Deterrence

[shiv]

Sanku that human development question is a deadly one - and some brief Googling gave me some pointers

India's human development in 2009 is certainly better that China in the 1960s - but is not yet there compared to the US in the 1950s. The real difference is that the Indian population has also increased by about 700 million since then which means that the total burden of people who have to be uplifted remains as large. India is getting there slowly. Faster than Pakistan if that's any consolation, but again absolute numbers in India are higher.

Why did you ask?

[harbans]

Shiv Ji, Indian human development, per capita income was higher than China till 1970 and almost on par with it till 1990. While china was developing TN weapons 50 million people starved to death in the great famine. China's percapita income in 2002 was lower than India's is in 2009. I asked people talking about poverty and India's space program why they did'nt say such about China as late as 2002 when they were sending men to space.

[NRao]

Regarding TN: Glad that you agree that the TN are desirable. And at that point, the current doctrine (massive strikes on enemy cities with relatively smaller fission warheads) becomes redundant (or due for evolving).

Good, I could make at least one person glad.

However, I am not sure India NEEDS a TN. In fact, after the current revalation about the 300-500 Kt FBF, I doubt India will go down the TN route - ever.

So, somewhere down the line if we seek to acquire the TN, current MCD has to pave way for a new doctrine.

All doctrines are fluid - subject to change. They have to be - 'hood is always in flux.

In that context, current MCD looks more like stop-gap measure, a doctrine tailored according to current situation. And as recently MMS declared, India not going to sign NPT or CTBT at least in immediate future, situation is open for evolving.
But all is speculation only on my part.

"current situation" = both external + internal.

Note that there is an underground under-current too. Heads of state talk to each other, diplomats talk to each other and via others. Think-tankers are involved. This track and that track. Internal politics, inter-party politics, intra-party politics, university professors, etc, etc, etc. And, do not forget some BRiets.

Also its clear that not having TN doesn't mean absence of deterrence.

This is one topic that befuddles me. Why is it that KS took it upon himself to challenge the establishment about a deterrence ONLY through a 200+ Kt TN. I have to think that he was aware of FBF and its capabilities - he may not have known specifics, but that India was capable of a 200+ Kt FBF.

So, why did he feel that there was no deterrence against the MT of China. the answer may lie in the next item below.

I would rather say its dilution of deterrence, not complete absence of deterrence - I presume this is what KS wanted to convey.

Deterrence is there or not there. There really cannot be a foggy/gray area called "diluted" deterrence. Deterrence is about scaring the other guy, and more so about making SURE that he is scared to death, nt just scared. There has to be surety, guarantee about deterrence. Else deterrence fails. It is binary.

Remember BOTH sides will have some one, in very high places, who will take huge risks. And, such a person, well placed, could take a risk of calling your bluff. IF the call works, then you fail. IF it does not work, then either you win or more likely both are in a big mess (in a nuclear context).

Bottom line, there cannot be, should not be, a diluted deterrence.

WRT KS, I am really confused. I will wait for another two weeks (based on his self imposed three moratorium) to see what his thinking might be. But right now, based on his articles and interviews, I think he is either absolutely confused or for some odd reason is incapable of communicating what he wants to communicate.

But, for sure, IMHO, as of today, he has made a mess of the whole topic.

However, as you quote above, to compute the deterrence value correctly - is a million, not billion dollar question.
And that we have cracked it right - can we be sure, its been correctly gamed to near perfection that 25kt fission will do the job, as KS-Pitamah discussed with an article with VSA, few weeks back.

Deterrence is played on a bigger game field, that is ALL it is - with N number of input that are also in flux.

You, as an individual also are aware and play a game of "deterrence' - just that you call it by another name: risk. You compute risk when going to your office (traffic jams, etc), you compute it when you invest, buy groceries, etc.

Look at "deterrence" as computing dual "risk" (yours and enemies) at a national level, but where you spend a lot of time getting into the mindS of your enemy AND your compatriots. It is a mind game - for you can easily compute the rest.

[Sanku]

Sanku that human development question is a deadly one - and some brief Googling gave me some pointers

India's human development in 2009 is certainly better that China in the 1960s - but is not yet there compared to the US in the 1950s. The real difference is that the Indian population has also increased by about 700 million since then which means that the total burden of people who have to be uplifted remains as large. India is getting there slowly. Faster than Pakistan if that's any consolation, but again absolute numbers in India are higher.

Why did you ask?

Oh because this was being discussed as a factor on the "worthiness" or pursing path A or B, I merely thought that we could learn from others experiences while choosing (on the forum of course) a path for ourselves.

So as always, statistics dont tell us anything on what to do. Sigh....

[shiv]

Harbans regarding 5 megaton bombs

One 5 megaton bomb damages about 340 sq km (total 5 megatons)
Three 1 megaton bombs will do the same job (total 3 megatons)
Ten 150 kt bombs will do the same job (total 1.5 megatons)

Each 150 kt warhead will be much lighter than the 5 megaton warhead, but many more missiles will be needed. but those "many more missiles", if made and dispersed are less likely to be all destroyed in a first counter force strike.

[Sanku]

Each 150 kt warhead will be much lighter than the 5 megaton warhead, but many more missiles will be needed. but those "many more missiles", if made and dispersed are less likely to be all destroyed in a first counter force strike.

True, but if some of those dispersed missile are destroyed, the effective yeild over target also drops. So the ideal situation is many more missiles each with high KT weapon.

Also the bolded part is true only within the same weapon technology. A boosted fission 200 Kt is not much lighter than 5 MT TN weapon.

[SSridhar]

But the probability of one megaton weapon being lost is more than at least some of the 200 kT FBF reaching their targets.

Besides, we need TNs of high tonnage to only take out very hardened places like Command/control centres.

[Sanku]

But the probability of one megaton weapon being lost is more than at least some of the 200 kT FBF reaching their targets.

Besides, we need TNs of high tonnage to only take out very hardened places like Command/control centres.

If that was to me, I have already said -- So the ideal situation is many more missiles each with high KT weapon.

Also, the calculations change again at very low number of delivery systems, thinking from the perspective of a few Agni's, even if one gets through, it must do the job.

Even a single Agni getting through should be unacceptable (of the four fired from Arihant, I am assuming that all else is gone, or nearly gone)

[SSridhar]

Even a single Agni getting through should be unacceptable

It is not for us, Indians, to say if it would be 'unacceptable' to the enemy. No NWS can expect to attack another NWS and expect to be immune from damage unless the attacked NWS lacks delivery platform for the distances involved. It is all factored into their calculations.

An NFU country is a defensive country while the FU countries assume nukes are for fighting wars.

[negi]

I believe there is more to the 'capability' to field a 5Mt TN than deployment or even use in a war.
If one would trace through the chronology of the bomb programmes of the P-5 it is evident that apart from political and H&D issue the need for a Mt bomb was to verify the scalability and hence the maturity of the TN design itself (this is of course speculation from my side).

Yes it is true that P-5 have more or less settled around the 100-300Kt TN weapons but imho they arrived at this figure after having tested and observed the affects of a nuke during the field trials.

So yes we can actually capitalize on the lessons learnt by the P-5 and need not even FIELD a Mt class TN however from an engg. pov ability to design and successfully test one is a different matter all together.

[NRao]

I do see the advantages of TN. I never said anything against possessing them. No one really knows how a full scale nuclear exchange between countries will go. Most models show it escalates very rapidly to full scale exchanges.

IF a situation reaches "full scale nuclear war" necessarily means that the deterrence has failed - for one side.

Deterrence is specifically to prevent the start of a nuclear war.

Perhaps even more specifically, it is to make sure that ONE person (say in the PLA) who is willing to take high risks, does not even dream about taking a risk. So, IF there is a Taliban ruled Pakistan, the deterrence is to ensure that even an irrational leader within that group finds it extremely hard to push that button to start a nuclear war. Which is what, perhaps, was conveyed in the discussion between Clinton and an Indian leader - we will annihilate them (I think this message was meant more to influence US decision making than Pakistanis, but I am sure the message has be delivered to Pakistan and the rest of the world).

[Manish_Sharma]

Mee too Harbans I read Hawksley's both Dragon Fire and World War 3. I wish Vivek Ahuja and Shankar write Scenarios or books based on those stories, would be so much better. But Hawksley caught the softness of indian leadership very accurately, I mean the hesitancy and inablity to use the available arsenal on the right time.
As Shiv very accurately writes, the moment even a single subkiloton is used against us, we should empty the whole arsnel on enemies immediately.

[Manish_Sharma]

So what will be the main advantages of having TNs :

1. Saving the precious fissile material, which india is short of?
2. Having more kilotons per warhead. Let's compare the 3 fission warheads of 20kt striking a city. Two are taken out by ABM only one reaches.
or
3 TN warheads of 150kt each, 2 are taken out but one still reaches.

Which of the above is more important in the Bhartiya context TNwise?

[Sanku]

Even a single Agni getting through should be unacceptable

It is not for us, Indians, to say if it would be 'unacceptable' to the enemy. No NWS can expect to attack another NWS and expect to be immune from damage unless the attacked NWS lacks delivery platform for the distances involved. It is all factored into their calculations. .

I agree, but then we need to skew their calculations, my statement is if given the small numbers of delivery platforms, esp long range ones. Each of them needs to be able to do as much damage as possible.

This is our best bet against others balancing their equations in a way which doesnt suite us.

Of course things may still happen despite that, but hey we would have tried -- not the current, peer deterrence system as Shiv puts it.

[Sanku]

As Shiv very accurately writes, the moment even a single subkiloton is used against us, we should empty the whole arsnel on enemies immediately.

But as he also hints, that would be completely pointless because we may be completely screwed while the adversary may have "some" damage.

Being dharmic and all that is fine, but it should not be our goal to "live up to a principle of doing right", our goal should be that if some one drops a tactical nuke on us, our dying retaliation and our last stand (which is what it will be) makes our enemies think forever before getting there.

Deterrence does not break when the nukes are traded, deterrence breaks when some one can even contemplate taking that chance.

We need deterrence, not a swan song.

[shiv]

Sooner or later the question comes circling back to the same point.

How much damage on an "adversary" will cause unacceptable pain.

I have taken this literally and I believe that pain must be caused - not the release of death. The dead must be the lucky ones that got away.

People (such as MV ramana?) have written about the horrors of nuclear war. The idea of developing a deterrent is to ensure that it will

1) Define and discuss those horrors gleefully and willfully in order that the goal is known
2) Plan on how those horror targets can be achieved.

Check this link on bombing Bombay
Can't find the original)
http://www.angelfire.com/mi/MIND123/BOMBAY.html

[shiv]

Here are thoughts that I had written on BRF in 2000 in happier days when BRF was a happier family.
http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 7&start=40

Call it family entertainment I guess

I believe that in the eventof a nuclear bomb blast over say Bombay (or Bangalore - where I live - since discussion of an event over Mumbai seems upsetting to some) will have effects on two levels.

1) The effect on the people within - say an arbitrary 10 Km of ground zero. Within this circle one would get the blast/burns and radiation injuries. There are some very relevant references to estimate the numbers and their behaviour. In that scale of disaster - IMHO one would be unlikely to get rational or organised behaviour among survivors. The hospitals in this zone, along with hearses, ambulances, electric and water supply would be rendered useless. The few walking survivors would try to migrate out of this zone.

2) Those outside this 10 Km zone (my arbitrary figure - it would vary depending on the height and intensity of the blast) we would have a population that is largely intact - and in the 10-30 km zone people would know that something serious has happpened in the ground zero area. They are likely to have electricity (Grid/generators) water and communications. It is in this area where disaster managemant has to start.

The behaviour of the people in this area could be one of two types
a) Utter panic - word of mouth rumours about radiation and more nukes - leading to a mass exodus from these areas, even as survivors move in. OTOH we could have

(b) - a more calm appraisal on the lines of "OK something terrible has happened - but we are alive an OK - so what can we do to help"

My guess is that there will be a mix of both types of behaviour and a mass exodus is unavoidable unless there is a degree of training and preparation in which agencies such as the Police, home guards and the medical fraternity could be assured (by whom? how?) that they should hang on while help arrives.

India has a doctor-population ratio of 0.41 per thousand, and a hospital-population ratio of 0.7 per thousand, with approximately 80% of each serving only 20% of the population in urban areas. This works out to 16 doctors per 1000 and 28 beds per thousand in cities.

Based on this - Bangalore could be estimated as having 112000 hospital beds - which is probably an overestimate - the real figure is probably about 25% of that.

Even if 1/3 are destroyed in a blast, the remaining 20000 beds would be insufficient for management of the number of injuries.

A specialist in the management of burns may be able to handle at the most 20 patients with severe burns in a day - and a city like Bangalore may have about 2000 surgeons capable of handling this. Assuming that half are eliminated by the blast, the the remainder would be unable to cope with the case load fully - and there is a real possibility that they would be overwhelmed by the workload in 2-3 days.

Ruthless triage would be essential, leading to a build up of queues of dying outside hospitals, and piles of unattended dead. Lorries and buses would have to be requisitioned to carry out dead and carry in supplies - and would have to be manned by volunteers, and led by police/home guards because it is likely that the Armed forces would be busy with whatever conflict is in progress.

Each severe burn victim would need about 12 (500 ml) bottles of intravenous fluid a day - so we are looking as 20,000 full hospital beds requiring 240,000 saline/glucose bottles per day, and additional nurses to look after the changing of bottles and nursing needs. This is ignoring the many thousands of others who do not get hospital beds.

If we assume that on average half the patients are to get 2 units of blood each - we would need 20,000 units of blood per day. Each unit needs about 2 hours of preparation time - so we need 40,000 unit-hours of blood bank work to be done in a day. It takes 20 min to bleed one blood donor - at 3 donors per hour one would need 6000 couches for 20,000 blood donors to get 18000 units in one hour. In practice a city may have about 200 blood donor couches - 600 units per hour - and if used continuously we would still only get 15000 units in 24 hours as against a requirement of 20000 units, and a theoretical total requirement of over 100,000 units.

The number of testing kits and sterile empty bottles required would normally be unavailable unless they have been stocked outside at a reserve - and these would take 3-4 days to come in - too late for many.

All in all - a frightening scenario. Like the Orissa cyclone - we can expect that a very large proportion of the injured will die - and ironically, and cruelly - disaster management gets easier if there are more dead than live people.

Disaster management in this situation would be restricted to feeding and sheltering those who manage to get out of the city, and talking of rebuilding the city after radiation levels have reduced.

Another question. Radiation drops off in intensity as decay occurs. What would be the effect of torrential monsoon rains on the residual fallout level?

[ramana]

NRao hate to prick the balloon, but is it possible that Bharat Karnad was alluding to the very same ideas that Adm. Prakash was alluding to when he quoted the yields? I am unconvinced still. Adm. Praksah's pdf file is nice data point and thats all it is. Its one sentence only. And a description of how short the period is for the COS to get to grips with the available resources. His write up is more telling on how scientists were given leeway to develop weapons, doctrine and all and the user brought into the picture way after everything is chiselled in "pink" granite.

--
And we are now quoting NPA lites to make the case.

[Benjamin]

:
As Shiv very accurately writes, the moment even a single subkiloton is used against us, we should empty the whole arsnel on enemies immediately.

Completely disagree with your view on this.

Say, Pakistan nukes us and we empty our arsenal to destroy pakistan. Then we become completely vulnerable to chinese nuclear attack who will attack us with impunity.

We need to have calculated number of warheads pointed for complete destruction of both China and Pakistan. And at no point of time should the arsenal be emptied.

[Benjamin]

Ideally, if I was the general with the order to destroy pakistan. I would do the below.

[After we have a moderate ABM shield..]

1. Get extensive intelligence information on pakistani nuclear missile sites.
2. Point not less than 1000 brahmos/prithvi/agni missiles with conventional warhead, to all the known locations of nuclear missiles, dams, powerplants, nuclear plants, military installation. And fire all of them in the shortest possible time span.
3. When step2 is started, simultaneously another commander is assigned the task of nuking pakistan. Nuke all major cities in Pakistan and burn them to ashes.
4. Deploy spy satellites to completely scan for any missile movements, while at the same time get the IAF fighters to patrol the skies of Pakistan and scan for any possible missile movement.
5. Have the ABM on red alert.
6. Have atleast 20 awacs scanning for any possible cruise missile [which might escape ABM] and neutralize it.
7. Order army to capture/seal pakistani border with china to neutralize any possible smuggling of Chinese warhead.

We are rid of one enemy.
Next target PRC.

[shiv]

cross post
http://www.hindu.com/2009/09/21/stories ... 800900.htm

[sugriva]

Ind will wipe off Pak, but at cost of 500 mn people

http://news.in.msn.com/international/ar ... id=3253889

Wonderphull. Wonder which madrassa the authors went to? How did they arrive at these numbers.

However if we read Ayatollah-al-odma Shiv's posts it appears that it will take a lot of nukes to achieve the above figure?

Also what is meant by 500mn people? 500mn dead, 500mn dead+living dead or 500 mn dead+living dead+injured.

[shiv]

Benjamin - if only..

Without nitpicking your numbers which are unrealistic let me add a scenario.

India nukes Pakistan, and China instantly nukes India "to save Pakistan"

In any case any war that threatens to turn nuclear will have every satellite flying over India to see what is being done with missiles. And long before any nuking starts there will be diplomatic messages to all concerned nations that they need to tone down their nuclear preparations. If China is planning on nuking India, India will be warned and vice versa. Warnings may be in public as well - using the media. In such a grave situation it is likely that the US will use its clout to pressure one or both sides. And even threaten to use its own nukes to cut the damage that one side may inflict by a pre emptive punishment after nuke conflict erupts? Naah - that is unlikely

So the real way to fight nuclear war is for one side to launch a lighting attack on the other side - with no warning. But better to write a few wills first as a desperate and bleeding nation launches off whatever nukes it has left.

tee hee

[NRao]

Ind will wipe off Pak, but at cost of 500 mn people

http://news.in.msn.com/international/ar ... id=3253889

Wonderphull. Wonder which madrassa the authors went to? How did they arrive at these numbers.

However if we read Ayatollah-al-odma Shiv's posts it appears that it will take a lot of nukes to achieve the above figure?

Also what is meant by 500mn people? 500mn dead, 500mn dead+living dead or 500 mn dead+living dead+injured.

THAT is no madarasa math.

It is a conversation, from what I can read into the situation right now, between (perhaps) two heads of state, one conveying to the other what the limits are. There is no concept - at THAT level - of what may happen to the 500 million people. And, be aware that what goes on that level most of us will not either understand or get scared of (as in this case).

But, to put it into perspective, as a planner I was aware that suggesting to even increase the capacity of a road - by a lane in each direction - would necessarily mean increase in accidents, perhaps even deaths. People who manufacture toothpaste are aware that someone will use their product and get rash or even land in a hospital. Same with cosmetics.

As I said before, that conversation, for all I know, prevented some other events from happening - only because the US president got to know what the Indian leadership was willing to go to IF Pakistan did something stupid beyond what had happened at Kargil. I would also suggest that Kargil be re-read, what went on between India-US-Pakistan and some of these quotes will be better understood (NOT agreed with).

[Manish_Sharma]

:
As Shiv very accurately writes, the moment even a single subkiloton is used against us, we should empty the whole arsnel on enemies immediately.

Completely disagree with your view on this.

Say, Pakistan nukes us and we empty our arsenal to destroy pakistan. Then we become completely vulnerable to chinese nuclear attack who will attack us with impunity.

We need to have calculated number of warheads pointed for complete destruction of both China and Pakistan. And at no point of time should the arsenal be emptied.

Sorry for not writing clearly but if you will see I have used the word "enemies" not enemy meaning both of them. I remember in pokharan II thread somewhere Arun_S mentioned that if Porkis nuke us then we have to nuke back both porkis and the chinese. Even if we don't it will be presumed so by all three chinese, russians and the US that we will do so. Then thinking on those lines both russians and chinese together can mount an attack on our arsenel. Anyway if porkis ever do that it will be with the chinese consent. So they will be on high alert on something like equivalent of DEFCON count of US. I'll try to find that and post here. This was the scenario in back of my mind when I wrote it.

[Shameek]

Even if we don't it will be presumed so by all three chinese, russians and the US that we will do so. Then thinking on those lines both russians and chinese together can mount an attack on our arsenel.

Why would the Russains attack us? China I can understand.

[Manish_Sharma]

Even if we don't it will be presumed so by all three chinese, russians and the US that we will do so. Then thinking on those lines both russians and chinese together can mount an attack on our arsenel.

Why would the Russains attack us? China I can understand.

It goes like this that after our attack on China a dying or semi-dying china will attack US and russia as they are also China's enemies. Give me some time I am trying to find that article.

[Manish_Sharma]

Here I found it:
http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... ia#p715749

Arun_S Post subject: Re: Indian Missile Technology DiscussionPosted: 11 Aug 2009 04:49 pm

Webmaster BR


Joined: 14 Jun 2000 06:01 am
Posts: 2787
Location: KhyberDurra

Yogi_G wrote:
I remember reading a long time back (surely in BR) that to prevent India from a retaliatory nuclear counter attack more than one Western nation or Russia China might team up and take out Indian sites. I know what I have written sounds cr@p but I will go look for it in the archives, i am just hoping that someone else remembers the article I am talking about and hopefully remember more info than the half baked gibberish I just wrote. The point is that it is not safe to assume that we have no threats apart from our immediate neighbourhood. In times of war especially a nuclear one you never know who might become friends and enemies. A while back, in Aero India, the F-16's with conformal tanks raised suspicions that it could be used for Pakis to launch an attack from UAE, bomb India and return to Pakistan. In such a scenario wouldn't UAE become an automatric enemy given that its soil has been used for an assault on India? We never know who the true friends are, we will know only in times of need.

Very very true.

Because Indian nuclear weapon tango is not "Two some", India second strike will be highly destabilizing globally (I.e. at least a "Four some tango" (Chinese "Four" is ~ symbol of death). So there i sno doubt that global powers will collectively prevent India from retaliating with a comprehensive pre-emptive strike. Check mate.

India can keep its Ahmisa thereafter, when other nation's Brahmastra (from ICBM range) has toast and pulverize Indian military and its IRBM (with 800 kg Indian brahmastra) to dust. The honorable Chief of Navel Staff can take solace that Indian Navy ships will not be broiled at sea while reset of India succumb to his wisdom.

What else do you expect when GoI is lead by "peaceful" "fearless leader" (doesn't it sound quixotic/oxymoron ?) and his hand picked people to command/lead the bureaucracy and military ?

The tango reference comes from non other than Bhishma Pita-mah of Indian Strategic policy.

Here is an excerpt detailing this very threat from my IDR article

WAY TO A CREDIBLE DETERRENT - © Arun Vishwakarma

Quote:
Nuclear escalation with Pakistan can’t be considered in isolation. Pakistani nuclear weapons and posture is a proxy extension of China. As noted by senior Indian strategists that India-Pakistan nuclear scenario is not a two-some game. Meaning that in case of Pakistani first-strike the nuclear exchange will not be limited between India and Pakistan. A first-strike by Pakistan can only happen at Chinese behest , thus an Indian retaliatory second strike will be simultaneously addressed to Pakistan and China that unfolds into a wider and destabilizing scenario. Thus a nuclear retaliatory attack on China will involve Chinese taking down other challengers that will drag USA in the expanded nuclear exchange, with growing global destabilization. This could prompt global nuclear powers to destroy Indian nuclear capability by a collective first strike before India escalates and launch a second strike . India could thus be inviting a debilitating global strike even before it manages to launch a second strike. Thus Indian counterstrike has to be large dispersed force that can handle simultaneous threats from all directions and be unusually robust against simultaneous first strike by multiple nations.


Sorry friends don't know how to bring the quote from another thread, apologies for not putting it in proper format

[Prem]

="Manish_Sharma"]Even if we don't it will be presumed so by all three chinese, russians and the US that we will do so. Then thinking on those lines both russians and chinese together can mount an attack on our arsenel.
Why would the Russains attack us? China I can understand

It goes like this that after our attack on China a dying or semi-dying china will attack US and russia as they are also China's enemies. Give me some time I am trying to find that article.

This is where the wisdom of 2 hajar Nukes play its part. 2 hajar will make sure that Chinese +s cant contemplate the initiation as well it will force them to take lollipos away from their incestual ,mentally unstable Munna Pakistan . Fast breeding of Pu shall come handy to maintain this mutual peace ,love and harmony .

[shiv]

This is where the wisdom of 2 hajar Nukes play its part. 2 hajar will make sure that Chinese +s cant contemplate the initiation as well it will force them to take lollipos away from their incestual ,mentally unstable Munna Pakistan . Fast breeding of Pu shall come handy to maintain this mutual peace ,love and harmony .

Prem wrong thread but there appear to be technical reasons why this number may not be realistic in the Indian context.

We have to think like a Paki/North Korean

How can you deter with less? It is OK to talk of this as "future" like India 2020 if one is projecting into the future.


Another thing is that there are some things that "we would like to see" but will never happen. And among those are Chinese ability to take lollipops out of the hands of their chamchas. Better if those chamchas arm Chinese adversaries and gift hem with enriched Uranium. What irony it would be to see a Chinese designed nuke gifted to Pakistan going off in Shanghai.

[andy B]

^^^ Dakter Sahib, I posted the below note quite some time back on the Indo-china war possibility thread. Xposting it on this thread as I think its related to detterence.

Admins please remove this post if considered inappropriate.

Regards,
Anand.

X Posting Mr. Muppalla from the Yindoo Nook Thread:

This is a serious statement by an Army chief. Something is really bothering the armed forces and MI and their goals and thoughts are not same as GOI. I suspect a confrontation of thoughts is happening between Political+Babu and MI+Armed Forces+Nuke Scientists.

The messages are blurred but not that blurred for a keen eye.

I agree that the above statement is a very important one and potentially has some serious implications.

I also think that the above statement is exclusively aimed at you know who bcoz when the no first use policy came around it was primarily aimed at our friend on the western border with whom we enjoy greater geographical depth, a massive qualitative and quantitative advantage, and in general have a lot better cards on the table as compared to them.

But then when the Dragon comes into the picture as it has been in the past few years where proactive encroachment of ze border has been time and again displayed the no first use policy becomes well questionable IMVHO to say the least.

Firstly we may hold a qualitative advantage but quantitative advantage becomes a slightly more complex problem. Also Geographical Depth becomes another one where they enjoy similar or more depth than us. The threat perception of the Dragon is far ummm higher than Porkistan in which case I think we now need to think that if ya'll push us we push ze "red" button.

I do think that as the "situation" develops/detoriates on our eastern borders the no first use policy will in time become redundant.

One thing that will hold great importance in shaping or changing the first use polciy is as ze Ncubus Maximus pointed out MAD doesnt hold true in our situation as compared to the USSR, the Dragon has sensitive nerve centres which once struck push the country back in the coal ages...

Bear with me on this but I think in a way we have to think like the Porkis when they think of us as an aggressor. If the no first use policy is indeed changed then it will IMHO prove to be another important point that the Dragon will have to think about when creating any sort of mischief.....

Disclaimer: Ze above post has been done after crunching number for 3 hours, having two coffees and reading the Nook and Kaveri Injun thread.

[NRao]

Shiv,

what is your email address?

TIA.

[NRao]

Not sure if this was posted earlier. By Uday Bhaskar.

DOUBTS OVER POKHRAN TESTS AND NO-FIRST-USE MISPLACED

data points:

In recent weeks there have been doubts expressed over the credibility of India’s thermo-nuclear device tested on May 11, 1998, as also the validity of adopting a no-first-use (NFU) posture. However objective scrutiny of these so called controversies would suggest that these doubts are misplaced. India does have a credible nuclear deterrent – and furthermore, the doctrinal position of no-first-use is a very desirable position for India to adopt.

The first doubt – as it were – about the yield of the thermonuclear device was expressed by Mr. K Santhanam – formerly with the DRDO; and the need to review the commitment to the NFU was reportedly expressed by the Army Chief, General Deepak Kapoor – in relation to reports about Pakistan increasing its nuclear arsenal in a major way. Taken together, these two issues are very central to the Indian nuclear deterrent and need to be placed in the appropriate context. Speaking at what was deemed to be a closed-door seminar in Delhi (August 26) , Mr. Santhanam formerly with the DRDO and part of the
team that oversaw the Shakti series of tests observed that the yield in the test results of the thermonuclear device was lower than what was expected and later claimed. Soon thereafter a controversy seems to have been generated in some
section of the media – TV in particular – with words like ‘dud’ and ‘hoax’ being bandied about rather freely.

The official response has been to reject these doubts and the Principal Scientific Adviser, Dr. R Chidambaram has reiterated that the thermonuclear device test was satisfactory and had met the requisite design parameters. This view has been
further endorsed by Dr APJ Abdul Kalam who was the head of the DRDO during Pokhran II. It is instructive that these two eminent scientists were part of the apex team that provided the necessary techno-strategic advice and assessment to then PM Vajpayee about the outcome of the Shakti series of nuclear tests that radically altered India’s strategic profile.

However over the last week , some other senior scientists such as Dr. Sethna have also supported the position of the ‘doubters’ and suggested that Dr. Kalam is a missile technologist and hence not qualified to comment on yield data. Consequently the layman has reason to be perplexed. Does India have a credible nuclear deterrent? I posed this central question to Dr. MR Srinivasan, a respected atomic physicist and former Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission here
in Delhi on Sep 5th and he observed: “ The yield of the May 1998 nuclear tests give India appropriate credibility for its deterrent – including the nuclear submarine, Arihant, when it is fully operational.”

Here it must be added that even Mr. Santhanam clarified that India does indeed have the capability to ‘vacate’ any nuclear threat that it may have to face – and his observation about the thermonuclear ‘fizzle’ was in relation to the need for India to review its CTBT position. It may be recalled that India has adopted a voluntary moratorium on further testing soon after the May 1998 nuclear tests – and has indicated that it will be able to convert this de-facto position into a de-jure one, should there be enough incentive and reason for it to sign the CTBT when it is universalized. Again, while some doubts have been expressed – and scientific opinion will always be divided about whether a limited number of tests are
enough – the objective strategic assessment made in May 1998 was that India had acquired necessary sufficiency for its deterrent. And as the former Army Chief, late General K Sundarji – one of India’s most astute minds about matters nuclear once observed: “If less is enough – more is not always desirable.” Nuclear deterrence can be achieved at levels much lower than what the US and the former USSR had maintained during the Cold war decades – and if a kiloton warhead can create the necessary deterrence profile, then is the megaton really needed?

Personally I have always subscribed to the view that India must define its nuclear sufficiency in a modest manner quantitatively – but the quality of its overall deterrent must be ‘credible’. That is to say that the nuclear warhead may be of less than 100 kilotons – the current global standard that can be obtained from both fission and thermonuclear explosions – but the delivery system and its accuracy, as also command and control must be of the highest order. These are the areas that India needs to focus on 11 years after May 1998 – more than the review of the technical data – a debate that is as old as Pokhran I of May 1974!

And as regards the NFU commitment – this is a very well thought out doctrinal position – and was adopted in keeping with India’s principled approach to the nuclear capability. Nuclear weapons have an apocalyptic destructive quality and have been perceived as a crime against humanity – as Hiroshima in August 1945 so vividly established. India had long resisted this option – but was compelled to do – reluctantly – due to overwhelming security reasons. And having been an
advocate of nuclear disarmament, India has wisely chosen to adopt a NFU posture – with the caveat that should it be subjected to any form of nuclear attack – the response would be massive. The national security apex headed by the PM is assured that India does have this capacity – and potential adversaries also appear to be of the same view.

To that extent the Indian deterrent profile of remaining committed to a ‘credible-minimum’ index and complemented by a NFU commitment is independent of the arsenal of other nuclear weapon states. China, India and Pakistan are states with a credible nuclear weapon capability in the Southern Asian region. All three of them need to arrive at the appropriate degree of ‘mutuality’ – and numerical equivalence is uncalled for.

Hence the doubts about both the yield levels and the NFU commitment are misplaced.
*****************************
(Commodore Bhaskar is Director, National Maritime Foundation, New
Delhi. The views expressed are personal. )

[shiv]

Shiv,

what is your email address?

TIA.

Nrao try bennedose at hotmail dot com and then acknowledge this message. I check that only once in a while - will reply using my regular id.

[Prem]

How can you deter with less? It is OK to talk of this as "future" like India 2020 if one is projecting into the future.


Another thing is that there are some things that "we would like to see" but will never happen. And among those are Chinese ability to take lollipops out of the hands of their chamchas. Better if those chamchas arm Chinese adversaries and gift hem with enriched Uranium. What irony it would be to see a Chinese designed nuke gifted to Pakistan going off in Shanghai.

Sir Ji 2020 not that far, even 2030 will do but we must have the ability to change the game and this will deter any adversary. Paki will remain, Munna , at the bottom of power ladder , the only way to control their behaviour is to change the preception of their master/s.
But , as you said,then you never know Uigher freedom fighter might just blow Shanghai with Taliban supplied nuke made with Pu from Kushub or HEU from Khan Network known to be used by many unknown aspirants.

[NRao]

Shiv,

what is your email address?

TIA.

Nrao try bennedose at hotmail dot com and then acknowledge this message. I check that only once in a while - will reply using my regular id.

Thanks.

done.

[shiv]

It is not about these numbers but about the perception inside the mind of the Chinese elite. They have been known to agree to sacrifice 100s of millions of chinese citizens to further their goals.
Any indication of lack of credibility or smaller size of the yield in their eyes will bring down the deterrence value. Chinese Han homogeneous social group have their own hubris which looks down on other cultures. Other societies are considered weak societies. Military capability is the only perception

Piskology of Chinese here. But wrong conclusions. This is too simplistic.

[Rahul M]

It is not about these numbers but about the perception inside the mind of the Chinese elite. They have been known to agree to sacrifice 100s of millions of chinese citizens to further their goals.

that was then. they had nothing to lose but population when mao et al made that comment.

a nuclear strike on any of their large industrial cities, even small 20-30 KT ones would destroy much of what china has worked very hard to create.
for people who disagree, I request a similar assertion of acceptable nuclear strike from any important chinese leader from the last 20 years.

[shiv]

Gurmeet Kanwal quotes Mao telling Nehru that it is OK even if 300 million Chinese are killed. Many will still survive In fact the same argument holds true for India as well so that particular Chinese argument does not hold water for India which also has a history of shrugging off thousands of deaths as par for the course.

More to the point, the Chinese do have a need for maintaining their honor. Part of that is to look down on others and see others weaknesses as adding to their superiority. More than anything else Chinese honor has to be maintained among each other as well - i.e Chinese look for validation and admiration from among their own as well. (Here they differ from Indians who are looking mainly for external validation from firangi peers)

However the Chinese attitude of seeking validation and honor from other Chinese makes them vulnerable to defeat and humiliation. If the risk of defeat and humiliation is high all the bluster and bravado will not amount to much. The 1962 war "to punish India" was one such war. It gave the Chinese lasting pride in themselves and proof that they could look down on India.

But any setback in Indian hands will not be swallowed easily by the Chinese. If war is started by them they will have to be certain to win - or else they will not attempt war only to be humiliated by India. And if they get into war and attempt to win and cannot have their way - they will either have to pour in more and more resources to keep their honor or make it nuclear. If they make it nuclear their world domination plans will get upset. The Chinese have to decide exactly where they think they are going vis a vis India and the world.

So far they have chosen the route of fighting India via their gonorrhea ridden prostitute Pakistan.

[vera_k]

How about this one? The Chinese government continues to be adept at accepting mass murder on a scale most states would shy away from.

Chinese region must conduct 20000 abortions

China victims decry forced late-term abortions