not make sense.

Having the cake and eating it too !
Last edited by ramana on 21 Sep 2009 22:39, edited 1 time in total.
Reason: Edited to fix the quote... ramana
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by Babu Bihari »

i posted this some days back in the other n-bluff thread-
Babu Bihari wrote: many would now start arguing that fissions bums are sufficient for india's deterrence.

scenario: if, for whatever reason, chinis nuke some nondescript village in AP or a disputed town in AP and convey to dilli sarkar that any nuke, no matter how small, would results in total destruction of 50 indian biggest cities with TN tipped mijjles. now would any indian PM have balls to order retaliation in line with our nuclear doctrine? and how is thinking will be changed and will the chinis take such a chance if we have TN tippes mijjles which would match chini capability?
..........
prediction: fizzle or sizzle, there will be NO nuke tests at least till MMS is india's PM.
and that debate has started in that very direction. these guys are just not comfortable in playing big on world stage, they want a india of call centers, without realizing the security of those call centers.

anyhow, what about the scenario posted above?

and what about cost penalty by following the doctrine based on 25kt bums? is that not going to be significant?

talking about KSubramanyan, i found this on wiki-
Subrahmanyam (born January 1929) grew up in Tiruchirapalli and Madras. Enrolling at Presidency College he received an M.Sc. in Chemistry from Madras University in 1950 and, after standing first in the Civil Services Examination that year, was appointed to the Indian Administrative Service in 1951.[7] After service in the Tamil Nadu cadre and in the Defence Ministry, he was appointed a Rockefeller Fellow in Strategic Studies at the London School of Economics in 1966.
i am NOT attaching any motives to KS, he has done a tremendous service for india, but somebody many years back didnt say positive things to me about rockefeller. can someone guide me more on rockfeller?

and was KS not a votary of no nuclear test prior to 1998? he was OK with an untested n-weapon?
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by arunsrinivasan »

Pick a new orbitBy C. Rajamohan

Posting in full, it is a good summary of our strategic mistakes
Three recent developments — the resurrection of the controversy over the yield of India’s sole hydrogen bomb test in 1998, the reports on the expansion of Pakistan’s atomic arsenal and the renewed apprehension about American pressures on various international arms control treaties — have seen a nervous New Delhi walk the well-trodden nuclear ground all over again. India’s obsession with debating the familiar prevents it from addressing new challenges.

In the late ’50s and early ’60s, when China was racing to become a nuclear weapon power, India devoted its energies to promoting global nuclear peace. One would have thought the border conflict with China in 1962 and China’s first nuclear test in October 1964 would have cured India of its nuclear non-sequiturs.

Instead, India embarked on a diplomatic campaign for a nuclear non-proliferation treaty. When India did respond finally in 1974 with a nuclear test of its own, it chose to call it a “peaceful” device and did nothing to launch a nuclear weapons programme.

Having broken up Pakistan in 1971 and conducted a nuclear test in 1974, India did not anticipate the response of Islamabad and Beijing, who had no reason to buy into New Delhi’s metaphysics on Pokharan-I. As New Delhi “stood up” to international pressures, Beijing decisively assisted Pakistan in acquiring nuclear weapons and missiles.

After Pokharan-I, India wasted nearly a quarter century posturing on universal disarmament and non-discriminatory non-proliferation, before testing again, declaring itself a nuclear weapon state and seeking nuclear reconciliation with the world.

When then-US President George W. Bush offered a sweetheart deal that would allow India to keep its nuclear weapons programme and regain access to the global nuclear market without signing the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, India spent three years agonising if it was a “gift horse” or a “Trojan horse”.

The story of India’s nuclear iner-tia continues with the current debate on the fizzle. Only one good may come out of the debate — burying the proposition that everything a “scientist” says must be “true”. As our “scientists” argue viscerally with each other, it should be quite obvious that science policy is as much about politics — personal, institutional and ideological — as it is about science.

The arguments about the fizzle are interesting but do not alter the fundamentals of the Indian strategy of nuclear deterrence, which rests on the ability to retaliate with nuclear weapons. The hydrogen bomb’s main distinction is the massive size of the explosion it offers. The business of nuclear deterrence, however, is all about the certain delivery of the bang and not its size.

On Pakistan too, India’s real problem is not with the size of its nuclear arsenal. It is our inability to deter Pakistan from running its unconventional war of terror against us. Pakistan is supremely confident that its nuclear arsenal — irrespective of its size — has neutered India’s conventional military superiority and New Delhi’s ability to punish Islamabad’s transgressions.

Nor does the H-bomb debate have anything to do with India’s position on testing nuclear weapons or signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The decision to test was and will always be a political one. At this stage, India has no incentive at all to break the current de facto moratorium on nuclear tests being observed by major powers. That context would of course change if Beijing, Moscow or Washington resumes testing of nuclear weapons.

On the presumed American pressure to sign the NPT, CTBT, and the Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty, the problems are all in our mind. If a much weaker India could not be coerced into signing the treaties it did not like between the ’60s and ’90s, where is the question of a rising India signing on the dotted line now? Must India jump every time the UN says something about universalising the NPT? Should we press the US to caveat all its references to NPT with a clarification that this does not apply to India? Can’t India differentiate between international rhetoric and policy?

But even a paranoid has enemies. There are many second order nuclear issues that our security establishment must address and resolve; but those are not the ones being debated today.

One is about the ability of the DAE and the DRDO to keep our nuclear arsenal in good trim, and ensure its safety and reliability. New Delhi must ask for a review of and full support for plans to create computer simulation of nuclear weapons testing and design. Instead of agonising over the H-bomb “fizzle”, New Delhi and Mumbai must put more resources to fusion research, especially the one involving high energy lasers.

Rather than worry about the CTBT, we must ask if the DAE and DRDO have the ability to conduct sub-critical nuclear tests that are legitimate under the treaty. And if they do, what is holding them back? Is it the absence of political will? On the FMCT, our speeches at New York and Geneva are less important than asking if the DAE makes the best use of its current stockpiles of unsafeguarded plutonium. It is about ending the extended delays in reprocessing accumulated spent fuel stocks.

None of these second order nuclear problems compares with our real challenges of deterrence. One is about preventing Pakistan from organising and supporting Mumbai-style terror attacks on India under the shadow of nuclear weapons. The other is about Beijing’s rapidly widening lead in missile and space technologies.

Addressing these challenges would necessarily involve a new national debate on what other great powers are calling the “new nuclear triad” — stronger conventional deterrence, theatre missile defences and a sophisticated infrastructure that can respond to the emerging atomic threats. It is to that debate that India must now turn.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by Raj Malhotra »

Arun_S wrote:Regarding 25 kT pure fission.

Email reply three days ago from K.Santhanam reconfirmed:
The fission bomb of May 98 had an estimated yield of 20 - 25 kT. No boosting.

If you are in contact with him, you need to tell him to re-write his article (op-ed) as it is confusing.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by Austin »

Kanson wrote:To be frank, isnt already those ex- gave their opinion on the subject ? So what new outcome it can get.

On the contrary, Santhanam claim of 25 kt for S2 is shocking. First it was 25 +or - 2. We thought it was all about TN and i guess it was about S2. May be he should have evidence for this ?
Ofcourse they did , but if GOI is confident that it knows better then ex AEC/BARC chief , then whats the harm in involving these folks for a peer review ?

These people have held highest position in GOI and if they are raising a valid question or raising doubts , then a peer review should and must involve them , besides the stake holders military ( SFC )

Santy is up close and personal guy as far as POK 2 goes , if he says so keeping his reputation at stake and if ex BARC/DAE head are willing to buy his argument for what ever reasons , then its a serious issue beyond personal belief or disbelief
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by shiv »

Arun_S wrote: The 17 kT primary of S1 is the only successful test by India..
17 is one more new number added to all the new numbers.

Santhanam said 25+2 in one link
He spoke of 15 in another
You say that he emailed you with a figure of 20-25 for the fission bomb. Is that S1 or S2?

If it is S2 where did the figure 17 come from?

If S2 was 25 and S1 fission only was 17 the total yield from the site was 42kt

Is there any dispute about that? The total yield of 43 kt as claimed earlier is not far off.

What was the 25+2 then?

Nothing is really clear and nothing has been proven as far as I can see. Every new number that is quoted is taken as the final word.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by Austin »

Shiv , the 17kT that Arun is referring to is the boosted fission first stage of S-1 , the only FBF tested and known to work
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by shiv »

Austin wrote:Shiv , the 17kT that Arun is referring to is the boosted fission first stage of S-1 , the only FBF tested and known to work

Fine - but where did that figure "17" come from? 17 kt is not a figure that has occurred in any of the refs I have read so far - this is the first occurrence. So where did it appear from?
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by Sanku »

shiv wrote:
Austin wrote:Shiv , the 17kT that Arun is referring to is the boosted fission first stage of S-1 , the only FBF tested and known to work

Fine - but where did that figure "17" come from? 17 kt is not a figure that has occurred in any of the refs I have read so far - this is the first occurrence. So where did it appear from?
Thats Arun's speculation on what the S1 looks like, his studied guess, he has made it clear a few times already. It may or may not be correct, but certainly sounds plausible.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by shiv »

Sanku wrote: Thats Arun's speculation on what the S1 looks like, his studied guess, he has made it clear a few times already. It may or may not be correct, but certainly sounds plausible.

Thanks for clearing that up.

That means that if you include Santhanam's email (as quoted by Arun) giving a value of 20-25 kt for S2 (without boosting) and Arun's own speculative value of 17kt boosted fission for S1 - the total yield recorded on May 11th 1998 is 37 to 42 kt which puts to rest all Western claims that the yield was no more than 20 kt - as quoted in the media reports along with the first ToI reports quoting Santhanam.

Now the only things that do not fit in is Santhanam's own quote about the 25+2 kt made earlier, and his mysterious statement about 15 kt.

Santhanam also said that the yield of S1 was "not more than" 60% of its designed yield. Now if S1 boosted fission was 17 kt (as Arun speculates) then the design yield was about 28 kt - which is the smallest Thermonuclear bomb I have heard of. I suppose it is less embarrassing to send up 28 kiloton Thermonuclear warheads on Agni than the 25 kt fission ones? But would deterrence be any better?
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by Sanjay »

Shiv - way too much is being made of omissions of bomb yields in op-ed articles. Just because somebody didn't mention - say 10 kiloton weapons - it does not mean they don't exist.

Santhanam seems to have claimed 25 kt -27KT for S1 and 20-25kt for S2.

In addition, TN devices have been designed with yields as low as 15kT and the US did conduct dynamic tests of 22kT TN devices.

The question that also needs to be probed is that given S1 was a device - as opposed to an operational weapon - what can the individual parts be morphed into ?

50KT FBF ? Possible.

Everybody is looking for data to support a point of view and if you are expecting anyone to be completely honest in this debate, I think you will be very disappointed.

Another general comment, words like "fraud" are unhelpful in this debate.

Separate the "credible deterrent" part from the "need to do more tests" argument and you have two distinct and equally valid viewpoints.

My views on the deterrent have been shaped by Adm. Mehta's comments.

I also agree with the need to perfect the India's TN weapons capability.

Nobody has yet answered this - Agnis are being built, inducted and deployed with 700-1500kg payloads (way too big for a 20-25kt warhead) - what's on them ? A big stone ?
Last edited by Sanjay on 21 Sep 2009 16:46, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by NRao »

Deterrent ke liye kuch be chalega!
Tho, kya chalega? Aur kyon?

IMVVVHO, the ONLY reason India should get a TN is to break the P-5 club.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by NRao »

Nobody has yet answered this - Agnis are being built, inducted and deployed with 700-1500kg payloads (way too big for a 20-25kt warhead) - what's on them ? A big stone ?
A tested or an untested "device", but found/thought to be a "deterrent".

Perhaps what we need is a list of what has been tested and (we?) found to be reliable? For what (info) is out there could itself be unreliable?
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by RKumar »

IMO ... KS comments are for the personal gain then simple truth or national interest.

If it would be not for the first, he should have rise this question 10 years back. When we had already sections imposed upon us, what was holding us to perform few more tests. It is like snake is gone, what is the use of beating a bush.

For discussion, lets agree he leaked most confidential report and broke his offical oath for greater national interest. He was holding such a important position, he must be aware of damage he has done to national security. When we are facing threat of two places China and Pakistan.

It is a lack of seriousness and national pride for people who were incharge, for not revalidating the test results in the first place. And it is even bigger for the KS to leak the information after 11 years. He did the second biggest damage to the nation next to the 1962 war.
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